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I. History and Theory of International Relations

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Anca OLTEAN*

Abstract. *Without opting out for a pro/con position concerning the efficiency of the League of Nations especially in the first decade of its existance, we will resume by reminding the article of Raymond Fosdick, The League of Nations is alive asserting that it is now (in 1920) the duty of humanity who choose its path of development, namely to follow the old oder or to implement the new standards in the framework of the new organization (The League of Nations). To choose to act within this organization means, in fact, the ralliation to the unexplored paths of human cooperation and to pursue the creativity in the diplomatic relations, is the opinion of the author.*

Keywords: *League of Nations, diplomacy, First World War, Versailles, international organization*

At the end of the First World War, the great alliated powers search for solutions to come out from the crisis and pursued the establishment of a system of alliances which to lead to the instauration of a collective security system at global scale. At the end of the war, there existed only two solutions to come out from the crisis: either to set some leftist or right wing orrientation regimes which to pursue the unification of the economic vital space of the European continent by means of force and conquest, either the re-organization of the European system by the free and voluntary association of the states of the European continent (Gyemant, 1999: 57). It was opted out initially for the second solution by the creation of an international organization known as the League of Nations, but, as it failed in the promovation of the proposed objectives, the other alternative appeared more pregnant and threatening in the second decade of the interwar period (Brie and Horga, 2009).

The Covenant of the League of Nations, initiative that belonged to a greater extent to the American president Woodrow Wilson, was adopted unanimously by the participants to the Conference of Paris at April 28, 1919. The pact contained initially 26 articles concerning the new organization and it was included in the texts of the treaty from Versailles from June 28, 1919 and, also, in the texts of the treaties from Saint Germain, Neuilly, Trianon and Sevres. The newly created organization had a global character because it included states belonging to the different regions of the world, however by non-participation of USA, Soviet Union and Germany to this organization, its universal character was a lot reduced.

Initially the Covenant of the League of Nations was ratified by 32 states to which it adhered ulteriourly other states. In the same time, it existed also states who left the organization (Germany, Japan, etc).

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The principles consacrated by the Covenant of the League of Nations

Firstly, according to the Covenant, the member states had the obligation to assume the 26 articles of the document, to which there were added the ammendments and ulteriour revisions. The Covenant expressed clearly the character of the League of Nations which was created as an open body, any state being allowed to become member of the organization with the condition that its admission be ratified by two thirds from the members of the Assembly[1]. This opening is reflected also in the fact that any state was allowed to leave the organisation with the condition that the respective state to announce its intention of redrawal from the League with two years in advance. In the same state a state who breaks its obligations could have been, according to the Covenant, excluded from the organization by a vote of the Council.

An important fact to mention is that, in the framework of the League of Nations, the decisions were taken according to the *rule of unanimity*. This is the principle followed by the decisional organisms of the League of Nations: the Council and the Assembly. Still, in what it concerns the Assembly, in the issues regarding the procedural actions, the decisions were taken with the qualified majority (two thirds from the total of votes). This unanimity vote led sometimes to decizional blocking especially in what it concerned the attitude of the League towards the agressive states, being well known that the unanimity, independantly of the circumstances, it is not easy to reach.

The location of the League of Nations was established according to the Covenant of the League of Nations to Geneve, existing the possibility to be changed with the League of Nations' Council's consent.

Because the fundamental aims of the League were the prezervation of the world' s peace and to stop the agressionist actions and that any problem that might have endangered the international security (independantly that the involved states were or not part of the League) was the subject of the debates in the Council and the Assembly, it is important to see which was the attitude of the organization in the issue of dezarmation and of aggression, in general.

Concerning the dezarmation, at least in theory, the Covenant of the League of Nations consacrated the principle of reducing the armaments of the member states, the Council following to create dezarmationn plans according to the geographical position and the condition of each member state. In the same time, the manufacturing by private actions of arms and munitions was condemned by the Pact. In reality, the principle of dezarmation was not applied, on the contrary some states increased their armaments (the case of Germany).

In what concerns the aggressivity of certain states in international relations system, this is also condamned by the Covenant of the League of Nations. When a state member of the League of Nations is agressed, it is the competence of the council to take the necessary measures[2]. In the cases of the conflicts between certain member states it is recommended the arbitrage of the Council and the creation of the International Court of Justice was designated to bring the judicial solutionning of the divergences, the pronounced sentences of the court being final. In the same time, the members of the League are oblidged not to use the means of the war in the bilateral relations. A state that infridges the provisions of the Covenant will be subjected to some sanctions that came from the other states which will lead to the break of international and economic relations with the respective state, but also of the relations between

[1] "The Covenant of the League of Nations", art. 2, accessed May 28, 2018, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv13/ch10subch1

[2] *Ibidem* (art.11).

their citizens and the citizens of the state who infridged the rules of the Covenant. The armed intervention was also recommended. In reality, these sanctions were not applied efficiently in the cases of aggression (the atack of Italy on Abissinia (Etiopia) or the attack of Japan on Manciuria).

The institutions of the League of Nations

The main institutions of the League of Nations as they were set by the article 2 of the Covenant of the League of Nations are the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat. Since 1922, to this institutions was added an International Court of Justice.

Concerning the Assembly, initially it was intended the creation of a deliberative forum, convocated without periodicity, formed from the representatives of the national Parliaments, but also of the public opinion. The italiens sustained an organization in which the decisions to be taken with two thirds of the votes (Gyemant, 1999: 66). Finally, it was achieved following the scheme presented below. The assembly was a forum that included representatives of the members of the League, not more that three for each state who are benefitting from a single vote. It is lead by a president and by six vice-presidents. It names permanent committees in which the member states are represented. It is gathered at the periodical intervals, existing as a rule an annual session which is developed in September, in Geneve to which it can be added also extraordinary sessions in special situations. The first gathering of the Assembly was convocated by the president of the United States and took place in Geneve during November 15-December 18, 1920. The decisions are taken with the unanimity of votes (in most of the cases) or with a qualified majority (in the issues of procedure as, for instance, the admission of a new member state). An important attribution of the Assembly was the fact that it ensured the financial management of the League of Nations. The competences of the Assembly are extended on all international problems which affected the peace of the world. In the framework of the Assembly, there were voted resolutions or recommendations. Also, the Assembly chooses non-permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations and the judges who work for the International Court of Justice. With the consent of the Council and with a qualified majority in Assembly there can be brought amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations. Another attribution of the Assembly is to advice the members of the League to reconsider the treaties which became unappliable and to determine the international conditions of whose perpetuation can be endangered the peace of the world[3].

In what concerns the Council of the League of Nations, it was composed of five permanent members, being finally reduced to four as a consequence of the redrawal of United States (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan) and from four non-permanent members (which became 6 from 1922 and 9 from 1926). The non-permanent members were elected one by one by the Assembly and they exerted a temporary mandate. The president of the Council was designated by rotation and its meetings took place at least once a year. The reunions of the Council had to take place at the location of the organization of the League of Nations (Geneve) or in another place, but it must have been established previously their organization. Among the non-permanent members of the Council there were Belgium, Brasil, Spain and Greece.

Each member of the Council had a vote and a representative. When a problem concerned directly a member of the League who is not represented in the Council, this can send a representative to the gatherings of the Council (Baptiste Duroselle, 1993: 59). The

[3] *The Covenant of the League of Nations,* art. 19.

first reunion of the Council was convocated by the president of the United States of America. The modality of adoptation of the decisions in the Council is the rule of unanimity. Concerning the attributions of the Council of the League of Nations, they were extended on all questions that regard the peace of the world. The council designates the main functionnaries of the Secretariat and formulated plans for the dezarmation. In the case of conflicts, the Council recommends measures of military and naval nature which must have led to the defeat of the agressor. The Council receives the annual reports of the mandatory powers (that had the task to exert their authority under the form of mandates in the lost colonies of Germany in Africa). The council decides in unanimity that if the Pact must be ammended and it also can invite the governments to the international reunions. With the approval of the Assembly, the Council can name new members of the League. In the attributions of the Council was the task of nomination of the General Secretary of the League of Nations with the approval of the majority of the Assembly. It had special tasks (the nomination of the Commission of governance for the Saar region or of the Higher Comissioner for Danzig). The Council can decide that the location of the League to be moved somewhere else[4].

In case of threat with the war, the Secretary General had to gather the assembly of the Council. In what it concerns the disputes among the member states, any member of the League represented in the Council could publish a declaration in which to express its own vision. The council is the one which recommended to the governments measures of military, naval, aerian nature in the solutionning of the conflicts. By the vote of the Council it can be excluded a member state of the League who infridged its obligations. The council included as part of the expenses of the Secretariat, the expenses of any office or commission found under the surveillance of the League.

The Secretariat was an administrative unit whose personnel was recruted on the basis of the state representation by the virtue of the geographical criteria. Its members were responsable in front of the League, not in front of the state of provenience. The main members were responsable in front of the League, not in front of the state of provenience. The main members of the Secretariat but also the General Secretary are named by the Council. The Secretariat had its residence at the centre of the League of Nations (Geneve). The first general secretary of the League of Nations was Sir James Eric Drummond. The Secretariat prepared the documents and the reports for the Assembly and the Council. The Secretariat coordonated the publication of the documents of the League of Nations in two official languages of the organization, English and French. The Secretary General prepared the dayly order for each session of the Assembly with the Council's consent. The international agreements and treaties are registered at the Secretariat and only after that they enter into vigour.

The international Court of Justice was created in 1922 being initially composed from 11 judges, then from 15 people chosen by the Council and then by the Assembly. During 1922-1934 they were judged in front of the Court, 66 of cases. The expense of the Court was supported by the League of Nations in the manner brought up by the Assembly and with the Council's content. The official language of the sessions of the Court were English and French. The decisions were taken with the consent of the majority of the judges of the Court. The decisions of the Court are final and without right of appeal. The Court's attribution was to judge the disputes and to formulate consultative opinions at the

[4]*The Covenant of the League of Nations*, art. 7.

request of the League. But the member states of the League of Nations could make appeals in front of the Court.

The successes of the League of Nations

The decade of glory of the League of Nations is considered to be the years '20. The achievements of the League happened mainly in this interval and they were possible because of a favourable context generated by the existance of some factors that we will analyze further on.

The war from 1914-1918, the first war of global anvergure imposed at its end a situation of material scarcity, frustration and insecurity. It existed a dream of the national peoples and of their political elites to come back to stability, security, economic prosperity.

The causes that led to the war were firstly the existence of the armaments and of the course of re-inarmation, the alliances and the secret diplomacy and the existence of the souverain states concerned exclusively by the maintenance of their own interests (Bell, 1988: 7-8). In order to avoid a new world conflict they were imposed certain remedies: dezarmation, open diplomacy and the creation of an international organization with the purpose to restrain the possibility of recourse to war and to promote the international law. The last desiderata was fulfilled by the creation of the League of Nations, and the first two necessarry remmedies became foundamental objectives mentioned by the League of Nations Pact[5].

The ideea of creating this organization belonged to Woodrow Wilson who militated very much for this ideal in the context of the peace negociations from Paris-Versailles, and its role could not be neglected, even if finally United States did not adhere to the new organization. For its role played in the sustainance of the League of Nations, Wilson received the Nobel Prize for Peace in the year 1919.

The League of Nations enjoyed the sustenance of the public opinion especially from the states affected by the war who were searching for guarantees that a new war could not be produced. Even later, in 1938, in Great Britain, the League of Nations was enjoying a large soutenance. The British editor of the journal "Times" wrote that the British people is the most favourable to the League of Nations from the entire world (Bell, 1988: 103).

If the socialists from France, the labourists from Great Britain or the communists from Soviet Union were reticent in what concerns the new organization on the ground that it would be a manifestation of capitalist imperialism, slowly they were admirative with regard to the innitiatives of the League with the view of dezarmation, fact desired by them, and offered slowly to the League their agreement. The conservators from the Great Britain, reserved with regard to the new organization and partisans (some of them) of the old diplomacy, did not afford to sustain the League, this especially from electoral reasons because of the fact that the majority of the population of Great Britain was favourable to the League. By the acceptance of Germany in the League of Nations (1926) and of USSR (1934), the League lost its quality of League of "the victors".

In this sense, we can stop on an article published in 1920 by Raymond B. Fosdick entitled "The League of Nations is alive"[6]. The author writes about the large participation

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[5] *The Covenant of the League of Nations,*
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv13/ch10subch1

[6] Raymond B. Fosdick. "The League of Nations is alive", Accesed May, 28, 2018.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1920/06/the-league-of-nations-is-alive/515550/

of the states to the new organization (all the neutral states in the time of the war, all the alliated powers from the time of the war-especially USA-, all the countries from Southern America- excepting Ecuador). It was expecting that some states such as Romania, Russia, Germany, Portugal, China, Japan to become members soon.

From this article it results the positive role of the League justified by the concrete actions of the organization until 1920. Such positive actions were: the take-over by the comissars of the League of the control of Danzig and Saar basin; the endevours pursued in order to create the International Court of Justice; the support of the League of Nations to the International Organization of Work; the registration of the treaties and documents at the Secretariat of the League this “marking the end of bad days of the secret diplomacy”; the constitution of some groups in the framewok of the specialized domains in the framework of the League such as the problem of the mandates of different colonies; in the issue of international cooperation in order to combat the traffic of opium; in the domain of information on all political events of the world; the activity of the League of Nations in the field of health protection (in concrete terms they were organized projects for the constitution of an International Office of the Health preservation; the involvment of the League in the resolvation of economic problems of the post–First World War world (it was created an economic section involved in the global study of coal, production, markets and the movement of raw ressources; in February 1920, at a meeting of the Council it was fixed the organization of an international conference for the study of the financial crises and for searching means for its remmediation; also, in the domain of economic affaires, the author mentions the intention of the League to militate for the extent of the credits for the poor countries from Europe).

The author appreciates also the politics of the League for dezarmation and of ensurance of the collective security. Also, he makes a clear distinction between the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, seeing in this organization an institution deeply charitable and generous, asserting that the role of the organization was to find remedies to keep a world in function (motion). In reality, one could not underestimate the interests of the victorious allies, as much as they were permanent members of the Council and, thus, they had a hard word to say in the activity of the League.

The League of Nations was an organization open to all the states that pursued to implement the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of its ulteriour amendments. Among the written documents of the organization (firstly the Covenant of the League of Nation) were revealed some principles of international law which they had to undertake all the member states. Moreover, the League could interwine also in conflicts in which they were not involved the member states, but which threatened the international peace prezervation system. The internal law of the member states in the matters of internal politics was not influenced accordingly.

The concept of international law was developed in the framework of the League of Nations also by the acceptation of the authority of some institutions of the League of Nations by the member states: the Assembly, the Council, the Secretariate (article 2 of the Covenant), the Court of Justice (article 12) of the Covenant of the League of Nations[7].

[7] *The Covenant of the League of Nations*, art. 2 and 12.

The protocole of the League of Nations concerning the pacific reglementation of the international disputes defines the international agression in the article 10[8], asserting that the states can be named agressors when:

-refuse to submit to the procedure of pacificatory solutionning of the conflicts according to the articles 13 and 15 of the Protocole and of the present protocole;

-refuse to take into consideration an unanimous report of the Council, a judicial sentence or a decision who declared that the dispute between the respective state and another state is exclusively of internal competence of the other state;

-they ignore the provisional measures for the interval in which the problem is analized by the organisms of the League of Nations.

Besides the definition of the agressor, this new concept of international law established in the framework of the League of Nations tried to impose modalities of solutionning of international conflicts (arbitration, judicial decisions, consultation of the Council)[9]. In case of failure the next step is the sanctionning of the agressor state (article 16, Covenant of the League of Nations – the forbiddance of the trade with the respective state, of the ties between the citizens of the member states of the League of Nations with the agressor state)[10], but also the helping of the prejudiced state by granting the assistance (raw materials, provisions of any kind, credit, transport, transit)[11].

This international law has on its base "the open diplomacy"[12] and the equality of all states in the relation with the norms imposed by it. And also a great state can be considered as agressor and it can be applied for it the sanctions imposed above.

In the same time, it can be made a step towards the protection of human rights. The protection of the minorities (ethnical, linguistic, religious), the granting of help to the refugees, the forbiddance of the traffic with slaves, women and children and the fixation of the adequate conditions of work are only a few from the concerns of the League.

At least from a teoretical point of view, the norms of international law promoted in the framework of the League of Nations meant a step forward in the domain of the development of international relations, even if, in reality, the interests of the great powers made that these generous principles not to prevail allways.

The dezarmation was the one of the main objectives imposed by the League of Nations. Its application in practice was considered as a measure to make the war less probable. Even if finally, this deziderata did not succeed, the efforts in this sense must not be left aside.

The dezarmation was not brought forward for the first time in 1918. The problem of the limitation of arms from a qualitative and quantitative point of view, was imposed for the first time at the Conferences from Hague (1899 and 1907). This efforts were not successfull and the problem was brought into discussion at the end of First World War by the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Conference from Washington (1921-1922) and the naval Conference from London (1930) had as purpose the limitation of naval armaments. Even the Royal Navy of

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[8] *2 October, 1920/* "The League of Nations Protocole for Pacific Settlement of International disputes", art.10. Accessed May 28, 2018. Accessed May 28, 2018. http://www.lib.byu.edu/rdh/wwi/1918/pacific.html

[9] *The Covenant of the League of Nations,* art.12,...

[10] *Ibidem.*

[11] 2 October, 1920/ *The League of Nations Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, ...*

[12] *The Covenant of the League of Nations....*

England, the symbol of the British power, was subjected to some agreements of dezarmation. The conference for dezarmation from Geneve (1932-1934) failed because the redrawal of Germany, and the points of view of France and England were against the increase of the armaments. There existed voices of the French socialists who suggested the unilateral dezarmation of France, believing that by this policy Germany will be determined also herself to inarmate.

The ideea of desarmation was sustained also from economic arguements, even in the period of relative prosperity at the end of the years 1920, both in France, but also in Great Britain, limitating thus the budget for inarmation. This limitation was more severely in the years of the economic crises (1929-1933).

The lack of interest for the army issues is revealed by the fact that in the European state, the military service was a lot reduced. If we take the example of France, immediately after 1918, the military service was of 3 years, being reduced in 1921 at two years, in 1923 at 18 months and in 1928 at one year (Bell, 1988: 166).

When the situation in Europe became more tensioned (after 1936), the majority of the European states increase their funds granted to the defense and the duration of military compulsory service.

The article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations entrusted to the League the responsability of governing of the peoples who lived in the former German colonies (at least Kiaochow) and of the territories from the former Ottoman Empire from the Arabic Peninsula. The League could delegate some advanced nations to act as administrators of these territories under the means of mandates. There existed three types of mandates (A, B, C) (Baptiste Duroselle, 1993: 54) in function of the political development level of the colonies, of their geographical position, of their economic and social position. The mandates of C and B types were granted exclusively to the four winning states from the Conference of Peace from Paris, and the mandates of type A were granted in a special conference in San Remo (April, 1920).

Mandates of type A: were including diverse countries from the former Ottoman Empire which were capable of self administration and had to be subjected to a chosen power according to their will, while them are getting their full independance.

Mandates of type B: were including Afrikan countries incapable of self administration. They had to be shared between the mandatary powers with a few restrictions with military character and following the principle of commercial equality.

Mandates of type C: were including the countries from South Western Afrika and a few isles from Pacific with a population reduced or dispersed, being able to be administrated by the mandatory power according to their own laws as an integrant part of their territory.

After the distribution of the mandates, the South-West of Afrika was granted to the South-Afrikan Union, France and England were sharing Togo and Cameroon, France received also a part from French Ecuatorial Afrika, territory that it ceased to Germany in 1911. The German West Afrika was granted to UK for administration, Belgium received Ruanda-Urundi, territory situated in Eastern Afrika, and Portugal received Kongo.

In Oceanie, Australia received the German part of the isle New Guineea, New Zeeland received the isle Samoa, and Great Britain received the isle Nauru.

At the North of Ecuador, Japan received for administration the isle Marianne, Caroline, Marshall, Palaos.

These mandatory states did not exert total sovereignty in the administered territory and were oblidged to present an annual report in front of the League of Nations. In order to see better how they were administered these colonies, we will analyse the provisions of the British mandates for German Eastern Afrika and for Palestine.

The British mandate for German Eastern Afrika[13]

(case study)

According to this mandate, the mandatory power was obliged to form a Commission who had as task to grant the boundaries between the Portuguese possessions from Eastern Afrika and the above mentioned territory.

Among the provision of the treaty, it results a few most important characteristics:

- The mandatory power was responsible in front of the League of Nations for the mandate that governed German Eastern Afrika

It was responsable for the peace, order and good governance of the territory, it had to ensure its moral and material good but also the social progress of the inhabitants (article 3 of the mandate). It had to ensure to the citizens of the member states of the League an equal treatment with the one of the British citizens from German Eastern Afrika (article 7 of the mandate). The mandatory power was responsable in front of the Council of the League of Nations for the administration of this territory and it had to present an annual report in this sense. (article 11 of the mandate)

- The mandatory power had to protect especially the rights of the native inhabitants in German Eastern Afrika

  - For this purpose, the mandatory power committed herself that it would not organize any military autohtonous force or military basis with other purposes than the defence of the territory and for the maintenance of order.
  - The protection of native inhabitants is revealed also in what it concerns the transfer of lands, the article 6 of the mandate stipulating that no land could have been transferred, excepting the transfers between the native inhabitants, only with the consent of the authorities.

The British mandate Palestine[14]

Among the provisions of the mandates it results a few more important characteristics:

- The mandatory power was responsable in front of the League for the way in which Palestine was governed

It had to establish in Palestine a Jewish state and to encourage the Jewish imigration in Palestine. It had the power to lead the external politics of the Palestine and it had to protect the citizens of Palestine both in the interiour of the state but also outside of it. It was responsable by the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Palestine and of the ensurence of the good governance of the country. According to article 14 of the mandate, the mandatory power was oblidged to present an annual report of the Council of the League of Nations in which to show its activity. In the same time, it was oblidged not to discriminate the citizens of the member states of the League of Nations found on the territory of Palestine.

The mandatory power oblidged itself to protect the rights of native inhabitants in Palestine

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[13] The text of the mandate was provided in Consuela Langsam, Walter, *Documents and readings in the history of Europe since 1918*, (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1969), XXV, 90-95.

[14] "The Palestine Mandate", accesssed May 28, 2018 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp

The mandatory power had to ensure the territorial integrity of Palestine, to grant the Jewish citizenship of all Jews who wanted to establish in Palestine, to ensure that all the religious buildings and saint places (including the muslim ones) will be protected.

The mandatory power was oblidged to protect the rights of people both for the foreigners but also for the native inhabitants from Palestine.

It oblidged itself to ensure the liberty of thought and to exert of any kind of cult on the territory of Palestine and to ensure that it wasn't make any discrimination between the inhabitants of Palestine on the basis of race, religion or language.

The mandatory power has full administrative and legislative autority

In spite of all these, it had to take care of the creation of a Jewish agency which to involve in the exercion of the administrative power. The administrative power in cooperation with the Jewish Agency had to have the management of the natural ressources of the country to the extent in which they were not in totality taken over by the administration.

Conclusion

Regarding comparatively these two mandates, we notice that, at least in theory, they plead for the implementation of beneficial intended measures. The provisions are democratic, it was pursued the protection of the rights of the native inhabitants, but also of the foreigners and it was militated for a good management of this territories. The Palestinian mandate contains more provisions concerning religious liberty, maybe because of the interferences of cultures existing here, and, in the same time, we notice, moreover, the involvement of the native inhabitants in the management of the ressources of the country by this Jewish Agency, fact that indicates an advanced degree of development of the local population from Palestine.

The role of the League of Nations in the issue of protection of national minorities

In the context of the fall of the three European empires (the Austrian Empire, the Turkish Empire, The Russian Empire) in Central and Eastern Europe several states were created (so as Romania), they extended their territory, but the fixed boundaries by the peace treaties did not correspond with the ethical boundaries. Thus, in Central and Eastern Europe existed 30 millions of minoritarians.

It was imposed the problem of the protection of their rights, aspect sustained by the president Wilson. The guarantee the rights of minorities was stipulated in the treaties of peace signed with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. The special treaties having as task the protection of minorities were signed by Poland, Romania, Greece, Yougoslavia, Czechoslovakia. The treaty with Czechoslovakia was signed at Saint Germain-en Laye la September 10, 1919, becoming effective at July 16, 1920 and we will bring into discussion as case study.

The treaty signed by Czechoslovakia (1919) for protecting the minorities[15]

Case study

By the article 27 of the treaty of peace signed by the allies with Austria, the Czechoslovakian state oblidged itself to undertake a treaty having in view the protection of the minorities.

[15] The text of the treaty in Consuela Langsam, Walter, *op.cit*, 117-121.

Case study

The present treaty mentions the rights granted to the minorities in Czechoslovakia:

- The Czechoslovakian states undetakes the obligation to ensure full protection of life and liberty of all its inhabitants, independantly of their birthplace, nationality, race, religion
- it ensures to all inhabitants of Czechoslovakia the liberty of thought, faith, religion, with the condition to avoid the immorality or the inconsistancy with the public order.
- To ensure to the minoritarian population the right to the Czechoslovakian citizenship
- It is guaranteed the equality in front of the law, civil and political rights for all the citizens of Czechoslovakian state
- the minorities will be able to use their own language also in front of the Court of Justice and in the localities with a considerable proportion of Czechoslovakian citizens of other ethnie than the Czech one, the state will ensure the instruction of the children in their own language, with the obligativity to teach the Czech language; in these localities a considerable number of minoritarians will be paied an equitable share from the sums resulting from the public fonds of the state.

In the same time, the treaty mentions also the constitution of an autonomous territory in Czechoslovakia, at Southern Carpathians –the Rutenian territory- which had to benefit by a large possibility of self-governance and of a Diet. This territory had to be represented in an equitable way in the Legislative Assembly of Czechoslovakia.

Conclusions

Analyzing these provisions, we notice that there are granted a big number of rights to the minoritarian population and that these are democratic and even regarded from the perspective of our actual world.

The League of Nations is invited following to this treaty to formulate its opinions regarding the respectation of the above mentioned rights in Czechoslovakia. In spite of the policy of protection of minorities, there existed in Central and Eastern Europe revisionist powers (Germany, Hungary), discontented by the fact that the citizens of the same ethnie were living outside the boundaries of their state.

The role of the League of Nations in supporting the small states from Europe and the successes registrated in the solutionning of the disputes arosed among them

Enjoying a high prestige in the years 1920, the League of Nations offered a framework of affirmation in international relations, for the smaller states. The annual repports of the Assembly, in which all the members states were represented, allowed also to the smaller states to play an active role in the diplomacy of the world, opportunity used with success by Benes and from the side of Czechoslovakia, Branting of the Sweden side, Hymans from the side of Belgium and Nicolae Titulescu from the side of Romania.

It was succeeded the annihilation of some conflicts appeared between the smaller states from Europe. In 1926, the Council succeeded the solutionning of some border incidents between Bulgaria and Greece who could lead to war. It was tried, in the same time, also the appeasement of the conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia for ducate of Teschen. It belonged previously to 1918 to Austria-Hungary and it was inhabited in proportion of 55% by Polish people, 27% Czechs and 18% Germans. In 1920, the Conference from Spa settled this dispute granting the city of Teschen to Poland, and a part from the ducate Teschen to Czechoslovakia. The parts involved were not content but the conflict was somehow appeased. In the same time, by British mediation it was achieved the dismanteling of the conflict between Greece and Italy who occupied in 1923 the isle Corfu.

There were concluded treaties of friendship and non-agression between states such as the one signed in Tirana, in 1926, between Italia and Albania[16] which, by the virtue of the ralliation of the League of Nations oblidged themselves to sustain reciprocally and not to make alliances with states who would prejudice the situation of some of them. They were oblidged to ask for the arbitration of the League of Nations in case of a dispute appeared between them. Signed for five years, the agreement did not let to be noticed the future hostilities.

The League of Nations supported the smaller states from Europe and by means of giving them credits, as it was the case of Austria and Hungary.

The role of the League of Nations in establishing a peaceful climate in Europe

The most powerful factor of tension in Western Europe was the problem of the German debts. The Comission had as task the payment of the German reparations and established in 1921 the figure of 132 billions golden marks which had to be payed in three rates. The incapacity of Germany to pay determined France to occupy Ruhr (1923). A positive fact was the dismanteling of this conflict by the acceptation of the American mediation and because of the the plans Young and Dawes.

The symbol of pacification for the years 1920 was the success of the Treaty from Locarno which, besides the guarantee of the French-German frontier and German-Belgian and of the demilitarized zone of Renania, suggested the peaceful acceptation of Germany in the League of Nations, aspect that happened in 1926. It remained memorable the discourse of Aristide Briand, French minister of external affairs, in which he pleaded for the acceptation of Germany in the League. The treaty of Locarno had its limitations, connected with the fact that Germany was not oblidged to guarantee its Eastern frontier.

Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresseman continued to have their plans of Franco-German ralliation and, if in 1929 the economic crises did not errupt, probably the faith of Europe would have taken another course.

In 1928, all the European states (with the exception of USSR) were member of the League of Nations (Bell, 1988: 166). The end of the decade closed promisingly by the signing of the Briand- Kellog Pact at Paris, at August 27, 1928 to which adhered the member states of the League of Nations, but also outside it (USSR, SUA). The article 1 of the Pact was mentioning that the member states condamn the recursion to war for the solutionning of the international controversies and rennounces to it as an instrument of the internationational politics in their relations some with the others[17] and the article 2 was suggesting the solutionning of the conflict only by pacific means.

At the end of the years 1920, the League of Nations was strong, viable and with an active role organism in the international relations. The economic crises deeply affected the interbelic world and starting with 1931 the prestige of the League started to decrease.

[16] *Ibidem.*

[17] "Kellog-Briand Pact 1928", art.1, accessed May 28, 2018, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp.

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ROMANIA IN THE 1970S: THE DETACHMENT FROM MOSCOW AND OPENNESS TOWARDS THE EEC. ASIAN ALTERNATIVES?

Andreea STRETEA*

Abstract. *Amid the economic setbacks inherited from the interwar period, Romania's inclusion into the Soviet Bloc triggered major transformations within its economy, marred by war reparations and forced industrialisation, as it has been investigated through qualitative analyses of literature and primary documents. The economic break-up from the URSS marked the evolutions of Romania in the 1960s and enabled it to seek some degree of closeness to China and, on the other hand, to the West, whilst building a particular model of nationalist communism. The fluctuating relations with Far-East countries failed to prevent the collapse of a regime that became obsolete after the hardships of the 1970s and 1980s.*

Keywords: *Romania, communism, China, USSR, economic development.*

It is our aim in this research to emphasise the situation of the Romanian economy during its Comecon membership, while emphasising the change of perspective adopted by Bucharest towards Moscow and the seeking of possible alternatives in the Asian space. From the methodological standpoint, we have chiefly relied on qualitative analyses of existing literature and documents collected by reputable authors from Romanian and international historiography. Some quantitative data has been included and assessed, in order to show the profile of the Romanian economy, its setbacks and the amount of trade it conducted with important partners such as China during the period envisaged.

At first, it is to be noted that during the interwar period, Romania underwent a state of transition lasting two and a half decades, evolving from a peripheral state marred by the caprices of empires to a national unitary state, seeking and, to some extent, achieving synchronisation with Europe's pace of development. Especially when compared to its immediate neighbours, Romania's accomplishments in this respect were noteworthy (Păun, 2009).

How was this possible in the aftermath of the Great War? The set of favourable historical conditions at the time engendered a unique framework for the country (Madgearu, 1995: 9-22), in stark contrast to the inconclusive steps taken towards sustainable development later, under the auspices of socialist construction. Stemming exclusively from outside its borders, the new system was burdened by ideological mimicry, artificially imposed by the Soviet Union, along with a troublesome set of institutions and procedures. The country manifested itself by overstating its capacity of expression, and not just its economic one. Set against this background, political purposes led to a violation of numerous principles of development, which gave rise to severe socio-economic consequences.

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Trapped inside a damaging logic of macro-cyclicity, the Romanian economy faced major regression, amid an array of economic, social and political factors, both endogenous and exogenous, either objective or subjective. This was translated into extensive development forcefully induced by political decisions, totally deprived of the ability to shape areas of intensive development throughout the communist period and, eventually, leading to the demise of the regime, in 1989.

Romania's economic relations with the USSR and countries within Comecon amid its extensive economic development

Romania's 2,5 billion dollars' effort on the anti-Nazi front alone, during the Second World War (calculated for the year of reference 1938) (Mureșan, 1995: 74), turned into a disproportionate burden on the country rich in resources. To this, one should add the significant territorial losses and reparations owed to the Soviet Union, the latter accounting for 300 million dollars, or more than half the country's income in 1945 (Mureșan, 1995: 76). This triggered a dramatic fall of GDP/capita, which halved compared to the interwar period (Mureșan, 1995: 10-16).

In spite of the growth of the Romanian economy in the period 1950-1973, in keeping with the evolution of those of the communist bloc, whose average GDP increase amounted to 4,86% at the time (Murgescu, 2010), the degradation of the former did not cease to manifest itself, along with the standard of living of its population. Sovietisation took several shapes and was initiated by the agrarian reform of 1945, then pursued through the monetary reforms of 1947 and 1952, along with the nationalisation of the most important forms of industrial capital, in 1948. According to the 1947 census, 87,42% of Romanian enterprises belonged to the private sector, compared to 12,58% from the public sector. Moreover, the state employed merely 33,5% of the total working population. The following year, as a consequence of the nationalisation policy, affecting 8849 companies, these figures would change, to the extent that the state was now employing 76% of the industrial labour force, 77% of that in transport, 80% of workers in the wood industry and 85% of those in food production. Also, the machinery now owned by the state amounted to 80% of the total in the energy industry, 58% in extraction and 80% in manufacturing (Făgărășan, 2004: 52-53). Foreign trade was completely taken over by the state, while forced collectivisation was taking a big toll on agricultural outputs. This, combined with a rationalised import strategy, meant that while private consumption was neglected, all the focus lay on production.

Such were the beginnings of an economic system that created a break with the historical tradition of a country that had experienced a remarkable course of modernisation from 1866 to 1939. Extensive by nature, with a Stalinist basis in the first years after the Second World War and with bilateral ties solely dictated by the controlling foreign power, this was a system that, according to many, endured even beyond the existence of the socialist system, up to the mid-1990s.

In fact, the creation of Comecon in 1949 came as a response to the Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program, an American initiative meant to provide support for reconstruction to Western Europe in the amount of 13 billion dollars, or ten times as much in current prices. The objectives pursued by the Americans between 1948 and 1952 included the rebuilding of war-torn regions, removal of trade barriers, modernisation of industry, reestablishment of prosperity and, not least, containment of communism. While the Marshall Plan was designed for capitalist economies, the Comecon had, as its founding members, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, with the latter assuming its leadership among its satellites. Later, Albania, East Germany, Mongolia, Cuba and DPR Vietnam joined the union. According to Mureșan (2007), communist countries were essentially wrong to join Comecon, given their ambitions for sovereignty, and Romania was no exception. The achievements of the organisation were rather slow and chiefly pertained to commerce, despite its much broader goals, encompassing cooperation in such fields as industry, agriculture, science and technology, transport and finance. Moreover, trade within the block mostly relied on barter, making the need for foreign currency experienced by the member states unfulfilled.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Comecon countries accounted for about three quarters of all of Romania's foreign trade (Popa, 2003: 91-100). However, 1965 witnessed a revamping of the country's commercial priorities, which would eventually lead to a decrease in this amount, from 64,9% that very year to 42% in 1979. This evolution tilted the balance in favour of western and developing countries, and after 1979, there followed a decade in which communist countries showed growing reluctance to Comecon integration. While the framework of Comecon provided for relatively steady economic development in the 1960s-1970s, towards the end of that period, there would be various setbacks in the socialist model of labour division. Swift technological progress, notably in the area of computer science, was hardly compatible with the centralist planning of the Soviet model.

The first economic break with the Soviet Union occurred at the beginning of the 1960s, engendering a process of economic endogenesis with long-lasting consequences. It revolved around Romania's rejection of the Valev Plan, meant to divide Comecon countries into predominantly agricultural ones (south of Hungary) and predominantly industrial ones (to the north). According to the plan, East Germany and Czechoslovakia were supposed to pursue their industrialisation process, while less developed countries, like Romania and Bulgaria, were due to abandon industrialisation to the profit of agriculture. As Romania was ridding itself of the obedience towards Moscow and building a model of nationalist-communism (Murgescu, 1964), not only did it oppose the Plan, but it proceeded to a forceful industrialisation process, essentially extensive, chiefly relying on its own resources.[1] Meanwhile, the quest for independence prompted the Romanian government to support the Chinese drive to contest Soviet supremacy in the communist bloc, as of 1964. This would bring Romania and China closer from numerous standpoints and have important consequences on the former's economy.

It was the beginning of Nicolae Ceaușescu's regime in 1965 that prompted a series of political changes that would have an echo in economic policy, set against the background of the so-called national communism, i.e. an unusual degree of economic independence for that time, with some touches of autarky, driven by overstated security reasons. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej's successor intensified his efforts to reduce the country's reliance on the Soviet Union and improve economic ties with the West. Ceaușescu also took advantage of USSR's dispute with China in order to remove Russian tutelage over its economy. After 1968, Romania acquired considerable political support on the part of the West, as a reward for its opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile,

[1] In 1963, 48,1% of Romania's national income came from industry, while the input of agriculture had already fallen to below 30%. This evolution was doubled by a favourable international context, which, after the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, led to even more openness towards the markets of more developed countries. On the other hand, a shift in paradigm was lurking, whose first trigger was the 1973 oil crisis that revealed the weakness of the national petrochemical industry, enslaved by the preferential agreements granted to Iraq and Iran and with two thirds of its refining capacity paralysed by a virtual Soviet embargo.

Romania's actions meant to fight against supranational planning led to the adoption, in July 1971, of the "Complex Programme for the Further Deepening and Perfecting of Cooperation and Development of Socialist Economic Integration of Member States", during the 25th Session of Comecon.

Furthermore, amid the international balance of power of the beginning of the 1970's, Romania became the first communist bloc country to join GATT, in 1971, followed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund, in 1972. In 1973, it was granted the Community Commercial Preferences by the EC in 1973 and the Most favoured nation clause of the US in 1975. This enabled Romania to engage in a comprehensive technological revamping, which was inevitably accompanied by increased foreign debt, whose burden became evident in the late-1970s and would trigger the next major stage in the country's economic orientation.

Romania's relative detachment from the USSR and Comecon and its refusal to permit manoeuvres by Warsaw Pact troops on its territory (still, overall, too benign to prompt a military intervention on the part of Moscow) occurred by taking advantage of the economic opportunities provided by the West and the ideological support sought in Asia, chiefly China, at the same time as the internal development of an extremely serious phenomenon for Romanian society, namely a return to what some refer to as "neo-Stalinism". China, amid its "Cultural Revolution", and North Korea, with its personality cult, damaging to any shred of democratic values or competitive spirit, became the archetypes for Romania's political stance over the following years. It was also a time of wasteful investments such as the Danube-Black Sea Canal, the People's House, as well as urban and peri-urban systematisation (Maniu, 2011: 479-494).

While Ceaușescu appeared to have an independent attitude to the Warsaw Pact, this is debatable, as shown by Dennis Deletant, who, having studied Romanian military archives, casts some doubt on this belief (Deletant, 2007: 495-507). While Ceaușescu is largely thought to have refused to join the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Deletant finds that he had never actually been formally invited to do so, despite the fact that afterwards, the Soviet Union did push Romania to comply with the Pact.

Ceaușescu's anachronic adhesion to Stalinism manifested itself in the Theses of July 1971, having a detrimental effect on the national economy and prompting the withdrawal of western financial support, as well as of the trade advantages the West had granted Romania in the past. The Theses followed Ceaușescu's visits to China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia and are clearly inspired by local models. They included 17 propositions regarding, *inter alia*, the constant increase of the role of the Party in state leadership, major construction projects conducted with patriotic labour, more ideological education at all levels, as well as additional media propaganda – all of which were used to frustrate dissidence and further enslave society.

It is in this context that Ceaușescu had little choice but to turn to Moscow in the 1980s in order to keep the economy running, which was a reluctant act, given the former separation from the USSR, but also in the light of Gorbachev's reforms, promoting reconstruction and transparency (*glasnost* and *perestroika*) – two concepts that were abhorred by the Romanian leader.

Even in this last decade of communism, China remained Romania's prominent economic partner, given the tight political, trade and diplomatic relations conducted with it. For the Chinese, this partnership was a window of opportunity in an area where their influence was being thwarted, and would grant them a certain bridgehead to the West. Whilst Albania, China's other European ally, was too feeble to act, Romania showed the potential to uphold Chinese interests in international socialist conferences and within the United Nations.

Albeit *per se* neutral in the conflict between the Soviet Union and China, Romania thus favoured the latter and the two countries supported each other in international trade and cooperation. Also, China was the utmost contributor to the aid provided to Romania as a response to the great floods of 1970, after which, in 1971, it granted Romania a loan worth 250 million dollars. In 1978, trade between Romania and China amounted to 3,6 billion dollars, divided into roughly equal shares between imports and exports (Bărbieru, 2015: 39-47).

Furthermore, Ceaușescu's visit to China in May 1978 led to the signing of a treaty on economic and technological cooperation over a ten-year time span, with provisions on weapons manufacturing. This enabled the government in Bucharest to send several delegations to Beijing in the period to come, which engendered various commercial agreements.

After 1978, China's economic growth transformed it into a prominent actor among industrialised nations, which is less than we can say for Romania, a contrast that led to a decrease in the intensity of bilateral relations (Russu, Buleagă, 2009: 49-50). As China's dialogue with the West intensified, the need for an intermediary in the guise of Romania also gradually faded, as it becomes apparent by analysing the speeches of Premier Chou En Lai. In 1966, as Brezhnev advocated for more unity and cohesion in the socialist bloc, Chou En Lai stated, during a visit to Romania, that "the Chinese people strongly support your fair fight". However, in 1971, the same Chou En Lai would allegorically say that "distant water will not quench a fire nearby"[2], a proverb signalling a weakening of Chinese-Romanian ties.

To conclude, Romania's foreign policy within the Soviet bloc is very well summarised by Abraham (2017), who follows its shift during Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej's time, from that of a satellite-state to "heresy", while during Ceaușescu's rule, it turned from autonomy to ostracization. Eventually, the form of economic self-sufficiency embraced by Ceaușescu caused massive delays to Romania's technological development and worsened the standard of living of its people. The turn towards Asia proved to be short-lived, sinuous and less productive than it had originally been foreseen by communist decision-makers in Bucharest, with China seeking to attain its major political goals in the international arena, to the detriment of the modest economic ties it could cultivate with a country such as Romania. The results of the policy implemented by the Romanian communist regime, culminating with the deprivation and shortages of its last decade, became apparent in 1989.

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PROPAGANDA AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY THROUGH TRANSLATION IN COMMUNIST ROMANIA. A CASE IN POINT: ROMANIAN REVIEW

Cătălina ILIESCU GHEORGHIU*

Abstract. *Some authors understand paradiplomacy, classified by Kuznetsov (2015) into eleven major domains, as the participation of non-central governments in International Relations through networking (permanent, or ad-hoc) with public or private entities to promote socioeconomic or cultural development (Cornago Prieto, 2000). Cultural diplomacy has been, and still is, an essential tool not only in its international dimension, but also as a decisive device in domestic projection (labelled by some scholars "intermestic affairs").*

In this paper I will bring into discussion a cultural product based entirely on translations and intended as a propaganda tool during the communist era in twentieth century Romania.

Keywords: *paradiplomacy; propaganda; thème translation; Romanian Review.*

1. Introduction

The Romanian Cultural Institute (a state-funded institution, subordinate to the Ministry of Culture) was founded in 2003 and was designed to "raise the profile of Romanian culture around the world." A merger of the Cultural and Publishing Foundations, both dating from 1992, the Institute had predecessors in the communist regime. At present, its nature and goals are complemented by such programs as the funding of the translation and publication of Romanian literary works abroad. But how was this cultural diplomacy performed during the Cold War? A case in point is Romanian Review, a cultural product consisting entirely of thème translations and intended for distribution abroad as a propaganda instrument. An ancestor of this journal appeared for the first time in 1861 as a contribution to the normalization of the Romanian language, but the collection I delved into started its trajectory in 1946, when the monarchy was replaced by a People's Republic.

The term "paradiplomacy", coined by Soldatos in late eighties was also referred to as "micro-diplomacy" by Duchacek or "parallel diplomacy", "foreign policy of non-central governments" and "pluri-national diplomacy" by Aldecoa in the late nineties. These definitions often enclosed the conflictual nature of the notion (between central and non-central governments), but paradiplomacy is an essential concept also for the analysis of changes occurred in modern states during the last decades. The end of the Cold War triggered the acceleration of the integration process in Europe. The decentralization of power in Russia and the requirements of the EU fostered cross-border cooperation among regional governments in Europe and Eurasia and regional networks emerged.

In the new millennium, with the rise of Chinese economy, scholarship assumed that paradiplomacy was possible even in non-democratic countries, which contradicted a

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previous assumption (federalism was not real in countries like USSR on grounds of the inexistent power sharing). According to Kuznetsov, democratization and decentralization of the USSR in the nineties gave way to paradiplomatic action, while in the 2000s, under Putin's leadership, regions' performance in international affairs decreased and with it, the academic research in the field. Examples of the past started with Stalin's Soviet Constitution of 1936, amended in 1944 granting the Union's Republics extraordinary competencies in international relations and defence policy, making USSR seem one of the most advanced countries in paradiplomatic terms. Nevertheless, the Soviet model was based on the supremacy of the Communist Party, bureaucratic and highly centralized, hence the incompatibility between the *de jure* and *de facto* situations which shows that paradiplomatic opportunities in the Soviet Union were an illusion. However, both USSR and the countries on the communist side of the iron curtain did practise an intense cultural diplomacy during the cold war. As Lecours and Moreno (2003: 3) show, "cultural defence and promotion tend to be the most important issues of paradiplomacy because they are central to its underlying force, nationalism." This assertion is embedded in the post-modern paradigm of nationalism which regards nations as imagined communities rather than objective historical entities. Within this model identities are strongly influenced by discourse ("speaking the nation"), an idea that emerges also from Anderson's theory on nationalism (2016/1983). By analysing social change and transformed consciousness, he delineates the processes by which the nation came to be imagined, modelled, adapted and transformed. In his view (2016: 6) nation is an "imagined political community" because in each member's mind, there is a communion with the rest of members, in spite of the fact they are unknown, in spite of exploitation and inequity because a nation "is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" and translation played a relevant role in the birth of nationalism.

In Pasatoiu's terms (2016: 145) the definition of paradiplomacy would be as follows:

[the] capacity of governments to pursue a foreign policy agenda aggregating trans-sectoral and cross-organisational interests not necessarily within a given jurisdiction but having as reference scale a given territory. Para-diplomacy reflects a foreign policy agenda that is constrained by the state foreign policy and needs to be complementary to that.

This author discards those definitions based on the "parallel" nature of paradiplomacy as external to the operational reach of central authorities, or opposite to the national agenda of foreign policy, or even to statecraft in itself. He rather subscribes the current dualistic dimension of paradiplomacy (international and domestic at the same time), from which some scholars have drawn the label "intermestic affairs" blending both terms.

2. Paradiplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy or Propaganda?

Quite a significant corpus of specialised literature has been written on paradiplomacy since the 1970s, but one of the most complete descriptions is Kuzhetsov's, that classifies the domain into eleven major dimensions: constitutional; federalist; nationalist (envisaging the definition/articulation of regional or group interests by promoting goods based on cultural distinctiveness); the international relations dimension; border dimension, globalization dimension; security dimension; global economy dimension; and finally, the environmental; traditional; and separatist dimensions (struggle for statehood and international recognition).

In this paper I will consider (as some authors do) cultural diplomacy to be a kind of paradiplomatic action, not in terms of regional governments being interlocutors of states, in order to "spread the word" of their narrative, but rather the other way-round, in terms of Eastern European states spreading their cultural propaganda in Western countries through translation (of literary and non- literary texts). They did so via embassies and target country cultural institutions or personalities, during the cold war. In its aftermath, they turned on to own institutions such as the Romanian Cultural Institute, created in 2003. Elsewhere (Iliescu, 2016) I called this mechanism indirect paradiplomatic action. I referred to those actions performed by the state through its institutions with regions or other interlocutors in countries where its diasporas had settled. Such is the case of three Romanian institutions, state-funded, subordinated to three ministries (Culture, Education and Foreign Affairs) that carry out (1) culture management activities; (2) language spreading activities; (3) political-diplomatic activities meant to support the paradiplomatic work of diasporas intended as lobbies. Vertovec (2009: 3) defined this dual activism (geographically distant but politically homeland-oriented) as "transnationalism", and explained it in the following terms:

When referring to sustained linkages and ongoing exchanges among non-state actors based across national borders – business, non-governmental organizations and individuals sharing the same interests (by way of criteria such as religious beliefs, common cultural and geographic origins) – we can differentiate these as "transnational" practices and groups (referring to their links functioning across nation-states). The collective attributes of such connections, their process of formation and maintenance and their wider implications are referred to broadly as "transnationalism".

This author (2009: 78) shows that transnational practices among immigrants are highly diverse between and within groups (whether defined by country of origin, ethnicity, immigration category or any other criteria). The former UN Secretary, Kofi Annan, cited in Vertovec (idem: 158), emphasized the importance of recognizing how migrants can "maintain transnational lives" while Vertovec concludes that:

Transnationally, the politics of homeland can take a variety of forms: exile groups organizing themselves for return, groups lobbying on behalf of a homeland, external offices of political parties, migrant hometown associations, and opposition groups campaigning or planning actions to effect political change in the homeland (idem: 95).

In the case of Romanian diaspora, institutions that early acknowledged the transnational dimension of migrating minorities in the host-land influencing political decisions in the homeland are: *TheRomanian Cultural Institute RCI*; *The Romanian Language Institute RLI* and *The Department of Relations with Romanians Beyond Borders DRRBB,* recently transformed into a Ministry (MRP), hence the importance given by the central government to diasporic populations as economic modifiers and moreover, as public opinion influencers and even possible voters (not only in elections but also in referenda).

The RCI was founded in 2003 aimed to "raise the profile of Romanian culture around the world"[1] as a merge of the Romanian Cultural Foundation and Romanian Cultural Publishing Foundation, both dating from 1992. It is a state-funded institution, subordinated to the Ministry of Culture. In 2007 the RCI joined the EUNIC (European Union National Institutes of Culture), thus being a second level body integrated in the

[1] The RCI enables (through its 16 branches located in capitals and main cities) foreign audiences to experience the products of Romanian culture by organising high-visibility cultural events adapted to suit the tastes of foreign audiences. It has developed close ties with Romanian minorities in neighbouring countries as well as with the Romanian diaspora. The CANTEMIR Programme, launched in 2006, aims foster links between Romanian and foreign artists.

supra-national (first level) structure of the EU[2]. From a paradiplomatic perspective, the RCI has subscribed collaborations with institutions of the so called “third level”, that is universities and regional bodies, as well as non-profit associations (generally made up of Romanian migrants). Thus, RCI’s nature and goals are complemented by specific programmes, such as the one funding the publication of Romanian literary or art works abroad. Although its activity is mainly oriented towards foreign target societies, the branches of RCI are also collaborating with Romanian diaspora, i.e. personalities rooted and appreciated by host society in cultural or academic fields. These individual nuclei together with universities may contribute to a better integration of Romanian immigrants into the receiving society. Thus, cultural diplomacy could be seen as indirect paradiplomatic action with various results: economic exchanges, negotiation on political issues at stake, twinning of cities, European Capital status awarding, etc.

After the fall of the communism, Romania started to settle and develop international relations and to strengthen its cooperation with strategic partners. At the same time, it joined international organizations both of political and economic nature. These efforts to integrate into the international community came both from the central and regional/local levels. The first decades of the 21st century brought new legislation on local public autonomy further modified according to the Council of Europe’s rigours intended to provide real opportunities for cross-border cooperation. Thus, the cultural diplomacy performed by the central government was completed by the cultural paradiplomacy led by regional, local (even municipal) authorities.

According to Kuznetsov (2015), regions can be seen from several perspectives. On the bottom level the term “region” defines meta-entities like Eurasia or Latin America. On the second level, “region” refers to geographically, historically, economically, linguistically or culturally united areas like Eastern Europe (links that go beyond artificial imposed unions like COMECON or Warsaw Pact). On the top of the pattern is the postulation of a “region” as administrative-territorial unit of a state that can be “real” (Bavaria in Germany) or “invented” for research purposes. In Kuznetsov’s opinion, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, some new areas of scholarly interests emerged, such as “post-communist” or “post- soviet” regions. In this sense, he warns that the involvement of the Chinese coastal provinces like Guandong, Shangai or Tianjin in paradiplomacy must be analysed not “as a manifestation of transnational relations tendency in this communist country, but as a sign that the central authority in Beijing is looking for differentiation in their foreign policy”. Cornago (2000) seems to agree and points at the central government’s “zhoubian” diplomatic strategy post-Tienanmen crisis, consisting of “a tool to overcome negative international attitude”. In Cornago’s view, we are not facing a spontaneous tendency on behalf of regions in China, but a programmed manoeuvre on behalf of the central(ist) power.

[2] Collaboration among national institutes of culture based in cities across Europe became formal through the foundation in 1997 of CICEB (Consortium of the National Cultural Institutes of the European Countries in Belgium), a non-profit organisation under Belgian Law. In 2006 it became EUNIC (European Union National Institutes of Culture), now with 32 organisations in 26 countries. This was the first major partnership of cultural institutes aimed at promoting European culture globally and at strengthening relations with countries outside Europe through its over 80 clusters worldwide.

3.A Case in Point: *Romanian Review*

Starting from these observations, I approached a cultural product issued in Romania consisting entirely of thème translations and intended for distribution abroad as a propaganda instrument under the name of *Romanian Review*, between 1946 and 2008. An ancestor of this journal appeared for the first time in 1861 as a contribution to the normalization of the Romanian language, but changed its aims and language in 1946, when the monarchy was replaced by a People's Republic. In 1861 the Romanian language was still not completely normalized in its written form so, one of the purposes of this review (called «for sciences, letters and arts») was to help create a «unitary and literary Romanian language». However, its presence among the periodicals of the time is soon interrupted and it is not until 1924 that the review re-appears with a slightly changed purpose: «a publication of studies, information and research», whereas in 1946 its wider scope is described as: «Rumania' s political, social, economic, literary artistic, scientific life». It is obvious that a clearly intended change of position within the system occurs. After claiming, at the beginning of its existence, a cultural-linguistic aim, the publication later turns into a socio-political one. Romanian Review is first published in English (1946) but soon a French version is issued, conceived as an identical twin of the English volume (same table of contents, same graphical form and cover design, same format and structure).

The first question arising when one starts looking into this collection founded in the 19th Century is what aim such a publication might have pursued when adopting a foreign language shape with no correspondence in the source language since, quite paradoxically, no Romanian version existed of the Romanian Review throughout the years (of its more than half a century existence). One possible explanation is that after 1946, the new post-war government needed some anchorage in traditional values to counter for its image of a direct beneficiary of the coup changing Romania from a monarchy into a "People's Republic". As the editorial board themselves acknowledge at the end of the table of contents in one of the volumes issued in 1946, the review "serves the cause of mutual good-will and understanding among all peoples".

Propaganda has been in terms of Preutu (2017: 449) "one of the essential aspects of the public manifestations of communist regimes, being the main vehicle for the dissemination of communist ideology". She starts from the assumption that propaganda involves not just manipulation but also education, identity moulding and development of societal values. International propaganda in the sixties and early seventies presented Romania as a country looking towards the West in terms of economic relations, a country with certain nationalist tendencies, even distancing itself from the Soviet Union (Preutu, 2017: 452). Romania's relations with the capitalist world extended to cultural relations and exchanges and the export of cultural products led to oscillations in the power's practices and in the relationship with its own society, activating a feeling of national pride. This is confirmed by such statements as Breslașu's (1962) in his article published by *Secolul 20*, a respected journal also based on translations, only of international literature into Romanian. In hyperbolic terms (quite common to this type of propagandistic essays meant to raise national pride), he states that "Romania's growing international prestige is owed to its peace, friendship and collaboration politics among the peoples of the world" and that "great personalities in universal literature sign translations from Romanian authors into languages of international circulation for huge masses of readers worldwide".

Starting from the setting up of the communist regime (1946) and until the anti-communist Revolution in 1989, Romanian Review acquires a profound socio-political character (proved especially by its opening articles) and the message intended to reach its audience throughout this period is a propagandistic one, namely: the Romanian people's socio-economic status is high (as sustained by the articles forming a substantial part of each issue), and high quality cultural manifestations develop (see the literary section of the review) under the communist regime which fosters not only art production, but also its export (as proven by the existence of Romanian Review itself).

An important turning point can be seen in the mid-seventies, as a response to the threshold marked by the year 1971 considered by historians the border between two types of leadership, when a new stage in the history of communist Romania began, an obscurantist period during Ceauşescu's dictatorship known as "the cult of personality", reaching its climax in the decade of the 1980s. As Malița (2016: 54) shows, the secretary general presented his new "theses[3]" through which measures to fortify the ideological control were introduced aimed at "firmly promoting the aesthetic principles of the party". Obviously, Romanian Review could not stand aside from this new wave of propaganda and tried to comply with the requirements but did so in a very ambiguous way, adopting surface changes while preserving quality in literary selection and translation. Thus, the review started increasing the number of politicised articles while reducing literary contributions and introducing speeches, photographs, quotations from and homages to comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu. If we look at the issues in themselves, we find out that in mid and late 1980s, covers start reproducing "committed art", first through abstract works, then straight through images of comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu surrounded by waving flags and happy children like in Maoist imagery. We also see how the portrait of Nicolae Ceauşescu is introduced after the table of contents, reminding us of the Stalinist period. Another striking change in the late eighties was the introduction of texts not related to the content of the issue but adequate to political purposes of the moment. Although fairly extensive, these texts were not always recorded by the table of contents which makes us think of last-minute imposed contributions which editors themselves had no clue about in terms of number or length. However, Malița (2016: 57) believes that "writers stubbornly insisted in making valuable literature" in those years and the "autonomy of the aesthetic principle was not destabilized".

