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I. HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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LA POLITIQUE RELIGIEUSE DE LA COUR VIENNOISE DANS LA PRINCIPAUTE DE TRANSYLVANIE (1692-1701): LE CAS DES ROUMAINS

Sorin ȘIPOȘ*

Abstract. *The Religious Policy of the Viennese Court in the Principality of Transylvania (1692-1701): the Case of the Romanians.* In the view of the Habsburg Empire the church union was to strengthen the fragile Catholic block in the Principality, on one hand, and on the other, it was to stimulate politically and socially a large ethnic and confessional group, which was quite marginalized, and to determine implicitly, a strong dependency upon the Habsburg dynasty. Hadn't it been for the involvement of the imperial authorities, the Romanians' union would have had few chances to be fulfilled. By the end of the 17th century in Transylvania the main social categories were dominated by the Reformation confessions, even the Governor was a Calvinist. The partisans of the Reformation were looking with restraint, even with hostility at the consolidation of the Catholic Church. At the very beginning the imperial authorities' involvement in the unionist action was characterized by cautiousness. But as the Reformation partisans expressed their disagreement with the Romanians' union with the Church of Rome, the imperial authorities did their best to make the Romanians unite only with the Church of Rome.

The religious union was realized under very difficult political conditions. The treaties started in 1697 with archbishop Teofil, and they were done with great discretion until they were closed during the period of Atanasie Anghel. The Union started timidly, but as the Habsburg's authority was growing, so was the Union accelerated. The Romanians' enthusiasm wasn't a great one. The Jesuits drew their attention towards the leaders of the Orthodox Church whom they presented the advantages coming from their adhesion. The peak of the Union treaties took place in Vienna, when the Archbishop Atanasie Anghel took again the holy orders, but as a Greek-Catholic bishop who complied with a return to and not with a union with the Roman Catholic Church and who accepted to stop the relations with the Orthodox churches neighbouring Transylvania. The religious union of the Romanians proved to have consequences which none of those involved in it had ever thought of. The national movement of the Romanians from Transylvania had its roots in this religious act with deep political implications. At the same time, the Union generated conflicts between the Greek Catholic Romanians and the Orthodox ones, the latter being deprived of religious hierarchy for almost six decades. Under such circumstances the Orthodox Romanians from Transylvania resorted to the help of Russia and the Orthodox archpriests from Karlowitz in order to practice their faith.

Keywords: *the Habsburg Empire, Romanians, Transylvania, Greek Catholic Church, counter-reform*

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Dans l'évolution historique des peuples, il y a des moments de gloire, d'héroïsme, mais également des moments difficiles, de crise politique et morale qui les met sous la domination ou le contrôle des voisins. Les roumains ont traversé aussi des périodes historiques de gloire, mais en même temps des moments de crise politique, économique et morale. L'emplacement des roumains dans un espace géopolitique dominé des empires et des royaumes forts, ont marqué notre évolution historique et a constitué ultérieurement le sujet de différents thèmes de réflexion et d'analyses plus ou moins réussis¹. Le but de notre analyse est la reconstitution d'un segment de l'histoire de la Transylvanie entre 1692-1701, une province récemment entrée sous l'autorité de l'Empire des Habsbourg. Concrètement, notre analyse se concentre sur la politique religieuse promue par les impériaux en Transylvanie, province où les roumains orthodoxes sont devenus les acteurs principaux. Dans cette étude, nous cherchons à identifier les facteurs politiques et religieux intéressés de la modification des réalités confessionnelles en Transylvanie. Également, nous cherchons à identifier les mécanismes utilisés pour attirer les roumains vers l'Eglise Greco-Catholique. Un autre objectif de notre recherche vise à examiner l'attitude de l'élite roumaine de Transylvanie vis-à-vis de l'union religieuse et précise les conséquences religieuses et politiques de l'adhésion des roumains à l'union religieuse. La dernière direction d'analyse, en fait une étude de cas, se concentre sur la manière dans laquelle l'union religieuse se reflète dans les recherches de Silviu Dragomir et David Prodan, deux historiens formés par l'école critique, mais avec des options politiques.

Ce que plus tard on a appelé la Transylvanie, est entré en totalité sous la domination du Royaume de l'Hongrie jusqu'à peu près la fin du XII^{ème} siècle. Les documents médiévaux précisent les populations qui se trouvaient dans cet espace, respectivement des roumains, des restes de slaves, des bulgares, des péché-nègues, etc, et également les formations politiques appelés ducats, pays, knézats et voïévodats. Les sources documentaires rappellent que les roumains étaient chrétiens, mais de confession orthodoxe. Les rois hongrois ont superposé sur les réalités politiques, confessionnelles, sociales, linguistiques et ethniques qui existaient en Transylvanie les formes d'organisation du Royaume d'Hongrie. D'après le droit médiéval, le roi devenait le maître du territoire dans son ensemble, duquel il a fait des donations aux nobles du royaume et à l'Eglise Romano-Catholique. Le transfert de propriété des vaincus vers les vainqueurs a constitué la cause de nombreux litiges, conflits militaires pendant le Moyen Age. Les nouveaux maîtres ont imposé en Transylvanie la confession gréco-catholique, la langue latine et le droit médiéval de type occidental. Les rois hongrois ont colonisé en Transylvanie, en même temps, des populations arrivées de l'Ouest mais aussi de l'Est de l'Europe. Ceci a conféré à la province une certaine spécificité et a influencé pendant quelques siècles le destin de la population roumaine. Le statut des roumains dans les nouvelles réalités politiques a connu des changements importants. La dernière présence des roumains parmi les esprits de Transylvanie date de la fin du XIII^{ème} siècle. Jusqu'à la Reforme, la seule confession officielle est la romano-catholique. Plus tard, on a reconnu

¹ N. Crainic, *Gândirism și ortodoxie*, dans *Gândirea*, XI, nr. 1, 1931. Idem, *Modul teantric*, dans *Gândirea*, nr. 1, 1940. Idem, *Ortodoxie și etnocrație*, București, [1936]. Idem, *Spiritualitate*, dans *Dreptul la memorie în lectura lui Iordan Chimet*, vol. IV, Cluj-Napoca, 1993. I. Livezeanu, *Cultură și naționalism în România Mare 1918-1930*, București, 1995. Z. Ornea, *Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească*, București, 1995. L. Boia, *Elemente de mitologie istorică românească (secolele XIX-XX)*, dans *Mituri istorice românești*. Sous la direction de Lucian Boia, București, 1995. E. Cioran, *Pe culmile disperării*, București, 1990. C. Noica, *Istoricitate și eternitate*, București, 1989. P.P. Panaitescu, *Destin românesc*, dans *Convorbiri literare*, nr. 11-12, 1941. A. Zub, *De la istoria critică la criticism (Istoriografia română la finele secolului XIX și începutul secolului XX)*, București, 1985. Idem, *Istorie și istorici în România interbelică*, Iași, 1989.

aussi le calvinisme, le luthéranisme et l'unitarianisme. La confession orthodoxe était seulement tolérée. Du point de vue politique, les roumains ne font pas partie des esprits de la Transylvanie. Le statut des roumains n'a pas connu des changements significatifs pendant le Moyen Âge, exceptant, peut-être, les essais de réunification des Eglises Chrétiennes après 1204 et après le Concile de Ferrara-Florence. C'est vrai que l'élite des roumains, les knèzes et voïévodes, ont fait des efforts à joindre les nobles du royaume, mais la grande majorité est déchue du point de vue social. Des changements majeurs ne se sont pas produits non plus après la transformation de la partie centrale du Royaume en pachalik, et Partium et le voïévodat de Transylvanie se sont organisés en principauté, sous la suzeraineté de la Porte Ottomane. Dans la Principauté de Transylvanie le système des quatre religions admises et reconnues (le catholicisme, le calvinisme, le luthéranisme et l'unitarianisme) et des trois nations politiques (la noblesse, les représentants des sicules et l'élite des saxons) s'est consolidé, les roumains en continuant d'être à l'extérieur du système politique.

Cependant, la fin du XVII^e siècle annonce des changements politiques à l'intérieur de l'Europe Centrale. La rivalité entre l'Empire Ottoman et l'Empire des Habsbourg est entrée dans une nouvelle phase. La Contre-offensive impériale commencée sous les murs de Vienne a réussi, en deux décennies, à reconquérir les territoires pour l'occupation desquels les turcs se sont efforcés presque un siècle à les conquérir. La libération de la partie centrale de l'Hongrie, transformée en pachalik, et la pénétration des troupes impériales dans la principauté autonome de Transylvanie, toujours sous la domination de la Porte (Călin Felezeu, 1996: 107-119.), a attiré l'attention des facteurs politiques et militaires autrichiens vers la complexité des problèmes de nouvelles provinces occupées.

Le Diplôme Léopoldien de 1691, le résultat du compromis entre le nouvel pouvoir politique et les esprits de la principauté, établissait les rapports avec l'empire et également les principes d'après lesquels on devait gouverner la Transylvanie. La base constitutionnelle de la Transylvanie, d'après le texte, reste son système politique déjà consacré: les trois nations politiques et quatre religions admises et reconnues (David Prodan, 1984: 134). Mais, en Transylvanie, de toutes les nations politiques, les saxons seulement appuyaient la politique de la Cour viennoise. L'Eglise Romano-Catholique, l'institution qui devait assurer la cohésion des nations et des provinces de l'empire, même si se trouvait dans une situation juridique équivalente aux autres confessions réformées, disposait de peu d'adhérents. Le Calvinisme était la religion dominante du pays, la religion des dirigeants politiques aussi. Ensuite, la propagande calviniste parmi les roumains, où on a combiné la force avec les privilèges, a réussi dans quelques décennies à déterminer un grand nombre de roumains orthodoxes à choisir le calvinisme. Dans cette situation, les autorités impériales, pour élargir leur base de soutien dans la principauté, devaient soit essayer d'attirer au catholicisme les actuels réformés, soit trouver d'autres solutions. Même si convaincre les actuels réformés à passer au catholicisme n'était pas une mission totalement impossible, un calcul simple démontre que le nombre de ceux qui accepteraient le repassage au catholicisme serait réduit, mais cela compliquerait les problèmes avec les esprits dans la principauté.

Parmi les solutions de régénération du catholicisme sur le territoire de l'Hongrie, proposées en 1689 par une commission conduite par le cardinal Leopold Kollonich, la plus intéressante de la perspective de ses effets à long terme paraissait être l'union des églises. Dans le cas de la Transylvanie, ceux qui étaient visés par cette stratégie de politique religieuse de la Cour de Vienne étaient les roumains (Ovidiu Ghitta, 2005: 378). Mais cette situation n'était pas sans précédent ! Au contraire, il y avait des antécédents, et même un cadre juridique

de l'église. Les parents spirituels de la politique viennoise pouvaient s'appuyer sur l'instruction de la Congrégation de la Propagande Fide de 1669, qui à la base des décisions du Concile de Florence de 1439 avait réglementé les modalités du passage des orientales aux églises religieuses de rite byzantino-slave unies à la Rome (Mathias Bernath, 1994: 87). Concernant les antécédents, Rome a obtenu un succès plus ample seulement aux Ruthènes (les ukrainiens) qui se trouvaient sous domination polono-lituanienne et qui s'est concrétisé dans l'union de Best (1596). A la moitié du XVII^e siècle, dans les plans d'union de Rome ont été inclus les Ruthènes gréco-orthodoxes de l'Hongrie de nord-est également (Mathias Bernath, 1994: 88). Comme toujours lorsqu'il s'agit des unions régionales, on est parti du principe double de l'unité en foi (dans les problèmes dogmatiques fondamentaux), avec le maintien du rite byzantino-slave (Mathias Bernath, 1994: 88). Le succès de l'expérience avec les Ruthènes, mais également l'échec concernant l'attraction des serbes, a mis en évidence quelques aspects importants pour la réussite de l'union. Alors, pour ceux qui s'uniront, l'Eglise Romaine déclare à ne pas changer leur rite ! Les essais des catholiques jusqu'à la Réforme et des Calvin dans les trois dernières décennies de changer le rite, se sont heurtés à l'opposition des croyants orthodoxes. En même temps, pour l'adhésion à la nouvelle foi, il fallait, pour le début, conquérir les prêtres, et après, par l'intermédiaire d'eux, le peuple. Il faut remarquer également le rôle du facteur socio-économique dans l'option des habitants à faveur de l'union. Et non pas dernièrement, il était impérieusement nécessaire l'implication du pouvoir politique, dans ce cas particulier de la Cour impériale, dans l'achèvement de l'union.

Les tout premiers essais d'attirer les roumains à l'union se doivent à Joseph de Camillis, nommé en novembre 1689 vicaire apostolique pour „les grecs de la diocèse de Muncaci et des autres lieux obtenus en Hongrie“ (Ovidiu Ghitta, 2005: 380). Il a réussi à attirer à l'union des communautés roumaines de Maramureș, de Sătmar et du Bihor qui récemment avait été réintroduit sous autorité chrétienne. Il a élargi son activité également dans les comitats d'Ardeal Crasna, Solnoc Moyen et Solnoc Interieur (Ovidiu Ghitta, 2005: 382). L'implication de Léopold I dans l'action de l'union explique le succès de Joseph de Camillis. Le roi Léopold I déclarait, par la patente impériale de 1692, que tous ceux qui étaient de rite grec unis à l'Eglise Romaine, et regardant l'église, les visages de l'église et leur choses, doivent bénéficier en totalité des réductions et privilèges dont bénéficie l'église, les visages de l'église et les choses des croyants de l'Eglise Romaine de rite latin (David Prodan, 1984: 137). L'offre était tentante pour les prêtres orthodoxes, désireux à se réjouir du même statut que les prêtres des religions admises et reconnues. Il a fallu passer quelques années jusqu'à ce que les roumains de la Transylvanie, plus précis leur élite religieuse, a répondu à l'offre impériale d'union. C'est en février 1697 seulement, après les efforts de Paul Ladislau Baranyi, dans le grand synode d'Alba Iulia, qu'on fait le premier pas vers l'union². Dans ce synode, pendant la première séance, le

² Voir pour l'union religieuse des roumains les suivantes références bibliographiques: Keith Hitchins, *Conștiință națională și acțiune politică la românii din Transilvania (1700-1868)*, vol. I, Cluj-Napoca, 1987, p. 30-61; Mathias Bernath, *Habsburgii și începuturile formării națiunii române*, Cluj-Napoca, 1994. David Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Din istoria formării națiunii române*, București, 1984; Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria românilor din Ardeal și Ungaria*. Edition soignée par Georgeta Penelea, București, 1989, p. 197-329. Petru Maior, *Istoria Bisericei românilor atât a cestor dincoace cât și a celor dincolo de Dunăre*, Buda, 1813; George Bariț, *Părți alese din istoria Transilvaniei pe două sute de ani în urmă*. Edition soignée, notes, commentaires et indices par académicien Ștefan Pascu et prof. dr. Florin Salvan, vol. I, Brașov, 1993, p. 218-274; Andreas Freyberger, *Relatare istorică despre unirea bisericii românești cu biserica Romei*. Version roumaine et étude introductif par Ioan Chindriș, Cluj-Napoca, 1996; N. Nilles, *Symbolae ad*

métropolite Teofil, qui se trouvait en tête de l'église roumaine depuis 1692, dans les conditions consacrées de la suprématie des calvins, évoquait les pressions auxquelles l'Eglise Orthodoxe a été soumise par les calvins, notamment l'action dirigée contre le rite, l'élimination des icônes mais également l'imposition du superintendant calvin. Il évoque aussi les essais d'attirer les prêtres au calvinisme en échange des privilèges aux gens qui faisaient de la propagande en ce sens (N. Nilles, I, 1885: 165).

Le métropolite Teofil surprend bien clairement l'essai de calvinisation de l'église orthodoxe par l'élimination des icônes, des postes, par la réduction des fêtes, par la subordination du métropolite au superintendant calvin, mais également par l'essai d'attirer des individus et des collectivités au calvinisme, suivi par l'offre des privilèges et avantages économiques. Pendant la deuxième séance on a débattu les conditions dans lesquelles on devait réaliser l'union, respectivement les quatre points du concile florentin, mais également quelques sollicitudes du clergé : le droit canonique devait rester en vigueur, les gens qui se trouvaient dans le service de l'église devaient bénéficier des privilèges accordés aux prêtres romano-catholiques, les roumains laïcs unis à l'Eglise de Rome devaient recevoir et continuer être avancés dans toutes les dignités, et leurs fils devaient être reçus, sans distinction, dans les écoles laïques catholiques et dans les institutions scolaires (N. Nilles, I, 1885: 165). Dans le troisième jour, on a décidé que ce qu'on a discuté et assumé par le synode doit être envoyé au roi Léopold et à l'archevêque Kollonich (N. Nilles, I, 1885: 165). Le texte de la déclaration de l'union a été rédigé seulement le 21 mars 1697 et comprend l'acceptation des quatre points du concile florentin. Les membres du synode ont sollicité que les prêtres et les dignitaires se réjouissent des privilèges dont bénéficient les prêtres romano-catholiques aussi, mais également les ariennes, les luthériens et les calvins. Ensuite, on demandait que dans chaque village où il y avait un prêtre, l'église devait avoir une maison paroissiale et les prêtres

illustrandam Historiam Ecclesiae Orientalis in Terris Coronae S. Stephani, vol. I, Oeniponte, 1885; Petrus Bod, *Brevis Valachorum Transylvaniam incolentium historia*, dans Ana Dumitran, Gúdor Botond, Pr. Nicolae Dănilă, *Relații interconfesionale româno-maghiare în Transilvania (mijlocul secolului XVI – primele decenii ale secolului XVIII)*, Alba-Iulia, 2000, p. 312-443. Ioan Crișanu, *Adaus la Istoria uniției bisericești a Românilor din Transilvania sub împăratul Leopold I*, dans *Programa Institutului pedagogico-teologic al Arhiepiscopiei ortodoxe române din Transilvania pentru anul școlar 1886/1887*, p. 3-38. Nicolae Densușianu, *Independența bisericească a Mitropoliei române de Alba Iulia*, Brașov, 1893, p. 17-33. George Popoviciu, *Uniunea românilor din Transilvania cu Biserica romano-catolică sub împăratul Leopold I*, Lugoj, 1901, p. 43-62. Augustin Bunea, Alexandru Grama, *Chestiuni din dreptul și istoria Bisericii românești unite. Studiu apologetic din incidentulu invectivelor Gazetei Transilvaniei și a d-lui Nicolau Densusanu asupra Mitropolitului Vancea și a Bisericii unite*, deuxième partie, Blaj, 1893, p. 3-38. Nicolae Iorga, *Sate și preoți din Ardeal*, București, 1902, p. 166-206; Idem, *Istoria românilor din Ardeal și Ungaria*, p. 224-227; Idem, *Istoria Bisericii românești și a vieții religioase a românilor*. Deuxième édition, vol. I, București, 1929, p. 422-426, vol. II, București, 1932, p. 18-47. Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Fragmente din istoria românilor*, vol. II, București, 1900, p. 69-181. Ioan Lupaș, *Desbinarea bisericească a românilor ardeleni în lumina documentelor din întâia jumătate a veacului al XVIII-lea*, dans Idem, *Studii, conferințe și comunicări istorice*, vol. I, București, 1928, p. 231-267; Idem, *Istoria bisericească a românilor ardeleni*. Introduction, le soigneusement de l'édition, notes et commentaires par Doru Radosav, Cluj-Napoca, 1995, p. 106-108. Mihail Dan, *În jurul unirii cu Roma. Cu deosebită privire asupra rolului iezuitului Carol Neurautter*, în *Mitropolia Banatului*, année VIII, nr. 7-9, 1958, p. 326). Pompiliu Teodor, *Politica confesională a Habsburgilor în Transilvania (1692-1759)*. *Cazul românesc*, dans *Caietele David Prodan. Revistă de istorie*, année I, nr. 2, juillet-décembre 1994, p. 15-39.

devaient dépendre et recevoir des dispositions de la part de l'évêque, d'après la coutume, et non pas de la part des laïcs, comme jusqu'à présent (N. Nilles, I, 1885: 165).

Parmi les sollicitudes du métropolite et des membres du synode, on peut remarquer, et ce n'était pas par erreur, le soulèvement de l'état des unis et la reconquête du prestige du métropolite et des prêtres devant le pouvoir politique, chose arrivée sous les princes calvins. En même temps, de la variante officielle, avancée aux officiels politiques et religieux, il manque la prévision conformément à laquelle les laïcs unis ont la possibilité d'accéder à des fonctions politiques (N. Nilles, I, 1885: 165.). La lettre du 10 juin par laquelle les archiprêtres avancent au cardinal Kollonich leur décision, est signée par le métropolite et 12 archiprêtres (David Prodan, 1984: 139).

Vers la fin de l'année et après ce qui s'est passé, le status catholique demandait également, par un mémoire à la Cour Vienne, l'approbation de l'union avec l'Eglise de Rome. La proposition a été reçue, après avoir été discutée dans une conférence ministérielle, mais aux insinuations du chancelier et du gouverneur de la Transylvanie, qui était calvin, pour que les roumains puissent s'unir avec n'importe quelles des religions admises et reconnues (David Prodan, 1984: 139).

La relance de la propagande unioniste parmi les roumains a coïncidé avec la publication du prescripteur royal le 14 avril 1698, adressé au Gouvernement d'Ardeal, où on proposait l'union avec n'importe quelle des quatre religions officielles d'Ardeal. Mais, au mois de juin, le cardinal Kollonich s'adressait aux prêtres roumains, en leur suggérant qu'un rapprochement au catholicisme était la meilleure solution à cette date là. Cela était un signal indirect que les roumains devaient s'unir seulement avec l'Eglise Romano-Catholique.

La mort du Teofil en juillet, oblige les autorités religieuses et politiques reprendre le fil des négociations. L'élection d'Atanasie Anghel, le nouvel hiérarque, n'a pas laissé se comprendre qu'on a changé quelque chose à l'intérieur de l'Eglise Orthodoxe. Entré dans l'attention de l'opinion publique, avec les discussions produites à l'occasion de son élection comme métropolite, le hiérarque part pour Bucarest pour obtenir la confirmation du métropolite de Valachie. Sa jeunesse et la formation théologique incomplètes dont il disposait, ont constitué des causes pour sa rétention de quelques mois dans la capitale de Munténie (Silviu Dragomir, 1920: 26). Dans l'historiographie roumaine, d'après l'analyse des documents qui mentionnent l'union des roumains en 1697, les conclusions sont partagées : Ioan Crișanu, George Popoviciu et plus récemment Ștefan Lupșa et Silviu Dragomir contestent le fait que l'union soit réalisée pendant le temps de Teofil (Ștefan Lupșa, 1949: 39). Au contraire, Augustin Bunea, Nicolae Iorga, David Prodan et Mathias Bernath remontent les débuts de l'union dans les temps du métropolite Teofil. On trouve également, chez les auteurs mentionnés, de grandes différences en ce qui concerne la participation des hiérarques roumains aux négociations de l'union. Popoviciu opinait qu'on avait mené de négociations secrètes non officielles entre les jésuites et certains clergés roumains en tête avec Atanasie Anghel, mais sans aboutir à des résultats concrets³. Au point de vue énoncé par Popoviciu, s'est associé, plus tard, Șt. Lupșa⁴. N. Iorga (Nicolae Iorga,

³ „Du milieu des événements nous pouvons conclure alors, avec toute la sûreté, que les essais d'union se sont déroulés plutôt en secret, en privé, et c'était avec les efforts du prêtre P. Baranyi et en attirant une partie du clergé roumain, qu'ils se sont dirigés vers le trône et on a adressé aux Colonnes des pétitions en disant que Teofil et ses adhérents du clergé voudraient l'union“ (George Popoviciu, *Uniunea românilor din Transilvania cu Biserica romano-catolică sub împăratul Leopold I*, Lugoș, 190, p. 61).

⁴ „La conclusion est que Teofil, a négocié avec Apor et Baranyi et s'est consulté avec deux de ses archiprêtres; mais, le résultat n'a pas été le vote de l'union dans le synode, mais le guidage de l'état

1989: 225-227), A. Bunea (Augustin Bunea, 1902 : 42-43) et Z. Pâclișanu (Zenovie Pâclișanu, 1946.) opinent qu'un synode légale s'est officié et que les documents de l'union ont été rédigés après la consultation du clergé orthodoxe. Parmi les nouveaux historiens qui ont investigué le phénomène, D. Prodan (David Prodan, 1984: 138-139). s'associe aux conclusions énoncées par Bunea, Iorga și Pâclișanu et M. Bernath⁵ est plus près du point de vue soutenu par G. Popoviciu en début du siècle. O. Bârlea appréciait que l'union se soit fait sous l'évêque Teofil, mais dans un cadre officiel (Octavian Bârlea: 140). Un autre aspect sur lequel les spécialistes n'ont pas arrivé à un consensus est lié au moyen de l'assemblée, du synode où on a prononcé l'union (Octavian Bârlea: 138).

La réalité d'Ardeal avait beaucoup changé au retour du métropolite Atanasie Anghel de Bucarest. C'était sous lui qu'un nouvel synode d'Alba Iulia avait reçu l'union. L'Acte de l'union est signé par 38 archiprêtres. Dans la variante roumaine de l'acte, l'union se réalise pour que les prêtres aussi puissent bénéficier des avantages des confessions admises et reconnues, mais également comme preuve de fidélité vis-à-vis du roi. Dans le texte en latin, l'union est attribuée à l'inspiration divine (David Prodan, 1984: 140.). Dans la variante latine, la formule de l'union a été complétée par le cardinal Kollonich qui sollicitait aux roumains qu'ils acceptent les points en litige entre les deux églises.

Le rapprochement des prêtres roumains de l'Eglise Romano-Catholique s'est fait comme suite au Diplôme du 16 février 1699, connu comme le premier Diplôme de l'union. Les avantages offerts aux prêtres roumains, grecs et ruthènes ont créé un état d'esprit extrêmement favorable parmi l'élite roumaine.

L'union des roumains a agité aussi les esprits réformés d'Ardeal. La Diète et le Gouvernement ont envoyé des mémoires et des protestes à la Cour Vienneoise, préoccupée par le renforcement du catholicisme et la dispense des prêtres unis des obligations fiscales. Ceci confirmait le fait que la politique viennoise vis-à-vis des roumains était en contradiction également avec les engagements assumés par les Habsbourg par le Diplôme léopoldien de 1691. En même temps, les esprits demandaient au roi Léopold I que les roumains puissent s'unir avec n'importe lesquels des religions admises et reconnues. L'acceptation de ces prétentions formulées par les esprits d'Ardeal mettait sous le point d'interrogation le sens même et le but de la politique des Habsbourg.

Léopold a réagit tout de suite au proteste des esprits réformés d'Ardeal vis-à-vis du prosélytisme catholique parmi les roumains, en demandant au général Rabutin d'empêcher l'abandon des roumains de la décision déjà prise de passer au catholicisme. Le mandat même envoyé par Léopold au général Rabutin confirmait la décision du clergé de passer au catholicisme, dans les conditions où les négociations de mois d'octobre 1698 n'étaient pas arrivées à la finalité proposée par les deux parties (Silviu Dragomir, 1963: 64).

Des sources extrêmement importants, vu l'absence des documents roumains concernant l'union, sont les enquêtes commandées et réalisées par le gouvernement, du printemps de l'année 1699. Même partiels, les résultats des enquêtes déplaçaient la discussion sur l'union des roumains des sources de provenance jésuite vers la masse des paysans

catholique vers l'exonération par le roi, par décret public, des promesses des privilèges faites par Baranyi et Apor, pour qu'à la base de ce décret puissent être commencés les pourparlers d'union. " (Ștefan Lupșa, *op. cit.*, p. 39).

⁵ „Quoi que lacunaires et contradictoires soient les sources maintenues sur l'évolution de la première phase de l'union de l'église, on peut cependant s'associer à l'appréciation critique d'un historien récent sur les événements de l'année 1697, et ceci est que Teofil et ses adeptes parmi les archiprêtres doivent être considérés *initiateurs des chemins* de l'union des églises" (Mathias Bernath, *op. cit.*, p. 107).

d'Ardeal, visé directement par les Habsbourg. Les résultats des enquêtes dévoilaient la décision des paysans de ne pas accepter les modernisations dogmatiques, en prouvant une forte affection pour la tradition. Des villages roumains entiers ont offert des réponses, souvent en contradiction avec ceux des prêtres favorables à l'union. Mais les réponses des prêtres également dévoilaient l'incertitude et la méconnaissance des conditions dans lesquelles on a réalisé l'union. Les réponses étaient prévisibles dans les conditions où les démarches pour l'union avaient été faites par le métropolite et les archiprêtres, mais qui avaient parlé au nom de tous les croyants. En consultant les habitants, a été prouvé qu'ils n'étaient pas au courant de ce qui allait se passer dans l'Eglise Orthodoxe et que, généralement, ils n'agréaient pas les changements. Néanmoins, une réaction véhémente et organisée en contre de l'union n'a pas existé et elle ne pouvait pas exister non plus, car les explications offertes par les enquêteurs ne clarifiaient pas cela. Dans certaines zones, comme Hațeg par exemple, on a préféré la collaboration avec les calvins, mais c'était trop peu vis-à-vis de ce que les calvins attendaient pour pouvoir empêcher l'attraction des roumains au catholicisme. De son côté, les prêtres roumains se sont visiblement efforcés pour ne pas perdre l'occasion de sortir des files des paysans serfs, même s'ils étaient obligés à faire des compromis (Silviu Dragomir, 1963: 28).

C'était le premier pas fait par l'élite roumaine pour répondre aux promesses des autorités religieuses et politiques de l'empire, pas qui la séparait, certainement, de la masse des croyants.

Pendant le métropolite Atanasie Anghel, on a organisé un autre synode de l'union, le 4-5 septembre 1700, auquel 54 archiprêtres de Transylvanie, dont 3 de Maramureș ont participé. Le grand numéro d'archiprêtres qui y participaient, prouvait que l'union bénéficiait d'un grand appui, au moins au niveau de la hiérarchie supérieure. Le synode avait conclu ses travaux par la rédaction d'un nouvel acte de l'union le 7 septembre 1700, identique à l'acte de l'union, variante latine, de 1698.

L'incertitude et la confusion créées par certains gestes et déclarations du métropolite Atanasie Anghel concernant l'union, ont déterminé les jésuites à urgenter le dénouement de l'action. Si au niveau de l'élite confessionnelle, même des prêtres, l'union était agréée dans les conditions où les prêtres et les servants de l'église bénéficiaient des dispenses, parmi les croyants, l'union entraînait avec des difficultés car les croyants se laissaient difficilement convaincus qu'ils faillaient accepter un changement sans rien obtenir en échange. L'image d'Atanasie Anghel est devenue, au fur et à mesure, même parmi les jésuites et les autorités locales, contradictoire. Il était accusé qu'il ne s'implique pas suffisamment dans la propagation de l'union, qu'il maintient les liaisons avec la Métropole de la Valachie. Leurs craintes faisaient appel aussi à la personne du métropolite qui pouvait, en tout moment, renoncer à l'union et se réfugier dans un village orthodoxe, en mettant fin alors aux efforts faits jusqu'à ce moment-là. L'union, en vision des jésuites, était trop liée à la personne de l'hiérarque, et celui-ci avait été assez ambigu jusqu'à présent. Donc, il y avait suffisamment des motifs pour convoquer Atanasie Anghel à Vienne (Silviu Dragomir, 1963: 80). Certains historiens considèrent qu'Atanasie avait été appelé à Vienne juste pour obtenir la confirmation (Silviu Dragomir, 1963: 80; David Prodan, 1984: 143).

La vraie raison de son appel à Vienne était la clarification de l'attitude ambiguë du métropolite, mais le statut de l'union également, auquel il avait consenti (Silviu Dragomir, 1963: 82; Ștefan Lupșa, 1949: 70). Les essais du hiérarque de se soustraire à l'invitation ont été suivis par des pressions et des menaces de la part des autorités impériales d'Ardeal. La réaction du métropolite s'est concrétisée dans l'organisation d'un synode le 7 janvier 1701, avant le départ pour Vienne. Les participants ont manifesté de la solidarité avec leur monarque, en demandant aux autorités qu'il soit maintenu en tête et „personne parmi les laïcs

ou les étrangers ne s'entremêlent dans les choses épiscopales sans que le concile le sache" (Silviu Dragomir, 1963: 88-89; David Prodan, 1984: 142).

Dans la capitale de l'empire, il est soumis à un interrogatoire, „en se prouvant alors que les cercles de Vienne avait cru, au moins partiellement, aux accuses dirigés vers le Métropolite" (Silviu Dragomir, 1963: 88-89; David Prodan, 1984: 142). A Vienne, le hiérarque a déposé la profession de foi tridentine et a été ordonné prêtre de nouveau et plus tard évêque. L'initiative de Kollonich n'avait pas de correspondant dans l'Eglise Romano-Catholique et ils ne s'encadraient pas non plus dans la ligne de conduite tracée par la Congrégation de Propagande de Fide. C'est dans ce moment que le désir du prélat latin est sorti, de souligner fortement le détachement, par l'union des roumains, de l'Eglise Orthodoxe et d'intégration dans l'Eglise Catholique. Cette union n'avait rien à voir avec le sens donné au phénomène de Florence (Ovidiu Ghitta, 2005: 386). Jusqu'à ce moment là, le métropolite et les archiprêtres roumains ont compris l'union pas comme un retour, mais comme une entente bilatérale par laquelle l'Eglise roumaine de Transylvanie, comme entité distincte, entrait sous la juridiction du souverain pontife, mais sans perdre son autonomie institutionnelle et l'identité rituelle et sans périliser ses relations avec les autres Eglises de l'est, non unies (Ovidiu Ghitta, 2005: 387).

La nouvelle ordination comme prêtre d'Atanasie Anghel a été succédée d'un acte politique important pour les roumains d'Ardeal, connu dans l'historiographie sous le nom du Deuxième Diplôme léopoldien de l'union (David Prodan, 1984: 144-145; Mathias Bernath, 1994: 154-157). Le point le plus important du diplôme est le troisième. Ceci prévoyait que, et les laïcs, et les personnes ordinaires qui s'uniront, d'après la norme prescrite par le théologien, à l'Eglise de Rome, soient immédiatement compris dans l'Etat catholique et qu'ils soient pris en considération parmi les Esprits et qu'ils bénéficient des lois de la patrie et de toutes les bénéfices, qu'ils ne soient pas jusqu'à présent seulement tolérés, mais sur le même rang que les autres fils de la patrie (David Prodan, 1984: 144-145; Mathias Bernath, 1994: 154-157). Donc, en acceptant l'audacieuse revendication roumaine d'ouvrir aux laïcs unis le chemin des droits politiques (la Cour l'agréait en ce moment-là), l'acte est passée assez rapidement sous le silence.

Les réactions anti-unionistes datent de la deuxième partie de l'année 1701 et débutent avec la lettre expédiée par Pater Ianoș à Atanasie Anghel. Dans la lettre on réaffirmait le droit des roumains de pratiquer leur foi orthodoxe et on faisait appel à la conscience et au jurement de l'ex évêque déposé à Bucarest. Pater Ianoș est soutenu aussi par le proteste du noble Gavril Nagyszegi. Les protestes des roumains contre l'union religieuse étaient accompagnées par la réaction des hiérarques orthodoxes des états voisins. Aux lettres maudites d'Atanasie Anghel, provenues de la part du métropolite de Valachie, Teodosie, et du patriarche Dosoftei, c'est le cardinal Kollonich, l'artisan de l'union des roumains, qui a répondu. Mecontente du geste du dirigeant spirituel était également une partie de l'élite sociale, surtout les roumains de Făgăraș, qui avaient des étroites liaisons spirituelles et économiques avec le monde orthodoxe du sud de Carpathes.