A striking feature of Romanian Review during all these decades is the fact that it does not state the names of the translators permanently working for it who translated the socio-political and historical part of the review, but only the free-lance collaborators' names who translated literary works and undersigned them. No editorial board appeared and no indication regarding the tutelage or the Publishing House was given till mid '80s. Even the name of the editor-in-chief disappeared between 1948 and 1980. However, if in the early 1980s we could find neither the name of the editor in chief nor the body that commissioned the publishing, at the end of the decade, the journal announced its chief editor, tutelary body, editorial staff and translators. Literary texts were commissioned to collaborators, (normally prestigious figures, literature professors) while the rest of the contributions were translated by the permanent team of translators working for Romanian Review. Thus, only literary translations specified the translator's name, which reinforces

[3] the name commonly given to the speeches by Nicolae Ceaușescu in July 1971, in response to a need for ideological legitimisation, delivered before the Executive Committee of the Communist Party under the title: "Proposed measures for the improvement of the political-ideological activity of the Marxist-Leninist education of party members, of all workers". The consequences of these theses were felt much later, after the establishment in 1974 of the territorial agencies of the Council of Socialist Culture and Education.

Malița's idea of an attempt on behalf of the editors to preserve the aesthetic principle's autonomy.

Instead of conclusion

In this paper I tried to pinpoint some of the features I have drawn from a wider study carried out on a cultural propaganda product during the communist regime in Romania, namely a review issued within the country's borders, based on translations and distributed abroad between 1946 and 2008. Starting from the assumption that the boundary between paradiplomacy (as defined by Kusnetzov), cultural diplomacy and propaganda is blurry rather than clearcut, I mentioned some of the policies and institutions that mark Romanian cultural diplomacy nowadays, in accordance with Vertovec's idea of diasporas as paradiplomatic forces. The question arising from this approach was how these actions (if any) were carried out during the cold war. In search of arguments, I approached the case of *Romanian Review* which provided illustrations of a systematic propagandistic activity developed by means of cultural products' export throughout the whole communist period. An intensification of propaganda devices was noticed in the seventies, coinciding with Nicolae Ceaușescu's "theses", but perhaps on a superficial level only, since literary aesthetic values continued to characterize the contents of the review, which would corroborate Malița's idea of a deliberate ambiguity (compliance and resistance) even at the level of publisher decision-makers. However, this is just one aspect of a wider study (in progress) encompassing insights from several angles aimed at providing an accurate and complete outline of a complex, transversal and multifocal issue.

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II. Public Policy and Social Realities

SOCIAL-CULTURAL COMPONENT TO STRENGTHEN THE MOLDOVAN DIASPORA IN TERMS OF DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

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Abstract. *This article addresses a current problem facing the government and Moldovan society, namely changes in the migration process in diaspora communities, both in terms of government policies and in terms of practical implementation of these policies.EU policies encourages the governments to actively pursue their efforts through the United Nations the issue of migration and strengthening the Diaspora to occupy an important place on the international agenda for the human rights of migrants are guaranteed under an international legislative framework and that shared administration migration processes between countries of origin and host countries to contribute to economic and social development. For this motive, in this article the concept of inclusion and migration will be mobilized to analyze the social reality of Moldavians migrants in UE. The second part of this paper is to present the social reality of Moldavians immigrants within the enlarged Europe, specifically by examining the migration experiences, the personal stories and perceptions about then. In order to measure to what extent borders and mobility is affecting immigrants' identity; this paper explores the construction of immigrant identity through the interaction with the host society analyzing social situation*.

Keywords: *diaspora communities, migration's consolidation, policies and strategies for diaspora, development policies.*

Introduction

Throughout history most countries have developed social practices and systems to strengthen its diaspora. Develop policies to strengthen the diaspora have many reasons, some of historical and denotes develop the relationship with the State of origin, other ideological, based on that assumption idea of consolidation and protection of the Diaspora, but also economic in dependence on social-economic development of the society structure data, etc. (Rea, 2008: 128).

This article addresses current themes facing the Moldovan government and society, namely the transformation of the new Moldovan migration process to a new stage: the emergence of diaspora communities. In this respect there is a need to develop development policies addressed the relationship with the Diaspora and the practical implementation of these policies by the Diaspora.

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Some authors consider that development themes about migration usually reflect interests of the state and, as a result, some authors consistently shown migrants in a subordinate position (Abdelmalek, 2000: 191-193). Thus, in this article we propose that aim to develop a different perspective of the concept of strengthening the Diaspora, to analyze the social reality of our emigrants in Moldova. In this sense, we use the concept of migration trajectories, allowing us to observe Moldovan emigrants' subjectivity linked to socio-cultural component to strengthen the Moldovan diaspora.

Current Moldovan migration is approached from the perspective of network configuration and available resources of migrant's migration. These resources can be analyzed as opportunities for economic capital, material resources, cultural capital, information, resources, legal and psychological support. We aimed to examine the socio-cultural component to strengthen the Moldovan diaspora in terms of development policies and speeches addressed to diaspora communities of Moldovan migrants, members of diaspora communities in Europe.

For empirical analysis, reference material appeals to interviews conducted within the institutional project ***"Policies Moldovan diaspora in the context of the Association Agreement with the EU: consolidating the role of the Diaspora in the development of state of origin '***(15.817.06.21F) Moldovan migrants EU.

Theoretical considerations: the notion of migration trajectories

The concept of migration trajectories represented in studies about new waves of migration in the European space (Wrench, 1999: 274), whose main objective is to reflect the diversity and complexity of migration processes and employment of migrants in Europe. European authors studies addressing the situation of migrants who are on different positions, based on statuses, acts available.

So, new migrants in the European space already no longer workers invited, as were the cases after the Second World War, but migrant workers (with residence permit), migrant arriving for family reasons (family reunification) applications for asylum, refugees, persons whose residence situation was settled after arriving in the country and illegal migrants. In this regard, new immigrants, according to the legal status of residence time and conditions of their realization in the host country, crystallized appearance diaspora communities.

In this context, research has pursued three main objectives. First, qualitative data available allow us to emphasize composition and profile of their new diaspora communities . On the other hand, it gives us an opportunity to examine the policies developed by the Government of Moldova aimed at supporting these communities diaspora. Moreover, interviews allow us to understand and explain the migration trajectories, that way of life processes of incorporation into society receivers of migrants, social interactions and cultural society of origin.

Some European authors (Wrench, 1999: 123) analyzed in a new context or career path concept of migration, from the more general notion of professional trajectory proposed by Howard S. Becker. In classical sociology, that term refers to the processes of professional mobility of individuals. From the author's perspective Becker, then taken over by other researchers, involves a development trajectories of status or position, accompanied by a change of perception possibilities in terms of emigrant. Trajectories are subject to the following factors: objective aspects that depend on legal and institutional context and socio-economic; the subjective aspects related to the sense that assigns individuals migration projects; objectives and actions designed to achieve them; concept of success, such as an emigrant design and acting as a motivating force for their intended projects and strategies; changes in social identity, accompanying changes in status; story time and marking the evolution of these trajectories. From this point of view, the migration takes on a new character and identity structuring requires the broadest sense of the term.

Trajectories depend on the skills of migrants, their skills in cross-border mobility and efficiency of their ability to interact with society of origin, and organizational skills in the host society.

In this sense, the concept of the migration path is built around three levels of social reality, depending on the opportunities and restrictions of mobility features actor immigrant and resources through networks and social capital. The first level (micro level) it is based on individual characteristics of migrants. According to author L. Guarnizo, it includes the length of stay in the host country, nationality, marital status, educational level, age and gender (Guarnizo, 2003: 755-782). Other authors also considers important, and that depends on immigrant legal status, but also the employment (Pecoud, 2004: 13-23).

The second level (macro level) is configured around opportunities and limitations, depending on political and legal environment and economic institutional entourage of origin and host countries (Pecoud, 2004: 21). While the first level includes all the laws and institutions that legalizes the status of foreigners, the second principle relates to the labor market and welfare state policies. Of course, these averages evolves migration vary by level of research that can be local, regional, national or supranational / international.

Development of policy development of the Moldovan diaspora.

Since 2013, the first Moldovan authorities include in its action program "European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, Welfare" policy formulation directly addressed the Moldovan diaspora everywhere. These policies try to include the diaspora component main objectives of government and about 48 priority actions of the Government (Government Decision no. 164, 2014).

With the formation of the Office for Relations with Diaspora (BRD) were formulated key strategic objectives that can be divided into two directions: on the one hand, BRD ensure the coherent and comprehensive policy for the Moldovan Diaspora and coordination of policies and programs for diaspora level of government and ministries, and on the other hand develops an ongoing dialogue with the Moldovan diaspora, and more than 248 diaspora organizations (non-governmental associations, initiative groups, cultural centers, research institutes, clubs sports, professional interest groups, etc.) in 35 countries (Government Disposition No. 58, 2013).

So, government through BRD initiate enhanced implementation of programs aimed at meeting the needs of diaspora members and enhance their opportunities, and to the development of Moldova as a satisfactory medium of expression for its citizens and a destination for migrants return.

In this regard, the relevant are over 20 programs in the field of migration and involvement of diasporas to development, implemented by the central government and local support of development partners as part of the Mobility Partnership EU-Moldova being included "Strengthening Diaspora and development "of the International Organization for Migration, UNDP, EU Commission, Swiss Agency for development and Cooperation (SDC), IASCI-NEXUS Moldova, UN Women, ICMPD, etc.

At the same time put a multidimensional approach from public authorities for the extension of international migration and other projects active, therefore being launched the mapping of the institutional mandate of several programs and projects of national and local level.

Complementary was initiated a collaborative project NEXUS, coordinated by IASCI Austria, where it was opened three regional centers in Ungheni, Cahul, Edinet, which helps citizens to achieve their personal goals related to migration - the phase before departure to return - through an integrated platform and market-oriented. NEXUS specialist centers offering specialized, individual assistance and concrete solutions from partners NEXUS "Migrate prepared. Return thanked "the principle of" single window ", where there are answers to all questions related to migration, and access to online services. The centers have initiated a broad collaboration with named individuals responsible for implementing policies for the diaspora in ministries and state agencies for Moldovan citizens have access to information about the preparation of the migration, services provided by government agencies.

We note that, in policy formulation were conducted a number of studies and research on migration and diaspora, for example - Mapping Moldovan Diaspora in 4 countries and the Russian Federation; Research at national households with migrant workers on the project IASCI-NEXUS Moldova; Labor migration and aspects of knowledge and skills in Moldova (NBS ILO) and other relevant studies. Also they are to developing a series of studies carried out with the support of the NEXUS Moldova: "Identifying and strengthening the model of migration and rural development in Moldova", "Study on the legal framework for the international carriage of passengers and parcels", "Development activities Extracurricular for children without parental care "," analysis of the role of the church and other organizations and religious communities in the diaspora - their involvement in socio-cultural diaspora and the country of origin "Migration and local development by UNDP and more other topics of interest serving on the argument policies involve the diaspora in their country of origin (Report the Moldovan government and the Diaspora, 2014).

Another perspective to strengthen the diaspora is the component that is included participatory dialogue open, transparent between the government and the diaspora. In this regard, were involved in the public consultation exponents diaspora, thus ensuring access of Moldovan citizens abroad in decision-making on national strategies in public health, demographic security, family and child protection, youth, culture, science, law on protection of Children at risk, transporting unaccompanied baggage and parcels, e-apostille and other electronic services and many other projects for migrants.

As a result of the consultation process with the Diaspora it was established the working group expanded development strategy Diaspora 2025 is developed the concept Strategy, which sets the general framework for ensuring policy Coherence State on diaspora and implement a common vision of government on diaspora and development. The costs of implementing this strategy were estimated at EUR 3,990 thousand from the state budget and presented in the Action Plan for the years 2016-2018. For this purpose was developed and implemented a platform for identifying problems facing the diaspora and finding solutions to them.

To strengthen the Moldovan diaspora, according to the objectives set out in government programs, it is necessary not only to formulate policies but also the real financial coverage. In this regard, policies and programs for Diaspora and initiatives from the Diaspora have a sustainable and continuous funding through budget subprogram "Support diaspora". Under this sub-program, the state budget was allocated financial resources major: for example in 2013 (November-December) - 1 million lei in 2014 - 3 million lei, the largest sums which were granted ever Moldovan diaspora support for the implementation of activities organized by associations and communities Moldovans abroad, including the centers of culture and mother tongue (Sectorial Strategy Spending on Culture, 2013). Mostly addressed diaspora policy actions are covered by the state budget and the support of development partners.

The government is trying to achieve a number of important activities with impact and positive effect on the development of the Moldovan diaspora and strengthen the connection between Diaspora with the country of origin, as more structured programs, projects of short or long-term, oriented towards increasing the participation of diaspora and citizens regardless of their place of residence. At the moment over 18 concepts were developed for various programs and initiatives targeted at different categories of migrants and diaspora members. Among them mention economic and investment programs for the 41% of migrants and diaspora members interested in starting a business and investment, but also the 70% of migrants who would invest in their locality (study results Nexus, 2012-2013).

A considerable role in the economic programs has Italy diaspora representatives who demonstrate active involvement in various demonstrations and activities of an economic nature. For example, at the initiative of two associations of the Diaspora "Gente Moldava" and "AIFI Nazionale" in Venice in September 2013 was organized Investment Forum Moldovan-Italian "Investment opportunities in Moldova", which aimed to promote exports and Moldovan companies and products competitiveness, attract investment, foreign capital and know-how. The Forum has demonstrated an ability to mobilize the community of Moldovans abroad and cooperation with the Moldovan central public institutions.

And in April 2015 the Moldovan-Italian economic forum in Chisinau, were presented the perspectives of improving business climate in Moldova, where they signed several framework agreements in tourism. Following the Investment Forum held in Venice, Italy, in February 2014 it was organized a delegation of businessmen from Italy. The visit was analyzed investment opportunities of Free Economic Zones (MIEPO, 2014).

Another dimension of policies to strengthen the Moldovan Diaspora constitutes the social programs that are directed diaspora needs social protection, access to health services and social action. In this context we should mention the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between the Patronage BRD SIAS / Christian Workers Movement (MCL) on social assistance and free Moldovan migrants working in Italy. Under the agreement for free use over 300 offices throughout Italy MCL operational for the provision of consular services in the framework of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration "Embassy comes closer to you"; are activities of Diaspora associations (services, consulting citizens, courses, lessons for children, cultural events, etc.); was offered free access to social services for the needy, legal assistance in labor and immigration application and issuing a residence permit (Italian), access to pension rights, employment, cultural, linguistic, and family assistance in tax liabilities for individuals training. In Moldova, with the support of Regina Pacis, MCL diversify their free social services needed by persons who have returned to Moldova.

At the same time it has become a necessity to adjust the concept of health insurance conditions massive presence of the Moldovan diaspora abroad. For example, the year about 10 thousand students studying abroad Moldovans already benefit from free medical insurance policy in Moldova. Also BRD Diaspora informed about the legal provisions on compulsory insurance of health, given the length of stay of citizens in the country over 183 days. There were also requests submitted by CNAS for members of the diaspora who have returned home and purchased medical insurance policy in case of emergencies. Given its mission, BRD will require changing the legal framework for health insurance, especially with reference to Moldovan citizens abroad.

Increasingly common are lately charity carried out by diaspora associations for this with support Bureau were distributed aid collected abroad: clothes, toys, books, medical machinery for persons with disabilities, preparing documents for those who go abroad for medical treatment and prosthetic abroad.

However, the most significant role of the diaspora is to implement cultural programs that are geared to preserve national identity and develop emotional ties with their home country. The best example is the program in which children DOR diaspora can return home and rediscover national values. The program aims to strengthen emotional ties, cultural identity and diaspora youth with their native country. Also, in partnership with the association Jeunes Moldaves (France) has organized ”Gala students from Moldova”. The competition was applied to 205 students and graduates from 21 countries, of which 33 were awarded with diplomas and gifts. This event promotes role models for the younger generation in the country and recognizes excellence in young people in the country who study abroad, with outstanding results in school and exhibit developed civic spirit.

From the perspective of strengthening diaspora, a group of Moldovan students from abroad have initiated Global Mentoring program "MentorMe" dedicated to high school students who want to study abroad. The program consists in discussing personal or virtual mentor, trough connecting with "bud", encourages cooperation within the community and facilitate the transfer of knowledge between generations. Currently this program also extends to young graduates who returned to Moldova and provide support for the plans for education or career guidance, opportunities for personal development, experience and lessons learned from mentors, integration into society of the country chosen for study.

Another topic and public policy tool was the concept development and pilot communities of excellence to stimulate communication, collaboration and involvement of distinguished members of the diaspora and the formation of professional associations. In this regard they were offered a series of consultations and drafted two recommendations as methodological support for the creation of specialized networks (businessmen, teachers, doctors, students, etc.), including promoting the creation of the network of associations of the Moldovan diaspora.

It was initially proposed as a vector for economic excellence piloting communities. According to the concept, these communities are groups of people famous in a certain area, associated formal or informal. Their objective is to create connections, exchange of ideas and opinions, sharing best practices and experiences, participation in joint projects and programs. Thus, were selected specialists and economic experts renowned both abroad and as well as in the country who participated in the consultation together with NEXUS Moldova at Concept Notes targeting economic potential of migration - Market Analysis and Feasibility Study "Migrant Savings and Investment Fund "and" Diaspora Bonds ".

Surely efficient use of financial resources to support activities organized in the Diaspora, BRD has developed so-called "Guide to support cultural projects and educational organized by associations and communities of the Diaspora," which includes an agenda announcements and invitations for all Moldovan associations and communities.

An important component of the guide is to preserve the principle of transparency and equality of all participants in this process.

Moldovan authorities (Government of Moldova, BRD) focuses its efforts on strengthening national identity in the Diaspora, by organizing a series of activities such as: the months of December 2012-October 2013 were made various types of celebrations in the Diaspora, including technical and financial support for 11 cycles of cultural and artistic events (festival "Martisor" Independence Day and Language Day promotion Eurovision, competitions etc.) in over 50 cities in Europe, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, East near the US and Canada.

In 2014, according to the same guidelines, the Government of allocated funds to implement projects initiated by communities / diaspora associations in organizing large events cycles. An opportune time for projects with diaspora has been announced for winter holidays (December 2013 to January 2014), under which activities were supported by over 45 associations from 19 countries, national costumes being shipped, national symbols and objects crafts, and organized a series of cultural events with the participation of artists in the diaspora in Moldova.

Then came spring holidays where they received support from the Government of a number of associations and communities in the Diaspora, they were procuring services and goods sent free of charge in the Diaspora. They were organized dozens of major artistic actions with the participation of artists, painters and craftsmen from Moldova and other cultural activities organized with local talent - adults and children established in those countries.

Support was provided to organize innovative events such as painted eggs Festival in Portugal, Festival peoples of Novosibirsk, the show "The thought of a Summer Night." Under National Holidays we were organized a series of cultural events in the Russian Federation, Germany, Canada and the US were offered goods as books, handicrafts and national symbols for 18 associations and communities of Moldovans abroad.

Another feature of supporting diaspora is the creation of centers of culture and mother tongue, opened in the host countries of migrants for these centers were purchased books and manuals that were to be distributed to the 32 associations of the diaspora who have libraries and organizes various training activities. Thus, during the years 2013-2014, for about 45 associations from 20 countries of the diaspora they have been delivered over 9,000 books and manuals, including donations from the Association of Young Historians of Moldova, Association of European Trainers from Moldova (ANTEM) and publisher Neighborhood.

In the context of European integration was relevant campaign "I bring home Europe" (June-July 2014), the message which focus on promoting European integration of Moldova. For this purpose has been developed communication tool of the campaign by resource internet (Sectorial Strategy Spending on Culture, 2013), where fellow citizens abroad could write those letters home about Europe and Prime Ministers from all EU countries to convince them, under their own examples, that you deserve be supported and promoted to become a full member of the European Union.

On this dimension of activity in the cities with the highest concentration of Moldovans in Italy, Portugal and Greece were held great cultural events, attended by renowned artists from Moldova. A share consolidation was organizing the first Days of Diaspora (28 to 30 August 2014), with informative workshops, cultural activities and the conference "Diaspora economic Moldova", which were presented policy proposals in three priority areas - economics and investments, pensions, infrastructure and energy, developed by experts from the diaspora with representatives of institutions responsible for these areas.

Among other innovative actions was to organize open days throughout the government, scrolling fashion "Diaspora Talks Fashion", which brought together Fashion designers fashion Moldovan diaspora "town Diaspora" for children and adults, the fair projects and "Festival Diaspora".

In conclusion, Diaspora Days are part of an extensive series of events meant to strengthen the relationship and facilitate communication between the government and the Diaspora, but also to mobilize the Diaspora associations and civil society for sustainable development of the country.

No less important is the work of establishing and strengthening relations with associations in the Diaspora. In this regard it has been initiated database development and liaising of about 248 associations and numerous diaspora initiative groups in 35 countries, identifying areas for joint activities, finding solutions to open cultural centers in the Diaspora.

Also, it secured the necessary support in order to bring new associations of the Moldovan diaspora in Spain, France, Denmark, USA. At the request of the representatives of the diaspora associations was assured data collection process for the 3rd edition of the guide "Moldovans in Italy: Guidelines for orientation and social integration of Moldovans in Italy", which was released in early 2014.

Strengthening diaspora in speech perception Moldovan migrants

Strengthening Diaspora is interpreted by interactions with the society of origin ***(subjective dimension)*** and the opportunities available ***(objective dimension)*** and can distinguish four kinds of speeches on the development diaspora between Moldovan migrants. These speeches corresponding to various processes that can be described in terms of reproduction of relations with the country of origin, negative perception and positive perception of diaspora, and opening "strengthening Moldovan diaspora".

The first of these areas are reproductive processes of social relationships and family networks based fundamentally on country of origin. Thus, feasts and holidays Moldovan marks reproduction during migration in the European and allow society to share the rhythms of origin, despite the geographical distance. In this sense, the family unit and established migration networks fulfill a vital role when reproducing inclusion relations with the country of origin.

"*The habits of Moldova observed, we live practically as in Moldova, organize outings in nature, with barbecues, beer festivals do, go to the Russian Orthodox Church*" ***(Female, 44 years)***.

From the perspective of Moldovan migrants, strengthening diaspora be dealt with in terms of reproduction of the social realities of the society of origin. There are cases when Moldovan emigrants demonstrate a lack of belonging to the country of origin, so their environment is perceived lack of inclusion in migration networks. Context of different realities of the country of origin rather be construed as an aggravating does not encourage comprehension of Moldovan immigrants to natives, to the extent that "not all".

From the point of view of Moldovan migrants, failing to speak the language of the recipient state is signaled as a barrier to inclusion and this is due, in large part, element 'between us' in which the Moldovan emigrants affected by longing return. This situation is explained by the feeling of nostalgia that generates a fingerprint on migrants.

"*Neither here nor there ... we are not in any sideways**(Male, 35 years)***". For some diaspora is not a force seemingly identity in the context of migration. Non-participation and lack of time to develop diasporii appears in this case as another obstacle to inclusion in the diaspora, which could include a meeting space with the society of origin in the migration space.

In another case, the Moldovan migrants argue that the opt-out situation is aggravated by the lack of information about events organized by diaspora. The fact they do not have the information necessary to participate in activities diaspora marginalizes them from the process of strengthening Moldovan diaspora.

"*Sometimes we do not know anything about what is organized by the Moldovan ... not out of the events organized by our stay here more than six years*" ***(Female, 50 years old)***.

Often in European metropolitan areas, where European capitals tend to form communities of Moldovan migrants, and tend to look for roommates to be in Moldova through announcements made by our fellow citizens. Such situations highlight the support relationships when sharing private space with people who speak the same language (Dominguez, 2010, 65-79).

On the other hand, some positive state of Moldovan emigrants, are worth inclusion in the Diaspora, as a positive experience. In these cases, diaspora communities contribute to the maintenance of cultural relations for those away from home, having a more positive view diaspora activity. For some immigrants are diaspora communities as places of meetings and help the migration path. In this sense, the diaspora community is perceived in terms of opportunities. Speech is an immigrant from Italy who confesses: "*diaspora members are open people, helps us to maintain a link with what is beautiful home ....* "***(Female, 45).***

In other cases, irresponsibility due to the lack of interaction with Moldovan diaspora is attributed attitude that "removes and critical before knowing" not endeavor to know more closely the activities of diaspora. Opportunities that are presented in the space diaspora be construed meetings not only within but also in terms of promoting national culture in host countries such as the ability to dispose of national social-cultural values. The objective aspects also gains importance when issuing a certain perceptions about strengthening the Diaspora. Regarding links between Europeans Community and Moldovan emigrants are varied: jobs, resting, as performances of popular music, excursions, restaurants, shops crafts and handicrafts offering a demonstration of the country's culture of home receivers within society.

In addition, children born in the EU or arrive at an early age, through their parents often know best national socio-cultural values in the host society. Lastly, inclusion in the Diaspora occurs mostly as a personal matter, that each must settle for himself and is built through personal contacts. According to interviews, to help strengthen diaspora increases with increasing level of study or training who emigrated.

"*Young people do not think to come back and then we need to educate here in a double culture, so was born a new generation, they are intelligent, and they need to learn about our national values ...*" ***(Male 40 years)***.

The perceptions that refer to diaspora role focus on various topics. As institutions of European countries, starting from the policies of the regime of foreigners, which formulates and implements the central government to the services applied by regional governments and municipalities to serve the needs of the immigrant population from a specific exposure (with reference to integration policies) or universal (ie policies on education, employment, etc.).

Regarding the institutions related to the country of origin, they are consulates, embassies, religious establishments they frequent migrants. In speeches migrants mention the role of associations and NGOs operating in the EU in order to facilitate the situation of migrants.

Regarding public services, immigrants are particularly appreciative of social services, integration and training programs, language lessons, as well as financial aid received, even if small, especially in the context of the economic crisis.

When this is occurs contact with migrants, seems more effective coordination between the various entities involved in the implementation of programs such as municipal governments, regional governments and NGOs. In this respect, as you increase the contact, it highlights the positive perception of the institutions. Through contact with migrants institutions are set up relationship with the host society in an exchange of rights and obligations.

While some appreciate the role of public services in European countries, others, on the contrary, it mentions the lack of initiative and poor service received at the embassy or consulate of the country of origin. In most cases migrants critical to the long waiting, waiting lack of space, lack of communication and information update, corruption. Some interviewees interpret their experience at the consulate as one nonhuman. When referring to the plight of the home, there are also reasons that allow us, in large part, to explain the migration, which is related to distrust of socio-economic context of Moldova.

"*At the consulate you go ... you talk through the bars, I send you out to the tail will not allow you to speak, is an indifferent treatment without involvement and assistance*" ***(Female, 31 years)***.

"*To make my ballot, I prefer to go in Moldova than the embassy. Now with biometric passports can travel freely and do not have to go to your embassy to legalize* "(***Female, 41 years***).

Labor associations and NGOs operating in the EU in order to help immigrants is seen as positive, even if sometimes appears to be a difficult task. Moldovan migrant's works recognize that an NGO-s meet when referring to legal assistance to regularize the administrative situation of migrants fragmented activities to promote culture or country of origin. However, leaders' speech associative sphere appears some discrepancy between the Moldovan community's populations, for example, between immigrants and emigrants leading association whose main objective is to work.

An immigrant interviewee highlights the lack of solidarity between Moldovan emigrants, which sometimes leads to loneliness hard to bear. When calling services OF THE diaspora NGOs, migrants values particularly activities for children, including various courses and activities about the country of origin. Generally, meetings and celebrations occur only in private - home to friends at church. In this respect, contact with the public seems relatively limited one, either through municipal and regional access to services or through involvement and participation in the activities of associations and NGOs.

The perception of migration in the Diaspora

Perceptions of diaspora are influenced by the role of institutions, social organizations, migration path conditions, as much as the perception of migration. In this regard, the discourse these people about various perspectives regarding migration, which is interpreted, on the one hand, as an opportunity or as an obligation, to personal or social level.

Some migrants interviewed consider that migration is a natural process, its human nature. For others, it appears as a necessity of absolute change, which requires a huge capacity to adapt to new circumstances and confrontation. This need for change can be interpreted, for young people in a positive way. In this respect, the situation is in contrast with the situation of young adults with family responsibilities.

"*Migration is a fact necessary in the life of any young, at least ... you cannot always stay in my parents' house, but you have to move to get to know the world, is not it?* "***(Male, 57 years old)***

From the point of view of society recipient (host), migration is presented as a challenge to the arrival of new people, who perhaps may have difficulties to establish interactions or communicate due to ignorance of the language, culture, etc. Many of those interviewed report that migration brings diversity, prosperity enriches the host society.

However, while it is considered that migration contributes to development policies of the country of origin, by including the original diaspora country's development. In this regard, some of those interviewed adopted speeches own society of origin. Most states change perceptions about migration in the previous years, this being harnessed in a slightly positive form thanks to the contribution of migrants to the labor market.

"*Unskilled migrants have always done, we accumulated experience, we want to share in our country, the homeland ... I perceive migration and multiculturalism as a plus for all*" ***(Female, 49)***

The perception of deterioration in terms of attitude towards immigrants is manifested in relation to various factors, including: social injustice, a differential access to social rights, checks by law enforcement to check the legally resident immigrants. Sometimes opportunities compares Moldovan migrants from EU countries as different issues such as: the attitude of the host society, access to a legal system for legal work and residence, language, availability of job offers, climate.

Few come to complete their perception of migration with reference to country of origin, considering that the departure of the population is a failure of governance. Even if there is distrust of public institutions, migration is interpreted positively, as far as make contributions that benefit the community, particularly through economic and social remittances.

Conclusion

Are away from their homeland, any migrant feels the need to integrate as quickly as in the host country. Risks related to human trafficking, forced labor submission; ignorance of migrant rights in relation to the employer in the host country etc. generates uncertainty as the migrant. This, in turn, determines the need to strengthen Diaspora, in our case - the Moldavian, the best solution is to create public organizations that represent them Moldovans migrants at all levels in both the host country and the country of origin. Also, these associations are established to address all the challenges undergone by the migrant in the host country, to base economic and spiritual potential of the diaspora to contribute to the effective integration of its members into society.

In particular, public associations set up by Moldovans abroad as aim for better organization of diaspora structurally, in order to support a qualitatively new level integrating newcomers and those who arrived earlier. The area is part of these concerns and strengthens relationships between community members through mutual aid by initiating various activities, liaising spiritual homeland. It has great importance and adequate representation of Moldovans in relations with government bodies and NGOs in countries of residence or in Moldova. Diaspora plays a major role in promoting a positive image of Moldova abroad. In this context becomes particularly important effort to institutionalize the Moldovan diaspora, which has great potential able to contribute significantly to strengthening bilateral relations in various fields, to find ways to support their home country with all the experience gained abroad.

Not least, we must take into account the profile of Moldovan migrants in Europe, which depends as diaspora ability to contribute to the "Europeanization" of Moldova. According to general perception, compared with Moldovans working in Russia, those working in Europe are more educated Moldovans, who also represents a skilled workforce. However, diaspora in Europe is variegated. Some Moldovans are fully integrated into European societies; others prefer to live in communities of Moldovans rather isolated. Therefore, before the diaspora to act as an agent of "Europeanization", it must itself to "Europeanize". On the other hand, the reality of Moldovan migrants appears as a process during which may occur ups and downs, departures and comings (ex; country of origin in the host country). In addition, it allows us to take into account all objective and subjective dimensions of migration trajectories, thus recognizing the capacity for action and reflection of our emigrants.

The analysis was centered on perceptions of Moldovan migrants, from their speeches about Diaspora, the role of institutions and social organizations, and migration. One of the fundamental contributions of the analysis is based on the concept of migration that allows to highlight the diversity of approach to migrants in different sizes, which refers to the cultural promotion in the host society. Beyond the immediate nationality are common elements in terms of perceptions about inclusion, the role of networks, social organizations. Regarding future migrants interviewed, it seems that it falls in mobility from Europe or permanent installation, depending on real or perceived opportunities. In any case, the return to their native country does not seem to present itself as a main alternative to the emergency which are now deep in Moldova following the recent events in our society. Given the fact that we live in a world gripped by globalization and rapidly changing, it is imperative that the Moldovans would not learn anywhere, preserve and promote national values, their cultural and spiritual heritage.

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SUPPLY - DEMAND APPLICABILITY ON ESI FUNDS IN ROMANIA

*BŰKFEYES-RÁKOSSY Zsombor**

Abstract. *This paper applies theory of supply and demand on European Structural and Investment Funds. The question of low absorption rate in Romania is explained by using comparative statistical data from the National Rural Development Programme. The study also shows the characteristics of supply and demand in ESI Funds, it comes up with a possible solution to increase the country's absorption rate in the future and it creates the premises of methodology for future studies on supply-demand applied to EU funds.*

Keywords: *European Structural and Investment funds, National Rural Development Programme, absorption, consultancy*

1. ESI funds supply and demand

Adam Smith's "invisible hand" or the law of supply and demand are the foundation of the free market economy. Kwat (2018) enumerates and describes seven top applications of supply and demand: 1. Application on Farm Products 2. Price Control 3. Black Market 4. Consumer's and Producers' Surplus 5. Minimum Wage Legislation 6. Subsidy 7. Taxation. All these applications are available and valid under perfect competition. Unfortunately, as George Soros' (2013) reflexivity theory claims, the individuals involved in economic activity are not whole rational and are not self-correcting themselves because their decisions are not based on reality, but on their perception of reality. The actions that result from these perceptions have an impact on reality, which then affects individuals' perceptions and thus the equilibrium. Regardless of a free market under perfect competition or a reflexive market, is it possible to apply the law of supply and demand on the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI)?

Romania started to benefit from European funds soon after the fall of communism. During the 2014-2020 programming period, Romania has allotted in total from the EU roughly 43 billion € (Ministerul Fondurilor Europene 2018). The European Commissioner for Regional Policy, Corina Crețu, declared on 5th of December that in the following programming period (2021-2027) the allotted amount through Cohesion Policy will be 27 billion €, which means +8% compared to 2014-2020 (Reprezentanța Comisiei Europene în România 2018). These external funds should be resources that are completing the national spending on investments and not substituting those (Del Bo et al. 2016). At this point of the paper one does not have sufficient data to establish whether this sum means much, little or enough for the country. The only relevant quantitative indicator which can set the optimal allotted sum to a country is the rate of the absorption at the end of a programming period. Of course, a high absorption rate is important, but, likewise, the following aspects are essential: the qualitative aspect, the quality of the projects, the

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excellence of the projects, the right projects for the real needs, the success of the project implementation in achieving the objectives (Matei and Săvulescu 2015). Due to the fact that Romania is still in the middle of the 2014-2020 programming period and, also, because the country will be able to claim payments until the end of 2023, one can refer only to the latest statistics related to the absorption rate.

Statistics released on 1st of December 2018 by the Ministry of European Funds (2018) show that Romania has a current absorption rate of European Structural and Investment Funds of 17.14% and an effective absorption rate of 15.16%[1]. The pace of growth shown in the last 10 months will not be sufficient to absorb the available funds which leads to two questions: does more than 30 billion € ESI funds mean a lot, little or enough for Romania and, if it means little or enough, what is the explanation and the cause of this slow and poor absorption rate? The present research tries to explain the slow absorption rate by using and applying the supply and demand theory on the 4th Axis of the National Rural Development Programme (NRDP), it highlights the characteristics and effects of supply-demand and, last but not least, points out a possible and feasible solution to increase absorption.

2. National rural development programme

The National Rural Development Programme is the best performing Programme until now in 2014-2020 programming period in terms of absorption in Romania. Comparing for instance the effective absorption rate of NRDP (35.92%) with the Regional Operational Programme (ROP) (3.20%) one can see how huge the discrepancies between the two programmes are. The Programme offers financing for agriculture mainly, but it also has sub-measures for Public Entities to finance education, culture and infrastructure or it had in the last few years financing for the non-agricultural sector as well. The Managing Authority of the NRDP had a different approach to other Authorities regarding the launch of calls: The Agency for Rural Investment Finance (ARIF) launched calls yearly starting since 2015, while the Managing Authority of ROP, for example, decided to launch one single call for each Funding Priority. The main reason of the difference that exists is caused by this approach, but how does supply and demand work in this case and how does it affect the absorption rate?

A financing opportunity has a great chance to have an absorption rate of 100% if the demand is high, regardless the supply. However, the overall absorption rate of a Programme is only influenced partly by the demand alone and the difference can be made by taking into consideration both supply and demand. Capello and Perucca (2017) argue that instead of taking into account the supply and demand, one should consider the supply and the potential demand, which means both the demand fulfilled by the current supply and the portion of demand that is unmet. For example, if the NRDP has a total allocation of 100.000.000 €, which has a supply of 10.000.000 € for young farmers and those farmers have a demand of 50.000.000, it still means that the absorption rate is 10% (the maximum amount of supply) and not 50% (the actual demand). If the Authorities are able to make a correlation between the supply-demand, the absorption rate could grow rapidly.

The difference between the classic supply-demand theory and the one applied to European funds is that on the X Axis the Figure presents the chances to be selected for financing in percentage (price), while the Y Axis presents the allocation, the quantity of

[1] Comparatively, on 2nd of February 2018 the current absorption rate was 11.81% and the effective absorption rate was 10.07%.

available money for financing. Interpreting Figure 1 based on the aforementioned example, one can see that if the allocation is 5 million €, then one has 10% chances of success or 1 out of 10. However, if the Authority decides that the allocation will be increased to 40 million €, the applicants will have chances of 80% or 8 out of 10. The same interpretation applies for the Demand: if the demand is for 50 million € and the Authority decided to spend 10 million € for young farmers, then the chances are 20% or 2 out of 10. The equilibrium point (30 million €, 60%) does not suggest that the amount of available money for financing should be the same as the amount of demanded financing, but it shows that an allocation equal to the one presented in the equilibrium point is probably the most efficient and the healthies for competition.



Figure 1. Ideal situation of supply and demand on ESI Funds

3. NRDP 4.1 and 4.1A Sub-Measures

For better understanding the NRDP 4.1. and 4.1a sub-measures are analyzed in the following rows. The 4.1 sub-measure has two major interventions: agriculture (vegetal and zootechnical sector), while 4.1a is dedicated to pomiculture. These two intervention schemes have almost the same conditions, except the final product the applicant will obtain and the fact that for the pomiculture the financing intensity can be increased perhaps a little bit easier. In these conditions, the statistics that are published in real time on www.afir.info and which are presented in Table 1, demonstrate a significant discrepancy between the supply and the demand for these two opportunities.

On one hand, totalizing the allocation and the requested amount for NRDP 4.1 one can see that the coverage was 259%, which practically means that only 1 out of 2.5 project was financed. On the other hand, the pomiculture sector had a coverage of 137%, which means that taking into consideration the rate of rejection every project was or could have been financed. One of the limits of these numbers and data is that projects that were not selected for financing in 2016 could appear as submitted in 2017 or 2018 as well. Another limit of the table when one correlates supply and demand under perfect competition theory with the NRDP is the insufficiency of the presented information and the lack of contextual description.

Table 1. Discrepancies between NRDP 4.1 and NRDP 4.1a

Sub-measure	Year	Allocation	Value of submitted projects	Remaining funds until submission ends	Coverage
4.1 (Family farm)	2016	10,000,000	6,906,169	5,093,831	69%
	2017	32,000,000	63,067,595	932,405	197%
	2018	59,000,000	88,654,124	-	150%
4.1 (Vegetal)	2016	75,000,000	185,508,649	-	249%
	2017	79,000,000	456,819,117	-	578%
4.1 Vegetal (Mountain)	2018	26,000,000	11,816,021	27,183,979	45%
4.1 Vegetal (Non-Mountain)	2018	53,000,000	80,045,660	-	151%
4.1 (Mountain)	2016	40,000,000	49,808,340	-	125%
	2017	14,000,000	47,462,714	-	339%
4.1 (Zootechnical)	2016	75,000,000	150,032,426	-	200%
	2017	60,000,000	121,431,057	-	202%
4.1 (Zootechnical) (Mountain)	2018	54,000,000	81,012,177	-	150%
4.1 (Zootechnical) (Non-Mountain)	2018	111,000,000	435,076,301	-	392%
4.1a (Orchards)	2016	65,586,064	78,816,241	-	120%
	2017	95,000,000	99,934,863	90,065,137	105%
	2017/II	85,000,000	170,457,771	-	201%
4.1a (Seeding)	2017	5,000,000	155,966	5,844,034	3%
	2017	5,000,000	0	10,000,000	0%

***Source*:** (Agency for Rural Investment Finance 2018)

Figure 2, 3, 4 and 5 are used to explain the background of lack or growth of interest of applicants for certain project in certain periods. In 2017 the chances of being financed on NRDP 4.1 were 1.7 to 10, while in 2018 there are 66% chances to obtain the grant. The difference in this case is not due to supply and demand, which remains probably the same, but due to the fact that in 2017 the minimum score that a project had to meet was lower than in 2018 before the end of the submission period. The rule is to close the submission period when the value of the submitted projects reaches 150% (in 2018) or 200% (in 2017) of the budget allocation. This rule is completed by another one which sets that the Authority cannot close the session in the first 5 days after the quality threshold drops. In 2017 for example, the session ended after +the 5th day of the second month (June) because the quality threshold went down from 75 to 55. The competition would have been the same in 2018, but the submission period ended in the first month with a quality threshold of minimum 90 points. In this circumstances, the background information explains why in 2017 there were projects with a total financing value of 456 million €, while in 2018 there are request for only 80 million €. In addition, there is also a level of demand that is unknown because projects with low scores were never submitted and their number is not measured in anyway.



Figure 2. National Rural Development Programme 4.1 – Vegetal Sector 2017 Supply-Demand
Source: (Agency for Rural Investment Finance 2018)

Figure 2 shows that individuals who have applied for financing on this opportunity with an allocation of 79.000.000 € had only 17% chance to obtain the grant. It is also displayed that the necessary sums in order to finance everybody were over 456.000.000 €. The equilibrium or the ideal allocation for this session would have been between 232.000.000 € and 310.000.000 €.



Figure 3. National Rural Development Programme 4.1 – Vegetal (Non-Mountain) Sector 2018 Supply-Demand
Source: (Agency for Rural Investment Finance 2018)

Figure 3 seems more equilibrated: the applicants have better chances to obtain the grants and the equilibrium point is determined within a difference of 5 million €. The characteristics that this funding session kept from one year to another are the following:

- Demand was high since the first year;

- Supply was never enough: many applications did not obtain the financing and a significant number of applications were not even submitted;
- Demand was limited in the last year by closing the submission period early;
- Easy predictability from the above related information how would a next call look like;
- High demand can create its own supply: the call from 2018 happened as a result of huge lobby.



Figure 4. National Rural Development Programme 4.1a – Orchards Sector 2017 I Supply-Demand
Source: (Agency for Rural Investment Finance 2018)

There were two calls for the NRDP 4.1a Orchards sub-measure in 2016 and 2017 that barely exceeded the financial allocation with a very low quality threshold. The first call of 2017 is presented by Figure 4 which shows that every applicant had chances of at least 9.5 out of 10 to be selected for financing. Practically, in the first two calls, every applicant with an eligible and correct project which reached the minimum score was financed. The interesting turn came after the second session when there were rumors in the market that the NDRP 4.1 (a sub-measure with huge success and interest as it was presented) has exhausted its funds and will be no next session until post-2020. Also, at the same time, other important sub-measures of the Programme were in the same situation as the 4.1[2]. It seemed at that time, both for the market and for the consultancy companies, that the NDRP begins to become an uninteresting Programme, with few opportunities. Then, the second session of 4.1a for 2017 was launched and things have changed:

[2] For example, the NRDP 6.2 or 6.4 sub-measures exhausted their allocation as well in 2017.



Figure 5. National Rural Development Programme 4.1a – Orchards Sector 2017 II Supply-Demand
Source: (Agency for Rural Investment Finance 2018)

The interest doubled for pomiculture and in 2017th second call the applicants had only 50% chances to be lucky. Moreover, in the session which is prepared for early 2019 the consultancy companies expect that the allocated funds will be exhausted in the first 5 days and the call will be closed very fast. What are the characteristics one can observe and what did determine such a growth in the interest of applicants on NDRP 4.1a? The characteristics are:

- Even tough demand was low in the first two sessions, it was created with time and it rapidly grew.
- Demand can be created by constant available supply and the lack of other alternatives (in our case – no more NDRP 4.1 or NDRP 6.2 and 6.4)
- The market and the Authorities need time in order to adjust to the actual supply and demand. Both of them are trying to adapt, conscious or not, yet there is a dephasing between the supply and demand.
- Usually analysis like the one in present paper can be made after the call is closed. However, the behavior of one actor on the market can easily predict what will be the demand for certain calls. This actor is formed by consultancy companies for the following reason: where the consultancy companies see a great deal, a good business opportunity, the demand will be high, while, where they see poor chance to earn, the demand will be low. This is the case of NDRP 4.1a: when the consultancy companies had no more NDRP 4.1, they made the shift and started to make noise around NDRP 4.1a.

4. Conclusions

The principles of supply and demand theory can be applied to European funds with some differences and annotations. A country found under rapid development such as Romania needs the allotted financing from the European Union to reduce disparities within the country and between the country and the rest of the EU. Even though the support is necessary and urgent, Romania is facing difficulties in absorption. The supply side of absorption capacity can be determined basically by three factors: macro-economic, financial (co-financing) and administrative absorption capacity, while the demand is fixed by the ability of the applicants to develop projects (Šumpíková, Pavel and Klazar 2014).

Analyzing the National Rural Development Programme, the one which performs the best until now in matter of absorption, under the magnifying glass of supply-demand, one can conclude that, despite the fact that there is delay in absorption of funds, it is not caused by the lack of applications or interest, but on the inappropriate resource sharing. The NRDP is performing the best because the Authority decided to launch call's year by year, fact that allowed an easier adaptation to the expectations and the needs of the market. At the same time, the market had sufficient time to adapt to the supply of available European funds. Changing the initial plan is not bad in itself knowing the fact that the worst thing that can happen for Romania is to not absorb at all part of the available funding.

In order to illustrate the supply and demand graph one has to change the X Axis from price to percentage of chances of obtaining the financing, while on the Y Axis it remains a matter of quantity which in other words is the budgetary allocation. The equilibrium point is represented by an allocation which allows sufficient projects to be selected in order to keep a good quality threshold, a high and relevant score which automatically lead to an efficient use of public money and to the achievement of Programme objectives.

The supply and demand graph of European funds can inform one (especially the Authorities) about the need for funding on future calls and it also demonstrates that high demand sometimes can create its own supply and supply in conjunction with lack of better alternatives can create demand in time. The EU funds market is not one which runs under perfect competition, but a reflexive one because the consultancy companies and the applicants base their decision on their perception of reality, which sometimes modifies the success and the absorption rate of certain programmes. In other words, where the consultancy companies identify a good business opportunity, the call for proposals is blooming. The possible solution in the attempt to increase the absorption rate is even a better and stronger dialogue between the Authorities and the market (represented mainly by consultancy companies). The consultants are similar to animals before an earthquake: they feel the opportunity or the `danger` and they only enter competition where they already know that their customers have sufficient incentives to apply. One can bet that on a call where the consultancy companies are not making marketing campaigns the absorption will be close to zero. The other bet is the one mentioned in the presented paper about the future call (early 2019) of NRDP 4.1a where the consultants claim that the call will be closed after the first five days[3].

Other uses or applications of the supply-demand principles on EU funds can be discovered by future research. A topic that will be actual in 2019-2020 is the comparison of the first and second call for Regional Operational Programme 2.2 – funding for SME's. Did the Authorities learn from the first call, does the supply-demand principle offer good predictions about the second call or how does the ROP 2.2 (which had a huge success in the first call) compare to ROP 1.1C (which was a poor call), are all questions that are awaiting answers and that could lead in the end to a better understanding of Romania's absorption and the way EU funds work.

[3] Of course this bet exists if the quality threshold in the first month is 40 or close to 40.

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EUROPEAN BULLYING AWARENESS POLICIES AND ENABLING INITIATIVES

Floare CHIPEA*
Ioana SÎRBU**

Abstract. *Following a synthetic presentation of the definition of bullying in the context of the current profile literature, as a repeated form of emotional and physical abuse by a person or group of persons as a perpetrator or as a victimized person with negative consequences on victims, the article highlights the status of the phenomenon and its disastrous impact on the physical, mental and social dimension of adolescent personality. There are several issues that are related to the prevalence of the phenomenon at European level and its structuring according to bullying types (physical, emotional, cyberbullying ...), gender and countries. The most extensive chapter presents some initiatives aimed at enhancing awareness and enabling bullying in different European countries, developed in partnership projects.*

Keywords: *bullying, school violence, perpetrator, victim, European anti-bullying policies*

1. Introduction

The present article aims to achieve a brief definition and specific features of the bullying phenomenon that affects the school population, nominating the social roles involved and identifying some consequences on the personality of the children. Another objective was the presentation, based on statistical data analysis, of its dimensions and prevalence at a European level. The most consistent part of the article aims to reveal, based of social documents analysis, European awareness initiatives, also prevention and combat policies developed against bullying phenomenon in schools.

Bullying is a term that in Romanian does not match to any exact correspondent in English. In English, the word bully describes a *perpetrator*, a *hooligan, a mocker*. In Romanian, bullying defines a form of *emotional and physical abuse*, a repeated and intentional behaviour, (the same exact person gets always hurt), characterized by the existence of an imbalance of forces: the aggressor tracks his victim and exploits his/her weaknesses.

Olweus, in his extensive research (1978-2013), is the first theorist to define bullying, while his studies remain a universal scientific premise, to which the current research and investigations are reported. In 1993, bullying appears as *a deliberate, repetitive abuse action that involves negative actions on others, carried out by a group of*

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persons or by a single person holding a higher social status than the victim/victims (Olweus, 1993).

"The phenomenon of school victimisation/bullying is a current issue with serious implications on an international scale for the mental and social health of the individuals involved, as well as on their well-being (Marsh & Co., 2011, quoted in Tocai S.I., 2014:417). The particular bullying behaviour implies group exclusion of the different one, the humiliation, the rumour spreading (also known as social exclusion/ relational/social bullying), the prohibition of speaking to another colleague or denigrating on physical, ethnic, religious or gender grounds – also known as **social bullying**; physical violence or bodily harm threat **- physical bullying**; personal property destruction **- criminal bullying**; verbal insults, using negative nicknames – **verbal bullying**; and **cyberbullying** (through cyberspace and through social media).

It is emphasized the fact that school violence victims are more likely to develop depression and suicidal attempts than other teenagers (Lazarus, 2012 quoted Ibid). Assaulted pupils periodically present a low level of mental wellbeing, general health level and social adaptation, instead they exhibit high levels of stress (Rigby, 1996). Literature also highlights the difference between the form of *direct bullying* – which may include punching, pushing, biting, versus indirect forms of bullying – using verbal abuse, insults or a licentious language against a person, blackmail, rumours spreading, use of malicious nicknames or social exclusion (Cowie, 2008).

The assigned **bullying roles** describe the *perpetrator/the bully*, *the victim* who poses in a vulnerable position, the *reinforcers* or *active spectators*, those who encourage the perpetration of bullying behaviour through actions such as: laughter, acclamation, *the accomplice/s* or *assistant/s*, followed by *defender's witnesses* and the *passive spectators*.

Starting from the destructive effects on children's personality, researchers and social actors involved in their education have been concerned, in various ways, with enabling or reducing the phenomenon. We intend to present some relevant anti-bullying initiatives and frameworks at European level, including the level of Romania.

2. eCARE project *Early Child Abuse Response Enabling* - an European Approach to Address Bullying

eCARE project (2015-2018) globally aim at contributing to children's rights and safe learning environment, building-up on existing initiatives, agenda, programmes or projects that were currently addressing the matter. **Main objectives** of this programme (Erasmus+ Each 2015-1-TR01-KA201-022267) followed: identifying the strategic needs of adult education specialists to prevent and combat bullying in schools, development of specific skills for pupils to prevent and manage the bullying situations in the school area and not only, promoting good practice at European level for the prevention and Control of Juvenile violence (aggression, children victims of domestic violence, young prone at events of violent behaviour).

eCARE consortium designed an innovative Capacity Building Programme by creating conditions for an inclusive partnership with Civil Society Organisations (C.S.O.), also learning, teaching and training activities. **The partner countries** entrusted in the project were Turkey (co-ordinating country), Spain, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania (in Oradea, under the coordination of teachers, at Secondary School No. 11). **Partnerships** included a variety of individuals and groups, secondary school pupils, parents, school executives, teachers, educational staff, community organizations, Youth/Health bodies, public services agencies, community leaders etc.

Good practices collection and comparative examination proved to be real **tools** regarding the bullying approach. Each partner identified 5 good practices matching the project quality criteria (provided in the handbook specially designed for WP2). The identified good practices are the echo of the current trends and policies considering a variety of approaches and actors such as teachers and school staffs globally, Civil Society Organisations (CSO), experts, policy-makers, to name but a few. Find detailed information on collected good practice in the project website (Newsletter No. 4 & Editorial Retrieved at http://earlycare.wixsite.com/ecare).

3. Bullying phenomenon european dimensions

To a simple online search using *European anti-bullying policies* as a key word, there are numerous sites and platforms that promote actions in this direction, especially through the access of educational projects sustained by European funds. Titles appear as anti-bullying European campaign (https://ec.europa.eu), A Daphne project type, an European anti-bullying network (http://www.antibullying.eu/) which promotes anti-bullying policies in partnership with various European institutions/organisations that advocate the rights of young people; and other initiatives starting from this case. European bullying awareness is increasing, demanding more attention, resources and especially legislative framework.

On the current political agenda, the consequences of migration in the European area upon children occupy an important status in terms of the impact on their social and educational lives. Shortcomings include poverty, parents market labour absence, illiteracy and, for certain, interethnic discrimination type conflicts. Ethnicity person harassment is assigned in the literature under the name of the **ethnic bullying** (see Gladden &Co., 2014).

According to the data of a doctoral research (2013-2018), held in Bihor County schools, in Romania, it appears that boys are more likely than girls in becoming victims of bullying in general, also verbally or physical type. Likewise, boys are more exposed than girls in adopting the role of aggressor in a physical, ethnic, or verbal bullying encounter (Tocai &Chipea, 2017).

The phenomenon of bullying between young people extends far beyond the space occupied by ethnic bullying, which, while representing a current problem at European level, describes various typologies and harmful consequences among young people and educational society.

More than 500,000 calls were recorded in Europe and recorded *emotional bullying* harm. More common among girls (see Figure 2), while the form of *physical bullying* is more often found among boys" (See Figure 1) (http://www.mediafax.ro). About 57% of the calls were recorded from girls. Victims of the bullying phenomenon **around the world** are 43% boys assigned, 57% girls, and **in Europe**, 42% from boys and 58% from girls" (idem). It is also noted in the communiqué: "Almost 63% of the calls recorded by the *Child Phone Services in Europe* include *emotional bullying* form as the most widespread, followed by *physical bullying* 24%. More than 90% of victims in Europe have indicated schools' co-workers as perpetrators, and more than 10% included friends. In another 4% of cases are teachers being nominated" (Child Helpline, Retrieved at http://www.salvaticopiii.ro).



Figure Nº1*Bullying prevalence in Europe among 15th year boys, reporting that they have been victimized at least twice in the last two months in 2009-2010*
Source: *Health Behaviour in School Aged Children Publications*: International Reports, official site, http://www.hbsc.org/

The widest spread of the phenomenon of bullying in schools, where 15-year-old boys adopt the role of perpetrator, meets In Lithuania, Belgium with a rate over 20%, followed by Romania and Austria with 15% -19% prevalence. Italy, Sweden and Iceland assign with the lower bullying prevalence (2009-2010).



Figure Nº2 *Bullying prevalence in Europe among 15th year girls, reporting that they have been victimized at least twice in the last two months in 2009-2010*
Source: *Health Behaviour in School Aged Children Publications*: International Reports, official site, http://www.hbsc.org/

The frequency which teenage girls adopt the role of aggressor is lower compared to boys' perpetrators, including countries as: Latvia (between 24%-20%), Central Europe (15%-9%), with a low prevalence among students from Norway, Sweden, Finland, UK, Italy Ş. A., according to data from *International study Health Behaviour in School Aged Children* on 2009-2010.

4. European Anti-Bullying Initiatives Policy[1]

In 2009, for schools in **Sweden** was mandatory to implement anti-bullying policies to prevent harassment and other forms of child abuse (Gill, Petterson, 2010). Sweden becomes a promoter in developing strategies for combating school bullying. Such initiatives signal to a global awareness, stressing the fact that every state/society has an obligation to protect children's rights and to create a secure schools environment by adopting various educational programmes and policies (Tocai, 2017).

Starting from 2014, **Turkey** supports the Civil Society Organization's "BILKA", which includes 7 regions, 34 cities and 37 schools addressing students, teaching staff, the auxiliary and the family, according to *Ali Karay Ortaokulu* school(AKO) Avcilar, Istanbul, partner in the Early Child Abuse Response Enabling Project (eCARE). The issue of school violence in Turkey has a special specificity by considering both - the present cultural context, ethnic and regional varieties - as well as historical bases, with an emphasis on international cooperation policies in the context of existing conflict regions and refugees. Therefore, the proposed country action parameters aim at a wider area to access several levels - starting with the school system, the school community and the annexed communities, the social context, health services and security, until the development of the education system.

School violence is widespread on contemporary society's issues and leans for **interethnic violence**. Turkey has the latest and largest of a five-year strategic plan frame, of the ADNED, the *National Direction of Education in the Acvilar District*, which is primarily addressed to school violence. The participants were teachers, community stake holders, educational policies staff, academics, as well as specialists in the field of violence prevention and child abuse. The program encompasses activities aimed to enhance students standing up against abuse and violence, and training skills to recognize and control their risk situations.

Examples of good practices in combating violence/bullying include *Capacity Building Programs* (CBP) addressing students and teachers who explore the capabilities of active learning and promote methodologies to assist children with special needs learning, victims of violence. Strategies for teachers are closely linked to *inclusive education* as a primary need for society. The objectives of these programs are aimed at a multimodal development considered to be beneficial for school system, that responds as well to individual needs and at the same time provides interregional and interethnic cooperation. Together with the capacity development programs, there is the *Preventive Advancement Counseling* for 0-8 years aged children and represents a strategic approach promoted in the Acvilar district where teachers and students as future teachers are trained to handle the issue of violence by specialists Değerler Eğitimi (Values in Education).

Spain is analysing the phenomenon of bullying/school violence at the level of 2,727 students in 66 schools at secondary school and high school level in Barcelona through a

[1] Data Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy They were provided as a result of analyses carried out by the project members within the Erasmus + EARLY CHILD abuse RESPONSE enabling – eCARE 2015-1-TR01-KA201-022267

survey. Subjects' responses reveal the frequency of school violence, bullying physical assaults, intimidation, mockery, marginalization, out of which 10, 7% say they have been assaulted at least four times a month, according to Portugal's eCARE report, 2016.

The initiatives to enable school violence are primarily included at a school level through projects, through existing NGOs or local/national educational policies. Is where we mention the *Seville* program involving 10 schools over 3 years (1996-1999) which was founded on the bullying paradigm of Olweus. Other such educational programs for intervention and prevention of school violence are: *Andave* (Educational Program for abuse prevention among students), *Convivir es vivir* (Living is companionship), a program for positive school interaction development, *No estás solo* (You are not alone) a program that provides material and emotional support to victims and aims to prevent victimization in schools and in student families. The *ConRed* project (see http://www.uco.es/laecovi/conred/)to prevent electronic violence as cyber bullying. There are organizations responsible for maintaining peaceful cohabitation in Spanish schools, such as the *Observatorio Nacional de la Convivencia*, (Valencia School Observatory) and *Instituto para la Convivencia y Éxito Escolar en las Islas Baleares* (Institute for Peaceful Cohabitation and School Success) in the Balearic Islands.

Spain, as well, sets emergency lines and support for school violence victims *El Feléfono Amigo* (Friendly Phone) school violence since 2001, created in Andalusia and *Protégeles* (Protect) in the NGO system. The Spanish (2015) Erasmus research highlights the negative consequences on the mental and physical health of those involved in bullying acts, by emphasizing the association between the role of victim and symptoms such as sleep disturbances, headaches, irritability, tiredness. Correlation with the consumption of toxic substances, alcohol and tobacco were also revealed, likely for perpetrators, more than for victims of bullying, or non-victims. The authors also point to the downward trend of the bullying phenomenon from high school to middle school.

Following the surveys carried out by the National *Commission for the Promotion of the Rights and Protection of Children and Young People* in **Portugal** (May 2015), there are 29,594 reported cases of violence, of which 30511 corelated to risk situations (of which 94.9% are domestic violence), 8896 (39.2%) corelated to exposures to acts that compromise the child's psychological health, and 4148 (14%) refer to violence among young people, according to the Portuguese partner report in eCARE, 2016. In 2015, the number of children involved in bullying acts is estimated at 240,000 (*Centro de Investigação e Intervenção Social do ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa*, Center for Investigation and Social Intervention of the University of Lisbon, Statistics) claim that 1/5 children are directly involved in school violence at school level national (https://eurohealthnet.eu/).

Portugal's national policies on addressing bullying and child abuse, or sexual harassment include data from 133 countries since 2014 and point to the harsh need for preventive and countermeasures. Examples of good practice in combating school violence include theoretical intervention guidelines and applied programs: *Violência en contexto Escolar* (Guideline Violence in School Context, see http://www.dge.mec.pt), *Escola Segura Program* (Program for a secured school) promoted at the level of the National Ministry since 1992 (see http://www.psp.pt).

Italy points to the need for a legal policies framework to tackle child abuse and to manage different types of violence. In the E-report, Italy calls the most significant initiative *Bullying in Italy: Violent and Offensive Violence*, 2015. The statistical distribution of the phenomenon indicates its increase among the students: more than 50%

of the 11-17 aged children were victims of the violence of the elderly, and 19.8% constant victims, where the girls more than the boys. Another significant aspect in this context is the increase in cyberbullying, 5.9% of children with electronic gadgets say they have been victims of this type of violence.

The first initiatives to stop these phenomena occur in 2007 when the Ministry of Education and Research is developing a national prevention campaign and provides a strategic guide and two emergency contact lines: *General strategies for preventing and stopping bullying* as well as an *Orientation Guide to Preventing and Stopping Bullying and Cyberbullying* in 2015 (see www. smontailbullo.it).

Greece recorded the prevalence of school violence in 2000, when 14.7% of 8-12-year-old students in Athens identified themselves as victims, 6.2% as perpetrators, and 4.8% with double roles. Statistics on bullying prevalence at national level are included in the HBSC (*Health Behaviour in School Aged Children Publications*) study every four years in 2015 revealing that of 4 141 participants aged 11 to 15 6.4% are constantly victims of school violence and 7.5% are aggressors or accomplices (http://www.hbsc.org/).

Among the most recent research of the Ministry of Education regarding the prevalence and types of bullying violence, participated in a total of 33112 secondary school students from Greece. The results emphasize the alarming incidence of this phenomenon and the risk of escalation from one year to the next.

Some of the significative anti-bullying programs implemented in Greece are *School Stop Bullying* (2010-2011), *Andreou's program and collaborators*, that enhance understanding school bullying and seek for prevention/intervention at the gymnasium level. All these programs are addressed to both students and teachers through training modules.

The Greek Ministry of Education has implemented the priority axis of the *Operational Program Education and Lifelong Learning* (NSRF) 2007-2013 Development and Information Network for the development, management, training, prevention and treatment for school violence and bullying, (see http://stop-bullying.sch.gr/). *The smile of a child* is a Greek NGO designed to protect the rights of the child and to provide support and services to families and children at risk. Through its actions it promotes the *European strategy against bullying The European Strategy Against Bullying*. The goal of the strategy is to develop an inclusive organization for all major governmental, non-governmental and relevant stakeholders working against violence. Another strategy to protect victims of violence in Greece is *Daphne III* as part of the Fundamental Rights and Justice Program. The state has the service 1056 Helpline registered as a national phone line of the child since 1997.

The study "The phenomenon of bullying in schools" done by *Child Helpline Association* which is the first of its kind in **Romania**, shows that 46 % of Romanian children were at one time or another victim of bullying, among which 53 % are girls and 47 % boys (www.salvațicopiii.ro).

The *Child Telephone Association* recorded 2,907 cases of bullying in Romania, 45,72% of the cases of physical violence, 22,86% verbal violence, 15,24% emotional abuse and 14,28% relational abuse (http: //www.telefonulului.com). Among 12-17 years adolescents who are victims of bullying, 28.58% are assigned as girls, and boys 57.14% as boys according to the same source. Analysing the results of these studies, it is shown that violence in Romanian schools has a high frequency - more than 75% of Romanian schools face this phenomenon, 53% of pupils recognize acts of violence among pupils as a common practice and 12% of participants states that they are happy to witness conflicts (http://salvaticopiii.ro).



Figure No 3 *Bullying prevalence in Romania among Counties*
Source: *Child Telephone Association* 2011- 2013,
Retrieved at http://www.telefonulcopilului.ro

Among the effects of the bullying phenomenon were: depressions and behavioural disorders (33.15%), exclusion and difficulty in relationship (29.78%), suicidal thoughts (15.17%), fear and anxiety (12, 92%), identity and loneliness (4.49%). Most cases were recorded in the Muntenia region (26.66%), followed by Oltenia (19.05%), Moldavia (17.14%), Transylvania (2.86%), Bucharest (2.86%), and Dobrogea (1.91%) (http://www.telefonulcopilului.ro/).

Examinations and analyses conducted to improve the legal system for minors stresses the next giving priority to the creation of institutions and programs to provide legal assistance to minors (*Criminal Trafficking Directive* No. 16, www.unicef.ro).

Conclusions

Young communities at risk (ethnic groups / groups of unskilled / illiterate young people, socially disadvantaged groups, groups of young offenders, etc.) by their spatial segregation, stir up bullying where they act as a victim, or even as a perpetrator. These excluded social groups represent real challenges for many countries (Clotfelter, 2001; Hoorens et al., 2013) and produce certain costs for integrating states (Patterson, 2005), such as illiteracy prevention, project funding, specialized necessary services, and others.

Evidence show that pupils that come from an incomplete or a single parent family have a greater vulnerability to become *victims of bullying* and even more in adopting the role of aggressors than in complete families (Sîrbu & Chipea, 2016).

The school life of a *bully* describes a trajectory of the young delinquent in the making, with a history of aggressions acts against others, associated with school dropout. These young people start with serious deficiencies, they initially start from a moral pollution of the social context and gradually turn into deviant groups absorbed by street communities (Chipea, 1997:57).

In this context, facilitating the process of integrating children from a migrant environment becomes an imperative on the European educational policies agenda. Studies show that immigrant pupils are more likely to be enrolled in socio-economically disadvantaged schools (Karsten et al., 2003, Coughlan, 2015; Schleicher, 2006); and with weaker learning conditions (Schleicher, 2006). Among the European socio-educational imperatives that concern the development and literacy of young people, it is necessary to manage the prevention / combating of ethnic and social bullying.

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ARE THERE GOOD SMUGGLERS? SOLUTIONS TO MIGRANTS SMUGGLING INTO EUROPE

Daniela DRUGAȘ*

Abstract. *According to the data provided by Europol there are around 40 000 migrant smugglers suspected of being involved in migrant smuggling networks. Nine out of ten refugees now in Europe admit that they used the services of a smuggler to get here. The article refers to the process of decision-making of migrants and refugees and the organizational structure of smuggling networks. Potential immediate actions and solutions and obstacles hindering the process are considered.*

Keywords: *irregular migration, migrants smuggling, traffic of human beings, solutions*

The instability in North Africa and the Middle East after the Arab Spring, in particular the Libyan political and security degradation, has created favourable conditions for the emergence and multiplication of operationally illicit smuggling networks that facilitate the North African migration movement towards Europe. (Swing, W.J, 2016:116).

Organizing this crossing is done by networks of smugglers, given that nine out of ten refugees now in Europe have arrived on the continent through these networks.

The cost of travel for each refugee varies between two to six thousand Euro, which means a profit for terrorist networks estimated between 5 and 6 million Euros only in 2015, a year with a high migration flow.

Payment of these initial sums does not guarantee safe crossing nor is it a final value. International organizations report that smugglers are requesting additional payments along the way, which, if not carried out, lead to violence and abuse of migrants in the form of torture or rape. In addition, there have been cases where migrants were seized or sold as slaves during the crossing (Drwiega, A. 2015:8).

According to data provided by Europol, over 40,000 individuals are suspected of being involved in migrant smuggling (EUROPOL, 2016:7), which is a fulminating figure.

Migrants smuggling

Migration smuggling occurs when a person facilitates the transportation or illegal entry of a person in another country in order to make a profit (United Nations Protocol Against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Art. 3a). It is different from trafficking in human beings, but in practice the two types of traffic interrelate. Contrary to trafficking in human beings, migrant smuggling does not involve migrant's coercion, it is done with the consent of the trafficked person. Once the two sides have finished the business, their roads are separated. Smuggling does not involve a new relationship or the continuation of the relationship once the destination is reached.

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Differently to smuggling, trafficking in human beings is not necessarily transnational and a central element of the definition of trafficking in human beings is that they are committed through fraud, deception and coercion for the purpose of exploitation. Once the destination has arrived, traffic involves a new relationship or its continuation. It violates the human rights of trafficked persons, the right not to be held in slavery or servitude, the right to freedom and security of the person, the right not to be subjected to inhuman and cruel treatment, and so on

Sometimes it happens that what started as migrants smuggling turns into trafficking in human beings. For example, a tax to enter illegally into a country - once the border is crossed turns into a toll that the migrant cannot pay. In order to pay this increased tax, and under the threat of being reported to the authorities, the migrant may end up in forced labour or sexual exploitation, becoming a victim of trafficking in human beings.

Even though migrant smuggling does not always turn into trafficking in human beings, the underlying factors and factors that favour it are intersecting so that measures to reduce smuggling can also apply to trafficking in human beings and vice versa.

Smuggling can take many forms and involve a large number of intermediaries. It can be structured in the form of trans-national networks and, more often, includes more or less organized informal individuals or organizations. It can be organized from home to destination or can be shorter travel routes. It may involve irregular border crossings or the use of fraudulent documents.

Trafficking in human beings is, by definition, transnational and always illegal. Smuggling is helped by corruption.

Migration traffic is on the rise - in Europe, migrants smuggling has increased significantly, especially on the Eastern Mediterranean route. Other Asian routes continue to exist, even if they are not growing. Smuggling is also present in Central America, with many trafficked migrants wishing to travel to the United States.

The flow of boats along the Mediterranean has become a symbol of the European Union's difficulty in controlling the borders and despair of individuals using these dangerous traverses, leading to death or physical and mental injuries to many of them. Besides the disaster humanitarian crossings have led to increased border management costs and have exacerbated the political tensions surrounding migration. To respond to the problem, it is necessary to better understand the dynamics and motivation of these migratory movements on each side of the journey. Political debates on improving maritime border controls show how little policymakers know about how migrants decide on these actions, receive information, interact with smugglers, and calculate risk.

Good well-informed strategy to respond to traffic services such as those facilitating the crossing of the Mediterranean will have to understand both the "customer" and the "supplier" (Townsend, J; Oomen C, 2017: 7).-. Unfortunately, there are great shortcomings on the part of the policymakers on both sides.

We will first examine the decision-making process of the migrant, the perception of risk and access to information.

Decision making by migrants and perception of risk

Understanding the motivation of migrants by political factors is incomplete. Specialty literature suffers from three limitations (Townsend, J; Oomen C, 2017:7):- concentration on push-pull factors instead of better understanding of the choices that migrants make in different phases of their journey, a biased perspective, stemming from focusing on gathering information in the countries of destination and potential over-generalizations of the interpretation of certain cases, and a fixed analysis of a fluid phenomenon - for example, changing motivations over time, and evidence of the initial motivation of movement not applicable to later migration

Most studies list the push-pull factors that underlie migration in a static, one-dimensional form. For example, cited pull factors usually include economic advancement, education, family reunification, protection and language, while push factors usually include violations of human rights. A little attention has been paid to the dynamics of decision-making, both before and after departure. In fact, while the motives, constraints and opportunities of those who consider migration may be different, even migrants who migrate forcibly make active choices about migration. Moreover, the "forced" nature of migrant movement may become a less useful predictor of their course of movement once they have left their home.

In addition, many studies are limited by a "destination bias". Most relevant research is completed in the destination countries, which means by definition it is based on the experiences of migrants who have managed to reach the destination. To learn more about migrants' motivations, more research is needed in countries of origin and transit.

There are several recent contributions in this regard, such as a recent study by UNHCR, which conducted 92 interviews with migrants from six different countries and a study by the RMMS – (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2014, :11) which focused on migrants from the Horn of Africa. These contributions are informative in mapping different sub-Saharan routes in Africa through Libya and highlight the various types of hazards that migrants can encounter. However, these studies do not show the reasons for hundreds of thousands of migrants, and do not mention those who changing plans, failing or abandoning plans to reach Europe.

Migrants' ambitions and motivations to migrate change as they leave, travel and arrive, due to numerous reasons. In the case of individuals fleeing the conflict, it is assumed that they are looking for safety but often embark on dangerous crossings - such as Somali, Syrians and Eritreans crossing the Mediterranean. Moreover, those traveling from transit countries - such as the Syrians fleeing the new conflict in Iraq - are often hoping to move to a place that offers long-term opportunities not only in the most secure country. In other cases, the difficulties of the route can push migrants to change their plans or review their initial reasons. For example, the Africans who explained before they left to work for a few years in Europe, recalibrated their declared ambitions and plans after having endured many misfortunes along the many months of their journey, a journey they expected fast and simple. Finally, ambitions are not always achieved - sometimes on the contrary - and some people fail in their attempts to migrate or are forced to make decisions that they do not want.

Quantitative studies of migrant flows vary in their attention to the motivation of migration such as poverty, conflict and human rights violations. Even though carefully designed, these general patterns are imprecise tools to understand how migrants - both individuals and families, those who succeed and those who fail - choose the course of the next place to migrate. Policy makers continue to rely on studies that generalize migrants' motivations and do not view major differences along migratory waves.

Risk assessment and decision making

Thousands of people trying to cross the Mediterranean have died or suffered multiple wounds. We have asked ourselves why migrants continue to embark on these dangerous crossings. A frequent explanation is that they do not understand the risks and do not know less dangerous alternatives, especially those who appeal to unscrupulous smugglers. For example, the European Union's Mediterranean Task Force recommends "information on extreme hazards and hazards accompanying irregular migration", suggesting that poor information and lack of knowledge are important factors in increasing the number of deaths at sea.

In fact, poor information does not explain migrants' decisions to endanger, for a variety of reasons.in general, people are not very skilled in calculating risk and give up its consideration in day-to-day decisions, the risk of dying or being hurt is worth considering, especially when compared to the immediate threats of personal security.

Long-term risks are compared to short-term risks and seem more important at a given moment - for example, migrants are more concerned about future barriers to finding a job and supporting their family than in related to life and language risks.

Even when individuals estimate the risk correctly, it seems insignificant compared to immediate threats.

Everyday life provides many examples of poorly calculated risk. Driving a motorcycle instead of a car illustrates how people do not take well-known risks when making choices for themselves. Likewise, many who want to cross the Mediterranean can explain, in general terms, the inherent physical risks. When they talk about their plans, they conclude that whatever the risks, the future benefits outweigh them.

Moreover, even when individuals properly assess the risk, it seems insignificant compared to immediate threats. An NGO report on Syrian refugee families indicates that once migrants have decided to embark, they feel that there is no way to return, even if they do the gravity of the danger (Save the Children, 2014: 9). For migrants, the possibility of death or injury in transit may seem more abstract than the concrete threats they face at home. Understanding how migrants perceive the potential risks and rewards of travel and weighing them in the face of their present situation is essential in any analysis of the clandestine movement.

Generally, most research on human risk perception focuses on short-term risks such as exploitation and injury. However, they do not take into account a central issue of migrant motivation - the potential value of long-term migration. Thus, major threats derive from European laws and policies, as migrants take into account the probability of engaging, integrating and helping their family members. Indeed, when future migrants go from risk assessment to discussing the expected benefits, it has become clear during interviews that many are very interested, but not necessarily, in assessing threats to their objective - long-term stay in Europe. Once migrants have left their homes, their long-term tolerance to reach their purpose increases as long as they can maintain their confidence that their ultimate goal is safe. A more sophisticated risk assessment method could determine how migrants are weighing short-term physical risks against their long-term goals - and both types of risk, in turn, against possible benefits.

When potential migrants switch from risk assessment to discuss possible benefits, it is clear, during interviews, that most are very interested, but not necessarily precise, in assessing threats.

Information and processing networks

Risk assessment and decision-making are processes that result from the interaction of experience, beliefs, emotions, and environmental information. Migrants' efforts to access and evaluate information seem to vary significantly. From interviews that analyse migration to Europe, many say they have looked at the situation in depth to choose options and risks. Answers to questions indicate that many have searched for active but sporadic information over the course of several months or years without paying much attention to the quality of the sources. A minority of migrants had alarmingly few sources of information and advice (J. Townsend; C. Oomen, 2017:6).

Moreover, migrants can get different information at different points in the migration process, and may consider them more valuable as they are in transit for a long time. At the transit points, migrants exchange information on security, transport opportunities and job opportunities. Some postpone the trip because they need time to assess risks and options. The comparison between those who postpone and those who move quickly through transit points can provide useful information to policy makers. Another possibility of research would be to compare the influence of different sources of information encountered in transit. Of these, we will only analyse three of the most important:-information received orally received mainly from family and friends who have already made the trip, official awareness campaigns, including the online platforms of international organizations, intermediaries and traffickers, who can use social media, among other channels, to promote their services. Many potential migrants receive information from family and friends, from home and abroad. Social media can play a role in dispersing current information along irregular migration routes. More is known about using media to find smugglers in Mexico and the United States than in Europe, but reports show that Facebook is also a source of information. It is certainly easy to find online social networks in languages such as Arabic, Kurdish and Somali, which are dedicated to distributing information on migration. When interviewed, members of these online groups have shown that social media facilitate but do not replace face-to-face discussions, only a few have used online networks to organize direct negotiations with smugglers. The major impact of social media is to increase the volume and speed up updates on migration, policies and incidents. To communicate effectively in this amalgam, governments in Europe must support accurate, accurate, accurate, timely, and trustworthy contributions to these conversations.

Media can play a role in dispersing current information on irregular migration routes.

On the whole, the most important influences are divided into three categories.

In the first place, those who have already done the journey transmit information, advice and encouragement to those who take this step forward. Secondly, even in saturated areas with migration agents and facilitators, the oral approach is the most common way to approach someone about a traffic network. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the existence of a diaspora in certain destinations creates and normalizes the interest in migration in general and in those destinations in particular. For example, a teenager in Somalia has strong links and opportunities in the UK. Certain communities in Syria are considering Sweden, given the country's current openness to Syrian refugees. However, we can argue that social networks and historical links play a greater role in influencing the choice of destination than intake and asylum policies, especially with regard to long-term settlement.

Recruits, intermediaries and traffickers

Interviews with migrants who consider traveling to Europe suggest that they understand that smugglers operate a business, and that the information received should be interpreted in this respect. But how much migrants rely on smugglers' advice differs from case to case. People who have personal relationships in Europe, providing them with encouraging advice and examples, may be vulnerable to increased confidence in local facilitators in terms of costs, risks and conditions at the destination. Close relationships broke when migrants, who left references and pink pictures offered by family members already in Europe, are deceived by smugglers or have accidents along the way.

Migrant understanding of migration policies

Interviews with migrants in sub-Saharan Africa indicates that their understanding of migration policy in Europe varies accurately. Given the variations in migrant education and access to resources, this is not surprising - it can also indicate that information is interpreted to support ambitions rather than to get informed about decisions. For example, migrants who have heard of the growing patrol in the Mediterranean can imagine that it involves a safer journey because they will be saved faster. The same migrants, hearing that Europe has reduced patrolling, would conclude that this is in their favour, as the chances of detention are reduced. While both hypotheses have a meaning, taken together, they highlight the fact that there is a mental scheme that can justify the decision to migrate, and through which contradictory events are interpreted in the same direction.

Some studies have shown that there is a link between harsher asylum policies and a lower rate of applicants in some countries. For example, in the 2000 years, the Netherlands initiated a procedure according to which the determination of the asylum was made within 48 hours - the demand rate decreased by 75% in just four years. When faced with a large influx of Eritrean asylum seekers in 2014, the Netherlands used a series of emergency measures to significantly reduce the flow in a few months. (Focus Migration, Netherlands, 2016:4).

However, the European Union as a whole has limited capacity to increase or decrease migration flows as it wishes. Migrants continue to find different spaces to reach and stay in Europe. At present, it is a challenge for Member States where the best thing states can get is to move unwanted migrants to another. Understanding in detail how migrants receive and react to policy change could help to support a mutually beneficial approach that strengthens protection standards (both in terms of results and appropriate access), could improve efficiency and create consistency between agencies and countries.

The mode of operation of trafficker's networks

We note a lack of longitudinal research of the organizational structures of migrant trafficker's networks that facilitate the crossing of the Mediterranean. Several points are quite clear, however - trafficking is not centrally coordinated, involves corruption and leads to different routes for different nationalities. Networks differ among national groups and there may be discrimination against outsiders. Different nationalities can travel in groups to specific destinations depending on a number of variables, including the amount they are able to pay for travel. Perhaps even more important, migration histories from one place to another can reinforce links that vary in turn nationalities and ethnicities. While traffic operations are diverse and can involve many links in the migration chain, they are not particularly sophisticated.

Traffickers do not facilitate the passage of the Mediterranean from goodwill, studies have shown that their relationship with migrants is "short and distant" (Staring, R, 2004: 276).Traffic is a commercial transaction and traffickers can become brutal in their efforts to maximize profits and minimize risks for themselves, sometimes to the detriment of migrants. Faced with the search and rescue patrols of the Mare Nostrum operation, smugglers reacted in order to have uncovered and saved boats. They launched overloaded boats with limited amounts of food and water, considering that they would be discovered by the Italian navy or other commercial vessels.

The trafficking-migrant relationship may be unpleasant. Officers who have heard the traffickers' phone conversations reported that they are talking about cargo calculations in cynical, even tough terms. Recent testimonies, mainly of Syrian refugees, describe how smugglers rob, abuse and even kill migrants. The media highlighted a series of shocking stories such as the July 19, 2014 incident when five smugglers stabbed 60 migrants on a boat.(ANSA, 2014:3). However, once they arrive in Europe, many migrants protect the identity of the smugglers. Perhaps the fear of repercussions, to avoid engaging in a trial, or because they know home other potential migrants need their help.

Organisational structure

The term "smuggler" refers to unauthorized movement of individuals across the border for financial or other benefits of the trafficker.

According to the definition, the smuggler should not be on board with migrants and asylum seekers, the definition including both situations - when smugglers only provide the equipment for migrants and asylum seekers who want to enter Europe at sea or when smugglers are located themselves on board, helping migrants and asylum seekers to enter Europe illegally.

Organized crime groups are able to move faster than law and governments, with the simple advantage of not having to wait for new policies, legislative changes, and budgeting. Smugglers have adapted their routes and methods in response to EU border control, which has led to longer and potentially more dangerous travel for migrants. In addition, diversification of routes has led to an unintended increase in the area that European Union countries have to monitor. (Duvell,F ; Vollmer B., 2009:4). The growth of the covered geographical area attracts more individuals involved in the traffic industry.

Most of the traffic area is via networks that are fluid and change over time. Recent studies on migrant traffic report that professionals providing transport, immigration, translations or jobs are often used to facilitate the process. In some cases, the peak level of a traffic network is occupied by someone active in a legal business, such as a travel agency or a transport company. (Staring, R., 2004:276) Interviews with 199 Iranians trained to travel irregularly in December 2014 and January 2015, for example, included a common pattern of relying on legal travel agents who also provided fraudulent documentation and who could arrange the bribe on the transit pass. (J.Townsend; C.Oomen, 2017:6)

On the one hand these are useful remarks. Experience shows that it is difficult to combat such lax networks because each of their members can easily be replaced in the case of arresting one of them.

On the other hand, focusing on the difficulty of the task can hide the vulnerabilities that can be achieved. Trafficking networks, even if they are fluid, involve hierarchical relationships and long-term arrangements between individuals who know each other. A better understanding of these hierarchies - and of outside accomplices - could help direct law enforcement efforts.

Secondly, any network has nodes that vary in importance - the best connected metro system can be seriously affected by problems in some central stations. Research shows that only a detail of a print does not provide everything that is needed - an over-all-time vision that reveals the most important vulnerabilities in a given network, and which takes into account the fact that those who make it possible for migrant trafficking are not always in the most obvious positions (J.Townsend; C.Oomen, 2017:11) .

Relatives and friends can have an overwhelming importance in financing and training individuals for trafficking, which is not necessarily taken into account when we focus on criminal networks.

In law enforcement institutions that include corrupt officers, removing only a small number of senior officers may have a big impact.

According to an OECD report, unlike other regions, migrant trafficking in West Africa has not generated enough profit to establish adequate transnational criminal networks (Lacher,W., 2012:12) .

These pay-as-you-go smugglers are part of lax networks that disperse and re-form according to the transaction. These operations operate on the basis of cash payments paid directly to smugglers who spend them in local economies. The traffic is also facilitated by free movement within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), poor border controls and the fact that some of West African countries do not apply for a visa for West African citizens.

Interviews with migrants from reception centres in Italy indicate the total cost of their trip. Compared with the Syrians (who pay 2000 Euros for a boat), Africans pay around 600-800 Euros. Therefore, they are treated much worse, being locked up in the bottom of the stalls, not allowed to come to the deck, and are so busy that sometimes they ask.

There are two forms of migrant traffic - full-package and pay-as-you-go.

Smugglers offering a full package work almost like a transport agency: the migrant pays a large amount (sometimes several thousand euros per person) to the home country of a smuggler who solves a few services. Only a few sophisticated groups can offer such services because they involve complex coordination and financial capital to arrange transportation and pay bribes. Payment can be made in several stages. This type of trafficking often involves corruption at different levels of the process, as smugglers need to control the entire logistics chain across states. The high cost of the entire package on certain routes means that large debts can be contracted, increasing the risk of exploitation and coercion (human trafficking) to force the migrant to pay his debt once he arrives in the country of destination.

The other model - pay-as-you-go - the dominant model in many parts of the world (especially in West Africa) means that the final destination can not be predetermined and the speed and direction of the trip will depend on the funds the migrant has for each step. A migrant can work for several days, weeks or months in locations along the journey to pay different parts of it. For fear of robberies, migrants have only the amounts they need for the next step of the trip and use operators for the international money transfer to access their savings.

Among the people currently trafficked, namely the Eastern European route between Turkey and Greece, there are many potential refugees. Most of those coming from Syria use the pay-as-you-go system to get to Greece and then get in touch with other brokers to organize their trip through the Western Balkans or travel independently. In the first months of 2015, according to data provided by Frontex, 580,000 people used this route, including 370,000 Syrians.

Migrants from Afghanistan (130,000 only in the first ten months of 2015) belong either to the group who paid the entire travel package and come directly from Afghanistan or belong to less wealthy families or are individuals working to pay for each part of the their trip. Some of the Afghan asylum seekers in Europe come from refugee camps in Iran where living conditions have deteriorated much in recent times. There are a large number of juvenile Afghan refugees.

Smuggling has different forms and may involve a large number of intermediaries. It may take the form of structured transnational networks or, more often, informal organizations and individuals, less interconnected. Depending on the migration route, certain types of methods and services may predominate, but the following forms tend to coexist.

Smuggling is a specialized industry that requires local knowledge and specific skills. Migrants are turning to this service to map spaces that they can not navigate alone - desert or sea - or because they have to travel through different cultures - and do not speak the language, for example.

The techniques used by migrants take many forms depending on geography, border controls, enforcement choices, legal migration routes and the existence of trafficking networks. However, it is possible to distinguish between two different forms of illegal entry.

The first is illicit crossing of the border. This happens when someone, for example, tries to get through the border crossing points (airports, ports, and border crossings on land) hidden in the closed compartments of cars, trucks, buses, trains and containers. Migrants can try to cross the border illegally between the border crossing points, whether land or sea. In the European Union, this is a category of illegal entries that has recently increased: in 2014, more than 280 000 illegal border crossings have been registered between official border crossing points. In the first ten months of 2015 this number has reached to 1.2 million. By comparison, the number of clandestine entries recorded by Frontex at official border crossings was around 3000 in 2014 and 800 in the first 6 months of 2015.

The second type of fraudulent entry is the attempt to enter with fraudulent documents (e.g. fake or counterfeit passports, stolen identity cards or visas). This type is associated with corruption in either obtaining documents or using them. It is quite expensive to travel to the countries of the European Union that have high security standards for travel documents. In 2014, Frontex registered around 11,000 people who were refused entry because of fraudulent documents. It represents less than 10% of the total number of annual refusals either because they do not qualify for entry (e.g. absence of valid documents or visas, insufficient means of subsistence, lack of return ticket, lack of justification for entry) or because they are identified as posing a threat to public security.

Smuggling network organization

Coordinators are in charge of networks and assume overall responsibility for operations, especially in full-package offers. They are very well connected and able to communicate with different types of facilitators in countries of origin, transit and destination. They have different names such as "coyotes" in Mexico, "snakeheads" in Asia, "burgers" or "tchaga" in Nigeria.

At a lower level, recruiters advertise migrant trafficking services and establish contacts with potential migrants. Smugglers must have a certain number of migrants before concluding their business with a carrier. In some cases, migrants have to wait at a traffic-controlled connection point until the required number of migrants arrives to organize a convoy or load a boat.

Carriers and guides perform the operational part of the traffic. They are responsible for domestic transportation and illegal border crossing. Often they treat inhuman migrants or exploit the people they are guiding, and this is the most risky part of the journey. Guides are generally people of the place who operate relatively short distances. Carriers or guides operate on their own and only occasionally. In other cases, carriers have well-structured transport business (e.g. bus companies, taxi drivers)

Service providers provide services such as accommodation and food, vehicles or boats, false documents, etc. Cashiers are responsible for surrendering migrants' money to smugglers at the successfully completion of the operation. Presidents are migrants who have settled in critical locations and are recognized by their own community. They have developed local contacts and can corrupt local authorities. They advise migrants about behaviour in transit countries, contact them with local facilitators and in some cases supervise traffic operations for the next part of the trip.

There are different levels of coordination between these different actors. It is possible to distinguish between organizational structures or lax networks between local organizations that are occasionally aligned, between groups or individuals to inter-state pyramidal criminal organizations. On the whole, chain organizations without transnational hierarchies seem to predominate, but different organizational structures and traffic techniques usually co-exist. Because communication and trust between facilitators are key factors, trafficking usually takes place within homogeneous ethnic groups.

It is interesting to note that on some routes migrants from some countries of origin are treated separately. Migrants use different facilitators. Some people facilitate the illegal crossing of the border for reasons other than profit, such as helping families or humanitarian motivation. In this case, it is not about migratory traffic as defined by the United Nations, even though facilitators are generally exposed to sanctions in the countries of destination or transit.

It is important to note that migrants smuggling and trafficking of human beings would not be so widespread if there was not a certain degree of corruption. Collaboration with international police is important, but not enough. Trafficking may be abolished in the short term, but new organizations are emerging very quickly to replace them. Other types of action are needed to complement police work and respond to the deeper causes of the phenomenon.

For some authors, trafficking is a risk-based, reputable and trust-based industry where competition is high (Bilger, H.; Jandl, 2005:21). Smugglers operate in a market with imperfect information. Reputation is a risk factor for them when they have to hide from the police. Smugglers have to carry out their services if not, they are not paid, but the reputation and future of their business is in jeopardy. We note that the higher the price paid to smugglers, the higher the level of security and the guarantee of reaching the desired destination. This explains the co-existence on the same routes of the whole, relatively secure package and the pay system as you advance where migrants are treated as goods or worse.

Even if there are no clear figures on the profit made by smugglers, this is undoubtedly a very profitable business. It is very profitable, but it is also profitable for migrants who send home funds. Some migrants and their families consider the cost of irregular migration as an investment in future incomes. Obviously, these calculations do not apply to those who escape from war zones or whose lives are threatened in the country of origin.

Networks and entrepreneurs

According to data provided by Europol, over 40,000 individuals are suspected of being involved in smuggling. In 2015 Europe had information on 10 000 suspects, which brought 1551 investigations into networks active in the European Union (EUROPOL, 2016:10) . A significant proportion of these suspects operate as part of migrant networks. Their nationality, from the countries of origin, is Bulgaria, Egypt, Hungary, Iraq, Kosovo, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Syria and Turkey. 44% of networks are made up of individuals outside the European Union, 30% of EU nationals and 26% both from EU and non-EU nationals.

Networks operating in the Scandinavian countries, Belgium and source countries are generally composed of members of the same nationality, networks in the rest of Europe are more heterogeneous in composition.

13% of suspects known by Europol operate in their home country. The Hungarian and Swedish suspects seem to live and operate in their home country. These suspects already live at key migration or destination countries and therefore provide home-based services.

Some EU-based suspects are resident in the country of origin, such as Bulgarians, Romanians and Poles, but are primarily active in other Member States that are usually near their home country or in countries with a final destination such as Germany, the Netherlands or the UK. Most of these suspects work as drivers, transporting Eastern European migrants to Western Europe, or are members of organized groups seeking opportunities in larger migration centers.

Suspects without EU citizenship are particularly active in transit or destination countries. They are often organizers orchestrating migrant trafficking activities across the entire route and are based in destination countries. In other situations, they work as local coordinators and are located in transit countries.

Networks can vary in size. Smaller regional networks operate autonomously and rely on freelancers who act as drivers, document falsifiers, or organizers. In many cases, these freelancers provide services to multiple networks at the same time. Greater networks usually operate internationally and offer the whole package taking migrants from source to destination countries.

Networks are generally composed of a few key individuals.

The average age of traffickers arrested in 2015 was 36. Smugglers in Syria, Pakistan and Iraq tend to be younger than Western Balkans or EU states. The members of the Romanian networks are the youngest in networks with members with EU citizenship. The age of the suspects also depends on the role they play in the network. Romanian suspects arrested last year were generally drivers. Iraqi, Syrian, and Afghan suspects tend to be irregular migrants themselves and are involved in arranging facilitation services for their co-nationals.

Link to diaspora

Smuggling networks in source or transit countries exploit ethnic and national ties with EU diaspora communities. Certain irregular migrants often choose certain destination countries because there are communities with which they have national, linguistic and cultural links. Diaspora communities in these countries offer support and opportunities for irregular migrants to extend their stay in the EU. Members of the diaspora communities that are part of trafficking networks provide support for finding accommodations, arranging travel, or finding a job on the black market.

Smugglers and the media

Certain smugglers rely on the media to publicize their services. In the European Union, smugglers also use media platforms to recruit drivers. These platforms are used by smugglers and irregular migrants to share information about what is happening along migratory routes, including law enforcement activities, changes in asylum procedures, or unfavourable conditions in destination countries. This type of information allows other migrant traffickers to adapt to the changing conditions. Traffickers adjust their prices in response to increased border control demanding higher prices for alternative and safer routes.

Linking to other crimes and terrorism

The rising flow of migrants to come into the EU generated concern that smugglers networks are being used to infiltrate potential terrorists into the European Union. There is also concern that terrorist organizations rely on migrant traffic as a source of funding.

In 2015, the authorities identified a few isolated cases in which terrorist actors used migratory routes. Two of the suspects of the Paris attacks of 13 November 2016 travelled to Europe as irregular migrants.

Members of terrorist groups generally rely on real or fraudulent documents to travel to the European Union and typically do not rely on facilitation services provided by smuggling networks.

Conclusions

Anna Triandafyllidou in the article "Migrant Smuggling: Novel Insights and Implications for Migration Control Policies" considers that border closure policies have important implications, but in the opposite direction to what they want. Instead of discouraging migrants and dissipating migrant trafficking networks, these policies cause migrants to invest more money and face even more risks - sometimes even death - along the journey, while networks become more professional. Confidence and community-level relationships are only replaced by an attempt to achieve profit, which leads to even greater risks.

The same author believes that border control and the fight against migrant traffic must take into account regional economic and political processes. For example, the author shows, Gaddafi regime's fall in Libya and the abolition of the Libyan economy based on oil have left the Libyans and migrants you are already here without means of subsistence. Also, the war in Syria, the oppressions in Eritrea, the lack of security in Afghanistan, the treatment of Afghans in Iran are elements that have led to a strong motivation to migrate.

The author draws attention to the monetary value of border control. The European Union and the United States are spending millions on border protection by not only border guards, but also purchasing expensive equipment for border control such as infrared, thermal or radar cameras. This money does not help local or national economies and does not help solve the cause. They only lead to the exacerbation of police violence and the lack of scruples of traffickers while migratory flows are routed to other routes.(Tryandafyllidou, A., 2017:12)

With regard to measures to eradicate migrant smuggling, some authors believe that a first step would be to increase the costs they have. Financial costs, but also the risk of being punished. Tax increases that smugglers have to pay to intermediaries can be achieved by reinvigorating anti-bribery policies by improving technologies to prevent document falsification and increased detection, or increasing sanctions against carriers, and providing them with more profitable, alternative business options. Traffickers' profits can be reduced by increasing sanctions and improving identification of money laundering and traffickers themselves.

With regard to money laundering, it is necessary to understand the nature and purpose of financial transactions involved in traffic. In West Africa it seems that payments are made in small, informal amounts, making them difficult to control. In other cases, the costs are higher and the benefits concentrated on a limited number of beneficiaries. Improvements in financial investigations against traffickers are necessary.

Better identification of traffickers can be achieved not only by better border control and international police cooperation, but also through the involvement of trafficked migrants. In some countries, special visas are granted to migrants without documents participating in the identification of their traffickers. Many countries provide temporary permits to those cooperating in investigative or judicial processes. However, those who have benefited from the services of a smuggler and have successfully arrived in the destination country are unwilling to participate in this process.

One challenge is that smugglers quickly adapt to change, having three options - to leave the market and devote themselves to other illicit activities, increase prices or increase the number of smuggled people to achieve the same profit. The first option is unlikely, although migrants use the same routes as other types of illegal trade (drugs, weapons, artefacts, endangered species), human smuggling is different. Unlike supplies of drugs and weapons, human beings can transit from one smuggler to another, so migrant traffic is based more on interconnected networks than on the logistics of international criminal organizations. The prices could increase, but migrants have limited resources so that smugglers will only increase the low-cost offer, high risk with more people involved and resulting in increased deaths.

Preventing and informing such campaigns in home countries can affect demand by reducing the risk that potential customers are being cheated by unrealistic promises in destination countries. The pressure can also be reduced by promoting employment opportunities in countries of origin and reinvigorating security and stability in countries of origin.

The question is if legal migration can replace illegal migration.

The link between the existence of legal channels of economic migration and the persistence of irregular migration can appear to be very logical at first glance.

Some economists (Auriol and Mesnard, 2012: 3) proposed selling work permits to compete with the illegal offer of smugglers. In order to exhaust the offer of smugglers, the price of a legal visa must push smugglers to reduce their offer at marginal costs so that their business is no longer profitable. At the same time, Auriol and Mesnard show that this policy - without any other measures additional migration will generate a higher migration influx and some individuals with a variety of skills. If visa sales are used in combination with stricter border controls and employers 'controls, then migratory flows could be controlled by lowering traffickers' selling visas and increasing their operating costs through more stringent controls. In addition, these resources from the sale of visas can be used to finance tighter border controls and employers.

Some of the above mentioned measures have already been taken. However, the fact that actions have not been implemented in a coherent manner suggests that there is still no clear understanding of the key determinant factors that characterize traffic routes.

Over the last 15 years, some steps have been taken at international level to combat trafficking in human beings and human trafficking. Here we include the United Nations Protocol Against Trafficking in Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United

Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. This Protocol entered into force in 2004 and was signed by 130 countries.

The European Commission has also taken concrete measures against migrant trafficking by adopting an Action Plan to prevent migrant smuggling: increasing the gathering and dissipation of information, migrant smuggling prevention and assistance to vulnerable migrants, reinforcing cooperation with third countries

The issue of migrant smuggling has also been analysed at regional level in the Bali, Budapest, Khartoum, Puebla or Rabat process.

Strong legal bases are needed as a fundamental starting point to address the issue of migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and they have about the same DNA.

Efforts must also be made in sectors and industries employing illegal migrants or victims of trafficking such as the construction industry, agriculture, fishing, and textiles. Transparency and integrity standards should be developed for officials most at risk of being involved in corrupt business in relation to migrant smuggling or person trafficking, such as border control and migration agencies. The collection and use of data on migrant smuggling and human trafficking in relation to corruption needs to be improved.

Migrant smuggling has been categorized as a criminal act, but its causal roots are poverty and aspiration for a better life. Even if traffic is technically a transnational crime organized in many regions or countries of origin, it is not perceived as being against the law nor stigmatized. This is especially true in regions where the population is accustomed to moving freely across borders and in pastoral societies, especially in West Africa. Migrants are not considered to be victims or participants in a criminal act, and smugglers do not think they would do something illegal. Rather, they feel they are service providers in terms of migrant aspirations.

Therefore, migration, even when smuggling is involved, is a matter of development involving economic disparities and the challenge of providing a sustainable lifestyle. Criminalization of migrants smuggling is necessary. However, law enforcement must be accompanied by strategies that respond to basic causes if the goal is to end migrant smuggling.

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III. Cultural Integration, Values and Froms of Multiculturalism

THE BUSINESS EFFECT OF AN INTERNATIONAL INTERNSHIP PROGRAM ON ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL INTEGRATION WITHIN THE “EN” GROUP IN JAPAN

Cristian VLAD*

Abstract. *After the acquisition of the Wall Street Associates executive hiring firm in 2012, en Japan, a Tokyo based talent operations organization was struggling with the integration of the newly acquired multinational business. In 2015, three years after the merger, the organization was still divided due to language, cultural and operational mindset differences. In an effort to enhance the internationalization of the mono-cultural en Japan business, the Founder and Chairman, Michikatsu Ochi, together with the President, Takatsugu Suzuki, as well as the HR team agreed in March 2015 to welcome a group on international internship students from overseas universities, in view of potentially hiring the ones with the right cultural fit at the end of the program. This was the first time ever the Firm was considering international hires straight out of overseas universities, a practice still rare in corporate Japan. At the end of the three-month internship program, the Firm understood the importance of hiring and including diverse talent, as the international students proved to be highly eligible candidates for hiring, as, in the short period of time, they introduced the Firm to new technology, collaborative talent practices and contributed to the integration of the two internal cultures.*

Keywords: *Internship, Innovation, Transformation, Talent, Organization, Japan*

I. Introduction

One of the largest staffing and recruiting agencies in Japan, en Japan inc. acquired and merged with Wall Street Associates, one of the largest international talent recruiting agencies in Asia in March 2012. Three years after the merger, en Japan was still struggling to integrate the newly acquired business, both in terms of operations as well as in terms of culture. Following the 2012 M&A, Wall Street Associates changed its company name to en World Japan, inspired by name of the mother company, en Japan. In Japanese, “en” refers to serendipity, *karma*, the combination of relations and circumstances which bring people together beyond logical understanding. Despite taking a new name, in January 2015 en World had not changed much else. Most operations were still carried out in English within a modern office, oozing an international atmosphere, located in the fashionable Kyobashi area, right next to Tokyo Station, by some 10 km away from Nishi-Shinjuku, where the parent company carried business as usual in Japanese, in a traditional environment. It goes without saying that the difference in the language of business communications and the

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physical distance between the two offices contributed to the psychological gap between the two organizations, but it was not only that.

It was also the nature of business conducted in the two offices that contributed to the mentality gap. Although both businesses were servicing seekers of new career opportunities, the type of candidates served was completely different. en Japan was mainly looking after young Japanese candidates, people who had less than five years of experience with their employer. This type of candidate is commonly called *dai-ni shinsotsu* (second-time new graduates) in Japan, inferring that, although the individual has spent a few years with a certain organization upon graduation from university, he or she has not been exposed to a lot of decision making; therefore, the individual still behaves as a new graduate, without much career experience. Most of en Japan's candidates were monolingual Japanese who would end up changing work from one traditional Japanese employer to another. en World International, on the contrary, was mainly providing career services to multilingual mid-career international employees with a minimum of eight to ten years of business experience, professionals who would end up moving from one international company to another, sometimes even experiencing a considerable pay raise or a cross-border relocation.

In 2015, the languages spoken within the two offices created an even deeper mentality gap. In en-Japan, Japanese was the main language of operations in Shinjuku, while English was predominantly spoken within en World in upscale Kyobashi. Although both languages were considered "official" for major communications within both offices, in 2015 there were only six bilingual employees, managers and directors who had functional command of both languages. At this time, there were 2,386 employees working for en Japan within the Nishi-Shinjuku office, as well as other offices around the country, concentrated in the main hiring locations of Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka and Fukuoka. Out of these, only five could speak and write business English in order to communicate with their colleagues working in the newly acquired organization. Within en World International, although 668 out of the 676 of the total employees were either bilingual Japanese nationals or international professionals completely fluent in Japanese, all official communication with the parent company was going through a small group of three integration experts who would meet periodically to exchange statistics and other necessary corporate information.

In an effort to bridge organizational culture and to help speed up the integration of the international associates working in "en World", en Japan decided in March 2015, at the recommendation of the Innovation Strategy Director, to welcome a small group of eight internship students coming from overseas to experience life and work in Japan and to help communications between the two organizations. Four out of the eight new comers were to be located in the monolingual en Japan office in Shinjuku, while the other four were expected to join the international working environment of the en World office in Kyobashi. All of the interns were coming from prominent academic institutions across Asia, majoring in Humanities, Liberal Arts and Social Science.

From a local business perspective, en Japan is considered to be one of the youngest and most dynamic career services providers in Japan. Emerging as a spin-off coming out of Recruit, one the oldest and largest career services providers in Japan, by January 2015 en Japan Inc. grew to be the third largest player within the industry, after only Recruit and Intelligence, the other two larger competitors, with a capital of 112 million JPY. A single-minded and novelty averse one-man owned company, en Japan prospered by changing operations from a traditional print-based recruiting model to an online business service and, backed by the booming IT developments of the late 1990s, it grew at dazzling speed, becoming the third largest player in the country within less than twenty years after its inception. en Japan entered JASDAQ in 2014.

II Research Objective, Method and Objects

Objective

The main objective of this research is toillustrate the benefits for corporations in hosting international students through internship programs in Japan. International internship programs geared at students with Humanities and Social Science backgrounds have not made the object of corporate attention, as it has been hard to determine what clear benefits there were for the hosting organizations.

Research Objects

En Japan Inc., a Japan-based career services provider with 2,386 employees in Japan, with regional headquarters (HQ) in Tokyo and main operational offices in Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka and Fukuoka and sales offices located in all major urban areas throughout the country. (HQ offices employ 1,686 people)

Research Methodology

We conducted research based on business case studies. Additionally, the author of this research engaged in first-hand participant observation (Yin 2003) of this change management process. Therefore, he could observe the stages of corporate confusion, the various stages of decision making and the whole procedures of organizational and cultural integration, with the eyes of an in-house full-time team member, from the start of the project until the end.

III The Integration Process

Upon their arrival in Japan, the students were separated into two even groups of four, one group joining the en Japan office in Nishi-Shinjuku, while the other group joined the en World in the Kyobashi office. Both teams were given the mission of helping the two organizations to create a common business culture, in order to better integrate operations, service development and communications.

The two teams started working right away. They decided to run a weekly series of “jam sessions” with their respective HR, Operations, Marketing and Sales teams and to reach out to each other on a weekly basis to share findings, to monitor progress and discuss further steps of collaboration and cultural integration. Both teams were expected to report to Global HR, the President and the Founder of the company once a month to share findings, to discuss possible solutions and to propose next steps.

In order to better understand the current situation and to be able to monitor progress, the interns developed and deployed an employee engagement survey, which was shared on-line with the whole existing employee population, both in English and in Japanese. The ratio of respondents was a surprising 82%, 64% of which clearly indicated that they had no understanding of the corporate philosophy, that they were not happy with their working environment and that they would not recommend a friend or a relative to work for the firm.

Two weeks into the program, after having run 4 jam sessions per team and location, the interns reunited to discuss the first series of findings. The results ranged from the necessity to align the two organizations in terms of technology, business objectives, corporate Mission, Vision and Values, to a common understanding of customer needs (both in terms of candidates and client organizations).

IV.Discussions and Actions

The first common discussion with Global HR, the President and the Founder of the Company revealed compelling business realities, such as the need to better understand customer and candidate needs, but also to go beyond language barriers and develop a common set of business values to share within both organizations and within the region, with associates working in other overseas offices. The interns proposed a series of actions, such as setting up a “Customer Complaint Purchasing Center”, a new function which would pay 1,000 JPY for each complaint registered from existing customers. This function allowed for an instantaneous connection to the “Customer’s Voice”, leading to a total of 3,806 complaints, comments and requests for service improvement coming directly from the customers in the span for 6 weeks.

Alternatively, the Founder of the business took it upon himself to develop and plan the communication of the new corporate philosophy, detailing on the concept of “en” (serendipity), the historical perspective of that philosophy and the vision for future common growth within the region. The interns helped with the development of the English, Mandarin Chinese, Korean, Thai and Vietnamese versions of the corporate philosophy and they created a series of communications materials, such message posters, managers’ tool kits, a cartoon based “Philosophy Book” and corporate image videos, which were shared with associates within the region. The videos featured real employees talking about the corporate philosophy, concrete business situations, emotional episodes, personal aspirations and commitments. The employees featured in these videos took pride in being selected for this campaign and shared the video materials with their colleagues, customers and families.

The interns joined the President and the Founder of the business in townhall meetings across the region to discuss with local associates and customers the newly developed philosophy and the alignment with their business realities. This included prospecting and on-boarding modern technology, ranging from deep learning to cognitive, automated solutions for candidate profiling and opportunity search, as well as for feasibility and fit assessments. Technology insofar had been utilized mainly for posting announcements on on-line job boards and for candidate search on digital platforms, without the utilization of automatized database search, smart analytics, cognitive functions or any artificial intelligence empowered solutions.

Three months after the beginning of the internship program, the students launched a last round of employee engagement surveys on-line to monitor progress with the deployment of the organizational culture. This time, 86% of the employee population responded, with only 8% indicating that they do not understand or agree with the corporate culture (Hofstede eds. 2010), while only 6% indicated that they would not recommend the company as a place of employment to a friend or a family member. Most of the respondents indicated that they were confident of their newly introduced technological solutions and that they could see a sustainable future for their career with the organization, which had decided to commit to meaningful globalization of talent and the introduction of modern technologies.

V. Conclusion

Although the internship program was a run for a three-month period of time, the following main results could be observed throughout the post M&A corporate culture integration process:

① The involvement of the international students propelled the company in its efforts to align organizational values

② They helped integrate organizational communications

③ They played key innovative roles in developing and deploying corporate culture and value penetration

④ They involved employees from all sides of the business in the philosophy dissemination process as well as in the process of on-boarding new technology.

⑤ They proposed and implemented a series of organizational architecture development and cultural integration projects new to the company, projects which were visually engaging and simple to connect with, generating innovative ideas propelled the diversity of though brought in by liberal arts and innovation management students.

The customer suggestions and requests for service improvement collected through the "Customers Complaint Purchasing Center" developed by the intern students is still in usage, continuously supporting the company in collecting valuable customer information related to existing business shortages, emerging needs and expectations. The Founder of the company himself was surprised to the change in employee engagement, as indicated by the two surveys run before and after the program, as well as by impact of the integrated communications actions developed and deployed by the group of international interns. All interns were offered employment by the company upon graduation and were invited to help support the further growth of the business within the Asia-Pacific region.

The internship program benefitted en Japan in organizational culture integration by enhancing cross-cultural communications and bringing down organizational silos through innovative processes, ranging from customer information collection to the process of on-boarding modern cognitive technology for new service development efforts.

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LIFE AREAS AS VEHICLES OF DIALOGUE AND INTERCULTURAL EXPRESSIONS

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Abstract. *Promoting intercultural dialogue has been a priority for most European institutions and recent developments have underlined its importance, bringing a new emphasis on this issue. This paper would like to provide a brief evaluation of recent initiatives in the area of intercultural dialogue, taking into account different fields with direct link to diversity and intercultural dialogue. Intercultural dialogue does not exclusively deal with social and political issues. It also considers the importance of dialogue in the relationship between most of life areas: religion, museums, art, music, sports, literature, languages and many others.*

The current article is dedicated to the role of intercultural dialogue by covering some issues related to the importance of direct interaction between representatives of different languages and cultures. Respecting and promoting linguistic diversity lays the ground for all citizens to take an active part in social, economic and cultural life and to shape skills and abilities in intercultural communication. In a wider sense, the aim of intercultural dialogue is to learn and to want to live together peacefully and constructively in a multicultural world and to develop a sense of community and belonging.

Keywords: *intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity, linguistic diversity, multiculturalism, social integration*

Some concepts of dialogue and intercultural dialogue

Dialogue is considered as a rational conversation between two or more persons. The word is derived from the Greek *dialogos*, which in turn comes from *dialegethai* (to converse). Dialegethai comes from *dia* (through, across) and *legein* (to speak). Today the meaning of this concept is perceived, according to J. Tarnowski, as a method, process and social attitude. The method describes patterns of inter-human communication conducted for the sake of mutual understanding, rapprochement and finally, cooperation.

The word *dialogue* as given in the dictionary of Catholic social science describes the term as conversation aimed at mutual confrontation and understanding of views, and as cooperation in the search for true protection of general human values and work for justice and peace.

Dialogue distinguishes itself from debate because it involves a form of listening that is beyond position or profession. Dialogue is described as a process of exchanging information where participants leave the dialogue with a deeper knowledge level and wider frame of reference than when they approached it. It involves the creation of an expandable context.

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Dialogue is successful to the extent that all parties to it are permanently stretched beyond their opening views. Furthermore, dialogue distinguishes itself from debate because negotiation is a discussion in which the participants try to strike a deal or reach an agreement of some kind. In other words, negotiation is the art of give and take. In contrast with the art of negotiation and debate, a dialogue may request from its participants to see each other not as an abstract being, but as a particular individual and the process as one of accepting the other.

It is also relevant to consider the concept of *culture* in order to understand one of the two elements of the word, *intercultural*. By definition, culture is always embodied in a specific community, in the way its members feel, think and act. That is, in the way they understand themselves and the world, realize their happiness, express their moral, religious and political values, and establish particular relations as individuals and groups in every sphere of practical living (Ariva, p. 4).

Once we have defined the constitutive elements of the concept, we may proceed towards the definition of *intercultural dialogue*. Intercultural is perceived as a path to conviviality and multiculturalism in which cultures influence each other without destroying themselves or entering into clashes or conflicts. One of the major challenges of the future is to devise dialogues between cultures able to balance unity and solidarity with tolerance and diversity. Intercultural dialogue becomes a necessity not only for overcoming conflicts but also for rethinking and responding to global challenges faced by humanity.

The Council of Europe offered a definition forthe *Intercultural dialogue,* as an ”open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that leads to a deeper understanding of the other’s global perception”.

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave the following significance to intercultural dialogue: “Without this dialogue taking place every day among all nations – within and between civilizations, cultures and groups – no peace can be lasting and no prosperity can be secure”. Outlining the value of dialogue between civilizations launched by the United Nations, he stressed that “it helps us draw on the deeper, ancient roots of cultures and civilizations to find what unites us across all boundaries, and [...] perhaps most important [...] helps us discern the role of culture and civilization in contemporary conflicts, and so to distinguish propaganda and false history from the real cause of war”.

Dialogue between cultures, the oldest and most fundamental mode of democratic conversation, is an antidote to rejection and violence. Its objective is to enable us to live together peacefully and constructively in a multicultural world and to develop a sense of community and belonging.

Aims of Intercultural Dialogue

Earlier assumptions considered dialogue between cultures similar to the dialogue between persons. Others believed that the real purpose of intercultural dialogue was to reduce international violence (war, terrorism), while there were others who thought that the ultimate goal of intercultural dialogue is fostering global economic development.

At this point we may also introduce the concept of the intercultural person, since he or she represents one who has achieved an advanced level in the process of becoming intercultural and whose cognitive, affective, and behavioral characteristics are not limited, and are open to growth beyond the psychological parameters of any one culture.

Thus, a person becomes international, universal or multicultural.

As phrased by UNESCO, the complication is that one person in an interaction cannot be interculturally competent alone, because interaction is a process co-constructed jointly by all participants. If together participants manage well, then together they are interculturally competent. If not, then it is simply inaccurate to say one of them was competent and the other incompetent. This notion of co-construction, of jointly making our interactions with others, rests at the heart of any intercultural encounter. Each encounter is about making something, creating something, jointly with at least one other person, and so the process of interaction must serve as focus. In any case, intercultural dialogue is the first step to taking advantage of different cultural traditions and histories to expand the list of possible solutions to common problems. Intercultural dialogue is thus an essential tool in the effort to resolve intercultural conflicts peacefully, and a precondition for cultivating a culture of peace[1].