L'union religieuse s'est réalisée dans des conditions politiques extrêmement difficiles. Les pourparlers ont commencé sous le métropolite Teofil, en 1697, ont été menés avec grande discrétion et se sont finalisés en 1701, pendant les temps d'Atanasie Anghel. L'union a commencé timidement, mais à mesure que l'autorité des Habsbourg a grandi en Ardeal, on a fait des pas toujours plus décidés. L'enthousiasme pour l'union n'a pas été grand de la part des roumains. Les jésuites ont orienté leur attention vers les dirigeants de l'Eglise Orthodoxe, en leur présentant les avantages qui découlaient de leur adhésion. En plus, les conditions imposées par les jésuites ont été plus douces que celles imposées déjà par les princes calvins. Il y avait 12 archiprêtres qui se sont prononcés pour l'union dès le début, et à mesure que l'autorité des impériaux a grandi dans la principauté, les roumains ont acquis de la confiance, le nombre des archiprêtres s'est élevé à 38 dans le synode de 1698 et à 54 dans le synode

convoqué par Atanasie Anghel avant son départ pour Vienne. Le point culminant dans les négociations de l'union a été le moment viennois, lorsque le métropolite Atanasie Anghel est ordonné de nouveau prêtre et nommé évêque gréco-catholique, en acceptant un retour et non pas une union à l'Eglise Romano-Catholique et en acceptant une interruption des liaisons avec les Eglises orthodoxes des alentours de Transylvanie.

Dans la vision des impériaux, l'union des églises devait renforcer le timide bloque catholique qui existait dans la Principauté. D'autre part, elle devait dynamiser du point de vue politique et sociale et implicitement, elle devait lier plus étroit à la dynastie un nombreux groupe ethnique et confessionnel marginalisé. Sans l'implication des autorités impériales, l'union de roumains aurait eu peu de chances à se concrétiser. Dans la Transylvanie de la fin du XVIIIème siècle, les esprits de la Principauté étaient dominés par les confessions de la Reforme. Le gouverneur même était calvin. Les adhérents de la reforme regardaient avec de la réticence et même avec hostilité la consolidation de l'Eglise Romano-Catholique. Les autorités impériales se sont impliquées prudemment au début de l'action unioniste. Mais, à mesure que les esprits reformés ont manifesté leur désaccord vis-à-vis de l'union des roumains à l'Eglise de Rome, les autorités impériales ont fait tout le possible pour que les roumains s'unissent seulement avec l'Eglise de Rome.

Par l'attraction des roumains à l'Eglise Greco-Catholique, on a désiré la consolidation de l'Eglise Romano-Catholique et implicitement la domination des Habsbourg en Transylvanie. L'union religieuse des roumains a prouvé des conséquences inattendues même par ceux impliqués dans la réalisation de l'union. Le mouvement national des roumains d'Ardeal trouve ses débuts dans cet acte religieux, mais avec des profondes implications politiques. Egalement, l'union a générée des conflits parmi les roumains gréco-catholiques et les roumains orthodoxes, les derniers sans hiérarchie religieuse pour presque six décennies. C'est dans ce contexte que les roumains orthodoxes de Transylvanie ont fait appel à l'aide de la Russie et des Métropolitans orthodoxes de Karlowitz pour pratiquer leur foi.

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ASPECTS FROM ANGLO-ROMANIAN RELATIONS FROM THE BEGINNING UP TO THE 19TH CENTURY

*Dana PANTEA**

Abstract. *The aim of this study is to show that the Romanian people has had a wide range of relations with England in spite of the great distance between the two and the well known insularity of the English people. We all know about the French influence upon our culture and development of the society, but besides this influence there was another one, the English one, which along centuries of contacts left its mark upon the modern spirituality of the Romanian people.*

Keywords: *England, Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, consul, Ottoman Empire, diplomats*

More often than not it has been said that the Romanian culture and spirit was greatly influenced in its development by the French culture. We have always considered the French as our elder sister and the connections with the French people and France are quite old and diversified. But along the history of our three provinces there were other connections too, even with countries so far as England. When searching for documents proving this idea we can find many notes, reports, books, letters, diplomatic acts.

The first authentic documents concerning the relations between England and the Romanian Principalities date from 1527, when John Wesley, the English ambassador to the king of Bohemia and Hungary, had a discussion with interpreter of the Moldavian Ambassador whom he considered an extraordinary man. The first description of Moldavia, was given to us by a merchant, John Newberie, who left England in 1578 to visit the Levant. Towards the end of the 16th century, Henry Austell visited Moldavia while Peter the Lamé was ruler, and later William Hareborne, Queen Elisabeth's agent at Constantinople went back to England passing through Moldavia.

This principality was also a subject of interest of Levant Company because Peter the Lamé encouraged his country's external trade, especially through his Levantine minister Bartolomeo Brutti, who addressed himself to Queen Elisabeth and assured her of his best feelings as well as of those of his lord. Another thing Peter the Lamé did for the merchants of Levant Company was to fulfill one of their great wishes by giving them the right to buy and sell goods in the country with customs duties of 3% instead of 12% as the local and foreign merchants had to pay. This facility determined an affluence of English merchants in Moldavia during the reign of Peter the Lamé; there are documents which testify that wood was bought for the English boats and which mention the names of

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English merchants and aristocrats who were either passing by or had commercial interests in this area: Richard Mallorye, Henry Cavendish, Thomas Wilcox. In addition to these trade contacts, between Engald and the Romanian provinces there were political contacts too, and the latter involved the princes' request for support to the Ottoman Empire in order to accede to the throne. Petru Cercel, while wandering through the Occident, got to London and, there he sent a letter to Queen Elisabeth's Secretary, Sir John Wolley, asking him to obtain a favourable answer to his request for the English Kingdom to sustain him at the Ottoman Empire to obtain the throne of the Romanian Principality. Another pretender, having the same request, was Ioan Bogdan. But because England was more interested in maintaining the fee privileges it had in the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom supported Prince Aron in whom the country invested large sums of money through its ambassador at Constantinople, Edward Barton. During the reign of Prince Aron, there were a few merchants coming and going through Moldavia such as: Anglesea, Wilcox, Babington, Aldridge, Bushell, but their mission was to reclaim the money invested by Barton for Prince Aron to ascend the throne rather than to do commerce (Demeny, Cernovodeanu, 1974: 17-29).

In 1600 Ștefan Bogdan, after he had taken part in the battle of Flanders, came to the Court of Queen Elisabeth and obtained a letter of recommendation from the queen in order to accede to the throne of Moldavia. But the English Ambassador Henry Lello's intercession for this prince was quite ineffective as the Ottomans sent the prince to prison. Eventually he succeeded to escape and returned to the Court of England where James I was king. We come to know about his presence at the Court from two well-known comedies at that time, *The Silent Woman* written by Ben Jonson and *The Knight of the Burning Pestle* written by Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher (Gavriliu: 1998: 30). In their play, Beaumont and Fletcher present a hall in the palace of the King of Moldavia where, Pampiona, the king's daughter, welcomes the knight (Beza, 1938:253).

In 1666, in a letter written by king Charles II and addressed to Sultan Mahomed, the king mentioned the name of Gheorghe Ștefan for whom he requests support to become again a ruler in Moldavia:

„Charles the Second By the Grace of God King of England Scotland France and Ireland Defender of the Faith To the Most High and Mighty Emperor Sultan Mahomet Cheife Lord and Commander of the Musulman Kingdome Sole and Supreme Monarch of the Easterne Empire Sendeth Greetings; Most High and Mightie Emperor, Our good friend Georgius Stephanus late Prince of Moldavia, having informed Us of his unhappines, to have fallen some yeares since into your disfavor whereby he became dispossessed of his said Principality and reduced by consequence into extreame misery under which he yet suffers, and having besought Our Mediation in his favour in the great compassion Wee have of his distresse remembering how much it is the part of Princes to preserve from contempt and Want, those that have themselves sometimes worne that character, Wee could not refuse him in that suite and have therefore commanded Our Ambassador Extraordinary to your Court, Our Right Trusty and Right Welbeloved Cousin the Earl of Winchelsea, in our Name to beseech your pardon to the said unfortunate Prince, who ownes his happiness to be in your favour, and by it alone, desires to receive restauration to his Estate and Dignity, which he promises, shall be ever employed, in deserving that Grace Wee now aske for him, this Wee have commanded Our Ambassador to say more at large whome we beseech you to heare petiently that and whatever else he hath in charge from Us, and to believe intirely in what he shall say especially when he assures you of the continuance of Our inviolable Frienship and Kindness: And so Wee bid

you High and Mightie Emperor most heartily farewell. Given at Our Royall Palace of Whitehall the fith day of June in the eighteenth yeare of Our Reigne and of the Incarnation of Our Lord 1666.

Your most affectionate friende Charles R. (Beza, 1938: 255-256).

The content of this letter explains the reason of the first relations between the Romanian provinces and England: the powerful England could sustain our interests to the Ottoman Empire. Because of the geographical position of the provinces, and the English commercial interests in the area, there were documents and maps drafted by those who travelled or worked here. Thus the Romanian researcher Marcu Beza, while looking for documents concerning the three provinces, found at British Museum maps representing the flow of the Danube from Belgrad to Pontus Euxin (1665), another map representing the flow of the Olt River in 1707 and another one representing the fortification of Hotin Fortress in 1739.

The Romanian Principality received less attention than Moldavia in this period because there were permanent fights between the Ottomans and the Romanians which made the roads dangerous for the merchants. However, great importance was given to Michael the Brave because the battles he won and the union he fulfilled were a real threat for the English who wanted the Ottomans to be strong in order to take advantage of the tax facilities they offered to Britain on their way to India.

Edward Barton and later Henry Lello, sent both the queen and Lord Burghley and Lord Cecil reports on Michael's activity, his successes and on the Ottomans' attitude towards the Romanian prince. In the English consuls' reports we can find words of praise and a real appreciation of the Romanian ruler's value from the point of view of his military strategy, courage and vision. Barton even supports him to the throne of the Romanian Principality and puts a good word to the Sultan (Gavriliu, 1998: 30-40).

The English-Romanian relations were mentioned again during Constantin Brâncoveanu's reign, when an English bishop who was interested in the Eastern Orthodox Church, came to the Romanian Principality. As England's Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Lord William Paget stopped in Bucharest on his way back home. He was very well received by Constantin Brâncoveanu whom he greatly praised for his wisdom and deep knowledge he proved during their two meetings. During the second audience which took place in the wonderful garden of the palace, Brâncoveanu asked Lord Paget to greet emperor Leopold and to express his grievance regarding the Orthodox Church in Transylvania which was persecuted by the Hungarian and German Jesuits. We can admire the Romanian prince's courage and patriotism and Lord Paget's nobleness who agreed to fulfill this mission. In fact it was the first foreign intercession at the Court of Vienna in favour of the Romanians from Transylvania (Moroianu, 1923: 9). On this journey Lord Paget was accompanied by Chishull, an Anglican priest and scholar who was interested in other things than politics, so that he noticed the discipline and order in the province, the beautiful architecture, the fact that education was encouraged and that the prince's sons spoke Latin and Greek (Iorga, 1931: 23-30).

As soon as the Phanariot reigns were established in the two provinces, their political orientation was drawn towards France and the relations with the English Ambassadors and consuls at the Ottoman Empire were more and more rare.

Transylvania's relations with England were different from those of the other provinces, here religion had a great impact upon them. There were Romanian students who, because of the pressure to turn to the Catholic faith, converted to Calvinism, so that they were sent to study in Oxford, Cambridge and London at the mid of the 17th century.

It is also here that the systematic study of the English language began: in Bihor county is printed the first English grammar in the South-East Europe, *Anglicum Spicilegium*, attributed to George Csipkes, and Samuel Juhasz Kaposi studied at Oxford and then taught English language and elements of England's history and geography at *Aiud College*.

The late 17th century and the early 18th marked an increasing in the English-Romanian contacts: Nicolae Mavrocordat kept a correspondence with the Archbishop of Canterbury, Mihail Halici from Banat county studied in London in 1694-1712 or 1715, Antiochus Cantemir was the Ambassador of Russia in London and the Transylvanian priest Dămian Samoilă studied in Oxford and was a good friend with Benjamin Franklin, thus the connections went even overseas (Dragos, 1996: 23).

From a political point of view the English wanted to be present in the Black Sea area in order to counterbalance Russia's power and France's desire to expand its influence. But the beginning of the 18th century meant also the economic decline of the Levant Company and it was the second come down of England's influence in the area. The English merchants didn't stand aside completely, they were still interested in Bulgaria's and the Romanian provinces' natural resources where from they bought grains and timber and sold cloth and manufactured goods. Because of these exchanges there were travellers who crossed the three provinces, some of them wrote down their impressions and even published them. An example in this respect is Lady Elisabeth Craven who, because of a road accident had to stay a day in Bucharest where she was received at Nicolae Mavrogheni's Court. From her writings we know that she found a strange atmosphere here, a mixture of Turkish milieu characterized by its specific music and clothing mingled with a European one in which French and Italian were spoken. Lady Craven spent some time with the prince's wife and was amazed by the vestments of the maids in waiting: those coming from Constantinople were wearing turbans while the Romanian ones were wearing expensive fur caps. The prince's wife admired her guest's English clothes and would have liked to have her as a guest for a year. Lady Craven described the lunch she had with the prince and his wife and was very proud to notice that the cutlery was made in England. She also described the small towns she crossed, the beauty of the places she passed through, the houses, the churches and the peasants who were so eager to help anyone having problems (Gavriliu, 1998: 39-40).

In 1792 the English doctor Adam Neal, when traveling to Poland passed through Moldavia and he was charmed by the beautiful scenery, the flat plains with herds of cows, the orchards as well as by the folk art. In 1802, another traveller, Clarke, left some notes about the Romanian peasant whom he found to be so good-humoured in spite of the poverty he was living in.

In 1802, following many negotiations and long postponings from the Porte, England succeeded in obtaining free trade activity in The Black Sea and Low Danube under the old conditions, namely customs fees of 3% and litigations judged by mixed commissions. During this period the English draw their attention upon the two Romanian Principalities because of the instability created by the rivalry between the great three powers: Russia, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire. This situation made Thomas Elgin, the English Ambassador in Constantinople take the decision of establishing a consulate here, which, according to the memorandum he sent to London, could facilitate sending the diplomatic correspondence between Constantinople and Vienna and encourage the English trade in the principalities. Thomas Elgin never received an official answer from the Foreign Office, but in spite of this he established a consulate in Bucharest, and the first General Consul of Great Britain in the Romanian Principality and Moldavia was Francis Summerers (Cernovodeanu, 1986: 20-23).

Thomas Thorton, well known writer, merchant and England's consul in Odessa, knew Moldavia and Wallachia very well and left a valuable and accurate presentation of the two principalities.

On the 24th of November 1814, England's Consul General, William Wilkinson enjoyed a solemn entrance both in Iași and Bucharest where he was accredited. The result of his short stay in the two Principalities were the notes he made about the two countries, which he published under the title *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia*, in London in 1820. It is the first book written in the English language regarding only the two principalities. Wilkinson worked as a real historian, he went to see the ruins of the bridge built by Traian, the traces of the Roman road in Caracal and he began his work saying that the Dacians were the ancestors of our people. He dedicated two chapters of his work to the two capitals: Iași and Bucharest; Iași was highly praised for its elegant houses built in the most modern West-European architectonic style. Wilkinson praised the Romanian art, was the first to give an appreciative description of the Arges Monastery, but he couldn't see the value of the Romanian civilization expressed through the art of churches and monasteries (Iorga, 1931: 46-51).

The situation became complicated during the movement led by Tudor Vladimirescu because of bloody reprisals from Turkey and because of Russia's clearly expansionist desire. The Greeks, Serbs and Romanians showed emancipation tendencies a fact that suited Russia who was interested in dividing the Ottoman Empire but put England in a difficult position because she had to fight both the Russian intercession in the Principalities and the Turkish reprisals. The hard political confrontations between Russia and Turkey, which could easily lead to war, did not serve England's politics and economic interests. As a consequence England informed Russia that she didn't agree with the dividing of the Ottoman Empire while Turkey was asked to remove its troops from the Principalities. In 1822 new rulers were appointed in the two Principalities: Grigore Ghica in Wallachia and Ion Sandu Sturza in Moldavia.

Following the changes in South-East Europe, England changed her criteria concerning the commercial policy. The Levant Company which had been operating for two hundred years had become anachronistic and was dissolved and its duties were taken over by the Foreign Office. As a consequence Canning reestablished the British consulates in the two provinces, which, this time, were officially recognized. The consulates had both political and economic attributions as they had to supervise Russia and to stimulate commerce on the Danube and the Black Sea (Cernovodeanu, 1986: 43-47).

The first appointed consul was E. L. Blutte, an agent of the Embassy in Constantinople, who took up his duties in 1826. Blutte proved to know the Romanians and their ideals well enough to support them in fulfilling their union in one single state which was to include the Romanians not only from Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, but also those from Banat and Bucovina. His diplomatic reports about the Romanian provinces were so highly appreciated that the English published them under the title *Correspondence respecting the Organization of the Danubian Principalities, 1828-1836. Printed for the Use of the Foreign Office, July, 1878*, in order to be used by the English diplomacy.

Following the Adrianople Peace Treaty in 1829 the economic connections between England and the Principalities started to develop, Galați and Brăila ports were enlarged, steamships began crossing the Danube while the abolition of the compulsory tributes to the Porte and the acquiring of the full administrative autonomy granted the growth of the agricultural production and the Principalities' accession to the modern

European economies. As a result of these freedoms and economic development in 1834 was founded the first English trading house patronized by George Bell and Andrew Lockhart Anderson, who aimed to purchase local products and sell British goods. In order to support the British trade, two vice-consulates were established in Galați and Brăila. This development was not seen with good eyes by Russia because the Romanian ports competed with Odessa, and, as a consequence, the Russians imposed very high customs duties especially for the English vessels which they stopped even eight times before they reached the port of destination.

Having secured its communication with India and the colonies in the Far East, England followed a policy to pursue free trade in the Mediterranean Sea area, a policy very well supported by Lord Palmerstone. But Russia has acquired a greater share of trade in the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube and secured the support of Austria and Prussia in its policy towards the Ottoman Empire, which led to a strengthening of its control in the Pontic-Danubian Basin, in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, thereby jeopardizing England's economic and political interests.

Thus, in England, there came into being a Russia phobia current which was enhanced by the pitiless repression of the Polish insurrection of 1830-1831 and the abusive behaviour of Tsar Nicholas I. Under these circumstances, although some British diplomats such as Richard Cobden and Lord Durham, supported Russia, England strove to point out that the Turks were not quite so undeveloped, but on the contrary, their institutions could be modernized as well as their country.

The Oriental crisis burst again in 1839 through the conflict between Turkey and Egypt, the latter being sustained by Russia who intended to destroy the relationship between France and England which seemed to her quite dangerous. England had Lord Palmerstone as a strong negotiator who succeeded in neutralizing both Russia and France by organizing a convention according to which France's hegemonic tendencies in the Oriental Mediterranean Sea were brought to an end, Austria and Prussia's support for the new regulations was secured, concessions for the international commerce on the Low Danube were also obtained (Cernovodeanu, 1986: 96-101).

This is the background against which the two principalities started fighting to obtain England's support in order to gain more freedom both from Russia and Turkey. Having this aim the Romanians resorted to London newspapers that were interested in this problem, sent Lord Palmerstone a memorandum signed by the national party in which they stated that Russia and Turkey usurped their sovereignty and that they refused to comply with the Organic Regulation which was imposed by means of foreign pressure and not by the agreement of the national assemblies.

Prince Alexandru Ghica tried a rapprochement to England through Colquhoun, the English consul who followed Blütte and who had worked in Bucharest for almost 25 years. The English consul had Alecu Mavrocordat on his side too as the Romanians hoped England would support them at the Porte for more autonomy. But Alexandru Ghica's demure attitude determined Colquhoun to approach the opposition represented by the national party led by Ion Câmpineanu. The latter went to London after talking with the English ambassador at Constantinople, Posonby, who also gave him a recommendation to the Prime Minister. Ion Câmpineanu was received by Lord Palmerstone and during the discussion that took place Câmpineanu informed him about the Romanians' desire of independence from Russia and Turkey, and the support they asked from England. Câmpineanu also met with other English Members of Parliament, such as Lord Dudley, Lord Morpith, but unfortunately he could only get vague promises according to which

England would sustain the Romanians when the conditions were favourable. Câmpineanu's visit wasn't dedicated only to political problems. Following Ion Voinescu's advice to travel a lot and get informed about the English way of living, about their activities in the manufactures and factories so that he might teach the people at home, Câmpineanu visited Birmingham and Liverpool and later on he confessed in a letter that what he saw in the evolution of manufacturing was a miracle (Dragos, 1996: 30).

There were other Romanian political personalities who went to London: Ion Ghica, Dimitrie Crețulescu, Nicolae Golescu, Dimitrie Brătianu; Brătianu would come back later, in 1848 in order to prepare the revolution. All of them found in the person of David Urquhart, a secretary at England's Embassy in Constantinople, Scottish by origin, a strong supporter of the Romanians' problems. Contacts with the British government had also Ion Heliade Radulescu, Nicolae Bălcescu, Iancu Alecsandri who wrote his impressions about England in his letters addressed to his brother, the well known writer Vasile Alecsandri.

Regarding the Union Act, the evolution of the political events was different in Moldavia and in the Romanian Principality, but when Cuza was elected ruler in both provinces, Colquhoun turned into a defender of the interests of the Porte, although he admitted in a report that Cuza was reasonable and prudent in matters of foreign policy. While France easily recognized Cuza's election in both provinces, England was very cautious because of the difficulties she had with India. An English personality who had always supported the union was Gladstone who admitted this in a letter addressed to Stroe Dumitru Bratianu while the latter was at the head of the League in Paris in 1891:

Dear Sir,

As somebody who 35 years ago did everything he could in the favour of the Romanians' prosperity by sustaining the Union of the Danube Principalities, I can assure you that I am still interested in their prosperity and upon my return to England, I hope to be able to read the brochure you so kindly sent me.

Yours truthful servant,

W. E. Gladstone

Brighton, 7th of April, 189 (Moroianu, 1923:17-18)

In order to obtain the benevolence of the great powers, Cuza sent his ambassadors to the European capitals: Vasile Alecsandri was sent to London and Turin, Ștefan Golescu was sent to Paris and Berlin. In London Vasile Alecsandri met lord Malmersbury, lord Claredon and lord Russel with very good results, but the English left the final recognition of the Union to the Conference in Paris. Lord Cowley, the British representative at the Conference, eventually recommended the Ottoman Empire to accept the double election but only during Cuza's rule. John Green, England's new consul in Bucharest, in spite of the fact that he cared about the Romanians, could see their evolution only through the prejudices caused to the British relations and interests with the Porte. Another consul, Churchill, supported the initiative of establishing a Romanian diplomatic agency in London as favourable to the development of the commercial relations between Romania and England, but Lord Russell's answer was negative.

Cuza went on fighting to remove the bipartisan rule of the country, and surprisingly, this time England was in favour of the memorandum sent by the Romanian ruler. This attitude was due to Bulwer's support, who admired and trusted Cuza, and to Alecsandri's diplomatic activity in London. When seeing England's new attitude, Cuza

declared that he was sure the Union would be fulfilled because he had England's support, „which was more precious than any other country's” (Arhiva Cuza, mapa XIV, f, 285). In 1864 and 1865 Cuza's activity was made known in the English press, *Morning Post* wrote about the reforms which were done in a couple of months, about the people's support for their ruler, about the strong government with capable ministers. When Cuza was forced to abdicate the provisional government asked again England to agree with the Romanians' desire, but England sustained Charles I only in order to avoid a military intervention. Again the British Empire acted according to its own interests (Cernovodeanu, 1986: 256). Lord Lyons, England's Ambassador in Constantinople, helped Charles I to be recognized as king of Romania while his successor, Sir H. Elliot was completely against him as he thought that the Principalities should not be apart from the Ottoman Empire.

In 1874 the Romanian king together with his wife, payed a visit in England but he was received neither by Queen Victoria nor by Lord Derby, the Foreign Minister but only by the Prince and Princess of Wales and the Duke of Edinburgh.

The government in Bucharest tried many times to establish a commercial agency in London because the trade was developing, Romania was buying clothing, cotton, iron, agricultural machinery while England was buying grains. Each time England's answer was a negative one.

This is the background against which the Oriental crisis burst again and developed as never before. At the beginning Romanian's position was a neutral one but eventually the country took part in the war and gained its independence, which was the most important historic event after the Union. England's consul in Bucharest criticized Romania's participation in the war, but at the same time he recognized the courage of the Romanian army and asked help from the Red Cross in England for the injured soldiers (Cernovodeanu, 1986: 331).

The following years the relations between England and Romania were not very close even if princess Maria, Duke of Edinburgh's daughter married King Ferdinand I and became Queen of Romania. There were other kinds of connections: many English books were translated into Romanian, the English language was studied in schools, but the commercial relations didn't develop according to the existing possibilities.

Transylvania's relations with England are completely different from those of the other provinces. If at the beginning of the 17th century there were diplomatic relations, later on the relations became cultural and confessional ones. There were books written about Austria and Hungary where we can find different things about Transylvania. Such a book is *Travels in Hungary in 1818* written by F. S. Beuden, published in London in 1823, where we can find descriptions of Transylvania, its climate, the relations between the nationalities. In 1839 reverend G. R. Gleig wrote about the meetings he had in Transylvania, about the inhabitants' attitude towards the Protestant religion in his book *Germany, Bohemia and Hungary visited in 1837*. Many students from this province went to study in England and because of this the education system developed much quicker than in Romania.

The Anglo-Romanian relations have evolved for a long period of time and known a wide range of fields: political and commercial at the very beginning, while the cultural contacts have developed later during the long process of knowing each other. As England has been a powerful country along centuries and because the industrial revolution started there it has also become a model, an effective example especially for a country such as Romania, where modernization was imperative. That's why Romanians from all three provinces go to England, but each having his own interest. If at the very beginning of the

contacts with England the aim was mainly political, to ask for support in order to obtain the throne, the interests changed according to the personality who visited England. For example Petrache Poenaru was interested in industry, manufactures, technical problems, communication; Vasile Alecsandri and Jean Bart, both writers, left in their books the image of the most civilized country. Vasile Alecsandri, who was also a diplomat, together with Ion Ghica drew their attention upon the problems of the Union and Independence. There are many notes, articles private and diplomatic letters which give us a great picture of England wherefrom we find out the details of British everyday life, the social life of different classes, the traditions, religion, the educational system, the parliament system.

The Romanians went to England not only to ask for political support, but also to observe, to learn and to bring back all this knowledge and disseminate it at home so that the Romanians could live a better life. The travellers and the diplomats admired the bicameral English Parliament, and the constitutional monarchy, models which finally they succeeded to implement in their country. They also admired the English woman who was so independent and emancipated as compared to the Romanian one. The educational system in England was also a model for establishing new schools in the three provinces.

Many times it has been said that the Romanians have a special philia for the French people who influenced the formation and development of our culture and society. But the modern spirituality of the Romanian people was formed not only under the French and German influence, but also the English spirit penetrates the Romanian collective mentality, thus the English culture becomes a model for the Romanian culture.

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ROMANIA'S EXTERNAL POLICY IN THE REPORTS OF THE PORTUGUESE DIPLOMAT MARTINHO DE BREDERODE

Alina STOICA*

Abstract. *This paper complements the previous ones with a study about the Portuguese-Romanian diplomatic relations. Walking on the footsteps of representative personalities of the Portuguese diplomacy, Martinho Teixeira Homem de Brederode de Cunha, I tried here to present the Romanian foreign policy, in the western politician view. He surprised an unstable landscape in Romania, aggravated by frequent changes of government, factionalism of parties and the transition from one party to another. The internal policy of the inter-war Romanian state obviously influenced the external policy, which Martinho de Brederode surprises in his reports sent to Lisbon.*

Keywords: *diplomacy, external policy, policy, Romania, Portugal.*

The characteristic of the inter-war period, in European and even global plan, was the doctrinaire opposition between socialism and capitalism, „the contradiction between the first socialist state in the world and the bourgeois states which interfered to stop the soviet revolution” (Campus 1980: 248). For the Romanian external policy, the main issue was the consolidation of the Romanian unitary national state, by recognizing the decisions of the peace conferences at the end of the First World War.

In this context, the Portugal interest and implicitly that of Martinho de Brederode for the Romania's economic policy, created the premises for giving a special attention to all the Romanian politic life sectors and also to the external policy adopted by Romania after 1919.

A series of extremely important issues couldn't be postponed. Among them was the problem of military demobilization, watched with interest by Martinho de Brederode. He appreciated that “Romania has under the weapons a big army, which costs millions of lei ⁶and which will pull out from the agriculture and industry almost all the useful arms. But, considering the uncertain situation at the border and especially from Hungary, there are some that believe that demobilization would be inappropriate” (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, no. 129, 17 Dec. 1922, f.5).

Another issue, provoked by the transformations in the international political system, by changing the European map and the decrease of international security, especially the European one, as consequence of the decisions inside the peace treaties (1919 – 1920), imposed to Romania the necessity to organize an efficient security system.

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His call directed most to the states from the Central and South – Eastern Europe, with the same international statute, but also to the Great Powers whose political support was absolutely necessary (Campus, 1980: 247). Besides Romania, Czechoslovakia, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Poland, Greece etc., were interested in defending “their national being and state unity, (...) which can allow them a peaceful development, in an atmosphere still polluted by the idea of force” (Campus, 1980: 247).

In this respect, the Portuguese diplomat mentioned in his diplomatic correspondence with Lisbon “Territorial dispute between Czechoslovakia and Romania, where it is stated that a representative of the first power noted was sent to the powers referred to in such a way that could not be accepted” (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, no.44, 8 May 1920, f.2). The Portuguese Minister was referring to an article that appeared in the journal *L'Orient*. He does not seem very convinced by the statements that ended his comment as follows “I do not know how truth it is in any of this. This again argues that it is not enough to be intelligent and hardworking, but it takes some preparation that only a career can give you” (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, nr.44, 8 May 1920, f.3), allusion to the manner in which the Czechoslovak authorities tried to resolve the dispute with Romania. Basically it is a series of diplomatic negotiations held between the two countries, which were settled by the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920.

Since August 8, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference, Versailles has decided the border between Romania and Czechoslovakia (AMAE, Bucharest, Fund Convention, volume 13, S 2, the note of August 8, 1919), without consulting the two states. Subsequently, during 1921, 1922 and 1923, Romania and Czechoslovakia moved to ratify the Treaty of Sevres, which they signed in late 1920. “Thus, Czechoslovakia gave Romania eight communes and an area of 175 km² with a population of 10,800 inhabitants, of whom 7093 Romanian and Romania gave Czechoslovakia three municipalities with an area of 60 square kilometers and a population of 3112 inhabitants, 6 of which Romanian” (Campus, 1980: 232).

The Romanian-Hungarian border was still in dispute. The appliances of the decisions of Trianon were achieved with difficulty. The Portuguese diplomat stated in his correspondence that the Romanian authorities had not withdrawn yet the Romanian troupes from Hungary and were still not going to make it according to the speech of the Minister of War during the National Day of the Old Kingdom, 10 May 1920. “The weapon, Sire, remains the vigilant sentinel on the country's border” (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 43, May 13, 1920, f.1), stated the Gen. Ioan Rascanu. “This conduct is necessary for Your Majesty to new victories” (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 43, May 13, 1920, f.4). Once in the press, the comments made in this regard that day, determined the neighbor states to complain. “It seems that none of Romania's neighbors feel too much sympathy to this country” (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 43, May 13, 1920, f.4), the Portuguese diplomat stated. “Romania has against the unflinching hatred of two powerful neighbors, two countries now much mutilated and battered, but with more nerve, Hungary and Bulgaria. Sympathy for Romania in the European East, I do not think that exists today all the way to Poland” (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 43, May 13, 1920, f.2-4).

The relations between Romania and Hungary in 1922 are still very tense. “I send you attached three reports, with reference to the refusal of passport to visit the Hungarian and Romanian soldiers, who are quite important. The Hungarian Minister is still lacking.

(...) He was in an extended vacation (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 84, 24 oct.1922, f.1).

The passport problem becomes serious. A few days later, on 31 October 1922, newspapers in Bucharest issued a press release given by the Hungarian legation in Bucharest, which it stated "that passports will no longer cover Romanian subjects because the Romanian legation in Budapest would have stopped too the Hungarian passport visa. The news is completely untrue. The Romanian Legation in Budapest has not ceased to grant visas passports to Hungarian subjects. The Hungarian Legation measure is therefore unfounded and caused our government to approach decisively to the Government of Hungary" (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, no.34, 31 Oct.1922, f.9).

On the other hand, the Romania's interests to attract Poland in a zonal alliance brought to the attention of the press in Poland and Romania and implicitly that of the diplomats in Bucharest, interested in knowing the developments. Here is what Brederode wrote: "The journals here speak more about the Polish offensive and Ukraine. It remains to know if there is somehow a straw fire"(ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, 34, 31 oct.1922, f.10). And in relation to the past history of this state, the Portuguese minister continues: "The reality is that historically, with Poland you never know. There are many who believe that with a so strong Russia, it is seen handcuffed between Germany and Russia. The rumor about Ukraine makes me a vague impression. Here we will know exactly what is happening in Russia, but the reality is that the Soviet Republic almost entirely dominates the old and enormous Tsarist Empire. The reality is that there were beaten all the original fantasy produced by the Entente. And now came the Bolshevik troops in Rostov, and Georgia and Armenia appeared on the verge of following the fate of Azerbaijan. What matters is that despite all the flaws of the Soviet regime, Russia still has, perhaps unconsciously, the feeling of national consciousness, the opposition to everything foreign. That is why there are many people who do not believe in the stability of the small Baltic republics and neither in the Ukraine stability. I can not believe that the Soviet regime will preserve only the boundaries in which it had been achieved. I do not believe in restoring the small Republic of Pakistan, nor that of Ukraine. It is hard to believe that the Soviets will continue as it was originally. Whatever the regime, installed in Russia, it would have never accepted under, any circumstances, the mutilation [State - Ed]. And hence this phenomenon for the reintegration of its members separately, Soviet Russia was trying to do now. This may be the reason of a supreme existence, the ultimate reason of resistance or actually the victorious Russian national aspirations" (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, 34, 31 oct.1922, f.12), the Portuguese diplomat concluded.

The arrival of the Polish Marshal Jozef Pilsudski Klemens, the creator of the Polish state, "an excellent observer of international geo-strategic realities" (Hrenciuc, 2004: 169) in late 1919 and early 1920, in Bucharest, was an occasion to discuss the creation of a federation of Eastern states as a barrier to the revisionist tendencies of Germany and Bolshevik Russia (Dascălu, 1991: 9-10). The project could not materialize, but the two countries, Romania and Poland, have signed a defensive alliance Convention on 3 March 1921. A year later, concluding the relations between the two countries, Martinho de Brederode stated: "I think that Poland has more affinity to Hungary than to the Little Entente, and it seems that until now it have not finalized the agreements proposed by Romania [This is the signing of agreements with Serbia-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and Czechoslovakia - Ed]. In general it is used the phrase Little Entente and Poland" (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, no.34, 31 oct.1922, f.9).

The diplomatic skills of the Portuguese Minister became obvious, as we have already seen in earlier chapters, also in the relation to ministers of Yugoslavia and Greece, by the information provided to him about their country and helped him to write reports to send later to Lisbon. He would have done anything to avoid lengthy undertaking visits in the two countries, which also had been accredited with Romania. Here's what he wrote about it: "My fellow Serbs and Greeks have proved to be good and friendly colleagues. I invited the Serbia's Charged of Affairs to dinner here twice with Rallique, the Charge of Affaires of England Chateaubriand, after the derby where we attended together. Thursday I had lunch at the British Legation. Next Saturday I invited to dine with me at Chateaubriand all the Greece Legation (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, 34, 31 oct.1922, f.13).

The flirtations between Portugal and Yugoslavia sought also economic issues, "the Charge of Affaires of Serbia told me a few days ago that Serbia now has more forests and cereals than Romania and all this might serve, but this is difficult due to the situation of Fiume, which is a problem of irredentism" (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, no.46, 15 May 1920, f.1). After the affirmations of Martinho de Brederode, it was necessary that Portugal waits for the transit through Fiume to be truly free. "However, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, will never accept Fiume to remain in Italian hands. They will never accept to be so suffocated and strangled by Italy. Not only them, but neither Hungary, Czechoslovakia nor Austria can accept such a situation. But, who now inherits the imperialist policy of the former Austro-Hungary, is Italy, which is always more and more persistent and greedy and Poland, which also follows the same steps of double ancient monarchies" (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 46, May 15, 1920, F.6), claimed the Portuguese minister in Bucharest.

The Romanian-Bulgarian border too, in 1920, was not yet pacified. Martinho de Brederode said in a report issued in June 22, 1920, a few issues regarding a Bulgarian note, an answer to a Romanian note, which claimed the Bulgarian continuing incursions in the Romanian Dobrogea. "A few days ago it seemed they invaded several villages in Dobrogea and did a lot of killing and stealing. They say they are led by Bulgarian officers in uniform. It seems that the ambush occurred as a result to the idea of marriage to King Boris by Marioara Princess, hoping to obtain the support of Romania against Serbia" (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 22, June 22, 1922, f.1). The peace in Europe was again hanging by a thread.

In the same vein, according to the diplomatic correspondence of Martinho de Brederode, the diplomatic relations between Romania and Bulgaria have followed their natural course. On November 4, 1922 Stambolinski, the representative of Bulgaria, was received with enough sympathy by the government in Bucharest and the Romanian companies. "It produced an effect of a holy man with good intentions, the Portuguese diplomat specified, who evidently has paid for his country's interests, but that seems to want to live well with its neighbors, which is quite rare in the history of Bulgaria. He is head of the Peasant Party in Bulgaria, which represented the majority of the nation, since more than 90% of Bulgarians are peasants and farmers. He came to discuss with the Romanian government regarding the Bulgarian state's claims that seem fair" (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 90, 4 noi.1922, f.1), Martinho de Brederode stated.

Neither the matter of the Little Entente was forgotten by Martinho de Brederode, who stated in a diplomatic note issued on 11 November 1922, to which he attached several articles cut from newspapers, on Bulgaria's entry into the alliance, that "Stambolinski went to Switzerland [in Lausanne]. Before departure he said he was very well received in

Belgrade - visit made after Bucharest - and that any power will not be able to prevent the sincerity of the relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia" (Dimineata, no.311, 1922:2).

On 9 May 1920, Brederode commented in a report of his an article found in the Romanian newspaper *L'Indépendance de la Roumaine, La Mer Noire et les Detroits*. After presenting the broad content, the Portuguese diplomat stated: "an interesting article, from a historic point of view and also because the general opinion of the Romanians, as reflected in this article, is that Romania has sacrificed too much for the Great Powers and especially the United States that do not enjoy here in this time, too much sympathy. The UK, either, has not been spared more".

The Hungarian plan for a Danube Confederation, which according to the Bucharest authorities would have undermined the national sovereignty of the Romanians and the other two Central European nations, appeared to be well received by London, Viorel V. Tilea's opinion, "especially Hungary that had offered to the English capital the participation as well as the control of industries and railways" (AMAE, *fond Conventii*, Raportul no. 2157/8 June 1920). The arrival of the British Admiral Sir Trowbridge in Belgrade, as Commissioner of the British Government to examine the new regime of the Danube region, was followed by an interminable series of articles in *L'Indépendance de la Roumaine*, whose objective was to provide England's well defined position on the issue of Danube. "The Condition of the Black Sea, the Straits and the Openings of Danube, until yesterday, was still part of the Eastern Question", stated the author (*L'indépendance de la Roumanie* (Bucharest), 1920, no. 102, 9 May). Now, after Russia's imperialism has disappeared, the issue was "who will take to resolve these conflicts and which states are most interested in the freedom of the Black Sea and the Straits Region" (*L'Indépendance de la Roumanie* (Bucharest), 1920, no. 102, 9 May). On 10 May 1920, Martinho de Brederode announced the sending of an article from the Progress, that appeared two days ago, entitled *La question du Danube*: "I believe that I am not wrong if I say that it was in part inspired by the British Legation. In any event, inspired or not, is obviously an honest and "fair mise" à point on this issue"(ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 46, May 10, 1922), the Portuguese diplomat concluded .

Romania could not accept such a situation and was seeking for support across Europe especially in London and Paris. As a response to the English policy, France encouraged the Hungarian aspirations, because it was promised in return the rail network operation and regulation of the Danube and Tisa-Danube channel. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia joined the Romanian steps (Campus, 1980: 220-222). After extensive debates on international level, the final status of the Danube was established on 23 July 1921 and on 8 August 1921 it appeared in the Official Gazette. According to the issued document, "the navigation on the river was free and opened to all flags" (Scurtu, 1991: 450).

In the analysis made upon the Romania's relations with its neighbors, Martinho de Brederode also considered the Romanian state relations with Russia, which he describes as rather reserved. In a report posted on 16 November 1922 and sent to Lisbon, the Portuguese diplomat commented on an official announcement of the Russian government, published in *Izvestia*, the official journal of the same government. The article was published on the eve of the disarmament Conference in Moscow "to which my report No. 55 referred to, in which Russia stated that it is willing to have normal relations with Romania, but does not allow the early conditions with ultimatum character and that the presence of Romania at the conference is desired, but excluding the preconditions" (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, no.109, 16 noi.1922, f.1). (...) "And I should mention that Russia Soviets kept a note of superiority of the former Tsarist Empire, and

speaks like a true sovereign, addressing to a much vassal country. In addition, Romania's participation in this conference is conditioned on resolving the issue of Bessarabia". (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, no.109, 16 noi.1922, f.1).

In a Report dating of 29 May 1923, Martinho de Brederode highlighted in some of the documents sent in Lisbon, that he was named "Dean of Allied Powers Ministers in Bucharest" (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, No. 37, May 29, 1923, f.1). In this capacity he was invited to a dinner attended by the Japanese legation in Bucharest, in honor of His Majesty, King of Romania. Among foreign diplomats, Martinho was the only guest.

Another marvelous dinner was also given in honor of the royal family by the Legation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which Martinho de Brederode could not miss because of its dual qualities especially the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and at the same time head of the Portuguese Legation in Belgrade (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, series D, no.7, 13 June 1922, f.2).

Bulgaria's revisionist tendencies aimed at the Romanian State shortly after the Treaty of Neuilly (27 November 1919). The loss of the southern Dobrogea area particularly rich in cereals, has led to numerous unofficial armed incursions by the Bulgarians. The massacres of June 1922, already mentioned in the previous pages, were retaken in July 1924. In his report Martinho de Brederode stated the presence of some gangs in Braila, apparently formed of Bulgarians. "Two girls were abducted. They came from wealthy families" (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, series A, 142, 22 July 1924, f.1).

In August 1924, the Portuguese diplomat stated: "The Bulgarian authorities have recently discovered in many places in the country arms and ammunition depots, which are said to be of Russian origin, which justifies the many explosions that have occurred lately in this country [Bulgaria - Ed] (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, series A, no.161, 7 aug.1924, f.3).

According to the Portuguese diplomat, the attitude of Bulgaria, in alliance with the USSR, is a response to the policy of the Little Entente in the Balkans - Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Czechoslovakia - whose primary purpose was to ensure the security and the territorial status quo of the Member States (ADMAE, Lisbon, dos M de B, CX 137, series A, no.161, 7 aug.1924, f.3-4). But the policy contravened the interests of the defeated States and the USSR.

Following the events of the times from the international political scene, where in the interwar period the League of Nations had played the leading role, Martinho de Brederode wrote in his report dated August 7, 1924, the presence of the Portuguese delegate, M. Ferreira, to the committee of opium meeting held under the auspices of the League of Nations. Obviously he made the necessary arrangements for the publication of this information in the Bucharest press (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, series A, nr.161, July aug.1924, f.4).

Romania's foreign policy and relations with neighbors also appear in the Report recorded on 21 August 1924. "The danger for Europe is the outbreak of a war in the Balkans, where the situation is tenser than ever. Since 1919 I have always said in my reports, that it will be very likely that this East European to be the spark that will cause a new war, at least European. (...) Seeing the attitude of the Bulgarians and the Turks and given the fact that we are in the Balkans, knowing also the common racial origin, and now seeing many common interests and dislikes, I tend to believe that these alliance attempts [opinion - the Turkish-Bulgarian negotiations - Ed] are, if not yet an absolute reality, at least very likely. And it would not surprise me some interest in this regard also from Hungary"(ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, series A, No.177, 21 aug.1924, f.1).

The Bulgarian protests aimed obviously, at the Serbian-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. "On the night of August 17, Yugoslavia's military attacked, Colonel Milcovich, returning from a trip by car, [outside Bucharest - Ed] was attacked with gunfire. The Yugoslavia's ambassador protested, including to the President [Council of Ministers - Ed] of Bulgaria (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, series A, no.178, 21 aug.1924, f.1).

The Portuguese diplomat reports also include extensive information on the Little Entente, received from the key officials of the politics of the moment. On occasion of some banquets, Martinho de Brederode had the opportunity to learn the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs: "Duca has no confidence in this combination [The Little Understanding], where Poland will not join, the moreover that Russia is nearby and has not been accepted into the League of Nations. (...) I asked him if The Little Understanding will take action in case of Hungary's repressive actions [on Romania - Ed] and his response was that Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, yes definitely, perhaps Poland less, that delay the entry into the Alliance [The Little Understanding - nn]" (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, series A, no.178, 21 aug.1924, f.4).

He was referring too to the Little Understanding also in a report dated June 21, 1928, in which he narrated the discussion taken during a reception given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Palace, with Titulescu, Benes and Marincovici. The discussion was held around the idea of disarmament, and the opinion was almost universally unanimous. They wanted peace, but always had to be prepared for a possible attack. From his report we learn that he knew Benes personally, for seven years. (ADMA, Lisbon, M dos B, CX 137, series A, no.178, 21 June 1928, f.2).

The superficiality and rareness of reports sent to Lisbon by Martinho de Brederode after 1923-1924, can be attributed to the fact that the liberal governments were much more settled, less troubled by infighting, with a coherent internal and external policy. On the other hand the European diplomacy tends to sit on the principles of collective security by the League of Nations, a process of approaching the USSR being launched, to attract the powerful state in the East European foreign policy concern. On the other hand we consider relevant in this case the economic crisis that broke out in 1929 and its impact on Romania.

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THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL LAW BETWEEN THE TREATY OF ROME AND THE LISBON STRATEGY

*Adrian-Claudiu POPOVICIU**

Abstract. *The globalization of economy determines the European countries' competitiveness to become a categorical imperative. The increase of the competitiveness and the protection of the social rights do not exclude each other, on the contrary, the innovative social policy plays an essential role in the protection and increase of the European economy competitiveness inside the global economy. The high educational standards, an effective and efficient protection against some risks like illnesses, accidents, unemployment, as a protection of the living level of elder people, represents decisive factors for a company's competitiveness in the age of globality. For these reasons, the actual social policy plays a key role in the global economic competition.*

Keywords: *European social policy, European social law, European worker, free movement of workforce*

European Social Policy

If, at the beginning, the European construction was concentrated mainly on economic development, by synchronizing the incident sector policies of the founding states, the community social problematic was less important, being an accessory element of the economic goal. In this way, the European social policy was, for a long time, limited to the mere avoidance of syncope in a competition, created by different social standards, and to the increase of the employees' mobility. From the establishment of the Internal Market¹ and since the European Union dedicated itself to the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union², the importance of ancillary social issues in EU policies has grown. The

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¹ The Internal Market concept was introduced by the European Single Act, which entered into force in July 1987. This stipulated: extending the Community's competences in certain politic fields (social, research and environmental policy); gradual establishment of the single market by the end of 1992, by implementing a comprehensive legislative program that involves the adoption of hundreds of directives and regulations; increased use of Qualified Majority Vote in the Council of Ministers.

² Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the process by which the economic and monetary policies of the Member States of the Union are harmonized in order to introduce the single currency. It has been the object of the second Intergovernmental Conference in December 1990. The Treaty provides the creation of the economic and monetary Union in three stages: - First stage (1 July 1990 to 31 December 1993): free movement of capital between Member States, better coordination of economic policies and closer cooperation between central banks; - Phase II (1 January 1994 to 31 December 1998): the convergence of economic and monetary policies of the Member States (in order to ensure price stability and sound public finances); the establishing of the European Monetary Institute (EMI)

social – politic responsibilities of the EU had been developed in the European Unique Act³ and in the Protocol on social policy⁴ which, as an annex at The Treaty of Maastricht (formally, the Treaty on European Union)⁵, it was true for all member states, except for Great Britain. Once the Treaty, revised at the Intergovernmental Conference in 1997, The Protocol on Social Policy was adopted.

The Labor Law, as a branch of the legal system governing labor relations, is very vulnerable to the conditionings coming either from the overall socio-economic realities, either from the international regulations. Thus, the International Labor Organization, the Council of Europe or European Union are the three international organizations that can cause changes or shifts of concepts in the national labor law. The same problem of redefining the content is also characteristic of social security law. Creating better jobs and better paid, which requires a high content of knowledge and offer more rewards for those engaged in such business activities, is an important element in itself, but also one which brings benefits to the society. First, how many people are employed, the number of people who are deprived of economic development is lower. Secondly, how the content of knowledge, required by their jobs, is higher, the more valuable the work of each person is. The European Union, by the regulations made in the organization and defining the labor market, directly affects the labor law and social security of the community states. The Internal Market, based on the four freedoms, from the beginning was one of the pillars of European construction, although the Treaty of Lisbon gives the EU legal personality, and the pillar structure disappears. The second important element in the functional realization

and European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998; - Phase III (launched on 1 January 1999): fixing exchange rates and the introduction of the unique currency on foreign financial markets, followed by the introduction of euro banknotes and coins on 1 January 2002.

³ It was signed on 17 February 1986 by nine states and on 28 February 1986 by Greece, Italy and Denmark, and from 1 July 1987 entered into force. In the preamble, it refers to the transformation of relations of Member States in a European Union. The main objective was the completion of the Internal Market, which, according to article 7, must be "an area without internal frontiers in which free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured under the provisions of this Treaty." Through a special item, the European Council was institutionalized which, until then, worked on the decision taken in October 1974 in Paris by the heads of states and governments. Single Act established the 31 December 1992 the date until when the Internal Market should be completed, purpose for which they were conferred new competences on the Community institutions in the fields: a) social policy; b) defending the environment and research; c) economic policy and monetary system; d) ensuring social cohesion and reducing economic disparities between different regions of Member States.

⁴ The legal basis of the definition and implementation of social policy is reflected in the Treaty establishing the European Community on the free movement of persons (Articles 39-42) and the right of establishment (Articles 43-48) in the context of the Internal Market. With the adoption, in 1992, once with the Maastricht Treaty, the Protocol on Social Policy (annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community), by the Member States and EU have expressed their willingness to continue the efforts in that area. Moreover, according to the protocol, the Union could "use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms established by the Treaty for the adoption of acts and decisions necessary to implement the agreement." Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the Protocol on social policy has been incorporated into the Treaty establishing the European Community.

⁵ Treaty on European Union (also named the Treaty of Maastricht) was signed by the European Council on 7 February 1992 in the Dutch city Maastricht, which represented, until then, the most profound change to the Treaties establishing the European Community. This treaty was The European Union's founding treaty.

of the Internal Market resides in the accomplishment of the main objectives of the community construction, stipulated in Article 3⁶ from the Treaty of Lisbon.

The actions in the social field are primarily the responsibility of the member states and should be taken closer to the citizen at national and sub-national level. The competences and responsibilities of the European Union in the social field are limited. However, the EU, with its blend of shared values, common rules and mechanisms of solidarity, is in the unique position to work in partnership with the member states and stakeholders and foster cooperation to manage the socio-economic change.

Starting from these general considerations, in this article I would like to present an overview of the main legal incident sources with which the European Social Law operates.

2.The European Social Law, origins and future

The main moments that shaped what we name today the European social policy, begin with the *Treaty of Rome* in 1957, by its articles referring to the workers' free movement⁷ and of their freedom of establishment⁸, in the context of the creation of common market. Also by this treaty it was established the necessity to create a common social system and had been put the basis of a common social policy⁹ and it was created the first instrument of community financial help, the European Social Fund¹⁰. This stage, considered by some specialists the 1957 – 1971 period (Marinaş, 2002: 391), the European social policy has developed in a piecemeal manner and the achievements have been modest. Despite these shortcomings, the ferment created during this period has enabled the adoption in the second half of the ninth decade of the century two very important community documents in the development of the European social policy: *The Single European Act*, in 1986, which contains provisions on health and safety at work, introduces the concept of social dialogue and economic and social cohesion (materialized by creating the Economic and Social Cohesion Fund) and of *The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of*

⁶ Art.3, al. 3 „The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. (*Official Journal of the European Union*2008/C 115/01)

⁷ Title III. Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital, Chapter 1. Workers, articles 48-51

⁸ Title III. Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital, Chapter 2. Right of establishment, articles 52-58

⁹ Part Three. Community Policies, Title VIII. Social Policy, Education, Vocational Training and Youth, Chapter 1. Social provisions, articles 117-122, art. 117 „Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their harmonization while the improvement is being maintained. They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the common market, which will favor the harmonization of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for in this Treaty and from the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action.”

¹⁰ Part Three. Community Policies, Title VIII. Social Policy, Education, Vocational Training and Youth, Chapter 2. The European Social Fund, articles 123-125

Workers (also known under the name of *The Social Charter*)¹¹, reflecting the concern for the social dimension of Community policies in the context of building the single European market and it was developed following a consultation process with stakeholders (representatives of employers, workers, self-employed, farmers, etc.). Important to note is that, even in draft form, a solution was in sight at Community level, the final document stresses the role and responsibilities of the member states towards the implementation and enforcement of fundamental social rights¹².

A year later, in 1990, the *Treaty of Maastricht* (ratified in 1992) establishes that one of the Union's missions has in sight „The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States”¹³. And in *The Protocol on Social Policy*, annex at the *Treaty on European Union*, it was established that the eleven signatories will follow the path opened by the Social Charta of 1989 by authorizing „those eleven Member States to have recourse to the institutions, procedures and mechanisms of the Treaty for the purposes of taking among themselves and applying as far as they are concerned the acts and decisions required for giving effect to the abovementioned Agreement”¹⁴.

The next step in consolidating the social policy is represented by the *Green Paper*¹⁵ - the document that launched the debate process upon the future of the social policies at community level (1993), in order to elaborate the *White Paper*¹⁶ published in 1994. In this process of consultation were involved the EU institutions, EU Member States and various public organizations, who stayed with representatives of employers and trade unions. As a result of the consultative process initiated by the *Green Paper*, the *White Paper* sets out the conduct of social policy by the year 2000 (after which they were reformulated by the *Social Policy Agenda*). Due to this, the main priority was the creation of new jobs, being closely correlated with the formation of an educated workforce, encouraging high standards of work and creation of a European labor market - what are the next priorities. Besides these, there are creating equal opportunities for women and men, policy and social protection, public health, social partnerships, international cooperation. In 1997, by the *Treaty of Amsterdam* (ratified in 1999) the social policy field

¹¹ The European Association for the Defense of Human Rights (AEDH), source: <http://www.aedh.eu/The-Community-Charter-of.html>, accessed on 15 February 2010

¹² European Institute of Romania, *Social Policy*, Monographs Series, Bucharest, 2003, p. 6, source: http://www.ier.ro/documente/formare/Politica_sociala.pdf, accessed on 16 February 2010

¹³ *Treaty on European Union*, article 2

¹⁴ *Treaty on European Union*, *The Protocol Regarding Social Policy*, article 1

¹⁵ Green Paper - European Social Policy - Options for the Union COM (93) 551, November 1993 COM(93) 551, November 1993, source: http://europa.eu/documentation/official-docs/green-papers/index_en.htm, accessed on 16 February 2010

¹⁶ European Social Policy - A Way Forward for the Union - A White Paper COM (94) 333, July 1994 COM(94) 333, July 1994, source: http://europa.eu/documentation/official-docs/white-papers/index_en.htm, accessed on 16 February 2010

is being developed, by inserting the 125-130 articles, contained in Title VIII¹⁷ and intends that „Member States and the Community shall, in accordance with this Title, work towards developing a coordinated strategy for employment and particularly for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labor markets responsive to economic change with a view to achieving the objectives defined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in Article 2 of this Treaty”¹⁸.

Year 2000 is a major moment in the evolution of social policy by developing the *Lisbon Strategy*, which establishes the ten-year objective of the European Union, represented by transforming the EU economy in the most competitive knowledge-based economy. Also in this year the *Social Policy Agenda* was also adopted, which takes those elements of the strategy and specific goals related to social policy and convert them into a 5-year action program, which is the current social policy. In 2003 took place mid Social Agenda evaluation, and in 2008 it was adopted the *Renewed social agenda: Opportunities, access and solidarity in 21st century Europ*¹⁹. The renewed Social Agenda it is based on three inter-connected objectives, of equal importance: *Creating of opportunities*: creating opportunities means generating more and better jobs and facilitate the mobility; *Assuring the access*: being given the very different starting point in life of every individual, the opportunities can not be ensured without improving the access for the most disadvantaged; *Proving the solidarity*: the Europeans share a commitment to social solidarity: between generations, regions, the wealthy and the less prosperous Member States and between rich and less rich.

Free movement of EU workers

European Communities, at first, then transformed into the European Union created by the multitude of regulations led to the emergence and consolidation of a set of rules, which are found mainly in the directive, known now as more and more professionals as community work law (Popescu, 2008: 366). Basically, this branch of Community law is the result of the evolution of Community social policy, the development of a structure to guide the labor law of the Member States of the Union towards the harmonization of labor relations in the Community space.

The summary of the law on free movement of persons is to eliminate discrimination between EU citizens of the country in whose territory they are and work, and citizens of another EU state, which are also working in the same state (Diaconu, 2008: 356). The main direct beneficiaries of the right of free movement of persons are the workers. The Community legislation incident to this social category has experienced a tortuous development, given that primary and secondary sources do not provide a clear definition of the community worker. Thus, Article 39 of the Treaty of Amsterdam²⁰, including Article 48 of the TCE, stipulates the followings:

„1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community.

¹⁷ Treaty of Amsterdam Amending The Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing The European Communities and certain related Acts, Title VIII (ex Title VI), Employment, articles 125-130

¹⁸ *Idem*, article 125

¹⁹ *Renewed social agenda: Opportunities, access and solidarity in 21st century Europe*, source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:DKEY=473792:RO:NOT>, accessed on 17 February 2010

²⁰ The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999

2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.

3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health:

(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;

(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;

(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;

(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service.”

Article 39 contains some elements which can result in a definition of worker: its activity is circumscribed in *taking up a job, the existence of remuneration for the work*, as well as *the elimination of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States* (Popescu, 2008: 379). These defining elements were preserved, with two changes, also in the new treaty²¹, that produces its effects starting with the 1st of December 2009, in the *Title IV Free Movement Of Persons, Services And Capital Chapter 1 Workers*, articles: 45²² (ex. art. 39 TCE), 46 (ex. art. 40 TCE), 47 (ex. art. 41 TCE) and 48 (ex. art. 42 TCE).

We must underline that inside the article 45 (ex. art. 39 TCE) also enter the persons seeking employment, the types of restrictions that states may impose reasonably to workers and their families and the rights enjoyed by family members under community legislation (Craig, Burca, 2009: 924). Also in this category of workers enter the people who have an independent activity, self-service. (Ştefan, 2006: 136).

The worker term is, unlike the primary sources of the Community law, better shaped by the Court of Justice of the European Union jurisprudence. In fact this approach was made by the Court as practically as possible, in order to eliminate the possibility of states to limit the application of free movement of persons, because in its view, the

²¹ The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

²² Article 45 (ex-article 39 TCE): „1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union. 2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. 3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health: (a) to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; (d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Commission. 4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service.” Official Journal C 115, 09/05/2008 P. 0001 - 0388, source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0001:01:EN:HTML>, accessed on 8 February 2010

definition of worker is a matter of Community law and not of National law²³. In the same spirit the Court ruled in Case Lawrie Blum v. Land Baden Wurttemberg, C-66/85, 3rd of July 1986. Lawrie Blum, British citizen, she first passed the exam in order to become a teacher in Germany. However, she was refused admission on probation, which must be performed before the second examination on the grounds that she had no German citizenship. Lawrie Blum argued that this refusal constitutes a violation of article 39 (2) TEC, although the German court held, however, that a probationary teacher does not fit the definition of a worker, according to art. 39 (2). Solution and the principles derived from the ECJ has held that the concept of worker should be defined in accordance with Community law, not according to national standards. Consequently, a teacher found out on probation during which services as teaching courses in return for which is paid, he must be considered worker as art. 39 TEC states. No matter the nature and duration of work, as long as it is a gainful economic activity.

The EEC Treaty provisions have been developed by several directives and regulations, as: Directive 68/360 concerning the right of enter and residence; the 1612/68 Regulation regarding the access and employment conditions; the 1251/70 Regulation concerning the right of remaining on the territory of a member state after being employed in that state²⁴; Directive 64/221²⁵ regarding the right of Member States to derogate from the freedom of movement on the ground of order, security and public health, as well as the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council's 2004/38 CE from 29th of April 2004 on the right of free movement and residence within Member States for Union citizens and their family members, of changing the (C.E.E.) 1612/68 Regulation and of repealing the Directives 64/221/CEE, 72/194/CEE, 73/148/CEE, 75/34/CEE, 75/35/CEE, 90/364/CEE, 90/365/CEE²⁶.

The Directive 2004/38/EC applies to all Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member State other than that which they are nationals and their family members who accompany or join them (art. 21 paragraph. 1). They have the right to: to leave the territory of a Member State to travel to another Member State (art. 4 paragraph. 1), to enter and stay in its territory (Article 5, paragraph 1, art. 6-22), to pursue work or self-employed in that State, to enjoy equal treatment with nationals (Article 24, paragraph 1).

Equal treatment between men and women is the main reason for regulators to ensure genuine equality of opportunity and treatment between men and women. Treaty of

²³ Case 75-63, Judgment of the Court of 19 March 1964. - Mrs M.K.H. Hoekstra (née Unger) v Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten (Administration of the Industrial Board for Retail Trades and Businesses). - Reference for a preliminary ruling: Centrale Raad van Beroep - Netherlands. -.. Source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61963J0075:EN:HTML>, accessed on 8 February 2010

²⁴ Commission Regulation (EC) No 635/2006 of 25 April 2006 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State

²⁵ was repealed by Directive 2004/38/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States

²⁶ Directive 2004/38/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0038:RO:NOT>, accessed on 20 May 2010

Rome established by art.119, intended to avoid unfair competition, equal pay for work of equal value between women and men. For the purposes of this article, payment "means the minimum wage or usual, either in cash or in goods, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, from his employer". Since 1975, finding that there is an arrearage under this article, several directives have been issued in this matter. Constantly, the Court of Justice of the European Union recognized and held the right to equal treatment as a fundamental right of Community law (Popescu, 2008: 393). The principle of equal treatment applies to all those who wish to undertake an activity within the European Union pay, or establish service professional reasons and focus on two main issues: equal pay and equal treatment.

Equal pay it was initially governed by the Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, which was updated by Directive 2006/54/CE²⁷. The main achievement is that the directive requires the elimination of sexual discrimination in respect of pay in cases involving the same work or work of equal value, and job classification systems. For illustrative examples of the cause, I considered edifying the cause 157/86²⁸.

Regarding a request to the Court by the High Court of Ireland, which seeks, in the proceedings pending before that court between Mary Murphy and others, and An Bord Telecom Eireann, a preliminary decision on the interpretation of article 119 of the EEC Treaty and Article 1 of Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States Relating to the Application of the principle of equal pay for men and women (Official Journal 1975, L 45, p . 19).

Bord Telecom Eireann Company was claimed by Mary Murphy and other female workers, as employees. They, entering in the factory workers category, whose work is primarily in removing, cleaning, lubricate and replace the telephones and other equipment, claim the right to be paid the same price with a specified male employee who works in the same unit as responsible for the deposit (stores laborer) and whose job is to clean, collect and deliver equipment and parts and, more generally, to help when necessary. Bord Telecom Eireann Company denies that this principle is implemented in a situation where less is paid for work of higher value. In support of its argument, it contends that the terms "equivalent employment" mentioned in Article 119 of the Treaty could not be understood as referring to an uneven work, and contrary interpretation implies that equal pay should be paid for work of different value. The Court was asked, *inter alia*, to decide whether Article 119 of the EEC Treaty should be interpreted in the way that goals, also, the hypothesis in which the worker, claiming the benefit of this provision in order to obtain equal pay within the meaning of it, provides a higher value work than the work performed by the person chosen as a comparison.

The Court's arguments relied on Article are set out in paragraphs 9, 10 and 10 of the decision. Point 9: it is true that article 119 expressly requires the application of the

²⁷ Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), Official Journal L 204 , 26/07/2006 P. 0023 - 0036, source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:204:0023:01:EN:HTML>, accessed on 11 February 2010

²⁸ Case 157/86. Judgment of the Court of 4 February 1988. Mary Murphy and others v An Bord Telecom Eireann. Reference for a preliminary ruling: High Court - Ireland. Equal pay for men and women. source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61986J0157:EN:HTML>, accessed on 12 February 2010

principle of equal pay for men and women solely in the case of equal work or, according to a consistent line of decisions of the court, in the case of work of equal value, and not in the case of work of unequal value. Nevertheless, if that principle forbids workers of one sex engaged in work of equal value to that of workers of the opposite sex to be paid a lower wage than the latter on grounds of sex, it a fortiori prohibits such a difference in pay where the lower-paid category of workers is engaged in work of higher value. Point 10: to adopt a contrary interpretation would be tantamount to rendering the principle of equal pay ineffective and nugatory. As the Irish government rightly emphasized, in that case an employer would easily be able to circumvent the principle by assigning additional or more onerous duties to workers of a particular sex, who could then be paid a lower wage. Point 11: in so far as it is established that the difference in wage levels in question is based on discrimination on grounds of sex, article 119 of the EEC treaty is directly applicable in the sense that the workers concerned may rely on it in legal proceedings in order to obtain equal pay within the meaning of the provision and in the sense that national courts or tribunals must take it into account as a constituent part of community law. It is for the national court, within the limits of its discretion under national law, when interpreting and applying domestic law, to give to it, where possible, an interpretation which accords with the requirements of the applicable community law and, to the extent that this is not possible, to hold such domestic law inapplicable.

Following the studies it was found that although women have a higher percentage of success than men and the majority of people who possess a higher education degree, however there are differences in pay. This difference was 17% in 2005 in the European Union, and combating such discrimination was a priority for the European Commission. A lower pay means a lower pension and is due to a higher risk of poverty for older women. The pay gap between women and men is the result of continuing discrimination and inequality in the labor market, in practice, it mainly affects women. This difference is linked to a number of elements both legal, and social or economic, which go far beyond the single issue of equal pay for equal work²⁹. There have been plenty of action and legislative amendments³⁰ with the stated aim to tackle this gap by 2010 (Ticlea, 2009: 105) while the growing participation of women in the labor market is a positive achievement, the employment rate of women increased by 7.1% over the last decade and reached 59.1% in 2008, a level which lies close to the Lisbon target (60% in 2010). The average difference between employment rates of women and men fell in 2008 to 13.7

²⁹ The European Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=ro&catId=681>, accessed on 13 February 2010

³⁰ In Sweden, the law on equality of chances of 1991 stipulates that all employers with at least ten employees prepare an annual program on equal opportunities and an action plan for equal pay. In the United Kingdom, the Law on Equal Opportunities (2006) states that all public authorities have a legal obligation to give due consideration to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination and harassment and promoting equality between women and men. In Spain, a new law on equality between women and men was adopted in March 2007. This law contains specific provisions against discrimination, collective agreements providing for positive measures, encouraging the reconciliation of professional and private life, promoting equality programs and encouraging good practice. Source European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, the pay gap between women and men, <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=12&type=2&furtherPubs=yes>, accessed on 15 February 2010

percentage points difference of 18.2% in 1998³¹. Until the completion of this work there is no report on the impact of actions taken from 2006 to today³².

Conclusions

In spite of the fundamental right of free movement, in the community organizing, there are still several obstacles that can jeopardize the ability to exercise this right effectively. Very technical and complicated nature of the existing legislative framework, coupled with an extensive jurisprudence of the Court, may make the interpretation and correct application of Community law on the free movement of workers, difficult issue that requires joint efforts made by Member States, European institutions and Community employers.

Today, ten years after the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, the European Union has become, as desired in the final document of the Lisbon European Council (23/24.03.2000) the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economic area in the world, an economic space in a position to achieve sustainable economic growth with more jobs and better jobs and greater social cohesion. However, new legislative initiatives designed to regulate the legal framework for the implementation of social policies at European level and the development of institutions and organizations that promote and monitor the implementation of such policies lead to the strengthening of the European Social Model and its application in all Union states.

If, before the Single European Act, the European Social Area seemed to be an utopia, today, the European social law fails to give substance to the idea of free movement of workers, in spite of that transitional period for workers in states that have joined the latest wave. Regardless of the inherent discontinuity of creating European social space, with the contribution of the three major organizations (ILO, EC and EU) can be achieved, even if started as a theoretical model, a Global Social Model.

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³¹ Report from The Commission to The Council, The European Parliament, The European Economic And Social Committee and The Committee of The Regions Equality between women and men - 2010, Brussels, 18.12.2009 COM (2009) 694 final, p. 4, source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0694:FIN:EN:DOC.>, accessed on 14 February 2010

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Source: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61963J0075:EN:HTML>, accessed on 8 February 2010

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II. IDENTITY AND ELEMENTS OF CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE EUROPEAN AREA

Stéphane LEROY ⇔ *Les influences étrangères sur le répertoire musical militaire français, des phénomènes de frontières culturelles: l'exemple de l'armée de Terre et de la Légion étrangère de 1950 à nos jours.*

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LES INFLUENCES ETRANGERES SUR LE REPERTOIRE MUSICAL MILITAIRE FRANÇAIS, DES PHENOMENES DE FRONTIERES CULTURELLES: L'EXEMPLE DE L'ARMEE DE TERRE ET DE LA LEGION ETRANGERE DE 1950 A NOS JOURS

Stéphane LEROY*

Abstract. *Les chants et musiques militaires françaises d'aujourd'hui ne sont pas exclusivement nouveaux et nationaux. Ils sont nés d'échanges humains transnationaux, dans des contextes de guerre ou de paix. Ils transforment les institutions militaires en creusets culturels où se mêlent genres, langues, époques et Histoire.*

Ce travail propose d'interroger ces influences étrangères comme expressions de frontières culturelles. Si cette étude n'est pas novatrice au sens premier du terme, la replacer dans un contexte et une démarche d'histoire culturelle l'est. On ne peut ignorer la perméabilité des frontières, des cultures et donc l'héritage culturel que ces chants représentent. Ce sont d'abord des outils de cohésion, mais également de véritables documents historiques. Ils permettent d'écrire une histoire humaine de l'armée à travers ses chants. En quoi ces chants sont-ils des phénomènes de frontières culturelles ? Comment se matérialisent-elles ? Quels sont les pays d'influence ? Pourquoi ? Dans quels buts certains sont-ils remaniés ?