In a wide sense, the aim of intercultural dialogue is to learn and to want to live together peacefully and constructively in a multicultural world and to develop a sense of community and belonging. Intercultural dialogue can also be a tool for the prevention and resolution of conflicts by enhancing the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The following objectives should be taken into consideration in order to have a respectful exchange of views between individuals:

- to identify similarities and differences between different cultural traditions and perceptions;
- to share visions of the world, to understand and learn from those that do not see the world with the same perspective we do;
- to bridge the divide between those who perceive diversity as a threat and those who view it as an enrichment;
- to share best practices particularly in the areas of intercultural dialogue, the democratic management of social diversity and the promotion of social cohesion;
- to develop jointly new projects.

But the real aim of intercultural dialogue is considered to be the reduction of international violence: terrorism and war. However, intercultural dialogue implies an understanding that leads to praxis. Therefore dialogue cannot be accomplished merely by holding conferences, but should be built into the very structure of the cultures of the world. Dialogue, in this sense, is a rational conversation between two parties in an atmosphere of freedom, respect, equality, trust, and commitment to truth.

Life areas as direct link to the intercultural dialogue

Intercultural dialogue does not exclusively deal with social and political issues. It also considers the importance of dialogue in the relationship between all fields or areas of activity: religion, museums, art, music, sports, literature, languages and many others.

Since 2008 the Council of Europe organizes on an annual basis the *Exchanges on the religions dimension of intercultural dialogue*, with the participation of representatives of religious communities, non-religious convictions, NGO's and other civil society actors, as well as representatives of member States' governments. The Exchange provides a platform for dialogue between public authorities, religious communities and organizations representing non-religious beliefs, and broader civil society on topics of particular importance to the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue. In 2007, in the context of its Chairmanship, San Marino set up the first European conference on "The religious

[1] https://en.unesco.org/interculturaldialogue/core-concepts

dimension of intercultural dialogue". In May 2008, the White Paper on intercultural dialogue "*Living together as equals in dignity*", highlighted the contribution of both religious and secular groups to European cultural heritage; and it is today widely recognized as the reference document on managing diversity in a democratic way[2].

Religious people and communities of many different faith traditions have a long history of aid for those in need, including those fleeing war, poverty or persecution. Religious orders and monasteries of various traditions offered places of safety and aid to the poor, and from the 19th century onwards religiously based charities of many different faith backgrounds have become involved in humanitarian assistance of various kinds (Goodall, 2015:1).

Pope John Paul II asserted that the church and the scientific community will inevitably interact; their options do not include isolation. Science can purify religion from error and superstition. Religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the other into a wider world, a world in which both can flourish. According to his attitude, we need each other to be what we must be, what we are called to be (this was according to Pope John Paul II, Letter to Director of the Vatican Observatory, 1.6.1988, in Papal Addresses 9, p. 300).

Festivals, films, museums, exhibitions or drama are among the most powerful ways at people's disposal for them to express their worldviews, emotions and opinions. Art is the most used instrument (and through the most varied forms), for remembrance and celebration of important events, for preserving collective identities, for honoring people. Through art, individuals and groups also actively exert citizenship and propagate opinions: they claim rights, denounce atrocities, influence public opinion and encourage action of their peers. Art is used to educate youngsters, to animate groups, to stimulate solidarity and collective links and to foster community wellbeing, or solely to touch the inner world of spirituality and worship, celebrating cultural diversity (Gonçalves, Majhanovich, 2016:7) .

Can music play a role in intercultural dialogue? Experience shows that shared musical experiences can generate strong emotions and an increasing number of cross-cultural musical projects would seem to indicate that people are seeking this shared experience across cultures in order to reach out to each other and achieve a better understanding. The French romantic poet and novelist Victor Hugo wrote: "Music expresses that which cannot be put into words and cannot remain silent." The German romantic metaphysics of art declared music a 'language above language'. This line of thought was continued in the second half of the 19th century by Schopenhauer, Wagner and Nietzsche, who considered music as an expression of the 'essence of things'. Nietzsche said that "Without music, life would be an error." Music was elevated by writers to a 'language of a spirit world', and the symphony was used as a prototype for absolute music.

Performers, composers and audiences did not only discover the enhanced creativity generated by the intercultural musical encounter, they also came to experience the transcendental power of this hermeneutical dialogue which effortlessly crosses cultural and linguistic boundaries. This can be well illustrated by the example of jazz. During the first half of the 20th century, throughout the Western world, jazz was perceived as the 'music of the black ' and regarded as the symbol of primitivism, animalism, evil and a

[2]https://search.coe.int/directorate_of_communications/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680761567

menace to Christianity and civilization.Later on, jazz bands members picked musicians from different ethnic backgrounds and nationalities, consciously deciding to ignore linguistic barriers and rather base their collaboration on musical excellence and intuitive understanding. This way jazz has become everyone's music (McKimm-Vorderwinkler, 2010:5).

Already accepted as a tool for social integration, sport is also seen as a means of promoting intercultural understanding in an increasingly diverse Europe. Regarding the contribution of sport to intercultural dialogue, a declaration annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty, 1997, ”emphasizes the social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity and bringing people together”. In addition, politicians and sports stakeholders agree that sport can act as a tool for social integration. Several Euro barometer surveys show that almost three in four EU citizens view sport as a means of promoting integration, while two thirds perceive sports as a means of fighting discrimination[3].

In 2003, the European Commission ordered a study to examine ”the contribution of sport, as an instrument of non-formal education, to the multicultural dialogue between young people” as well as ”the part it plays in promoting the integration of recent migratory flows”. The study provides policy recommendations on increasing the use of sport to promote intercultural dialogue as well as on issues related to refugees and asylum seekers and the use of EU structural funds . It gives examples of good practice for sporting organizations serving culturally diverse communities.

UEFA president and former French football star Michel Platini has made a passionate plea for preserving the exclusivity of football and sport across EU regulations, arguing the game is a vital cog in the process of social and cultural integration across the continent (Kukhler, 2008).

Platini stated that ”European sport has always been a powerful catalyst for social and cultural integration. Millions of children from all parts of the world have become and continue to become European by kicking a ball around a muddy pitch in our towns or countryside before going to school [...] Grassroots sport is an extraordinary catalyst for ethnic intermixing and integration. Football in particular is a welcoming, protecting and integrating sport”[4].

Generally, the literary context surprises between different cultures the act of communication through the exchange of ideas and the identification in the other of some patterns of writing, collaboration that ends with the construction of writer identity.

It has been said that literary works can benefit and advance intercultural understanding. For instance, Mazi-Leskovar, a professor from Ljubljana asserts that “literature should alert readers to all those who are in one way or another different from the readers themselves. Literature thus encourages inter and intercultural awareness”. Multicultural literature remains one of the sources through which issues related to intercultural communicative competence can be successfully addressed. Works of literature enable the reader to observe the world from several perspectives and cherish the diversity of individual perception and the power of literature lies in its unique ability to deeply involve the reader both at a cognitive, as well as emotional level (Steppat, 2017:4).

Abdo Abboud, professor of Comparative Literature at the University of Damascus, agrees thatliterature is a mirror of the social and cultural relationships within a people, a society and a culture. When works of literature are translated from a foreign

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[3] https://www.euractiv.com/section/sports/linksdossier/sport-and-intercultural-dialogue/

[4] *Sport and Intercultural Dialogue,* on https://www.euractiv.com/section/sports/linksdossier/sport-and-intercultural-dialogue/**,** 25 Feb. 2010

language, the recipients in the new language are enabled to achieve insight into the social and cultural conditions of that people or nation. And because dialogue between cultures requires channels, literature is also a highly important tool in that dialogue. If one wishes to get to know a culture, two options are available: either one learns the language, or one reads the literature in translation. Language teaching is subject to limitations, simply because there are so many languages, that it's impossible to learn them all. So translation will continue to be the most important channel of communication between cultures.

Languages, the main vehicle in the intercultural dialogue

In all European countries multiculturalism and diversity has become an every day reality. To ensure a harmonious interaction between people and groups with different cultural and religious identities, respect for cultural diversity, tolerance, dialogue and cooperation are becoming basic social skills needed by every European citizen. Intercultural learning, intercultural dialogue, intercultural competence must be understood as one of the preconditions for individuals to cope with the new challenges of having to build societies that must be based on respecting people in their diversity. Intercultural learning is an experience which involves all senses and levels of learning, knowledge, emotions, behavior in an intensive way. Language is one of the most visible elements of culture and in that sense a central aspect in intercultural communication.

Language-learning bridges cultures and promotes intercultural dialogue and respect. It is an important tool for fostering dialogue and fighting racism and discrimination because it opens our horizons to the richness of cultures and ideas brought by migrants from all continents to the European area.

The priority of languages as identity signs becomes evident when dealing with issues relating to language loss and the emergence of new linguistic practices. From the perspective of intercultural relations, safeguarding linguistic diversity goes hand-in-hand with promoting multilingualism and must be matched by efforts to ensure that languages serve as a bridge between cultures, as a means to promoting the successful diversity of the world’s cultures[5].

Learning languages, understanding other languages, builds bridges between people, between communities and cultures. Of course, speaking someone's languages doesn't mean we solve all our problems. But it is a window, a way of appreciating that another point of view, another perspective, exists. And that's an essential starting point to understanding each other better.

Linguists believe that a large percentage of the world’s languages are likely to disappear in the course of the 21st century. While the precise number of languages spoken in the world today is disputed, inventories in evaluating languages statistics such as the *Ethnologue and Linguasphere* put the total between 6,000 and 8,000.

Endangered languages and their extinction

About 2,500 languages are in danger of becoming extinct according to UNESCO, and some of them are spoken by only 30 people. By the turn of the century, it is estimated that at least 50 per cent of the world's current spoken languages will be extinct.

There is an increased social consciousness around the importance of language diversity in the development and maintenance of knowledge, cultural heritage and human

[5] *Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue*, UNESCO World Report, UNESCO Publishing, Paris, 2009, p. 67

dignity, under the related causes of linguistic human rights and the protection of endangered languages (Paolillo, 2006).

An endangered language is one that is likely to become extinct in the near future. Many languages are failing out of use and being replaced by others that are more widely used in the region or nation, such as English in the U.S. or Spanish in Mexico. Unless current trends are reversed, these endangered languages will become extinct within the next century. Many other languages are no longer being learned by new generations of children or by new adult speakers; these languages will become extinct when their last speaker dies. In fact, dozens of languages today have only one native speaker still living, and that person's death will mean the extinction of the language: It will no longer be spoken, or known, by anyone (Woodburry, Anthony C., 1992).

The distribution of languages and language families around the world tells an important story about the successive waves of human expansion throughout the habitable areas of the globe.

The most dramatic examples of language extinctions in recent history occurred in the Americas and Australia. At the time of Columbus, an unknown number of distinct languages, easily in the thousands, were spoken in the Americas. Today, as a result of wars, disease and incorporation into the populations of European colonists, only a few hundred remain, and many of those remaining, especially in North America, are near extinction or in danger of being replaced by a European Language (Adelaar 1991:70).

The causes of language death and extinction are numerous and may reflect deliberate human action, involving violence and coercion, or accidental circumstances, through contact with neighbors, absorption into other linguistic groups or natural causes. Generally, language loss is preceded by some sort of multilingualism, whether societal, through coexistence of different language varieties in the same geographic area, or individual, through individuals knowing more than one language (Wurm, 1992:263). Although most languages go extinct because their speakers are absorbed by a dominant language or cultural group, many languages are simply oppressed out of existence, usually by a colonial power or their descendants. So, sometimes the answer to question *Why are languages extincted?* is simply: “Because the government said so”.

Language statistics are collected in a number of ways, depending on the purpose, resources available for their collection and the nature of the entities collecting the statistics. Large compilations of language statistics are therefore heterogeneous, in comprising a body of statements gathered through different means. Unfortunately, a major consequence of this is that the statistics so gathered are often not readily comparable to one another, and it can be very difficult to know what sort of information one really has.

At present, the field of linguistics is only a small part of the occupation of linguists. While many linguistics graduate programs require a component of training in linguistic fieldwork, this requirement is not universal, nor is it focused entirely on under-described languages. Linguistic field surveys are also rare, being complex to organize and relatively expensive for their participants’ time and resources. Consequently, much of the information that exists about smaller language groups is likely to be out of date.

Because so many languages are in danger of disappearing, linguists, the very few ones interested in this concern, are trying to learn as much about them as possible, so that even if the language disappears, all knowledge of the language won't disappear at the same time. Researchers make videotapes, audiotapes and written records of language use in both formal and informal settings, along with translations.

In addition, they analyze the vocabulary and rules of the language and write dictionaries and grammars. Linguists also work with communities around the world that want to preserve their languages, offering both technical and practical help with language teaching, maintenance and revival. This help is based in part on the dictionaries and grammars that they write. But linguists can help in other ways, too, using their experience in teaching and studying a wide variety of languages. They can use what they've learned about other endangered languages to help a community preserve its own language, and they can take advantage of the latest technology for recording and studying languages (Woodburry, Anthony C., 1992).

Preserving these languages is important, and UNESCO explains why: ”Languages are humankind's principle tools for interacting and for expressing ideas, emotions, knowledge, memories and values. Languages are also primary vehicles of cultural expressions and intangible cultural heritage, essential to the identity of individuals and groups. Safeguarding endangered language is thus a crucial task in maintaining cultural diversity worldwide”.

From the perspective of cultural diversity, linguistic diversity reflects the creative adaptation of groups to their changing physical and social environments. In this sense, languages are not just a means of communication, but represent the very fabric of cultural expressions. We may say they are the carriers of identity, values and worldviews. The respect for linguistic and cultural diversity is a cornerstone of the European Union. But we must constantly renew the efforts to relate these values to citizens' lives. Languages can make that link. Learning languages can make Europeans more aware that a better Europe lies at our doorsteps, a Europe that can deal with the complex reality of multiethnic societies and the coexistence of different cultural identities and beliefs.

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ON THE ORIGINS OF THE SWISS SONDERFALL. AN ENCURAGING VIEW ON THE SUBJECT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN A FEDERAL STATE WITHOUT ETHNICITY, ILLUSTRATED BY THE HISTORIC AND THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SWISS SONDERFALL.

Christian BERGMANN*

Abstract. *Switzerland is a small country, with roughly 8 million habitants, yet it has an important role in political sciences. It can be viewed as an experimental field on several aspects, one is its multilingual character, the other the federal organization, and the most important its direct democratic tools for popular participation in decision making and constitutional change. One important question is, can Switzerland be viewed as a model for future state organization? In the following article, you will get to know Switzerland from a historic perspective, mentioning the cases which made Switzerland special. There are also some thoughts at the end, about how much Romania could profit from the Swiss model.*

Keywords: *Switzerland, multilingualism, federalism, neutrality, direct democracy, national identity*

The following article should be considered as a brief introduction to Switzerland, consisting of Swiss history and the evolution of the Sonderfall.

Why a history about Switzerland and the Sondefall? The *Sonderfall Schweiz (special case Switzerland)*, to which scholars refer to when talking about Switzerland, can be best understood by reviewing the country`s history (Linder 2004, p. 1, Reinhardt 2008, p. 2, Vatter 2016, p. 33, Watts 2008, p. 32). But also, Switzerland is a country which has four official languages, stated in the Federal Constitution (Swiss Federal Constitution of 1999, art. 4, p. 2, Widmer 2007, p. 151): German, French, Italian and Rumantsch. At first you might think that is not a big deal (Belgium has 3, Canada has 2) but if you look closer, you will notice that for example Rumantsch, is only spoken by less than one percent of the entire Swiss population, Italian by roughly eight and French by 22% (Bundesamt für Statistik, *Strukturerhebung 2018*). And yet, all four language groups have their rights codified in the Federal Constitution. There are more aspects about Switzerland, we will see about that, but to keep the volume bearable, the work will focus mainly on elements directly linked to the Sonderfall: Multilingualism, Federalism, Neutrality and Direct Democracy (Widmer 2007, p. 101).

Another notable aspect of Switzerland is that it was constituted by people with the free will to form a nation. It is not constituted through ethnicity or language or destiny (Maissen 2010, p. 8). We will start with an introduction to the early history of Switzerland and see where we can find a guiding path, which will show us the developement of the characteristics of the *special case*.

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The work will conclude with an epilog about how far Switzerland could be viewed as a modell for Romania and its own minority problems.

I am sure that most people already know a lot about Switzerland, it is famous for its mountains and the ski resorts, for the fancy wristwatches, banks and finances and last but not least, the finest cheese and chocolate in the world (authors appraisals). But only a few really know the original value of Switzerland, as a model for an almost perfect federal republic with unparalleled rights to political participation for all its citizens (Vatter 2016, p. 33,Bonjour 2010, p. 6, Widmer 2007, p. 101). But let us take a look where that comes from and why it is unique to Switzerland.

Archeologists analyzed a biface made of silex in 1977, found in Pratteln a small town in the canton of Basel-Land, north-west Switzerland. The biface is dated roughly from the Lower Paleolithic era, between 450,000 and 350,000 BC (Osterwalder 1977, p. 11-13; Leuzinger 2014, p. 8). That is, so far, the oldest artefact of primitive civilization found within the territory of modern day Switzerland.

But we have to wait some more time, until about 8,000 BC, the Neolithicum, to get a more important reference. It is the time of the *pile dwelling villages*, entire villages built on wooden piles on lake shores, a few feet above sea level on high tide. They are considered to be an important source for the study of prehistoric societies (Trachsel 2005, p. 299). But there are absolutely no written documents from that time, only archeological findings, although of very good quality (Trachsel 2005, p. 320). Scholars from the 1867 era, belived that this is the beginning of Swiss history (Leuzinger 2014, p. 13).

And still, this is just another hint for more advanced civilization in Switzerland, but without any consequences for today`s political system. Again we have to wait several more years, around 500 BC, the Iron Age or La Tène epoch, for findings with a certain meaning for Switzerland. The indications from that time period, come from early Roman and Greek travelogues, refering to the “Swiss“ as a Celtic tribe, (Osterwalder 1977, p. 174-176) and in the period of approximately 450 BC, we find the people of the Helvetics and the Rhetian, among others, both Celtic tribes, inhabiting todays Swiss western and eastern territory. Unfortunately, again, there are neither written records nor any stories coming from those tribes, we only know about their habits and appearance, through quite well documented Roman chronics and some archeological findings (Meyer 1984, p. 11-13). It is belived that the Helvetics had their territory in southern Germany and we cannot be certain about when and how they moved into Switzerland, maybe due to the Germanic threat from the north (Meyer 1984, p. 18).

What we know about them is scarce, historians wrote that the lack of state organization among the Celtic tribes and their hostility even among each other contributed to the eventual fall of their own culture on the long run, although the Celtic tribes where feared among Romans for their brutality and blitzkrieg type of attacks, it was the cold blooded calculation and organization capabilities of the Roman strategists, which brought forth the victory of the Imperium Romanum over the Celtics and the Helvetic subtribes (Osterwalder 1977, p. 182-183).

Coming from the centuries BC, we arrive at the epoch of the Roman Empire and as with almost all European countries, western Switzerland was occupied up to the Bodensee and the Zürich metropolitan area by the Romans around 450 BC. The Romans built towns like Aventicum (Avenches), built upon the road that connected Rome with the northern region of Europe around 100 BC, Augusta Raurica (Kaiseraugst) 44 BC and Colonia Iulia Equestris former Noviodunum, Celtic for “new fort“ (todays Nyon) also around 44 BC, only to name the most important. Although the Romans conquered the

Helvetics, they did not destroy them or force them to assimilate and give up the local culture and habbits, the people started to trade with Rome and even Athens which is well documented by archeological findings of that period (Schelbert 2007, p. XIX, Helbling 1982, p. 16). It is not surprising that we know more about the Helvetics from Roman chronists, it was Gaius Iulius Caesar who wrote about the people in the Alps in his Belum Gallicum (58-49 BC) "The country between the Alps and the Rhein river, the Jura mountains and the Rhone river, is inhabited by the Helvetics" (Helbling 1982, p. 14).

The early centuries AD, the dark Middle Age of Swiss history (Osterwalder 1977, p. 291), are characterized by scarce written documents and several conflicts upon which the Swiss territory acted as a frontline. Starting in the 3rd century, one Germanic tribe will become infamous on Swiss territory, the Alemanni (Helbling 1982, p. 17, Osterwalder 1977, p. 291). The Roman defenses started to fail and cities like Aventicum have been destroyed by hordes of Alemanni penetrating Helvetic territory. The Romans never entirely rebuilt the damage done and the local people started to mind everyday business instead of advanced Roman cultural life. And with the beginning threat of the Visigoths, Rome abandoned Switzerland and the Alpine region around 401 AD (Helbling 1982, p. 18). Although people still remained and maintained a Romanic type of life later on (Osterwalder 1977, p. 292).

The Romans left a lot of culture in todays Switzerland: wine, chestnuts, some vegetables and poultry, but also landscape surveying, architecture and traffic infrastructure – streets! The Roman social life mixed up with ancient Celtic habbits and structures. Most notably, the state organization with a written language and written laws, was admired and, up to a certain degree, even copied (Helbling 1982, p. 17).

But as much as the Romans left during their period of influence, almost 1,000 years (Schelbert 2007, p. XX), it is of no impact on todays Swiss politics, which means we cannot trace back any of the elements, characteristic to the Sonderfall, to the Roman Empire. We could only deduce the stubbornness of todays Swiss people to the Celtic tribes of the centuries BC, most notably the Helvetics. Although the designation Helvetic, will be of relevance only after 1798.

We leave the ancient world and travel through the early Middle Ages, a time characterized by Christianization, influence of the Roman Catholic Church, monarchy, feudality and everlasting disputes between different people on todays Swiss territory: Francophonic Burgundians in the south-west, Germanic Alemanni in the north and Lombards in the south-east (Schelbert 2007, p. XX). The Alemanni moved south and settled in the northern territory of Switzerland, the Burgundians have been settled in the south-west by the Romans, first linguistic demarcations are visible (Helbling 1982, p. 19-20). Here we cannot leave out Charlemagne (as King from 774 until 814), although of less importance for Swiss politics, it is important for the development of the linguistic feature of Switzerland. During his reign, there were no frontiers running through Switzerland, only the language boundaries started to develop and they remained unchanged until today (Osterwalder 1977, p. 331). This is our first finding, having an influence on the Sonderfall.

Later on, we can witness disputes between different houses: Habsburgh, Wittelsbach, Luxemburgh and Savoy (Maissen 2010, p. 16). One shouldn`t forget that some differences between the powers, were due to the famous St. Gotthard Alpine Pass, that was back then, the most important route traversing the Alps, important for trade (Häusler 1972, p. 13).

History repeats itself and the people inhabititng Switzerland again had to face another foreign suppressor and that is the only real significant impact for present day Switzerland and its politics, the everlasting suppression, or the fear of it, by a foreign king, most notably the House of Habsburgh during that time period.

At this point, we have roughly gone through 400,000 years of history. There is far more to tell about the events that had been taking place during that time and the people involved, but we stay focused on the developement of the Sonderfall. As a remark, between 1291 and 1798, Switzerland is commonly refered to as the *Old Confederation*.

The Old Confederacy evolved in the 14th century, out of a network of ties within the Holly Roman Empire, at the time around 1300, Switzerland had developed two poles, the lake of Geneva and the lake of Bodensee, one was under the Francophonic influence of Burghundy and the other under the Germanic influence of the Alemanni, during that time, two of the most important dynasties, Savoy and the House Habsburgh setteled their disputes and draw the influence frontiers through Switzerland, basically along the Sarin river, canton Fribourg and Bern.

Habsburgh had its name from the castel Habsburgh situated in the canton of Aargau, where they resided until 1220 (Maissen 2010, p. 16-17). Again, more roots of the multilinguistic character are visible.

We have to draw our first conclusions from the findings so far, the Sonderfall consists of the four mentioned elements: multilingualism, federalism, neutrality and direct democracy. We could see that the roots of multilingualism can be traced back to the early centuries AD, but stronger developed during the reigning of Charlemagne. This makes it the oldes element of the Sonderfall. Although there would be no multilingualism without the federation (Widmer 2007, p. 151), that is because officially it was only in 1481 that a French speaking canton, Fribourg, joined the Old Confederation. You will notice that multilingualism and federalism are closely conected but for this work, I will separate the two and bring them into an artificial order. Let us first have a closer look at the multilinguistic character, prior to 1481 the Old Confederacy knew only German as a language of communication, between 1481 and 1798 it was bilingual (French and German) and after 1798, the Italian language joined the confederacy with today`s canton of Ticino. But between 1815 and 1848, the German language was again the only official language of the new Swiss Confederation, the final state of Switzerland and the language structure, evolved during the last half of the 18th century (Bakic 2010, p. 109). The remarkable elements of that time are, the more centralized government of the Helvetic Republic of 1798 decided to teach the pupils of each region in their mother tongue, Rumantsch included, but also the fact that more Francophonic and Italian cantons wanted to join the Confederation, after the Congess of Vienna 1815, instead of following France or the Cisalpine Republic (later to become the precursor of the Italian Republic) (Widmer 2007, p. 155). While in France, after the revolution, a nation state evolved with “one state, one people, one language“, Switzerland went the contrary route, it gave up its Alemannic imprint and became a multilinguistic state – a unique act at that time (Widmer 2007, p. 156). But why would they do that? Because of the liberal character of the Old Confederation, the communal democracy and the ample authonomy of the single cantons. Although the Francophonic cantons liked the ideas of the French revolution, „liberté, égalité, fraternité“, they prefered the precise rights of liberty, granted in the ideas of the Old Confederacy which was partially restored after 1815, over the more abstract French ideology of liberty (Widmer 2007, p. 156). Paul Widmer also describes some evolving problems, today (2007) French is not the prestigious language anymore among the youth, it is English (Widmer 2007, p. 163). The relations between the language groups are prone to atrophy, today lots of pupils are more attracted to spending a high school year abroad in the USA or GB, not in the other parts of Switzerland for learning French or Italian.

But it is also noteworthy, in terms of fiscal balance, that the German speaking cantons often refuse the total amount of money from the federation, they take less and give the surplus to the Italian and French speaking cantons, they belive (the German cantons) that it is better to be more courteous and help those who have less (Widmer 2007, p. 164). This is a noteworthy mindset.

Let us see what the internal advantages of multilingualism are. It constituted Switzerland! Not the one language made the Swiss nation but three, it is not the one language holding society together but the core elements: people`s democratic rights, federalism and neutrality. This circumstance is the best showcase of the *nation of free volition* (Widmer 2007, p. 166).

And external advantages? Switzerland has very close ties to the three neighbouring language cultures: France, Italy and Germany/Austria, and the best example would be Geneva with its international institutions, a German speaking city would not enjoy the ample support of France and several African countries. It is a location advantage in the battle for international companies and organizations (Widmer 2007, p. 167).

The subject of multilingualism is very old, more than 1,000 years, today the only concerns are to properly maintain this situation and make sure that every citizen masters at least two national languages (Widmer 2007, p. 163). We could spend much more time dicussing the multilinguistic character of Switzerland, unfortunately the space is limited, but I would encourage everybody to do further reading on this very important subject, especially if you live in a multilinguistic country. An interesting work is the Phd-thesis of Nada Bakic from 2010: "Sprachliche Minderheiten in Serbien und in der Schweiz. Ein Vergleich im Bereich Bildung und Verwaltung" (Linguistic minorities in Serbia and Switzerland. A comparison of education and administration).

We leave the language history and jump back in time to have a look at the next element of the Sonderfall: federalism. Before describing the evolution of Swiss federalism, I would like to explain some differences between the USA and Switzerland. We call Switzerland today the Confederatio Helvetica (CH) but one should not confuse it with the old Confederate States of the USA during the secession war of 1860. Confederatio means not the same here in Switzerland as it ment in the US in the 19th century. In the US, the Federalists had to face the Anti-Federalists who were promoting a loose confederation of states and not a union (Vorländer 1997, p. 74). You will see more of this later on.

That leads us to a very important stop in time, the year 1291, the inofficial founding year of Switzerland (Oechsli 1891, p. 294, Reinhardt 2008, p. 11). The year 1291 is the most mystified date in Swiss history, there is a big contorversy going on among older Swiss scholars, whether this date should be considered the official founding date or not (Beck 1978, p. 214-220, Meyer 1990, p. 154, Sablonier 2008, p. 165-167, Reinhardt 2008, p. 11, Meier 2015, p. 43-44).

Here is what happened, on August 1st 1291, the three cantons (the Waldstätte) Uri, Schwyz and Nidwalden (today Nidwalden and Obwalden), forming the alpine region of central Switzerland, came together and swore an eternal oath. That oath and its written charter, the *Bundesbrief*, is a masterpiece of political volition in the early middle ages of history, an *instrumentum publicum* (ab Hohlenstein 1956, p. 526-527). But according to the content of that *federal charter,* we can not think of that document as a founding element of any sort or form, the content was limited to mutual assistance in the case of war, ensuring public peace and rejection of foreign judges (Meyer 1990, p. 156).

The charter in its original form, can be seen in the Federal Charter Museum in Schwyz and there are no indications about freedom, resistance and founding of the confederacy (Sablonier 2008, p. 164, Meyer 1990, p. 156). Still, in the hearts and minds of some people, this is the constituting date of the Helvetic Confederation and it is celebrated as an official national holiday in Switzerland since 1891 (Reinhardt 2008, p. 11).

We can follow ab Holenstein and his interpretation of the charter: mutual agreement among equals, but not among the entire people, one must not overemphasize the event because the first treaty was written in Latin. Or we follow Meyer, "just a set of rules to follow for cooperation among the first three cantons, but not a constituting document for an entire country" (Meyer 1990, p. 157). Nevertheless, we should keep that written document in mind when talking about federalism, 1291 is early. During the course of the 14th century, more cantons joined in different treaties: *Alliance of Brunnen* between Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden (today Nidwalden and Obwalden) in 1315 and for the first time in German language, basically reinforcing the former Bundesbrief, in 1332 Luzern joined, in 1351 the Walsdtätte and Luzern made a treaty with Zürich. In 1352 Zug and Glarus were forced to join the treaty. In 1353 Bern joined in (Meier 2015, p. 204-205). The Old Confederation now consisted of eight cantons out of todays 26. The year 1370 is another important date, the Waldstätte and the other cantons signed the *Pfaffenbrief*, to understand this, I have to go back to the 6th Century, after the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church ruled on several aspects of peoples life until that treaty. That charter made an end to that rule, no member of the clergy was allowed to impose foreign rules upon the Swiss people ever again, the clergy could only rule on clerical matters and those of marriage but not on penal law (Meier 2015, p. 205, Reinhardt 2008, p. 22-23, Maissen 2010, p. 38). Another important treaty, was the *Sempacherbrief* of 1393, the charter which was regulating war, trade and change (Reinhardt 2008, p. 25).

In 1454 Schaffhausen and the town of St. Gallen approached the confederacy but did not join it yet. The most important treaty of the 15th century, happened in the year 1481 the *Stanser Verkommnis*, named after the town of Stans in the canton of Nidwalden. Again, I have to go back in time a little to explain the origin of this important event, it was in 1477 during the Burgundian Wars when Federal troops defeted and even killed Charles the Reckless of Burgundy, the last Duke of the House of Valois, at the battle of Nancy. At that time, this was an incredible achivement by the Confederates, the news spread all over Europe, since the troops of Burgundy had been considered as one of the best of their time. Some of the spoils of war can be seen today in several Swiss museums: in Bern, Zürich, St.Gallen and Solothurn (Reinhardt 2008, p. 43, Schelbert 2007, p. XXIV-XXVI, Deuchler 1958, p. 58).

This charter regulated several aspects of the Old Confederation until 1798, most important: it did forbid cantons to interfere with the domestic affairs of other cantons and it prohibited unauthorised warfare. These measures strengthened the inner cohesion of the eight cantons and paved the way for Fribourg and Solothurn to enter the confederation in 1481, but also it provided a certain framework for the future, no canton could enter any treaty with a foreign power, without the consent of all cantons within the confederation (Reinhardt 2008, p. 44-45).

But all these charters only demonstrate a cooperation based on common interests between equals, the cantons of the Old Confederation. These documents where in some aspects ahead of their time but did not constitute a nation or closed country. They should be viewed as an "idea, to respect the different as different and yet to constitute an entity for the common good, a guiding light towards the final state of todays Switzerland" (Widmer 2007, p. 121). In 1501 Basel and Schaffhausen joined and finally in 1513, the canton of Appenzell. And these 13 cantons formed the Old Confederation.

The year 1515 marked an end to the expansionistic politics of the Old Confederation, Helvetic expansion will be a subject of the next chapter, it was at the famous battle of Marignano, south-east of Milan and today called Melegnano, where the Federal troops had been defeted by the French King Francis the 1st. That event was the founding moment of almost eternal Swiss neutrality, our third element of the Sonderfall (Reinhardt 2008, p. 47, Widmer 2007, p. 134-135), but more of that after this chapter.

Marignano had a lasting effect on the Old Confederation, the Swiss started to mind their own busines and begun engaging in inter cantonal religious wars, it was dawn of the Reformation. It took place in Zürich in 1522, introduced by Huldrich Zwingli and 1536 in Geneva, introduced by Johannes Calvin (Maissen 2010, p. 83, 94). Several wars erupted and two groups formed, the conservative catholics and the more liberal protestants, the religious wars between these two confessions continued until 1848, almost 300 years in total.

In 1648, at the Westphalian Peace Treaty, the Old Confederation was granted vast juristical independence from the Holly Roman Empire of German Nations (Schelbert 2007, p. XXVIII). The everlasting disputes between the two confessions stopped temporarily in 1798 when French Napoleonic troops occupied the Old Confederation and the new Helvetic Republic was declared, following a constitution which was written by Peter Ochs and approved by the French Consulate in Paris, unfortunately without reference to the Swiss people and their circumstances. But it started to develop a certain awareness among the cantons, for the first time and with the town of Aarau as the first capital, after that Lucerne and finally Bern before its disbandment. This was new because until then, there was no capital in the Old Confederation, only the main town of each canton had an administrative role but nothing more (Maissen 2010, p. 160, Helbling 1982, p. 113).

That new republic was more centralized and less federal, which led to new confrontations between two groups: Unitarians promoting a centralized state with a strong capital city and Federalists, promoting canton sovereignity, like during the Old Confederation (Fahrni 2002, p. 60). Here again, you see the difference between the US and Switzerland.

The republic was very unstable, between 1800 and 1802 there had been five coups d`etat and in 1802, Napoleon Bonaparte had to intervene again and disband the complete Helvetic Republic, after barely five years of existence. He established a more federal republic again and issued the *Act of Mediation*on on February 19th 1803 which was received in Paris by Swiss delegates (Stüssi-Lauterburg 1994, p. 5, Maissen 2010, p. 170, Helbling 1982, p. 116).

That charter was highly welcomed by the Swiss people, they felt threatened by the unitaristic aspirations of the Helvetic Republicans and its artificial constitution (Helbling 1982, p. 117).

The new federation got its new name with the Act of Mediation and it kept it until today: Swiss Confederation-Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft-Confederatio Helvetica (Helbling 1982, p. 117).

At this point we can see the clear federal anti-centralistic character of the Swiss confederates, nobody wanted to be dominated by a single capital and a single government or a foreign ruler or even foreign judges. Even the Act of Mediation was eventually rejected in 1813, that made an end to the Anciene Régime as a role model and a new constitution and a new federal contract was elaborated with more freedoms and authonomy of the cantons but also legal equality, freedom of religion and freedom of press, as a concession for liberal demands (Reinhardt 2008, p. 94).

Starting at the Vienna Congress in 1815, the 18th century was characterized through massive social movements and change, it was the time of restauration and regeneration, we have to stay focused in order to not get lost in all the events but on the Sonderfall, and federalism.

The first French Revolution paved the way for more liberal ideas and those culminated in the 1830s uprisings "Les Trois Glorieuses" or the July Revolutions or the second French Revolution. Those had a massive impact on Switzerland, Liberalism entered the streets of the Confederation, it was not an elitistic pastime anymore, it was a new order, coming from the bottom and demanding people`s rights and cantonal sovereignty (Farni 2002, p. 60-62). Moreover, economic progress and industrialization, formed a fundament for the new state (Wecker 2014, p. 431). Again, religious conflicts erupted, because the conservative catholic cantons feared the protestants would dominate them and therefore they unified in 1845, forming the special union *Sonderbund* (Luzerne, the Waldstätte, Zug, Fribourg and Wallis) but that union was quickly defeated in November 1847 by the army of the liberal confederates, whose leader was General Henri Dufour, an important figure for Swiss cartography and landscape survey (Helbling 1982, p. 126).

Today`s Switzerland was born in 1848, I have to admit some could call me heretical but modern day Switzerland was founded with the declaration of the new federal constitution on September 12th 1848 (Vatter 2016, p. 442, Helbling 1982, p. 130, Reinhardt 2008, p. 102, Wecker 2014, p. 431, Kriesi & Trachsel 2008, p. 34). That federal construction was a modified copy of the American system, but the emphasis lies on cantonal authonomy, one of the core principles of Switzerland (Widmer 2007, p. 124). The Federal Constitution of Switzerland was a compromise between liberal Protestant unitarians and conservative Catholic federalists, the cantons kept their own police force, school system, taxation authority, civil law, penal law, justice and health system, parts of the infrastructure and trade policy (work, trade, banking), the new federal government took care of customs, defense, postal service, foreign relations and, of course, the curency, it had a very low budget at the beginning (Vatter 2016, p. 442-443).

I can not go deeper into cantonal organization because we could write books about it, I want to point out some aspects, the fundamental priciples (Vatter 2016, p. 443) of Swiss federalism: authonomy and equality among the cantons, the duty to cooperate with each other, but also the fact that they are an active contributor to the decisions, voiced by the federal government. Switzerland has a bicameralistic federal assembly, the people are represented in the national council, the *Nationalrat* and the cantons (today 26) are in the council of states, the *Ständerat*, both share equal powers and constitute the legislative branch of Switzerland (Vatter 2016). But cantonal soveregnty is the key: The existence of the cantons is granted, the cantons decide how they organize internally, the cantons choose their administrative organs independent, the cantons possess vast competencies, the cantons possess own financial resources, the cantons are no subject to political control, the cantons contribute equally to the process of decisions making on federal level, the cantons also contribute in the council of states, to decisions made on federal level (Vatter 2016, p. 444-445).

Here we have to mention the principle of subsidiary which is strong in Switzerland, if the federal government wants competency, it has to be proven that the local authority (in most cases the canton) cannot take care of a problem (explicitly mentioned in Art. 3 Federal Constitution, Vatter 2016, p. 444). This principle organizes the entire federal state from the bottom to the top, the core idea of cantonal soveregnty.

We could see over the past centuries, Swiss people were always suspicious towards a unified state and central authority, the compromise constitution of 1848 only lasted until 1874, when it underwent a total revision and the second constitution lasted till 1999, after another total revision the Swiss Federal Constitution is only 19 years old. Today federalism is the natural modus operandi of Switzerland but there are also problems arising, I want to mention a few before we get to the third element. The major issue of federalism is that every element can decide autonomously and that leads to inequalities, most notably of financial nature, welfare services, education or construction law, and some others. It is an important characteristic of federalism that decisions are made on the lowest level possible, right there where most information gather and where the people are most affected by the decisions (Widmer 2007, p. 131). This makes it a protracted task, finding a suitable compromise, but it can bear the bennefits of finding the "best practice", 26 cantons try to solve problems differently, the best solution can be taken over by other cantons if suitable (Widmer 2007, p. 131). Kriesi and Trechsel talk about benefits: Swiss federalism is assumed to protect minorities, they rely on Arend Lijphart and his work on consociational countries of 1977, *power-sharing structures may enhance conflict resolution* (Kriesi&Trechsel 2008, p. 42). Swiss federalism brings citizens closer to the political authorities, Swiss federalism diffuses power, it enables a more flexible, better-adapted implementation of federal policies at the cantonal level and functions as a brake on centralizing trends (Kriese&Trachsel 2008, p. 43). Swiss federalism offers a playground for experimentation, due to the vast autonomy of the cantons compared to the ones enyojed by a German Bundesland (Kriese&Trachsel 2008, p. 44). Neidhart also mentions problems, distribution of state tasks, distribution of state finances, institutional problems and cantonal territorial reforms (Neidhart 2002, p. 248-260).

As you can see, there are lots of discussions going on about the subject of federalism, not only in Switzerland. We have to close the federal chapter and move over to the next element of the Swiss Sonderfall: neutrality. It is the most important principle of Swiss foreign policy and was officially declared for the first time by the Tagsatzung (Federal Diet of Switzerland, legsilative and executive council of the Old Confederation and the following Swiss Confederacy until 1848) in 1674 (Widmer 2007, p. 134).

But we can witness it since the defeat of Marignano in 1515, during the times which followed, neutrality was only declared when the circumstances dictated it, especially during the Thirty Years War of 1618-1648, which left the Old Confederacy mostly unharmed, but it was not an explicit principle (Widmer 2007). An important proponent of Swiss neutrality was Nicklaus von der Flüe, a hermit from Einsiedeln (1417-1487), he helped to prevent war between the cantons on the Diet of Stans (Stanser Verkommnis) in 1481, his heratic words: "Mischt euch nicht in fremde Händel" and "Macht den Zaun nicht zu weit" led to the core principles of todays Swiss foreign policy, it means: do not participate in other people`s wars and do not declare war on others (Widmer 2007, p. 135).

We have to go back again, to the beginning of the Old Confederation, it was in 1315 at the Battle of Morgarten, where a small group of men from the canton Schwyz, defeted the Knights Regiment from Duke Leopold I of Habsburgh, an incredible victory, so unbelivable that it became part of the unsolved Swiss myths (Beck 1978, p. 214-220). But that led to further engagement, 1386 marked another victory by confederates in the battle of Sempach against Duke Leopold III of Habsburgh, he died at that battle together with several members of the nobility, which led to a problem for Habsburgh because nobody could inherit their possesions. The new local masters had little to no liabillities towards Habsburgh and viewed the Confederates as an alternative to the nobility far away (Maissen 2010, p. 40-41). After that and several internal wars, the confederates took part in the famous Burgundian Wars, we had mentioned that earlier, but also during the Italian War of 1494, confederate mercenaries were requested by Milan, Florence and France. They even fought against each other, depending who got hired by whom. Between the Burgundian Wars and the battle of Marignano an estimated 200,000 men served as mercenaries abroad, at an estimated 800,000 habitants of the Old Confederation, around the year 1500 (Maissen 2010, p. 65). The foreign services had a very bad reputation at home, they were thought to be the cause for corruption, decadence and prostitution (Maissen 2010, p. 65). The book *Die Geschichte der Schweiz*, published 2014 with contributions of several authors, lists not less than 20 battles in its chronology (p. 616-623) between 1291 and 1848, in which Swiss federal troops fought for either several days or even months, not only on todays Swiss territory like: the Battle at Nancy in 1477 (France) or the Swabian Wars in 1499. Also the War of the League of Cambrai between 1508 and 1516, on locations in France and Italy. During the Coalition Wars between 1799 and 1815, Switzerland acted as a client state of France and it had to endure fights on its own territory. Among the wars fought abroad, there where several others fought between the cantons, either due to influence and power or due to religious differences like during the Reformation years. After years of wars and battles and killing, one can not be surprised that Switzerland became a neutral state.

The neutrality is the most important principle of Swiss foreign policy, Switzerland stayed true to that position over the last centuries, documented lately by joining the League of Nations in 1920, the Helsinki Accords of 1975 or the United Nations in 2002 (Widmer 2007, p. 134-135). Widmer mentions two aspects of neutrality: passive and active neutrality (p. 145-148). Neutrality means not participating in a conflict and deciding not to take any decision during that conflict, staying out of that conflict is why neutrality is chosen, that is the passive type and the other type is to force somebody to take a decision and to act, like in the case of a judge, that would be an active role, the idea is to help solving problems and avoiding armed conflict (Widmer 2007, p. 146). “Issues arise when it comes to humanitarian crisis“, should Switzerland stay neutral in the face of human rights violations just because it is neutral? Widmer points out that it should: use only facts and do not judge by hearing, the voice should not be too loud and noisy, declarations should be of substance, the judgement has to be intersubjectively comprehensible and the voice should serve the cause, not the domestic policy (Widmer 2007, p. 150). Neutrality is not a recipe for solving general problems but it neither is obsolete, it is usefull because it rejects the logic of power and war, its element is not passion but considerateness, it is a product of reason therefore it feeds on the consciousness that all politics is limited and the posibillity of war present but on the goal of peace, worth persisting (Widmer 2007, p. 150). The subject of neutrality is deep and I recomend further reading by Edgar Bonjour and his work *Geschichte der Schweizer Neutralität* (History of Swiss Neutrality) of 1975, but for now, we have to close the subject and move on to our last element of the Sonderfall: direct democracy.

I kept this element to the end because of two reasons, if we look at it historically it is the youngest element on federal level. It had already existed in some forms on cantonal level prior to the creation of modern Switzerland but it was only during the 1830 that the mandatory referendum was introduced in almost all cantonal constitutions, except that of Neuchatel, and in 1874 the petition for referendum was introduced on federal level and in 1891, the popular initiative was introduced on federal level (Widmer 2007, p. 108). The other reason is its importance and complexity, which can be considered the key characteristic of Switzerland. Before we get into it, I have to point out what the elements of direct democracy in Switzerland are: the petition for referendum (fakultatives Gesetzesreferendum), the mandatory constitutional referendum (obligatorisches Verfassungsreferendum) and the popular initiative (Volksinitiative). To better understand how these elements interact with each other, I have to mention the system of consociational democracy (Konkordanzdemokratie), which is very important for the Swiss polytical system, in short and following Arend Lijphart and his work: *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (2012), in general democracy means "the government by the majority of the people".

And in contrast to this definition, we should look at Sir Arthur Lewis and his thoughts on the subject, democracy is "that all who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in making that decision either directly or through chosen representatives" (Lijphart 2012, p. 30) and another statement by Thomas E. Cronin seems fitting too "Many worried about tyranny by the majority and held the protection of the minority to be of equal, if not superior importance to majority rule" (Cronin 1989 in Bolliger 2007, p. 419). You can see the incompatibility of the statements because in the first, you exclude the minority, violating the third, from decision making and favor only the majoritarian voice, in the second it would not be the rule by majority but by everybody. And then you have the third, protection of minorities. According to Lijphart, Switzerland is the best example for the consociational democracy, mitigating the aforementioned issues: instead of concentrating power in the hands of the majority, the consociational model tries to share, disperse, and restrain power in a variety of ways: 1. Executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets, 2. Executive-legislative balance of power, 3. Multiparty system, 4. Proportional representation, 5. Interest group corporatism, 6. Federal decentralized government, 7. Strong bicameralism, 8. Constitutional rigidity, 9. Judicial review and 10. Central bank independence (Lijphart 2012, p. 33-40).

But, one at the time, I have to explain some circumstances. We could see that before 1798, Switzerland was a loose confederation of souvereign cantons, there was no federal constitution, the Tagsatzung (Federal Diet of Switzerland) with delegates from every canton, formed the only supra-cantonal institution (Vatter 2016, p. 273) housing executive and legislative branch and in charge of war and peace issues but also alliances with other countries. But the power was limited since each canton was responsible for its own internal organization. The course of direct democracy in Switzerland had an interruption in 1798, during the centralized Helvetic Republic which was based on the ideas of an individual who was inspired by the French Revolution, Switzerland became a French protectorate without vast people`s rights to participation on the new federal level (Vatter 2016, p. 360), it was Napoleon Bonaparte who understood the importance of federalism in Switzerland, he restored the ancient freedoms and rights with the Act of Mediation. And only after 1815, Switzerland started to become truly independent by resolutions of the Congress of Vienna and its own written constitution. After the creation of a nation-state in the form of the federation in 1848, more decisions had to be made on the new federal level, consisting both spheres, internal and external relations and the people started to demanded the same rights on federal level as they had on cantonal level, the new government (after 1848) had to react to avoid unrest and uprisings (Widmer 2007, p. 105-107).

The introduction of those elements of direct democracy, on federal level, were the most inventive actions of Swiss politics, with the people`s referendum, the opposition had an effective instrument to influence government policy and the consociational character had a very stabilizing effect on Swiss politics in general (Widmer 2007, p. 109).

Now let us have a look at the elements, the people`s initiative (Volksinitiative) enables the people to either change the complete federal constitution (Totalrevision) or certain articles only by collecting 100,000 valid signatures within 18 months, it is considered as an activating element, activating the parliament to act and have a counter proposition ready. The initiative on total revision of the constitution existed already in 1848, new was the possibility to have a partial change (Teilrevision) (Kost 2013, p. 78, Schiller 2002, p. 100-101). The mandatory constitutional referendum (obligatorisches Verfassungsreferendum) means that all change of the constitution, total or partial, needs a confirmation by the people and the cantons, the cantons act in this case as a control organ to make sure the Federation does not get too much competencies. This was introduced in 1848 (Vatter 2016, p. 50, Schiller 2002, p. 100). And the petition for referendum (fakultatives Gesetzesreferendum) enables 50,000 citizens, their signatures have to be collected within 100 days, to demand a people`s referendum if parliament wants to issue a new law (Vatter 2016, p. 50, Schiller 2002, p. 100).

Furthermore, I would like to talk about some functions of direct democracy in Switzerland, Vatter speaks about certain effects of direct democracy: integrating, legitimizing and stabilizing (Vatter 2016, p. 375), he also points out that consociational democracies are not less efficient than competitive democtracies, within consociational democracies the learning process is longer, decisions take more time but are not less inovative (Vatter 2016, p. 376). For the people`s initiative he defines four functions: 1. Valve function, 2. Flywheel function, 3. Catalytic function and 4. Mobilizing function (Vatter 2016, p. 378). There are two directions, which the debate about the effect of direct democracy is heading, one direction points to the *breaking effect*on government policy, five characteristics confirm that: the initiative is a powerfull veto-instrument against political decision maker, the people prefer to vote in favor of long-term policies instead of short-term decisions made by politicians, the participation tools enable the people to obtain more information about an issue, they know more about the costs and benefits of a project, the creation of a status-quo-bias which means risk averse people might vote against a change of the current situation and the last point is, that rather conservative points of view are better implemented in politics by the help of direct democratic tools (Vatter 2016, p. 379-380). Widmer also points out to some pros and cons of direct democracy, it can take a very long time until laws pass, much more than a parliamentary democracy would take (Widmer 2007, p. 110) but he mentions also the benefits, the people`s right to referendum stops government activism and actors have to be reserved in order to succed with their proposal, it helps limiting short term activities without proven success. The highest gain of slow political processes is its legitimacy, stability and higher credibility among the people (Widmer 2007, p. 111).

Additionally, the people`s referendum promotes inovation within the political system, best examples are the vast environmental laws and regulations, and the integrative effects make sure that all political interests are taken into consideration, unlike in some representative decision making models (Vatter 2016, p. 400). After going through some aspects of Swiss direct democracy, I want to focus on the debate going on today, about the direct democracy. We shall see about the proponents and the adversaries.

Christian Bolliger asks the bold question whether we have to reject direct democracy in order to protect minorities. His conclusions are: it is possible that specific minority interessts are not recognized within majoritarian decisions and the minority will have a hard time fighting the majority without proper tools. But all members of the society will lose rights if they decide to reject direct democracy. Science shows that effects of direct democracy are dependent on factors like how strongly the minorities are accepted within a society and how the institutional surrounding of that society is structured (Bolliger 2007, p. 443). Gerhard Schmid speaks about another issue, foreign policy, if all acts of the government are subject to popular confirmation, there is a risk of “happy decisionism“ which means that certain actors could contest each and every contract and rejected it after negotiations, by popular referendum (Schmid 1996, p. 311), that would slow down every political process. Aymo Brunetti sees also problems with the status-quo-bias, it is a central factor in decision making, because people do not want to abandon certain habits and customs. He points out that the popular initiative has less influence on politics because it demands reform and that is empeded by the bias (Brunetti 1997, p. 180). Andreas Kost also mentions the veto-effect of the initiative and the referendum, the people seem to stop reformist aspirations of the government by voting against its decisions. But it is proven positive to have certain issues discussed among the electorate, that generates more acceptance and legitimacy. Especially in financial questions, the people in Switzerland had voted much more conservative when it came to spending money, he even mentions that fiscal evasion is, in cantons with more people‘s rights on budgetary decisions, less of an issue (Kost 2008, p. 91). Feld and Kirchgässner come to similar conclusions like Kost regarding financial aspects of direct democracy, the spendings of the federation would be less if there were a finance referendum possibility which does not exist, the national debts would be lower if the people were included in the decision making process (Feld, Kirchgässner 1997 in Schiller 2002, p. 100). All in all, the effects of direct democracy in Switzerland are positive: it enhances the economy and the social structure. But it promotessome well organized interest groups and does not protect minorities sufficiently (Vatter 2016, p. 401).

You can see the debate about the pros and cons of direct democracy in Switzerland is huge and the common question seems to be whether Switzerland would still be Switzerland without the popular rights, they are an expression of freedom, they are the reason why somebody wants to become a Swiss citizen, because if the people are not allowed anymore to participate in a decision making process, who rules Switzerland? If the answer was Brussels, the Swiss personality would be disturbed (Widmer 2007, p. 120).

During the last few pages, you got to know four important aspects of Swiss politics. The end is dedicated to the conclusion of the work, that is to recapitulate the chapters and see where Romania could profit from the experiences made in the Swiss Federation. We started with multilingualism in our work so we will start with it again. That is also the only aspect which Romania and Switzerland have in common. Though Romanian is the only official language in Romania, in the western part of the country, in Transylvania, Hungarian is a strong minority language and in some districts even a majoritarian language. Switzerland could act as an example for multilingual management of a country. You could see, the Swiss constitution guarantees each language group its own language, even those groups which are below one percent of the entire population, have their language guaranteed. The four languages are located in four different regions and each region has a different language as its official language. So far there are no incidents known, where a German Swiss demanded language rights in a Francophonic canton or the other way around, if you move there as a citizen, you have to adapt to that region, the region is not adapting to you. The same could be a possibility for Romania, the western region has a strong Hungarian minority and in order to respect and appreciate those people, they could be granted better language rights within the affected districts. In Switzerland, each and every product bought in a store, needs three languages for content description, Romania does not need to go that far.

Our next point is federalism, this is something Romania can not apply. Romania is a unitarian country with a centralized goverment and organization, a former monarchy. In order to organize it federal, the constitution needs to be changed, that is something which cannot be done in due time. Considering ongoing problems, this would be too much of a burden for todays citizens, to reorganize their country in a new matter. As you could see, even Switzerland took over a century to become the political system it is today, not mentioning the internal wars because of that. What could be applied is the sense for cooperation among the people, even if of different ethnics or cultures or regions. The next aspect is neutrality, Romania is member of NATO, the UN and the European Union, it can not be considered neutral. For beeing neutral, it would have to leave those organizations, except for the UN. That would be something nobody would take into serious consideration, the financial and security benefits do not allow for such an action right now.

And last but not least, direct democracy. This is a complex matter as you could see, implementing those tools requires vast improvements and changes, one should start at school education. The history shows that there are several issues which need thorough planing and thinking, therefore all necessary informations must be at hand, or at least, the citizen must know how to obtain those informations. Political participation needs a well informed electorate and, something i have not mentioned prior in the work, the right republican virtues!

In Switzerland, it was Isaak Iselin (1728-1782) who talked about the right virtues, ”only the virtuous man, can be a good citizen“ he also mentioned those virtues in his book *Träume eines Menschenfreundes (Dreams of a Philanthropist)* of 1776. Those are sedentairness, tenurial and education (Iselin 1776 in Brühlmeier 2011, p. 141). Iselin goes that far as to claim that a good republic will not work without better republicans, “give a people the most elaborated constitution but leave them without virtues, freedom will be impossible“ (Iselin 1776 in Brühlmeier 2011, p. 142). I would like to exemplify this concept, there were several attempts to modify the federal constitution by popular initiative, one in 1985 demanding the death penalty for a drug dealer and one in 2012 again demanding the death penalty for child molesters (Curia Vista, online news portal of the Swiss Parliament). Those are good examples of bad virtues, as a good Republican and Christian you do not demand the killing of a human in the name of the people. A good example for good virtues is the creation of the canton Jura in 1979, all Swiss citizens were asked by popular referendum, if they aprove the creation of the canton of Jura, which they did, the majority of Swiss voters were in favor for the separatistic demands of the Jurasic people. They understood the issue and problems those people had to face. Rolf Graber points out that social unrest and the feeling of beeing left behind, will stimulate people to form their own alternative realities, that is mostly a counter reaction to liberal-capitalistic modernization processes, like Switzerland went through in the 19. century, for him the developement of direct democracy is a history of inclusion and exclusion (Graber 2017, p. 205-206).

He relies on the work of Jürgen Habermas “The Theory of Communicative Action“ of 1981 “As a battle for recognition, the project direct democracy will always remain an unfinished one, which points beyond the shape of a nation state. By being linked to social justice, it (direct democracy) refers to the unversalistic retribution demanding of the dignity of man, as a realistic utopia of a just society (Graber 2017, p. 207).

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MULTICULTURALISM OR CIVIC INTEGRATION. DAILY CHALLENGES AND FOUNDING TARGETS IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SPACE

Istvan POLGAR*

Abstract. *The issue of national minorities and the so called „new minorities" are, in the process of European construction, one of the most important aspects that European countries have had to manage. Learning about and researching minorities, for them to transmit knowledge and experience to young people through education, have become an essential pillar of European values on the construction of an intercultural society based on direct and indiscriminate cooperation and collaboration between ethno-religious communities. It is known that European legislation and practice promote the idea of living together in the sense of social value consisting in accepting otherness, good understanding of the various ethnic groups within the same local communities and openness to communication and cooperation. Nowadays Europe is faced with the dilemma of multiculturalism versus civic integration aiming to examine which model would be the better choice in the given circumstances that European public space became a geopolitical environment that is experiencing a new institutional arrangement between nation states and a new paradigm of coexistence of the cultural differences. After a brief interpretation of the key terms, we will focus on the financial instruments, which aim is promote the integration of traditional and new minorities in the European society.*

Keywords: *Multiculturalism, civic integration, european funds, intercultural*

Demography issues and Migration issues are two of the key elements of modern society, bringing benefits and conflicts both to the receiving places and to the place of origin and raising issues of security, social measurments and multiculturalism in our globalised world.