Keywords: *cultural transferences, military songs, cultural ID, cosmopolitanism.*

Introduction

Leur étude et publication intéressent cependant peu militaires, historiens et musiciens. La dernière version du *TTA 107* (Ateliers d'impression de l'armée de Terre n°1 (imp.), 1985), carnet officiel de chants de l'armée, est difficilement accessible, même si la médiathèque de la Défense a mis le sommaire en ligne. L'histoire des chants étudiés ici est tirée des études de Thierry Bouzard (2000, 2005), un des rares français à s'intéresser à ce répertoire et aux influences étrangères dans un chapitre de son second ouvrage. Il reconnaît que les chants militaires « appartiennent à notre patrimoine culturel » (2000 : 9) et que « les échanges se font en s'affranchissant des frontières et des conflits » (sans date : sans page). Tout en s'appuyant sur ces travaux, notre travail propose une analyse culturelle de ces influences.

Nous verrons d'abord que les chants militaires constituent un voyage au-delà des frontières culturelles. Nous étudierons ensuite la Légion comme creuset culturel à travers les marques de culture allemande intégrées à son répertoire après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Enfin, il conviendra d'analyser les transferts d'influence nationaliste.

1. Les chants militaires français, un voyage au-delà des frontières culturelles

Le répertoire français s'est largement enrichi au contact des influences étrangères. Une première question, relative à la multiplicité de ces empreintes, s'est donc

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légitimement posée. Dans son *Anthologie*, Thierry Bouzard en distingue six : allemande, italienne, sarde, russe, américaine, africaine du Sud. Pour ce travail, nous avons jugé judicieux de les décomposer en douze catégories afin d'isoler au mieux les différents types d'influences :

- reprise d'un air allemand : *Loin de chez nous*, *La colonne*, *Képi blanc*, *Connaissez-vous ces hommes*, *Être et durer*, *Sur la route*, *La petite piste*, *Les chacals*, *Debout les paras*, *Sous les pins de la Base Arrière*,
- reprise d'un air germanique et adaptation de paroles allemandes : *Les oies sauvages*, *Lili Marleen*,
- reprise d'un air et de paroles allemandes, chants chantés en allemand : *J'avais un camarade*, *Westerwald*, *Anne-Marie du 3^e Étranger*, *Kameraden*,
- traduction d'un chant allemand : *Le chant des marais*,
- version allemande reprise d'un répertoire étranger : *En Algérie*, *Les Lansquenets*,
- Légion des Volontaires Français après une reprise dans le répertoire allemand : *Contre les viets*, *L'edelweiss*, *Nous sommes tous des volontaires*,
- air italien : *La Galette*, *L'artilleur de Metz*, *Régiments d'Afrique (les trompettes d'Aïda)*, *Eho*, *Les grèves*,
- air sarde : *Les Allobroges*,
- air russe : *Les cosaques*, *Les Hussards de Bercheny*,
- adaptation américaine : *Les Bérêts verts*,
- air américain : *Alléluia*, *Souvenir qui passe*,
- africaine du Sud (Afrikaners) : *Sarie Mares*, *Massarie Marie*.

Les travaux de Thierry Bouzard permettent d'identifier 23 des 85 chants du *TTA 107* comme soumis à une influence étrangère. Certains sont répertoriés soit dans l'édition de 1985 (*Loin de chez nous*, *Sous les pins de la BA*, *La Galette*, *L'Artilleur de Metz*...), soit dans les carnets de chants Légion (*Képi blanc*, *Les oies sauvages*, *Lili Marleen*, *Les Lansquenets*, *La petite piste*...). D'autres figurent également dans les deux répertoires (*L'edelweiss*, *Contre les viets*, *Les Cosaques*...). Leur présence à la fois dans les carnets de chant de la Légion et de l'armée de Terre est la preuve d'échanges entre les répertoires. Les influences étrangères sont multiples, variées et interviennent au niveau des paroles comme des airs. Elles montrent les échanges qui existent malgré les frontières et les différences culturelles et linguistiques.

On remarque d'emblée la prépondérance de l'influence allemande. Thierry Bouzard note également l'absence de l'influence britannique. Toutefois, malgré les contacts entre les Anglais et les Français Libres du Général de Gaulle réfugiés à Londres en 1940, aucune interaction de répertoire ne s'établit (Bouzard, 2005: 241). Les conditions, pourtant idéales pour des échanges, n'étaient alors pas favorisées par le contexte politique, le Général de Gaulle tentant d'affirmer la légitimité de la France Libre.

Les paroles de certains chants, sans toutefois subir une influence musicale étrangère, traitent d'autres pays, explicitement ou implicitement. Ils font majoritairement référence aux campagnes menées à l'étranger. Par exemple, les contenus de nombreux chants reflètent l'épopée de l'ancienne grande puissance coloniale française. Ainsi, on trouve pour l'Indochine les métaphores de la « rizièrre » et de la « boue », et celles du « sable » et du « djebel » pour l'Algérie. « La neige » fait quant à elle référence à la Norvège, où la 13^e Demi brigade de la Légion étrangère s'est illustrée en 1940. D'ailleurs, les figures de style sont récurrentes, dans les chants Légion comme dans ceux de l'armée

de Terre. Elles mettent en évidence des dépassements de frontières géographiques. En voici quelques exemples :

- *Eugénie* (chant Légion et TTA) :

I

*Eugénie les larmes aux yeux
Nous venons te dire adieu
Nous partons de bon matin
Par un ciel des plus sereins
Nous partons pour le Mexique*

... (Ateliers d'impression de l'armée de Terre n°1 (imp.), 1985: 51) ; Képi blanc, 2009: 45).

- *Hymne de l'infanterie de marine* (TTA) :

II

*Sois fier soldat de Marine
La victoire aima tes chansons,
L'éclat des grandes actions.
Du Bosphore à la Martinique,
Du Sénégal au Pacifique*

On voit de ton drapeau resplendir les trois couleurs (Ateliers d'impression de l'armée de Terre n°1 (imp.), 1985: 26).

- *Rien n'empêche* (chant de tradition du 2^e régiment étranger du génie) :

I

*De la boue des rizières aux rivières du Tonkin
Honneur, fidélité pour unique refrain
Le feu, l'eau et la terre comme seul univers
Il s'avance et combat, le sapeur légionnaire,
Brisant tous les assauts, quand la mitraille explose
Sur cette terre d'Indo où tant d'anciens reposent
... (Képi blanc, 2009: 39).*

- *Je suis revenu* (TTA) :

I

*Quand la France était lasse et prisonnière
Il m'a fallut traverser la frontière
Capturé dans la Sierra, enfermé à Miranda* (Ateliers d'impression de l'armée de Terre n°1 (imp.), 1985: 53).

- *Connaissez-vous ces hommes* (chant Légion) :

I

...

*Du Tonkin à Dakar,
D'Afrique en Norvège
Dans le sable, le vent, la neige
... (Képi blanc, 2009: 81).*

- *Chant du 4^e escadron* (chant Légion) :

III

Algérie, Syrie, Indochine,

*Druses, viets ou bien fellaghas,
L'escadron leur brisa l'échine,
... (Képi blanc, 2009: 143).*

Dans ce dernier couplet, les rebelles « druses », « viets » et « fellaghas » incarnent leurs pays respectifs : Syrie, Indochine, Algérie, où la Légion a fait campagne. *Eugénie* se reporte à l'expédition du Mexique en 1863, en vue de soutenir l'empereur Maximilien, et dont le plus célèbre combat est celui de l'hacienda de Camarón –Camerone. Il est fêté tous les ans par la Légion le 30 avril. *Je suis revenu* fait quant à lui référence au camp de Miranda, en Espagne¹.

Les chants s'affranchissent des frontières géographiques, mais dépassent également les barrières temporelles, venues elles aussi enrichir les répertoires contemporains. Fondues au sein de nouvelles créations, on a tendance à ignorer leur existence. Bon nombre de chants sont antérieurs aux bornes temporelles choisies pour cette étude (1950 à nos jours). Symboles forts, ils ont été réemployés et ont perduré jusqu'à aujourd'hui tout en faisant de larges emprunts à l'Histoire, et particulièrement à l'histoire de la musique. Des airs de grands compositeurs de classique sont en effet mis à contribution : *Suoni la trompa, e intrepido*, extrait des *Puritains* de Vincenzo Bellini de 1831 et *Aïda*, de Verdi, de 1871. Le premier est la musique de *La Galette* (Bouzard, 2000: 81; 2005: 176) et de *L'Artilleur de Metz* (Bouzard, 2005: 177), le second de *Régiments d'Afrique* (Bouzard, 2000: 377), que l'on trouve dans le *TTA* sous le titre *Les trompettes d'Aïda (cavalerie d'Afrique)* (Ateliers d'impression de l'Armée de Terre n°1 (imp.), 1985: 71). Si l'on compare la version donnée par Thierry Bouzard dans son *Anthologie* avec celle du *TTA*, on remarque que la seconde comporte deux strophes supplémentaires. L'air d'*Aïda* sert également à *Eho*, sous-titré « *(les trompettes d'Aïda)* ». Ce dernier figure dans l'ultime carnet Légion (Képi blanc, 2009: 131). Il s'est imposé comme une évidence pour ces chants. En effet, d'après *l'Histoire du chant militaire*, « l'acte II de l'opéra *Les Puritains* de Vincenzo Bellini composé en 1831 est alors à la mode » (Bouzard, 2005: 176). De plus, *Aïda* évoque la terre d'Afrique et sa conquête, reprise dans ces chants :

III

*La piste est difficile
Et toujours nous appelle
Par les monts pelés de Taza,
De Ksar'souk de Midelt
L'élan de Bournazel vers le Tafilalet
Sur les Ksours ralliés*

Plantera fièrement nos trois couleurs (Atelier d'impression de l'armée de Terre n°1 (imp.), 1985: 71).

D'autres chants de la même époque, devenus des classiques du répertoire français, s'inspirent du XIX^e siècle. Le plus connu est certainement *J'avais un camarade – Ich hatte einen Kameraden*, chant très prisé de la Légion. Ses paroles, de 1821, sont de Ludwig Uhland et l'air de Friedrich Silcher, de 1825 (Bouzard, 2000: 77). Le dernier carnet de chant de la Légion donne les versions française et allemande:

I

J'avais un camarade, de meilleur il n'en est pas

¹ Pendant la Deuxième Guerre, les évadés de France qui passaient les Pyrénées y étaient internés.

*Il n'en est pas,
 Dans la paix et dans la guerre
 Nous allions comme deux frères
 Marchant d'un même pas* (bis) (Képi blanc, 2009: 119).

I
*Ich hatte einen Kameraden
 Ein bessern findest du nicht
 Die Trommel schlug zum Streite
 Er ging an meiner Seite
 In gleichen Schritt und Tritt* (Képi blanc, 2009: 121).

Ce chant est emblématique de la camaraderie et du sacrifice, valeurs prônées par l'Institution. Le contingent allemand a influencé l'évolution du chant légionnaire. À travers ses chants, nous voyons en partie comment s'est effectuée l'intégration des soldats allemands grâce à l'assimilation de marques de leur folklore typiquement allemandes.

2. La Légion étrangère, un creuset pour les frontières culturelles : l'intégration de marques de culture populaire allemande dans les chants d'après la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

Les Allemands sont intégrés en nombre à la Légion après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. L'année 1945 est pour eux et leurs alliés celle de la défaite. La Légion, qui a besoin de soldats pour l'Indochine, implante des antennes de recrutement à Coblenze, Fribourg, Vienne, Trieste (Montagnon, 2006: 199). Les anciens parachutistes allemands se retrouvent au Bataillon Étranger Parachutiste, créé en 1948 et rattaché au 3^e régiment étranger d'infanterie. Ce ne sont pas les seuls. Ils constitueront cependant le gros des effectifs pour la campagne d'Indochine. Cette prépondérance a des conséquences sur le chant. L'acceptation et l'utilisation de certaines marques de leur culture vont favoriser leur intégration. Selon Thierry Bouzard, c'est pour les inciter à chanter en français que des paroles sont adaptées sur les airs qu'ils entonnaient pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (2000: 139 ; 2005: 244). Ces propos sont illustrés par le recueil « *Chante Légion* » (Père Just de Vesvrotte, vers 1950), publié pendant la guerre d'Indochine où 6 chants sur 33 sont en allemand : *Anne-Marie*, *Ein Heller und ein Batzen*, *Oh du Seelige*, *Stille nacht heilige nacht*, *Veronika* et *Westerwald*.

10 chants sont également adaptés sur des airs germaniques. Cette tendance ne s'arrête pas à ce seul recueil. Si l'on prend l'exemple de *Connaissez-vous ces hommes*, présent dans les répertoires de 1975, 1982, 1985 et 1989, il emprunte son air à l'*Afrikalied –chant d'Afrique–*, également intitulé *Die panzer rollen in Afrika vor –Les panzers avancent en Afrique–*. La réadaptation française portait d'ailleurs originellement le titre d'*Armée d'Afrique* dans les carnets de 1975, 1982 et 1985. L'Afrique dont il est question dans l'adaptation française est bien sûr celle de la Légion, dont la maison mère est à Sidi Bel-Abbès, en Algérie. Ces chants évoquent les campagnes que les légionnaires y ont menées. Il ne s'agit pas de la même vision de l'Afrique que celle où « avancent les panzers ». L'Afrique peut également être vue comme un lien entre ces deux chants, ce qui pourrait expliquer la réutilisation de la mélodie :

I
Connaissez-vous ces hommes qui marchent là bas

*Écoutez un peu le son de leurs pas
Elle vous dit qu'ils ont martelé bien des routes
Et ça, c'est vrai, il n'y a aucun doute
Du Tonkin à Dakar,
D'Afrique en Norvège
Dans le sable, le vent et la neige
Gloire à la Légion étrangère.*

Refrain (bis)

Aï o, Aï o...

Aï o- Aï o- Aï o- Aï o- Aï o- Aï o... (Képi blanc, 2009: 81).

Le poids de l'influence germanique transparaît à travers les « aïo, aïo » caractéristiques des chants allemands. Ils figurent ici en bonne place puisqu'ils constituent l'ensemble du refrain, répété deux fois.

La reprise d'une mélodie n'est pas exclusive à un seul chant. Par exemple, celle de *Die panzer rollen in Afrika vor* sert également pour *Sous les pins de la BA* (Bouvard, 2000: 193). Ce type de transfert évoque bien la malléabilité des chants militaires. Le répertoire paraît ainsi inépuisable, d'autant plus que l'Institution interprète parfois les textes à sa manière. De fait, la lettre n°2 663 de l'État-major de l'armée de terre, en date du 15 juin 1987, interdit « les "Oh", les "Aï", les "Aïli-aïlo", les sifflets et autres borborygmes de liaison » (Bouvard, 2000: 11). Ceci explique sûrement pourquoi *Connaissez-vous ces hommes* ne figure pas au TTA. Il est en revanche présent dans les carnets de la Légion, sous trois titres différents, dont on peut observer l'évolution progressive : *Armée d'Afrique* (SIHLE, Képi blanc, 1975: 63)², *Armée d'Afrique (Connaissez-vous ces hommes)* (SIHLE, Képi blanc, 1982: 68-69 ; 1985: 68-69) et enfin *Connaissez-vous ces hommes* (SIHLE, Képi blanc, 1989: 74-75 ; Képi blanc, 2009: 81). L'Institution passe donc ici outre les directives du commandement. Elle joue de la confusion du texte officiel qui déclare que « la langue française est assez riche pour que ne soient autorisés que les chants de marche interprétés en français » mais « n'exclut pas l'interprétation d'autres chants dont la pratique est laissée à l'interprétation des chefs de corps » (Bouvard, 2000: 11). *Connaissez-vous ces hommes* n'est pas le seul cas de transgression. On le retrouve le « aïo » dans le refrain de *La petite piste* :

Ô porteur

Et askari

Aïo, aï-ay safari ... (Képi blanc, 2009: 117).

Ce chant est inspiré de *Wie oft sind wir geschritten* ou *Heia Safari* !³. Il s'agit d'un autre chant allemand scandé en Afrique pendant la Deuxième Guerre. Il aurait été le préféré du maréchal Rommel (Bouvard, 2000: 316).

D'autres chants utilisent des interjections germaniques typiques et populaires. Les deux refrains de *Au terrain*, scandent « haïdi, haïdo » :

Refrain 1

*Le casque est lourd, ami
Mais par la porte ouverte,
Claquent les pépins*

Refrain 2

*Ta seule détente, ami,
N'est pas dans le retour
Vers tes amours,*

² Si le titre qui figure en tête de la chanson est bien *Armée d'Afrique*, le sommaire précise *Armée d'Afrique (Connaissez-vous ces hommes)*.

³ Musique de Robert Götz et paroles de A. Aschenborn, 1916 (Bouvard, 2000: 316 ; 2005: 256).

<i>Tu vas bondir ami,</i>	<i>Mais pour la France, ami,</i>
<i>Haï di haï do,</i>	<i>Haï di haï do</i>
<i>Tu vas bondir ami,</i>	<i>Il faut lutter</i>
<i>Le go t'arrache vers ton destin.</i>	<i>Para sans trêve ni repos (Atelier</i>
	<i>d'impression de l'armée de Terre (imp.),</i>
	<i>1985: 46).</i>

Ce chant est le seul du *TTA 107* à présenter ce type d'interjections. D'autres, comme *Westerwald*, utilisent des sifflets, également interdits par la lettre n° 2 663 de l'État-major de l'armée de terre (Bouzard, 2000: 11). Ce chant, qui figure dans tous les carnets Légion consultés, est chanté en allemand et n'a pas été traduit. Les sifflets qui accompagnent « über deine Höhe pfeift der Wind so kalt » font penser aux airs montagnards d'Outre-rhin et peuvent également symboliser ce « vent qui souffle si froid » :

Refrain :

*Ô, du schöner Westerwald
Über deiner Höhen pfeift der Wind so kalt
Jedoch der kleinste Sonnenschein
Dringt tief ins Herz hinein (Képi blanc, 2009: 135).*

Notre traduction :

*Ô, toi, jolie forêt de l'Ouest
Sur tes sommets le vent souffle si froid
Pourtant le petit rayon de soleil
Pénètre profondément dans le cœur.*

Ces différentes interjections, qui se retrouvent fondues au sein du répertoire, peuvent être interprétées comme des marques culturelles et folkloriques, c'est pourquoi l'édition du carnet de chant de 1989 place *Westerwald* dans une sous partie « Folkloriques ».

Des chants religieux allemands sont également introduits dans le répertoire de la Légion. Ils font eux aussi partie du folklore populaire relatif aux festivités catholiques de Noël. Le Père Just de Vevrotte, aumônier de l'Institution au Tonkin, a inclut à « *Chante Légion* » des chants de Noël connus des Français et des Allemands : *Oh du Selige*, présent également dans les carnets de 1959, 1975, 1982, 1985⁴ et 1989 ou *Stille Nacht Heilige Nacht*, figurant dans les carnets de 1959, 1975, 1982 et 1985. Ces deux chants sont traduits puisque leur équivalent existe déjà dans la culture française. Nous donnons à titre d'exemple *Oh du Selige*, *Oh Toi le bienheureux*, du carnet de 1989 :

Oh du selige

*O, du fröhlich o, du selige
Gnadebringende Weihnachtszeit
Christ ist geboren, Welt ging verloren
Freue dich, freue dich Du Chritenheit*

...

Oh Toi le bienheureux

*Oh toi le joyeux
Oh toi le bienheureux*

⁴ Dans la catégorie « chants Légion ».

*Noël emmenant la grâce
Le Christ est né
Pour sauver le monde
... (SIHLE, Képi blanc, 1989: 143).*

Le carnet de 1989 possède également les deux versions d'un autre chant typique et populaire de Noël, *Mon beau sapin – O Tannenbaum*:

Mon beau sapin

*Mon beau sapin, Roi des forêts, que j'aime ta verdure
Quand part l'hiver, bois et guérets sont dépouillés
de leurs attraits*

Mon beau sapin, Roi des forêts que j'aime ta verdure

O Tannenbaum

Oh Tannebaum, O Tannebaum, wie grün sind deiner Blaetter

Du grünst nicht zur Sommerzeit,

Nein auch im Winter, wenn es schneit,

O Tannebaum, O Tannenbaum, wie grün sind deiner Blaetter (SIHLE, Képi blanc, 1989: 145).

Soulignons ici les subtilités de la traduction, à l'instar de nombreux chants. Par exemple, « Christenheit » –« Chrétienté »– dans la version en langue source devient le « chrétien » dans la langue cible. Il aurait été difficile de chanter des traductions *in extenso*. Des adaptations ont donc été nécessaires pour accorder de nouvelles paroles sur d'anciens airs, et conserver la justesse de la mélodie. Lorsque l'on regarde les versions originales allemandes, on note que les adaptations françaises sont plus légères. D'autre part, les rythmes diffèrent dans chaque pays. Les chants Légion sont chantés sur un rythme plus lent que ceux de l'armée de terre puisqu'ils se fondent sur la vitesse du pas qui est traditionnellement plus lent à la Légion que dans les corps de l'armée.

Ces chants font donc partie d'une culture et d'un folklore populaire commun aux deux côtés du Rhin. Il n'est pas étrange de les retrouver dans ce répertoire militaire car la fête de la Nativité, fête de la Famille par excellence, est également la célébration de la grande famille légionnaire. Le classement de *Stille Nacht...* et *O du Selige* comme « chants Légion » dans les carnets de 1959, 1975, 1982, 1985 reflète cette tradition, tout comme le classement des versions bilingues française et allemande de *Douce nuit...*, *Oh toi le Bienheureux* et *Mon beau sapin* dans « Autres chants, Noël » dans celui de 1989. La pratique religieuse, du moins la fréquentation des lieux de culte, tend à disparaître aujourd'hui. Cette tendance pourrait expliquer pourquoi les chants de Noël sont absents du dernier carnet de chants de la Légion, et ce bien que demeure l'attachement à la tradition de célébration de la Nativité.

D'autre part, soulignons que la prépondérance de l'influence allemande ne doit pas faire oublier les autres emprunts. On note la présence d'inspiration russe, avec par exemple *Les Cosaques*, qui véhicule également des marques de culture et de folklore populaire :

I

*Nous aimons vivre au fond des bois
Aller coucher sur la dure
La forêt nous dit de ses mille voix
Lances-toi dans la grande aventure (bis)*

La la la la la la la la la la la la la la la
La la la la la. Hé ! (Képi blanc, 2009: 161).

Ces caractéristiques font partie du stéréotype du cosaque. Les « la la. Hé ! » sont aux chants russes ce que les « *äö äö* » sont aux chants allemands, ce qui explique pourquoi l'édition du carnet de chant de la Légion de 1989 le place dans la catégorie « Folkloriques ». Classé parmi les chants de « bivouac et de popote » dans la dernière édition, ces paroles se prêtent parfaitement au contexte du camp. On l'imagine aisément chanté autour d'un feu.

On relève également des influences américaines : *Les Bérêts verts*, dont les deux premières strophes de la chanson d'origine –*The Ballad of the green berets*, par le sergent Barry Sadler–, sont reprises en français et en anglais par la Légion dans le carnet de 1989 :

Dans le ciel couleur d'acier	Fighting soldiers from the sky
Ils descendent par milliers	Fearless men who jump or die
Ceux qui vont sur cette terre	Men who mean just what they say
Lutter pour le béret vert.	The brave men of the green berets.
Il faut croire ce que l'on dit	With silver wing's upon their chest
Ne dire que si l'on agit	These are the men the Legion's best
Être brave et être fier	One hundred men are test each day
Pour gagner le béret vert	But only one gets green beret.

(SIHLE, Képi blanc, 1989: 130).(SIHLE, Képi blanc, 1989: 131).

Cette chanson date de la guerre du Vietnam. Elle a notamment été popularisée par le film éponyme de John Wayne (Bouzard, 2000: 201). La Légion se l'est aisément réappropriée puisque ses soldats, tout comme les parachutistes américains, portent le béret vert, symboles des deux institutions. Cette chanson montre bien que la Légion a également pris des chants pour les symboles qu'ils véhiculaient. De plus, le sergent Sadler a écrit cette chanson en hommage à ses camarades morts au Vietnam, décriés et reniés dans leur patrie (Bouzard, 2000: 201). Il s'agit donc d'un plaidoyer pour défendre la mémoire de ses camarades et, dans une certaine mesure, pour réconcilier la nation américaine avec son armée.

3. Des transferts d'influences nationalistes

Les chants d'influence étrangère peuvent participer à la construction d'une identité nationale et culturelle française. Certains chants font ainsi appel au passé historique français. Un des plus parlant est *Nos pères les Gaulois*, chant de tradition du 92^e régiment d'infanterie, chanté sur l'air de *When Johnny comes marching home*, un chant de la guerre de Sécession :

I
Nos pères les Gaulois ont dû en combats sanguinaires
Défendre la beauté la liberté de notre terre,
Nous jurons d'être forts et grands
Pour sauver le pays des Francs
Héros d'antan soient devant Dieu témoins

Refrain

Le régiment d'Auvergne marche (Bouzard, 2005: 67).

Le Gaulois, symbole fort de l'histoire et de la culture françaises, devient ici le défenseur d'une civilisation. La notion de paternité est également à prendre en compte. « Nos pères » fait des soldats qui scandent ce chant des descendants des valeureux

guerriers. L'Auvergne est également un symbole. Outre la région d'implantation du 92^e RI⁵, elle est celle où les Gaulois ont livré de grandes batailles, comme celle de Gergovie. Malgré les symboles historiques forts que ce chant véhicule, il n'est cependant pas répertorié au *TTA 107*. Il a pourtant été écrit « vers 1980 » (Bouzard, 2005: 266), soit 5 ans avant la parution de la seconde version du *TTA*.

Un autre peuple ancestral est également mis à contribution. Il s'agit des Allobroges, originaires des régions actuelles du Dauphiné et de la Savoie. Ils ont inspiré à Contarno, un chef de musique sarde qui a pris part aux opérations de Crimée (1854-1855), une marche intitulée *La Liberté*. Les paroles des *Allobroges* ont été écrites « peu de temps avant le rattachement de la Savoie à la France », et dans le but de fêter ce rattachement (Bouzard, 2000: 284). Ce chant figure au *TTA*, dans la rubrique « chants de bivouac ». On y observe l'idée de Liberté, idée que la France se fait forte d'exporter depuis la Révolution de 1789. Elle est le reflet de la devise « Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité » et incarne l'idée d'une France qui servirait de rempart contre l'opprimeur, comme l'illustre le refrain :

Refrain

Allobroges vaillants, dans vos vertes campagnes

Accordez-moi toujours asile et sûreté

Car j'aime à respirer l'air pur de vos montagnes

Je suis la liberté, la liberté (Atelier d'impression de l'armée de Terre (imp.), 1985: 98).

Les chants militaires peuvent également être perçus comme un lien entre les forces armées et la Nation. C'est par exemple le cas dans *Les Hussards de Bercheny*, chant de tradition du 1^{er} régiment de hussards parachutistes dont les paroles ont été mises en ligne sur le site internet du régiment :

II

...

Voyez bonnes gens largués sur vos plaines,

Tombant du ciel et progressant dans la nuit

Ne craignant rien ni la mort ni la haine

Voyez ce sont les hussards de Bercheny

III

Autour de nous la bataille fait rage

Si certains tombent sous les coups de l'ennemi

À eux la paix mais à nous le courage

De risquer tout pour secourir la patrie

IV

O parachutiste voilà l'orage

Rendons-nous fiers de nos anciens de Hongrie

Rien n'est trop dur pour un gars de notre âge

S'il est para de Bercheny cavalerie⁶.

On note bien à travers ce chant l'idée de l'armée comme défense de la Nation, représentée par les « bonnes gens ». Le possessif « Vos terres » suggère également bien

⁵ Clermont-Ferrand.

⁶ http://www.rhp1.terre.defense.gouv.fr/m1_H_chant_rgt.html (page internet consultée le 4 mai 2010).

que l'armée se bat pour le bien des concitoyens. On trouve dans le *TTA* un chant intitulé *Bercheny*. Il diffère quelque peu de la version mise en ligne :

II

...

Autour de nous attendant l'esclavage

Tous ces lâches se vautrent dans leur veulerie

A eux la paix mais à nous le courage

De risquer tout pour secourir la Patrie

O Parachutistes, voilà l'orage,

Montrons-nous fiers de nos anciens d'Algérie

Rien n'est trop dur pour un gars de notre âge

S'il est Para de Bercheny-Cavalerie (Atelier d'impression de l'armée de Terre (imp.), 1985: 47).

On note des différences entre ces versions. La deuxième version est plus nationaliste et plus violente dans ses propos. La « Hongrie » est absente de la version *TTA*. Il s'agit d'une référence historique au comte de Bercheny, un patriote hongrois réfugié en France sous le règne de Louis XV qui a mis sur pied un régiment de « housards »⁷ au service de son pays d'accueil. Dans *Bercheny*, elle est remplacée par « l'Algérie » où le régiment s'est illustré. Si Thierry Bouzard date *Les Hussards...* de 1963 « lors de l'implantation du régiment à Tarbes » (2005: 165), on ignore la date de création de *Bercheny*. La version qu'il présente est identique à celle disponible sur le site du 1^{er} régiment de hussards parachutistes.

Certains chants militaires français choisissent des mélodies d'origine révolutionnaires ou politiques. Par exemple, *Les Hussards de Bercheny* réutilise la mélodie de *La Varsovienne*, qui « a toujours figuré au répertoire de l'armée soviétique » (Bouzard, 2005:267). Très forte au XIX^e, l'idée de liberté transparaît. C'est le siècle des nationalismes, de l'unité italienne et de la guerre de Sécession américaine (1861-1865). Ces éléments révolutionnaires ou politiques ont eux aussi servis d'inspiration aux chants français. Ainsi, l'*Addio del volontario*, un « chant italien des partisans de la réunification de l'Italie datant de 1848 » (Bouzard, 2005:223), sert d'air pour *Les Grèves*. Le *Battle Hymn of the Republic*, chant emblématique des troupes de l'Union pendant la guerre de Sécession, sert lui d'air à *Alléluia*, chant de marche du *TTA*. La version française reprend le « Glory, glory, ... Alléluia (ter) » (Atelier d'impression de l'armée de Terre n°1 (imp.), 1985: 45).

On a vu l'importance sur le chant du contingent allemand au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les volontaires français servant dans les armées allemandes avaient aussi leurs chants. Certains airs ou certaines paroles de la Légion des Volontaires Français contre le bolchevisme, qui combattait sur le front russe, ont été repris. L'absence de références scientifiques sur ces textes ne nous permet cependant pas d'étayer plus avant ces propos. Les travaux de Thierry Bouzard mettent néanmoins en avant certaines de ces influences. Ainsi, *Contre les viets* est une reprise d'un chant de la LVF, *Contre les rouges*, chanté sur le front de l'Est (2000:145). On note ici le contexte idéologique d'écriture du chant, qui se retrouve dans la guerre d'Indochine. La filiation des deux conflits contre le communisme se fait ici implicitement. Elle se fait également « naturellement », de par la présence d'anciens de la LVF dans la Légion des années 1950. *Nous sommes tous des*

⁷ *Ibid.*

volontaires reprend lui un air de la légion Condor, corps allemand qui a combattu en Espagne dans les rangs du général Franco. Ses paroles ont été adaptées d'après *Les volontaires*, un autre chant de la LVF (2000:124). Le chant de tradition du 2^e REP, *Le chant du diable*, aussi intitulé *La Légion marche* reprend l'air de la marche de parade de cette même légion Condor (2000: 322). On peut donc quelque part considérer ces adaptations comme idéologiques puisque leurs influences l'étaient. Elles expriment les « motivations du combat » de ces soldats (Bouzard, 2006: s.p.).

Par sa nature, le chant militaire se prête au nationalisme. *Les Lansquenets*, prisé par « les militants nationalisés » a été interdit par le commandement (Bouzard, 2005:267-268). Bien que n'ayant pas eu accès à la version politique du chant, on peut imaginer que la version militaire a dû être adaptée pour s'en affranchir. L'armée doit en effet toujours faire preuve de neutralité politique. *Les Lansquenets* ne figure donc pas au TTA. On le retrouve en revanche au carnet de chant de la Légion, dans le chapitre « chants de bivouac et de popote », ainsi que dans le carnet des lieutenants du 1^{er} REC (Les lieutenants...,1999: 58). Son contenu, chargé de sens, s'inspire des lansquenets, mercenaires allemands en France au XV^e siècle comme l'illustre la première strophe :

I

*Ce monde vétuste et sans joie, fay la la
Croulera demain devant notre foi, fay la la
Et nos marches guerrières
Feron frémir la terre*

Au rythme des hauts tambours des Lansquenets (bis) (Képi blanc, 2009: 159).

Cette même phrase est martelée à la fin de chaque couplet. Le carnet de chant de la Légion en livre cependant un 4^e, absent de l'*Anthologie* de Thierry Bouzard :

IV

*De tous nous serons vainqueurs, fay la la
Et nous marcherons de tout notre cœur, fay la la
Et même s'ils sont de taille
Nous livrerons bataille*

Au rythme des hauts tambours des Lansquenets (bis) (Képi blanc, 2009: 159).

Les propos tenus dans ce chant ne sont pas neutres et dénotent un certain degré de violence. Ils donnent une image barbare des mercenaires allemands. Les « hauts tambours » peuvent ici être perçus comme symbole –culturel ? – des lansquenets.

Conclusion

Il apparaît que l'amalgame des influences étrangères sur le chant militaire français se soit opéré naturellement. Les différents chants étudiés, ainsi que les études mises à profit pour ce travail, montrent bien qu'ils franchissent sans cesse les frontières culturelles, tant au niveau des contenus que des mélodies. Pour apprécier la valeur historique culturelle d'un chant militaire, il nous est apparu essentiel de lier ces différents éléments.

La Légion étrangère a tenu un rôle important de creuset culturel. Par la nature cosmopolite de sa troupe, elle s'est très bien prêtée à cet exercice, comme elle réussit celui de l'amalgame des nationalités. Le cosmopolitisme des chants permet ainsi d'intégrer culturellement des hommes issus de nationalités différentes et de structurer un groupe.

La prépondérance allemande a eu des répercussions importantes sur le chant. Certains éléments de culture germanique intégrés à ces chants ont perduré et figurent toujours au répertoire, même si, pour certains, cela est moins flagrant. Ils sont les derniers

témoins de l'origine de ces chants, fondus au sein du répertoire national, dans lequel apparaît un certain degré de syncrétisme.

Identité culturelle et nationalisme ne sont pas incompatibles. Les chants arrivent à lier les deux. L'inspiration trouvée dans nos peuples ancestraux en témoigne. Le chant militaire n'est pas figé. Il évolue, au gré des époques, des modes, des régiments ou des spécialités militaires.

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JOSEF NADJ: HONGROIS EN FRANCE, FRANÇAIS EN RUSSIE

Julie GOTHUEY *

Abstract. *Josef Nadj: a Hungarian in France, a French in Russia. Born in Voivodina in a true cultural mosaic, Josef Nadj, following his immigration in France, has become a real ambassador of French coreography abroad. Born and brought up in a multiethnic region marked by many geopolitical changes along the 20th century, Josef Nadj, has always distinguished himself through his work both as belonging to and representing an ethnic group. The French people have always considered him the Other, the foreigner in motion, and Nadj has highlighted their opinion through his dance.*

Keywords: *frontier, cultural, ethnic, strain, France, Voivodina*

Les figures de l'étranger

Pour le public, quand il arrive en France dans les années 80, Josef Nadj est avant tout un jeune artiste hongrois. Qu'en est-il aujourd'hui ? Que se passe-t-il lorsque ce chorégraphe aux origines hongroises, né dans une région multiethnique, franchit les frontières ? Que reste-t-il du sentiment d'ethnicité et comment est-il perçu ?

A la manière de Nicole Lapiere qui s'attache dans son ouvrage à montrer qu'il existe plusieurs façons d'être étranger, nous observerons donc le cas du chorégraphe Josef Nadj: « Pour leur vie, leur itinéraire, leurs travaux, ils correspondent à cette figure archétypale de l'intellectuel comme étranger analysée par Georg Simmel: celui qui est un peu dedans, un peu dehors, et dont l'expérience décalée aiguise les interrogations et stimule la pensée » (Lapiere, 2004: 26). Dans et en dehors de quoi ? Du désir de quitter volontairement sa terre natale à la reconnaissance internationale en passant par l'assimilation, où et comment Nadj est-il étranger ? Nous poserons ici cette question par l'étude des différentes figures de l'étranger associées au chorégraphe Josef Nadj tout au long de son parcours. Par l'analyse de la réception de son oeuvre, nous verrons comment la figure de l'étranger peut être considérée comme un concept mouvant, marquée par l'évolution des modes de perception.

Quitter « un pays qui n'existe plus »

« Je suis né dans un pays qui n'existe plus, aux confins de l'Orient et de l'Occident, en Voïvodine. Un no man's land en ex-Yougoslavie, entre la Hongrie et la Grèce, sur la rive d'un affluent du Danube. Question existentielle: Qui suis-je ? » (Nadj, 2006). A presque cinquante ans, Josef Nadj pointe le doute qui plane sur l'appartenance et l'existence de sa région d'origine. Nommé différemment tant de fois, traversé par de

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nombreux peuples aux histoires différentes, les frontières de son « paysage »¹ semblent encore jouer un rôle prépondérant dans sa construction personnelle.

Le « no man's land » évoqué par Nadj est la Voïvodine. Il grandit ainsi au cœur d'un vaste brassage ethnique, dans une région marquée par les bouleversements géopolitiques. Dans son ouvrage consacré au chorégraphe, Myriam Bloedé souligne l'originalité de l'histoire d'une famille traversée par les frontières: « Sans jamais quitter Kanizsa, son grand père maternel est né dans l'empire austro-hongrois avant de devenir, en 1918, un sujet de la (première) Yougoslavie, le royaume des Serbes, des Croates et des Slovènes. Pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la région et ses habitants ont été annexés à la Hongrie avant de rentrer dans le sein de la Yougoslavie moderne [...]» (Bloede, 2006: 78). Aujourd'hui seule province « autonome » intégrée à la Serbie – depuis que le Kosovo a déclaré son indépendance en 2008 – la Voïvodine a fait partie de la Dacie, de l'Empire romain, de l'empire des Huns, de l'Empire byzantin, de la Bulgarie, de la Hongrie, de l'Empire ottoman, de l'Autriche, de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de l'État des Slovènes, Croates et Serbes, du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, du Royaume de Yougoslavie, de la Serbie, de la République fédérale socialiste de Yougoslavie, de la Serbie-et-Monténégro redevenue en 2006 la Serbie.

Cette histoire mouvementée a bien sûr été accompagnée de nombreuses migrations, à l'origine d'une autre singularité de la Voïvodine: la constance de sa diversité. Aujourd'hui encore, vingt six groupes ethniques parlant six langues officielles y dessinent une véritable mosaïque culturelle. Josef Nadj est originaire de Kanisza, ou Magyarkanizsa²: « Kanisza se trouve dans un petit triangle qu'on appelle « le coin des tempêtes » - sans doute aussi à cause de l'Histoire. Car c'est un peu le destin des gens qui vivent là que de connaître, à chaque génération, un changement de régime au moins. Moi-même, j'ai vécu l'éclatement du pays dans lequel je suis né et j'éprouve ce paradoxe: en tant que Hongrois, je suis né Yougoslave et puis je suis devenu Serbe en attendant mon passeport français » (Nadj, apud Bloede, 2006: 79). Le déplacement des frontières plutôt que des personnes dérange. Lorsque le régime change, la nationalité change, et avec elle, une part de l'individu dans ce qui le définit. Sans qu'il ne participe volontairement à ce changement d'identité.

La frontière ne se limite donc pas à une ligne de découpage. Selon le sociologue allemand Georg Simmel, « La frontière n'est pas un fait spatial avec des conséquences sociologiques, mais un fait sociologique qui prend une forme spatiale » (Simmel, 1999: 606). Si la frontière est le fait de l'homme, elle génère des effets remarquables sur son mode d'existence. Territoire, pays, nation, terre d'accueil ou de départ, les espaces créés par les frontières peuvent être vécus et investis d'autant de manières qu'il existe d'individus pour en témoigner. Dans son ouvrage *Pensons ailleurs*, Nicole Lapierre s' imagine une rencontre entre Simmel et l'ethnologue Arnold Van Gennep: « Puis, la discussion s'engage sur cette forme particulière de passage qu'est la frontière. Une limite arbitraire, une ligne de partage tracée par l'homme et sujette à variations historiques et politiques, sur ce point ils sont bien d'accord. La frontière renforce la cohésion interne qu'elle sépare et qu'en même temps conjoint dans leur limitation réciproque ; bref, par son tracé, elle crée des entités et des identités, martèle Simmel » (Lapierre, 2004: 62). En

¹ Notamment dans *Le dernier paysage*, film réalisé par le chorégraphe, coproduction Les Poissons volants et Arte France, 2006.

² Qui peut se traduire par « Kanisza hongroise », pour se distinguer de la Kanisza turque, de l'autre côté du fleuve, toujours en Voïvodine, mais dont la population turque est la plus présente.

divisant un espace en divers fragments, la frontière renforcerait ainsi l'ethnicité: dans le sens de Fredrick Barth³, il s'agit notamment du sentiment d'appartenance à un groupe, mais aussi l'expression de ce sentiment. Avec le tracé des frontières, nous voyons simultanément apparaître la cohésion d'une entité et l'émergence d'une identité au sein de la communauté. C'est en ce sens que Josef Nadj semble avoir vécu « l'éclatement de son pays ». Les personnes originaires de sa région ont cette histoire singulière en commun. Et en même temps, certains vont ressentir le besoin de s'exprimer sur leur façon de voir ou de ressentir ces événements. C'est ainsi que le 25 septembre 1981, Ottó Tolnai annonce la naissance d'un « nouveau courant artistique, le Cercle de Kanizsa » (Bloede, 2006: 27): Zoltán Bicskei, Csikós Tibor et Josef Nadj, trois amis peintres du même âge, originaires de Kanizsa et influencés par l'artiste Tihamér Dobó. Le Cercle sera de courte durée, puisqu'ils ne firent qu'une seule exposition ensemble. Pourtant, cette anecdote sur les débuts de Nadj nous révèle l'existence d'une vie culturelle et artistique active propre à sa ville natale: le poète István Koncz et les grands auteurs voïvodiniens comme Danilo Kiš, Aleksandar Tišma et Otto Tolnai ; ainsi que des sculpteurs, photographes, et peintres dont l'attachement à leur région était si intense qu'ils ressentirent la nécessité de le partager par le biais de la création. Si quelques-uns sont restés, la plupart sont partis vers de nouveaux ailleurs, confronter leur histoire aux autres, apprendre d'autres façons de faire et de voir, proposer leurs productions artistiques à de nouveaux regards. « Le sentiment d'appartenir à une minorité et l'instabilité de la frontière renforcent l'enracinement. Mais (paradoxalement ?) c'est sans doute la profondeur de l'enracinement, la puissance de l'ancrage qui incitent au départ. Le départ, cependant, suppose l'ailleurs et pose la question du retour » (Bloede, 2006: 89). Après son service militaire en Bosnie Herzégovine, Nadj quittera les Beaux Arts de Budapest pour la France de son plein gré. Il revient depuis régulièrement à Kanizsa. Pour repartir avec de nouveaux désirs de créations.

Danseur et chorégraphe hongrois en France

« [...] Kiš⁴ l'aîné et Nadj le plus jeune se rencontrent. C'est à Paris, on peut l'imaginer, au milieu des années 1980, et donc ils parlent. De cette Pannonie dont ils viennent tous les deux – *de quoi sommes nous faits nous qui venons de cette région ?* – et qu'ils ont tous deux quittée. De l'expatriation comme geste volontaire – car Nadj insiste, quand il est parti, il ne fuyait pas-, c'est-à-dire comme choix, et non moins douloureux pourtant. De la nature de ce choix et du comment continuer. *Comment conserver ce noyau qui a donné vie à notre imaginaire sans le trahir, en l'enrichissant au contraire avec le temps et l'espace ?* » (Bloede, 2006: 13). Lorsqu'il arrive à Paris, Nadj est un jeune artiste hongrois en formation. Son parcours de l'Est à l'Ouest de l'Europe lui a révélé les difficultés posées par l'absence d'un langage commun. La langue française lui est totalement étrangère: « Une langue demande de la compréhension. Pas l'image ni le son, c'est pourquoi j'ai immédiatement mis l'accent sur ce matériau là. Sur un langage commun qui est le geste » (Bloede, 2006: 82). Il approfondit sa recherche d'un langage corporel par la technique du mime et du théâtre gestuel avec Marceau et Decroux, mais sans jamais quitter le désir d'interroger ses origines et de les « enrichir ».

³ « Ethnic groups and boundaries. The social organisation of culture difference », Bergen, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1969. Traduction française : « Les groupes ethniques et leurs frontières », in Philippe Poutignat et Jocelyne Streiff Fenart, *Théories de l'ethnicité*, Paris, PUF, 1995

⁴ Danilo Kiš est un auteur né à Subotica, en Voïvodine, et qui s'est installé en 1962 à Paris.

A cette époque, à Paris, la danse contemporaine est en plein essor. Marin, Gallotta, Saporta, Bouvier, Obadia, Bagouet... toute une génération se jette à corps libéré dans la création chorégraphique. Après mai '68, tout est à faire. Loin de New-York où les places sont occupées par les maîtres, on voit émerger de jeunes artistes parfois plasticiens, architectes, sportifs, ou pédagogues animés par le désir d'interroger le corps de l'individu. La subjectivité s'impose, les histoires personnelles se confondent aux mythes, et l'on questionne les théories sur l'identité, la migration, le genre, la communauté. Grâce à Béjart l'influence du ballet s'accompagne de nouveaux possibles: la danse peut se nourrir du théâtre, rencontrer les images, l'opéra, interroger la narration. D'un autre côté, Cunningham a engagé la réflexion sur les pistes du mouvement, de l'épure, du hasard et de la collaboration avec 6 d'autres artistes (Le Moal, 2008). L'ouverture du Centre National de la danse à Angers en 1979 et la création d'une Délégation à la danse en 1986 témoignent de la nouvelle politique culturelle d'aide à la création.

C'est dans ce contexte propice au développement artistique que Josef Nadj fonde sa compagnie, le théâtre « JEL »⁵, son « noyau » en quelque sorte. Dès ses premières déclarations publiques, le danseur affirme – revendique presque – ses origines et leur importance dans son processus de création⁶. Depuis, lors de reportages officiels tels que l'opus de « Paroles de danse » consacré à sa pièce *Les Commentaires d'Habacuc*⁷, ou dans un film autobiographique comme *Dernier Paysage*, le chorégraphe explique en français et en hongrois d'où il vient, et le rôle fondamental que joue sa terre natale.

Hongrois en France, Josef Nadj le rappelle également par le choix d'interprètes venus de la même région de l'Europe que lui, Lazslo Hudi et Peter Gemza, compagnons de route réguliers depuis quinze ans. La musique, traditionnelle ou contemporaine, offre à la fois la possibilité de partager un imaginaire sonore familier avec le public français⁸ et une résonance avec le sujet de ses créations. La première, *Canard Pékinois*, créée en France en 1987 raconte un rêve de départ vers « cet ailleurs interdit par la politique »⁹ qu'est la Chine à l'époque de la Yougoslavie. En filigrane de la référence historique, c'est une histoire locale, que Nadj nous conte: « [...] entre les deux guerres mondiales, un groupe d'amateurs de Kanisza monte *Princesse Csardas*; toute une série de représentations a lieu et s'achève, comme il se doit. Chacun des acteurs retourne à sa vie " normale ". Quelques semaines plus tard, et à quelques jours d'intervalle, les suicides se succèdent. Il ne reste pas un seul survivant de la distribution de *Princesse Csardas*. Quand on raconte cette histoire à Kanisza, en la transmettant de génération en génération, c'est toujours avec

⁵ « JEL » signifie « signe » en hongrois

⁶ Voir les citations précédentes ainsi que les dossiers de presse de la compagnie disponibles sur le site de la Compagnie : www.josefnadj.com

⁷ *Josef Nadj*, un film documentaire de Jean-Michel Plouchard, coll. Paroles de danse (1997). Extraits du spectacle *Les Commentaires d'Habacuc*, création de Josef Nadj au Festival d'Avignon en 1996.

⁸ Dans *La Mort de l'empereur – drame musical*, spectacle de Josef Nadj de 1989, la musique originale est composée par le Hongrois Gyorgy Szabados et interprétée par les onze musiciens de la formation Makuz de Budapest. Il utilise de la musique traditionnelle hongroise notamment dans sa création sûrement la plus autobiographique, *Journal d'un inconnu*; et travaille entre la France et la Voïvodine avec Akosh Szelevényi, présent sur scène lors d'*Entracte* en 2008 entre autres collaborations.

⁹ Myriam Bloedé, dans la présentation du spectacle sur le site de la Compagnie Josef Nadj : <http://www.josefnadj.com/creation-diffusion/les-creations/canard-pekinois-276.html>

le rire qui grince un peu dans la voix »¹⁰. Les personnages, masques, costumes et décors contribuent généreusement au dépaysement du spectateur. A l'heure où l'univers personnel du chorégraphe prime sur la qualité technique de sa prestation, Josef Nadj séduit le public par ses invitations aux voyages: *Sept peaux de rhinocéros (danse macabre)* évoque en 1988 la transmission familiale et la mort du grand-père de Nadj: « [...] Ce face à face avec le pouvoir imbattable de la mort s'affirme en un acte spirituel, il constitue l'initiation. Je l'ai reçu des contes de mon grand-père et de sa propre mort, de la peur bête, pantoise d'en finir là, qu'il connut pendant la guerre »¹¹. Deux ans plus tard, *Comedia Tempio* est un hommage au Hongrois Jozsef Brenner dit Géza Csáth (1887-1919), auteur d'un journal, de contes et nouvelles, mais aussi d'études scientifiques liées à sa pratique de médecin psychiatre. L'imaginaire du chorégraphe renvoie une fois de plus à ses origines: « Des rires mêlés d'angoisse parfois, tant cet univers surréaliste, qui évoque pourtant l'Europe centrale traditionnelle chère à Josef Nadj, frôle le rêve inquiétant [...] » (Sirvin, 1990). *Les Echelles d'Orphée*, en 1992, s'inspire du recueil de poèmes " *les chants de Wilhem* " d'Otto Tolnai pour raconter une nouvelle histoire de Kanizsa: Une troupe de pompiers bénévoles, acteurs amateurs, montent cent ans plus tôt *Les Enervés* d'Eugène Labiche. Cette création vaut à la Compagnie de gagner un concours mondial en 1911, et d'exister toujours aujourd'hui. En 1994, le chorégraphe rend hommage à Oskár Vojnich, écrivain-voyageur, né en 1864 en Hongrie, mort en 1914 en Egypte, dans *L'Anatomie du fauve*. Ainsi Josef Nadj convoque ses souvenirs, les légendes locales et la culture qui l'ont en partie construit, et les déploie sur scène, incarnant des personnages réels ou fictifs avec certains danseurs et musiciens au patrimoine commun. Transposer ce qui fait l'histoire de Kanizsa sur les plateaux de France et d'ailleurs, c'est la solution adoptée par le chorégraphe pour enrichir « avec le temps et l'espace » le « noyau » de ses origines.

En s'affirmant ainsi étranger en France, paradoxalement, il se fait, création après création, une place auprès des spectateurs, de la critique, et des institutions. Simmel explique: « Bien que ses attaches avec le groupe ne soient pas de nature organique, l'étranger est cependant membre du groupe, et la cohésion du groupe est déterminée par le rapport particulier qu'il entretient avec cet élément. Seulement, nous ne savons pas comment désigner l'unité particulière de cette situation, sinon en disant qu'elle comporte une dimension de distance et une dimension de proximité, et, bien que ces dimensions caractérisent dans une certaine mesure toutes les relations, ce n'est qu'une combinaison particulière et une tension mutuelle qui produit cette relation, spécifique et formelle, à l'étranger » (Simmel, 1990). En évoquant constamment ses origines étrangères dans ses spectacles, il marque sa différence au sein du groupe qui l'accueille et dans lequel il s'intègre pourtant. Ses compétences techniques et artistiques lui ont valu d'être nommé à la tête du Centre Chorégraphique National d'Orléans en 1995. Mais on peut sans risque supposer que la personnalité de Josef Nadj et l'esthétique liée à son parcours ont certainement été déterminantes dans cette reconnaissance institutionnelle. D'ailleurs, il participe toujours à des événements officiels valorisant la création et la culture hongroises: exposition de photographies¹², participation à des festivals tels que « Magyart »¹³.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*

¹¹ Extrait de la présentation de la pièce par Nadj sur le site de la Compagnie Josef Nadj : <http://www.josefnadj.com/creation-diffusion/les-creations/-peaux-rhinoceros-275.html>

¹² L'exposition « *Les minorités nationales, souffle de diversité, souffle d'Europe* » regroupe des photographies de Sandro Weltin, prises en Voïvodine et accompagnées des textes de Stéphanie Marshall en partenariat avec le Conseil de l'Europe. Cette exposition a été présentée au Maillon

Après avoir conté sur scène les légendes de Kanizsa, Josef Nadj découvre par les hommages littéraires et artistiques la matière nécessaire pour développer un nouveau cycle de créations. Il ne s'agit plus uniquement de citer des hommes aux origines familiales, mais de puiser l'ensemble d'un univers chez les auteurs qui l'ont marqué. Il s'inspire à la fois de leurs oeuvres, mais aussi de leurs vies et de leurs processus de création, sujets qui fascinent le danseur, plasticien de formation. Notons cependant que la plupart des auteurs et artistes pour lesquels ils imaginent des « tombeaux »¹⁴ sont, à l'instar de Vojnich, des passionnés de voyage et d'ailleurs. Ce n'est pas non plus le fruit du hasard si « L'ailleurs » était le mot d'ordre pour rassembler et fédérer les artistes de tous horizons lors du Festival d'Avignon 2006, édition lors de laquelle Josef Nadj était l'artiste associé à la programmation.

Ambassadeur de l'art chorégraphique français à l'étranger

« Le chemin, c'est la recherche de l'essentiel. Le voyage, c'est l'acte de saisir les choses, de poser et de reposer les questions éternelles. Le voyage, c'est l'acte même de la recherche ; l'essence du chemin c'est la connaissance ; le départ de la connaissance, c'est le vide » (Nadj, apud Bloede, 2004: 92). Depuis son arrivée en France dans les années '80, Josef Nadj ne cesse de voyager. Il retourne régulièrement en Voïvodine, mais il part aussi découvrir d'autres régions du monde. Les tournées d'abord: En 2009 par exemple, la Compagnie a joué 9 spectacles en tournée dans 7 pays en dehors de la France. Depuis 1995, 48 pays ont accueilli au moins une représentation d'un spectacle créé par la Compagnie Josef Nadj¹⁵. Mais le chorégraphe voyage aussi pour visiter, rencontrer d'autres techniques, cultures et artistes¹⁶. « Lorsque nous avons joué en Australie, c'était très important pour moi de pouvoir aller à Ayers Rock et de voir, de toucher ce territoire sacré des Aborigènes. Quand je vais dans une grotte découvrir des peintures rupestres, visiter le site mégalithique de Newgrange en Irlande, ou assister au Japon à une représentation de nô ou de bunraku, j'observe quelque chose, une forme, un phénomène, qui a survécu dans un endroit du monde: il faut aller sur place pour en tirer un enseignement » (Nadj, apud Bloede, 2006: 168). Dans le parcours du chorégraphe, la frontière est ainsi indissociable du passage. Voyager, pour Nadj, c'est aller à la rencontre, donc vers la connaissance. Au-delà de la passion ou de la curiosité, pour lui comme pour de nombreux artistes, le nomadisme est un mode d'existence. S'il est installé à Orléans, c'est bien parce qu'il faut un lieu de rassemblement, pour explorer, chercher et

de Strasbourg du 18 mars au 17 avril 2009 à l'occasion de la programmation de *Paysage après l'orage* de Josef Nadj.

¹³ « Magyart, saison hongroise en France » en 2001, notamment le « Tanchaz », bal hongrois organisé à Chaillot le 8 décembre.

¹⁴ En introduction de son essai, Myriam Bloedé justifie le choix de son titre: « "Monument funéraire servant de sépulture pour un ou plusieurs morts", le mot tombeau désigne également une "composition poétique, une oeuvre" dédiée le plus souvent à un poète ou à un artiste. » in *Les tombeaux de Josef Nadj*, op.cit. p. 6.

¹⁵ Ces chiffres ainsi que ceux des années précédentes sont consultables aux archives du CCNO à Orléans. Pour 2009, ils figurent sur le site de la Compagnie : <http://www.josefnadj.com/ccno/l-equipe-quelques-chiffres-305.html>

¹⁶ En introduction de son essai, Myriam Bloedé justifie le choix de son titre : « "Monument funéraire servant de sépulture pour un ou plusieurs morts", le mot tombeau désigne également une "composition poétique, une oeuvre" dédiée le plus souvent à un poète ou à un artiste. » in *Les tombeaux de Josef Nadj*, op.cit. p. 6.

commencer à diffuser la création nourrie de ces migrations diverses. Et que le CCNO constitue une véritable institution, administrative et culturelle, et qu'elle peut ainsi profiter de subventions pour permettre de créer, de diffuser mais aussi de recevoir en résidence des artistes venus d'ailleurs¹⁷.

Son image d'étranger en France, qu'il entretient malgré son incontestable intégration, semble lui garantir, au moins sur le plan symbolique, la liberté de circuler, et donc de s'instruire par la rencontre avec l'autre. « Dans tous les cas, cependant, la figure de l'étranger - notion qu'il faut moins entendre ici dans le sens restreint du statut juridique que dans le sens d'un paradigme: le paradigme de l'individu marqué d'une façon ou d'une autre par une - frontière, dont il est objectivement porteur ou dont il est le support projectif - est une figure de voyage, une figure qui voyage sur un axe relationnel, symbolique et imaginaire, avec la figure de l'autochtone » (Chaouite, 1997). C'est en ce sens qu'évoluent les sujets de création de Josef Nadj: après les histoires et les figures de Kanizsa, il interroge les auteurs et artistes voyageurs, et semble se tourner désormais davantage vers l'Orient et ses modes de pensée, de création et d'existence. Déjà introduite dans *Canard Pékinois* et *La Mort de l'Empereur*, la réflexion sur cette région du monde réapparaît progressivement - *Il n'y a plus de firmament* en 2003 en hommage à Artaud, premier à revendiquer la nécessité d'un « détour par l'Autre »¹⁸ - jusqu'à prendre forme dans *Asobu (Jeu)*. Créée d'après l'oeuvre de Michaux, auteur de carnets de voyages réels (*Ecuador* en 1929, *Un barbare en Asie* en 1933) 11 ou imaginaires (*Ailleurs* en 1948, parmi beaucoup d'autres), la pièce émerge dans l'imagination de Josef Nadj parallèlement à la préparation du Festival d'Avignon. A cette période il confie à Isabelle Danto, dans un entretien pour le Figaro du 7 juillet 2006, avoir de « nouvelles envies de scénographies », de passer « de la boîte noire à un territoire très vaste », d'aller « vers d'autres rencontres, d'autres origines, pour réinventer un rite qui puisse nous alimenter, ici. »

A ce point de notre réflexion, si nous devons représenter le parcours du chorégraphe sur une carte, nous verrions apparaître une nouvelle acceptation de l'Europe qualifiée de « centrale ». La Voïvodine au coeur d'un parcours qui emmène Nadj vers l'Ouest, pour le faire repartir vers l'Est, voyage inenvisageable à l'époque de l'URSS. Dans ses pérégrinations vers l'Asie, il s'intéresse aux différentes formes spectaculaires, d'où le glissement de ses créations vers des performances ritualisées au cours desquelles le signe calligraphique et la présence des musiciens sur le plateau organisent la cérémonie. Les modes de vie des artistes et les différentes techniques pratiquées, sont sources de nouvelles explorations du geste: « L'Orient, [...] captive pour toutes les ressources techniques dont ses acteurs disposent. Ils en sont héritiers, chargés de leur transmission impeccable mais en même temps, ils assurent leur exercice parfait au présent » (Banu, 1999: 9). Apprendre au contact de l'autre, par la transmission et la pratique collective le poussent à collaborer avec quatre butokas de la compagnie Butô Dairakudakan lors de la création d'*Asobu (Jeu)*. Enfin, comme un écho à ses amis poètes voïvodiniens, comme une résonance aux grands auteurs internationaux découverts sur la table du grand père, les textes fondamentaux intriguent rapidement le chorégraphe. On retrouve ainsi le *Yi-King* chinois à l'origine d'*Entracte*, et le *Sho-bo-gen-zo* de Maître Dôgen a inspiré la performance éponyme.

¹⁷ Par exemple « Traverses » est un événement annuel organisé par le CCNO et qui diffuse des créations chorégraphiques internationales.

¹⁸ Expression utilisée par Monique Borie in *L'ailleurs, tremplin....*

Dans le parcours de Nadj, le franchissement de frontières géographiques, l'exploration de l'Ouest à l'Est dépasse donc les douleurs provoquées par l'Histoire, et va jusqu'à entretenir des relations privilégiées avec la Russie. En 2000, la Compagnie reçoit le « Masque d'Or du meilleur spectacle étranger présenté en Russie » pour *Les Veilleurs*¹⁹, puis pour sa version de *Woyzeck* en 2002. Il est à souligner que Nadj obtient en Russie le prix en tant que français (le premier chorégraphe français à obtenir cette distinction), pour des créations en hommage à des auteurs de langue allemande. Peu après, au cours de l'hiver 2003-2004, invité à concevoir la partie chorégraphique du *Penthésilée* de Kleist, mis en scène par Alain Milianti, il en a profité pour prendre une série de photographies dans les dessous du théâtre Drama de Saratov. Une fois encore, il puise un fragment du lieu, de l'ailleurs, pour le transposer et le transporter: ses images ont fait l'objet d'une exposition titrée *L'Opus de Saratov* à la maison Jean Vilar d'Avignon en 2006. Et le théâtre de Saratov fût présent au Festival d'Avignon par l'intermédiaire du chorégraphe français aux origines hongroises... Plusieurs de ses pièces ont été présentées en Russie²⁰. Aujourd'hui, dix ans après le premier Masque d'Or, « [...] à la demande de Valéri Chadrine, directeur du Festival Tchekhov et directeur artistique pour la Russie des « années croisées France-Russie [...] »²¹, Josef Nadj finalise *Cherry Brandy*, qui sera présenté pour la première fois à Moscou et Saint-Petersbourg en Juillet 2010. C'est donc en tant qu'artiste français que Nadj se voit commander un nouvel hommage. Mais comme à chaque fois, le paradoxe des origines, du parcours et des frontières offre au chorégraphe une nouvelle opportunité de s'exprimer tout en interrogeant la vie et l'oeuvre d'un autre²².

Cette fois, le point de départ est un acteur²³ fêtant ses quarante cinq ans de carrière, seul et ivre, qui s'interroge sur sa vie, son parcours, ses rôles et le rapport entre réel et fiction. Le plateau est à la fois sujet et lieu de projections, pour le personnage littéraire, son créateur, mais également l'interprète et le chorégraphe: « Il y a donc convergence, pas toujours immédiatement repérable, entre l'appropriation de traditions et l'ouverture au monde, les déplacements qui donnent des possibilités de travailler autrement la rencontre avec l'autre et la connaissance de sa propre culture »²⁴. Par ses allers retours entre la Voïvodine, la France, la Russie, l'Asie et les autres lieux de représentation, Josef Nadj accède à de multiples moyens de connaître l'Autre dans ce qui fait sa singularité et son appartenance à une communauté. En passant les frontières, il brouille les pistes. A tel point que désormais, dans le Journal Francophone de Budapest²⁵, à l'occasion d'une exposition de ses photos à l'Institut français de Budapest en février

¹⁹ Bien que les pièces de Nadj ne puissent être clairement situées dans un espace-temps fictif identifiable, l'univers déployé dans *Les Veilleurs* évoque rapidement l'attente dans un climat de guerre ou du moins un sentiment d'insécurité.

²⁰ *Les Veilleurs*, *Woyzeck*, *Le Temps du repli*, *Journal d'un inconnu*, *Entracte*, représentées dans diverses villes (Moscou, Saint-Petersbourg, Volgograd, Saratov).

²¹ Voir la présentation de la création sur le site officiel de l'Année France-Russie : http://www.france-russie2010.fr/En_France/20101014/187838171.html

²² Il nous paraît important de souligner que l'autre figure majeure de la danse contemporaine invitée à créer un spectacle en collaboration avec le Théâtre du Bolchoï dans le cadre de l'Année France – Russie est Angelin Preljocaj, artiste français d'origine albanaise.

²³ Il s'agit du personnage central de la pièce *Le chant des cygnes*.

²⁴ Hortense Archambault « Héritiers d'une histoire en mouvement », entretien de Bernard Debroux et Georges Banu, avec Vincent Baudriller in *Alternatives Théâtrales* 89, p.5.

²⁵ « Par la voix des rythmes », par Eva Vamos, posté le 8 février 2008 sur le site <http://www.jfb.hu/node/435>

2008, il est présenté d'abord comme le chorégraphe directeur du CCNO avant de préciser qu'il est magyarophone originaire de Kanisza en Voïvodine.

Josef Nadj, une figure de l'étranger en mouvement

Intensifiées depuis le XX^{ème} siècle, les migrations transforment les hommes en étrangers. Ce qui définit l'homme et son espace, un pays et sa population, des éléments de distinction qui doivent prendre en considération l'existence d'une communauté composée d'étrangers. Exilés, réfugiés, voyageurs, explorateurs, vagabonds, il existe de nombreuses figures de l'étranger, qui demeurent variables selon qui le définit. Mais « D'abord figure lointaine et du lointain, d'étrange langue et d'étranges mœurs, elle permet de définir la bordure confortable du -Nous [...] » (Chaouitte, 1997: 3). En se posant la question de la nature de l'étranger, de ce qui est toujours partiellement exclu de la communauté et pourquoi, il devient possible de réinterroger ce qui constitue les critères d'appartenance à cette communauté.

Lorsque Josef Nadj arrive en France, dans les années '80, l'émergence de la construction identitaire comme sujet de création s'accompagne de nouvelles approches de l'identité française. Des qualificatifs comme « creuset » ou « mosaïque » témoignent de la prise de conscience qui opère sur la question de l'influence réelle de l'immigration²⁶. Si la danse apparaît comme l'une des disciplines amenées à se développer dans ce contexte, c'est qu'elle offre un terrain d'exploration à la fois esthétique, philosophique et sociologique. Nicole Lapierre rappelle que pour Fredrick Barth²⁷, « [...] ce ne sont pas des traits culturels fixes qui définissent les identités ethniques mais la dynamique des interactions, inclusions, exclusions, par lesquelles elles se différencient [...] » (Lapierre, 2004: 64). En France, Nadj trouve des outils de formations, des interprètes, des pratiques, des références, des institutions et des moyens pour « enrichir » son identité d'artiste hongrois tout en questionnant l'identité française et la représentation de ces appartenances. Voilà comment le chorégraphe parvient à demeurer un danseur hongrois en France, et se voir récompensé puis commander des pièces en tant que français pour d'autres pays.

Animé par le désir de compléter son vocabulaire et d'élargir le champ des possibles, il fait du voyage un mode de vie et de connaissance. En confrontant les techniques, les origines, les sujets et les lieux de diffusions, l'art chorégraphique se révèle être un témoin riche quant à l'évolution des préoccupations identitaires. Dans un texte de 1925, Kracauer parle du voyage et de la danse, activités appréciées par ses contemporains. « Et il interprète l'un et l'autre comme une sorte de compensation face à la perte de transcendance et au désenchantement de la société moderne. L'homme, ne pouvant plus être « citoyen de deux mondes », existant « dans l'entre-deux », c'est-à-dire « constamment à la fois dans l'espace et au seuil de l'infini supra-spatial, dans le flux du temps et dans le reflet de l'éternité » (Lapierre, 2004: 27), trouve dans la mobilité du voyage ou le rythme de la danse une sorte de culte esthétique de substitution. Ce qui compte alors, c'est d'être en dehors un moment, hors de l'espace ou du temps quotidiens, comme au cinéma » (Lapierre, 2004: 80). Pour Kracauer, le voyage et la danse

²⁶ Sans évoquer ni analyser les positions développées dans leurs ouvrages, citons l'apparition d'ouvrages tels que *Le creuset français, Histoire de l'immigration, XIX^{ème} – XX^{ème} siècles* de Gérard Noiriel, Paris, Le Seuil, 1988; et *La mosaïque France, Histoire des étrangers et de l'assimilation*, Yves Lequin (dir.), Paris, 1988.

²⁷ *Ethnic groups and boundaries. The social organisation of culture difference*, Bergen, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1969. Traduction française: « Les groupes ethniques et leurs frontières », in Philippe Poutignat et Jocelyne Streiff Fenart, *Théories de l'ethnicité*, Paris, PUF, 1995.

offrent la possibilité de s'échapper du présent tel qu'il est. Le danseur, le voyageur ou le spectateur y trouve un espace-temps intermédiaire, qui possède une dimension en plus de l'espace-temps de la représentation: le mouvement. Et bien que Nadj semble plus dans l'élan vers que dans la fuite de quoique ce soit, la création chorégraphique et le voyage apparaissent comme indissociables moteurs de recherche et de connaissance de l'Autre.

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RECONFIGURING HISTORY AND IDENTITY

*Barbu ȘTEFĂNESCU**

Abstract. *The work is a study of passing from a certain kind of identity, the national identity, which was overestimated by the communist regime, towards other kinds of identity developed during the last decades: the local, regional and European identity. The event which determined the writing of this study is Oradea's anniversary day, 12th of October, when the city celebrates two moments with deep significance for the Romanian population: 12th of October 1918 and 12th of October 1944, both having negative connotations for the Hungarian population. Because of this, both the Hungarian citizens and the Hungarian political personalities resorted to boycotting the annual ceremonies. Today, Oradea is looking for an identity to which all its citizens can accede, no matter the ethnic group, the confession they belong to or the political orientation, an identity many citizens have already acceded to by making use of a culture of convergence instead of one of difference which has been rendered absolute during the last two centuries.*

Keywords: *reconfiguring identity, culture of difference, culture of convergence, local identity, reconciliation*

The solemn moment we are celebrating today, marks the anniversary of a certain number of years from events that took place on the 12th of October. In 1918, here, in Oradea, there was drawn the Declaration of Self-Determination of the Romanians living in Transylvania, Declaration which lies at the basis of the union resolution of Transylvania with Romania. Another event which took place on the 12th of October, but in 1944, was the liberation of Oradea by the Romanian army who forced the German Hungarian troops and the Hungarian administration to retreat. Such moments are meant to reassert different kinds of human solidarity. Thus, in the post communist epoch, the 12th of October has been chosen as the annual celebration day of Oradea by the Local Council by means of the Romanian majority vote, a choice implicitly opposed to by means of absenteeism at the festivities on the part of the political representatives of the Hungarian minority who understood the establishment of this date as the celebration day of the city as a revengeful, thus insulting attitude against the Hungarian population.