One of the great challenges of contemporary Europe is related to migration and the need for European integration of minority communities, including immigrants. Evaluations conducted have shown that there is a great need for expertise and policies regarding the European integration of minorities in both their countries of origin and in the new host countries when we are dealing with migration (Polgar, 2016:9-11).

The concept of "Europe without borders" can provide the solution to the ethnic problem on the continent. Some politicians and political scientists consider that the model of the "nation state" has not been able to provide sustainable finality through the citizenship institution. Limited in its defining pattern, the classic citizenship offered only a kind of equality principle, abstract, to residents within the borders of a national state, but

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the same borders did split many ethno-cultural communities, dividing the population into two categories, the majority and the inhabiting minorities (Weber, 2001:53).

The issue of national minorities and the so called „new minorities" are, in the process of European construction, one of the most important aspects that European countries have had to manage. Learning about and researching minorities, for them to transmit knowledge and experience to young peoplethrough education, have become an essential pillar of European values on the construction of an intercultural society based on direct and indiscriminatecooperation and collaboration between ethno-religiouscommunities. It is known that European legislation and practice promote the idea of living together in the sense of social value consisting in accepting otherness, good understanding of the various ethnic groups within the same local communities and openness to communication and cooperation (Brie, 2016:13-14).

As the economy expands to become increasingly more global, society and workplaces are more diverse than ever before. To succeed in a multi-cultural workplace, it is essential that you are able to work with and adapt to the work styles and habits of people of varying ages and cultural identities. To be a successful job candidate you must be able to demonstrate a sensitivity and awareness to other people and cultures.

A theme that appears frequently in public debate, in recent years, concerns the future and destiny of a united Europe, from the cultural approach of the European integration, the relationship between national and European level, the relationship between the national cultures in the European space and the possibility of the emergence of a European cultural identity with supranational character.

Therefore, during the article we will try to start from an assertion according to which, Europe is faced with the dilemma of multiculturalism versus civic integration aiming to examine whether the model of multiculturalism can be viable given that European public space became a geopolitical environment that is experiencing a new institutional arrangement between nation states and a new paradigm of coexistence of the cultural differences (Shohat, Stam, 2014:7-11). After a brief interpretation of the key terms, we will focus on the financial instruments, which aim is promote the integration of traditional and new minorities in the European society.

Nowadays, international labour mobility in the European Union is treated like a normal phenomenon, but it is viewed with rather negative than positive impact on the economies of Member States, because of the dilemma of implementing appropriate policies for the integration of migrants in the labour market. One of the top questions is: "how to prepare migrants to feel at home and make them and the human capital they carry from their countries of origin an integral and productive part of the host communities?"(Glystos, Bruno, 2010:3-5). It has been observed and it was generally accepted that even when employed, if economies slow down, minority unemployment rates will often increase more than average (Popescu, 2016:353).

It can be stated that both migrants and minorities make a considerable contribution to the economy and the social cohesion of the EU Member States. Normally, this should result in a reduction of poverty and unemployment and an improvement of their social inclusion. Therefore EU integration policies should contribute towards eliminating these obstacles and promoting the social inclusion of migrants and minorities.

Funding for migrants and minorities varied considerably among the EU Member States. Targeting strategies also differed with a distinction between: "specific actions in which migrants and minorities alone were targeted; an 'explicit but not exclusive' targeting approach in which they were the main but not the only group targeted; a mainstreaming approach and, general European Social Fund measures in which they were among a series of disadvantaged groups targeted” (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2011:40).

Some EU countries have placed a greater focus on NGOs as delivery organisations responsible for implementing ESF interventions targeted at migrants and minorities, others have relied on public employment services and local or regional state institutions.

One of the EU’s distinctive contributions to the conceptualisation of the integration of third-country nationals during the last 25 years has been an emphasis on the need to overcome past acculturation and assimilation discourses, and policies exclusively concerned with the obligation of third country nationals to integrate into the perceived ‘host society’s values, principles and way of lifes (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, 2011:55).

The European cultural model has a value-based framework, based on legality, freedom, equality, fraternity, solidarity and Christian sentiment of the sacred, which adds to the historical evolutions of the three major modern political revolutions. Europe is a conglomerate of national identities, whose ethnic, linguistic, mental, religious, etc. Diversityhas determined a variety of cultures (Lentin, Titley, 2011: 4).

This problematic nature of the European project is encapsulated in the motto of the European Union: "unity in diversity“. The concept of European identity expresses rather the idea of unity than real identity.

Europe is going through an identity crisis, especially because of the difficulties of the process of deepening the integration and reform of the community institutions. It is the crisis of legitimacy of the Community institutions, which would have its source and a crisis of communication between the European institutions and the citizens of the Member States.

If national identity confers to the individual national legitimacy, citizenship is the condition of a decent existence within a state. Nationality defines that the individual belongs to an ethnic group and it should not be confused with the meaning of citizenship (Lentin, Titley, 2011: 6).

Citizenship refers to all members of the respective state indifferent of the ethnic origin and the state has the obligation to equally protect all and to secure their rights and the freedoms implied by this status.

Although European Union politicians and leaders have increasingly emphasized the importance of culture in strengthening European solidarity and cohesion, European integration has, surprisingly, led to a resurgence of interest in local, ethnic, national and cultural identities.

Europe is a conglomerate of national identities, whose ethnic, linguistic, mental, religious, etc. diversity. has determined a diversity of cultures. We can speak of a European culture as a sum of these cultures, but not of a self-sustaining culture, the latter presupposing a long-lasting process of merging the various individual cultures, combining different identities, and to homogenize them according to laborious principles and which would most likely come out of any institutional control.

Identity, definitions and explanations.

There are several definitions and explanations through which we can understand identity. We can affirm that “identity” is a complicated and unclear concept that nonetheless plays a central role in ongoing debates in every field of social science. We can differentiate debates about national, ethnic, gender, and state identities). In the following we will enumerate some of the frequently used ideas to explain identity.

1. Identity is "people's concepts of who they are, of what sort of people they are, and how they relate to others" (Hogg, Abrams, 2004: 2).
2. "Identity is used in to describe the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture" (Deng, 1995: 1).
3. Identity "refers to the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other individuals and collectivities" (Jenkins,1996: 4).
4. "National identity describes that condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with national symbols – have internalized the symbols of the nation ..." (Bloom,1990: 52).
5. Identities are "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self" (Wendt, 1992:397).

As it was presented above, identity can be used to refer to either a social category, defined by membership rules and characteristic attributes or expected behaviors, or as a socially distinguishing feature that a person takes a special pride in or views as unchangeable but socially consequential (Fearon, 1999:9-15)

Based on the above definitions and explanations, a more simple answer to the question "what is identity?" would be this: "It is how one answers the question "who are you?" Or, my identity is how I define who I am."

Multiculturalism.

The origins of multiculturalism in modern society can be tracked at the beginnings of the era of industrialization especially in the last decades of the last century. The phenomenon is created from population movements within one and the same country as well as the international transfer of labor (Cristea Dragulin, 2015:3-7).

As an ideology of diversity, multiculturalism aims to create a framework for affirmation of group identities. As Giovanni Sartori states, multiculturalism is politics ready to promote ethnic and cultural differences (Sartori, 2007:6)

Still as an ideology of diversity, multiculturalism has the intention to provide a framework for affirmation for group identities. In this way, the ideological horizon approach to cultivate diversity comes to promote plurality as a paradigm shift, of the report between minority and majority, as the imagined limit of repeated identity construction.

C. W. Watson circumscribes multiculturalism to political implications and philosophical presuppositions of the coexistence of the ways varied human situation in the world and the way in which different cultural entities struggle for recognition, both within the national state and in the global system (Frunza, 2004:1-2).

Multiculturalism seems to respond to the needs of a changing world in which the expression of various identities gets "the form of answers to the challenges brought for the national state as well as for the transnational sphere.

Thus, the process of globalization puts us in front of one continue resuming the majority/minority, in concrete cultural spaces and globally, and urges us to continously understand, acceptance and affirmation of diversity (Frunza, 2004: 3).

One of the major criticisms to the address multiculturalism refers to the field of education. The main accusation is related to the fact that multiculturalism opts for introduction into the Western academic canon of some themes, domains and courses that are considered to be marginal and unrepresentative in terms of the canon of Western education.

Multicultural ideologies and policies vary widely,ranging from the advocacy of equal respect to the various cultures in a society, to a policy of promoting the maintenance of cultural diversity, to policies in which people of various ethnic and religious groups are addressed by the authorities as defined by the group to which they belong.

Multiculturalism that promotes maintaining the distinctiveness of multiple cultures is often contrasted to other settlement policies such as social integration, cultural assimilation and racial segregation. Multiculturalism has been described as a "salad bowl" and "cultural mosaic".

Civic integration.

Since the late 1990s, civic integration policies for immigrants have been adopted by most Western European states. The novelty of the policy is at least twofold.

First, integration is no longer left to the free play of society's institutions, such as the labour market or education, but is attempted to be brought under conscious, concerted state control (Joppke,2017:4). In this respect, civic integration is tantamount to the rise of state-led integration as such, replacing the previous dominance of laissez-faire, complemented by mainly local interventions. Secondly, civic integration combines measures that further the integration of immigrants with measures for their selection and control, so that integration and immigration policy are no longer separate domains.

The fusing of integration and control functions under the auspices of civic integration may well be the real European innovation in migration policy (Joppke,2017:5).

In the past 30 years, civic integration has become the dominant approach to immigrant integration across Europe. The term itself is an approximate English translation of the Dutch noun inburgering, whose literal translation would be 'naturalisation', 'habituation', or 'acclimatisation'.

Joppke continues to explain that we have more and more member states which are adopting the civic integration model, as a tool for integration. Also reflects on the phenomenon of the retreating multiculturalism.

Civic integration is in most places the first coherent, national-level immigrant policy where previously there was no policy; what it 'replaces' is not an old policy but a non-policy, a de facto multiculturalism of non-intervention in the integration process on the part of the state.

As for conclusion we can inspire our self from Joppkes's *Civic integration in Western Europe: three debates* article in which the author considers that civic integration policies evidently are not all of one cloth. But it is misleading to see them as 'fortification' or mere prolongations of nationally distinct ways of dealing with integration and citizenship.

Something new has happened in Europe, which is the broad political elite's acceptance of a new world of recurrent immigration. This has catapulted the integration process to the forefront of the political agenda, and states converge on understanding it as binding newcomers into mainstream institutions, above all the labour market, by way of civic integration.

European Funds for migrant integration.

Across the European Union, data indicates that there are still significant, growing and multifaceted socio-economic gaps between people with a migrant background and mainstream society. At the same time, failure to realise the potential of people with a migrant background, including the most marginalised, represents a considerable waste of resources, both for the individuals concerned and more generally for the EU economy and society.

The European Commission is continuing to look at practical ways to assist Member States when it comes to further integrating people with a migrant background. In this respect, Member States have several EU funds at their disposal. These include funding instruments under shared management, including the European Structural and Investment Funds and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, and under direct management, for example, the EU programme for Employment and Social Innovation, Rights, Equality and Citizenship programme, the Health for Growth programme[1].

To ensure a sustainable and credible policy approach to the management of migration flows, it is essential to address the problem of irregular migration. An effective return policy in conformity with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and based on the preference for voluntary return is key to this objective.

The European Union, through the public policies and financial instruments declared and sustained that the integration of people with a migrant background is an integral part of both European history and European future. The EU considers that people with a migrant background can offer an important contribution to the social and economic progress of Europe. Moreover, in the case of refugees there is strong moral reason and a legal obligation to offer them sanctuary and a place where they can rebuild their lives. The aim of fostering cohesive and inclusive societies regardless of ethnicity, nationality, legal status, gender, sexual orientation, religion and disability is reflected in the European Union's values and principles[2].

At the same time, the EU is facing demographic challenges. The share of people aged over 65 is rapidly growing. By 2050, almost a third of Europeans will be in that age group. This trend is echoed by a rapid shrinking of our active labour force; today, four working people support one pensioner. In 2060 this ratio will be two on one. Some sectors, such as information technology and social and healthcare services are already facing particular labour market shortages. Europe will need more talent from abroad, while further continuing to harness and invest in its existing work force[3].

Studies indicate that immigration is associated with a positive contribution to the public finances and welfare of the host Member State whereby all high-skilled and low-skilled people in the society benefit depending on the migrant's initial level of skills and the duration of their integration in the labour market (International Monetary Fund, 2016:12). Swift and successful integration is crucial to maximise the opportunities created by migration.

At the same time, data indicates there is still a significant and growing socio-economic gap between people with a migrant background and mainstream society. Labour market participation of people with a migrant background may be hindered by several associated challenges (Battisti, Felbermayr, Peri and Poutvaara, 2014)

[1]https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/policy/themes/social-inclusion/integration-of-migrants/toolkit-integration-of-migrants.pdf, accesed in 03.12.18

[2] Ibidem

[3]Ibidem

Therefore, European officials believe that through public policies and different financial instruments attention must be focused towards improving the access of people with a migrant background and migrants to the labour market, including by recognising and updating their skills to the demand, and provide access to housing and mainstream services.

According to the data received from Eurostat, in the European Union we have 20.8 million people living in the EU third-country nationals which represents 4.1 % of the EU's entire population.

According to the same source, 35.1 million people are living in the EU who were born outside of it. This number represents 7 % the EU's entire population[4].

European integration funds are supporting national and European initiatives that facilitate the integration of non-EU immigrants into European societies. Projects and funds are primarily targeted at newly arrived immigrants. These projects supports Member States and civil society in enhancing their capacity to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate integration strategies, policies and measures, as well as their exchanges of information and best practices and cooperation on integration issues (OECD, 2010).

The measures designed by the funding authorities, for instance in the programmes and calls for proposals, aimed at integrating people with a migrant background should take into account the following principles: non-discrimination, gender equality, individualising the response to needs, empowerment, integrated approach, long-term perspective, and contingency measures.

If the nature of EU-funding is understood it can be a valuable source for financial support and great projects can be implemented in order to support your work on migration and integration or any other field[5].

An obstacle is represented by the existence, and the necessity of regular updating, of integration policy frameworks which varies across Member States. Differences include the guiding principles, measures, and monitoring and evaluation (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2017)

Member States have several EU Funds at their disposal to invest in the integration of people with a migrant background. These include funding instruments under shared management, including the European Structural and Investment Funds and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, and direct management, for example the EU programme for Employment and Social Innovation, Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme, the Health for Growth programme.

In the following we will try to present a brief summary of the EU funds which are available in the 2014-2020 development period.

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[4] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/policy/themes/social-inclusion/integration-of-migrants/toolkit-integration-of-migrants.pdf accesed in 02.12.18

[5] https://www.eurodiaconia.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/FUND-11-17-Briefing-for-members-Migration-and-Funding-September-2017.pdf accesed in 04.12.18



Source: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/policy/themes/social-inclusion/integration-of-migrants/toolkit-integration-of-migrants.pdf

People with a migrant background may face a wide range of challenges which must be addressed simultaneously in order to achieve the best results. For the EU funds to best respond to these challenges, a number of steps should be followed. Firstly, it is essential that evidenced-based national/local strategic policy frameworks are in place. Secondly, in case Member States and/or regional authorities decide to use EU funds for people with a migrant background, the interventions should be in line with these strategic policy frameworks. Thirdly, the overlaps between the EU funding instruments call for a reinforcement of the coordination mechanisms and synergies among them. Furthermore, when devising integration policies and strategies to be supported through EU funds it is recommended to build upon research findings[6].

Conclusion

One of the EU's distinctive contributions to the conceptualisation of the integration of third-country nationals during the last 25 years has been an emphasis on the need to overcome past acculturation and assimilation discourses, and policies exclusively concerned with the obligation of third country nationals to integrate into the perceived 'host society's values, principles and way of lifes (Carrera, 2011:39).

The amount of EU funds allocated for people with a migrant and minority background in 2014-2020 appears likely to significantly exceed that of 2007-2013 (Popescu, 2016:353). This is perhaps not surprising given improved reporting and an evolution in the demographic situation within the EU – in particular an increase in migration from third countries.

While integration policy remains a national competence, the Member States recognise that the 'failure of an individual Member State to develop and implement a

[6] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/return-fund_en accesed in 03.12.18

successful integration policy can have in different ways adverse implications for other Member States and the European Union' (Popescu, 2016:353).

The dispute for imposing in the European cultural context one or the other of the two theories to designate the plea for affirmation diversity does not seem like a simple argument.

The European Union wants to build a European cultural identity but wishes to do so by preserving national and regional identities in Europe. This new European identity, which needs to be built will be based on the common cultural fund of the European states, preserving the variety and the national and regional cultural diversity. European identity is nothing but a continuation of national identity, another identity level, at the level of the continent and the European Union.

It is important to not forget, that Europe is above all a community of values, and the goal of European unification is to achieve, test, develop and preserve these values. The fundamental European values are based on tolerance, humanity and brotherhood.

Without a collective identity beyond the national borders and a common framework for projects in the European public space, Europeanization is not possible. In fact, citizens perceive their daily problems as being related to the national public space.

In addition, successful integration is seen as crucial for economic and social cohesion in the European Union.

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MINORITY LANGUAGES IN EUROPE. SIGN LANGUAGE, FROM EUROPEAN REGULATIONS TO NATIONAL DECISIONS

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Abstract. *Sign languages are an important part of Europe's multilingual diversity. They are visual languages, expressed through the placement and movement of the hands, facial expressions or body movements, all of these actions representing important steps in forwarding information. This is the language used by about 71 million adults, aged between 18 to 80 years,in Europe and more than 55 million citizens of the European Union as a mother tongue. They constitute a linguistic minority of the Member States and their language is often recognized in the Constitutions of the States accordingly. However, not all the countries in the European Union have already implemented legal decisions about this minority language, even if the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was signed. Thus, this article tries to look over the most important European documentation and national decisions regarding the sign language and to give an objective answer to the question: should the sign language be recognized by every country in the European Union as a minority language?*

Keywords: *minority language, sign language, European regulations, national decisions*

The regional and minority languages are part of the cultural heritage of Europe and their protection and promotion contribute to the construction of a Europe based on democracy and cultural diversity. Moreover, the right to use a regional or minority language in private and public life is an absolute right of persons, according to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom. Conforming to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, a minority language is a language traditionally used within a territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population and who use a different language from the official language of that State. A minority language does not include the dialects of the official language of the State or the languages of migrants. The territory in which the minority language is used is represented by the geographical area in which the said language is the mode of expression of a number of people (Council of Europe, 1992).

Sign language has supposedly existed as long as spoken languages. There is no answer about who invented it, but it is most likely that the people themselves, who needed this type of language created a variety of gestures in order to communicate, because the action of communication happens instinctually. There is no doubt that the sing language is used by a certain minority of people. The exact number of users cannot be defined, but the European Union of Deaf estimates that there are approximately 0,1% of the population of

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every countryusing this language as mother tongue (European Center for Modern Languages of the Council of Europe, 2014).Therefore, the sign language is considered to be the mother tongue for this minority of people, due to the fact that this is the language that they use for expressing their needs, feelings, ideas, etc. This is the reason why there are many voices who sustain the idea that the sign language should be introduced in the official documentation of each State and considered as a minority language for the people who use it. Many countries have already adopted this approach in their Constitution and assumed the reality of this minority language on the territory. Others are about to introduce the sign language in the official documentation. There are international and European organizations created in order to protect and to promote this language. The European Commission, by its Education and Training Directorate, sustain all countries to promote and to protect the sign language as a minority language (European Commission, 2015), because the sign languages are an important part of Europe's multilingual diversity. Therefore, there are countries in the European Union which have another point of view, even if each spoken language in Europe has a counterpart sign language.

1. General considerations

According to the MerriamWebster Dictionary, the Sing Language is "a formal language employing a system of hand gestures for communication", or "an unsystematic method of communicating chiefly by manual gestures used by people speaking different languages" (MerriamWebster Dictionary, 2018). The sign language must not be confused with pantomime or gesturing. Sign languages are languages that are conveyed by means of hand shapes, the movements of the hands and body, and the use of facial expressions and lip patterns. Whereas spoken languages use units of sounds to form words, sign languages use visual-gestural units of form, composed of four basic hand forms: hand shape, hand location, hand movement, and hand orientation (Timmermans, 2005: 9).

The sign language is not an international language, but there are universal features in sign languages. They are natural languages in their own right, rule-based and systematic, with distinct lexicons and grammatical structures, certainly not less complex than spoken languages. As spoken languages, sign languages have a structure that can be further analyzed and divided into smaller segments: sentences, signs and even smaller units, being used according to grammars that can be described with the help of rules. Each country has its own national sign language. Some countries have more than one sign language. For example, in Spain, Catalonian Sign Language is used in Catalonia, and Galician Sign Language in Galicia; in Belgium, Flemish Belgian Sign Language, Belgian French Sign Language, and German Sign Language are used; in Switzerland, Swiss-German, Swiss-French and Swiss Italian Sign Language(s) are used; in Finland, Finnish Sign Language and Finnish-Swedish Sign Language are used. Most sign languages are mutually unintelligible (Timmermans, 2005: 10).Also, there are language families between sign languages, like in the case of oral languages. As for example, the Austrian Sign language or Dutch Sign language can be understood by someone who uses German Sign language, but cannot be understood easily by someone who uses Italian Sign language(European Center for Modern Languages of the Council of Europe, 2014).So, exactly like the spoken languages, the sign languages have the same type of variations: in function of the region, the social or ethnic group, the social situation, the age or gender. At the same time, they are not fixed languages, but they evolve as every language. Of course, the sign language is preferred specially by deaf people, but also by hearing people who have in their family deaf members.

There is a wrong conception to think that the sign languages are dependent on the spoken languages. Sign languages are, without no doubt, independent of spoken languages, following their own way of development. Also, the grammars of sign languages have very few rules in common with the spoken languages used in the same geographical area. Moreover, there are cases in which a country has only one official spoken language and more sign languages, whereas an area that contains more than one spoken language might use only one sign language (Translation Directory, 2016).

Over the time, the users of the sign language taught about an international form of sign language which could be used by all and seen as Lingua Franca,[1] and so, they created Gestuno, an international communication system often called International Sign Language or IS and use it during meetings and international conferences with participants who do not share a common sign language. However, it should not be compared with Esperanto, the most widely spoken constructed international language, because Gestuno only brings together about 1500 signs and it does not have a concrete grammar or lexicon, so it's not a real language (Hand Speak, 2014). The name Gestuno comes from Italian and means the unity of sign languages.

2. Decisions at European level about Sign Language

Over the time, different Decisions and Resolutions concerning the Sign language have been taken at European level. The most important will be mentioned in this part of the article. The first European institution who proposed legislation in the issue regarding the Sign Language was the European Parliament. The first Resolution from 1988 can still be considered actual in many aspects, due to the lack of progress in this domain. The European Parliament stressed the importance of the official recognition of the sign language in the member states, but also the importance of the recognition of sign language interpreter as a profession. At the same time, the European Parliament proposed to the broadcasting authorities to include translation into sign languages, or at least subtitles of those programs considered of political interest but also to extend the translation to the programs of cultural and general interest. It was established as well a minimum level of provision of sign language interpretation and sub-titling. Not less important was the decision of the European Parliament to support projects aimed at teaching sign languages to hearing children and adults in order to a better integration and communication of deaf people. Also, the European Parliament asked the member states to support the research and the publication of up-to-date dictionaries of their national sign language, but also multilingual dictionaries of the sign languages. These are considered to be the most important resolutions of the "European Parliament Resolution on Sign Languages from 1988", adopted on 17 June 1988 (European Parliament, 2002).

In 1998, the European Parliament proposes the second Resolution regarding the Sign Languages, taking into consideration the previous one, but also the resolution on equality of opportunity for people with disabilities and the article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty on non-discrimination. This second Resolution marks, first of all, 10 years of interest for the sign languages and also some evolution made in this aspect. At that moment, for the European Parliament it was still important to have qualified and professional sign languages interpreters, it was still important to give opportunities for employment for the users of sign languages and to give them an education and training.

[1] It is a language used in common by people not having the same mother tongue, but able to use a bridge language in order to understand between them

On the other hand, the European institutions are already prepared to receive sign languages users within (European Parliament, 2016).

The situation of regional or minority languages has been one of the biggest concerns at European level during many years. In this context, in 1992, the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages is adopted as a European instrument for the protection of languages. In this Charter, the emphasis is put on the cultural dimension and the use of a regional or minority language in all aspects of life, so the role of this Charter is to protect and promote regional or minority languages and not linguistic minorities. Even if is not mentioned explicitly, the sign language should be considered protectedby this Charter. There are not specified in the Charter any individual or collective rights for the speakers of these languages. Nevertheless, the commitments of the parties concerning the status of these languages and the internal legislation which is due to be introduced in compliance with the Charter will have a clear effect on the situation of the communities concerned and their individual members (European Center for Modern Languages of the Council of Europe, 2014).Thereby, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is a basic instrument in the field of international law due to the fact that it focuses on the languages themselves, rather than on the rights of the minorities.

The Recommendation 1492 from 2001 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe concerning the Rights on National Minorities, in its paragraph 12.13 states that the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Minsters should "give the various sign languages utilized in Europe a protection similar to that afforded by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, possibly by means of the adoption of a recommendation to member states" (Council of Europe, 2001).The text of the Recommendation was examined by the Committee of Ministers who assigned terms of reference to the Committee on the Rehabilitation and Integration of People with disabilities to draw up an opinion about the text of the recommendation. The official opinion was that sign languages can be regarded as a non-territorial language, so they can be placed under the protection of the European Charter for Minority or Regional Languages. Furthermore, sign language users are a cultural and linguistic minority, which, in accordance with the Council of Europe Declaration on cultural diversity member states should develop and/or maintain measures to sustain,to protect and promote linguistic and cultural diversity, in order to enhance pluralism and multi-cultural societies in Europe. Nevertheless, sign languages should be recognized as an expression of cultural wealth, seeing that they constitute an element of Europe's linguistic and cultural heritage (Timmermans, 2005: 20-21).On the other hands, the Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages points out that the protection provided by the Charter is designed for other type of languages, included in Article 1 of the document and the Charter was not conceived to meet their specific needs. They also mention that sign languages should be the subject of a special international instrument addressed to their particular needs and it would be welcomed this kind of initiative.

On 1 April 2003, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted another Recommendation on the protection of sign languages in the member states of the Council of Europe, the Recommendation 1598. The Assembly recognizes sign languages as the expression of Europe's cultural wealth and as a feature of Europe's linguistic and cultural heritage, as a complete and natural means of communication for deaf people and takes the view that official recognition of these languages will help deaf people to become integrated into society and gain access to education, employment and justice (Council of Europe, 2003). The Committee of Ministers concluded that sign languages deserve special consideration and protection. As to the question of a possible future Council of Europe instrument, the reply states that a study of the needs of sign language users should be conducted first.

The last European document regarding the sign languages is the Brussels Declaration on Sign Languages from 2010 and it is a document supporting the rights of Deaf people and equality of the users of sign languages. It was signed at the end of a conference entitled “Implementation of Sign Language Legislation” which was organized by the European Union of the Deaf (EUD). The most important regulations were: the recognition of national sign language on an equal footing with the respective spoken language of the Member state; the right of users to learn a sign language; the access to public services in their national sign languages; the same opportunities by providing accessible educational options for sign language users; the support of the use of sign languages; the existence of sign language interpretation service (European Union of the Deaf, 2010).

In conclusion, the European institutions were involved in the process of legal recognition of the sign languages as a minority language in the Member states of the European Union. The progress is obvious in all documents, even if it’s a slow one. It is now the duty of each member state to adopt their own legislation and to promote the real use and the recognition of the national sign language. In the end, this is all about democracy and the recognition of rights.

3. Decisions at National level about Sign Language

The European Union of the Deaf, the EUD, is a nonprofit European non-Governmental organization based in Brussels and representing associations of the 28 EU Member States and other countries like Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. It represents the interests of deaf in the European Union from 1985 and itspurpose is to establish and to maintain the dialogue between the European Union and the associations of deaf persons from the 28 Member states. Throughout the time, the countries of the European Union have made progresses by recognizing the sign languages in their official documents, with the support of the European Union of Deaf.

Overall, there are four countries who have introduced the sign language in their Constitutions: Austria, Finland, Portugal and Hungary; there are nine countries that have a separate legislation for sign language: Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain; there are four countries that have a language legislation: Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Sweden; there are twelve countries that have a legislation in the field of education of people who use sign languages: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden; there are six countries that have a media legislation: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary and UK; there are nine countries that have an interpreting legislation for sign languages: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, UK (Insolera, 2016).

A synthesis of the most important resolutions regarding the national decisions about national sign language is presented in the following lines.The Austrian Sign Language is one of the four sign languages within Europe which is mentioned in the Constitution of the country in Article 8 of the Constitution from 2005: “Austrian Sign Language is recognized as an independent language. More shall be regulated by further laws”(Insolera, 2016). An important institution to be mentioned in Austria is the University of Klagenfurt who has started a scientific research into sign language in 1990.

Today, the University has a special Department calledCenter for Sign Language and Deaf Communication and has an intense research activity in the field (Center for Sign Language and Deaf Communication, 2014).Belgium is one of the countries that have a separated legislation for the sign language, apart for the French Community and for the Flemish Community.As sign language is different from a language to another, it is obvious that in a country with two official languages we had two sign languages recognized by two laws. As for the Czech Republic, it was in 1998 when the Parliament adopted the Sign Language Actaccording to which the right of the Deaf to communication and education through sign languages was recognized. The Czech users of sign language have their own television program. As for the education, the children who use sign language attend classes together with normal students, because they have the right to interpreters or deaf assistants (Timmermans, 2005: 85-87). In Denmark,the Danish Sign Language is recognized on equal footing with the oral and written form of the Danish. The most interesting project in Denmark was, beyond a doubt, a Dictionary of Danish Sign language (Timmermans, 2005: 40). In Finland, the Finish Sign Language is one of the four languages included in the Constitution of the country. By adopting this law, Finland has become one of the countries who recognize a sign language as a natural language and the right to use it as a mother tongue (De Meulder, 2015: 500).At the same time, Finland has interpretation services and interpreters for sign languages, TV programmes and even a church where the program is translated also into sign language. In Finland, the persons who want to learn the Finish Sign Language have more possibilities. There are studies of: Sign language instructor, Sign language interpreter or Basic studies in Sign language opened to everyone through the University of Jyväskylä or even MA studies with the possibility to choose Finnish Sign language as major subject (University of Jyväskylä, 2015).As for France, the country gives a great importance in the Sign Language, because in France was founded the first public school for deaf people. The school was established by Charles-Michel de l'Épée, considered as well the father of the deaf.In time, the researches in the academic field proved that the French Sign Language is a complete language with its own grammar, lexicon and vocabulary and even adopted the law from 11 of February 2005 by which the French sign language is considered a “langue à part entière” (Signeset Formations, 2005). Being strongly supported by German universities, the German Association of the Deaf reached success on 2002 when the German Sign Language was first legally recognized in the Federal Disability Equality Act which “*Guarantees disabled people the right to access to public places and buildings, public transport, the internet and political elections. It guarantees the right to communication, and acknowledges sign language as an official language*(ANED, 2009:3).In Greece, the Greek sign language, under the law 2817/2000 has been recognized as an official language for the deaf but not yet as a minority language (Kassapi, Polatoglou, Dourouma, Kouzelis,2008:2).

After Finland, Hungary has the second act stipulating in it that the Deaf community represents a linguistic minority. In the renewed Constitution of 2011, the Article H3 states that: “*Hungary shall protect Hungarian Sign Language as a part of Hungarian culture*” (Constitute, 2011: 5). In Romania, it was after June 1999 when, through an Amendment of the Romanian Government, the Romanian Sign Language gained an official recognition. It states in its Article 15 that “De la data intrăriiînvigoare a prezenteiordonanţe de urgenţălimbajulmimico-gestual se bucura de recunoaştereoficială din parteastatului” [From the effective date of the present amendment the sign language will enjoy legal recognition from the state] (GuvernulRomâniei, 1999). In Sweden, the

Swedish Sign Language was officially recognized since 1981 through an official Commission which states that the people with hearing disabilities have to be bilingual to function in society. Bilingualism on their part, according to the commission, means that they have to be fluent in their visual/gestural sign language, and in the language that society surrounds them with, Swedish (Timmermans, 2005: 75-80). Even though the United Kingdom does not have a written constitutional document, it regulated the use of sign languages through a series of Acts of Law which are passed in the Parliament. As it is their preferred language for participation in everyday life for more than 70 000 people, the British Sign Language has been recognized as one of the official languages of the UK on March 2003 (Timmermans, 2005: 82-84).

There are different levels of recognition, as presented above, in different Acts and Laws. During the time, all European countries tried to introduce in a certain measure legal recognition of Sign language in the official documentation of the state. In this paper we have just presented some measures that seemed important and relevant for this stage of the research. It is certain that the national recognition of sign language in every country could be a research on its own and could constitute an independent article. Maybe we could take into consideration to present in the future the presence of sign language in the national law in some specific countries.

4. Conclusions

As a conclusion, it can be state thatevery country should take measures to protect, promote and support the fields of research, use, teaching and learning of the national sign language/s. Furthermore, the education for theusers of sign language should be offered in a bilingual mode with the national spoken language and the national signed language as both the subject and means of communication. The focus of policy concerning sign language should lie on securing equal opportunities by providing equal educational options, primarily by training fully bilingual teachers, preferably native sign language users. Finally, it will be necessary that states come up with specific action plans to secure civil and human rights for the users of sign languages (Krausneker, 2008: 28-34).

According to the Linguistic Human Rights, the sign languages users have the natural right to identify themselves with a national language. Thus, the countries should recognize this right of the people. As we could see, that there are differences between the states regarding their perspective towards sign languages and their legal recognition. While some of them like Austria, Finland, Hungary and Portugal included laws in their national constitutions regarding the legal official recognition of sign languages, others are barely having some legislation. Including the sign language in the national Constitution is an act of respect of human right and thus the basis of democracy. As the right to communicate is directly connected to access to education, employment, enjoyment of citizenship rights, culture, media, free time and others, a state with a legal recognition of sign language means a society without excluded people. Sometimes, even if there are countries which have legislation on sign languages, their legal recognition is not enough and, therefore, governments should have a global approach and take accompanying measures in order to improve the social inclusion.

Lately, at European level, important conferences and meetings were held in order to support the importance of recognition of sign language. The most important was the conference titled “Multilingualism and equal rights in the EU: the role of sign languages” from September 2016, held in Brussels, where the speakers tried to attribute the same importance to the sign language as to a spoken language. Maybe this conference will be a starting point to the legal recognition in all countries of national sign language as a minority language. It would be part of human rights and a democratic system.

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IV. Foreign Policy and International Relations

THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP AND PROSPECTS FOR RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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Abstract. *This paper is an in-depth analysis of the role of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership and its influence on relations with the Russian Federation. The analysis of the role of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership and the prospects for relations with the Russian Federation are necessary, given that the interests of the European Union and Russia intersect in Eastern Europe, and Moldova has been in the past 10 years between East and West. In the situation created Moldova finds itself between two regional powers – the EU and Russia. The European Union, as well as the Russian Federation, are major partners for the Republic of Moldova, and the orientation to the east or west often depends on political desire. The Republic of Moldova is one of the countries in Eastern Europe where Russia, by various methods, tries to maintain its influence, directing all forces against the EU enlargement to the East. In the context of the Republic of Moldova's rapprochement with the EU, the main geostrategic interest of the Russian Federation is to maintain control over the former Soviet republics. And in order to maintain its status of great power, Russia needs to maintain its influence, including its military presence in Moldova, as a tool for exerting political pressure. However, the current reality, namely that the draft resolution proposed by the Republic of Moldova on "The complete and unconditional withdrawal of foreign military forces on the territory of the Republic of Moldova" was adopted at the UN General Assembly on June 22, 2018, questions the continuation of the presence Russian military in the Transnistrian region.*

Keywords: *Republic of Moldova, Eastern Partnership, Russian Federation, European Union, Europeanization, cooperation, partnership.*

Introduction

This paper aims at analyzing the role of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership and the influence on bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. Today, it is becoming increasingly obvious that Moldova's proximity to the European Union is not in favour of Russia, which wants to maintain its influence in a state on the border with the EU. The Republic of Moldova for more than 9 years is part of the EU – Eastern Partnership program. During these years there have been many political changes in the country, but Moldova has always been one of the most active participants of the EaP.

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The Eastern Partnership joins 6 post-Soviet countries – the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia, but these countries are currently in different phases of implementing program prerogatives and have different plans for the EU. The evolution of the Republic of Moldova in the EaP has shown that the country's progress in the program depends on the official policy, but also on the influence from the outside. It should be noted that the EaP policies and the active participation of the Republic of Moldova in this program intersect directly the interests of the Russian Federation in this area. Thus, the influence of external factors marks the decisions taken by the governments of the EaP states.

1. Theoretical conceptual framework

In 2003, within the European Union, the Extended Europe concept emerged, when the European Commission, through the Communication "Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours", proposed the development of a prosperous area, a circle of friends at the EU's external borders.[1] A little later, the European Neighborhood Policy Concept also appears, when in Brussels, on 12 May 2004, the strategic document "The European Neighborhood Policy" was adopted.[2]The strategy document has defined the coverage of the European Neighborhood Policy: 12 countries from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority and such countries like – Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

It is important to note that the Russian Federation refused to maintain and develop its cooperation relations with the European Union under the umbrella of the European Neighbourhood Policy. At the same time, at the continental level, the European Neighbourhood Policy is interdependent on Russia's foreign policy, given its role in solving the frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, and the political influence it exercises for its benefit in the post-Soviet space.

Four years later, the European Council on 19-20 June 2008 reiterated the need to promote the Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy and to deepen cooperation between the Eastern neighbours of the EU. Thus, in May 2009, the Eastern Partnership initiative is officially launched.

An important theoretical and conceptual aspect is the concept of Europeanization. The concept of Europeanization is one of the most popular among integration theories, which in its turn has several approaches and definitions. However, in order to carry out an analysis of the EU's neighbourhood policy, we can only mention those referring to the external dimension of this process, namely the institutional changes taking place in the partner countries at the borders of the Union (See more Brie, 2014: 113-130 and Brie, 2017b: 51-78).

One of the first definitions of Europeanization is the definition of the American professor Robert Ladrech. In his paper "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and

[1] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A new Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11.03.2003, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf, accessed 01.11.2018

[2] European Commission, Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy – strategy paper, com (2004) 373 final, brussels, 12 may 2004, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/2004_communication_from_the_commission_-_european_ neighbourhood_policy_-_strategy_paper.pdf, accessed 01.11.2018

Institutions: The Case of France", the researcher believes that Europeanization is a complex but rather slow process that leads to the reorientation and modeling of policies in such a way that the political and economic dynamics of the European Community becomes part of the organizational logic of the states' national policies (Ladrech, 1994: 70). The definition of the American scholar is interesting as the organizational model of the European community can influence the organizational logic of the states that are in the European space.

In Heather Grabbe's paper "Europenization goes East: Power and Uncertainty in EU Accession Proccess", we see an idea that Europeanization is a process under the aegis of the European Union, which is necessary for states wishing to join the European Union (Grabbe, 2003: 3). The author analyzes the process of Europeanization in the Central and Eastern European countries, which in the future want to become EU members, and points out that in these countries the process of Europeanization is deferred from that which takes place in the countries that are already members of the Union. It should be noted that the researcher also highlights the influence of the European Union on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, a specific factor of the Europeanization process in this region of Europe is that the Central and Eastern European states are open to this influence of the European Union.

Italian researcher C. Radaelli in his paper "Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?" considers that Europeanization represents concepts that interconnect the internal and external aspects of European integration. This is a process of spreading values and legislative norms within the EU but also in countries that are at the borders of the Union (Radaelli, 2004: 4).

The Norwegian researcher Johan Peder Olsen in "The Many Faces of Europeanization", proposed classifying the concept of Europeanization into five categories:

- Europeanization as act of alteration in the external territorial boundaries;
- Europeanization as a development of governance institutions at the European level;
- Europeanisation as the central penetration of national and sub-national governance systems;
- Europeanization as an export of forms of political organization and governance;
- Europeanisation as a political project for a stronger and unified Europe (Olsen, 2002).

Considering the research topic, the last two categories of author J. P. Olsen are interesting from a scientific point of view. These two categories can be analyzed in the context of research into the European Neighbourhood Policy of the EU and the Eastern Partnership Initiative (Brie, 2017a: 55-71; Brie, 2017c: 123-155).

According to Olsen, Europeanization as an export form of political organization and governance is typical for Europe beyond the European Union territory, which focuses on cooperation with non-European states. It should be noted that the process of Europeanization from this point of view also concerns the Republic of Moldova within the Eastern Partnership. Thus, the European model of democratic governance also influenced the official political governance of the Republic of Moldova. As a confirmation, we can add that the Republic of Moldova's accession to the Eastern Partnership Initiative in 2009 was an important political expression of the pro-European government of Moldova at that time. As a result, after the assumption of the responsibility of the government towards the pro-European vector, the political desire of the Moldovans changed, which was still oriented towards the EU.

Europeanisation as a political project for a unified Europe also takes place under the influence of governance systems outside the European continent. This theory largely refers to the political project for building a strong political Europe. As a result, it is creating a political space that will include the EU and its neighbours. It is worth mentioning that the EU has tried to create political space through its actions.

Europeanization as a political project is important because it is a meeting point between the intentions of neighbouring states and EU members. This process is an effort of the Union for relations with the region. This marks the beginning of a partnership between the EU and its neighbours and increases the commitment of both the neighbours and the Union.[3]

The European Neighbourhood Policy is a specific form of institutional transfer that applies to the EU's neighbours.[4]At the same time, the ENP does not formulate the prospect of EU membership, but it presupposes the creation of a "circle of friends" at its borders, which are offered the opportunity to participate in various community activities.

In the paper "Institutional Convergence of CIS Towards European Benchmarks", the German authors believe that the EU has set its interest in implementing democratic and market institutions in neighbouring countries in order to reduce the institutional deficit in these countries (Schweickert, Melnykovska, Gawrich, Drautzburg, 2008: 16). Thus, the technical and organizational consultancy and expertise provided by the European structures to neighbouring countries to solve concrete macro or microeconomic problems is a form of institutional transfer.

In order to carry out the theoretical analysis of the respective research, the theories of international relations were used, such as transnationalism, critical theory, and functionalist theory.

Advocates of transnationalism believe that international relations have gone beyond the framework of inter-state interactions. In addition to states in international relations, there are also international organizations, individuals, and other non-state actors. Thus, the diversity of participants in international relations has contributed to transforming international communication from international to transnational.[5]Transnationalism can be used to understand the interaction between two different actors such as the Republic of Moldova and the European Union.

Critical theory is used to interpret statistical data regarding the participation of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership. Thus, we can analyze the indices presented in the "Eastern Partnership Index" reports, which are made every year starting with 2012.

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[3] Ioana Mureşan, Politică Europeană de Vecinătate: nou cadru pentru europenizare?, in Colecţia de studii IER, Institutul European din România, nr. 15, București, 2005, p. 31, http://beta.ier.ro/documente/working_papers/wp_15.pdf, accessed 04.11.2018

[4] Eugenia Feuraș, Cadrul teoretico-conceptual cu referință la rolul instituțiilor în procesul de aderare la UE, în Revista „ECONOMICA", nr. 3 (97), 2016, p. 100, https://ibn.idsi.md/sites/default/files/imag_file/92_110_Cadrul%20teoretico-conceptual%20cu%20referinta%20la%20rolul%20institutiilor%20in%20procesul%20de%20aderare%20la%20UE.pdf, accessed 05.11.2018

[5] Павел Цыганков, Политическая социология международных отношений, Москва: «Радикс», 1994, https://www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/Polit/cugan/01.php, accessed 05.11.2018

The functionalist theory is based on the establishment of connections that eliminate gaps between states through the formation of specific and functional organizations. Some aspects of this theory are reflected even in the European Neighbourhood Policy when EU countries, through competent institutions, offer rewards to the neighbouring states, demanding in return the implementation of measures that will lead to the security of the areas adjacent to EU borders (Brie, 2017c: 123-155).

Referring to the Republic of Moldova, which is part of the eastern neighbourhood of the European Union, we find the Soviet legacy of an energy dependence on Russia, and an energy sector characterized by numerous political interferences. The interdependence of the political factor with the economic and social one is a feature of reality in the eastern neighbourhood of the European Union. It is therefore becoming increasingly clear that the Eastern Partnership countries, including the Republic of Moldova, are specific to the interdependence these countries have with Russia (Brie, 2017a: 55-71).

2. Methodological framework and research historiography

The methodological framework used is more analytical in nature, based on the decisions made at the beginning of the EaP to date, according to normative acts published by the EU, or the regulations approved by the Moldovan government that deal with the relationship of this state with the European Union. The examination of the progress reports issued by the European Commission, the Parliament or the Council is very important because they are objective indicators of the progress made by the Republic of Moldova in the EaP.

Various research methods have been used in the paper, such as:

- Discourse analysis – analysis of the speeches of the political leaders of the Republic of Moldova, the EU and the Russian Federation, revealing the general directions of the interests of each of these actors.
- Documentary analysis – study of official documents of the EU and the Republic of Moldova, relevant to the chosen theme: reports, accounts, treaties, agreements, regulations, directives, decisions, communications, action plans.
- Behavioural method – highlighting the specifics of the Russian Federation's interests in Eastern Europe, including the Republic of Moldova.
- Historical method – the possibility of complementing the research of phenomena and specific processes not only in their spatial development, but also in time. Registration of the occurrence, the stages of the evolution and the current progress of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership and the impact on relations with Russia.
- Comparative method – comparative analysis of the progress of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership.
- Statistical analysis – interpretation of public surveys on the impact of European integration and the civic perception of this process in Moldova.
- Critical analysis of documentation sources – critical analysis of sources such as studies, official publications, journals, books, reports on the topic of research.

Given the topicality of the research, the statements of the officials representing the actors involved, especially those of the European Union, of the Russian Federation, as well as those of the Republic of Moldova: the prime minister, the foreign minister, the deputy ministers – persons responsible for the implementation of this area, are used in the paper, considering the value of the argument, their statements representing the official position of the Republic of Moldova.

In the Republic of Moldova, the scientific preoccupation with the European integration, including the activity of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership, is manifested through a multidimensional research, which is in continuous development. Thus, if the participation of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership is widely approached by Moldovan specialists, then the impact of this cooperation on bilateral relations with the Russian Federation is not sufficiently researched. It should be noted that in Moldova there are several researches that are dedicated to the European integration of the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership and the Moldovan-Russian relations in different contexts.

3. Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership: after 10 years of participation

For over 10 years, the Republic of Moldova has been part of the Eastern Partnership launched by the European Union in 2009. During these years, Moldova has gone through several stages in its evolution in the Eastern Partnership. In order to carry out a complex analysis of the role of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership, it is worth mentioning the main progress and results achieved by Moldova in 10 years within this initiative.

Officially launched on May 7, 2009, the Eastern Partnership aims to further strengthen the relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours. The overall objectives of the Eastern Partnership are political association and economic integration between the European Union and Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus by establishing new bilateral commitments and a new institutionalized framework for multilateral cooperation on four thematic platforms: governance and stability, economic integration and convergence with EU policies, energy security and people-to-people contacts.[6]

The Eastern Partnership is an EU political instrument that structures cooperation with the six partner countries on two dimensions – bilateral and multilateral. The bilateral dimension consists of signing and implementing association agreements, the creation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area, the liberalization of the visa regime, and the multilateral dimension through thematic platforms and flagship initiatives.[7]

Thus, the bilateral dimension for Moldova means the implementation of the Association Agreement and the liberalization of the visa regime. The Association Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union was signed on 27 June 2014 in Brussels. The agreement was ratified by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on 2 July 2014 and by the European Parliament on 13 November 2014. The Association Agreement (AA) also includes the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area - DCFTA.[8]As of 28 April 2014, the visa regime for Moldovan citizens was liberalized by amending the EU Regulation no. 539/2001 on abolishing the visa

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[6] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Eastern Partnership, Brussels, 3.12.2008, COM(2008) 823 final, 30 p., http://www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/668e28f3-9e29-4a41-b376-43acaeff76ec/EaP_COM(2008)823.pdf, accessed 15.11.2018

[7] Ce este Parteneriatul Estic? Ministerul Afacerilor Externe și Integrării Europene al Republicii Moldova, site-ul oficial, http://www.mfa.gov.md/totul-despre-pae/-, accessed 15.11.2018

[8]Acordul de Asociere RM-UE, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe și Integrării Europene al Republicii Moldova, site-ul oficial, http://www.mfa.gov.md/totul-despre-aa/, accessed 15.11.2018

requirement for short-term trips for Moldovan citizens holding a biometric passport in the Schengen area.[9]

Therefore, as of April 28, 2014, citizens of the Republic of Moldova can travel visa-free, with only a biometric passport, in 26 Schengen states. The results obtained mean that Moldova on the bilateral dimension reached the three major objectives set in 2009 in Prague: political association, economic integration and liberalization of the visa regime. In this respect, it should be noted that Moldova has overcome the rest of the EaP countries. The multilateral dimension of the EaP for Moldova means participation in the discussions in the Ministerial meetings of the Eastern Partnership.

It is obvious that the Republic of Moldova is an active participant in the EaP. Moldova has achieved remarkable successes in the EaP, especially during the year 2014, succeeding in signing and ratifying an Association Agreement with the EU and obtaining the liberalized visa regime. An important success is the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU. But we can not fail to mention that these successes, and firstly the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, led also to the application by Russia of economic sanctions directed against Moldovan agri-food exports, such as the exclusion of 19 categories of products from the free trade regime with Russia by canceling the “zero tax”.

Thus, the Russian executive has adopted the decision by which Russia has the right to apply customs duties to 19 Moldovan product categories despite the fact that there is a free trade area within the CIS. After a series of non-tariff actions restricting imports of wines, canned food, fruits, Russia for the first time applied prohibitive tariffs in trade relations with Moldova. At the same time, non-tariff measures related to the quality and safety of products, frequently initiated, especially after the initialling of the Association Agreement with the EU, derive from momentary decisions and may be temporary. There is something else in the case of the cancellation of the “zero rates”, which is related to the budgetary process, i.e. the revenues that form the state budget, including the collection of import duties.[10]

Several analysts, experts and researchers have have addressed the issue of the success, importance but also the inefficiency of the Eastern Partnership, but of an important value in this case is the publication “European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries” and “Eastern Partnership Index”, which represent a comprehensive analysis of the progress made by each state in the process of implementing the reforms and adjusting the internal situation to the requirements of the European Union.

In order to understand the evolution of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership, we will analyze the publication “European Integration Index 2012, 2013, 2014 for Eastern Partnership Countries” and the latest “Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016”. The study “European Integration Index 2012 for Eastern Partnership Countries”[11]has been developed by experts from several countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and reflects the progress of the European

[9] Dialogul RM-UE privind liberalizarea regimului de vize, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe și Integrării Europene al Republicii Moldova, site-ul oficial, http://www.mfa.gov.md/liberalizarea-regimului-vize/, accessed 15.11.2018

[10] Denis Cenușă, Anularea „taxelor zero” pentru produsele moldovenești: Are dreptate Rusia sau nu? Centrul Analitic Independent EXPERT-GRUP, https://expert-grup.org/ro/comentarii/item/1000-taxe-zero-rusia, accessed 15.11.2018

[11] European Integration Index 2012 for Eastern Partnership Countries, May 2012, http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP%20Index%20%202012.pdf, accessed 15.11.2018

integration process of the EaP countries, analyzing sectors such as democracy implementation, electoral system, human rights, judicial independence, combating corruption, decision-making transparency, market economy and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, political dialogue, civil society participation. In the top of the six EaP countries compared in the study, Moldova holds the first place as in 2011. For this reason, Moldova is called "the most willing reformer" among the six states.

According to the study, Moldova has accumulated more points than other countries in the area of democracy: electoral process (0.88 points), fighting corruption (0.75 points), public administration quality (0.79), press freedom (0.71), human rights (0.68) judicial independence (0.66).[12]For the time being, Moldova, along with Georgia, has implemented the most levers to ensure an independent judiciary, but it states that political interference in justice persists. The index is based on a questionnaire with 695 questions, covering the areas of European integration.

According to the "European Integration Index 2013 for Eastern Partnership Countries", Moldova remains the top reformer in the region and is closest to meeting EU standards. Although its correlation score remains almost the same as in 2012, the country has made progress in Harmonization and Process Management (0.59).[13]The Republic of Moldova continues to occupy its leadership position in all three dimensions and holds the highest mark for profound and sustainable democracy.

Measuring the annual path of the EaP countries on European integration, the edition "European Integration Index 2014 for Eastern Partnership Countries",[14]is a mixed set of results for the six Eastern partner countries. Moldova continues to be the avant-garde reformer in the region. Its score being the highest, however, remains the same as in 2013. At the same time, Moldova has a rather low score in services, the area in which it was overtaken by all EaP countries except Armenia. But during the analyzed period (January 2013 - June 2014), Moldova had the most developed interpersonal links with the EU, and in 2014 it became the first country in the EU that secured visa-free travel to the EU. Moldova has improved its index of harmonization, deep democracy, education policies, culture, youth and the information society.[15]

The progress made by Moldova in the EaP in the period of 2015-2016 was sufficient for Moldova to remain in the lead. Under the "Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016", the equivalence of legislation and the links between the Eastern Partnership countries and the EU are assessed. By measuring the approximation it can be deduced how much the six countries are approaching the European legislation. In terms of link assessment, the emphasis is on the intensity of connections in both the economic, social and inter-human spheres. Today, the Eastern Partnership Index is almost the only instrument to measure objectively the results of EaP countries.

Looking at the results of the six countries, we can point out that Moldova is ranked first in only one of the 6 sub-sectors – citizens in Europe, and in another –

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[12] Ibidem, p. 50.

[13] European Integration Index 2013 for Eastern Partnership Countries, p. 18., http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP_Index_2013.pdf, accessed 15.11.2018

[14] European Integration Index 2014 for Eastern Partnership Countries, February 2015, 112 p., http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP%20Index%202014.pdf, accessed 15.11.2018

[15] Indicele Integrării Europene pentru ţările Parteneriatului Estic 2014, http://infoeuropa.md/parteneriat-estic/indicele-integrarii-europene-pentru-tarile-parteneriatului-estic-2014, accessed 15.11.2018

democracy and human rights, it shares the first place with Georgia. In other cases, Moldova ranks second or third, being advanced by Ukraine and even by Armenia.

Chart 1. Sector rankings of the Eastern Partnership countries 2015-2016**.**

Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016	**Republic of Moldova**	**Georgia**	**Ukraine**	**Armenia**	**Azerbaijan**	**Belarus**
Overall ranking (place number)	**I**	II	III	IV	V	VI
Democracy and human rights	**(0.71)**	**(0.71)**	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.56)	(0.45)
European integration and convergence	(0.69)	(0.66)	(0.70)	(0.66)	(0.57)	(0.42)
Sustainable development	(0.78)	(0.64)	(0.77)	(0.81)	(0.78)	(0.64)
International security, political dialogue and cooperation	(0.71)	(0.76)	(0.78)	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.48)
Sectoral cooperation and trade flows	(0.61)	(0.56)	(0.64)	(0.39)	(0.50)	(0.35)
Citizens in Europe	**(0.72)**	(0.66)	(0.46)	(0.57)	(0.46)	(0.54)

Source: Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016. Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development.[16]

At regional level, the Eastern Partnership can be divided into 3 groups of countries. The first group – Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, which are in close relations with the EU due to the conclusion of the Association Agreements. The second group – Armenia, which tries to combine membership of the Eurasian Union with the renewal of relations with the EU. The degree of rapprochement with the EU though, is always partial, in the equivalence to the European legislation, not preferred by the Russian Federation in its geopolitical influence zone. The last group – Azerbaijan and Belarus, which are governed by the most authoritative regimes in the EaP countries. These countries have no other purpose than to access the EU's market and investment. Both countries view the European model as a threat to the sustainability of their undemocratic regimes.[17]

Thus, Moldova can only be compared with countries in the first group – Ukraine and Georgia. After these two countries have obtained the visa-free regime with the EU, during the year 2017, it is assumed that the competition with Moldova will also increase for the preference in the general ranking.

Analyzing the evolution of the Republic of Moldova in the past years within EaP, it should be noted that even if Moldova is in the first place in the last years, in the general ranking, it is advanced by Ukraine and Armenia in several fields. So, in reality, bringing

[16] Eastern Partnership Index 2015-2016. Charting Progress in European Integration, Democratic Reforms, and Sustainable Development, December 2017, p. 26-29, http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP_Index_2015-16_0.pdf, accessed 15.11.2018

[17] Denis Cenușa, Moldova, pe poziția de fruntaș al Parteneriatului Estic, 2018, http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/moldova-pe-pozi%C8%9Bia-de-frunta%C8%99-al-parteneriatului-estic/, accessed 15.11.2018

eastern European countries closer to the EU is a complicated and long-lasting process that must necessarily involve the creation of living standards comparable to those of Europe.

4. Evolution of Moldova-Russia relations in the context of the Eastern Partnership

Initially, the launch of the Eastern Partnership was not welcomed by the Russian Federation. This was clear, even before the official launch of the EaP. On March 21, 2009, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated: We are accused of having spheres of influence. But what is the Eastern Partnership, if not an attempt to extend the EU's sphere of influence, including to Belarus…Is this promoting democracy or is it blackmail?[18]This is one of Russia's first official reactions.

From the official briefing of the Russian Foreign Ministry's representative, A.A. Nesterenco on March 26, 2009, it appears that in Russia the Eastern Partnership was criticized and not understood as the EU wanted, on the grounds that it created new dividing lines in Europe, and the former Soviet states targeted by the program will have to choose between Moscow and Brussels.[19]

Immediately after a week since the official launch of the EaP, Vladimir Chizhov, the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the EU, doing an interview for the Nezavisimaia Gazeta magazine on a question about EaP, said "it is important that the Eastern Partnership is not directed against Russia's interests and does not artificially remove these six states from co-operation with Moscow, adding that Russia does not want CIS countries to face a dilemma – either ahead in the bright future with the EU or behind with the Russian Federation".[20]

With the return of Vladimir Putin to the Presidency, the Russian Federation has also hurried the process of integration into the CIS through the achievement of the Single Economic Space in 2012 and the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.[21]The Republic of Moldova, which is part of the CIS, is influenced by the Russian Federation through several instruments such as access to the Russian market, the labour market, energy dependence, settlement of the Transnistrian conflict (Nantoi, Platon, Gerasymchuk, Matiychyk, 2013: 14). Meanwhile, Russia's soft-power policy in the region and Moldova hinders the EU's rapprochement and contributes to the compromise of the European agenda.