The problem arising here, in the new political context of substantial diminishing the interethnic tensions, is whether the symbol of the historical achievement of a community has the power to aggregate the other important minority community by proposing this symbol as a celebration for the whole community without remembering the latter of its defeat, its unwilling entering in a new state where it had to comply with the status of a minority group after having had a privileged status in the former state. We

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think there is an affirmative answer to this problem because any celebration is seen as “a representation of the values of unity, solidarity, reconciliation, generosity, having the aim to suggest, even for a short time, the abolition of certain social antagonisms” (Nicoară, 2009: 74), on condition that the two communities, especially their intellectual and political elite look into their common history through a different perspective than before, namely they should give up revealing only the differences and the divergences while accepting the search of certain things easy to be found in a common space which could surely lead to convergence.

In all societies, people identified themselves both as individuals and different size and consistency human groups thus gaining a collective identity. The identity of one group is always formed in the mirror of alterity, of “the Other”, the one who is different from us because of a series of cultural characteristics. (Mitu, 2006: 74)

Today, we are living, beyond doubt, one of the most spectacular phenomena of identity reconfiguration in both Romanian and European history: there are deep mutations in the perception of the other at the level of mentalities. The globalization sustained by the media and by the freedom of movement makes the other better known no matter who they are or where they live. The freedom of movement amplifies the possibility to meet the other in his own place, to see him from another perspective than before, in other words we must give up a lot of mental clichés and prejudices which another culture has instilled or added to our perception. The world is becoming smaller and smaller and is striving to unify on the basis of certain cultural elements especially those which support global communication: the English language and the internet.

Without being able to avoid globalization but at the same time alarmed by the danger of losing their cultural identity, the human groups make efforts towards a negative direction, that of preserving their specific elements. The European Union itself is made up as a sum of distinct cultural groups meaning a whole of peoples, languages, national, regional and local cultures (*La culture au cœur. Contribution au débat sur la culture et le développement en Europe*, 1998: 255-259).

If the modern epoch expanded the national identities by creating “a Europe of nations” based on assuming the culture of difference which is more powerful in the Centre and East Europe (Neumann, 2001: 10), the postmodern epoch we are living in, makes us accept other kinds of identities as the local, regional, or European ones without giving up the national identities which have deep roots in the European mentalities. The European identity, quite a vague term for the time being, will, beyond doubt, become a reality of the future generations.

The awareness of an identity “us” different from “you” or “they”, different from the other in the way we know it is the outcome of the classic epoch. In the Greek-Roman thinking, both history and mythology had the permanent role to sustain and justify the clear separation between “the civilized” and “the barbarians”. The Greek and Roman rhetoricians turned to the founding mythologies, to the ancestors’ heroic deeds whenever necessary (Nicoară, 2009: 16-17). This classic culture gave birth to the civic consciousness while defending public possessions became the symbol of patriotism. History had the mission to select and transmit over time the models to be followed and the memory of outstanding people (Nicoară, 2009: 24). Christianity came along with a new system of values in which the idea of City gained the new meaning of the union of the believers’ hopes in Christ. God’s City went before any world city (Dawson, 44). For a very long time the main identity element in our cultural area was the Christian confession. It was the Renaissance that brought about the reconsideration of the modern civic spirit,

first in the Italian space, in Florence where the glory of the Roman ancestors went together with the glory of the humanist and artistic present in order to give birth to the pride of being a Florence citizen. This pride was based on the feeling of certainty that there was a direct relationship between the glory of Leonardo da Vinci's city and that of its Roman ancestors who conquered and ruled the world for thousands of years (Oțetea, 1968: 192-204). There are two roots which have supported and are still supporting the modern patriotism: history assumed mythologically and becoming the archetypal time, the paradigm to follow and the present which is either in accordance with the greatness of history, or has a great potential to rise up to the ancestors' glory in a near future. When the European nations were shaping and when they took the decision to establish national states they expressed the idea of nation state by means of ideologies starting from symbols which they found in their antic and mediaeval history. The Romanians made use of well known prices' names, such as Stephan the Great and Michael the Brave, both strong symbolic personalities (Nicoară, 2009: 131). The former had a long reign, won a lot of battles against neighbouring kingdoms and empires, built an exceptional number of monasteries; the latter was blazed both by the glory of his death and by his visionary act of reuniting all the territories inhabited mostly by the Romanians under one and the same rule, an act which had no immediate consequences but future symbolic ones (Bernath, 1994: 41). We can add here Iancu of Hunedoara whose name was used symbolically by the historians of Transylvanian School in order to justify the Transylvanians' national ideology which was meant to get back the rights the Romanians had *ab antiquo* as natives compared to the other ethnic inhabitants, and as descendants of glorious ancestors, the Romans who once ruled the world. This together with the Romanians' contribution to the public duties which was greater than the one brought by all other nations would have given them the right to be the fourth acknowledged nation in the Transylvanian constitutional system. Whenever these arguments were brought forward to sustain the Romanians' rights, the representatives of the privileged states would give the same insolent mediaeval answer: you cannot have equal rights with us because you have no elites; no matter how many you are, you are not a nation, you are only the plebs (Prodan, 1967: 143-167).

The historical discourse of the Ardelean School, an Enlightenment movement, draw its attention upon the peasant, or better to say upon the Romanian seen as a peasant (Mitu, 2006: 240) and, it is upon him that they focused their Enlightenment program, thus converging up to a certain point with the program of the Habsburg state, a state that manifested its interest in the Romanians because they were the largest number of contributors and they had to be able to pay in order to sustain rhythmically the state treasury. It was with their help that the Viennese Court intended to recover the Catholicism in Transylvania under the circumstances in which the Reform attracted the German population and a great part of the Hungarian one towards other confessions. This way of thinking was at the basis of the initiative of establishing the Greek-Catholic Church by means of which the Romanians entered the constitutional system without implying its formal modifications. The Habsburg state with its attempts of modernization took advantage of the social opposition which set the Hungarian nobility against the Romanian peasants in order to disrupt the old, out of date system of mediaeval privileged states, that "Unio Trium Nationum" which, in time gained ethnic and national connotations, although, at its very beginning it had only social ones (Bernath, 1994: 222-224). But the Austrian state was forced to admit the failure of its cultural homogenizing policy which it tried to achieve with the help of the German language and of the

Catholicism. It so happened because during the reign of Joseph II they established the religious tolerance and the idea according to which the Danube Empire was stronger and more interesting through its multiethnic and multicultural character. It is this idea that allowed the development of cultures and national movements which eventually will contribute to the disappearance of the empire.

To this confessional and national policy the Habsburgs added their well known policy of regulating the relations between the nobles and the serves, the state becoming the guarantor of law enforcement in a field in which the rule used to be the arbitrary. The Habsburgs were against the personal serfdom state and sustained the establishment of schools for all levels. During the reign of Maria Teresa, all the citizens of the Empire, no matter their social condition, had the right to apply a petition to all state authorities, including the Imperial Court and the peasants' petitions were to be verified in her name by commissioners or special commissions (Gorun, 1998: 118).

For the very first time in their life, the Romanians, as an ethnic group, felt the support coming from a state and answered with an enthusiastic devotion to the "the cult of the good emperor". The way the monarchy acted was felt both on the practical level – the benefits of the religious union, of the militarized borders, of the regulation measures of urban rapports, school policy, religious tolerance – and on the ideological level: the monarchy, together with the Romanian elite asserted the noble Latin origin of the Romanians thus being contradictory with the Saxon and Hungarian historians' opinion (Nicoară, 2009: 170-171).

This is the situation at the historic moment at the turn of 18th and 19th centuries when modern nationalism is born under the influence of the liberal ideas which aimed not at reforming institutions and feudal mentalities but at completely removing them. Modern nationalism intended to create national states by promoting, inside the ethnic groups, the feeling of belonging to a unitary and homogenous whole on the basis of cultural solidarity and which was to express itself on political level in establishing the national states. This problem raises mainly in the East half of Europe where people lived inside great empires: the Habsburg, the Tsarist, and the Ottoman Empire which from now on will be considered as prisons for peoples. Herder's ideas which lay at the basis of the culture of difference in the Central European space become a common good of the Romanian culture too (Neumann, 2001: 18). They urge to form an identity based upon the characteristics of culture at its anthropological level, namely what we call peasant culture seen as the keeper of authenticity, national spirit, and the folklore becomes "the wisdom treasure of each nation" (Nicoară, 2009: 42). The Romanian elite will go on watching the state, where from, the necessary energies were to come in order to sustain the future national achievements. Thus the Romanian national ideology turns to account the potential of future expressing of the peasant mass, while the same Hungarian ideology put emphasis on the symbolic potential represented by the mediaeval nobility (Mitu, 2006: 240).

More and more often, the Romanian national ideology considers as equal the people engaged on the way towards nation forming and the peasant because the peasant identifies himself with the country, stands out against the boyars and the nobleman, the latter being the ruthless social and national exploiter guilty of the peasant's poor social situation (Ștefănescu, 2009: 88).

By imposing the historic liberalism the accent was laid upon the individual, upon the work and the values it creates, upon the social parasitism brought about in a modern epoch by a recurrent feudalism, which manifested itself in Transylvania through the Diet, an institution that not even in 1846 understood the necessity to vote the abolishment of

serfdom, although the Hungarian liberals considered it the shame of the century. They didn't necessarily do it out of economic considerations - to preserve the traditional work force given by the serfs' free work done as compulsory service - but out of national political considerations. There were voices who warned that abolishing serfdom could change the political relations in Transylvania, which eventually happened (Dragomir, 1989: 142-147).

On the other hand the Romanians from Transylvania were eager to change their social and political status which can easily be seen in their involvement in the events of 1848, when they exceeded the expectations – naïve or not – of the Hungarian political class who had said a few decades before that the designed independent national state of Great Hungary should not expect major malfunctions as they considered that the major danger was coming from the German and Slavonic population. The Hungarian elite looked upon the Romanians through a mental cliché, “the good savage” (Mitu, 2006: 228), meaning a primitive group whom they were to offer the opportunity to become a part of the Hungarian superior culture before freeing them from serfdom. Therefore the Romanians' involvement in the fight against the Hungarian Revolution was a shock for the Hungarian political class and it also sharpened its the political relations with the Romanian elite. Opposing the historical evolutions, the Hungarian politicians would still believe in a utopian success of their plan to assimilate the Romanians by force and this idea would be present in their discourses.

We recall these historical realities admitted to a great extent by the Hungarian historiography, not to stir the aversion of the Hungarian citizens' consciousness or to sustain that the events mentioned above put Oradea among the Transylvanian cities having an important role in achieving the Union with Romania. Our intention is to show that these events are not only the results of historical circumstances in favour of the Romanians but also they belong to “the long duration”, as the great French historian, Fernad Braudel says, duration which includes both combinations of circumstances and punctual events. These evolutions underline both the history of elites and of institutions and the history of number. The Romanians couldn't be considered only a number, on the contrary, in the second half of the 19th century, they developed exceptional political elite including names from Bihor and Oradea. Beginning with the 20th century the mankind developed towards the recognition of judicial rights, including all citizens' (Nicoară, 2002: 101) right to vote, and, following this direction, the events of the autumn of 1918 would have taken place no matter what.

Coming back to the problem of identity, which we intend to discuss, we have to highlight the idea that when the Romanian national consciousness or better to say the national identity was born, first in Transylvania, it was done against the Hungarian alterity. We cannot talk about a symmetric relation here as, in its turn, the Hungarian national consciousness related itself to the German opponents. During the modern epoch, it continues the social and confessional opposition between the Romanian peasants and the Hungarian noblemen. Thus, in time, the Hungarians are put on the list of Romanian people's historical enemies, a cliché we cannot get rid of even today when the idea comes into conflict with today's realities. Hungary, the country against whose revisionist policy we raised Charles II fortified line during World War II is today the neighbor with whom Romania has the strongest and most intense economic, military and political relations. There are many Romanians driving on the Hungarian motorways or doing shopping in their malls. These changing realities will lead to the identity reshaping of the future

generation. History will be a part of this reconfiguration and will make use of its convergence resources after having used differences and divergences for such a long time.

Whether we like it or not, Romanians and Hungarians must manage together a common cultural heritage belonging to their European region. In other words, they willingly accede or not to a central European regional identity depending on the way they have brought about their contribution to a Transylvanian identity even if this identity, while still having many sources of expression, diminished especially during the communist regime which didn't agree with traditional peculiarities.

If we have a look upon the local identity which has been developing till the present moment, we may come to the conclusion that it will still be developing in the future years and will be symbolically put forth by such celebrations as the one that gathered us all here today. In order to do that we have to think over the concept of identity or to explain it, because on my own opinion it has undergone changes or is changing. 12th of October 1918 as well as 12th of October 1944 should not be considered as bearing their old feelings; for the Romanians these dates should not mean the celebration of a people's historic revenge against those who kept them in serfdom or at the towns' peripheries, while for the Hungarians they should not express the nostalgia for an illusive Great Hungary. The only way to do it is not by giving up history – no group will ever give up its memory - but by becoming aware that history, more than any other science, is very sensible at the ideology and instrumentation tendencies (Nicoară, 2009: 9), and by searching along history common points, lasting parameters which we used to rank differently. The great French historian Marc Bloch wrote that the incapacity of understanding and explaining future is based upon the lack of not knowing the past.

Asserting a strong local identity is a general European phenomenon which includes towns from Romania, thus making them part of the search of peculiarities. Today, one of Oradea's peculiarities, beyond its indubitable urban advantages, is, with no doubt, its multicultural vocation. Romanians and Hungarians, generally and those from Oradea especially, are asked to invent a new tradition, that of respect and mutual appreciation, of cohabitation in the same communities not in parallel ones. As a matter of fact these traditions already exist in the life of everyday people; it is the politicians who must learn it. There is something I can't forget, an event about which Nicolae Iorga would have said it was the history of common people, of the humble ones, not altered by the insistent presence of the politics. Death took away too soon my Hungarian neighbor, Boros. He was an open, friendly and charismatic man; so many people attended the burial ceremony: relatives, friends, neighbours, most of them being Romanian, thus reflecting the social structure of the quarter. The Reformed priest found himself in a great difficulty because of the massive presence of the Romanians and he considered it was necessary to say the sermon in Romanian too. This tolerant, nice attitude of a civilized person gave the priest the dissatisfaction of finding out how badly he spoke Romanian. Anyhow, what really matters is the symbol of the Romanians' massive participation at the burial of a Hungarian and of the sermon delivered in Romanian too. Henceforth, we think, the cultivating of new traditions starts.

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EUROPEAN CULTURE BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND UNITY

*Mircea BRIE**

Abstract. *The image of the European culture is given by the association of the concepts people-culture-history-territory, which provides certain local features. From this relation, we identify a cultural area with local, regional and national features beyond a certain European culture. Thus, we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European level: a culture of cultures, that is a cultural area with a particular, local, regional and national strong identity, or a cultural archipelago, that is a common yet disrupted cultural area. Whatever the perspective, the existence of a European cultural area cannot be denied, although one may speak of diversity or of “disrupted continuity”. From a methodological point of view, we have to point out that despite the two-levelled approach the two conceptual constructions do not exclude each other: the concept of “culture of cultures” designates both a particular and a general identity area.*

Keywords: *Europe, cultural diversity, cultural homogeneity, identity, interculturality*

Introduction

The trends expressed in the scientific environment of the European culture are either gathered around the concept of *cultural homogeneity*, a phenomenon in a strong causal connection with globalisation, or it designates an existing reality that cannot be denied or eliminated, that is *cultural diversity*. In the first case, we deal with universalization and uniformity of values, images and ideas broadcast by media or cultural industry. Within such construction, regional and national character suffers, as one may notice the insertion of a means of cultural “predominance” mainly issued by the United States of America, also known as “Americanisation” of world culture (La culture au cœur, 1998: 255-258). In the second case, cultural diversity involves plurality of ideas, images, values and expressions. They are all possible through a variety of expression and the presence of a great number of parallel local, regional, ethnic, national, etc. cultures. Moreover, given the context, certain authors speak of “identity revenge” and the “feeling of returning to historical, national and cultural identity”, particularly in an area such as Central and Eastern Europe and at a historical time when national features and identity are compelled to be redefined by being more open to the new geopolitical, historical, or cultural configurations (David, Florea, 2007: 645-646). Beyond the relative epistemological antagonism of the approach, our debate can have slight variations. The field of cultural cooperation tends to become „multipolar”, as the concept of “cultural networks” is introduced. These networks have begun to shatter old structures and support identity, communication, relationship and information (Pehn, 1999: 8). International

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stakeholders acquire an ever more important role; their projects, ideas, methods or structures, in other words their identity, are not only more visible (thus acquiring a multiplying effect on others); they are also more specific and particular in expression.

Is the European culture global or specific? Can we speak of cultural globalisation? Or, is the European culture going cosmopolite? Which is the place of the traditional, the ethnic, the national, the specific and the particular? The debate makes room to the equation global v local, general v particular. National and regional cultures do not disappear under the immediate acceleration of globalisation due to the increasing interest in local culture. Considered as a general process, globalisation is “characterised by multiplication, acceleration and strengthening of economic, political, social and cultural interaction between actors all over the world” (Tardif, Farchy, 2006: 107-108). If generalised, this cultural globalisation does not have the same influence throughout Europe.

In the French version of the report published in March 1998 on the issue, the *European Steering Committee on Culture and Development* of the Council of Europe starts with the question: “European culture: the corner shop, the independent trader, or the world supermarket?” The conclusions of the report are rather generalisations that can be classified as follows (La culture au cœur, 1998: 255-259): 1. There is a very strong requirement for accessible broadcast media products and other worldwide cultural services; at the same time, local cultural offer including local media arouses the interest for the particular, for ideas, images and values celebrating the community and local feelings due to interaction and local practices. Diversity is also preserved due to the support of nation-states. 2. Facing the strong trend for consolidation of „cultural continents” world (e.g. the European or the North-American one), there are autonomous “cultural islands” that are defined and preserved on local, regional and national levels by enforcing all expressions and cultural production to the local and traditional criteria of excellence/acceptance. These “cultural islands” turn into cultural museums closed against any external influence. 3. There is a strong “seduction of globalisation”. From this point of view, the European culture is an economic success as it is worldwide oriented from a commercial point of view. The economic “conquest” of world markets supports cultural “export”. In this equation, an important role is played by great companies in the field of information and telecommunication, cultural production, entertainment and tourism. 4. The European area is a place for cultural mixture, for interculturality. This makes it possible that “hybrid cultures” may appear to assimilate ideas, images and values to their own cultural format. 5. If we accept the idea that all countries should act worldwide and that no culture can work in isolation, the policies adopted by governments should save local cultural production and diversity.

The European cultural perspective is also provided by the European Union’s policy. “*Is there a European cultural policy?*” This is the title of a conference held in Bucharest in January 2009 by Vincent Dubois, a professor at the Institute of Political Sciences in Strasbourg and a member of the Institut Universitaire de France. The question seems to be natural and legitimate from the point of view of identifying the specific culture in the European area. The discourse begins with an apocryphal quotation by Jean Monnet (he would have never uttered this phrase!): “If I were to redo something – certainly, the European construction – I would start with culture” (Dubois, 2009). The abovementioned message considers that what we call the “Jean Monnet method”, the project he built to sketch the European integration, has another direction: starting with the economic structure, there is a mechanism. Considering the production system, we grow to

be interested in social issues. These interests entail Europe's cultural integration. This project, this orientation of interests has definitely had influence on the manner of designing the process of cultural integration. What cultural actions initiated by the European Union lacks, either partly or totally, is the support and claim of a cultural policy through the involved political organisations. Nevertheless, there are three important objectives of the European cultural agenda: 1. promoting cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue. Yet, as far as this objective is concerned, we deal with a broad meaning of culture overriding culture in a strict sense. It concerns interethnic exchanges beyond mere promotion of cultural products; 2. promoting cultures as creative accelerators. Terms such as "art" or "culture" are not used in the documents issued by the European Union. The term "culture" is used in the wider anthropological meaning. The term they prefer is "creativity"; it designates any activity defined through innovation; 3. promoting culture as an all-important element in the European Union's external relations. We can see that the cultural objectives as such are subsumed to the ones concerning European integration in a broad sense (Dubois, 2009).

An important element is provided by the reference level: sub- or multinational, autochthonous or diasporas; last but not least, it is the European and international context (Bennett, 2001: 29-32).

Beyond any approach, the image of the European culture is provided by the association of the concepts people – culture – history – territory. They confer a certain local specificity due to their characteristics. From this point of view, we can identify besides a European culture, a cultural area of local, regional and national specifics. Thus, we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European level: a culture of cultures, that is a cultural area with a strong identity on the particular, local, regional, or national levels, or a cultural archipelago, that is a joint yet disrupted cultural area. Irrespective of the perspective, we cannot deny the existence of a European cultural area, whether a diversity cultural area, or one of "disrupted continuity".

From a methodological point of view, we have to point out that despite the two-levelled approach the two conceptual constructions do not exclude each other: the concept of "culture of cultures" designates both a particular and a general identity area.

1. Europe – a cultural diversity space

The concept of border has long developed as an "intolerance axis" of nationalism and racism, of neighbours' rejection (Wackermann, 2003: 28). Besides the physical frontier, irrespective of the conceptual approach, we identify other types of "borders" whether within or at the border of the European Union. We consider these frontiers symbolic or ideological since more often than not they are not palpable. From Europeanism to nationalism, from ethno-religious to cultural identities and social gaps, the wide range of approaches of these frontiers may continue in the context of implementing efficient European neighbourhood policies. The physical border at the external boundary of the European Union may "open" in time. Yet other types of borders may appear between people and communities. For instance, immigrants live within the European Union preserving their own identity and thus creating a world that "refuses integration" due to the specifics this identity develops. We can see that there is a gap between this kind of communities and the majority that may become a symbolic cultural border and turn into "external" border.

In the current context of economic-financial crisis, many European societies develop a strong "self-protection" feeling not only of economic origin. There is also a

kind of preservation of their own identity, including the cultural one. Crisis or exaltation moments can easily lead to nationalist feelings diluting the “Europeanist” perception of the border. This dilution occurs at the same time with strengthening identity-community and the feeling of ethno-cultural appurtenance to a nation. There is a time when many European peoples come to the foreground and “re-find their identity” by turning to the national trend despite the “unity” and solidarity stated by the Member States officials at European institutions.

National borders established at different times and in different historical and political contexts have contributed to national and cultural economic integration of peripheries. In the current context, the integration of Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union has brought about a reversed phenomenon: disintegration of national market and administrative decentralisation have led to influencing the integration of peripheries to national and cultural systems. Currently, there are strong trends to focus on cross-border cooperation, thus eroding the idea of compact and relatively isolated national group (Muller, Schultz, 2002: 205). From the cultural point of view, we can notice the flows of exchanges without a loss of local, regional, or national features. Cultural characteristics introduce the debate on cultural border. It divides cultural areas with their own identity, thus building what we call the European cultural area of cultures.

1.1. Europe: culture of cultures

The numerous political borders tend to have a decreasing importance in the European Union area to the point of fading away. In time, the former borders turn into mere “symbols of singularity and independence” (Banus, 2007: 139). At the same time, cultural borders acquire a new ever more visible role. It is not only an internal approach, when cultural “sub-elements” specific to the European area can be identified; it is also an approach characteristic of governance external to the European Union. This cultural border makes a clear-cut distinction between Europe and non-Europe. This perspective raising the issue of the unity of the European civilisation and providing the image of a European cultural set (divided into cultural “sub-elements”) is crushed by the supporters of national cultures of European peoples. The “culture of cultures” idea lays stress on cultures’ specifics, yet acknowledging its unity. Basically, cultural borders are contact areas providing communication and cooperation to avoid barriers between the European peoples or cultures.

Cultural diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism are elements specific to the European area. The European integration process is complex; it does not impose and is not conditioned by the idea of cultural unity, or the existence of a common culture including all Europeans. Specificity and diversity are precisely the means of intercultural dialogue between European peoples. Each European society has to find their own integrating solutions depending on traditions and institutions. The integrating model used in Germany might not work in France. There are salient differences between the model of the French assimilation policy and the tolerance expressed in the United Kingdom. If we expand this approach to Central and Eastern European area, differences are even more striking.

European societies and cultures do not reject each other in the European construction equation. It is a time when each can learn from the experience and expertise of others. The ex-communist Eastern and Central European countries have undergone a process of transition to a democratic model after 1990. Yet, this democratic model involves accepting diversity including the acknowledgement of national minorities’

claims. In some situations, cultural expression and political responses to claims did not rise to the occasion. Unfortunately, the result was military solutions.

In Western Europe, minorities have gradually earned a long-term recognition of autonomy and equity in point of national resources (from this point of view, there are contrasts with the sudden changes in Central and Eastern Europe turning into intense manifestations due to minorities' claims and resistance of the majority). There is not the same situation in the rights of minorities originating from old European colonies. Upon their proposal, there is the issue of social status, financial means and relationship between European cultures and cultures in the regions of origin (*La culture au cœur*, 1998: 69).

Europeans' attitude concerning immigrants has not been steady throughout time. If in the 1970s the European countries favoured immigration and some of them, such as Federal Germany and Switzerland, even encouraged it for reasons of labour force, things have subsequently changed. At the end of the 1980s, due to the overwhelming number of immigrants and their "non-European" character, the old continent became less welcoming. However, Europe tried to favour a climate of openness and generosity. "It is fundamental to create a welcoming society and acknowledge the fact that immigration is a double meaning process supposing adaptation of both immigrants and the society assimilating them. By its nature, Europe is a pluralist society rich in social and cultural traditions that are to develop even more in the future" (Tandonnet, 2007: 50). Could this European optimism identified by Maxime Tandonnet be just a utopia? The presence of the Islam in Europe is a certitude, yet its Europeanization is still debatable. According to the French academician Gilles Kepel, "neither the bloodshed of Muslims in Northern Africa wearing French uniforms during the two world wars, nor the toil of immigrant workers living in terrible conditions and building France (and Europe) for next to nothing after 1945 did turn their children into... European citizens as such" (Leiken, 2005, 1). If Europeans can assimilate the Muslim immigrants or if there is to be a conflict of values is open to debate. Stanley Hoffman has noticed that Westerners are more and more scared that "they are invaded not by armed forces and tanks, but by immigrants speaking different languages, worshiping other Gods, belonging to other cultures and taking their jobs and lands, living far from the welfare system and menacing their lifestyle" (Stanley, 1991: 30; Huntington, 1998: 292).

Alternating negotiation and conflict, communication and doubt, Muslims build little by little an individual and collective identity "risking to be at the same time pure and hybrid, local as well as transnational" (Saint-Blancat, 2008: 42). The multiplying identity vectors contribute to the flow of symbolic borders and to individualising diasporas communities. There is a sort of gap around each Islamic community as compared to the rest of the community. This gap often turns into an internal and external border at the same time. This reality is stressed by the establishment of community models where identity features are transferred from the ethnic and national area (Turks, Magrebians, Arabs) to the religious, Muslim, Islamic one (Saint-Blancat, 2008: 44). According to the behaviourist model, we can notice several behavioural reactions of Islamic communities building up a solidarity overcoming ethnic or national differences. This reality is also determined by the discriminating attitude of the majority. Several stereotypes lead not only to a patterned image, but also to a solidarity around the Islamic values even in the case of non-believers, maybe atheists. The phenomenon can be reversed: from Islamic solidarity, they may reach ethnic solidarity. It is the case of the Pakistani Islam communities in the United Kingdom (about 750,000 people) who have ethnically regrouped (individualised on an ethnic border) due to a religious support (Pędziwiatr, 2002: 159).

Ethno-cultural borders may overlap or not over state borders: we can identify symbolic “borders” in most European states separating more or less human communities on ethnic or cultural criteria.

EU policy has an impact on national minorities’ position in the Member States. One of the current objectives of the European Union is building a “neutral” area where different national cultures may find themselves and cooperate (La culture au cœur, 1998: 69). A key element of accession agreements for Central and Eastern European countries mentioned the treatment of national minorities including the management of the “border” between minorities and majorities. For example, in Estonia there was a programme funded by the state on the issue of the “Estonian society integration” (implemented in 2000-2007) together with programmes funded by the EU, UN and other Northern states whose aim was to promote interethnic dialogue and Estonian language learning by the Russian speakers (Thompson, 2001: 68). In Hungary, the government was concerned with improving the treatment of the Gypsies, which was required by the European Union during the pre-accession negotiations. The issue of the Gypsies is a general issue for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In their reports on the accession negotiations with the countries in the region, the European Commission showed their concern on the protection of national minorities’ rights. In the 1999 report on the progress of the candidate countries, the Commission stated that “the rooted prejudice in many candidate countries still results from discrimination against Gypsies in social and economic life” (Thompson, 2001: 69). There will still be difficulties despite the attempts of the European institutions to improve the situation. Some Central and Eastern European countries seek to redefine their national position after escaping the Soviet era. In such a context, national minorities have a hard time to identify with the national identity of the state. For example, according to Estonia’s response to the recommendations of the Commission on minorities’ protection, the Government speaks of “preserving the Estonian nation and culture” and the “development of the population loyal to the Estonian Republic” (Thompson, 2001: 69). The case of Ukraine (which is not a European Union Member State) is more eloquent due to the fact that it has a privileged relationship with the EU at its external border. Here, one can find what Samuel Huntington called the “erroneous civilisation line” – a delimitation dividing two cultures with different perceptions of the world (Thompson, 2001: 69).

Thus, the difficulties of integration are obvious. Amongst the groups of different ethnies or cultures, there are often communication barriers that often lead to gaps and entail discrimination reactions and conflict situations. On the other hand, these gaps are but expressions of elitist political trends that are difficult to seize in daily life. From this point of view, ethnic borders are spaces of mutual understanding and insertion and, from another point of view, they are spaces of divergence and exclusion (Tătar, 2003: 159).

1.2. Cultural border versus cultural identity

From this perspective, Europe seems a structure made up of cultural areas delimited by cultural “borders” overlapping more or less on national states’ borders. The border defined by the *Dictionnaire de géographie* (Baud, Bourgeat, 1995) as a “limit separating two areas, two states”, a disruption “between two types of space organisation, communication networks, societies, often different and sometimes opposed” (Wackermann, 2003: 11), represents the “interface of territorial discontinuities” (Wackermann, 2003: 10). Borders show the limits of jurisprudence, sovereignty and political systems. Thus, they can have the role of lines, “barriers” or “landmarks”. On the other hand, they show the typology of political construction. The relation border –

political system is interestingly seized by Jean-Baptiste Haurguindéguy, who sees the “border as a limit of the political” and “the political as a limit of the border” (Haurguindéguy, 2007: 154).

As compared to political border, cultural border is not seen exclusively in connection with the idea of state; this image can also be seen as compared to the international context, international political system and international bodies. However, everything can be connected with the relation between the political area and the border through “democracy”. Just like democracy, culture is not, and should not be, the exclusive means of political structures. Intergovernmental bodies established after WWII have repeatedly stated their interest in “cultural democracy”, “cultural rights” and the promotion of coherent policies in the cultural field (La culture au cœur, 1998: 37). Besides these desiderata, national states have been directly involved in promoting cultural policies to “develop national identity”. Several European states allow an important part of their cultural budget to preserve and protect a material cultural patrimony standing for the joint heritage of Europe in its entirety. The rich Roman or Renaissance cultural heritage contribute to more than strengthening the European culture, as it is also overlapped on the Italian political desiderata to develop the identity of the Italian nation and state (La culture au cœur, 1998: 44).

Cultural policy is more than building and renovating cultural buildings; it stands for a whole set of measures in the cultural field (Bennett, 2001: 55-62). Promoting cultural identity and culture, favouring creativity and active participation in the cultural field are four fundamental objectives of the European cultural policies. The importance deriving from such policy is the foundation of establishing identities and states in several regions of the European continent. Tracing political borders, as well as claims of any nature are supported more often than not by cultural and identity arguments. It is a topical perspective even in the context of European integration and globalisation nowadays: the process is associated with current trends to local and regional elements, which brings about the strengthening of identity significance and cultural heritage (Wackermann, 2003: 39; O’Dowd, Wilson, 1996: 237).

Cultural identity (represented by encoded behaviour and communication, such as language, customs, traditions, clothes, traditional structures, institutions, religion, arts, etc.) is the specific element providing national cohesion and continuity of generations. Identity is plural, as each individual is defined in an effective or potential manner through a multiple appurtenance: either immediate surroundings (family and close friends), or the first levels of ethnic, religious, social or local appurtenance take shape (La culture au cœur, 1998: 52). Several individuals or groups of individuals cannot identify themselves with such identity structures, which generates the search for new references, that is, new systems of values. In Western Europe, crises of the provident state, unemployment, immigration or exclusion have a deep influence on society. On the other hand, in Central and Eastern Europe, the road to democracy has proved to be painful in many countries. The return to nationalism has been a mere expression of a reality leading to creating or strengthening cultural identities. Thus, in many European countries, one of the cultural policies objectives is “favouring (re)discoveries or (re)assertion of identities” (La culture au cœur, 1998: 53).

Dictionaries of cultural geography define borders as basic spatial structures having the role of geopolitical disruption and marking or landmark acting on three levels: real, symbolic and imaginary. The symbolic refers to the appurtenance to a community anchored in their own territory thus making reference to identity. Anthropologists insist on

the founding role of the symbolic in establishing collective or individual identities through delimitations. Borders always trigger strong marks of identity leaving its imprint on cultural relationships on an inhabited territory (Spiridon, 2006). The tradition of geo-historical research initiated by the French school of *Annales* has insisted on the significant equation border – identity. Lucien Febvre has analysed the semantic evolution of the notion of border as a sign of the mutation of historical reality in parallel with the establishment of nation-states. The couple border – identity is present in the ideas expressed by Fernand Braudel in *L'identité de la France*. To Braudel, the border is the place where autonomous yet interdependent plans are articulated – on the one hand, real geopolitical borders and, on the other hand, their intellectual, ideological and symbolic projections. The ideas mentioned above hold true in the spatial delimitation of Europe and the perceptions of European identity, particularly as the idea of “European cultural identity” refers to offcut and delimitation: geopolitical, ideological or symbolic, and to unstable borders sometimes traced in a paradoxical manner and generating confusions (Spiridon, 2006).

2. Europe – unitary cultural area

Irrespective of the approaches on diversity and multiple identities from a cultural point of view, Europe can be conceived as an organic cultural structure despite disruptions that may occur between the elements making up its complex structure. Considering this approach, the European culture is built on an intricate system of common values characterising the European cultural area. Just like isles making up an archipelago, despite some areas delimitating it, the European cultural area is made up of elements that can be characterised as organic structures with a certain composition in point of shape and expression. The areas limiting these “insular” cultural areas interpreted as cultural borders from the perspective of our approach are disruptions within an organic cultural system: Europe. This cultural area is organic and has specific relations with the neighbouring cultural areas.

2.1. Cultural Europe: between common values and interests

The classical criterion for cultural location connecting a cultural area to a people speaking the same language, having the same lifestyle and behaviour, etc., can be replaced by some criteria defining the common and organic cultural area of the Europeans.