The activity of the Republic of Moldova in the EaP has helped to cool diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation. Sudden cooling of Moldova-Russia relations took place with the signing of the Association Agreements with the European Union. Even

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[18] EU expanding its 'sphere of influence,' Russia says, 21. MARCH 2009, HTTPS://EUOBSERVER.COM/FOREIGN/27827, accessed 20.11.2018

[19] О российском отношении к программе «Восточное партнерство». Из брифинга официального представителя МИД России А. А. Нестеренко. 26 марта 2009 г., site-ul oficial al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Federaţiei Ruse,http://www.mid.ru/brifingi/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/798212, accessed 20.11.2018

[20] Владимир Чижов: "Южный поток" надо сделать приоритетным проектом ЕС", – Считаете ли вы, что запущенное Евросоюзом «Восточное партнерство» направлено на выстраивание Брюсселем сферы влияния на постсоветском пространстве?, 18.05.2009, http://www.ng.ru/courier/2009-05-18/9_chizhov.html, accessed 20.11.2018

[21] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Interview to Interfax News Agency, official site Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, https://russiaeu.ru/en/news/russian-foreign-minister-sergey-lavrov-interview-interfax-news-agency, accessed 20.11.2018

before signing the Association Agreement, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin said that the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union will negatively affect the Moldova-Russia relations, especially the commercial and economic relations, as Russia will have to change the rules and export practice from Moldova to the Russian Federation. The official added that "the consequences of the agreement signed by Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova will undoubtedly be serious. We will do everything we can to protect our economy. It is important for the signatories of the document to understand that it has consequences not only on relations with the EU but also with other partner states, including Russia, as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova have concluded Free Trade Agreements within the CIS".[22]

An interesting fact is that on the day of signing the Association Agreement between Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and the EU, the Russian Federation without explanations, announcements canceled two air flights from and to Chisinau. Thus, according to Air Moldova's press release, aviation authorities in Russia have announced that they do not allow the flight to operate a few hours before the take-off of the aircraft scheduled for 07.00, 27 June 2014.[23]Coincidence or not, but this happened on the day of signing the Association Agreements with the EU.

Russian President's spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, stated that the conclusion of the Association Agreements with the EU is the sovereign right of each state, but said Moscow would take protective measures if the implementation of these agreements would have a negative impact on Russia's market and economy.[24]

But these examples were only the verbal reaction of Russian officials to the signing of the EU Agreements. Bilateral relations have really got worse when Russia has gone from talk to action. As Moldova approached the signing of the Association Agreement, Russia introduced gradual sanctions.

In September 2013, Rospotrebnadzor, the specialized consumer protection agency in the Russian Federation, announced the suspension of import of Moldovan wines. According to Rospotrebnadzor's press release of September 11, 2013, the reason for the introduction of the embargo on wine was linked to claims for the quality of alcoholic beverages. Russian officials said restrictions on beverages would remain in force until Moldova removed the detected violations.[25]At that time Moldova exported 28% of the wines and 22% of the spirits to the Russian Federation, totaling 60 million dollars, about 3% of the total volume of exports.[26]

Following the Russian embargo of September 10, 2013, the European Commission proposed to fully open the European Union market for Moldovan wine imports before the entry into force of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement and the Free Trade Area Agreement.

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[22] Карасин: ассоциация Молдавии с ЕС изменит правила торговли с Россией, 10.06.2014, https://ria.ru/world/20140610/1011549227.html, accessed 20.11.2018

[23]Air Moldova anunţă despre anularea a două curse, 27 iunie 2014, http://ipn.md/ro/societate/62808, accessed 20.11.2018

[24] Cum a reacţionat Rusia la semnarea acordurilor de Asociere cu UE de către Moldova, Ucraina şi Georgia, 27 Iunie 2014, https://www.publika.md/cum-a-reactionat-rusia-la-semnarea-acordurilor-de-asociere-cu-ue-de-catre-moldova-ucraina-si-georgia_1987841.html, accessed 20.11.2018

[25] О поставках продукции из Республики Молдова, 11.09.2013, http://rospotrebnadzor.ru/deyatelnost/sanitary-supervision/?ELEMENT_ID=600&sphrase_id=1527610, accessed 20.11.2018

[26] Guvernul R. Moldova regretă embargoul asupra vinurilor moldovenești, 11 septembrie 2013, https://noi.md/news_id/27741, accessed 20.11.2018

The year 2014 was marked by a wide range of economic sanctions from the Russian side against Moldova. Thus, at the beginning of 2014, the Russian Federation threatened to adopt more measures to protect the Russian economy in case of signing the Association Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova. In April 2014, the Russian Federation introduced an embargo on finished pork products from the Republic of Moldova. The embargo was introduced because the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance in Russia – Rosselhoznadzor has repeatedly detected cases of re-export of European products at the border.[27]

After the Moldovan Parliament ratified the Association Agreement with the EU, Russia said it would take protective measures in this case and on 18 July 2014 Rospotrebnadzor banned imports of canned vegetables and fruit from Moldova. According to the official position, the ban was imposed on infringements of consumer protection law.[28]After a few days, on 21 July 2014, Rosselhoznadzor announced that it bans the import of apples, pears, quinces, apricots, cherries, peaches, nectarines and plums from the Republic of Moldova.[29]At the same time, the Moldovan National Food Safety Agency disagreed with the ban, arguing the insufficiency of the reasons and evidence invoked by the Russian side.

On 1 September 2014, the Russian Government's decision on the application of customs duties on imports of 19 categories of goods from Moldova, from wine, fruit and vegetables to furniture, entered into force.[30]For these categories of goods, the same customs regime applies as for countries such as Romania, Poland, China, Germany, Estonia, and France. Moldovan Prime Minister Iurie Leanca said that Russia would have no reason to unilaterally impose taxes on Moldovan products. "There is no legal or commercial reason for the Russian Federation to revise the relationship with the Republic of Moldova in such a cardinal manner from the point of view of commercial arrangements," the Head of the Executive stated.[31]

From October 27, 2014, Russia bans the import of meat from the Republic of Moldova. Thus, the head of the Rosselhoznadzor, Sergei Dankvert, mentioned that the Moldovan meat processing enterprises do not meet the sanitary-veterinary requirements of the "customs union".[32]

All these sanctions were a kind of response by the Russian Federation to the signing of the Association Agreement and Free Trade Agreement with the European Union to protect the Russian market from European products that could reach Moldova, being explained by alleged violations of the quality of local products signaled by "Rospotrebnadzor".

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[27] Россия ввела запрет на поставки готовой свиной продукции из Молдавии, 08.04.2014, https://ria.ru/economy/20140408/1002979248.html, accessed 20.11.2018

[28] Роспотребнадзор запретил поставки молдавских плодоовощных консервов, 19.07.2014, https://www.interfax.ru/world/386663, accessed 20.11.2018

[29] РОССИЯ ОПАСАЕТСЯ РЕЭКСПОРТА УКРАИНОЙ МОЛДАВСКИХ ФРУКТОВ И ОВОЩЕЙ, 29 07 2014, http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=13412, accessed 20.11.2018

[30] Rusia a introdus taxe vamale la importul a 19 de categorii de mărfuri din Moldova, 30 august 2014, https://adevarul.ro/moldova/economie/rusia-introdus-taxe-vamale-importul-19-categorii-marfuri-moldova-1_540196ec0d133766a8b54eca/index.html, accessed 20.11.2018

[31] Iurie Leancă: Rusia nu are motive să impună unilateral taxe pentru produsele din Moldova, http://agora.md/stiri/2451/iurie-leanca-rusia-nu-are-motive-sa-impuna-unilateral-taxe-pentru-produsele-din-moldova, accessed 20.11.2018

[32] Россельхознадзор приостанавливает поставки мяса из Молдавии в Россию с 27 октября 2014, http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/press/112633.html, accessed 20.11.2018

Since 2015 there have been several cases when Russian soldiers have been detained on the Chisinau International Airport and sent back to Moscow. On 22 May 2015, a Russian citizen was banned from entering the territory of the Republic of Moldova after customs officers from the Chisinau International Airport found that he was an officer in the Russian Ministry of Defense and intended to travel to Transnistria without having notified Moldovan authorities in advance. On May 14, 2015, two other Russian soldiers who wanted to reach Transnistria were detained at the Chisinau airport.[33]Also, during this period, several Russian journalists, including Russian film-making teams, were stopped at the Chisinau International Airport.

Another interesting case occurred in September 2015 when the Russian military attaché at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Chisinau participated in the military parade on 2 September 2015 in Tiraspol. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration sent a verbal note to all embassies accredited in Moldova on August 14, 2015 requesting them not to participate in the actions on the left bank of the Nistru river, dedicated to the establishment of the so-called Transnistrian Moldovan republic. However, the Russian Federation ignored the request and sent a military attaché to the military parade organized on this occasion. On September 3, 2015, representatives of the Russian Embassy were summoned to the Foreign Ministry to provide explanations regarding the participation of the Russian military attaché at the Tiraspol military parade. Chisinau's Foreign Minister, Natalia Gherman, then said that such actions affect Moldova-Russia relations and do not fit into the relationship foundation between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation and primarily within the relations declared by the Russian Federation towards the Republic of Moldova.[34]

In 2016 the official Moldova-Russia dialogue returns to normality. The year 2016 was abundant in important political events and official working visits in terms of Moldova-Russia bilateral relations. In March 2016, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Grigorii Karasin, was on a working visit to the Republic of Moldova for a new round of inter-ministerial Moldova-Russia consultations at the level of deputy ministers. During a meeting with the Moldovan Foreign Minister Andrei Galbur, the interlocutors pleaded for intensifying the political dialogue, invoking the resumption of inter-ministerial consultations at the level of deputy foreign affairs ministers. They agreed to continue the dialogue at the level of the co-chairs of the Joint Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation and to strengthen cooperation in the cultural and humanitarian field.[35]

After some time, on 4 April 2016, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, Andrei Galbur paid a working visit to the Russian Federation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his counterpart in Moldova, Andrei Galbur, mentioned they were dissatisfied with bilateral

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[33] Încă un militar rus, reţinut pe aeroportul din Chişinău, 2015-05-26, https://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2015/05/26/inca-un-militar-rus-retinut-pe-aeroportul-din-chisinau-09-21-27, accessed 20.11.2018

[34] Diplomaţia rusă, chemată să dea explicaţii ministerului de Externe. Declaraţia Nataliei Gherman, 4 Septembrie 2015, https://www.publika.md/diplomatia-rusa-chemata-sa-dea-explicatii-ministerului-de-externe-declaratia-nataliei-gherman_2392511.html, accessed 20.11.2018

[35] Ministrul de externe Andrei Galbur l-a primit pe viceministrul afacerilor externe al Federaţiei Ruse Grigorii Karasin, site-ul oficial al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe şi Integrării Europene, Comunicate de presă, 29.03.2016, HTTP://WWW.MFA.GOV.MD/COMUNICATE-PRESA-MD/503518/, accessed 20.11.2018

relations and have pleaded for the situation to be remedied. It should be noted that the volume of trade in 2015 decreased, almost with a one-third.

Sergei Lavrov mentioned the following: “We have a common view that the relations between Moldova and Russia are not satisfactory. I heard today our partners who stressed that the Chisinau Government is interested in the development of cooperation between Moldova and Russia”.

At the same time, Andrei Galbur stated: “We are interested in the full resumption of Moldova’s agricultural production export to the Russian market. In connection with this, we reached an accord to organize a meeting in May 2016 between the co-chairs of the intergovernmental commission for Moldova-Russia economic cooperation”.[36]

In July 2016, the meeting of the co-chairs of the Moldova-Russia intergovernmental commission for economic cooperation, Octavian Calmic and Dmitri Rogozin, took place in Chisinau in an extended format. After that, expert consultations on the draft roadmap for restoring and intensifying the trade relations between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation for the years 2016 - 2017 were held in Moscow for three weeks.[37]

Also in 2016, Moldova-Russia relations were discussed by the Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip and the Russian President Vladimir Putin at the CSI heads of state meeting (16-17 September 2016). Thus, Prime Minister Pavel Filip stated that “the discussion was constructive, based on issues of mutual interest”.[38]

At the end of November 2016 in Moscow, the Deputy Prime Ministers of the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, Octavian Calmac and Dmitri Rogozin, signed the Protocol of the meeting of the Moldova-Russia Economic Cooperation Commission, which is part of the Action Plan for the development of trade for the years 2016-2017. The documents include priority actions of bilateral cooperation in trade, business, energy, transport, agriculture, industry, migration and humanitarian spheres as well as regional cooperation.

During the talks, the transport problem was overcome, with the Russian side committing to grant 75,000 permits to Moldovan carriers in the Russian Federation and 750 permits to transit Russia’s territory to third countries, which will greatly facilitate trade between both states, but also Moldovan exports to countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. At the meeting of the Moldova-Russia Economic Cooperation Commission, Dmitry Rogozin said that “today’s meeting has demonstrated that we can reach a consensus when it comes to solving the problems that arise in different areas, based on our national interests”.[39]

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[36] Declaraţia de presă a viceprim-ministrului, ministrului afacerilor externe și integrării Europene al Republicii Moldova Andrei Galbur după încheierea întâlnirii cu ministrul afacerilor externe al Federației Ruse Serghei Lavrov, Comunicate de presă, 04.04.2016, http://www.mfa.gov.md/comunicate-presa-md/503568/ accessed 20.11.2018

[37] Discuţii importante la Moscova privind relațiile comercial-economice dintre Moldova şi Rusia, 28 Iulie 2016, https://www.publika.md/discutii-importante-la-moscova-privind-relatiile-comercial-economice-dintre-moldova-si-rusia_2699491.html, accessed 20.11.2018

[38] Premierul Pavel Filip a discutat cu Președintele Federației Ruse, Vladimir Putin, privind relațiile dintre cele două state, site-ul oficial al Guvernului Republicii Moldova, Communicate de presă, 2016-09-18, https://gov.md/ro/content/premierul-pavel-filip-discutat-cu-presedintele-federatiei-ruse-vladimir-putin-privind, accessed 20.11.2018

[39] La Moscova a avut loc ședința Comisiei moldo-ruse de cooperare economic, site-ul oficial al Ministerului Economiei şi Infrastructurii al Republicii Moldova, Comunicate de presă,

Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip, while offering an interview, pointed out that "in 2016 the Moldova-Russia relations have witnessed a positive evolution, proven by the high-level meetings that we have had – I have seen both the President of Russia, and with the Head the Russian Government. These relationships continue to be good, and the dialogue continues to make the necessary adjustments. The Republic of Moldova has always offered and will offer friendship to other countries – and especially to the countries with which we have old and varied relations, such as Russia. This is something that a part of our population wants".[40]

The year 2017 was marked by the activity of the President of the Republic of Moldova, Igor Dodon, for the deepening of friendship relations with the Russian Federation. During 2017, the President of the Republic of Moldova made five visits to the Russian Federation:

1) 18-19 January 2017 – official visit (the first official visit of the President of the Republic of Moldova to the Russian Federation for the past 9 years). The agenda included a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Federation's Vice-President Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russian Federation Council President Valentina Matvienco, the President of the College of the Eurasian Economic Commission – Tigran Sarkisyan, His Holiness, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia - Kiril.[41]
2) March 16-18, 2017 – working visit to Moscow on the occasion of the Economic Forum. During the visit, Igor Dodon had an official meeting with Vladimir Putin.
3) 8-10 May 2017 – working visit to Moscow at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin;
4) 1-3 June 2017 – working visit to Sankt-Petersburg on the occasion of the International Economic Forum.[42]
5) 25 December 2017 – working visit to Moscow at the invitation of Vladimir Putin.

On March 1, 2017, Igor Dodon said: "Yesterday, the Russian dignitaries decided to apply a migrant amnesty to Moldovan citizens. More precisely, Moldovans will be lifted the Russian entry bans that have been enforced earlier, including those who have committed administrative misconduct. About 250,000 people who have their residence permit expired but are still on the territory of the Russian Federation can apply to the local section of the Main Migration Department of the MIA (Ministry of Internal Affairs) of Russia to legalize their stay on the territory of the Russian Federation".[43] This was a good result for Moldova achieved by President Igor Dodon for Moldovan citizens.

11/29/2016, https://mei.gov.md/ro/content/la-moscova-avut-loc-sedinta-comisiei-moldo-ruse-de-cooperare-economica, accessed 20.11.2018

[40] Pavel Filip: sper mult că drumul rm spre ue va fi deja ireversibil în 2019, http://tribuna.md/2017/04/13/interviu-pavel-filip-sper-mult-ca-drumul-rm-spre-ue-va-fi-deja-ireversibil-in-2019/, accessed 20.11.2018

[41] Igor Dodon întreprinde o vizită oficială la Moscova, site-ul oficial al Preşedinției Republicii Moldova, Comunicate de presă, 16.01.2017, http://www.presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/igor-dodon-intreprinde-o-vizita-oficiala-la-moscova, accessed 24.11.2018

[42] Relațiile diplomatice între Republica Moldova şi Federația Rusă, Ambasada Republicii Moldova în Federația Rusă, http://www.rusia.mfa.md/diplomatic-relations-ro/, accessed 24.11.2018

[43] Igor Dodon a anunțat despre aplicarea amnistiei migraționale de către autoritățile Federației Ruse pentru mai multe categorii de migranți moldoveni, site-ul oficial al Preşedinției Republicii

Analyzing the dynamics of Moldova-Russia relations in 2017, we can mention that the Moldovan President Igor Dodon had 7 meetings with the Russian President Vladimir Putin:

- January 17, Moscow, during the official visit to Russia;
- March 17, Moscow, during a working visit to Russia;
- April 14, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, at the meeting of the Supreme Council of the Eurasian Economic Union;
- May 9, Moscow, during the May 9 celebrations;
- June 2, at the St. Petersburg Economic Form;
- October 10, Sochi, during the meeting of the CIS Heads of State Council;

December 25, Moscow, during a working visit to Russia.[44]

Also, in 2017, Igor Dodon had a meeting with the Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (22 May 2017) and two meetings with Dmitry Rogozin (June 1, August 5, 2017), Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Also in 2017, Igor Dodon had 16 meetings with the Russian Ambassador to Chisinau, Farit Muhametşin (9 February, 27 February, 10 March, 12 April, 19 April, 28 April, 19 May, 25 May, 20 June, 19 July , July 28, August 30, September 26, October 17, November 29, December 20).[45]

The President of the Republic of Moldova, in 2017, also had 42 meetings with various Russian officials, including Leonid Kalasnikov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Russian Federation on CIS issues, Grigori Karasin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Kiril – Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, representatives of "Delovaia Rossia" organization, Kazbek Taisaev – member of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Veaceslav Volodin – President of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation), Gheorghi Poltavchenko – governor of St. Petersburg, Igor Ceaika – co-president of "Delovaia Rossia" Association, Valentina Matvienko – President of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.[46]

If we are to analyze the volume of foreign trade of the Republic of Moldova with the Russian Federation, then it should be noted that during 2017 it increased by 7.5% compared to 2016. Regarding the volume of trade recorded, the Russian Federation ranked second among the trading partners of the Republic of Moldova, with a share of 11.4% in the total trade of the country.

The export of goods amounted to USD 254.5 million, increasing by 9.2% or by USD 21.4 million as compared to 2016. The Russian Federation ranked second in the top of the countries where the Republic of Moldova carried out export operations, with a weight of 10.5% in the total export of the Republic of Moldova. Imports of goods made in the Republic of Moldova from the Russian Federation grew by 6.8% compared to 2016.[47]

Moldova, Comunicate de presă, 01.03.2017, http://www.presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/igor-dodon-a-anuntat-despre-aplicarea-amnistiei-migrationale-de-catre-autoritatile-federatiei-ruse-pentru-mai-multe-categorii-de-migranti-moldoveni, accessed 24.11.2018

[44] Site-ul oficial al Preşedinției Republicii Moldova, Comunicate de presă 2017, http://www.presedinte.md/, accessed 24.11.2018

[45] Ibidem

[46] Geografia lui Igor Dodon: Izolaţi lângă Putin, Ziarul de Gardă, 19 octombrie 2017, https://www.zdg.md/editia-print/politic/geografia-lui-igor-dodon-izolati-langa-putin, accessed 24.11.2018

[47] Relaţiile economice bilaterale, Ambasada Republicii Moldova în Federația Rusă, http://www.rusia.mfa.md/economic-relations-ro/, accessed 24.11.2018

By analyzing the evolution of Moldova-Russia relations in 2017, we can not fail to mention the case when at the end of May 2017, 5 Russian diplomats from the Russian Embassy in Chisinau were expelled from Moldova. At the same time, Moldovan officials did not provide additional information on the reasons for declaring the five Russian diplomats “personae non gratae” in the Republic of Moldova. On this issue, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigori Karasin pointed out that the decision of the Chisinau authorities is “a serious challenge” and a “blow applied to the forces headed by President Igor Dodon, who militates for normalizing the relationship with Russia.” He added that “the response will of course be tough enough”.[48]

President Igor Dodon’s reaction to this case was a critical one: "Over the past 25 years of relations between Moldova and Russia, we have not been so close to the gap as we are now. This is the result of the irresponsible decisions of the Moldovan government and the parliamentary majority, taken not in the interests of the citizens, but aligned with the geopolitical interests of the Westerners.” Igor Dodon said that “the government committed a revolting gesture in relation to our strategic partner Russia. (...) I am deeply indignant at this displayed hostility of Moldovan diplomacy and categorically condemn it”.[49]

In response to the expulsion of the five Russian diplomats from the Republic of Moldova on 31 May 2017, five Moldovan diplomats were declared personae non gratae in the Russian Federation. Advisor to the Embassy of the Republic of Moldova in the Russian Federation was invited to the Foreign Ministry of Russia, where he was handed a note stating that in response to the expulsion of Russian diplomats, five Moldovan diplomats were declared personae non gratae, and in three days they were to leave Russia. At the same time, the Moscow authorities expressed the hope that those in Chisinau will realize the counterproductive and unfriendly actions against the Russian Federation, as well as the destructive character of the steps taken by the Moldovan side, which are contrary to the principles of partnership and trust.[50]

Another unpleasant case in Moldova-Russia bilateral relations occurred in August 2017 when the Government of the Republic of Moldova, at the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, adopted a decision by which the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin was declared “persona non grata” on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. Foreign Minister Andrei Galbur said that Dmitri Rogozin made a whole series of comments and offensive statements against the Republic of Moldova and its people. In this respect, he referred to an interview for the news channel Russia-24 in which he defamed the Republic of Moldova and its citizens.

It all started when Dmitri Rogozin’s visit to Chisinau and Tiraspol on July 28, 2017 failed and did not occur because the Romanian authorities did not issue an overflight permit. In this respect, the President of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, Adrian Candu mentioned the following: “The competent authorities of the Republic of Moldova from the beginning informed the authorities of the Russian Federation that the event to be

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[48] Cinci diplomați ruși, declarați persona NON GRATA în R.Moldova. Moscova promite „un răspuns dur”, 29 Mai 2017, https://radiochisinau.md/cinci-diplomati-rusi-declarati-persona-non-grata-in-rmoldova-moscova-promite-un-raspuns-dur---51163.html, accessed 24.11.2018

[49] Rusia a decis expulzarea a cinci diplomaţi moldoveni/ Dodon denunţă "iresponsabilitatea" Chişinăului, 31 Mai 2017, https://www.mediafax.ro/externe/rusia-a-decis-expulzarea-a-cinci-diplomati-moldoveni-dodon-denunta-iresponsabilitatea-chisinaului-16395829, accessed 24.11.2018

[50] Moscova reacţionează: Cinci diplomaţi moldoveni expulzaţi din Rusia, 31.05.2017, http://trm.md/ro/politic/moscova-reac-ioneaza-cinci-diploma-i-moldoveni-expulza-i-din-rusia/, accessed 24.11.2018

organized in the Transnistrian region is not authorized by the authorities of the Republic of Moldova. We have announced to the Russian authorities that all people going to attend this event will be stopped and returned home, whether they are journalists, artists or dignitaries. We do not have what to celebrate because the country remains torn after that conflict, and that's why it was incomprehensible to us and to me personally what President Dodon wanted to do there and how he could celebrate that event. Mr. Rogozin knew about the attitude of the authorities of the Republic of Moldova related to this event. His move to Chisinau was nothing more than a challenge because he knew he would not be allowed the overflight of Romania because he was on the list of sanctions imposed by the European Union. At the same time, he received official information on the diplomatic channels that we are against the event".[51]

At the same time, Prime Minister Pavel Filip mentioned that the Republic of Moldova wants to be treated with respect by all countries. "The manner in which our citizens were treated through these statements is simply unacceptable and I think it is the duty of the authorities, every time, to protect the dignity of our citizens and our country. Relations with any country in the world must be based on mutual respect," said Pavel Filip.

Thus, the tough reaction of Chisinau comes after Rogozin described as "gypsy-like" the Moldovan-Russian negotiations on the intergovernmental line.

The head of the Moldovan state, Igor Dodon, said that "the governors involved Moldova in an unprecedented diplomatic and geopolitical conflict in the last quarter of a century".

The Moldovan political analyst Petru Bogatu said: "A signal from Chisinau to Moscow that the period in which Russia treated relations with the Republic of Moldova as relations between a master and a lackey was over. No respected state can accept to be trampled. Russia under the current political regime is unfortunately an unpredictable country and surely we must also expect tough reactions".[52]

It is clear that this case had a negative influence on Moldova-Russia bilateral relations. At the same time, we can mention that President Igor Dodon was doing everything for Moldova's rapprochement with Russia.

In 2018 we can mention the following political events that marked the Moldova-Russia bilateral relations:

- February 17, 2018, The meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Tudor Ulianovschi with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov with the occasion of the Munich Security Conference. The two officials stressed the need to improve the political dialogue in order to identify mutually beneficial solutions for the advancement of cooperation in priority areas.[53]

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[51] Comentariul Președintelui Parlamentului Andrian Candu pe marginea acțiunilor întreprinse de guvernare după declarațiile ofensatoare ale oficialului rus Dmitri Rogozin în adresa Republicii Moldova, 02.08.2017, http://www.parlament.md/Actualitate/Comunicatedepresa/tabid/90/ContentId/3294/language/ro-RO/Default.aspx, accessed 24.11.2018

[52] Dmitri Rogozin a fost declarat PERSONA NON GRATA pe teritoriul Republicii Moldova, 2 August 2017, https://www.prime.md/ro/dmitri-rogozin-a-fost-declarat-persona-non-grata-pe-teritoriul-republicii-moldova_59234.html, accessed 24.11.2018

[53] Ministrul Tudor Ulianovschi a avut o întrevedere cu omologul său rus Serghei Lavrov, site-ul oficial al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe şi Integrării Europene, 17.02.2018, http://www.mfa.gov.md/comunicate-presa-md/510778/, accessed 24.11.2018

- 27 March 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration declared three Russian diplomats from the diplomatic mission of the Russian Federation in Chisinau personae non gratae. The decision comes as solidarity with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and following the conclusions of the European Council on 23-24 March 2018, which qualifies the Salisbury attack as a threat to collective security and international law.[54]
- May 14, 2018, the Moldovan President Igor Dodon meets with the Russian President Vladimir Putin after the assembly of the Eurasian Supreme Economic Council.[55]
- June 13, 2018, visit to Moscow of the President of the Republic of Moldova Igor Dodon at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin for the opening of the World Cup 2018.[56]
- July 14, 2018, the meeting of Mr. Igor Dodon with Vladimir Putin.[57]
- August 4, 2018, working visit of President Igor Dodon to Omsk, Russian Federation, at the invitation of the Omsk Governor Aleksandr Burkov.
- 14-16 September 2018, the organization of the World Congress of the Family under the aegis of the President of Moldova, with the participation of the Russian State Duma, the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and the civic activists.[58]
- 20-22 September 2018, Chisinau, Moldova-Russia economic forum, with the participation of a large number of businessmen from the Russian Federation. Moldova-Russia Economic Forum is a platform for discussion on the development of trade and economic relations between Moldova and Russia. Starting with 2018, this forum will be held annually and will take place in Chisinau and Moscow. The first event took place in Chisinau, and in 2019 it will be organized in Moscow.
- 28 September 2018, brief working meeting of the President of the Republic of Moldova Igor Dodon and the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the CIS Summit in Dushanbe.[59]

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[54] Trei diplomați din cadrul Ambasadei Federației Ruse în Republica Moldova au fost declarați persona non-grata, site-ul oficial al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe şi Integrării Europene, 27 martie 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.md/comunicate-presa-md/511547/, accessed 24.11.2018

[55] Președintele Republicii Moldova, Igor Dodon, a avut o întrevedere cu Președintele Federației Ruse, Vladimir Putin, site-ul oficial al Președinției Republicii Moldova, 14 mai 2018, http://www.presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-republicii-moldova-igor-dodon-a-avut-o-intrevedere-cu-presedintele-federatiei-ruse-vladimir-putin-11155, accessed 24.11.2018

[56] Șeful statului întreprinde o vizită la Moscova, site-ul oficial al Președinției Republicii Moldova, 13 iuni 2018, http://www.presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/seful-statului-intreprinde-o-vizita-la-moscova, accessed 24.11.2018

[57] Igor Dodon a avut o întrevedere cu Vladimir Putin, site-ul oficial al Președinției Republicii Moldova, 14 iulie 2018, http://www.presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/igor-dodon-a-avut-o-intrevedere-cu-vladimir-putin, accessed 24.11.2018

[58] Igor Dodon a prezidat ședința finală cu privire la desfăşurarea Congresului Mondial al Familiei, site-ul oficial al Președinției Republicii Moldova, 11 sseptembrie 2018, http://www.presedinte.md/rom/presa/igor-dodon-a-prezidat-sedinta-finala-cu-privire-la-desfasurarea-congresului-mondial-al-familiei, accessed 24.11.2018

[59] Președintele Republicii Moldova, Igor Dodon a avut o întrevedere de lucru cu Președintele Federației Ruse, Vladimir Putin, site-ul oficial al Președinției Republicii Moldova, 28 septembrie 2018, http://www.presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-republicii-moldova-igor-

- October 31 - November 1, 2018, official visit to the Russian Federation of the President of the Republic of Moldova. During the visit, Igor Dodon met with the Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Kirill, State Duma Speaker Veaceslav Volodin, and other Russian officials.[60]
- November 22, 2018, the meeting of the Moldova-Russia Economic Council in Moscow. The event was chaired by President Igor Dodon, and the Co-President of the Russian Public Association, Delvaia Rosia, Andrei Nazarov. During the meeting, Igor Dodon stressed that as of January 1, 2019, customs duties will be canceled for half a year on five types of goods exported from Moldova to Russia, including winemaking, canning, fruit and vegetables. Thus, the meeting was a continuation of the Moldova-Russia Economic Forum held in Chisinau on September 20-22, 2018. The outcome of the meeting was the elaboration of the roadmap for expanding cooperation and increasing trade between Moldova and Russia.[61]
- 20-25 November 2018, working visit of the President of the Republic of Moldova, Igor Dodon, to the Russian Federation - Moscow and St. Petersburg.[62]During the visit, Igor Dodon delivered a speech at the plenary session of the Russian State Duma, being the first President of the Republic of Moldova to address directly to Russian law makers. Also during the visit, the President of Moldova had a working meeting with Dmitri Rogozin.

An important event for the Republic of Moldova took place when, on June 22, 2018, the UN General Assembly voted the draft resolution proposed by the Republic of Moldova on “The complete and unconditional withdrawal of the foreign military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova”. The document submitted was co-authored by Canada, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom and Ukraine, voted by 64 states, while only 15 states voted against, among which was the Russian Federation.[63]

Russia’s reaction to this document was a negative one. Thus, according to official information posted on the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the adoption of the resolution by the UN member states will complicate the process of settling the Transnistrian conflict. At the same time, it is highlighted that the decision of the Republic

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dodon-a-avut-o-intrevedere-de-lucru-cu-presedintele-federatiei-ruse-vladimir-putin, accessed 24.11.2018

[60] Președintele Republicii Moldova efectuează o vizită oficială în Federația Rusă, , site-ul oficial al Președinției Republicii Moldova, 30.10.2018, http://www.presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/presedintele-republicii-moldova-intreprinde-o-vizita-oficiala-in-federatia-rusa, accessed 24.11.2018

[61] La Moscova s-au desfășurat consultările interministeriale moldo-ruse, site-ul oficial al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe şi Integrării Europene, 08.11.2018, http://www.mfa.gov.md/comunicate-presa-md/513863/, accessed 24.11.2018

[62] Igor Dodon întreprinde o vizită de lucru în Federația Rusă, site-ul oficial al Președinției Republicii Moldova, 20.11.2018, http://www.presedinte.md/rom/comunicate-de-presa/igor-dodon-intreprinde-o-vizita-de-lucru-in-federatia-rusa, accessed 24.11.2018

[63] breaking news - Adunarea Generală a ONU a VOTAT proiectul de rezoluţie privind retragerea trupelor ruse de pe teritoriul Republicii Moldova, site-ul oficial al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe şi Integrării Europene, 22 iunie 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.md/comunicate-presa-md/512679/, accessed 24.11.2018

of Moldova to submit the document, despite the fact that it was not approved by all the political forces in the state, will worsen Moldova-Russia bilateral relations.[64]

The reaction of the so-called Tiraspol authorities was an interesting one. Therefore, a member of the Transnistrian separatist parliament stated that "Russia should increase its troops number in this territory and in no case withdraw them, and the Russian military technology be as new as possible.[65]

Conclusions

Since the creation of the Eastern Partnership ten years have already passed. During these years the Republic of Moldova was quite active, being among the leaders of this initiative. Even if in the last years Moldova has ranked first among the EaP countries, there are sectors where the country has had less success.

At the same time, it is important to note that the activity of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern Partnership influences negatively the bilateral relations with the Russian Federation (See more Brie, 2016: 359-381; Brie and Brie, 2008: 95-107). Thus, Moldova's rapprochement with the European Union stirs up Russia's dissatisfaction reactions. Several times, Russia's reaction to Moldova's closeness to the European community can take the form of economic sanctions, embargoes or export bans, as it happened in 2014. In conclusion, it should be noted that 2019 is to be a very important year, because it will be the 10th anniversary of the launch of the Eastern Partnership. In connection with the 2019 anniversary, the Republic of Moldova has backed the organization of a high-level event on this occasion in the spring of 2019.

Analyzing the perspectives of the Moldova-Russia relations in the context of the Eastern Partnership, we can assume that Russia's reaction to the celebration and organization of a high-level event on this occasion will be negative. At the same time, it is obvious that the Moldovan President Igor Dodon will continue to advocate the development and deepening of relations with Russia.

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[64] Комментарий Департамента информации и печати МИД России в связи с голосованием в Генассамблее ООН по представленному Республикой Молдова проекту резолюции, site-ul oficial al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Federaţiei Ruse, 23.06.2018, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/kommentarii_predstavitelya/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/3274365, accessed 24.11.2018

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A STRATEGY FOR MAINTAINING THE HEGEMONY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Abstract. *As the conditions of the global power structure modify, so should the approaches of states that wish to maintain their position internationally. The United States of America has been a global hegemon since the end of the Cold War, but to remain so, it needs to apply a maintenance strategy which takes into account the new challenges and challengers that have arisen. Our paper tries to identify a solution for keeping the hegemony of the US afloat, by tackling the most stringent problems faced by the said country: state failure and criminal states, the current contestation of international rules and norms, rising powers and nuclear proliferation. Thus, what we have called the empowering method offers synoptic solutions, which embed the usage of diplomatic means, identifying new patterns of military power usage, providing civilian assistance and trying to reshape the global governance system.*

Keywords: *power maintenance, military power, civilian assistance, global governance, international institutions, empowering method, failed states, rules and norms, failed and criminal states, nuclear proliferation*

Introduction

Time has revealed that, in the global system, hegemonic power shifts from a group of actors to the other, as one superpower cannot keep operating at full parameters indefinitely. The said shifts are cyclical, but supremacy seldom returns to countries that have lost it in the past. With that being said, it can be argued that the United States of America has been the hegemon of the system since the USSR has been dismantled and bipolarity came to an end, but while mild critics argue that this will not be the case forever, the most ardent consider that it will not even be the case for long.

The main challenge faced by the United States in terms of strategy is finding a way to revitalize the system as a whole, so that the nation might amplify its strength. The alternative implies standing by idly whilst witnessing a decrease in its power and influence - as the global environment provides new challenge(r)s. The US has overwhelmingly received the most out of the international system's prolonged stability; thus to keep its position intact, it must again assume control, embrace its leadership role and try to adapt this system as to provide greater security and a source of stability in the times to come.

The interstate system is governed by international rules and institutions that cover a vast array of fields such as politics, economy or security – to name but a few. The system is put under stress in its entirety due to the forever changing nature of both actors' identities and interests; given that transnational entities, states and processes constantly undermine the general wellbeing - specifically in matters of individual and state security.

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Changes are constant, but it seems that the system is lagging behind and has been outpaced by the challenges that have arisen. Consequently, a plethora of queries about the legitimacy and relevance of rules and institutions of the international environment has surfaced. The so called "erosion" of state and supra-statal (interstate) capacity to deal with the above-mentioned challenges is a broad phenomenon that undermines US security in both a direct and an indirect manner.

The accurate functioning of the interstate system has been for a long period a central theme of US strategy, but after the victory obtained in World War II, its importance has decreased and it has gradually devolved from a main aim to a mere expectation. With the deepening of globalization, a paradox was allowed to come to fruition: while globalization, as a process, aided the US greatly in terms of economic development and soft power insurance, its consequences include a gradual weakening of the international system, which, in turn, has led to a problem of security. Scholars too numerous to name warn about this later fact in unison, but the public and policy makers seem not to grasp the full array of implications a weak system entices. Moreover, some US policies created with the main goal pf addressing separate challenges have led to the exacerbation of latent structural problems, inherent to some parts of the system, but affecting it in its entirety.

This security problem ultimately affects the individual. In order to provide US citizens with a climate in which they can continue to pursue happiness and prosperity, a strategy of conservation must be established. But, while aiming to preserve stability, the vast processes of the international system and its rules must be adapted to encompass new state-powers and the challenges they bring to the table. US national security should thus stress a series of objectives, of which two vital. The first: the states need to augment basic/primary governance (with an emphasis on the security sector) on their own territories, as to ensure the security of the system as a whole - and second: collective approaches must be revitalized and enhanced through rules and institutions, in order to allow for an effective response cross-border threats – be them security centered, economic or of another type. The states themselves can no longer attend to these objectives by themselves –as we no longer live in a realist (form the standpoint of the theory of International Relations) type of world - so this strategy requires the cooperation of non-state entities and the development of new tools and mechanisms for dealing with issues such as terrorism and environmental threats.

Systemic changes are a priority and an end, but we have to remember that the US faces complementary stringent security challenges. Nonetheless, if one cures the source of a disease, the spillover and, subsequently, contagion should be limited. With this, we advocate, in simple terms that while the present is not to be neglected by policy makers, their focus must always be towards ensuring future stability.

The strategy of maintaining power or conserving it needs alternative means for objectives to be attained. With deeply entrenched and diffuse sources, both state and systemic weaknesses require a number of multifaceted solutions which must be enacted perennially. Solutions cannot be advertised and later enforced entirely by the US, despite the federation's continued military and economic supremacy and an inclination towards unilateralism. By definition, the modernization of international governance requires that consensus be reached within the international community, as one focal actor needs the active support of the majority of its peers. Accordingly, our proposed strategy advertises methods that defy the conventional majority which has taken the limelight of the US's contemporary national security debate and practice. For the best part of their history, the

United States has been a unilateralist federation; however, the source of such individualism within the global arena of politics will not be discussed herein.

This paper aims to analyze one major component of US strategy that we have decided to call the **empowering method**. In turn, it is complemented by another, namely: planned pliability**,** on which we will only delve shortly for it will be the subject of another paper**.** Planned pliability is made up of a series of policies created for the purpose of maintaining US power and aiding in the shaping of an ever-evolving security environment. For the policies that enable planned pliability to work, update is critical, granted that economic, political and security assumptions that once were the premises of foreign policy have been either partially or totally annulled. The world in no longer split between two ideological camps with the hammer of war and destruction resting above one or another, and while the threat of armed war between superpowers still lingers, it has been drastically reduced. With this being said, one can argue that America's belief system, particularly regarding the world and the way in which the protection of US interests should unravel have only scarcely changed since the days of the Cold War. America's unipolar vision is, however, in mid-process of being overshadowed by a diverse type of global characters possessing the capacity to enhance or threat US security. We need to stress that the United States still retain the position of hegemon in many areas – admittedly, in the vast majority of such areas – however, the anticipated longer-term economic and demographic development of some states and the transfer amongst clusters of nations suggest an emerging shift of global power. The world is involved in a perennial interlinking process, especially in domains of common interest. Thus, the United States must revisit its deeply engrained habits of uni-polarity and sole engagement, in order to be allowed freedom of action and to be granted legitimacy and wiggle-room. With this freedom of action it can protect its interests on the global stage of politics. Moreover, if in the past America succeeded to band-wagon other powers of the world and ensure the backing of its decisions – the War on Terror being a prime example – the role of the leader has quite a different description in the present.

If planned pliability is a condition for ensuring the adaptation to changing global spider-webs of power, the empowering approach is hinged in realist view about the relationship of US power with the demands of a maintenance strategy that preserves the current power of states and the status quo of the international system. The empowering approach relies on working predominantly with and through other actors to achieve US strategic goals. Maneuvering in such a way is essential for burden sharing to take place and the achievement of US ends. Even if the United States would have a recipe for strengthening all the states, it lacks the resources to do so, and in many cases it would indubitably be unwelcomed.

Furthermore, the United States cannot act alone in such endeavors, as it is not strong enough, nor does it have legitimacy to construct a revised contract among states and the other actors of the system of International Relations (IR). One can hardly deny the fact that legitimacy and strength come from collective support and collective action, thereby consent is a *sine qua non* condition for the reshaping of the entire global system. Thus, a strategy of conservation that takes into account all the elements briefly presented above is in direct dissent with US foreign policy traditions and the federation's historical preference for self-reliance. We need only to go back a few years to observe the direction given by policy makers. If one would analyze the US before Obama it could be noted that The Bush doctrine sought to universalize US values and establish hegemony through primacy. Admittedly, the tendencies of the G. W. Bush Jr. administration, during the president's two-terms, could even be deemed imperialistic. The Obama administration provided but a frail reversal of such policies in practice, despite an admitted preference for multilateral approaches. With Donald J. Trump as acting president, however, there is an evident will to undo as many policies of the past cabinet as possible. This tendency to reverse policies that pertain to the national and international stages alike could prove perilous, for steps have been taken to make the US more appealing to international partners and to reshape the country's image into that of a benign leader. Trump's slogan: "Make America great again!", is based on the supposition that the power of the US has decayed, which is arguably true, but we are unsure if the methods to achieve greatness promoted by the acting president are the way to re-establish a the federation's primacy on the stage of IR.

The paper is divided into two main parts, one deriving from the other logically. The first, shorter part, briefly delves on some of the main challenges that have arisen in time for the United States, such as state failure, criminal states and the dangerous actors on their territories, the current contestation of rules and norms, rising powers and nuclear proliferation.

The second part focuses on how these problems can be solved, through a strategy of maintenance or conservation. The main element of the advertised strategy is what we have chosen to call *the empowering method*.

Methodologically, research has been used to both identify the current threats and find synoptic means of containing them, as to further American hegemony within the system.

1. **Current Challenges To Us Interests**

While identifying the central sources of American power may prove elusive, we argue that it is the freedoms of its citizens that have enabled this particular federation to develop military, technological and economic strength, which in turn has enabled it to rise to pressing internal and international challenges. The United States' unity has been sustained by its citizens and its power has been developed through policymakers since its founding, and it is precisely these citizens that are invaluable for future progress.

In the country's early times, Americans vested all their energies inward. As they benefited from a geographical position that sheltered them from external threats, the early settlers advanced across the entire continent, making use of the vast internal resources and commerce. Subsequently, these settlers and their heirs managed to establish national political relations. With time, the nation extended its reach overseas, securing resources that were unavailable within the geographic spread by building international commercial and political relationships. In the nearer past; namely in the aftermath of World War II, the United States consciously focused again inwards, reshaped itself, and took upon itself to be recognized as the hegemon of the entire international system. American strategists pursued the promotion of an environment of global economic growth conducive to stability, so that the nation's citizens could preserve their way of life and continue to thrive.

It is true to say that for the most part, the United States was one of the fathers of the modern nation-state system, but we have to take into account that it also was a primary beneficiary. Putting national interest in the forefront of their internationalist approach, the US drew up rules, processes and institutions that would aid them in their domination of the system. This newly constructed *status quo* did not only benefit the US, but benefited their allies and, in some instances, allowed their enemies to participate in such a construction and profit alongside favored/favorable nations. Amongst the fundaments of this new system, three characteristics stand out: international financial institutions that encouraged economic growth were created, rules and legislation to regularize behaviors in the international arena were enacted, and collective security arrangements were instilled - to deter from conflict and mediate major discord, if the latter should arise. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to only reiterate these developments, as the US has had a normative approach that affected the behavior of states towards citizens. The US participated as a leader in the creation of norms, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights or the International Criminal Court. To reiterate, the system did not only work for the United States, but it generally worked for others. Participation within this system provided significant incentives for other state actors and, especially after the Cold War, it was perceived as something benign even by state governments that had once openly accused the said construction - such as Russia or China. Other entities, notwithstanding, still blame the evolution of this system and regard their inability to obtain power as a fault of the system itself and, subsequently, of its promoters.

A weakening international system might not seem the most alarming problem that the US faces, as global terrorist networks thrive, young nuclear powers arise and China's economic expansion or Russia's territorial one are no longer novelties, to name just a few stringent priorities. Of course, other issues such as the instability in predominantly Muslim countries, the depletion of resources, environmental threats, *etc.* are also to be labelled sources of dissolution of the legitimacy (and capacity) of states and/or supranational actors.

We have identified two major ways in which the state can achieve (self)reinforcement: directly or by shaping the international system in way in which the state can manage challenges coming from transnational or non-state actors – because, while nations reside at the core of the system, the other said actors are gaining in importance and in the level of control they can exercise.

Admittedly, the United States still retains enough strength in numerous IR-related domains; nevertheless one can perceive a nascent probability that emerging powers could become its direct opponents, and the nation's efforts, particularly vested in shaping the world, will be further complicated. Thus the US needs to (re)align its vision of the global system with the interests and expectations of other key players.

It a well-known fact that globalization both creates and destroys. Transnational financial actors such as corporations are gaining terrain inside the system, markets are becoming increasingly interconnected, capital now moves with the speed of a mouse-click/ screen tap, and technology –in its entirety- is developing at a rapid pace – all the previous providing efficiency, whilst taking from the control that states have over market-based economies. The diminishing power to control outcomes is especially troublesome for weaker states, as it creates the image of vulnerability in front of external forces. Although these serious threats are visible, there is no perceptible intent from the members of the international sphere to create some kind of safety net as to aid weakening states. Reduced state power, in turn, gives birth to a series of new challenges that span far beyond economics, environmental degradation, disease and armed conflict.

State monopoly on violence (Ferguson, 2009) is no longer a given on the territory of some states, the social contract is not instilled in others, border control is problematic in others, populists are gaining momentum in some and the list could go on. States are failing to work for the betterment of social conditions and this fact instills a security problem that affects the entire state-run system.

Furthermore, non-state actors such as global extremists function against the state-system. The fight against terrorism received much attention in the last Bush Jr. mandate, and has remained a national priority for the US since, but while al-Qaida was severely crippled, other terrorist organizations have evolved into regional threats. Globalization aided a series of such actors to escape isolation and create networks, leading to a serious threat to global security.

With the end of the Cold War, an opportunity arose to reduce the interest of countries in acquiring nuclear weapons. Oddly enough, a chain of small and insecure states opted for the exact opposite, enlarging or extending their nuclear capabilities. States' reasons for such decisions of arming themselves stem from perceived threats from their neighbors, from the need to protect a frail regime which is in contradiction with some general principles of a system moving towards a unanimous democracy, or from a combination of both reasons.

A new security dilemma thus comes to play, granted the direct threat that states with nuclear capabilities pose. Allowing them to develop freely becomes a problem for the United States, which translates into a challenge for international politics. In the absence of continued international efforts to put nuclear proliferation to a standstill (and to tackle security slippages and deficits more broadly), the number of states with nuclear capabilities will grow – bringing forth waves of insecurity for other state and non-state actors across the globe.

An equally worth mentioning set of challenges comes from states and secondary actors, which seek to either exploit to the fullest or counter the system's present power structure. Whether these subversive forces target civilians or seek to obtain and then use weapons of mass destruction, they do so in rejection of majority-accepted rules, such as non-proliferation regimes. To counter the said subversive or illegal actions, the U.S has sometimes acted in violation of the same rules. Methods such as torture (Guantanamo), target killing (the most relevant example being the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in 2011) and preemptive use of force (Iraq) are just some examples.

At times when the system's chief powers take reactionary measures that starkly resemble those of the subversives, the system itself starts to function in an ambiguous way. For example questions such as "*what is legitimate in a state of war and to what extent is the war on terror actual warfare?*" remain unanswered, thus norms and rules for such situations become a matter of interpretation. In these circumstances, the modern system of states risks losing the normative pillars which keep the structure afloat. As such, we observe that the main challenge is to embrace the changing circumstances and to tailor rules and norms accordingly.

US planners are experts when it comes to crafting strategy against a specific state - considered America's adversary. At the moment China and Russia appear to be the main contesters of US hegemony, taking on the role of the defunct Soviet Union, and we must recognize that the power of these (and other) states shows signs of rapid growth and further possible acceleration of that growth, and current trends – if allowed to come to fruition - will yield a significantly more multi-polar world than that the present one. As such, we must emphasize that the United States' position of sole power-center is unlikely to remain a permanent trait of global politics.

International stability relies on the rising-star states, which will be the pillars of stability, but in the same time serious threats to US interests. States such Russia, China, India, Brazil and South Africa (bearing the infamous BRICS acronym), seem, for diverse reasons (geopolitical interests, economic ones, etc), very likely to enter into clashes with the United States in the future. Emerging regional powers such as those mentioned beforehand present the UN Security Council, which is still dominated by the former the colonial powers, with a new challenge. Here again, the powers with a legacy need to accommodate new states, in order to keep the latter latched to international norms and discourage them from becoming regional hegemons, with interests limited to one particular region.

The particular diseases of globalization are also threats to the security of the system and consequently to that of states, but issues such as genocide, climate change, nuclear proliferation or free trade have been discussed in national-governmental forums or agencies, and have lost the front of international debate.

The United States has shown reluctance in understanding the evident linkage between their homeland security and systemic weakness. The failure to grasp this very clear connection and to include what has been enumerated before in their security strategy in the post-Cold War era will be addressed by the maintenance strategy.

2. The Overall Strategy

The central goal of any state's security strategy is to allow citizens to continue to prosper without any threats, both internal and international. Thus, for the US to attain this objective in the decades to come, the federation should try to reform the international system and threatening states within this system, whilst aiding weak(ening) states conserve their structures. We can identify a number of immediate objectives to be taken into account, drawing information from what was written earlier in the paper, but if we were to synthesize, three issues seem the most acute.

First, the expansion of potentially malign behaviors, which attack the wellbeing of the system, must be deterred and up-to-date rules and organisms in charge with the prevention of new threats must be created. Second, the US should proceed in such a manner, that every state is held accountable for its actions, and that the territory on which no accountability could be identified greatly diminishes. In other words, the US needs to enhance the capacity of other states to ensure national and regional security. And last, emerging powers must be pushed toward stable, system-reinforcing behaviors, through the permanent restructuring of international institutions. International expectations must be met, and this can only be achieved through institution revisal, so that institutions become not only more transparent, but also genuinely democratic.

There is no identifiable logical reason why objectives as those stipulated above should not fall into place with the interests of an overwhelming majority of regimes, but we have to take into consideration that the system is still widely anarchic, and tensions are one of its defining traits. But for any strategy of maintenance to work, the given condition of the system must be that of peace and the interests of the majority of states must be common. A stable international environment, governed effectively and efficiently, would benefit all states - both strong and weak.

Breaking rules and norms has great destabilizing consequences, thus the phenomenon must be contained, as to aid stability and a normative flow that could become a public good at a global level. In the short term, eluding international norms might grant one advantages, but in the long run, only stability will protect US interests, even as global power is shifting from one state to another and eventually beyond the states. To maintain its hegemonic position, the US must permanently be prepared to adapt to change and promote case-specific continuity.

The specific policies that need to be shaped, re-shaped or put into practice derive from the ambitions to maintain its current control over the inter-state system. To further this control, the system itself must be stabilized, but stabilizing it falls far out of the reach of any single state actor, and arguably, it cannot come as a result of the use of armament. The US should do whatever stands in its power to demonstrate the benign character of its position as a global leader, by stressing its interest in achieving sustainable stability and illustrating that its interests coincide – even if only partially – with the vast array of other states, particularly long-term allies, great powers and powers on the rise.

International institutions, other states, rules and norms and even non-state actors are invaluable for this strategy to work, and for it to be perceived as non-threatening and legitimate. An empowering approach is also needed in many aspects, and greater strategic and even political flexibility is required, because different paths and partners will be pursued. Admittedly, the US will find its prime partner in the European Union, and the further normalization of relations with the latter is needed, as both entities function on the same basic principles of liberal democracy and their goals are overwhelmingly convergent in the international system. The heavy reliance on military and economic power is sometimes counterproductive, thus diplomacy must act as key to all future strategies. Besides being counterproductive, we claim that military and economic measures will prove insufficient.

One has to keep in mind that this paper (and the strategy presented within) is not trying to reinvent the wheel, as some classical approaches are vital for the strategy to function: alliances are still very important, as is the conservation of military and technological superiority. Nuclear deterrence should also be pursued. The difference with what has been employed in the past resides in the fact that greater flexibility must be attained, and new, innovative policies created. Working within partnerships is also strongly advertised for the achievement of shared common goals.

If this strategy is ever to be carried out, it is vital to find a way of restoring legitimacy to the United States. Simple steps can be taken immediately and their impact could be seen in record time. Controversial practices, such as imposing high tariffs, withdrawals from environment accords, to name but two examples are especially counterproductive, and what is seen as particularly menacing towards other key actors has to be halted. Authority is needed to insure that there will be efficiency in dealing with the main issue at hand: reshaping or strengthening the institutions of the international arena and finding viable solutions to global problems.

As noted, we will not discuss planned pliability any further, rather we will briefly explain what the empowering method, as an indirect strategical approach entails.

2.1. The empowering method

It is our firm belief that levering US power by the introduction of other actors (including institutions) to more effectively assist the pursuit of shared goals and to support the creation and usage non-military tools is impervious for any plan of consolidating power that the US should draft. Continuing military preeminence (although the main source of power for America) is simply not cutting it anymore in the international arena. As it has been mentioned before, America struggles with legitimacy in many domains, be them military, environmental, security related or financial. When US legitimacy and resources are depleted, the federation needs to find a sustainable, long term strategy, reliant less on the power of the fist, and more on that of non-threatening gestures and inflictions of its voice. While we consider that military strength is still essential to an indirect approach, we argue that it has its limitations, and in order to attain its goals, America must take into consideration such issues as economic assistance, diplomacy and global governance. These will be presented shortly in what follows.

2.1.1. Using Diplomatic Means

As “diplomacy allows weak powers to counter strong ones” (Ferguson, 2009), it is indubitably it may aid hegemons consolidate their status. Washington officials, in an attempt to reinforce international stability, should revive traditional partnerships with old allies. With Europeans, contrary to the current US’ focus, the goal should be the increase of non-military initiatives, even within NATO, and not advertising further military capabilities. Moreover, the continued emphasis on budgetary increases from allies and on achieving a true burden-sharing process may be perceived as a legitimate request, as long as the said increases will not be solely directed to armedmilitary operations.

In connection with the Middle East, the US needs to establish itself as a reliable third party, in order to find a peaceful solution between Israelis and Palestinians. The peace process in the Middle East is reliant on a "two-state solution", but neither side is willing to make amends, despite the proportion of Arabs and Jews living in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank is just shy of a 1:1 ratio (favoring the Arab population). Although the US has a great deal of power in the Middle East, it is often left impotent. While pushing for peace in the region, assessments must be made of what is feasible and what should be postponed for the sake of realistic outcomes.

In the broader Middle East, the administration should gradually and carefully aid reform. Some of the more prominent reformers in the Arab World should be identified and encouraged, but gradually, realizing that existing regimes must not be undermined, and that this process of bringing about reform will be lengthy and tumultuous (Ross, Makowsky, 2009: 61-64). To provide an example of how this has been done in the past – arguably for the worst – we only need to refer to Bush’s insistence that Palestinian elections should take place, fact which granted Hamas some sort of quasi-democratic legitimacy.

With NATO allies, the poignant question is not what can be done to expand national military commitments and subsequently capabilities, but how non-military initiatives can be encouraged. In the fields of international police work, intelligence, trade concessions and foreign assistance there is much work to be done, and a positive outlook seems graspable, as long as there is little insistence on growing the number of people they enroll and the number of guns each servant owns. Furthermore, states should be accommodated politically and invited to accept leadership roles in international institutions, roles fitting for both their current power and their ambitions.

China, Russia or India (and other regional powers) must be approached, and the relationships must be normalized, not only in the U.N, but also in economic and environmental domains. This reengagement must come because there is a clear disproportionate interest in matters of geopolitical stability in these states’ regions. In the near future, the United States will presumably have a limited capacity of shaping stringent geopolitical affairs; thus it needs the aid of regional power centers. New nuclear states and terrorist organizations can only be deterred by stressing the roles of rising powers within the UN. Other global organizations and interstate actors need to become more transparent and new rules need to be implemented, but this can only be done by allowing all willing and capable states to join in the global governance system.

Although the G7 was later stretched to encompass eight, then twenty states, the forum itself needs to expand its focus and deepen its initiatives (Hajnal, 2007: 112-118). Only by these means can the banking system be reformed and stabilized. The Third Basel accord has come to place and be applied, as its main regulations have been postponed to 2019.

Moderate Muslim governments should be encouraged openly, as they are no threat to the question of security, but could become so if not taken into account in various international fora. If in the past, theoreticians have advertised giving incentives for the European Union to embrace Turkey, due to the recent turmoil in the state, reasons to doubt governmental moderation when it comes to human rights have arisen. If for the moment, Turkey is a delicate matter, other states must be pursued to open their ruling regimes to political opponents; and by it, to further the widening of democratic spaces in states with frail such traditions.