We first refer to common cultural values due to which we can confirm today the existence of a cultural reality specific to the European area. In the survey entitled *The Cultural Frontiers of Europe: Our Common Values*, Rudolf Rezsöhazy develops the common values of the European cultural area on new elements conferring specificity and unity (Rezsöhazy, 2008): 1. The Greek-Roman civilisation as a basis to build the European culture and spirit; 2. The values of Christianity starting with basic notions, such as the single and personal God, the concept of salvation and damnation of man, love, justice, solidarity and fraternity of man (all men are considered sons of the same Father); 3. Middle Ages and mediaeval civilisation; 4. Renaissance and Reform; 5. Enlightenment; 6. Political and industrial revolution; 7. Capitalism and socialism; 8. Development, progress and welfare of post-war history; 9. Family as core value of our society.

Another approach conferring unity to the European area refers to common interests of Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern and Western Europe have undergone a process of political, economic, military and environmental integration (Dubnička, 2007: 299). The fight against terrorism and the fear of military wars, the fear

of increasing world population associated with poverty and migration to Western Europe raise the following dilemma: integration or national identity? Which is the role of the EU in this situation? The answers to these questions have to be sought in the following fields: culture, history, religion, economy and security (Dubnička, 2007: 299-309). Besides divergences separating the Europeans, the current context brings to the foreground the strong determinism recorded by the integrationist trend triggered by common interest.

An area with common values and interests is able to build and strengthen its common identity character. There is also the relation with the non-European area. From this point of view, the European cultural area takes a distinct form as compared to other cultural types and systems. Thus, there is a cultural border around cultural Europe. Such cultural border makes a clear distinction between Europe and non-Europe. Besides this theory laying stress on scepticism concerning certain projects for future enlargement of the European Union, we can notice the use of debating on the issue of the real borders of Europe, an issue approached by analysts for centuries.

Cultural perspective raises debates on the notion of the unity of the European civilisation as well as on the relation between geography and culture. Can Europe be separated from Asia on the cultural criterion of delimitation? Professor Delanty approaches the concept of Christian Europe and Europe as an heir of the Roman and Greek civilisation (Delanty, 2006: 46). Besides the line of geographical, tectonic separation of the two continents, is the European culture able to impose new borders? It is a question to which European analysts provide different answers. Visions are strongly influenced by the current geopolitical subjectivity. During Middle Ages, Europe was limited to the Catholic West clearly separated from the expanding Islamism. Through Peter the Great's endeavours, Russia was included in the European diplomatic system. Europe as a concept expanded. For the first time in 1716, in *Almanach royal* published in France, the figures of the Romanovs were amongst the European monarch families. This was mainly due to the fact that Russia joined the other powers in the European diplomatic system (Anderson, 1968: 156). Around 1715, the position of the Ottoman Empire resembled Russia from many points of view. It joined the European diplomatic arena at the end of the 15th century. The fact that the Turks joined the European relations system was mainly due to the rivalries between France and the Habsburgs (Anderson, 1968: 157). Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire did not express as a European state and did never belong to the European diplomatic system in the 18th century. To Napoleon, the European area meant the "French Europe" conceived as a space whose borders had to be settled according to the tensions against the Ottoman Empire (Delanty, 2006: 46). Further examples are available to these days. Yet, the hypothesis of cultural borders of the European area imposes certain delimitations that we often assume, whether we like it or not.

Our aim is not to trace such borders of the European area. However, we have to point out that our debate rather imposes a characterisation of the European identity as a spatial notion that is protected like a fortress. Is Europe (we directly refer to the EU, which is more or less associated to the European area as a whole!) not only politically, but also culturally an area imposing external borders clearly determined from a territorial point of view? If we pursue the evolution of the process of European construction in time, we can conclude by answering the question with the simple fact that in the European Union external borders are more and more important (more closed!), while the internal borders are becoming formal (more open!). Thus, Europe seen as a "fortress" is more and more open, more "hospitable" from the point of view of its Member States, and more closed, more secure at the borders and less permissive from the point of view of the rest of the

world. In this construction, we can identify more than the advantages of high degree of democracy and welfare that the Community citizens enjoy; there is also the exclusivity imposed to others by closing the fortress. When putting aside internal barriers, Europe (EU!) starts to become a super-state reinventing the “hard” border to protect states and politically associated people; it excludes those who have not been beneficiaries of such political decisions. Do external borders of the Community turn into expressions of the national state border in this context? It is a difficult issue entailing debates not only on the character and typology of the border, but also on aspects introduced by the fact that the European Union does not have a border from within which is can see outside. There are several territories that are geographically “within” the Community, but do not belong to the European Union. The attempt to trace the Community border to (physically!) separate the “Europeans” and the “non-Europeans” is impossible from a cultural point of view. Even recent historical heritage after the Cold War imposes both borders and real barriers that cannot be surpassed from the point of view of political decisions. Borders are still closed irrespective of cultural heritage. On the other hand, the process of tracing external borders does not seem to have finished. Considering this remark, there are people and states that will belong to the “inside” in the future, although they are currently outside the borders. The hard border whose construction is more definite excludes both Europeans and non-Europeans. Consequently, the European border is either open or closed depending on the exclusivist interests and less on cultural grounds. Thus, politicians’ discourse using the European cultural heritage as a reason against the integration of countries such as Turkey is mere populist action. The decision is political and the club is exclusivist. “Europe is and should remain *a house with many rooms*, rather than a culturally and racially exclusive club” (Bideleux, 2006: 62). Thus, the European Community is a territory closed on both political and identity grounds.

2.2. Numerical revolution and the society of communication: between diversity and homogeneity

Due to technical development in the field of reproducing and broadcasting information through numerical encoding, distances between different parts of the world have greatly diminished nowadays. The new free practices with access to networks and numerical content of information provide the opportunity to have quick access to a lot of information. For example, due to different internet programmes, people in any part of the world can communicate in real time for free. The new technologies change production and cultural consumption due to the fact that cultural content belonging to a wide cultural range is at our disposal. Between culture, communication and new technologies there is a natural relation leading to outlining a communicational society within which cultural production and consumption is specific, yet shallow (La culture au cœur, 1998: 318).

Specific cultural programmes can be broadcast within the new context not only in a limited space; they are available in diasporas areas (Tardif, Farchy, 2006: 166-167). Distance communication between communities belonging to the same cultural area is facilitated and settles the premise of developing a borderless cultural area. Thus, emigrant communities in the diasporas can keep in touch with the cultural area of origin and succeed to preserve their identity. The internet provides a great chance to small cultures and threatened linguistic communities. Universalisation should not be understood as a means of uniformity, but as a chance to cultural identity... integration in the universal value circuit (Oberländer-Târnoveanu, 2006: 2).

This opportunity to promote the particularity and preservation of identity of small groups under the pressure of assimilation is accompanied by a similar process in a reversed direction: cultural elements specific to cultural “homogeneity” resulting from globalisation are more easily offered to cultural environment including small cultural communities. Another result is “relocating cultural consumption” as the new technologies of information and communication reduce distances and compress time (La culture au cœur, 1998: 120). This reality puts aside local and provincial constraints although there is an “invasion” of the universal. The European cultural area as a whole acquires a more consistent form in this context, as its elements are more connected and related through interculturality. Cultural diversity acquires a consistency through several models provided. The choice undoubtedly leads to homogeneity. There is the same process in the European area. Beyond any infusion from the outside, particularly the American area and the Islamic area, it preserves its own cultural specific (La culture au cœur, 1998: 117-133).

2.3. Network culture – a new type of cultural border

The multiplication of education, research and cooperation opportunities in the cultural field has been carried out due to international “workshops” and the development of transnational networks. The role of these networks is to accelerate cultural actions and promote common values (La culture au cœur, 1998: 321). Thematic networks aim at settling research, development and knowledge actions on common interests identified on regional, interregional and transnational levels. Technically, the network is made up of a group of institutions with resembling aims identifying a common need in their field of action. Joining under an organisation can be formal or informal, as communication between members and sharing joint objectives of the networks are essential for it to work.

Thus, a network is defined by sharing information and idea, learning from the experience of others, expertise and large perspective on approaches in the field of cultural patrimony marketing and management. “Networks make us become familiar with the new artistic and cultural expressions, new methods of management and provide consistency to the partnership between public institutions and civil society” (Lujanschi, Neamu, 2005: 4). In the new European cultural configuration, networks make up the expression of a different form of cooperation as compared to the classic system. They have the role to favour, simplify and rush the implementation of joint cultural projects. Networks are useful as they allow reaching international level without going through the national institutional framework (Pehn, 1999: 47).

Networks have a core role both for professionals’ *mobility* and acquiring a European *cohesion*. Cultural exchange and cooperation greatly contributes to Europe’s integration and cohesion. The European Union encourages long-term cooperation leading to networks interconnecting cultural institutions. Networks provide a wide range of public information and increasing interest in culture by developing the ability for communication, collaboration and diversity understanding (Lujanschi, Neamu, 2005: 7).

The *Manifesto of the European Cultural Networks* adopted in Brussels on 21 September 1997 by the Forum of European Cultural Networks considers that “European cultural networks contribute to European cohesion, facilitate mobility of operators and cultural products, facilitate trans-cultural communication, fights xenophobia and racism, and provides practice in inter-cultural understanding, strengthens the cultural dimension of development that is not produced by purely economic factors” (Lujanschi, Neamu, 2005: 3).

More often than not, these networks are considered unofficial organised groups attempting to focus information and putting pressure on decision-makers. Some analysts

even consider them exclusivist groups established around institutions in Brussels and Strasbourg (La culture au cœur, 1998: 321). More or less formal, these networks are often used by the European institutions in decision-making. Thus, networks become interlocutors acquiring regional, national or European recognition. Yet, their recognition is not related to a certain financial support. It is a certain legitimacy, that is, a new manner of working on an institutional level.

No matter their role relating to the European institutions, as petitioners or partners, European cultural networks have become important transnational vectors to stimulate cooperation in the cultural field. Intercultural dialogue is facilitated by formal or informal connection of specialists or representatives of organisations in the European area. Thus, the European cultural area acquires a new approach as regards its structure: cultural “small isles” interconnected through a transnational relational system. “The process of ‘*networking*’ is a long-term process of a deep and subjective nature that is difficult to quantify and judge” (Pehn, 1999: 49).

3. Conclusions

Thus, we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European level: a culture of cultures, that is, a cultural area with a strong identity on the particular, local, regional and national levels, or a cultural archipelago, that is, a joint cultural area with disruptions. No matter the perspective, the existence of a European cultural area is not denied, whether we speak of diversity or “disrupted continuity”. The European culture seen as a “house with many rooms” does not exclude the existence of the “house” or the “rooms”. The natural question arising from this perspective is as follows: are specific cultures completely integrated in the general European cultural area? The answer seems natural. Our European identity supposes a basic reality. Besides, the particularity of the European culture is provided by diversity and multiculturalism as means of expression on the local, regional or national levels. Consequently, the European cultural area is an area with strong identity both particularly and generally. The phrase “culture of cultures” is appropriate from this point of view. As to identifying cultural borders, we can notice the fact that cultural contact areas belong to at least two categories: internal areas between local, regional or national elements; external areas that impose the delimitation around what European culture is. Both approaches used in this paper do not exclude each other despite the conceptual opposition. The existence of national cultural areas does not exclude the existence of a common European cultural area. In fact, it is precisely this reality that confers the European area a special cultural identity. Europe can be conceived as a cosmopolite space, a media-cultural space where cultural security can turn into an element of preservation of a European common identity, besides the approaches we have referred to. Facing economic pressure generated by the economic policies, today’s Europe responds to the whole world as a powerful common cultural area through the EU. Do peoples’ identities disappear in this equation? The debate has to comprise approaches starting from the definition of the place of the national in the context of the European construction process. Can the nationalism specific to the 19th and 20th centuries Europe be extrapolated to peoples in a different concept, that of Europeanism? Besides the slight variations of the approach, “nationalism” can be European. In this case, Europe as a whole is strengthened as a structure in construction including the cultural perspective.

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NARRATIVES OF MIGRATION: THE ACCULTURATION PROCESS IN THE CASE OF ROMANIAN COMMUNITIES IN SPAIN

*Cătălina ILIESCU GHEORGHIU**

Abstract. *The new global working circuits as well as delocalization of productive capacity generate changes not only in the migration movement, but also in the new process of migrants' socialization. Migration, which dislocates millions of people and relocates them in new global working circuits, is conditioned by many factors; among them, an increase of global cities concentrating scientific, technological and financing services, generating and sustaining a permanent movement of determinate social sectors. While labour is moving from the third to the first world (Horvath, Anghel, 2009: 13), the production capacity moves the other way round, on grounds of the exclusivist logics of profits maximization, with little concern towards states' interests, and overlooking social, environmental and cultural impact produced by this bi-directionality whose consequences are very often devastating.*

In the present global landscape, migrants have attained major weight on the demographic scales in developed countries but also on the economic balance in those territories they left behind. Romanian migration in Spain is able to play the role of an "interface" between post communist Eastern European zone, nowadays one of the greatest emigration nuclei on the planet (Viruela, 2008) and the "myth-generating west", forbidden for decades, and very often revealing itself as being full of imperfections and inequalities.

In this paper I will try to pinpoint some relevant aspects regarding Romanian community in Spain and its acculturation process from the narrative theory perspective.

Keywords: *Romanian migration, acculturation, narrative theory, post-communism, body social dimension.*

1. Romanian migrants in Spain

In the early 90's, Spanish society hardly knew a few things about Romania; they had a vague idea of who Nicolae Ceaușescu had been, they might have heard of Gerovital (the geriatric treatment), of Nadia Comaneci and certainly of Dracula, and this was probably more than they knew about other Central or Eastern European countries at that time. Now, however, almost two decades later, Spaniards are used to sharing job environments, cultural events and, unfortunately, even bomb attacks (11th March 2003 terrorist actions against Atocha and several other Madrid railway stations) with Romanians and other migrants, because, hard as it is for some to admit, they are part of

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contemporary Spanish society and almost 10% of the population of this former exporter of migration is now made up of newcomers.

Romanian migration to Spain began in the mid-nineties but registered a dramatic growth in the new millennium, as a consequence, among others, of the Spanish government removing the requirement for a visa in 2002. Presently, there are 796.576 Romanians officially registered on the Spanish territory (January 2009 census)¹ probably the most numerous segment of migrants in Spain (followed by Moroccans 710.401, and Ecuadorians 413.715) and 1% of the country's population. Romanians' importance as a minority became conspicuous at the local and regional elections in May 2007 (after the EU enlargement and Romania having become a member) when the main Spanish parties included Romanian names on their candidate lists and tackled issues of interest for this migrant community during their electoral rallies.

One of the main difficulties Romanians faced in recent years was the "moratorium", officially in place from 2007 till 2009 that prevented them from getting a new contract and working as employees. Nevertheless, they could live and study in Spain as EU citizens and could even set up their own businesses, which obviously, very few could afford, hence the dual situation: on the one hand, stable jobs and social security for those who had a contract signed before January 2007, allowing them to get "integrated", buy a flat and participate in the Spanish socio-cultural (even political) life, and on the other hand, black labour market with its exploitation, unsafe conditions and insecurity for those who either came later, or were not legally employed at that moment.

The main professional sectors occupied by Romanians are: building, agriculture (seasonal jobs) and housework (including aged people care). The reasons why Romanians prefer Spain (according to a survey we carried out in 2006)² are: job possibilities (due to Spain's delay in suffering the crisis other European countries were already experiencing), its estate boom, aging population, high living standards a more relaxed control of black job market, linguistic and cultural similarity and mild climate. Thus, areas round big metropolis and the Mediterranean Coast are preferred. In fact, the Valencia Community (105.070 Romanians), 15% of the total number of foreigners (838.224), is the second most populated by Romanians after the capital satellite area (Madrid Community: 147.864). Other regions with a relevant number of Romanian citizens are: Andalucía (95.349); Cataluña (84.190); Castilla La Mancha (75.594). In the province of Castellón (belonging to the Valencia Community) a high density of Romanian population can be noticed (51.947), while in the city of Castellón, the capital of the province, 50% of the population is made up of Romanians.

The Province of Valencia concentrates about 45.731 Romanians, Alicante about 30.072 out of the total number (440.311) of foreigners coming mainly from North-European countries (Generalitat Valenciana, 2009:24-27).

The view upon Romanians is more "sympathetic" or "tolerant" than the feeling that certain sections of the receiving society have towards immigrants from other parts of the globe, like the Maghreb. This fact might be explained, Viruela suggests (2006), on religious grounds or through the way differences between North and South have been highlighted for centuries within (geographical) Europe. Romanian workers are often associated (Viruela, *ibid*) with features such as responsibility, punctuality, discipline and some of the employers are aware of their Romanian staff being generally overqualified for

¹ Figures released by the INE (National Institute of Statistics) in Spain, January 2009

² On 53 subjects, members of the Romanian community living in the Province of Alicante

the jobs they are being offered. However, in the last two years, we have witnessed a xenophobic tendency growth among the host society in the context of a global crisis and an increase in criminality rates, violence, very often attached to “otherness”.

In our survey carried out in 2006, we also asked members of the Romanian community if they felt integrated in the Spanish society, and 60,4% (of the 53 interviewees) answered “yes, in great measure but after a while”; 26,4% said “so and so” and 13,2% stated “a hundred per cent since the very beginning”. Nobody opted for “no” or “very little”. When asked how Spaniards treated them, 37,7% said “in a friendly way from the very beginning”; 58,5% “in a friendly way but after a period of reserved behaviour” and only 3,8% felt “lack of confidence” on behalf of Spanish society.

In 2010, a few months ago, we carried out a new survey aimed at inquiring into their intentions of leaving Spain given the present crisis conditions or remaining. The world crisis, which has been notifying its presence globally for more than two years, now is affecting especially migrant populations. In the case of Spain, Tamames (2008: 66) shows that the Romanian and Moroccan labour segments suffer the most, due to the building sector dramatically decreasing and to a drastic fund reduction in agriculture. In the Moroccan case, religious circumstances might act as a weakness, while Romanians, more recently incorporated to the Spanish labour market, are likely to suffer the effects of the LIFO (last in, first out) principle.

Among the questions posed by this second survey³, there are some which I would like to discuss here:

1. *Do you feel integrated in Spanish society?*

The options were NO (which got zero answers), YES, “totally”(which got 21), or “partially” (which got 20).

2. *Getting adapted to your host country was:*

a) “agreeable” (25 answers) b) “difficult” (16 answers) or c) “traumatic” (with zero answers)

The answers to these questions depict the host society as a tolerant, caring, mature and migration-sensitive one. None of the surveyed subjects feels non-integrated and none has gone through a traumatic process of adaptation. Nevertheless, if we look at the following three questions, we realize that the picture contains several nuances.

3. *Are Spanish people now warmer/friendlier than before? (open question)*

Answers varied between: YES (8 subjects), NO (27 subjects), “it depends on the circumstances” (3 subjects) and “I haven’t felt the difference” (3 subjects).

4. *Are Spanish people more intolerant now than before?*

“Yes, because of the crisis” (8 subjects), “because of some Romanians’ behaviour” (11 subjects), “because of immigrants’ behaviour” (11 subjects), and “not really” (11 subjects).

5. *Which would be the reason why you would go back to Romania? (open question)*

The most relevant answers (quantitatively) were: “becoming unemployed and life getting really worse” (13 subjects), “I don’t know” (12 subjects), “unbearably worsened situation in terms of racism” (5 subjects).

To summarize, we could say that most of the surveyed people remember their adaptation to the host society as a non traumatic, even agreeable process, in which

³ This new survey was conducted in February 2010, on 41 informants belonging to the Romanian community residing in Alicante

Spaniards used to be warmer and more tolerant than nowadays (in the crisis context); that they feel quite integrated in Spanish society, which is probably why they do not think of leaving Spain except for an extreme case like sharpened racism or serious living difficulties. Two aspects are striking in these answers. First, 22 informants think that Spaniards have become less tolerant recently because of Romanians' or immigrants' behaviour, so migrants themselves tend to put the blame on the migrant community for conflicts that have to do with either poverty and socio-economic conditions, or education, thus justifying stereotyping tendencies and drawing a dangerous border between "good" and "bad" migrants.

Secondly, it is surprising to find out the low degree of trust Romanian migrants allow their home country's improvements. Almost all the answers were focused on Spain, subordinating future plans to the host context and not to a possible change of conditions in their home country, a neglected subject.

Romanian associations, which have significantly increased on Spanish territory in recent years (over one hundred) try to cater for their compatriots' social and cultural needs. Most of them offer counselling and assistance in resolving procedures with local administration, the department of foreign citizens or the welfare system. Others, like ARIPI⁴, are focused on cultural activities and offer translation services, tuition in Romanian for children who are likely to forget their mother tongue, lectures, concerts, exhibitions, theatrical performances, meant to safeguard emigrants' identity and traditions under the unavoidable assimilation power exerted by the dominant cultural system, or, as Jandt puts it in the fourth chapter of his *Intercultural Communication. An Introduction*, the "acculturation process that no one can escape", and which differs only in terms of degree.

2. Stages of acculturation

Jandt (1995) also shows that in the process of migration a *cultural shock* always takes place, since, unless the subject is prepared to live in the new culture, the situation can be rather stressing for an immigrant whom he defines as a person "willing to become a member of the new culture and expecting to remain in the new country", unlike the "sojourner" who is an individual living in the country for a period, whose stay is goal-oriented, (education for instance) and unlike the "expatriate", who is in fact a non-citizen of the country, living in it on an indeterminate length of time. The immigrant nevertheless, goes through different stages while suffering the cultural shock, summarized by Jandt, as follows:

- 1) **Initial contact** (in which the immigrant experiences the euphoria of a new and exciting life).
- 2) **Disintegration of familiar cues** (in which normally a feeling of irritation and hostility is invading the individual).
- 3) **Reintegration of new cues** (in which the migrant achieves the ability to function in the new culture and feels anger and resentment for being different).
- 4) **Gradual adjustment** and a degree of autonomy in the new society (which implies the recognition of good and bad elements existing in both home and host countries) together with a feeling of control and comfort.

⁴ ARIPI: Amigos de Rumanía para la Iniciativa y Promoción de Intercambios Culturales (<http://www.aripi.es>)

- 5) **Reciprocal interdependence** (which is the final stage, characterised by the achievement of biculturalism, when the subject is capable of coping comfortably in both home and host cultures).

Jadnt shows that each of these stages is accompanied by symptoms of the cultural shock that might be *physical*, and manifest for instance in an overconcern with cleanliness of food, bedding, dishes, a stress on aspects such as health or safety, even in the use of drugs and alcohol; or they might be *psychological*, materialized in insomnia, fatigue, isolation, frustration, nervousness, need to criticize the new country, irritability, even depression. In this context, it is obvious that no migrant can escape the acculturation process even though each individual suffers it in a different degree, oscillating in relation with factors that have to do with personal features and experience. Thus, when the two cultures (home and host) are similar, the acculturation process is likely to be successful, although it also depends on the environment where the subject has been brought up; the process will not proceed alike for a cosmopolitan urban background and a traditional rural one.

Apart from these elements, others might intervene such as *age* (younger people adapt better than older), *educational background*, *personality* (whether the individual is a risk taking, gregarious, curious person or not), *previous contacts* (like travels or family relationships). Another aspect which influences the acculturation process is *connectivity*, i.e. the degree of connection with one's friends and social group back in the home country as well as the capacity of accessing mass-media broadcasting from there. This factor can be extended to mobile phones, internet communication facility or low cost flying companies that diminish the pressure assimilation exerts on migrants preventing them from a loss of their original culture.

For a research in the field of anthropology on the topic of body and its social display in the case of Romanian women who migrated to Spain (Iliescu, forthcoming)⁵, we have carried out an interview with eight women whose age ranged between 29 and 54, settled in Spain, more exactly in Alicante (Valencia Community) and in Coslada (Madrid Community) and who came from different geographical areas and social/educational backgrounds in Romania.

MB (age 49, 9 years in Spain): Region of Transylvania, urban developed centre, lower-mid class (peasantry), high school and medium training.

MG (age 42, 3 years in Spain): Region of Valaquia, southern part of the country, close to the capital, urban developed centre, lower-mid class (workers), obligatory education level.

LL (age 52, 10 years in Spain): Region of Moldavia, urban undeveloped centre, mid class (workers), high school education.

AA (age 31, 5 years in Spain): Region of Moldavia, urban undeveloped centre, mid class (qualified workers), higher education (university degree).

DD (age 29, 6 years in Spain): Region of Moldavia, urban undeveloped centre, mid class (qualified workers), higher education (university degree).

IL (age 31, 7 years in Spain): Region of Moldavia, urban undeveloped centre, lower-mid class (workers), higher education (university degree).

DP (age 35, 8 years in Spain): Region of Transylvania, cosmopolite developed urban centre, upper-mid class, higher education (university degree).

⁵ A study which belongs to a National Project I+D+I, 2007-2010, Nr. SEJ2007-60792 entitled "La presentación social del cuerpo en el contexto de la globalización y la multiculturalidad". Project directed by Josep Martí (IMF-CSIC).

MM (age 54, 8 years in Spain): Region of Transylvania, cosmopolite developed urban centre, upper-mid class, high school and medium training.

Judging by the answers our interviewees give to several questions: “How do you dress up now in Spain, in comparison to your style back in Romania?” or “Do you think that in post-communist Romania, women express/affirm themselves through their body after such intense censorship?” Or “Which is the beauty ideal in Romania and Spain nowadays compared to the past?” we find out that some seem to find themselves at stage 4 (MB, MG, AA, LL) and others already at stage 5 (IL, DP) while some others (MM and DD) could still be at stage 3, of what Jandt calls “cultural shock phases”.

Although the society in her home country is now extremely concerned with body and physical appearance, DP opts for a dressing style which is atemporal, untrendy, but very practical, comfortable and adapted to her condition of mother of a 3 year-old infant. She underlines the fact that image and physical appearance have never been important neither for her nor for her husband. IL recognizes she is interested in physical appearance and she likes going to the hairdresser, is wearing trendy clothes and make-up. She used to dress up classically for her job till her boss, who was very much concerned with female employee’s physical appearance and summoned her not to gain weight, told her to dress in a more appealing way, a change which she adopted with normality as part of the job’s requirements although she verbalizes this experience in her interview to show disagreement. Both DP and IL admit they are out of the present beauty ideal, which they are able to describe though realistically and without any complex. They find it normal for women in nowadays Romania (especially young ones) to mix elements of the 3 existing models defined by Svendsen (1997:136) as: (a) the beautiful woman, (b) the traditional married woman, (i.e. a caring wife and mother) (c) the independent modern woman, aware of her physical appearance and its possibilities in social mobility.

Both DP and IL seem to have overcome the resentment stage, and achieved a balance in their lives after migration, judging by their position towards body, beauty and corporal cares, not being submitted to host nor to home cultures’ canons. They can talk detachedly about their host and home countries and cultures, work in both if necessary, being able to act as bicultural subjects.

MB, MG, AA, LL seem to have reached the status of control and comfort which is characteristic for the *gradual adjustment* phase, in which they are able to talk on a reasonably objective tone about their host and home cultures, spotting the differences, strengths and weaknesses of either.

MB is not interested in appearance since she has other priorities in life such as building a house or travelling round the world, although she remembers, while working as a cleaning lady in a Spanish home, being extremely careful not to become an element of competition to the house lady and create conflicts. In a way, we could say she censored her own physical appearance for the sake of her job, which she recognised as a priority.

LL dresses up in a classical elegant style, wearing Spanish clothes but preserving her Romanian style and obeying the precepts of her religion. She doesn’t wear jewellery, she doesn’t like showing her attributes and she feels at ease with herself.

MG has gone through an essential change; she is far more liberal, youngish and relaxed in her dressing style now than he used to be in Romania, her skirts are shorter and colours are more vivid, and she is happy she can go out less self-consciously than before. She also mentions her mother would totally disapprove her new style if she could see her daughter. She appreciates the relaxed aesthetics in Spanish social relations, but she shows no resentment towards her home culture.

AA stresses upon the feeling of freedom Spain has given her in comparison to her home country at all levels although she finds Romanian society more respectful with traditional values, which seem to count as a strength for her.

The four of them are critical to the present tendency in post-communist Romania of overexposing feminine body and charms within media and public sphere, transforming women in consumption objects, an affection Spanish society does not suffer from, in their opinion.

Regarding beauty ideals, they agree on an exaggerated stress upon a slim body with big breasts as far as the Romanian society is concerned, but they are doubtful in the Spanish case, which indicates they might be watching more Romanian than Spanish TV, and they have limited relations with Spanish friends/society/masculine tastes, an aspect called “connectivity” and identified by Jandt as a positive factor against the loss of the original culture, as we have seen.

On grounds of these elements that show these women have reached a stage of control and comfort in their migration experience, we might consider they find themselves in a *gradual adjustment* phase in Jandt’s terms, regarding the acculturation process.

Finally, we consider MM and DD as being still very much tied (either in a nostalgic or in a rejecting way) to their original culture. DD is very critical, sometimes offensive to her home culture (she states she wears her worst clothes for travelling to Romania, since they get degraded there anyway; her memories from her homeland are of prohibitions, limitations, censorship, and oppression, both public and individual, also on a neo-protestant religion background). When referring to the beauty ideal, she classifies Romanian girls as following a “prostitute canon”, which is in fact “the image they have earned for themselves in Europe”.

MM is, on the contrary, very critical to the host culture (generalizing about people going everywhere dressed up as if they went to a sports ground, stereotyping Spanish women as chatterboxes, which is why “Spanish men prefer Romanian women”. She makes conclusive statements like for instance “90% of the prostitutes in Spain are Romanian girls”. MM probably regrets her choice to migrate, since her discourse contains recurrent signals of frustration, both financial (she often implies she used to earn more money in Romania, whenever she refers to perfumes, cosmetics, body cares that she could afford in her homeland) and psychological in terms of having a more respectful job back in her country and a full cultural life which she misses in Spain.

On grounds of these strong feelings towards the host and home, we tend to ascribe the stage in which DD and MM find themselves regarding the *cultural shock* to what Jandt called *reintegration of new cues*, characterized by individuals being able to function properly in the new culture, but still feeling anger and resentment for their belonging to a different culture.

In his account for acculturation, Jandt (1995) brings into discussion the notion of culture which he describes through four dimensions:

a) *Individualism versus collectivism*, that is the way people define themselves and their relationships with others; for instance, an individualist culture stresses upon individual interests prevailing over the group’s ones whereas collectivist cultures suppress individual aims in favour of the group’s welfare.

b) *Masculinity versus femininity* explaining that masculine cultures strive for maximal distinction between what women and men are expected to do, stressing upon characteristics such as assertiveness, competition and material assets as keys of success. On the contrary, “feminine societies” Jandt shows, permit overlapping between sexes and

social roles by stressing upon the quality of life, interpersonal relations, concern towards the weak, among others.

c) *Power distance*, which is defined as the way a culture deals with inequalities, or in other words, the extent to which it is willing to accept inequalities.

d) *Uncertainty avoidance*, a dimension measuring to what extent people belonging to a determinate culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations.

These four dimensions of culture identified by Jandt, underlie societies, and the Romanian one is no exception. Most of our interviewees (except for the youngest ones) have lived the major part of their lives under the communist dictatorship, that is under a collectivist system which influenced the way they define themselves and their relations with others, but they left Romania during its transition process and reached a capitalist western system where, more often than not, the individual interests prevail over the group's ones, a reality which defines also the current home society they left behind.

Regarding the *masculinity versus femininity* type of culture, they come from a masculine, patriarchal society which was still mainly agricultural and incipiently industrialized, before the socialist revolution. This society had apparently been changed by the communist system, but de facto, it was quite oppressive to women who were allegedly equal to men at discourse and propaganda levels, in reality submitted, humiliated, threatened and punished under a regime led by ideological masculine power. By migration, they move into a culture in which much has been achieved in passing from masculinity (where differences between men and women have been stressed for decades) to femininity, where social roles are overlapping, and the model of society is becoming more interpersonal. With a great part of it cherishing values such as the quality of life instead of material success.

However, these parameters as well as the other two observed by Jandt ("power distance" and "uncertainty avoidance") require further insight which goes beyond the scope of this paper. Regarding the "power distance" factor, the treatment of Roma ethnic minority is one of the structural aspects which might be worth studying, whereas "uncertainty avoidance" is a parameter that might be approached from the religious perspective and the ethnographic analysis of superstitions deserving its own study. As a cue to such an analysis we might just suggest the approach to the religious issue proposed by Galtung and MacQueen in their book *Globalizing God* (2008) where they start their argumentation from the following definition on religion: "How can we overcome the existential fear that traumas, old and new, will visit us? How can our dreams of realising glories, old and new, come true? Somewhere, some when? There may be forces out there, or deep inside. Relink to them if we have lost that relation: Re-ligare, religio, religion". The gap left by the demise of the communist promise in Romania and other former soviet-sphere countries, is being filled up by religion, either the principal one (Orthodox Christian) or others like protestant or several growing neo-protestant faiths. In their classification of religions, Galtung and MacQueen (2008: 48) place Orthodoxy in Model I which is described as "collectivist" and "feudal", together with Catholicism, Hinduism, Confucianism, and state Shinto. On the other hand, Christianity Protestant religion falls into Model II, described as "individualist" and "liberal". They explain the notion of feudalism by showing that Orthodoxy is highly hierarchical, worshipping a transcendent god "judgmental and choosy". In turn, collective practice is no guarantee of salvation in Protestantism, where the individual is responsible. God, as his own cause, the ultimate judge, has his criteria for salvation, which is, a "scarce commodity", so a competition is established "for access to heaven". These authors compare Model I to an empire and

Model II to a more interstate economic competition, providing a very interesting account for questions such as globalized religion, conflict and peace.

3. Narratives under migration. An illustration

Romanians have acquired new life-styles in Spain, new attitudes and they accessed new value standards, different from those which they had brought from their homeland. At the same time, they discovered that the concept of “west” is not a homogeneous block built on narratives such as those circulated by the dictatorship and mixed up with memories from an early pre-communist capitalism, but rather an entity with a complex configuration and a considerable inner diversity.

The consequences of this re-socialization are not unnoticeable, Antohi (2008: 293) suggests, while he wonders what kind of collective identity the Romanian communities residing in countries like Spain will sprout or how this new collective identity will interact with the new narratives describing the Romanian experience of globalization within or out of their country borders; which the position of Romanian communities will be, as ethno-political groups, within Spanish civil society with its patent or underlying possible prejudicing or xenophobic impulses?

In their stories, the eight Romanian women referred to in the first part of this paper, reveal information on how they see themselves and how they want to be seen by others, but also on their way of perceiving events, actions and social context. As Atkinson shows, interviews in which life stories are told provide a clear and ordered record of personal truth which necessarily, includes both “fact” and “fiction” i.e. a personal explanation, justification, perception of facts. This kind of qualitative research helped us to become more aware of the roles and standards existing in the Romanian community living in Spain. While our interviewees talk, they reveal data on the social reality surrounding the story, and the one described by the story; even the story itself can be seen as a social construct. Atkinson considers (1998: 13) these stories to define “an individual’s place in the social order of things” and to help explain “an individual’s understanding of social events, movements and political causes [...]”.

In order to get an insight into some of the questions Antohi poses, we have resorted to an enlightening account provided by the narrative theory, (which goes beyond Foucault’s “discourse” seen as a vehicle for social and political processes, or Barthe’s “myth” regarded as an element in the second order semiological system), applying not only to public representations, but also to individual stories. Thus, a narrative is a dynamic entity (i.e. it changes with exposure to new experience) on people’s behaviour, guided by stories they believe on certain events, defined from the grounds of social and communication theory as “a context for interpreting and assessing all communication” (Fisher, 1987), or as a “way of constituting social identities” (Somers, 1992), or a “sequence of statements connected by both temporal and moral ordering” (Ewick & Silbey, 1995), or a “modality of shaping people’s views of rationality, objectivity, morality, of themselves and others” (Bennett & Edelman, 1985), or an “instrument of mind” operating in the construction of reality (Bruner, 1991).