At home, facilitating the success of Muslim populations could prove very productive, as a policy with international implications. Cooperation between religions must be advertised, and states from the European Union must be encouraged to follow the same path. David Hollinger is arguably correct when he sais that "*religious ideas offered as justifications for public policy should be open to critical debate and no longer given a pass*" (Hollinger, 2008: 18-19). It can be easily validated that religious actors in the public square often seem to assume that pandering on the idea of faith is no longer sufficient. Religion, when it involves itself in the public square, needs to provide a stronger account of itself, something far beyond any cliché of the past. The role played by religion in the large arena of American politics is a serious matter of concern for all involved, and this phenomenon should be watched very closely. Cimino and Lattin argue that political activism from religious groups is something which will only increase in the near future (Cimino, Lattin, 2002: 72-73). As religious debate becomes stronger, the capacity to propose a dialogue between faiths becomes greater, and a framework to advertise such dialogue should be created. Thus the religious divide that can be felt in several geographic areas can later be tackled with legitimacy, after an efficient model of cooperation is found within the nation.

Cooperation in other fields should be prompted with key actors, such as states and international organizations. Paradigm changing initiatives in the fields of climate change, economic development and alternative energy will not only be beneficial for America, but will have a positive impact on the wider community. Issuing public goods, will make America develop not only through the use of those goods, but it will facilitate maintaining legitimacy, leadership and subsequently power in the system.

2.1.2. New Patterns of Military Power Usage

Since we have relied to a great extent on the use of soft power, the following passage, which advertizes the use of military power, might seem counterintuitive. Nonetheless US military power is a fundamental component of American strength – especially if it becomes a hybrid, of both soft and hard capabilities. It is an essential factor which can aid the peaceful co-opting of other states and non-state actors into a system of shared norms and common objectives. The reliance on military preeminence must stop, and the system needs transformation.

Funding should be directed towards human resources and technological R&D, as intelligence offices (which are a part of the military apparatus) do a great job in avoiding conflict. Attacks can be prevented by simply modernizing both institutions that deal with intelligence and finding new and fitting methods for their staffs. Intelligence is mainly invaluable because it can detect and interrupt the acquisition of weapons and planned attacks against the US.

The current reforms of the military apparatus are clearly insufficient, but we have to keep in mind that another reorganization, done bureaucratically is out of the question, due to economic and time costs. The focus should thus be shifted towards head-hunting, especially targeting mid-level personnel, where series of consecutive waves of retirement have left jobs vacant. Here the planned pliability meets the indirect method because having relevant intelligence and analysis allows policy makers to draft good policies. Decision making thus goes hand in hand with military power of the sort discussed here.

US soldiers should be deployed in regions struck by natural disasters, as their unique capacity to relocate rapidly and respond with efficiency is valuable. This means can also be employed to demonstrate why America is a strong leader, being both capable and concerned. Furthermore soldiers can be used to aid the training of others in regional peacekeeping operations. Material support is also essential, as the United States army has the newest technologies and the people that can teach others how they can be used. UN operations could benefit enormously from the expertise of army officials. The US strives to provide a professional military structure for NATO, but it is our recommendation that the same effort should be vested in regional peacekeeping initiatives.

Officials must learn how to separate counterterrorism missions from preventive, stability or relief operations. As a consequence, not only will the chain of command be clearer, but international credibility and success will be ensured. Bringing together missions which often compete against each other in terms of subject and needed approaches is surely counterproductive in the long run. This blurred line between several types of missions has clearly complicated the intervention in Afghanistan, and there is a strong possibility that this will become a problem in other areas of interest, unless a way to clearly segregate humanitarian intervention from the political one, and both said types from efforts related to counterterrorism.

The only place in which we consider the presence of an American army to be something beneficial is on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as a stabilizing (for the region and especially for Afghanistan) and containing method (for terrorist organizations). As forces have been pulled out from Iraq, a gradual expansion of troop numbers is needed in contested regions or areas of the globe (Berger, 2010: 76-92). Reconciliation with Taliban leaders willing to enter political structures is something that needs to be done by joining forces with other nations. In the same way, generous economic assistance should be issued for Afghanistan, which has been the beneficiary of some, albeit insufficient aid. To reduce the possibility being seen as radicals, US officials must renounce to the idea of maintaining permanent bases in Muslim countries, following a model that was used, with more or less success, in the case of Iraq.

Preventing conflict in other regions and, at the same time, insuring that any possible attack on the United States is dealt with accordingly represents a true priority, but it is also an enormous challenge. Enemies should thus be divided through targeted actions, rather than dealing with every opponent at the same time. Since several countries share the US's interest for a stable international environment, some responsibilities should be delegated to actors strong enough to deal with regional issues. In the years to come, it is vital for the US to promote systemic stability through the strengthening of foreign forces. There is often an expectancy of grand gestures when it comes to the US army, but such conceptions must be reevaluated and the US forces need to learn to keep a lower profile and decentralize operations whenever this is possible. In international relations, the leader must come from the situation, as certain states hold advantages when dealing with others.

Moreover, developing energy independence, cyber security and the development of new technologies must be on the primary expenditure lists when it comes to the military budget, because although the US faces no conventional peer competitor, they are not in the clear as recent internal scandals have shown. Sometimes a hand of people can destabilize entire countries by using computers; thus, creating weapons with more firing power does not cut it anymore, as the nature of conflict has changed immensely.

2.1.3. Providing Civilian Assistance

Civilian assistance (comprising, but not limited to economic aid) is another core element of the indirect approach that has the purpose of obtaining long-term global security. In high-risk environments, a civilian corps should be deployed to aid stability operations. This corpse should be comprised of people from outside the military, capable of aiding the peace process in post-conflict zones. Furthermore, the corps should enlist culturally aware personnel that can tolerate risk. While we do not advertise that United States attempt to create a parallel structure to its military capability, we observe that but a civilian operational component would prove to be an invaluable element of U.S. humanitarian, post-conflict or counterinsurgency efforts.

Initiatives would thus focus less on bilateral assistance, rather multilateral initiatives would be employed. Democratization is an important challenge for the whole of the system, but it pales in comparison to the need of improving the results of governance so that citizens' security and wellbeing are ensured to a greater degree. Although it should prove difficult to balance this stabilization approach with current and future political efforts to promote incremental reform in geopolitical strategic areas -and in other partnering countries – it is not far-fetched, nor naive.

Furthermore, the US should establish a global pool for covering national risk (Chaturvedi et al.: 94-97), something in the shape of a subsidized insurance fund, to make states suffering from natural disasters or terrorist attacks more resilient in the face of such tragedies.

America should become a leader of other allied developed nations, by making trade concessions, rather than waging trade wars and applying high tariffs on imports. The US should further tryto reinvigorate the Doha Round of trade negotiations (which was shelved in 2008 and had small bits unearthed in December 2013 - to only be buried again since) and thereby restore confidence in large-scale international economic agreements and in the possible trade partnership with the EU.

Yet another thing America could do is encourage Muslim states to create youth development programs, so that peaceful alternatives to Jihadist youth movements would exist. Through these programs, the primary beneficiaries would prove to be a safety net and a potential economic catalyst. This would also be a means of encouraging economic and social security and general wellbeing within Muslim countries.

2.1.4. Reshaping the Global Governance System

Stability and growth cannot come without an improved system that relies on new, innovative and democratic patterns of governance. Improvements to the system should come constantly, because as realities change, policy-makers always seem to be caught one step behind.

As mentioned before, the problem of failing nuclear states is one of the toughest challenges America faces, and in order to resolve it efficiently, it must ultimately develop multilateral support and rally a collection of states on its side. The UN can be used as the framework for the creation of a coalition that has the sole scope of identifying risk awareness and risk management systems, which could sound the alarm in case one nuclear state or another is failing. A unilateral approach would surely prove to be destabilizing, but assuming leadership in this domain could prove laudatory. A failing nuclear power implicates the whole system and demands aggregated response, because it transcends the geographic boundaries of one state and all citizens face a certain risk. The Atomic Energy Agency needs to be granted more authority as to oversee the safe dismantling of nuclear weapons in cases of intervention in an unstable nuclear state.

A new method for dealing with failed states (or regions within states) could aid the international community in reducing the risk of such areas becoming general security threats. Sovereignty entails one's responsibility of controlling activities within own borders but in some cases sensitive matters such as sovereignty must be left aside. When a government fails to fulfill their responsibility, the vast array of other states must intervene in order to avoid a partial systemic threat or even failure. When a state lacks the capacity to deal with threats, they usually call in other states - the most recent example being Libya, where the political power sought the aid of Russia and one part of the contesters that of the United States. But while gathering traditional allies is effective, assistance through an international forum could prove not only more acceptable, but more sustainable. The UN and other regional organizations should create response capabilities that go beyond peacekeeping - to even include governorship for the amount of time needed until power can be instilled in the hands of those that hold legitimacy.

There is a need to modernize the decision-making process, as to incorporate the new powers of the system. The UN risks becoming irrelevant, unless the organization's decisions, especially those that require the Security Council's approval, come to reflect the reality of our time and to accommodate all powers. European powers now hold roles that countries like India or Brazil do not, and this may prove to be problematic for the future of the institution. Reform within the UN should be pursued together with the development of complementary decision-making processes, which may push further reformation. Informal consultative methods can be used, and although these lack transparency, it is clear that they can bring about a certain reforms.

In the same way, non-state actors need to be taken into account in decision-making processes. No one disputes the primal importance of states in the international arena, but the realities of our time tend to demonstrate that other entities have become increasingly important. In some cases, non-state entities hold power inside failed states and even in armed conflicts, thus they must be accommodated in the political sphere. Issues such as terrorism, cybersecurity or pandemics of all sorts affect non-state actors such as NGOs and corporations to the same extent as they affect states, and sometimes they can aid in addressing these problems.

Integrating non-state actors won't be easy; it is a lengthy process that involves creating incentives to ensure cooperation on issues of common concern, and making these actors realize their responsibilities, not only their rights in the international system . The United States should advertise a method of creating new consultative frameworks which integrate non-state actors into official international debates and action plans.

Conclusions

Maintaining power has never been facile for any state throughout history and the strategy proposed does not claim to have identified all systemic requirements and all implications that derive from such a goal, however, it provides a series of broadly-exposed talking points, which could constitute the basis for a more comprehensive approach.

We have argued throughout this paper that any maintenance strategy must take into account the wider implications that American power has on the system and vice-versa. Accordingly, we claim that the interstate system must be modernized, so that it can actively promote stability. Safety and freedom can only be preserved on US soil with such systemic changes being proposed and implemented from below, to later overflow from above. The further strategy argues that unilateral actions and military power can no longer protect American interests, rather common understandings of threats must be developed, and collective action is impervious in order to mitigate the threats identified.

The strategy aims to be a far-stretching solution, one that, if applied, would enable other states to protect their borders and contain internal threats, impeding them from spilling regionally/globally. Maintenance requires the aid of others, being by no means a unilateral struggle, especially considering that the US does not have the resources nor all the required tools to carry out such a plan by itself. Thus, other states, non-state actors and international institutions are to be co-opted in aiding regimes that are ineffective in ensuring internal security. All the above mentioned must also be included in the process of creating a modern global governance system. For this, the US needs to be aware of the interests of others and try to preserve its own legitimacy in the international arena.

We have further argued that democracies are slow in observing developing problems, and often rise up only when acute crises are already deep inside the system. As the Cold War ended, America's primary concern became securing a peace dividend, rather than reexamining the requirements of international leadership. Chronic problems of eroding states and international institutions have thus remained unaddressed. When crises could no longer be ignored, the US government applied "quick-fixes", without investing in sustainable sets of solutions. The United States chose not to create a strong UN peacekeeping capacity and dreamt of nonproliferation agreements and institutions that are lacking in capabilities. While states worked together to create new international rules and institutions that meet collective responsibilities, in particular fields related to justice or the environment, the United States did nothing, but observe, and continue to do so.

It is impossible to cast the blame solely on the United States for all the failures of the system, but one must recognize that for over one decade –during the 1990's – it stood as the single pole of power globally, with its position uncontested. Thus, many of the system's weaknesses, that gradually festered, have come during America's slumber. This inability to take the necessary actions and strengthen the system has left the United States with less effective, and certainly less attractive options for resolving challenges brought about by terrorism, weakening states and the processes of globalization.

Tension will always arise between what can be done to strengthen the system and the immediate, particular interests of America. We claim that there is undeniable conflict between short-term and long-term benefits and, most often, the first win. The starting point of the strategy of maintenance presented herein is the "revelation" that America has a significant degree of national interest in the efficiency of the international system. Failing to observe this interest leads to policies such as those adopted and implemented until recently.

Investing into a stable system is what boosts national security; of course others will benefit, but there are sufficient arguments to show that United States tend to benefit the most.

The paper offers a line of action and policy making, congruent with the clear interest of the US of maintaining its hegemonic position well into the 21st century and beyond. Both internal and international issues have been addressed, and a couple of solutions have been given, time will only tell if any of these solutions resonate with American grand strategy and if any will develop into working principles of the global system.

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EUROPEAN UNION BETWEEN UNILATERALISM AND MULTILATERALISM. A GLANCE OVER THE RISE OF EUROPEAN POPULIST EXTREMISM

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Abstract. *Progress, technological advancement, common market, peace and welfare are all some terms to which the European Union was used until recently. The migrant crises, rise of populist extremism and the effects of transition and post-transition in some of the member states are playing a vital role in deciding either on further unilateralist or multilateralist approaches of the management of the current situation. This paper is trying to identify the main identity cliché transitions from traditional to modern approaches, including the eventual resetting of the political class and reaching a consensus between old and new values we need to embrace in order to keep moving forward towards progress and prosperity.*

Keywords: *Traditionalism, Modernism, Unilateralism, Multilateralism, Populism, Extremism*

The European Union was born, in different stages, as a reaction of the European states to ensure economic, social and political peace and stability, respectively, to prevent a new World War. As a result, the foundation of European construction was set up by the initiative of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, through the supranational authority called the European Coal and Steel Community (Gillingham, 2004: 363). This process was followed by the establishment of the European Economic Community, where it arose the common economic market (Paxton, 1992: 7-9). Thus, due to the ideological concentration to have an economically, socially and politically stable continent, in 1993 the Maastricht Treaty resulted in an uncut diamond of modern European democracy but with many traditional reminiscences. An ideology is a set of comprehensive and coherent ideas that explains and analyzes social conditions, thus helping citizens understand their place in society. In addition, this set of ideas is systematized, hierarchized and structured as a genetic critique of ideas.

The European Union has begun to develop as an economic and political society, with a tradition of inheritance from every European actor who helped shape it. Thus, traditionalism was associated with a characteristic part of the then social, cultural and social society (Shils, 1981: 6). Moreover, the first six states (Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries) promoted traditionalism through its ideologies, giving traditionalist valences to European ideology which was to materialize in international relations and foreign affairs (Needler, 1996: 198). Over time, new European actors have joined the Union, so new ideologies with fresh principles have begun to attack traditionalist thinking deepened into the individualist valences of older states. With the infusion of new principles, the EU Member States have begun to understand that in order to have a

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prosperous and united Europe, it must rely more on cooperation, openness and inclusion of all European issues, starting from the social side to the economic side or politics (Buonanno, Nugent, 2013: 94-95).

1. Traditionalism

The traditionalism is a reaction to modernism, liberalism and radicalism. The word tradition comes from Latin, from the verb trader and means to move on or down. Thus, from an etymological point of view, tradition signifies an affirmation or the action of transmitting from one generation to another a model, ideology or habit (Sedgwick, 2004: 21). Traditionalism in essence means reorienting an ideology or thinking towards the past, to the habits of long ago, believing that past actions were what they have brought us today, so they are worthy of respect (Bullock, Verpoest, 2011: 190). The consensus on traditions in a society is limited not only by the restrictions that arise as a result of unequal opportunities, but and resistance. Resistance is present in several forms and motives. One of these reasons is to attach to the indigenous traditions of a particular sector of a society, to which a foreign tradition is presented. We also encounter an aversion to the upper class and the refusal to give respect, which is implicit in accepting the traditions of the majority. In some groups, especially linguistic and ethnic groups, such resistance is accompanied by the accentuation and reinterpretation of indigenous traditions tending to revive or consolidate an indigenous tradition threatened by a concurrent tradition. Individuals turn indigenous tradition into a doctrine or an ideology. Resistance guarantees the heterogeneity of cultural tradition. In addition, heterogeneity increases the accountability of traditions due to alternatives and implicitly and sometimes explicitly criticizes traditions. Despite the resistance, the traditions of different layers influence each other. Resistance does not prevent syncretism; this is often a condition of syncretism. The power of foreign traditions opposes too much to be permanently blocked. Those who resist have already assimilated elements of the new tradition they are struggling with, resulting in a mixture of individual tradition and foreign tradition, and thus creating a new ideology reinterpreting an indigenous tradition. The same process of resistance, acceptance and blending takes place in migrating traditions from one society to another. Usually these reactions have a nationalist character based on a traditional reaction, which is normal because the national is traditional. These foreign ideologies, better traditions borrowed from other nationalities, try to reconstitute the national essence of an ideology to look like this (Shils, 1981: 246).

The period before 1989 was marked, globally, by the confrontation between liberalism and communism as instinctual ideologies where each proclaimed a model of a particular society and boasted as the creator of the free society. This is the widespread presentation of the West-East conflict, which was based on these two ideologies. In Western countries, the model of systems was based on a liberal-democratic political system operating in the context of capitalist economy and the defense of individuals' rights. This was the model of the free society. From a political point of view it was characterized by the pluralism of the political parties, who competed for power, by separating the powers in the state and the values of constitutionalism. To some extent, the legal review of the executive. From an economic point of view, it included the commitment to create a free-market system where the means of production were owned by the private sector; however, the post-World War II Western states have been characterized several times as users of a mixed economy where the state had a considerable proportion of productive resources. Here was the contribution of social democracy, a form of socialism that sought to use the power of states to mitigate market inequalities. Social democracy was a strong player on the ideology scene characterized as the traditional ideology of the end of the 20th century.

The ideology of communism was opposed, in theory and practice, to this model of exuberant liberal democracy in the context of mixed economics. The ideal in this case was found in a planned society, controlled by a single party supposed to act in the interest of everyone in a society in which everyone was equal, and in which the division of conflicts between social classes was removed by collectivization productive resources. The rationality behind this controlled society wished to be the factor that would lead to the state's disappearance as an administrative entity and thus to proclaim its superiority over the West from the point of view of equality, planning and rational use of resources (Schwarzmantel, 2008: 8-10). In addition to social democracy and liberalism, traditionalism represented the rails that brought the wagon conservatism. Conservatism is the doctrine that claims that the reality of any society can be found in its historical development, so it is the best guide for governments, not to interfere with what has once been established in history. This doctrine emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to the nationalist projects of the French Revolutionaries. In addition, this doctrine describes society as an entity that grows, grows and grows roots, leaving leaves dry and undeveloped. As a rule of this doctrine, political parties must respond to the changing circumstances of a society (Kuper, 2003: 131). Conservative political doctrine can be defined as a set of ideas that aim at organizing and leading a society by preserving for a long time the traditional political structure. In its inception, conservatism advocated, in opposition to liberalism, the monarchy as a form of government (Miroiu, 2012: 42-53). Conservatives also argued that political institutions were the product of a long-lasting development. Their change by humans would be done against eternal laws, conservatives claiming that changes are in fact brutalizes of history. Conservatives claim that the political institutions are the effect of a long-term development. Changing it by humans would take place against the eternal laws, the changes being brutalization of history. Also, this doctrine is based, as does the liberal doctrine, on the principles of the rule of law. It supports the ideas of people's inequality and the need for distinct and hierarchical social classes. The primary characteristics of conservatism are the private property, religion, the defense of social order and supports the inequality of individuals and classes in society. This doctrine has two ramifications: classical conservatism, which supports the idea of preserving traditional institutions against the changes envisaged and sustained by the liberal doctrine; neo-conservatism, which sustains the traditional political institutions created on the basis of liberal doctrine.[1]

In conclusion, we can state that the European Union has used the traditional stream to develop different ideologies and doctrines that will structure its transition to modernity. These doctrines, with a traditional ramification, were the basic structure for the Member States wishing to complete the European Union. Through these traditional ideologies, Member States have made their way to a future that is represented by the Union they are part of today, but the question is how important it is for the good of the European Union, from an economic, social and political point of view, if these states continue to follow a much more open doctrine towards modernity, taking into account the globalization and all the similar phenomena that 50 years ago were nonexistent or too little visible.

[1] *Conservatorismul*, Politicaromânească.ro, http://www.politicaromaneasca.ro/conservatorismul-200, accessed 12.05.2018.

2. Modernity

Modernity refers to a historical period that has manifested itself in Western Europe through a series of cultural, social and economic events around the 17th century. This period is characterized by the increase of the scientific consciousness and instrumental secularization of reality, industrial society growth, social mobility, market economy, bureaucratization and the consolidation of nation-states. The last characteristic, but also the most important, is the birth of the concept of a free, autonomous, self-controlling and profoundly thoughtful person. In contrast to traditionalism, modernity can be described as a concept of social and individual experiences that are shared by all the citizens of the world through technological expansion and innovation, profoundly democratic political models, and the disappearance of the borders of nation-states. Essentially, modernity is a more esthetic form of a set of ideas and ideological principles of globalization. This ideology is accompanied by changes in the self-perception of the European citizen and reshapes on certain level the modern institutions (Kuper, 2003: 546). On the other hand, there is no standard definition for modernity because, in its essence, modernity is characterized by versatility, fluidity and it is bringing new changes in society. It is a process that has been constantly present since the 17th century in the mindset of western states, trying to analyze this phenomenon of modernity and globalization (Bryk, 2008: 10). Modernity and its familiar terms, namely modernity and modernization, exist as a topic of discourse quite often encountered in literary criticism in the history of science, public policies or political programs. This ideology "attacks" tradition, obsolete normative acts, stagnation, political and economic sclerosis, underdevelopment and fundamentalism of any kind. As topics promoted by the ideology, we encounter progress, development, growth, accumulation, flexibility, revolutions, reforms and conscious changes on various- but interlinked fields. Modernity can be described as an era focused on the future, certainly designed to be different as a present and better than the past. With the advent of the idea of progress and accumulation of wisdom, the enlightenment has emerged, opening up a new horizon that predicted evolution of the social. It was manifested as a loss of what was from the etymological point of view and retrospectively made understandings and meanings of the political concepts of reforms and revolutions that later became key words. Due to rapid trade growth, through industrial revolution and innovative discoveries in science, we can say that the second half of the 18th century can be characterized as a definitive and flawless victory of modernity in Western Europe (Therborn, 1995: 3). The complexity of modernity has developed not only due to the revival but also to the enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Jacobin Revolution, but also to the British industrial empire that has never forgotten the models of antiquity. However, Karl Marx believed that "the rebirth of the dead served in these cases as a comparison of the glorification of the new and not to parody the antiquity”. He also said that "exaggerations must be avoided in the application of the new ideology and do not escape from finding solutions in reality" (Idem, 1995: 4). The European history of the second half of the last millennium mostly had a revolutionary role, in the sense of periods of time sustained by society where the exclusive competition with the potential to claim control over a European state or a part of it, has been discussed. Therefore, the first period was covered by the consolidation of modern states, regardless of whether they were absolutist dynasties and by exception, constitutional monarchies or a bourgeois republic like the Netherlands. The instauration of nation-states as a product of the manifestation of the nation’s sovereignty was the most exclusive and central issue of the second era of the European revolutions. The lack of clear limitations which mark the difference between internal and external, as well as an internal connectivity forming a pronounced interdependence of the delimitated population, leads to internal conflicts linked to the discussions at the organizational level of a whole. The consolidation of these states and spreading the power of the judiciary, fiscal and military networks has enriched the importance of legitimacy as well as its rules (Idem, 1995: 21-22). As far as culture is concerned, the lack of it has become a major state problem in the 19th century, so political measures have been taken to support it. In all European countries, policies have been developed to promote the reduction of illiteracy and a more efficient development of education, thus promoting urbanization as an assertion of power of the nation-state and the industrial revolution. As the demand for skilled workers has continuously risen due to the industrial revolution, so have the efforts of most liberal governments which have supported and promoted education. As measures to support modern culture, we can mention the following: modernization of school curricula, modernization of textbooks, and the introduction of the free-of-charge primary education which also became mandatory (Delanty, 2013: 287-288). These measures have led to an increase in numbers of pupils attending a primary education course with different qualifications, positively influencing the growth and development of the. Also, thanks to the new European citizen with a meditative and free thinking, the nation-states ordered the establishment of associations that promoted the culture of national academies that played a role of cultural authority, allowing the manifestation of cultural events with exhibitional role and invested in urbanism, thus creating numerous public edifices such as libraries, university campuses and cultural monuments for its citizens. In the twentieth century in Europe, most of the legislation on education focused on setting up new schools, better development and structuring of secondary and higher education, and enriching the education system with technical or craft schools (Idem, 2013: 290). Thus, we can say that modernity helped the new democratic states in a better approach to educational policy, understanding that it is better to invest in specialists and educated people in contrast to totalitarian states where traditionality proved to be rigid and too conservative in terms of education and culture. In the same century, budget investments in education increased, thus increasing the development of education but also creating a new objective, namely lifelong learning. In conclusion, the ideology of modernity supported the development of the nation-state as an independent state, especially built in Europe with a European consciousness based on a history at least common with the other European states, reflecting the European citizen's aspiration to delimit himself from Balkan-, Russian- or oriental influences. This trend motivates the European actors to take steps to structure the current European Union, which includes European institutions and a modern European legislative frameworks that promotes a centralized political, administrative and economic system to ensure an everlasting well-being of the citizen. In addition, modernity was helped by the wave of scientific innovations, thus managing to consolidate its principles through new technologies. As far as agriculture is concerned, modernity promotes a sustainability, which again proves the tendency oriented towards the future. As far as the modern European citizen is concerned, thanks to new technologies, he has access to a large field of multicultural exchanges and the knowledge of identities which compose the European Union (Richards, 2004: 53-54).

3. Transition

Commonly, transition can be defined as a shift of path triggered by change in order to bring the state towards stability. Transitions are characterized by several dynamic steps, milestones, final results and turning points (Meleis, 2010: 11). The economic transition appears as a need when a new ideology is adopted by a state, and once adopted, new values and rules emerge in the economic field. An economic transition is rather complicated and difficult because it is manifested by privatizations or restructurings where all these complementary changes must be made without disturbing the state's economy too much, as it must continue to function, its role being to cover many of the populations needs. An economic transition must also be supported by the political platform in order not to create flawed policies or to be changed too often in the transition process (Roland, 2000: 2). The transition at the level of the political class begins as a result of some events which determine the state to change its ideology. In this case, the entire political structure will go through a period of transition or restructuring, in order to improve its efficiency. Sometimes, these pressures that call for change are of a civic nature, when citizens feel the need for a transition to an ideology closer to them. This pressure is largely manifested by revolutions or manifestations in the streets. Another pressure comes from the political actors themselves, where often after the elections, the new political power has a new vision of the country's ideology, and thus a transition to a new set of ideas takes place (Codato, 2006: 2-3). At any time of transition, we will encounter phases of adoption of the new rules, and in these periods of adoption, the social, economic and legal status is confusing and chaotic, so in a state affected by a transition period we encountered problems in the social area as well as the lack of clear information for citizens regarding some procedures in their relationship with the state, such as dividing the town hall institution into new departments, which may lead to a sense of insecurity and misinformation. In order to avoid such situations and to ensure the functionality of the system from a sociological and psychological perspective, but also the maintenance of the social order, a set of instruments of pressure or persuasion should be applied and followed, namely organized and unorganized, implicit and explicit, direct or indirect, formal or informal , conscious and diffuse. All of these have the purpose of social stability in the state and also try to influence individuals to adopt legal conduct and to comply with the norms of the community or society they live in (Ciuchi, 2011: 245-246). As economic consequences, an economic transition may be the key to prosperous economic growth or the opportunity for state fraud and a high degree of corruption in influencing the approval of preferential fiscal or economic policies.[2] In conclusion, the phenomena of transition, ideologically, economically or culturally, affects a state largely in a positive way, but if the process is not managed and enforced by rules, it can lead a state towards crisis and chaos in all respects. Thus, the transition must be understood, monitored and implemented in the smallest detail in order to avoid creating breaches between the old and the new system. In this case breaches can become tools which might be exploited by individuals in bad faith, with a potential negative effect upon the entire society.

4. Post-Transition and Normality

Once the transition period approaches the end, the state in which this phenomenon is taking place is entering into a reshaping period where the new ideologies are already partly absorbed by the system and a more careful motorization is assessed by evaluating certain indicators that are related to the new change. We can say that the state has largely

[2] *The Social And Employment Consequences Of Privatization In Transition Economies: Evidence And Guidelines,* B., Martin, Interdepartmental Action Programme on Privatization, Restructuring and Economic Democracy, http://publicworld.org/files/ilotransition.pdf, pp. 13-23, accessed 16.05.2018.

absorbed most of the sets of new ideas and concepts but they still have to go through a period of consolidation they find their place in society. All the changes must be monitored and analyzed to a certain extent by both citizens and institutions. Post-transition is a bridge towards the new normality for the host state which comes along with implementing a level of modernity accepted by the state. Essentially, post-transition means a deeper harmonization in terms of social, political and economic new doctrine that will dictate the degree of modernity of the state.

Normality is the assimilation of socially, economically and politically accepted rules, principles, values and norms. Also, the state of normality means a period of balance from all points of view. With the beginning of the normality period, the post-transition period is considered to be over. Normality is the happy moment when a state comes out of the transition period because the transition is not only a stage but an entire process (Neumann, Heinen, 2012: 441-442). As relevant steps for this work, we consider that the internal transition and the external transition that manifests itself in the phenomenon of changing the ideology of a state, but also in the state of accession of a state to the European Union necessarily have an impact on the period of time it also manifests itself on the finite results of this process. Through inner transition we can understand that a state is going through a shock therapy to infuse a new ideology. The process takes place in a limited time and practically summarizes a whole historical process that would have lasted for centuries and changes the dynamics of the state in structuring rules and laws that are pleasant to the new system to be assimilated. This inner transition is a sign of stopping a supposed European isolation and the first step in entering the European experience. The external transition is an effort made by EU Member States to create policies, norms and regulations that are applicable not only to European niche but also to new states willing to join this supranational structure. Also, the external transition is a direct leap into a modernity that, for other European member states, means normality.[3] If there was a better optimization of the transition process, a new political, social and economic ideology, the only step that should be changed is actually an essential factor within each stage, namely, time. Following the analysis of the process of transition from traditionalism to modernity, we noticed that modernity cannot exist without tradition. This is because everything is new, innovative, needs solid foundations to develop, and in our case the foundation of modernity can be nothing more than traditionalism. In this case, we can see that through this pyramid structure, which has traditionalism as it's cornerstone, followed by the transition with all its steps leading to modernity (which is always in continuous progress, tailored to current needs), the stages cannot be skipped in order to reach modernity on a shorter path. The only solution for achieving modernity starting from a system based on traditionalism can only be done through shortening the amount of time needed for the process to take place. Shortening time can be done by implementing simple bureaucratic solutions, and by streamlining institutions from the local to the national level, so that all the transition process, including the inner and outer elements, to be carried out in the most optimal conditions and centered on the citizen and its needs, thus saving time and resources that can then be invested in consolidating the new system. Thus, it is mandatory to preserve the tradition of transition towards modernity, having the same stages that have been structured, conceived and applied from one European generation to the next one.

[3] *România în UE. Calitatea Integrării. Creștere. Competență. Ocupare, Ciclurile Tranziției, O Perspectivă Epistemiologică Asupra Globalizării,* Marin, Dinu, http://store.ectap.ro/suplimente/simpozion_23_nov_2007_ro_vol2.pdf, pp. 154-155, accessed 18.05.2018.

5. Tradition and the Process of Establishing It

Globalization is a process in which more and more citizens become connected in different ways over the longest distances. Space becomes more and more irrelevant and most of the things we do, do not take territorial valences, and social relations no longer depend on a particular territory, becoming suprateritorial. Globalization can also be a compression of the world and an increase in consciousness that represents the world as a whole (Lechner, 2009: 15-16). It represents the transplanetary and supra-territorial extent of relations and connections between people and involves the reduction of barriers to global social contact. In addition, this phenomenon describes the rapid processes of intercontinental integration from an economic, social and political point of view (Wells, Shuey, Kiely, 2001: 37). The tradition has become difficult to establish because the forces of globalization have become heavily influential, especially with the development of technology, with a more accessible and fast-forward channel. From the point of view of the identity of a state, tradition is hard to establish because society is concerned with all the foreign and multicultural identities that come to them with the opening of borders and also with the possibility of studying any other identity due to technology and progress in telecommunications, being the most recent, efficient and powerful tool for spreading the power of globalization. The phenomenon of globalization incites states in the pre-transition period to speed up their transition to modernity with the help of external influences that have a global role and involves the influences of other states, and it remains to decide which of the conflicting traditions this phenomenon will reach to dominate and to make his way up to the modern system.

6. Resetting the Political Class

Resetting the political class is a result of the struggle between tradition and modernity. In order to get from tradition to modernity in the true sense of the word, everything that is ineffective needs to be changed so that that segment of the system functions according to the needs of society. As a result, the political class is the one that requires first of all a restructuring and a reset, because as long as the state operated under the old system, they did not manage to control it. Thus, the failed policy has to be changed in order to increase the chances of functioning society under normal conditions under the new system. If, following the elections that are part of the reset of the political class, part of the new class will be old members, it will be proof that the confidence of those who vote is still unwavering, giving a new chance to its leaders for a new beginning. Otherwise, people with voting rights will choose new representatives in decision-making bodies, so that the modern system will be driven by fresh political figures, with new ideas and solutions. Through this process, equal chances are given to the old political class, but also to the new leaders waiting to become the solution to the problems they identified and to which the old system failed to bring about solutions. In addition, modernity is a filter that separates traditionalist ideologies, badly exploited by political representatives pursuing their own interest and not that of the country, we can consider modernity as a solution that refreshes the political scene of a state once it penetrates into its ideology. Resetting the political class is a slow and very rare encounter in contemporary societies. The majority of citizens who want to have such a process live in a society where their voice is no longer heard by the state where state interest is no longer close to the citizen, and politics has become more of a business for those who apply it and lead it a way to lead a society towards a prosperous reality. This process of resetting the political class has to go through a phenomenon of purification that can stretch over a long period of time because resetting is done gradually from one generation to the next, from one transition to the next. Thus, as this reset process is shorter, some steps can be optimized. Firstly, the electoral cycle cannot be repeated in a consecutive manner, so the new political class will have new political representatives with a broader perspective. Also, candidates in the political class should be limited to mandates in their office, thus obliging them to impose an efficient schedule to his political agenda. In addition, no resetting of the political class can be manifested without an impulse coming from the electoral platform.

7. Conclusions

In conclusion, all the factors that have been analyzed embrace the essence of development. The European Union needs characteristics of tradition and modernity to preserve its identity, but also to develop towards a more prosperous future. Traditionalism has been and represents the basis of the community building. Thus, we can see that the founders of the community space have tried to preserve a lost peace with the world wars and to impose some basic indicators that each state should develop and respect in order to remain in the Union. As a result, the ideology of traditionalism inspired each member state to preserve its national identity while pursuing a community objective. Besides, the legacy of the memories of traditional ideology was also a model for not being followed by the Union as totalitarianism, communism, and inequality of chances or exploitation of European citizens. As strong as traditional reminiscence, the European Union will continue to add new layers of history that will be used as a new basis for history to be written. As a result of technological development, and with the emergence of more and more problems where traditional-based systems could not find solutions, there was a need for change, reforming systems by developing them and increasing their efficiency. In response to these unresolved issues of traditionalism, modernism emerged, an innovative and flexible, fluid, and much more open system with the ability to focus its competences on the affected areas, and which was closer to the interest of European citizens. The road to change from traditionalism to modernity has not been a simple one, and it has sometimes been the result of the revolution or drastic reforms in society. Also, the transition from traditionalism to modernity cannot be produced directly, but only through a series of processes that must be taken in turn to reach their goal where normality is to be achieved. Thus, among this transitional processes we can enumerate the internal transition that takes place inside a state in the form of focusing on a clear and well-defined objective of restructuring specific policies in order to have easier access to the European community, but also to make a steps towards modernity and to the development of the state from an economic, social and political perspective. In addition to the internal transition, there will always be an external transition where host entities, in our case the European community, will make some effort to structure a set of community policies and rules, perhaps to a more accessible standard for new or accession states.

Consequently, there is a relation of interdependence between traditionalism and modernity. Progress cannot begin without a basis from which it can contrast the modern profile of a state. Although the European Union is based on elements of traditionalism from each individual member state, it will always go along the path of modernity. Only this way it will be effective and able to withstand the upcoming external influences and in the same time to ensure the welfare of the citizens of each and every member state, preserving altogether a common and modern European identity.

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V. Event

EUROPE A CENTURY AFTER THE END OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1918–2018)

Alina STOICA*

Europe from the end of the First World War (1918) no longer resembles Europe from the beginning of the war (1914). The map of Europe, especially in its Central, Eastern and South-eastern part, will look completely different after only four years.

Instead of some great empires – the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian, the German and the Ottoman, which no longer responded to the political, economic and social developments in Europe since the end of the 19th century – the map of Central and Eastern Europe highlighted other realities, born from the developments of the late 19th and early 20th century. It was looming the outcome of a process that had begun with the Balkan wars (1912–1913), when in the European part of the Ottoman Empire new states appeared, such as Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania, while a part of the former Ottoman territories came into the composition of Romania and Greece.

The new geopolitical reality of this part of Europe would be in those one hundred years the tableau on which not onlyan entire regional development projectshallbe inscribed, but also the various crises that will keep the region in the attention of the whole of Europe and beyond. The attention that this area has attracted over time to Europe is similar to the difficult situation that Europe has positioned itself in the global context. Referring to Europe, the researcher Amin Maalouf said: “The situation is particularly delicate for Europe, which is caught in some way between two fires: that of Asia and that of America I mean between the commercial competition of the emerging nations and the strategic competition of the United States”, with his comment, he was subclassing the economic predominance of the West in favour of the evolution of the Asian states.

Therefore, in the 100 years that have passed since the First World War, profound aspects have changed in the nature of world politics, aspects related to the continuous

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refinement of social relations and the adherence of people and organizations to shared norms. And in crisis situations, as revolutions, wars betweencountries, civil conflicts, and natural disasters over the last decades prove abundantly that, "the normal social behaviour norms are often not worth as much as a frosted onion." The problems and structures discussed in this volume are real and have a clear impact on the evolution of Europe of the last one hundred years.

Significant is the fact that the volume that we propose is addressed to both researchers in the fields of history, international relations, politics, geography, philosophy, sociology, etc., as well as to the general public, and brings together a selection of papers presented at the ***Europe a century after the end of the First World War (1918–2018)*** conference, which took place in Oradea on October 10–12, 2018. The conference was organized by the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences from the University of Oradea and the Institute of Euroregional Studies with the support of the Oradea City Council and in collaboration with prestigious universities and other institutions from Europe (Alicante/Spain, Aston/United Kingdom, Athens/Greece, Brussels/ Belgium, Chişinău/Republic of Moldova, Coimbra/Portugal, Debrecen/Hungary, Leipzig/Germany, Linnaeus/Sweden, Ljubljana /Slovenia, Minsk/Belarus, Montpellierand Reims/France, Oslo/Norway and from Romania (Cluj, Bucharest, Constanţa and Oradea). In our endeavour we have enjoyed the support of the Publishing House of the Romanian Academy, which has published this volume.

Through the timeliness of its vision, the volume responds to some of the questions[1] that we considered relevant to the conference theme, assumed by this volume, and which were found to a great extent in the call of the event to be part of the event cycle dedicated to the Romanian Centenary. These questions have been translated here, in solid scientific responses that have assumed, on the one hand, the explanation of order in Europe and, on the other hand, the assimilation of certain moments of disorder in the European order. The richness and clarity of ideas, the refinement and rigor of the demonstration are supported by solid arguments in the texts, supplemented by the footnotes. Consequently, the volume brings together twenty-eight works in three sections, preceded by an introductory study necessary, on the one hand, for tracing in the reader's mind the directions of the analysis pursued by the coordinators and approached by the authors, and on the other hand, involved in the efforts of understanding and explaining the world in which we live, reporting and seeking explanations in reflections on the past. Each section includes both theoretical and pragmatic writings, punctual case studies that refer to a specific problem/situation.

[1] A few examples: How was it possible for a European order based on a balance that dates back to 1648 and reformed in 1815 to collapse?Why did President Woodrow Wilson's Declaration (1917) found such a fertile ground in Europe?How could Central and Eastern European nations build their national states in a domino effect of a few months (1918 – beginning 1919)?How is it perceived, the change of European political order following the First World War in Germany, Austria and Hungary? The Treaties of Paris (1919–1920) consigned a reality resulting from the war or a reality emerging from the democratic processes in the self-determined territories?What is the contribution of the new states in Central and Eastern Europe to the interwar, post-war and current European order? Why did the European order from the interwar period prevailed in the Second World War?Why did the European order after 1945 not change the interwar borders deeply?Is the European order after 1990 the continuation of the interwar order on another level?

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ORADEA SUMMER SCHOOL
EXPLAINING THE EU'S ACTORNESS AND ITS ROLE IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE EU

MÉSZÁROS Edina Lilla*

Oradea Summer School *Explaining the EU's Actorness and its Role in the Eastern Neighborhood of the EU* took place between June 6-13 2018 and it was organized within the ENACTED project (European Union and its neighborhood. Network for enhancing EU's actorness in the eastern borderlands) by the University of Oradea, the Faculty of History, International Relation, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences, *The Institute for Euroregional Studies*, 'Jean Monnet' Center of Excellence

Figure 1 - source - https://crisana.ro/stiri/actualitate-2/parteneriatul-estic-intre-blocaj-si-revitalizare-scoala-de-vara-la-oradea-163590.html

26 PhD students and post-docs from Moldova (Academy of Economic Sciences of Moldova in Chisinau, Moldova State University), Poland (Warsaw Economic School), Romania (Al. I. Cuza University in Iaşi, Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, University of Oradea), Hungary (University of Debrecen) and Ukraine, who were selected by national representatives of the project based on their competences accumulated through research tied to the ENACTED project. Also, 6 students from Ukraine (Lutk, KrivRigh), who are on mobility at the University of Oradea, participated in the summer school, as well as Moldovan students studying at the University of Oradea.

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The goal of the Sommer School was aimed at offering an in-depth analysis of the EU's external role and its impact over the wider eastern neighbourhood area in an altered context marked by the Ukrainian crisis and the existing tensions with Russia. Secondly, it aimed to stimulate the active involvement in the promotion of European values among the young academics (PhD students and post-doc researchers) and senior professors from the network. Third, it aimed to build a favourable context for trans-borders cultural dialogue. Finally, the summer school sought to increase the capacity to teach and research in EU-related matters, to equip young academics with knowledge and skills in the field of the EU studies, which can be afterwards relevant to their future careers.

Figure 2 - source - https://crisana.ro/stiri/actualitate-2/parteneriatul-estic-intre-blocaj-si-revitalizare-scoala-de-vara-la-oradea-163590.html

The summer school took place in the generous space of Oradea Fortress, where the participants attendthe introductory courses, *Re-affirming the Identities in Central and Eastern Europe*, held by professor Andrei Marga, Former Rector of Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Former Romanian Minister of Education and of Foreign Affairs

Challenges for the Eastern Partnership in the Context of SovereignTendencies of the EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe proposed by professor Ioan Horga, Dean of the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences of University of Oradea and Head of Institute for Euroregional Studies.

The participants could hear courses based on the particular points of view of the representatives of members in the project: - Ewelina Szczech-Pietkiewicz, Associate Professor, PhD, Warsaw School of Economics, *Redefining the role of Poland in the Eastern Partnership;*

Klara Czimre, Associate Professor, PhD, University of Debrecen, *Eastern Partnership: external relations in the light of cross-border cooperation. Case Study: Hungarian-Ukrainian border.*

ValeriuSainsus, Professor, PhD, Moldova Academy of Economic Sciences, Chişinau, *The Republic of Moldova in the new geopolitical confrontations - the effects, the impact in the geo-economic context*

Igor Dukhan, Professor, PhD, Belarussian State University, Minsk, *Playing out Belarusian cultural policy between Russia and EU (diachrony, synchrony, contemporaneity)*

Oksana Dobrzhanska, PhD, Chernivtsi National University, *Ukraine's Current Challenges and Future Prospects in ENP and Eastern Partnership*

Given that Oradea is host city of institutions that are relevant for the ENACTED project, like NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence and Oradea Border Police School, the hosts invited Mrs. Oana Bordeianu, PhD, Chief Commissioner, Oradea Border Police School, who held a course entitled *Contribution of FRONTEX in harmonizing border police training in Member States, Schengen Associated Countries and Third Countries;* Mihai Erlik, PhD, Police Chief Commissioner, Oradea Border Police School, who held a course on *Handling cooperation and migration phenomenon at the Romanian borders*

And Mr. Alexandru Kis, PhD, Staff Officer, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, Oradea, who held a course entitled *NATO and Eastern Europe.*

The courses were followed by debates and clarifications within four workshops, based on the competences of participants and comprised of representatives of each participating state. The following workshops were created: *Eastern Partnership and digital challenges*, coordinated by Mirela Mărcuţ, PhD, University of Oradea; *Eastern Partnership and types of threats*, coordinated by Edina Meszaros, PhD, University of Oradea; *Economic dimension of the Eastern Partnership*, coordinated by Assoc. Professor Luminiţa Şoproni, University of Oradea; *Cross- border cooperation and Eastern Partnership*, coordinated by Constantin Ţoca, Lecturer PhD, University of Oradea.

The final day of the summer school scheduled the presentations of workshops, based on the tasks established at the first workshop meeting. As a result of these workshops, a minimum of 10 papers will be written by at least two participants, from different countries, in an effort to comply with the general tasks of the project. The papers will be finalized by the end of July in order to be published in due time. The workshops were held within the rooms of the Institute of Euroregional Studies within the University of Oradea.

The organizers offered a social program, which started with the visit of the main tourist sights of Oradea: Oradea Fortress and the Fortress Museum, Union Square with Black Eagle Palace, Moon Church and St. Nicholas Church, Zion Neolog Synagogue, Town Hall and Town Hall Tower, The Baroque Palace and the Roman Catholic Cathedral,

The participants could see the multicultural dimension of the city, as Oradea is home to Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Germans, Jews, Roma, etc., as well as the multi-confessional dimension of Oradea, which is home to Orthodox people, Roman-Catholics, Greek-Catholics, Protestants - Calvinists, Lutherans, Neoprotestants - Baptists, Pentecostals, Adventists, etc.The participants took advantage of the tourist attractions of the area: Thermal waters in Baile Felix and Oradea.

Beyond the knowledge accumulated by the participants and the exchange in views within the workshops, Oradea Summer School created the opportunity for them to establish strong bonds not only among them, but also with representatives of the host institutions thanks to the socializing events. The guests could taste the local cuisine, they found out about local musical instruments (horn-violin and the doba) and learnt folk dances from Bihor and other regions of the country, as they were taught by the members of the folk group Unio of the University of Oradea.

At the end, the participants received certificates of attendance.

At end of Oradea Summer School, the participants decided to keep in touch within a Facebook group and they would like to see each other at the next summer school in Chisinau.

VI. Honoured Personality

THE FATHER OF 'OFFENSIVE REALISM', PROFESSOR JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ORADEA

MÉSZÁROS Edina Lilla*

The 25th of October 2018 was a day of great importance for the University of Oradea, as it had the pleasure to welcome Professor John J. Mearsheimer, one of the most prominent exponents of the American School of International Relations, at the invitation of the Department of International Relations and European Studies of the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Sciences. In order to pay homage to Professor Mearsheimer's prioneering work in the field of political science and international relations, based on the recommendation of the IRES department, the Senate of the University of Oradea had decided to award Mr. Mearsheimer with the title of Doctor Honoris Causa, a title that his Excellency gladly accepted, despite the fact that he is a highly engaged scholar caught in between different activities.

For those who are not familiar with John J. Mearsheimer's professional background, must know that he is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has been pursuing teaching activities since 1982. He graduated from West Point in 1970 and then served five years as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. He then started graduate school in political science at Cornell University in 1975. He received his Ph.D. in 1980. He spent the 1979-1980 academic year as a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Centre for International Affairs from 1980 to 1982. During the 1998-1999 academic year he was the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Professor Mearsheimer has published several works about security issues and international politics more generally. He has authored six books: *Conventional Deterrence*(1983), which won the Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Book Award; *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*(1988);*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001, 2014), which won the Joseph Lepgold Book Prize and has been translated into eight different languages (also in Romanian);*The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (with Stephen M. Walt, 2007), which made the*New York Times* best seller list and has been translated into twenty-two different languages;*Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics* (2011), which has been translated into ten different languages; and last but not the least, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and*

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International Realities published in 2018, in which he predicts the end of the American liberal hegemony.

The Emeritus Professor has also written many scientific articles that have appeared in prestigious academic journals like *International Security*, and popular magazines like *Foreign Affairs* and the *London Review of Books*. Furthermore he has authored a number of op-ed pieces for the *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*, dealing with hot topics like Bosnia, the problem of nuclear proliferation, the American policy towards India, the failure of the Arab-Israeli peace efforts, the folly of invading Iraq and the causes of the Ukrainian crisis etc.

Finally, Professor Mearsheimer has won a number of teaching awards, such as the Clark Award for Distinguished Teaching when he was a graduate student at Cornell in 1977, and he also won the Quantrell Award for Distinguished Teaching at the University of Chicago in 1985. In addition, he was selected as a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar for the 1993-1994 academic year. In that capacity, he gave a series of talks at eight colleges and universities. In order to pay a tribute to his lifetime work and contribution to enriching the IR scholarship, in 2003 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Professor Mearsheimer, with his contribution to the *realist thought* and his useful foreign/domestic policy insights and predictions, inspired and challenged many generations of scholars and students all over the world, among which we also find the academics and the students from Oradea, Romania. The IRES students, understanding the significance of the presence of such a distinguished personality at our University, about whom they have heard only during lessons, or got acquainted with his work through books or the internet, on their own initiative ordered from the publisher Mr. Mearsheimer's books that were translated in Romanian, in order to have copies during the DHC award ceremony. The students wanted the books of Professor Mearsheimer to get to as many people as possible. Furthermore, in the days following the *lectio magistralis* delivered during the award ceremony, to the astonishment of us, teachers, the students from the first year asked information about the tenets of the distinguished scholar (despite the fact, that they were supposed to study IR theories only in the second semester of the academic year), which denotes their eagerness and inexhaustible thirst for knowledge, but also shows the great impact that the lecture had upon their young and beautiful minds.

Professor Mearsheimer was awarded with the title of Doctor Honoris Causa during a solemn ceremony gathering the representatives of the management board of the University of Oradea, of the Oradea City Hall, the media, professors and students, and for his *lectio magistralis* he chose a topic of great timeliness, "The American Foreign Policy in the Age of Trump". During the lecture, Mr. Mearsheimer captured everyone's' attention from the audience due to the insightfulness of his thoughts and the straightforwardness of his presentation mode. The prominent scholar has structured his presentation around three talking points, making a comparative analysis between Trump's foreign policy as a candidate and as a president, also drawing attention to the 'fierce struggle' between Trump and the American foreign policy establishment, nicknamed the 'Blob'. The entire presentation was a summation of the score resulted from the imaginary boxing match between president Trump and the 'blob' on various issues, such as the future of the liberal international order, U.S. Alliances in East Asia & Europe, the problem of nuclear proliferation, potential rivals, the Greater Middle East and the Climate Change, in the end highlighting that in certain points, such as the Middle East and Climate Change, Trump has achieved a decisive victory over the 'blob'.

In the afternoon, following the DHC award ceremony, his Excellency accepted another challenge, to answer some questions within the Workshop entitled *The Future of the World Order: Stability or Disorder?*, this time within a more restrained frame, with the presence of not more than 50 scholars, professors and representatives of the media. The format of the workshop was more restrained, but it gave the opportunity to eight scholars from the UK, Russia, Hungary and Romania (Cluj-Napoca, Craiova, Iasi and obviously Oradea) to 'bomb' the distinguished professor with their questions, and after several rounds of Q & A (questions and answers), also delegates from the audience could satisfy their curiosity by putting questions to the honourable guest. Among the debated issues we find hot topics of great actuality, such as: the failure of liberal hegemony in international relations; the situation in the Middle East; the US relations with China, India and Russia; the transatlantic relations; the Ukrainian crisis and, last but not least, recent developments in nuclear weapons and proliferation.

During the two hours debate, Professor Mearsheimer stood firm in front of the wave of critical and many times less indulgent questions and remarks, in the end proving to everyone in the room, that not without avail is he considered one of the most prominent IR specialists in the world. Looking at the current developments on the international scene, Professor Mearsheimer's words and predictions for the future world order (in which he asserts the end of the liberal hegemony and the rise of China) might seem Nostradamus type of prophecies.

As a final remark, we can only say that the presence of Mr. Mearsheimer at the University of Oradea signified a milestone in the life of the city and of the Oradean academic community, and it is also a proof of the fact that the University of Oradea is becoming an influential research pole both at domestic level, and also at the level of the international scientific community. It shows that if we genuinely want it, and work hard for it, nothing is impossible and we can excel, thus blurring the former East-West divide, banishing it on the dusty pages of history books.

Mr. Mearsheimer we would like to express our gratitude for accepting our invitation and for honouring us with your presence, and as you've promised, we are looking forward to welcoming you in Oradea soon.

"Louis, I think this is the beginning
of a beautiful friendship."

Rick Blaine, *Casablanca*

Analele Universităţii din Oradea, Seria Relaţii Internaţionale şi Studii Europene, TOM X, pag. 215-218

IN HONOREM PROFESSOR DAN OCTAVIAN CEPRAGA

Sorin ȘIPOȘ*
Laura ARDELEAN**
Federico DONATIELLO***

The University must represent in all times a model of professionalism, honesty and civic spirit. More importantly, in the Centenary Year, these values represented by the universitarian spirit must go beyond the walls of the academic institution, in order to give society positive models and healthy landmarks. It was not accidental that the Doctor Honoris Causa award ceremony was also held to honor our distinguished guest, professor Dan Octavian Cepraga, Romanian by birth, blood and consciousness, who succeeded in a Europe dreamed by those of us who remained at home, in Italy, the land of our ancestors, from where we received the *Seal of Rome*, just when we celebrate 100 years of reunified Romania. Now we can and must enjoy the achievements of the forerunners, but at the same time observe with responsibility the present and the future of the Romanians in the small country, Romania, and the enlarged country, Europe. Consequently, the action, in addition to its academic dimension, also has a sentimental one, that by the high degree offered by our university, we can tie our distinguished guest even more strongly to the Romanian world in which he originates.

The disciple of the well-known philologist and romanist Lorenzo Renzi, Dan Octavian Cepraga was formed within the famous Paduan school, following the philological and literary teaching of Gianfranco Folena, the scholar who, more than other Italian scholars, succeeded in conciliating a broad historical vision comparative with the values of the text, its linguistic, stylistic and rhetorical aspects.

In this way, the scientific interests of Professor Cepraga developed in a double direction: on the one hand, to medieval philology, with studies of Provençal and French poetry, and on the other, to Romanianism, with research on popular poetry, the formation of modern Romanian language and, last but not least, the contemporary Romanian literature.

The variety of interests defines the personality of the scholar, who knows how to combine his various scientific skills with a secured mastery of the instruments of philology, with methodological balance and with broad humanistic horizons. It is a vision of the culture inherited from the highly respected professor and intellectual, master Lorenzo Renzi, whom the University of Oradea awarded the title of *Doctor Honoris*

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Causa five years ago. The fact that his disciple, Mr. Dan Octavian Cepraga, obtains the same recognition from the same institution is undoubtedly a sign of a profound continuity of spirit and formation, as well as a strong link between the Paduan school and the Romanian cultural space in general and the Oradean one specifically.

We can not mention Lorenzo Renzi without referring, at least in the field of Romanianism, to Alexandru Niculescu. In fact, the great linguist has marked the researcher destiny of young Cepraga's, initiating his studies in the Romanian language and presenting him, while still a student, to his future professor, Lorenzo Renzi.

Let's mention briefly the main areas of research embraced in his *cursus studiorum* over the years by Dan Octavian Cepraga.

Born in Bucharest on November 4, 1967, he would be transferred with his family to Italy in 1977 to escape a Romania increasingly overwhelmed by the obscurity of Ceauşescu's dictatorship.

He is conducting his first studies in Bologna, first at the “Luigi Galvani” Classic High School, then at the oldest university in Europe, where he first approached the Romance philology, under the guidance of Professor Elio Melli. After his meeting with Professor Renzi, Dan Octavian Cepraga is transferred to Padua, where he takes his degree in Modern Literature with a thesis titled *L'elemento cristiano nelle carolini tradizioni rumene* (studio e testi) (*The Christian Element in Traditional Romanian Cultures*), coordinated by Lorenzo Renzi, a work in which the original interests in the field of Roman philology are intertwined for the first time with Romanianism.

The Romanian folk songs of the winter solstice are in fact studied as a testimony to a secular oral tradition, which has its roots in the common cultural, poetic and narrative substrate of the European Middle Ages. After graduating, Dan Octavian Cepraga continued his specialization in anthropological field with a scholarship at the „École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales” in Paris, studying at the Laboratory of Social Anthropology (Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Sociale) and the Ethnologie du Sud-east européen seminar, under the guidance of Professor Paul Henri Stahl.

Returned to Italy, he obtained the title of Doctor in Romance and Italian Philology at the University of Rome “La Sapienza”, with a thesis titled *Il genere pastorella nei manoscritti: ricerche sulle computational strutture de la canzonieri d'oc e d'oïl*, coordinated by Professor Roberto Antonelli. From the Romanian folklore and the Romanian oral poetry, the pendulum turned again to the great tradition of the Western Middle Ages, that of the French and Provençal French poetry.

After doctoral studies, Professor Cepraga's academic career takes place at the University of Padua. In 2004 he became *Professore associato*, giving classes in Romanian Language, Romanian Literature and, for some years, European Ethnology. Since August 2018 he has been Professore Ordinario of Romanian Language and Literature.

In the field of Romanic philology, Dan Octavian Cepraga mainly dealt with Provençal and old French poetry, studying the manuscript tradition of the poems in the language *d'oïl* and the lyric genres of the medieval Romanic space. In addition, he dedicated himself to the themes of the history of the Romanic metric of the 13th century, investigating in particular the link between the French, Provençal and Italian lyrical traditions.

It is a line of study that continues to persuade the Paduan tradition, identifying in the formal values of the text not a sterile formality, but, on the contrary, a careful approach to the literary text and its constitution. Besides all these, in the study of linguistic and literary interferences, the supranational aspect and the profound European unity that characterizes the studies of Romanic philology are highlighted. In this perspective, for example, the important contributions dedicated to the *pastourelle* genus of troubadours and truvers are integrated. We also mention the translation work of Mr. Cepraga's on medieval texts, an activity that finds his best expression in the volume *Poesie d'amore provenzali (Provençal Love* Poetry), made in 2006 with his friend and colleague Zeno Verlato. It is an attempt to bring the old medieval poets with metric and poetic versions to Italian, which enjoyed the prestigious Monselice translation award. Therefore, it is not surprising that His Excellency transferred with the same success and profound innovations the textual, formal, and comparative approach in the field of Romanian studies, too.

As a Romanist, Dan Octavian Cepraga first dealt with popular poetry, studying especially the Christian sources of Romanian narrative and ritual songs (carols and old songs). This is an important topic in the studies of medieval philology, as the Romanian folklore represents a fundamental testimony to the study of European civilization. As far as the study of the Romanian folk poetry is concerned, we can not fail to mention the anthology of His Excellency, the *Tongs of the Lord. The Traditional Christian Carol (anthology and study)*, as well as a more recent appearance, the edition of the book *Carols in Bihor, gathered from Voivozi and Cuzapby George Navrea* (introductory study by Sorin Şipos and Dan Octavian Cepraga), published at the Romanian Academy, Center for Transylvanian Studies, proof of scientific and human collaboration between Professor Cepraga and the historian of the University of Oradea, Sorin Şipoş.

To this nucleus is added another Italian volume: *Le Nozze del Sole. Canti vecchi e colinde romene*, written in collaboration with L. Renzi, R. Sperandio. Published in the prestigious Carocci Publishing House (Rome, 2004), it proves to have a great impact on the Italian public. The introduction of this volume into an editorial collection specializing in medieval texts is not at all accidental: in this way, old carols and Romanian songs are found alongside texts such as the troubadours, the medieval French epic or the Scandinavian saga.

Convinced of the profound necessity of a comparative study, Dan Octavian Cepraga passionately dedicated himself to studying the relationship between modern Romanian and Italian literature. A particularly lucrative research line concerns the Romanian literary language and the formation of Romanian poetic language in the 19th century through the contact with the great Western poetic and literary tradition. In the 2015 volume, *Esperimenti Italian. Studi sull'italianismo romeno dell'Ottocento* (*Italian Experiments, Studies on Romanian Italianism in the 19th Century*), His Excellence turns his attention to an important and less explored chapter in the history of Romanian language and culture in relations with Italy and Italian culture. In this field of study, the two souls of the scholar - the Romanian and the Italian - are merging convincingly, leading to profoundly innovative results.

Finally, one can not forget the didactic activity of a teacher and a cultured person who always keeps a close eye on the communicative aspect and the training of the students. The undeniable ability to communicate, through which he manages to attract the audience, is joined by organizing numerous activities to promote the Romanian identity in the Italian space. Recently, the Ministry for Romanians Abroad gave Dan Octavian Cepraga the prestigious Centenary Award for his remarkable contribution to the promotion of Romanian values and Romanian culture abroad.

The last dimension of the distinguished guest personality is found in the scientific collaboration from 2009 with the history specialists of the University of Oradea. The collaboration resulted in the realization of scientific meetings on important topics approached interdisciplinary, history and philology, an old research line found in the preoccupations of the historical and philological school of the inter-war Cluj, remarkably honored by Sextil Puşcariu, Silviu Dragomir, Constantin Daicoviciu and others. At these meetings, specialists from Moldavian State University and from Jules Verne University of Amiens participated from the start as a sign of remarkable intellectual solidarity and friendship.

Among the collaborations of Professor Dan Octavian Cepraga with historians and philologists from the University of Oradea we mention the scientific meetings in the form of colloquia, symposia and conferences in the number of 15, of which we mention: *Textus testis. Valore documentario e dimensioni letterarie del testo storico*, Padua, November 17, 2009; *Istorie. Literatură. Politică* (*History, Literature, Politics*), Oradea, November 4-7, 2010; *Un'Idea d'Europa. Prospettive storiche e filologiche da est e da Ovest*, Padua, November 10-11, 2011; *From Periphery to Center. The Image of Europe at the Eastern Border of Europe*, Oradea, June 4-8, 2013; *The Image of Central Europe and the European Union in the Narrations of Foreign Travelers*, Oradea-Chişinău, July 17-26, 2014; *Hermeneutica documentului medieval* (*Hermeneutics of the Medieval Document*), Oradea, November 4-7, 2015; *Națiunea imaginată. Concepte și etape în construirea identităților naţionale europene* (*Imagined nation. Concepts and Stages in Building European National Identities*), Deva, June 16-18, 2016.

The scientific collaboration has strengthened and consolidated in the very hard work of preparing and editing the volumes of conferences and joint projects in the number of 16, works that enjoyed favorable reviews and entered the world's major libraries. All this work, supported by over a decade of collaboration between our institutions, Oradea, Padua, Chişinău, Amiens, has shown us that when it is desired to make performance at all cost, it can be done, and that the interpersonal and personal relationships have a special role in this equation, which are forging themselves into confrontations with bureaucratic complications and lack of vision of state institutions. This exceptional collaboration is our vector and it recommends us, internally and internationally as well.

These are some of the reasons for which the Doctoral School of History and the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies Oradea-Chișinău proposed to the University of Oradea to give to Professor Dan Octavian Cepraga the highest distinction of our university. As can be clearly seen, the distinction is given to Mr. Cepraga not for what he will do in the future, but for what he has done so far for our institution, which is a guarantee that in the future the collaboration will continue at least in the same parameters.

Romania, through the University of Oradea, in the Centenary Year, understands to honor his scientific partner by stretching his branches to symbolically embrace him and showing that from today, we share, besides our roots in the land of our country, our ideals for Romania and United Europe, namely democracy, professionalism, citizens' welfare and honesty. This should be the ideal and the duty of our life as well as the purpose of the university in the Centenary Year, taking over the expression of Vasile Pârvan, uttered at the opening of the Upper Dacia University in Cluj, in the autumn of 1919.

VII. Book Reviews

EVOLUTIONARY PATHS FOR THE EUROPEAN DIGITAL POLICY

Anca OLTEAN*

Review of: Mirela Mărcuț, *Crystalizing the EU Digital Policy. An exploration into the Digital Single Market,* Springer International Publishing AG, 2017, ISBN 978-3-319-69226-5, ISBN 978-3-319-69227-2 (eBook).



The book *Crystalizing the EU Digital Policy. An exploration into the Digital Single Market*[1] intends to be an introspection of the European digital space (market) in the context of European Single Market. The idea of digital space is very important since 79% of Europeans are regular Internet users underlines the author. In order to reach a comprehensive evaluation of the evolution of European digital single market, Mirela Mărcuț conducted her research at Jacques Delors Archives with the support of Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe in Lausanne. There is still a long way to catch, is the opinion of the author, in order to reach the optimal technological potential of the European Union. Her study has also a socio-economic approach of the policies pursued by EU with reference to the field of digital market. Ultimately, the author focuses of the "transformative quality" of ICTs sector upon the society in overall generating a "tranformative revolution" (Mărcuț, 2017:1) The boundaries between digital and real are, this way, bypassed, infers the author.

The evolution of ICT was favourized by globalization and liberalism (Mărcuț, 2017:3) There is also an alternative of globalization and this is regionalism that is an alternative but it does not oppose to globalization, points out the author. (Mărcuț, 2017: 3) Because of the digitization processes, new forms of cooperation were pursued across the European Union. Welfare state is the form of governance undertook by European social model. This European social model develops fast, hand in hand with ICT sector and with the new technologies. (Apud Mărcuț, 2017: 10) Digitization leads to Big Data storage of information as a component of knowledge and information economy. (Ibidem).

The author sees EU as a regional integration project hindered only by social-economic barriers and inequalities. (Apud Mărcuț, 2017: 11). The author remarks the similar evolution of the digital space and digital single market whose origins are to be found in the European Economic Community. (CEE) During Delors tenure of European Commission (starting with 1985), the concepts of single market and digital single market

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[1] Mirela Mărcuț, *Crystalizing the EU Digital Policy. An exploration into the Digital Single Market,* Springer International Publishing AG, 2017, ISBN 978-3-319-69226-5, ISBN 978-3-319-69227-2 (eBook).

evolved constantly. At that time, it was a “feudal Europe” dominated by “lethargy”, “eurosclerosis” and “europessimism”. (Mărcuț, 2017: 15) This Europe was lacking political will. The unemployment was the most prominent problem of the community. One of the aspirations of the community was the its technological transformation. This would have prevented the economic decay of the community. The acceleration of the innovation in reasearch was a must. One of the ideas pursued by Jacques Delors underlined by the author was the removal of existent barriers that would strenghten cooperation in technology sector. (Mărcuț, 2017: 19-20) Also in the domain of technological transformation was necessary to have a European approach, and not a merely national one. However, Delors encourages local innitiative in development of the communities. (Ibidem). Research and development fields were for the first time pointed out by Single European Act (1986), asserts Mirela Mărcuț. The Council of the European Union and the European Union play a vital role in the development of the Union. The Council decides the budget and the direction of the variety of policies pursued by the Union. In the same time the author quotes Delors who underlined the liaison between collaboration and cohesion of the member states: “collaboration in itself has a positive effect on cohesion” (Commission of the European Communities 1992). Other aspects underlined by the author as a priority of European communities is communication of the users that need standardized systems of communication and trans-European services networks that would unite the people of the communities and would accelerate the integration. Delors’ Commission, concludes Mirela Mărcuț, focuses on integrationism of economic and monetary politics of the CE (UE) overshadowing, thus, a little bit, the prioritization of information society. (Apud Mărcuț, 2017: 30)

The origins of research and technological development of the Union are layed down in Single European Act (1986) and reinterated in the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 1992). However the term “information society” was introduced by Delors’ White Paper (1993), information society relying on “innovation”, new information and communication technologies that were expected to influence the future forms of economic and social organization and integration. The private sector plays an important role in the promotion of “information society”. The author encourages us to make a distinction between common information area and “information society”. The amount of digitalized information increases and so as the number of Internet users, it is obvious that a revolution is about to follow in this area. Private investment is seen as a driving force also in the process of expansion of information and tehnology sectors. The digital divide of the “information society” at the level of European Union is defined by access or no access to technology, but also to the quality of the devices. In the information society, people are expected to be able to cope with the ongoing changes of information technology. (Apud Mărcuț, 2017: 40) There is also a divide in terms of skills of the Internet users.

Reffering to digital single market, Mirela Mărcuț emphasizes the fifth freedem of the Union, “the freedom of movement of knowledge”. The author remarks the fragmentation of digital single market since its creation, and the existent barriers that hinders its functionning. Thus she recalls physical barriers (the maintenance of frontier restrictions and physical controlls at the border checkpoints existent prior to Schengen space), technical barriers (depend on national approaches), legal barriers, security barriers, fiscal barriers, social barriers (the labour forces must to adjust to digital economy and society). The author remarks two characteristics of the digital single market and single market that are “deepening” and “widening”, the acceleration of integrative approach and the expansion of EU’s values, infrastructure and centers of interests on a ever broader context.

The author Mirela Mărcuț concludes that the aim of her book “was to analyse the major actions of the Union in reference to digital technologies”. This digital single market based its evolution on the real space, namely the single market. (Mărcuț, 2017: 214) The book analized the information society in perspective, especially after the tenure of European Commission by Jacques Delors. The author asserts she did a comparative analysis between single market and digital single market, finding inspiration in the practical experience of the single market to find evolutionary paths for the second. She tried to find barriers in the commerce and expansion of the digital single market. Last but not least, she remarks the contribution of national actors in the evolution of digital single market. A second aim of the book was to provide “the current model of digital policies in the Union” which dues its existance on regulatory framework than being left to self regulation and this could turn into a plus for European Public Sphere. The European Community is also a community of Internet users and its digital policies model is shaped on the tradition of social policies of the EU is the opinion of Mirela Mărcuț (Mărcuț, 2017: 216) National level would follow responsable the infrastructure implementation of European digital agenda while the mastership of the European digital space should be a problem of the European leadership agenda. The work ends with the words of Jacques Delors “aide-toi et l’Europe t’aidera” when reffering to the completion of the internal market, a metaphor true for all of us.

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WOULD THE WORLD BE BETTER WITHOUT THE UN?

Cristina MATIUȚA*

Review of: Thomas G. Weiss, *Would the World Be Better without the UN?*, Polity Press, 2018, ISBN 978-1-5095-1726-8, 220 pages.



Reforming the UN, which has been considered a priority since long time, is needed more than ever, in order to effectively tackle new global challenges such as international terrorism, armed conflicts, but also climate change, demographic growth, limited water resources or migration. The book briefly reviewed here, *Would the World Be Better without the UN?*, addresses this necessity and comes in the continuation of other extensive writings of Thomas G. Weiss, Presidential Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York's Graduate Center, former member of the UN secretariat, keen observer and distinguished researcher of the UN system, marking, as the author says from the beginning, the culmination of a career-long efforts. And also from the very beginning we find out the author's answer to the question in the title of the book: certainly "no", answer drawn from over four decades of study the world organization.

The author opts for a counterfactual approach to examine what the UN does, what would happen in the absence of the organization and what should be done to perform better. He focuses on UN achievements and shortcomings in three substantive pillars of its activity: international peace and security; human rights and humanitarian action; sustainable development.

The book is organized in three main parts, totalizing nine chapters. Part I ("Building Blocks"), including the first two chapters, introduce us the players and problems around which the next two parts are organized. Thus, the first chapter, entitled "Three United Nations", briefly analyses the actors across three dimensions of the UN: the First UN (member states), the Second UN (international secretariats) and the Third UN (civil society, the private sector, the media, commissions, consultants and individuals). The notion of a three-faced UN is a contribution to "the challenge of theorizing contemporary global governance. It builds on a growing body of work that calls for a conception of *multiple multilateralisms*"(p. 20). The second chapter, "Four UN Ailments", spells out four central problems facing the United Nations: unreconstructed state sovereignty, North-South theatrics, atomization and lackluster leadership. These problems explain in a great measure the unsatisfactory outcomes of the organization. As example, addressing lasting and suitable solutions for trans-boundary problems such as terrorism, pandemics or climate change is impossible when sovereign states reach decisions based on narrowly defined interests. In author's words, "…Westphalian

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sovereignty is a chronic ailment for the United Nations that could be lethal for the planet" (p. 26).

Part II, "The World without the UN and its Ideas and Operations?", comprising next three chapters, highlights what could have happened without an active implication of the UN within each main pillar of its activities, namely international peace and security, human rights and development. Chapter 3 tries to answer the question: "A more violent world with diminished international peace and security?", by using examples in which UN ideas, norms, principles, standards, as well as its operational interventions, have substantially contributed to international peace and security. We have all reasons to believe that, without UN's successful efforts and actions, the planet could have been plagued by even more violence, war and pain. Chapter 4 examines the question: "A more repressive and unkind world with diminished human rights and humanitarian action?", illustrating, based on examples of both ideas and operations, how international society would have been even more repressive and ruthless without substantial normative and operational inputs from the United Nations. The final chapter of this section- "A more impoverished and polluted world with diminished development?"- emphasizes how the planet could have been even poorer and more environmentally threatened without the efforts and actions of the world organization since 1945.

The third part of the book, "The World with a more Creative and Effective UN?", explores the possibilities of the second counterfactual, namely how an alternatively configured UN system could have made a greater contribution in a number of specific ways. It analyses examples in which the UN failed, but where a more effective world body could and should made a real difference. There are issues in which the First UN (member states) have fallen dramatically, such as "several double vetoes in the Security Council to prevent action in Syria; short-sighted decisions in the Human Rights Council; dramatic cuts in united funding" (p. 103). The chapters of this section also stress the necessity of renewing and reinvigoration the Second UN (international secretariats) in order to make it more functional. The examples illustrate that UN's contribution to disarmament, development and human security could have been greater if they had been pursued more vigorously and in a more centralized way by both states and secretariats.

The concluding chapter of the book- "Let's be Serious: the UN we Want and Need for the World we Want"- emphasizes strategies for reform that are both desirable and possible. Reforming the Security Council's membership became a permanent agenda, but each structural proposal threatens to open Pandora's Box. While structural reform is not agreed by all, more openness, accountability and inputs into its deliberation can be ascertained. At least mass atrocities are now considered unacceptable behavior by states and thus sovereignty can be abrogated when a state is manifestly unwilling or unable to protect its citizens. Reforming and strengthening the staff and improving the management of peace operations are also essential. The author lists three possible strategies: 1. Fewer moving parts and operations in fewer countries (this concentration is justified because limited resources dictate that UN should focus on those countries most in need of its assistance and also because the UN system is the only institution that can deploy a full range of necessary services, from security to humanitarian relief, from peace-building to sustainable development); 2. More big ideas and independent monitoring (while operational UN need not be everywhere, universal norms should be and the UN has added significant value in generating ideas and policies, giving them international legitimacy, promoting their adoption for policy, implementing or testing them at country level;

monitoring process etc.); 3. Better use of better people (the highest consideration in recruitment should be competence rather than geography, gender, age etc.).

The final message of this book is that UN matters, it is a crucial component of our fragile international system and, while the vituperative words of Donald Trump poison the air, it is worth repeating what John F. Kennedy said in his first State of the Union Address on January 11, 1962: “Our instrument and our hope is the United Nations- and I see little merit in the impatience of those who would abandon this imperfect world instrument because they dislike our imperfect world” (p. 188).

Analele Universităţii din Oradea, Seria Relaţii Internaţionale şi Studii Europene, TOM X, pag. 229-232

ACTORS AND POLICIES IN DIGITAL ROMANIA

Mirela MĂRCUȚ*

Review of: Stoian, Marius, Puchiu, Radu, Foca, Marcel (2018), *România Digitală*, Bucharest: Club România

As with previous revolutions, the current discussions about the evolution of society, economy, and man-kind in general revolve around technology. This time, the key concept is *digital*, which encompasses every little aspect of daily life – from the most mundane activities to the most sophisticated innovations. When discussing about mundane, day-to-day activities, the emphasis is on boosting digital skills. Sophisticated innovations refer to the Fourth Industrial Revolution, where *digital* aims to break the barrier between artificial and natural intelligence. Such challenges puzzle academics, businesspeople, innovators, politicians alike, as there is a sense of uncertainty about what the near future can bring.

România Digitală [Digital Romania] brings all the pieces of this puzzle together into a comprehensive approach on digital issues. The 1000-page anthology gathers analyses from different sides of the discussion on *digital* – from the academic to the political, bureaucratic, and business perspectives. It starts from a bird's eye view of digital transformation across the globe, emphasizing that the race to the top takes place between the USA and China. The comprehensive approach is reflected into the views of the coordinators who state that digital transformation is a "transversal approach changing life of Earth in a fundamental manner". According to the coordinators, digital transformation is *race for good*, whose main aim is the continuous improvement of people's lives. This view reflects the EU's view that ICTs are general-purpose technologies with aubiquitous presence.

What is Europe's place in this digital transformation? What is the Romanian contribution? How does Romania perform in this area and what expertise does it have? These are some of the questions regarding the main players of digital transformation. Certainly, the anthology proves that Romania does not lack expertise or perspectives. The answers for the first two questions can be easily thought out with statistics. However, the better approach is to analyze policy initiatives of the two players and the interactions of major players to create better policies for this *race for good.* The main point of focus for these policies is Romania, but they are intertwined with European efforts. The focal point of the analysis of Digital Romania relates to the interconnection between actors at all levels, as well as with the failed or successful policies that could influence digital transformation.

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Considering the emphasis put on actors and policies, the anthology adopts a deterministic position towards technology in economy and society, focusing its efforts on analyzing the way in which technology and *digital transformation* can be harnessed for the greater good. The range of analysts in the anthology contributes to this deterministic view, considering the multitude of both private and public actors directly and indirectly involved into policy analysis and implementation. The result points to a comprehensive overview, a "how-to manual" for the digital transformation of Romania. Moreover, the approaches are both innovative (consider the block-chain solution for managing digital identities) and solutions that have been tried out in other EU Member States. In this case, Estonia can be considered a *leitmotif* of this anthology. Overall, the European Union, its models, policies, and recommendations stand as a benchmark for Romania.

Actors

First, the road towards the digital transformation of Romania requires ***actors.*** Thisis the first level of this review. Although ICTs and the Internet in particular create a digital space that acts at a global scale, the most important actor that is relevant for digitalization is still the ***state.*** More specifically, we must discuss the duo *state-European Union.*This outlook is in concordance with the deterministic principle that guides the anthology, namely that technological innovation should be guided by relevant actors in order to generate development.

The authors of this anthology almost always connect the need of the Romanian state to pursue digital transformation with the European Union. The EU acts in different ways. It is either a controller with conditionalities or a supplier of financing. But, first and foremost, it acts as the main supplier for the digital policies of Romania. Secondly, the EU is an actor in the digital transformation of Romania because of the structural funds dedicated to this objective and, in this sense, a number of articles deal with the involvement of structural funds to develop Internet infrastructure (RoNet project) or to develop the administration.

The statu-quo of virtually all the articles within the anthology is reflected by the EU analysis of the digital economy and society in Romania, which help the authors fuel their arguments about Digital Romania. In this sense, the example of other countries is highly relevant for Romanian progress towards digital transformation. These comparisons are possible with due to the benchmarking done by the European Union with DESI and Digital Progress Reports. As mentioned, Estonia, the digital state, serves as an ideal example for Romania, but there are other initiatives from other countries that authors feel could be applied to Romania. The idea is that Romania does not need to re-invent the wheel when pursuing *digital transformation*, considering the availability of good practices within the EU space.Its advantage is the high-speed connection, as well as the highly developed IT sector. On the other hand, more than one actor considers Romania a country of paradoxes, considering its high-speed Internet, the citizens' digital skills and Internet usage.

The state, as an actor, is present in this anthology under multiple forms. The most important national actor for the development of digital Romania is undoubtedly the Ministry of Communication and Information Society, which has managed the digital transformation process under various forms and names over the decades since the democratization of Romania. In this sense, a myriad of articles by specialists emphasize the dual character of this national actor. Authors view it either as a driving force of digitalization or a deterrent. In the first case, the authors emphasize the central role that the government occupies in digitalization because it coordinates or should coordinate efforts of the Digital Agenda for every structure within the Government (see Manuela Catrina or Laurentiu Stelea). On the other hand, this may cause a power struggle between administration and hence the ministry can act as a deterrent due to the desire to control the agenda (see Andrei Nicoară).

The second layer of digital governance analyzed in the anthology refers to an actor that is more often than not neglected by national authorities, namely *the city or the local administration* in general. In the context of digital transformation, the city becomes the *smart city*. Manuela Catrina references the smart city as an actor for digital Romania, considering that local administrations are the first point of contact between citizens and the state and that most of the *life events* happen locally[1]. In the vision of national authorities, *smart cities* need guidance from the central level with strategies, policies, and funding. On the other hand, smart cities can be beacons of light, channeling digital policies from the bottom towards the upper government levels. In this sense, Iași is referenced as an example considering its accession to Open Government Partnership (Oana Olariu and Dan Mașca). This is a voluntary mechanism meant to transform local government with digital tools. Iași and other cities in Romania, especially the magnet-cities, should be interested in pursuing bottom-top strategies to push for digital transformation.

What better way to pursue bottom-top solutions than by involving the citizen directly? Several articles discuss open government and the need to have active rather than passive citizens in governance. How can citizens become active (Corneliu Mănescu, Ovidiu Voice, Elena Calistru)? Initiatives, likeparticipative budgets (Ovidiu Voicu, Elena Calistru), feedback questionnaires, real-time reporting apps to report local problems to the administration (Ovidiu Voicu). All of this can be possible with proper digital skills and infrastructure, which are two of the hottest points of digital transformation in Romania.

Overall, the state, in all its forms, is portrayed both as an actor – directing digital transformation in various ways and various results – and as a policy result in this anthology. In the discussion about digital transformation, as Manuela Catrina emphasizes, the key word for the government is *transformation*, not *digital*. This is because *digital* is a tool and government must become more open with digital public services or prioritization of technology is economy and society (see Radu Puchiu, Elena Calistru or Gabriel Popa).

However, one must not ignore the potential of other actors in digital transformation. The private sector is currently spearheading this objective in Romania, from the booming IT sector to the banking sector, which must adopt new technologies in an effort to compete with new fin-tech companies, such as Revolut (see Dana Demetrian). These sectors benefit from external funding or are part of a corporation supporting their efforts. One must also discuss the other side of the private sectors, especially the SMEs and other companies that cannot afford digital transformation or it is not easily accessible for them for other reasons. The anthology also features the challenges that the industry goes through – from the lack of investments due to costs or from lacking digital customers or at least a perception of lack of customers (see Constantin Măgdălina). What is relevant about the anthology is that it not only offers a view at the problems, but it also offers possible solutions. In the case of SMEs and private sector struggling to bring digitalization

[1] Life events are some of the major ways in which citizens interact with digital services, according to the European Commission.

to their business models, authors offer solutions, such as guaranteeing schemes, tax deductions or financing for proof of concept for new ideas (see Grigore Pana).

Policies

The core of the anthology focuses on the results following the interactions of actors towards digital transformation, namely the policies. So far, the interactions of Romanian actors from the previous section can be characterized as being somewhat bumpy, with reference to the competition for managing regarding the Digital Agenda and the multiple changes in the leadership of information society policies. The policy related discussions in the anthology can be divided into two categories, *as-is* and *to be*.

The *as-is* analyses range from European to national overviews of the Digital Single Market, as the main policy instrument for digital technologies in the European Union. Main ideas include the interaction of digital policies with European funds, as one of the keys towards digital transformation in Romania, the discussion over the Digital Agenda of Romania, which is supposed to be the flagship initiative, and overreaching analyses on the IT sector – including e-business and e-commerce. For instance, Roxana Voicu Dorobanțu identifies three key directions for the digital transformation of Romania, namely infrastructure, education, and e-government, and acknowledges that there is no roadmap or overall vision for these three domains.

In *to-be* analyses, these three themes are present throughout the book and the authors constantly ask for more investment and coordination, especially in case of education.The acknowledgement of *informatics* as a fundamental subject in school is one solution. Digital skills are essential for the future labor market, but they must be a lifelong commitment (Eliza Vaș, David Timiș) both for professionals and for other social categories. In this case, authors argue for digital academies, the digital inclusion of young people and women, and, most of all, for the inclusion of the Internet as a universal service (see Virgilius Stănciulescu). Overall, the overarching theme of *to-be* analyses surrounds digitalization of every sector of society and/or economy and the first step towards digitalization is a serious roadmap that is assumed by authorities at all decision-making levels.

In conclusion, this undertaking by Club Romania benefits from strong expertise combined with stirring policy analyses of virtually every aspect surrounding digitalization in Romania. In sum, it can be considered a policy-making tools for decision-makers, a highly relevant aspect considering the acute need for transformation.

DID THE WORLD HAS REACHED A DANGEROUS CROSSROAD?

Ana DAMASCHIN*

Review of: Jean Muhire, *Multinational corporations repression,* Munich: BookRix, 2017. ISBN: 978-3-7438-4363-9



To the extent in which the international economy has advanced in all major economic regions, most global companies have expanded their businesses across national borders to maintain their competitiveness. By critical and thorough analysis Jean Muhire, in his work "Multinational corporation repression", examines conceptually the way in which multinational corporations being major economic, political, social, and cultural actors set the terms of global evolution on the upper level.

Multinational corporations are leading players in the new world order due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Today, the biggest companies are wealthier than most developing countries like Chile, Nigeria and Pakistan. From 100 largest economic entities in the world, 69 are corporations and 31 are countries. (CIEL, 2017:6)

Beside this fact, the last 20 years, the globalization of markets and capital has allowed them to grow, gain economic power, unprecedented financial policy and realize the creation of the oligopoly. The author wants to highlight that the multinationals' economic and legal versatility, their economic and financial resources are not only an advantage but also a problem, as these characteristics represents the barriers to exercise legal and social control.

Policies, practices and corporatist fundamental objectives let to massive violation of human rights and the subordination of politics to the economy both nationally and globally. Inspiring from a wide range of examples in the field of international criminal law, business and human rights, economic and financial law, criminal business law, the author insists on showing the existence of the multinational repression system.

On the one hand, the purpose of the topic is to show how the repression of multinational corporations functions nationally and internationally. On the other hand, repression is the last resort to indicate criminal behavior when other means have failed.

The fourteenth amendment adopted after the Civil War created a new category of entities with rights: corporations. (Chomsky, 2018:107)

Multinational corporations are, in the opinion of Jean Muhire - legal entities of private law with rights and obligations.

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Moreover, the author underlines that the judgments of legal entities and economic crimes are not included in the international jurisdiction (the author pointed out the International Criminal Court), giving multinational companies a loophole in any jurisdiction. Beside this fact, as companies grow larger and gain more power, it has become increasingly difficult for governments to ensure that these companies comply with human rights and environmental laws. (CIEL, 2017: 3). On the one side, governments exert the fundamental authority and responsibility to protect the environment and their citizens. On the other side, states still grant corporations more rights.

In this way, author supports the way in which the EU Plans entrench and institutionalize investors in order for states to resolve internal problems.

The book starts with a general introduction about this topic, then it shows an overview and some guidelines on the basics of the subject. It must be said that the objective of this work is: firstly to show the repression generated by multinational companies and, secondly, to reveal the loophole made by multinational corporations in international jurisdiction.

In the various chapters of his work, author has formed the unique idea that showed the current reality of the repression of economic and social crimes commited by corporations. This work is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter – „Theoretical Considerations", we examine the theoretical considerations which study the concept of multinational companies, its internal organization and function, speaking also about concept of economic crimes (according the Rwandan Penal Code on the national level comparing to international jurisdiction). Indeed, the substantial scope of this article is a critical analysis of different crimes committed by large companies during the period of their existence.

Another issue is the responsibility of the multinationals. The most important aspect in this book is about national and international standards, as all multinationals are civily responsible to respect the right to equality of opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment, rights of workers, national sovereignty, obligation to protect the environment and obligations with regard to consumer protection.

The second chapter is called „Crimesrelating to the constitution and in case of difficulties of multinational corporations". It still must be noted that multinationals usually respect the sandards, but when they become stronger they often begin to comit crimes. Muhire analyzes in depth conventional business offenses, talks a lot about different crimes committed in case of bankruptcy or abuse of social goods.

Finally, the third chapter has the merit of analyzing the of crimes committed most frequently, such as corruption and related offenses. Entitled „Crimes related to the operation of multinational companies and liability issues internationally" the present chapter gives references to the Rwandan criminal phenomenon. For this moment, almost all country is mobilized to fight against abuse of power, which is the major problem to achieve the progress in the country.

The book is well structured and offers a clear image about the real world of multinational corporation. In this meticulous work, *Multinational corporations repression,* the Rwandan author tries to develop a theory based on the idea that multinationals are the main operators of international economic relation system.

The book provides us the indisputable understanding of the central problems of our time.

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Analele Universităţii din Oradea, Seria Relaţii Internaţionale şi Studii Europene, TOM X, pag. 237-242

THE EUROPEAN UNION - EVOLUTION AND A HISTORY OF COOPERATION

*Claudiu Gabriel BONACIU**

Review of: Bărbulescu, I. Gh., *New Europe-European identity and Model*, Polirom publishing house, 2015.



The study of the European Union foundation compels us to a whole review of the its history and how it came to life (Bărbulescu, 2015: 27) I do intent, in the present article, to try and make a comprehensive analisys of first important ideas that gave life to this concept and not in the least ,about the first EU funded projects.

In ancient times the idea of a whole Europe United, was based upon the concept of territory enlargment. Later along the territorial expanse arises "The European civilization" from East to West, somewhat along the Danube River, that Herodotus called the "axis Europe" (Bărbulescu, 2015: 28).

For a better understanding of the transition from the European idea to the European Union, it is necessary to compare the cocepts of both ideas. The European philosophers would justify the idea as a vital need for unity, future continuity and existence. Diversity was also another strong reason enough to set up European communities, that would exchange traditional and cultural heritage.

At this point EU is a political, social and economic entity of 28 member state that are located primarily in Europe. The Union has created an **internal single market** governed by a system of laws that apply to all the member states. EU policies aim to ensure the free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the internal market, exact legislation in justice, home affairs and maintain common policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries and regional development. For travel, passport controls have been abolished.

Theoretically speaking EU can be regarded as a pioneering concept in the practice of international relations between countries, without taking away the sovereign aura of each state. It is a multicultural confederation. In order to understand the difference between the two concepts, it should be noted that in a federal systems, important decisions are taken by a common body, to which the Member States are subordinate, while in a confederal system, decisions are taken unanimously by Member States.

An important contribution to the early construction of the European federalism can be attributed to Romania also, in the context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolution and the socio - political situation between the two world wars, during which the basic principle of international relations was that of self-determination (Bărbulescu, 2015:53).

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The federal plan of the Danube Confederation, the creation of the Economic Community of small Antante, the Tardieu plan of the Danube Confederation, as well as the Balkan Entente, has been mentioned in this regard. Within the European theory they can be asimiliate a model of a Federal Type association (Bărbulescu, 2015:27).

The path of transformation from the European idea of unity to the European Union in its self was a process, customized over time. The Union is the result of a long and complex process of cooperation and integration, that started in 1951. At its origins, the concept was thought of, as a solution given to a period of general crisis emerged after the Second World War. If at the beginning of the century – 1914, Europe was at its peak, 1945, the general situation was far from being ideal. The Treaties and agreements between the Member States, following the war, aimed to create a space of stability, peace by creating a European internal market and progressively securing conditions that would allow the leap from an economic union to a political on.

In 1948 takes place The Hague Congress or the European Congress, that brought along a strong federative movement, that gathered many European representative, that discussed ideas about the development of the political co-operation between European nations and not only. Subsequently in Congress, the 'European idea' of unity was quickly acquired by the Western European governments, and the European Construction became an intergovernment concern... „The Shuman Plan" – led to the foundation of the Europen Coal and Steel Community, a contribution and a hystorical achievement that must not be overlooked. Basically, it was settled a new set of rules for a future collaboration between the two old adversaries - Germany and France. Rules that would later safeguard the peace between the member states of the European Union to this day.

But in the opinion of European strategists, it would not suffice to have cooperation only between the Member States of the European Union, but also between neighbouring States, which are in different processes or relations with the European Union.

It is very important to recognize the role played by the US as regards to the genesis of the EU, through their constant support of the Shuman Plan, in which the UK more conservatively looked with skepticism the outcome of the plan proposed by the French,ECSC, an organisation regarded with optimism by the Americans. Professor Bruce Carolan of the Dublin Institute of Technology writes an article about the Foundation of UE, and about the contribution of U.S. and United Kingdom in the creation of a Unified European Community (24 th of April 2009Î ,,ironically speaking, UK's position in the opposition and euroskepticism , affected to some extent their diplomatic relatioship with the U.S.". The British reluctant approach towards the European project, was not without consequences in terms of international diplomacy.Their delayed acceptance into the ECSC and the increased importance of the French approval in the European Union project, was a direct repercussion of their skeptic attitude in the European policies. First project was the The treaty establishing the European Defense Community also known as the Treaty of Paris - EDC signed in 1952 but unfortunately unratified by the French Parliament and Italy, consequently never entered into force. In political terms, the ECSC can be considered a success, at least because it was an important first step in the process of European integration.

Thus the period 1950 – 1954 was dominated by other ideas of French politicians. The first was the French project on the creation of a European Defence Community (the one). The Treaty was signed in 1952, but because of the negative vote in the French assembly (August 1954), the project fell. However, the need to integrate Member States into EU, members continued to propose new common policies in Europe.

So the failure in defence policy has prompted Western European countries to seek another area, namely the economic one. It was thus achieved that, on 25 March 1957, two treaties named the European Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM were signed in Rome. The first one was to become the today's uropean Union and the latter would be less well known by the general public duet o its sensive topic, was founded to bring nuclear power under the European umbrella. The reasons that contributed to the intense cooperation in this area were, the fear of energy dependency, in the context of the Suez crisis, and the desire to reduce military control exercised by American and Soviet military governance. Euratom has failed to become a strong organisation. National governments have been stuck in their desire to control their national energy programmes. Euratom failed to some extent to become a powerful Organization, because the member states wanted greater control over their power programs that the Union would offer.

As regards the construction of UE, it can be stated that a constructive dialogue between intellectuals and politicians is being shaped after the Second World War. Projects relating to European unification begin to pass beyond the theoretical sphere and reach the working table of the European chancellery (Bărbulescu, 2015:386). We are witnessing the transformation of debates on the future of Europe, which is a real 'political mutation ', moving from a implicit political process to an explicit or, in other words, from the economic dimension of the European Communities to the European Union policy. Afterwards, all these European ideas come to materialize into Treaties, leading to the establishment of the European Communities.

The establishment of the European institutions between 1957 – 1992 is the result of economic and political processes in a continuous transformation, and where international relations have contributed decisively to the democratisation of communities.

Today's European Union is the result of an evolution, a construction over five decades.

And the main engine of this evolution was the cooperation of the states in finding widely acceptable solutions to the various challenges that the European Union has been confronted with. And all these solutions needed a very solid legal base, that is when the Treaty of Rome was modified in 1957, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

TFEU, one of the two treaties that formed the constitutional basis of the European Union.

The political unification of the European Union has emphasized the extent of the democratisation of communities, and in 1979 there is a massive increase in power of the European Parliament, giving the possibility of having direct elections, aspect which brought and added a massive legitimity to the European project altogether (Bărbulescu, 2015:140). The components of the European Parliament would be elected through direct vote by the European citizens. People would be directly involved in the election process and they would start to have a say in the matter of the state affairs. The EU Parliament is the only institution elected directly by the EU citizens.

To solve somehow a preexistent level of citizens distrust in the establishment, regarding the lack of efficency of the european institutions in solving the most important social and economic issues, the representatives would open for discussion the topic of the importance of the european peace issue.

“The Treaty of Lisbon” in the opinion of Professor I. Ghe. Bărbulescu, it's not a random act, it reinforces the importance of peace in the European Union. The Treaty is an international agreement that amends the two treaties which form the constitutional basis of the European Union (EU). The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the EU member states on

13 December 2007, and entered into force on 1 December 2009. It amends the Maastricht Treaty (1993), known in updated form as the Treaty on European Union (2007) or TEU, and the Treaty of Rome (1957), known in updated form as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007) or TFEU. It also amends the attached treaty protocols as well as the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

The Treaty enables, inter alia, institutionalization of enhanced cooperation between Member states at the level of the Defence policy and the other measures. This derives from the conflicting events in the former Yugoslavia, and although there was no need for a precedent, it is now possible to speak of an ineffectiveness of the European Union's external action to regards of the situation in Ukraine. (Bărbulescu, 2015:154).

"The newly created European Union" - through the "Maastricht Treaty" signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993, establishes a three pillar structure policy, until the "Lisbon Treaty" came into force in 2009. The Treaty also greatly expanded the competences of the EEC/EU, and led to the creation the the single European currency, the euro.

- **The First Pillar** reformed by the Treaty is amending the treaties establishing the European Communities http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/ro/sheet/3/tratatele-de-la-maastricht-si-de-la-amsterdam.It is an extension to other non-economic areas.Specific to this pillar is the management structure of European Communities, the process of taking decisions altogether is unprecedented in international law. Thus, communities, within theThe first pillar of the European Union form a unique example of a supranational organisation. According to the principles of democracy and the rule of law, this type of organisation is passing decision making authority from the institutions of thr Member States directly to the Communities.
- **he Second Pillar** of the Treaty covers Common Foreign and Security Policy (-contributes to the security, peace and the sustainable development of the planet, solidarity and mutual respect among people and nations (...) European Union„„Updated versions of Treaties... „Title I, at 3.
- **The Third Pillar -** Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters(PJCCM) brought together co-operation in the fight against crime. This pillar was originally named Justice and Home Affairs(JHA). (https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/eu_citizenship/consolidated-treaties_ro.pd

The Treaty on the European Union encourages any country from Europe to adhere to the Union as long as they they respect and promote the democratic principles of the establishment through their policies.

The European Union is community governed by laws, which means that its legitimacy and functioning are guaranteed by the compliances of each Member with the Law and Justice. The EU's Policy only address states with constitutional structures and governmental practices in accordance with the Western democratic model.

If any of the countries refuse to comply with a Community Decision already adopted or would intentionally violate a decision of justice taken into force by Community law, it would place itself outside the Union

The general principles of Community Law have been initiated and formulated through past decisions of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg and then introduced in the TEC or the modifying treaties. ' The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice interprets

European law and its own role by referring to the fundamental objectives of the Treaties (Https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_ro).

The EU is often mistakenly compared with a classical federation, such as the US, Germany or Switzerland. But Christian Egenhofer from The Center for European Political Studies (CEPS), wrote an article saying that:" Federations tend to have separation of powers between the different levels of government and a clear distinction of competences" (Young, Ernest A., Union European perspective: a comparative perspective) (18th December 2015). General Principles of the EU Law, Oxford University Press, 2017). Neither is true for the EU, however, were power is dispersed across the institutions, the Commission, the Member States and the European Parliament must cooperate as partners in drafting, adopting, implementing and enforcing legislation.

The early European federalism has evolved as the Union acquired competences not only in the "simple" policies, such as agriculture, trade, transport, the internal market, but also higher levels, traditionally understood as exclusive prerogatives, such as currency, defense, foreign policy, domestic policy, economic policy, social cohesion (Bărbulescu, 2015:407).

There is a federal perspective view of the Union, in terms of the distribution of competencies and sovereignty attributed to the institutions and EU Law. But it is also intergovernmental, keeping the center of gravity inside every Member State. Professor I. Gh. Bărbulescu says "the federal and Intergovernmental Dimension Coexists" (Bărbulescu, 2015:386) The Treaty of Lisbon is a solid example of Cooperation, a concept otherwise developed by the European Union Treaty in 1984. The purpose of cooperation is not other than to strengthen a strong international organization, a Union of states and people based on shared sovereignty.

The European Establishment founded firmly through Maastricht and developed through Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, is a synthesis of the federal model vs the intergovernmental model, based on its pillar structure, one based on the supranational concept of the member States and the other two on intergovernmental cooperation (Bărbulescu, 2015:387).

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LESSONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THROUGH EUROPEAN FUNDS: LESSON ON POLAND

Laurențiu PETRILA*

Review of: *Anamaria Loredana Felderean (Ianoși), Drumul României spre o absorbție eficientă a fondurilor europene. Despre transformarea miracolului polonez în miracolul românesc. Analiză comparativă [Romania's Way Towards an Efficient Absorption of European Funds: On the Transformation of the Polish Miracle into the Romanian Miracle: A Comparative Analysis].Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2018, 432 p.*

One of the greatest problems confronting Romania after entry into the European Union was the problem of European funds. Recent years have undoubtedly been noteworthy in Romanian history. Romania recently celebrated the ten-year anniversary of its entry into the European Union (EU) with much enthusiasm. We may say that immediately after the opening of the borders and the freedoms specific to states belonging to the European community, the most important advantage conferred by Romania's adherence to the EU has been the possibility of accessing European funds. Madam Ianoși's work, in another order of ideas, represents an incursion into the success of Poland with respect to the absorption of European funding in the period spanning 2007-2013 (See more Gligor and Puştea, 2017; Bărbulescu, Brie and Toderaș, 2016; Brie, 2010; Brie, Chirodea and Țoca, 2013). The author proposes a scientific study aimed at identifying the factor which accounted for the so-called "Polish miracle" (Felderean, 2018). The rigorousness with which this researcher approaches her scientific exercise on a theme which is of maximal interest to all nations which have recently entered into the European community makes for obligatory reading for all who are interested in the European Union. Political leaders, but also other decision-makers in our country, may draw important lessons from the example of our Polish neighbors with regard to efficiency and efficacy in the access of European funding.

This study commends itself not only thanks to the Polish miracle, but also thanks to the fact that it examines difficulties presently being encountered in Romania and which explain the factors at the root of the lower level of absorption registered by our country. This study presents extremely important data, which helps us to understand that, in this matter having to do with European funds, not only did we delay or put off European integration, but they were even at times an important impediment in the way of the development of the well-being of Romanian society. The hypothesis of this study proceeds from the premise that "The identification of the strong points of the Polish miracle of absorption and their implementation in the framework of the Romanian system,

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with the help of civil society, will have as its effect, in the medium and long term, the increased efficiency of absorption of European funds in Romania." (Felderean, 2018)

In conclusion, the purpose of the study is to share with a greater public certain modalities for the improvement of the grade and quality of absorption of European funds in Romania and to apply, at an experimental level, certain solutions discovered. The results of her doctoral research demonstrated the fact that, although Romania unfortunately finds herself relatively far away from the desideratum of replicating the success of Poland in the matter of absorption of European funds (on this matter the author presents multiple causes, but she especially insists on causes having to do with political instability, especially post-adherence to the EU, but also causes having to do with inefficiency of government as well as the fact that European funding were insufficiently prioritized by the Victory Palace). The author specifies very legitimately that a reconsideration of the Romanian system of absorption and the implementation of certain reforms at the national level, similar to those implemented by Poland, would have the effect of the growth of the capacity of absorption of Romania (for example, the reform of regionalization) and, implicitly, the standard of living. 2018 was the year in which Poland declared to be the first of the countries belonging to the former communist bloc which arrived at a state of economic maturity, comparable to Western nations. The present work is extremely interesting also because of the context in which Romania finds herself at the present moment. We are living in a period that can be described, at the very least, as bizarre. We have, in the executive branch, a Romanian commissioner who has insisted in various occasions that Romania finds herself permanently at risk for losing access to European funds because of internal blockages.

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THE DEMOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL REALITIES OF THE WWI FROM TRANSYLVANIA

Maria-Gabriela POPUȘ*

Review of: Ioan Bolovan, *Primul Război Mondial şi Relaţile Demografice din Transilvania*, Editura Şcoala Ardeleană 2015, Cluj - Napoca



Ms. Ioan Bolovan, professor at the Babeș-Bolyai University, as a result of a thorough research, brings into our view the demography of Romania during the WWI. As a result of a hard work, the book named "WWI and the Demographic realities from Transylvania" appeared in 2015 in Cluj with the aid of the "Școala Ardeleană" publishing house. It's due to the title that we can define the location being Transylvania and the period that the historical, demographic and social documentation referring to 1914-1918 was conducted on. The subtitle clearly emphasizes the main ideas like "Family, Mortality and Gender Reports". The book has 4 chapters of research: "I. General Demographic Aspects", where we can find the European's territory general demography, the emigration of Romanians from Transylvania to territories that were not in war; "II. The natural population movement in 1914-1918", which tells us about birth rate, mortality and marriages during WWI; "III. The family and the marital behavior in Transylvania between 1914-1918", which is about intergenerational relations, family problems; "IV. The church and the society: Attitudes and charitable actions of Romanians from Transylvania during the war", this one telling about helping the households which men left to the front, the gathering of funds for orphanages.

If we are to look at the general demographic aspects of WWI, we can conclude that it ended with approximately 8.5 million victims. The exact number is impossible to find out because of the prolonged period, large territories and their registrations. According to 1910's census, the majority of the populations consisted of Romanians, 55,3% of total population, 34,6% of Hungarians (including Hungarian speaking Jewish people), followed by 8% of Germans and Slovaks, Romas, Serbians and other minorities representing 2% (Bolovan, 2015: 25). Due to this census, we can say that the biggest number of the soldiers from Transylvania sent to fight by the Austro-Hungarian empire were Romanians. A new migration wave to Romania through the mountains starts among Romanians, especially among the young ones, this process being amplified by the passports withdrawal (See more Brie, 2008; Brie, 2009; Brie, Șipoș and Horga, 2011).

In the period of 1914-1918, the birth rate was continually decreasing because of men's leaving for the front. The author emphasizes the mortality causes more than the birth rates (which is obvious). Besides the soldiers' deaths on the front, he accentuates the "natural selection" as well, because of the plagues attacking the old people and the

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children mainly. Another cause is the venereal diseases making more victims. The author makes a special research regarding the family and the life outside it. The deaths caused by venereal diseases were constantly increasing, this being a problem that affected the whole Europe, not only Transylvania. The number of prostitutes or wives cheating on their husbands was increasing fast so the moral values were forgotten for a while. Different authors write about the women from Transylvania as being "loose", but the author of this book brings into view loyal women who keep their purity and respect for their husband. Besides the strict demographic and numerological idea that changed the population structure, he brings out the consequences beyond the war fighting which are the fighting for survival of those at home, them being the women and children, the gender reports, the change of the family structure where the woman traditionally had responsibilities like cooking, laundry, sewing and childcare, while the man would work the fields, in the forest, take care of the animals. First major changes took place in villages, as the most of the population lived there, when the old men, those who didn't fight on the front, migrated to cities in order to work in factories so the war can go on. That's when the woman's emancipation began as she was able to take care of the household on her own, this being the most important thing in a peasant's life. We can deduce this from the letters sent between spouses, the husbands asking if everything is fine with the working and the wives inform them about all those aspects.

The subtitle of this book presents the family as the central idea, followed by the mortality and gender reports, because of the fact that all the events take place in family's environment even if death comes far from home, its structure is changed forever. The efforts of war and the war itself were brought across the family, and the way the war is presented with positive notes for those at home, with illustrations and views of happy soldiers, with patriotic and unconcerned texts for those at home. Ioan Bolovan mostly describes the adventures and the correspondence of peasants families from Transylvania in his book, this being a quantitative research and taking into consideration different families from different regions of Transylvania compared to "About I.C. Brăteanu's family life" (Sabina Cantacuzino,2014) which tells about politics, political decisions and I.C. Brăteanu's life in particular.

The church had been the moral support before that time and it used to bring indications for a good behavior in society and family, but it stopped to have the same impact on people. The demographic traumas and effects also brought the church to changing its own moral concepts and it started to encourage the birth rate, the poor people and the efforts to keep up with the war. It gave up the weekly holidays so people could work the lands, approves the marriage among relatives in order to increase the birth rate, asks for solidarity from the families whose men went to the front through help in working and support for the orphanages.

The proposed ideas in this book's subtitle are well structured in those 4 chapters, some important moments from family's life during the WWI being greatly emphasized.

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REALISM, ACTUALITY AND MODELLING: FROM EUROPE TO UNITED EUROPE

Ștefan ȘUTEU*

Book Review: Nicolae PĂUN (coord.), *Uniunea Europeană în contextul unei lumi în schimbare. Fundamente istorice, valori, instituții, politici*[*The European Union in the context of a world in change. Historical foundations, values, institutions, policies*], București: Editura Academiei Române, 2017, 948 p., ISBN 978-973-27-2806-2

In early 2017, anticipating the centenary of the Great Unification (1918-2018), the publishing house of the Romanian Academy released a volume inscribedin European studies, entitled *The European Union in the context of a world in change. Historical foundations, values, institutions, policies*. The 948 pages of the book, in academic page format are well served by the elegant graphic design. The dust jacket features the twelve stars of the EU banner overimposed on a stylised map of the EU in the background, suggesting unity and perfection (the circle) and integrity (the number twelve).

The coordinator of this treatise is University Professor Nicolae Păun, dean of the Department of European Studies, and scientific advisors are the historian and Romanian Academy president Ioan-Aurel Pop and Professor Vasile Pușcaș. Most of the thirty-six authors are academics at the Faculty of European Studies, and the volume's introduction features their respective biographies (7-13). The articles vary in length from six or seven (e.g. Sergiu Mișcoiu and Laura Herța, ”Europe, the project of a lifetime. Robert Schuman”, pp. 160-167) to 98 pages (e.g. Titus Poenaru,”Institution actors, states and citizens and the process of expansion”, pp. 673-771). Of note, the Summary is presented in trilingual form – Romanian, English and French (pp.15-25) – the same as the concluding remarks (pp.927-932).

The Bibliography, comprising 43 pages printed in small size font (pp. 883-926), is organised by fields, such as”Books”, ”Journal articles”, ”Electronic” resources and ”Official documents”; an average of 24 titles per page results in 1.000 quoted references, relative to the 2.072 bottom page notes spanning the almost 1.000 pages volume.

The Preface, authored by academy president Ioan-Aurel Pop and entitled ”The history of Romanians of Europe: between Latin West and Byzantine East” (pp.27-39), elaborates on the ”formation of Romanians as a Romanic people” and ”frontier population”, which ”by virtue of essential parts of their identity, claim origin in the West, and by other equally essential parts, claim origin in the East and South-Western Europe” (p. 30), having ”a Slavonic written culture” (p. 34) but also owning a latin cultural model (p. 36), and presently subscribing to the ”functional ideal of european unity” (p. 39).

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The coordinator of the volume, Professor Nicolae Păun, in ”Prolegomena”, underlines that ”United Europe – born after the great conflagration that ended in 1945 – is a «Phoenix-type» idea”, butpresently it ”traverses the most profound crisis in it’s entire history” (p. 40).

The chosen themes belong to a variety of fields: history of integration, foreign affairs, political science, diplomacy, economy, political philosophy and institutional communication. The first few chapters dwelve into the idea of integration, taking into account the regionalisation imposed by the Cold War, which lent credit to the idea of ”the two Europes”. The following studies, consisting of historical scenarios, document analyses, and quantitative and statistical approaches, help sketch the background and afford predictions regarding the Europe of 2020.

The legal studies explain in detail the reform process, starting with the creation of the first Community from 1950th decade, and up to the achievements and shortcomings of the The Treaty of Lisbon (initially known as the Reform Treaty) (2007). Economical analyses review the features of the single market, from the standpoint of Regional, Concurential or Monetary Politics, and sheds some light on the prospects of the single currency – all subjects actively and heatedly debated in local governments all over the Union. The political studies, of utmost importance, focus mainly on the sensitive issue of Europen Union’s extension process. The contextualization within globalization, the geopolitical challenges like migrant’s crisis, the transatlantic partnership and the preeminence of the Franco-Germanduo, are all historical facts of great importance for the future of all the Union’s nations.

The synthsising volume ends with case studies dealing specifically with Romanian issues.

The subjects examined over the 829 pages are subdivided in eight analytical directions, each with a corresponding chapter (from I to VIII), all of them dedicated to the european integration viewed from a realist’s perspective, ”in the context of a changing world”. The chapters are entitled: (I) ”We the Europeans. Models and projects”, (II) ”Postbelic Europe. Integration and Cold War”, (III) ”The political-institutional experience. From communities to the Union”, (IV) ”Politics and strategy in the European Union. The agenda for 2020”, (V) ”References, memory and european symbolism”, (VI) ”European economic integration. Europe’s single market. The project. The actors”, (VII) ”The experience of the expansion” and (VIII), ”European Unions’s and the system of foreign affairs”.

The treatises of UE (from startup until Lisbon), the Reports of the European Comission in Bruxelles (casually known as *Country Eurobarometers*), the statistics, the scenarios and the programs for communities evolution and competition policies, for cohesion and rural / regional development, for proposal of euro-strategies and euro-systems (monetary, migrationist etc.), for the analysis of the concept of EU enlargement or of Global Economy, the investment plans etc.–are just a part of this work working concepts.

From circa one thousand authors listed in the Index (p. 933 and following), we will list only the ones refered to in the volume’s Content: Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Winston Churchill.

I quote a sample from the article „Europe’s angenda – 2020” (pp. 470-1): by Adrian Corpădean, vice-dean of the department of European Studies:

”Launched in March 2010 and adopted in June the same year, the Europe 2020 Strategy inherited the main themes of the Lisbon agenda, regarding education, innovation, stability and social inclusion, but this time placed under the dome of improved gouvernance and community level, due to the Euro Plus Pact and the Stability and Growth Pact […]".

As it stands, the foremost priorities of European Union for 2002 are the following:

- "75% of members aged between 20 and 64 should have a workplace";
- "3% of the Union's gross domestic product shall be allocated to the research and development sector";
- "the emissions greenhouse gases shall be reduced by 20%"; „20% of the energy used within the UE shall be of renewable sources"; „a 20% increase in energy efficiency compared to the reference point of 2005, and computed in oil tones equivalents" – „these priorities became known as the 20-20-20";
- "school dropout rate of below 10%";
- "40% of members aged between 30 and 34 should complete tertiary education";
- "a reduction by 20 millions of the group of individuals at risk of poverty and social exclusion".

Two more especially relevant quotes, the first from *Prolegomena* and the latter from the Afterword belong to the coordinator of the volume, Professor Nicolae Păun:

"The splendid palace with its abstract architectural lines, that the city of Strasbourg built on the Ill's shore in 1994 to host the European Court of Human Rights, embodies the success of European Council, six decades since its founding; dominating by height the headquarters of other European institutions, this ship-like building of aluminum and glass, anchored symbolically at the Ill's shore, seems meant to serve as a beacon light across Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Danube Delta. Among the neighbouring buildings, across the modern highway, there is the new Palace of the European Council, *Palais de l'Europe* (hosting the meetings of the European Parliament since 1987, and for a long time afterwards); on the opposite shore, the grand and new edifice of the Parliament (since 1999), built like a translucent see-wall, with a main body reminiscent of a massive circular tower, with transversal concrete panels. Until very recently, the whole complex testified of the intents and dreams of the early Council from the fourties, that is to forge Europe in a «United States» –like shape." (pp. 44-45).

"*... collective leadership, by integration of multiple interests, striving toward optimal gouvernance, thus contributing to progress and stability*, these are the greatest assets, both principially and factually, that recomends the European Union as an unprecedented political-economical, social and cultural experiment, and as an undeniable evolutive stage in the reconfiguration process of world order […]" (p. 882).

The careful reader of this treatise of European studies will be able to join Augustin in saying: "I consider myself as one of those who have written on what they have learnt and have learned what they have written".

The three words best describing the volume are Realism (from Past), Actuality (to Present) and Modelling (to Future), all necessary capacities toward the goal of preserving the ideal of European Union, and termed in diverse manners, such as: unity, association, comunion, communication, community, collaboration, company, participation, partnership, solidarity, companionship, unity. We suggest the volume should be part of the bibliography of any work aiming toward exhaustivity, as it proves to be a useful and even indispensable tool for any serious historian or European studies scholar from the Romanian space.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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