A narrative is not a genre. Backer (2006:9) shows, but rather a meta-code that underpins all modes of communication and categorizes world into types of characters, types of events and bounded communities. It also systematizes experience by ordering events in relation to each other temporally, spatially and socially. Human behaviour is classified by narratives into dichotomic pairs like valued-non-valued; normal-eccentric; rational-irrational; legitimate-non-legitimate or legal-criminal. Narratives are based on a

selection process, since any story has many versions which are in competition with one another. Thus, individuals and communities continuously draw on past narratives in order to construct present ones. Narratives also imply tension, since they reproduce power structures but at the same time provide means of contesting those structures, hence the dominance-resistance pattern still in force. Classifications of narratives are given by several researchers; for instance, Hart (1992) divides them into ontological (subjective), mobilizational (intersubjective) and vertical (by oppositions), whereas Somers and Gibson (1994) distinguish four types of narratives: ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narratives. We will try to describe briefly this four-fold classification providing illustrations from our case study.

3.1. Ontological narratives

The ontological narratives are stories we tell ourselves about our place in the world and our own history; they are focused on the self, but a situated self, that depends on a community. Conflicts may arise between our stories and ontological narratives of others who share the same social space, as well as incompatibilities with collective narratives. As we have already seen, some of our interviewees admit they have to dress up modestly and “try not to compete with Spanish ladies”, for instance MB who works as a maid. She was trained as a dancer in the Art School and worked as a choreographer. She was somehow privileged in the 80s because she could travel abroad and buy lots of things in western countries for her family. This provided her a certain status within her social group during totalitarianism. Thus, her ontological narrative based on past experience clashes with the collective narrative Spanish employers might share on Romanian migrant women working as maids or nursing children and elderly for low wages, in many cases without a contract and no welfare benefits, their need of jobs making them vulnerable and therefore, exploitable.

Nonetheless, MB is having a large house built in Romania part of which she will use for private tuition, so her modest humble look, while cleaning Spanish homes is perhaps compatible with the collective narrative operating in the host country, even with the ontological narrative the lady of the house has on Romanian migrant women working as maids, but probably not with her own ontological narrative back in the home country, which is constructed on a past story, a status, an educational background and a set of aspirations. Of course, this can be also accounted for in terms of an ontological narrative based on different roles belonging to different places, but the clash between them would still exist.

3.2. Public narratives

Public narratives are stories elaborated and circulated at social and institutional level on such issues as family, religion, educational institutions, media, nation among others, and which are not unmovable, but require some time in order to be changed. An interesting example of a public narrative that has been operating for centuries in Romania is the assignment of evil actions at individual level or ill-oriented transgressions at group level, to the ethnical other, i.e. gypsies. As Woodcock (2004) shows, the social corpus in nowadays Romanian society is dominated by the heterosexual masculine ideal; therefore, the ethnicity discourse crisscrosses the power discourse based on gender.

Gypsies reached Romanian territory in the XV century, were servants till 1856 when servitude was abolished. They have always been considered to be a different ethnic group from the majority, who regarded themselves as civilized citizens (since they belonged to the European ethno-national group) whereas gypsies were marginalized

economically, politically and socially on grounds of their “uncivilized, uneducated, nomadic lifestyle”, Woodcock shows. Since 1989, tension has increased due to an everlasting Romanian ethno-nationalism clashing with the public discourse of the negotiation of a European identity in view of the country joining the EU. The general trend in Romanian society is dominated by negative stereotypes against gypsies, whose official name is now “rrom” or “rroma”, although the generally employed term in interpersonal communication continues to be “țigan” (gypsy), a traditional notion enclosing negative connotations and conveying an image of transgression, law-breaking, incapacity of working or behaving in a “civilized manner”. When referring to this minority, our interviewees adopt the term “țigan”. The public narrative extends in this case to quotidian life. According to Woodcock (*ibid*) such narratives include the conviction that high prices at market places are due to gypsy speculative practices on Romanian producers, difficulties in crossing other countries borders for Romanian population are due to gypsies abuses committed along the last decades.

As Moravkova (2009: 135) shows, the situation of Roma in Slovakia does not differ too much. “Changes in political, economical, social and cultural life after 1989 brought difficulties also to the majority, not mentioning Roma who were totally unprepared for the transformation. Worsening of the socio-economic conditions led to the increase of poverty resulting also in worse hygienic conditions”. Whole families were leaving the country, a fact that brought a negative effect in visa policy at European level. These departures underlined the problems existing in Slovakia regarding Roma population who saw the situation was not going to change and, Moravkova observes, the discrimination on the labour market still remained.

This public narrative on the ethnical other is inherent in our informants’ assertions. As I said, the interview was aimed at providing information on the way body, physical appearance and corporal cares were conceived in totalitarian Romania, in post-communist transition and finally in Spain (Iliescu forthcoming). One of the questions in the interview was inquiring on a very well-known tradition in Romania (and other eastern countries) according to which people used to wear golden teeth, quite visibly, in their mouths. We asked our interviewees whether they had such pieces, or any of their relatives/friends/people in their area shared this custom. Quite unanimously (except for one answer), they attached this to gypsies. They reckon it was a sign of wealth and welfare, a modality of ostentation, and preservation of gold, thus avoiding it to be stolen from them, which implies informants’ conviction that Roma used to possess gold, and also, that in their social group stealing is very common. What is striking in these statements, is the fact this stereotypes or even prejudices, work to such extent that those interviewees who used to have golden teeth in their mouth previously, but changed to porcelain later on, not belonging to Roma ethnic group (e.g. IL or AA), still define this habit as being almost exclusively gypsy. Two other assertions drew our attention; one was given by MM when asked about golden teeth: “Golden teeth were only seen among gypsies. People of good quality did use gold too because it was healthier, stronger, better tolerated but in a hidden way, not visibly. By no means”, in which she draws a clear opposition between gypsies and “good quality people”, a narrative on the other hand, still latent in the whole discourse on ethnic otherness. A second utterance was given by DD when asked about her preferences in terms of adornments, accessories and jewellery: “I usually wear a very thin collar, a discreet bracelet, not big things, ’cause I’m not a gypsy”, implying certain repulsion towards what she has already labelled or inherited culturally and educationally as “gypsies” bad taste.

3.3. *Conceptual narratives*

They embody a series of concepts and explanations that scholars construct for themselves and others about their object of study. In other words, this kind of narrative is a product of scientific inquiry which sometimes penetrates public space and shapes public narratives. An example of such conceptual narratives are those circulated in Romania during the dictatorship, aimed at supporting scientifically certain decisions, or laws dictated by the political power. Such is the case of certain pseudo-scientific studies published by the *Femeia* magazine, a journal for women (the longest living material of its kind during the totalitarian regime). Those studies belonged in fact to a conceptual narrative meant to support the demographic policy of the unique party which imposed draconian measures against contraception, culminating in the 770 Decree of 1st of Oct. 1966 which caused the death of more than 10.000 women, who, along two decades, desperately tried to interrupt pregnancy and re-take control over their own bodies and lives. This is one example of the dominance-resistance pattern mentioned before. The main function of this magazine, Cosma shows (2002: 141), is to “indoctrinate politically”. In fact, this intention is undisclosed deliberately by the editorial board when claiming to “raise women’s political level and enrich their knowledge in the field of culture”. “Compulsory gynaecological examination, Băban and David show (1997: 159), took place once in a term in working places with female populations, openly searching to verify women’s reproductive health, but intentionally oriented to find first trimester pregnancies”.

In spite of the industrialization efforts, made by communist authorities, a traditional mentality inherited from an agricultural patriarchal society prevailed, exacerbating the preponderant status of men in family and women’s role as mothers. Sexuality continued to be a taboo and a reason of shame and stress for female population in opposition to propaganda slogans enhancing women’s emancipation. The Decree 770 not only forbade interruption of pregnancy (punishing under the Penal Code both women and those who provided services or aid), but it severely limited divorce, and totally prohibited contraceptives. An obligatory gynaecological check was imposed during the 70s and 80s. Women saw it as a brutal state intrusion into their private lives. In this context, the *Femeia* review regularly published long (2-3 page) articles signed by prestigious names in the field of medicine, in which the vital importance of such measures was highlighted (Bodeanu, 2002: 169).

This is how conceptual narratives are able to penetrate public space and influence the rest of narratives, acting in this particular case as (yet another) modality of state control.

3.4. *Meta-narratives*

These are frames in which each of us is embedded as a contemporary actor in history and work according to Somers cited in Baker (2006:44) as “epic dramas” of our times. Political and economic dominance, play an essential role in the survival of a meta-narrative and media or film industry (like Hollywood machine) are the perfect means to spread them. In our case study, most of the interviewed women (except for the youngest AA and DD, who were not aware, and perhaps in a smaller measure IL and DP, also for age reasons), experienced a reality back in totalitarian Romania which was governed by a meta-narrative based on the success of communist doctrine over the capitalist one. This meta-narrative contained an underlying epic drama supplied by the Cold War, but with the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe (bringing about a void of epic capital in all

those countries), it was substituted in the post-communist transition for global meta-narratives such as the “war on terror” or “the new Crusades” which are political and religious narratives of the past and present sustained, in Baker’s view (2006: 45), by political and economic dominance and which countries like Romania, affected by the globalization processes, cannot escape. Galtung and MacQueen (2008: 51) consider religion to be carriers of political messages. Unlike “social” messages (about what to do and why one should do it), political messages contain tactics, telling how to do it, who should do it, when and where. What differences the political message brought by each of the major religious systems (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, pure Buddhism, the Chinese amalgam and the Japanese amalgam) in these authors’ opinion is whether they carry or not a transcendental utopia. According to them, it is inevitable that “conceptualizations of Paradise will have some political carry-over effects” and attaining a utopia (be it the ethereal Christian one, or the more embodied Muslim variety) requires a revolution, whereas a considerable amount of repression is needed to maintain it.

Final remark

I hope I have been able to identify some of the issues arising whenever we approach the migration phenomenon, the acculturation discourse, and the encounter between post communist Eastern European societies and the idealized (for quite some time) falsely homogeneous Western Europe.

Starting from surveys carried out with a four year period in between, I tried to detect the degree of integration of the Romanian Community in Alicante and its cost in terms of traumatic load. The discussion was completed with information provided by eight women interviewed on their corporal identity in the context of globalization and multiculturalism, approached from a narrative theory perspective. Some interesting reactions and aspects have been uncovered, and many others remain in need for further research.

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III. EUROPEAN SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEX

Diana GAL ⇔ *La sécurité globale versus la sécurité nationale*

Georgiana CICEO ⇔ *Reshaping the Structures of Global Governance. What Lessons are to be Learnt from the Latest Financial Crisis?*

Natalia PUTINĂ ⇔ *The Role of the Geopolitical Factor in the Formation of Gagauzian Autonomy within the Republic of Moldova*

Nicolai ȚVEATCOV ⇔ *“Power Players” Within the System of Political Relations in the Post-Soviet Space (The Case of Transdnistria)*

LA SÉCURITÉ GLOBALE VERSUS LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE

*Diana GAL**

Abstract. *Global Security versus National Security.* The emergence of the concept of security possible when the concept has become a normative sense. In this case, it appears an increasing degree of complexity resulting from the appearance of a series of factors (political, economic, military, informational, etc.), whose interaction has generated structure the concept on several levels: international security, regional security, national security and, increasingly circulated today, global security. This article tries to present the most important concepts of security: national security and global security.

Keywords: *state, security, globalization, national security, NATO.*

La sécurité durable est un terme générique au même titre que l'honneur, la justice ou la paix. Quant à la notion sémantique de la sécurité, elle est définie par „le fait d'être loin de tout danger” ou „sentiment de confiance ressenti en l'absence de tout danger”.

Si l'on approfondie cette notion, la sécurité „désigne les locaux et les circonstances qui déterminent à la fois le statu quo de confiance générant le sentiment de paix, de protection et de défense contre une menace ainsi que le processus menant à la prévention de tout danger”.

L'émergence de la notion de sécurité est possible dès lors que le concept prend un sens normatif. Dans ce cas, il apparaît un degré croissant de complexité résultant de l'apparition d'une série de facteurs (politiques, économiques, militaires, d'information, etc.). „la Sécurité” n'est pas seulement un concept, mais aussi, un générateur d'idées. Il en résulte les concepts suivants: le risque (d'un événement qui peut causer une perte), la menace (procédé conduisant un risque à devenir réalité), prévention (méthode pour éviter qu'une menace ait le risque d'être mis à exécution), sécurité (niveau d'assurance pour qu'un système de sécurité se comporte comme prévu).

Cette corrélation permet d'affirmer que la sécurité est actuellement traitée comme un système, parce que le concept implique plusieurs dimensions en termes de promotion des intérêts: dimension politique, militaire, économique, informationnel, etc. De ce fait, le système de sécurité peut être défini en intégrant des notions telles que „un ensemble de principes, de règles et de connaissances sur ce domaine, adoptés par un groupe d'états, reconnu internationalement comme les institutions et les instruments à surveiller et à faire respecter”.

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1. La securite globale

La sécurité mondiale exige, à l'heure actuelle, la révolution militaro-technologique (qui a conduit à l'accélération de la dynamique globale des armes), la mondialisation des transferts d'armes, les modes actuels de production mondiale de technologie militaire et technique et la nouvelle concentration de la puissance militaire.

Face à des risques majeurs et les menaces actuelles, les états prennent en compte cette problématique et y font face à l'échelle mondiale en renforçant leur puissance militaire nationale traditionnelle et celle de ses alliés. Cependant, la montée du terrorisme mondial et des armes de terreur de masse, qui a prit une dimension supplémentaire depuis les attentats du 11 Septembre aux Etats Unis, a conduit à comprendre que cette lutte pourrait être effectuée plus efficacement en augmentant les efforts pour promouvoir la sécurité par la coopération.

Tout en renforçant la sécurité collective (l'alliance) et le développement de la sécurité commune initiée par les petits États pour régler les problèmes de sécurité, y compris économiques, sociaux, environnementaux, la communauté internationale a augmenté les mesures de sécurité coopérative. Il s'agit du contrôle des arsenaux nucléaires et de sécurité:

- assurer la reconversion des industries militaires et de défense qui mettrait en danger la sécurité internationale
- dispositions communes relatives à la taille et la structure des arsenaux militaires et la prolifération des technologies dangereuses. Cette définition est cohérente par rapport à la notion d'intervention légitime convenu par processus multilatéral visant à réglementer l'utilisation de la force comme dernier recours pour assurer la sécurité.
- promotion mutuelle de de systèmes de défense transparents qui sont nécessaires pour les arrangements de sécurité coopérative.

La sécurité mondiale est gravement affecté par la montée en puissance et la prise de contrôle du crime organisé sur les territoires tant sur le marché interne qu'externe. La violence, la corruption, le chantage, les menaces, la contrebande tendent à affaiblir le pouvoir de l'Etat. D'où la neccessité de définir une approche préventive, systématique, pour assurer une sécurité globale et coordonnée, renforçant ainsi mécanismes existants d'actions simultanées entre les Etats permettant l'harmonisation des politiques de lutte contre la criminalité organisée et le terrorisme international, résultat d'une mondialisation non maitrisée.

2. La securite nationale

En 2001, Les Etats Unis mettent en place une politique sécuritaire suite aux changements qui ont affecté la vision sur les analystes de la sécurité en général, et la sécurité nationale en particulier.

Composante de la sécurité mondiale, la sécurité nationale prend, après la guerre froide, une nouvelle dimension puisque les menaces, selon Barry Buzan, „sont de plus en plus diffuses et non plus purement militaire” (Buzan, 2005). La prolifération des menaces terroristes, environnementales, culturelles, risques majeurs pour la sécurité nationale nécessitent la mise en place de moyens - militaires et non militaires, nationales et internationales afin de tisser un entrelacement de points securitaires aux échelles nationale, régionale voire mondiale, qui soient en mesure d'assurer la sécurité et la stabilité des mécanismes de coopération et de coordination, permettant la régionalisation et la mondialisation des relations militaires et de sécurité.

Par ailleurs, dans les conditions actuelles, la sécurité nationale ne peut pas être "totalement détachée des conditions systémiques globales". Il existe une interdépendance stratégique mondiale, car il y a des facteurs systémiques influant sur l'action décisive des pouvoirs de l'état militaire de chaque Etat, ses militaires et sa sécurité potentielle. La sécurité nationale est étroitement liée au monde, dans le contexte du nouvel ordre mondial, tel que confirmé par le fait que les actions unilatérales d'un Etat donnent des résultats sur la sécurité peu probants.

Les états membres des Nations Unies ont pratiquement leur propre sécurité, Pilier de la Charte, la sécurité collective, qui stipule l'action de l'organisation contre les actes d'agression, pour rétablir la paix et le processus reconstruction qu'il prend en charge ces derniers temps, l'ONU est de plus en plus impliquée dans la sécurité des États. Les faiblesses et les incohérences que présentent les Nations Unies dans le domaine de la sécurité mondiale ne pouvaient pas entièrement rassurer les autorités de sécurité collectives et, par conséquent, la législation nationale (Buzan, 2005).

Dans le domaine de la sécurité a eu lieu récemment des partenariats stratégiques, qui sont induits par le nouvel contexte de sécurité. Les partenariats stratégiques, la sécurité internationale, la sécurité nationale et la mise en place d'une collaboration et d'une coopération effective, permettent d'éviter des affrontements majeurs entre les acteurs régionaux, mondiaux et les Etats membres (Muresan, 2005). On retrouve „dans une nouvelle formule pour l'harmonisation des intérêts de la prévention des conflits majeurs entre les principaux acteurs, tous représentés, regroupés d'un noyau de puissance majeures que sont les États-Unis, l'UE, la Russie, la Chine, le Japon, l'Inde et le monde arabe". Ce groupement crée et maintient un tel environnement de sécurité qui permet d'éviter la détention d'armes de destruction massive et de prévenir des conflits de haute intensité et des guerres (Muresan, 2005).

La guerre contre le terrorisme a démontré que la sécurité nationale est une composante de la sécurité mondiale, dans la mesure où ses intérêts peuvent aller au-delà de la zone d'intérêt stratégique, car le terrorisme n'a pas de frontières. Dans une large mesure, comme dans le monde professionnel, les conflits ethniques et les mouvements séparatistes associés au nationalisme extrême et l'extrémisme religieux, peuvent affecter la sécurité nationale et générer un conflit ayant potentiellement une grande influence sur la sécurité des régions entières, voire sur le monde. Dans le cas des «Etats défaillants» sans un gouvernement fonctionnel, la sécurité nationale est à peine affectée par des acteurs non étatiques, exerçant le pouvoir en son nom propre, pour un intérêt personnel, ce qui affecte le climat mondial (Buzan, 2005).

L'analyse de la sécurité nationale actuelle - „Global Security" conduit les gouvernements et les organisations internationales à reconnaître que la prévention des conflits et des crises, ainsi que la mise en place d'une organisation du contrôle de maintien de la paix n'est pas possible sans la participation conjointe de tous les acteurs de la sécurité, de la plus grande à la plus petite (Flanagan & Schean, 2008).

La mesure dans laquelle chaque acteur contribue à la stabilité de sécurité mondiale est très différente. Le manque de performance dans le processus de mondialisation économique limite la contribution gouvernementale possible pour certains états régionaux dans le maintien de la sécurité mondiale, au risque de compromettre leur propre sécurité. Il convient ici de développer l'idée développée dans, Stratégie européenne de sécurité, Javier Solana, qui soutient que la meilleure protection pour notre sécurité est un monde composé de pays bien gouvernés de manière démocratique. Les menaces activent un nouveau visage dynamique. Les problèmes sont rarement résolus par un seul pays sans un

soutien régional, comme Solana le développe dans sa stratégie (Flanagan & Schean, 2008). Un monde plus sûr est un monde juste, où chaque entité est basée sur un système de sécurité mondiale, dont le fonctionnement est appuyé par les états dans un système institutionnel viable.

En conséquence de la mondialisation, de nombreux développements et processus transnationaux ont un impact significatif sur la sécurité nationale. Les gouvernements doivent prendre des mesures pour protéger leur territoire contre les nouvelles menaces. La coalition antiterroriste internationale en faisant appel à la collaboration avec d'autres parties pour désamorcer les conflits internationaux, pour empêcher la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, l'amélioration de la croissance économique dans les marchés en développement en favorisant les conditions du libre-échange et le développement des programmes d'actions de coopération avec les centres mondiaux de l'énergie pour permettre la transformation et la modernisation indispensables aux exigences de sécurité des institutions nationales de ce siècle („Developing a security and defence culture in the ESDP”, 2003).

Le mode d'action des Etats-Unis soutient fermement cette affirmation: Ils ont structuré une stratégie de sécurité nationale spécialisée de lutte contre le terrorisme et la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, appuyée par des attaques préventives, sur une base sélective et limitée contre les Etats voyous en fonction des armes de destruction massive utilisées par les terroristes.

La Stratégie de la mondialisation et les partenariats en matière d'enjeux de sécurité nationale est une équation parfaitement intégrée et prise en charge par de nombreux États et organisations internationales qui favorisent la coopération dans le domaine de la diplomatie préventive, le contrôle des armements et de leurs exportations, l'assistance pour la réduction des risques et la dissuasion de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive. Cela concerne aussi la promotion d'initiatives importantes pour désamorcer les tensions diplomatiques et les conflits régionaux, qui est un cadre propice à la prolifération du terrorisme et des armes de destruction massive et d'autres menaces à la sécurité.

Les états partenaires de l'Asie Centrale ont effectué des missions avec l'OTAN, selon le nouveau concept de sécurité pour faire face, par projection de la stabilité aux frontières de l'organisation en Afghanistan. La police et les forces spéciales sont formées et équipées pour effectuer des missions de déminage et d'appui permettant le transit et l'installation de troupes et de matériel logistique sur leur territoire. Les mêmes partenaires asiatiques de l'Alliance influencent directement de manière importante les facteurs locaux pour garantir une diversité ethnique en Afghanistan, selon les objectifs de la coalition internationale („Developing a security and defence culture in the ESDP”, 2003).

Au niveau économique, la sécurité nationale des Etats est affectée par le comportement particulier du processus de la mondialisation des transactions internationales dans l'état serré, dépassé les transactions totalisant près de tous les investissements étrangers directs, plus de 35% des investissements directs mondiaux (PIB) et plus de 75% du commerce mondial.

Dérivé de la mondialisation, l'instabilité régionale peut sérieusement affecter la sécurité nationale. Par conséquent, les États doivent soutenir les efforts du processus de stabilisation et de démocratisation dans les zones adjacentes, et élaborer une politique cohérente visant à atténuer les conflits et éviter qu'ils ne dégénèrent, tout en réalisant une coopération efficace, bilatérale et multilatérale de sécurité coopérative dans l'exemplarité des relations de partenariat régional.

Pour les grandes puissances qui sont concernées par le renforcement de la stabilité stratégique des petits États, elles souhaitent, afin de préserver la sécurité nationale, susciter un intérêt vital dans la construction d'un climat de paix mondiale et de confiance. Dans un effort visant à élaborer la coopération et éviter la prolifération des armes massive, le dispositif consiste à durcir la réglementation en vigueur dans le domaine de la lutte contre les menaces terroristes internationales et l'étendre aux autres états frontaliers qui ont une forte implication, et de façon permanente.

Grâce à une politique de sécurité nationale active, dynamique et la participation réussie de l'Etat, il est possible d'élaborer une stratégie complexe en matière de sécurité internationale. Ces dernières années, les politiques de défense du territoire national des États membres, par l'intermédiaire d'une diplomatie préventive associée à des politiques offensives pour promouvoir leurs propres intérêts, qui s'appuient sur une stabilité globale dans les différentes régions du monde. En Europe, par exemple, l'UE a mis en place une politique européenne de sécurité et de défense, par l'intermédiaire des objectifs du Pacte de stabilité pour l'Europe du Sud, afin de maintenir la stabilité dans les Balkans et dans la région du Caucase, de la mer Noire et de la Mer Caspienne. La lutte contre le terrorisme en partenariat avec les Etats membres de l'OTAN participent aux efforts de défense collective dans la construction de l'Union européenne en lui donnant une dimension militaire. Les engagements de partenariat et de coopération avec d'autres États, permettent d'instaurer une confiance et la coopération aux niveaux régional et continental (Cremona, Hillion, 2006).

Les implications pour la sécurité nationale de l'économie mondiale peuvent toutefois couvrir d'autres domaines. La prise en compte de la valeur et du potentiel de développement culturel, scientifique et humain est une composante essentielle pour assurer une sécurité nationale, ce qui induit un impact significatif sur la sécurité mondiale.

Il est frappant, par exemple, de voir à quel point les États, malgré le processus rapide de mondialisation culturelle, tiennent à conserver leur identité culturelle, l'unité culturelle à travers les programmes locaux et régionaux pour faire valoir leurs identités culturelles propres. Fondamentalement, il faut une lutte acharnée pour la préservation des valeurs nationales et des cultures, en dépit des tendances sécessionnistes et de pertes culturelles dans certains domaines. Avec toutes les influences culturelles l'équilibre penche vers la suppression des différences culturelles entre les nations. Les projets culturels majeurs sont des menaces pour la sécurité interne de la nation (Buzan, 2005). La principale communauté politique et culturelle, ne parvient pas à s'opposer au cosmopolitisme culturel, qui devient plus évident que les éphémérides de la mondialisation.

Entre les deux grandes tendances que sont l'intégration et l'affirmation de l'identité nationale, les Etats se battent pour préserver leur propre sécurité culturelle, percevoir correctement l'impact que l'influence culturelle peut avoir dans le monde, l'évolution culturelle de l'humanité elle-même. En fait, l'argument irréfutable que nous donne les stratégies de sécurité culturelle, dans le cadre de stratégies de sécurité nationale qui ont, en plus des implications internes visant à bloquer le processus d'évolution de leur propre culture, perçue comme une agression à combattre, développe un aspect sécuritaire ayant des implications importantes dans la culture humaine.

Les privations de droits, post-guerre froide, le concept de sécurité nationale prépondérante sur sécurité collective n'a pas supprimé les notions anciennes considérant la diversification comme une augmentation des risques ainsi que la peur des menaces transfrontalières, bien au contraire. Pour faire face à l'insécurité, la corruption, la fraude fiscale, la contrebande, le crime organisé et le terrorisme, tous ont besoin d'une vigoureuse offensive du gouvernement en partenariat avec la société civile, les ONG et les institutions

publiques, dans le sens indiqué par la Stratégie de sécurité nationale. Ce type d'opérations de grandes envergures tendent à renforcer l'État, en tant que pilier de la sécurité, la sécurité sous-régionales, régionales, et donc mondiale (Johnston, 2003).

Alors que les membres des grandes puissances de la «communauté de sécurité», sur le modèle de la sécurité nationale américaine, sont restructurées selon la pratique traditionnelle de la sécurité coopérative pour les petites et moyennes entreprises, sans une force militaire significative, formant ainsi une partie de la sécurité internationale. Mais dans le cas des grands pays représentés par la superpuissance américaine, la sécurité coopérative est d'abord et avant tout un moyen de renforcer la sécurité nationale.

En fait, l'interdépendance de la sécurité mondiale chantier en construction. La sécurité est un des point de l'interdépendance, l'autre étant les relations internationales. Il s'agit d'oeuvrer de manière multilatérale en matière de sécurité nationale pour donner une cohérence durable en matière de sécurité. Initialement, les états limitaient l'ordre mondial aux obligations et aux engagements pris dans les domaines militaires et de la sécurité. Aujourd'hui, il est clair que les choix nationaux dans ce domaine sont présentés comme une décision commune, à l'OTAN ou lors de consultations bilatérales ou multilatérales, dans d'autres organisations internationales. Par conséquent, nous percevons la relation entre la sécurité mondiale et la sécurité nationale comme une interaction dynamique dans un mouvement continu de transformations.

Existe il des situations où la sécurité nationale pourrait affecter la sécurité mondiale?

Répondre à une telle question va, à mon avis, de pair avec le fait que la sécurité est d'ordre mondiale et intégré, qui comprend la sécurité nationale et régionale. Dans ces conditions, la sécurité nationale et mondiale sont complémentaires, même si le concept de sécurité mondiale dépend des notions que l'on intègre à la sécurité nationale (Johnston, 2003). De ce fait, elle peut exercer à la fois une certaine pression sur la sécurité nationale mais aussi se substituer pour certaines compétences et devoirs imposés au niveau nationaux. Comme le degré d'efficacité du système au niveau mondial est bien plus exigeant, l'importance des fonctions de sécurité nationales se subordonne à celles de la sécurité mondiale.

Les spécialistes considèrent deux problèmes pour le domaine des rapports entre la sécurité mondiale et la sécurité nationale: le premier part d'un manque de confiance dans la sécurité mondiale, ce qui crée une discontinuité avec les orientations nationales, et par répercussion entre le niveau régional et mondial. Le second part d'une exagération du rôle de la sécurité mondiale, ce qui conduit à une diminution du rôle de la sécurité nationale, il se forme une faille dans le dispositif de sécurité, qui affecte l'échelle mondiale mais aussi nationale.

Conclusions

Il est extrêmement bénéfique en termes de sécurité d'étudier la mondialisation et l'intégration nationale, car cela offre la possibilité de structurer une stratégie de réponse, qui, à partir des causes de la crise généralisée, permet de réduire les états d'incertitudes. Comme il ya une dimension globale et régionale liées à la sécurité nationale, et que l'ouverture rapide sur l'extérieur des frontières nécessite d'accroître la collaboration et la coopération internationale dans le domaine, des efforts multiples s'imposent à la communauté internationale pour répondre aux besoins de paix, de sécurité et de stabilité dans l'ensemble des régions du monde.

Il convient d'accorder une plus grande importance à la sécurité coopérative, qui a soutenu la mise en place de partenariats, offrant une vision optimiste de la sécurité mondiale par conséquent une amélioration à l'échelle nationale en favorisant la mise en place de politiques actives responsables, qui demeurent l'unique solution pour faire face aux nouvelles menaces. L'espace mondial est le bon cadre pour développer les activités qui sont nécessaires pour aider à renforcer la sécurité nationale.

À mon avis, ces activités devraient être axées sur: l'augmentation des ressources de production dans le cadre du renforcement de la sécurité collective et de la sécurité nationale, la maniabilité accrue des systèmes de sécurité collective, le développement sur une base régionale, de la défense de coopération, avec la participation des pays et des acteurs non gouvernementaux, sur l'accroissement de la coopération économique. Il faut atténuer les effets négatifs de la mondialisation, en développant des mécanismes de contrôle de la coopération internationale et en mettant l'accent sur les causes de l'insécurité: la finance et les domaines bancaire, économique et judiciaire. Au delà du terrorisme, le développement de la gestion et le contrôle des menaces asymétriques dans le but de réduire les vulnérabilités économiques, sociales, politiques, militaires, environnementales. Ces préoccupations croissantes pour la sécurité mondiale pour constituer un cadre général pour le développement de la sécurité nationale, parce qu'elle est viable quand elle intègre l'ensemble de ces systèmes.

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RESHAPING THE STRUCTURES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. WHAT LESSONS ARE TO BE LEARNT FROM THE LATEST FINANCIAL CRISIS?

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Abstract. *In view of the accelerated processes of transformation set into motion under the impact of political, economic and technological forces unleashed by the globalization the traditional ways and means for problem solving had to be reshaped as we have to reckon now with juxtaposed loci of political authority – national, regional, international - and an ever-increasing network of actors involved in a process generally referred to as global governance. With the worst of the most recent world economic crisis considered to already lay behind, the present paper tries to examine to what extent the turmoil has been able to contribute to addressing at least some of*

Keywords: *economic crisis, global governance, G8, G20, IMF, World Bank*

Over the past few decades a huge variety of problems such as climate change, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, failed states, weapons of mass destruction, pandemics came to pose significant challenges to the states, perceived ever since the founding of the Westphalian order as the sole source of political authority within the system of international relations (Clark, 2001: 639-42). Globalization largely referred to as a process of enlarging, deepening and accelerating interplanetary connections, of widening activity networks and of increased regularization of new patterns of action (Held *et al*, 2004: 39-40) intensified the erosion of the state's once privileged position within the system. In response, the states have had to adjust their agenda, their functions and their responsibilities. They were compelled to cooperate among themselves and with a growing number of non-state actors be they international agencies or regimes as well as an increasing number of different non-state political actors, such as non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations or transnational professional associations¹,

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¹ From the rising body of literature on these new actors of world politics see R. Keohane and J. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2-nd ed., New York: Harper-Collins, 1989, p. 24-29, S. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations and World Politics" in: *World Politics*, vol. 25, no. 3, p. 333-368 and J. Mathews, „Power Shift” in: *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no.1, 1997, p. 50-66. For comparison see also A. King and B. Schneider, *Prima revoluție globală: o soluție pentru supraviețuirea lumii. Un raport al Clubului de la Roma*, Bucharest: Editura Tehnică, 1993, p. 86-88 and D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, *Transformări globale: Politică, economie și cultură*, Iași: Polirom, 2004, p. 74.

which tend to 'bypass the governments of states and act directly on their environments' (Russett *et al*, 2000: 400-1).

As a consequence, new patterns of governance had to be established in order to cope with the changing reality. They refer to activities 'backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance' (Rosenau, 1992: 4). Global governance as a concept is not entirely new. Its roots can be traced back to the European conquests of the fifteenth century (Murphy, 2000: 789), but its current form and structures came to become increasingly difficult to be explained. Under these circumstances, it turned out to be easier to define global governance by what it is not: 'it is not global government, it is not a single world order, it is not a top-down, hierarchical structure of authority' (Karns, Mingst, 2004: 4). For the Commission on Global Governance, this refers to the 'sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs', 'it is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken' (1995: 2). Its many faces cover international rules or laws including over 3000 multilateral agreements as well as customary practices and judicial opinions, international norms that do not generate binding obligations for states, but rather standards of behavior generally referred to as 'soft law' that supplements the initial framework convention (as for instance in the field of human rights or environment), international forums both formal and informal in their setup as for example international organizations, international courts, global conferences, G8, non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian relief, development aid or human rights monitoring or ad-hoc conferences and last but not least international regimes consisting of linked principles, norms, rules, decision-making structures for a given issue area such as trade or nuclear nonproliferation (Karns, Mingst, 2004: 4-15). As a consequence we have witnessed in particular over the timespan of the past few decades a reconfiguration of the social space as the patterns of knowledge, production and governance have been changing their nature. Globalization by reducing barriers in various fields of human activity and increasing interdependence in the realms of culture, economy, politics, psychology and ecology (Rosecrance, 1996: 45-61)² has contributed significantly to this diffusion of power and authority within the international system. Although we speak with more or less equal emphasis of a globalization of politics as the political power and the political authority transcend the borders of the nation-state (Beck, 2003a: 25) or of a globalized culture perceived intensively as a result of the 'global extension of Western culture' or as a 'process of homogenizing that it threatens the obliteration of the world's rich cultural diversity' (John Tomlinson, 1999: 23) even though these theses came under increasing criticism from a number of authors such as John Tomlinson, James Lull and Ulf Hannerz in order to name just a few of them, this process is most obvious in the economic realm where both the production (Gilpin, 1987: 199-221 and 241-252) and finances escape already any territorial logic.

What bound together the whole pieces of this ever more complex puzzle were the dominant ideas and ideologies. Among them neo-liberalism has come to occupy the central stage and again its impact is most glaring in the field of economics. The politics of globalization was widely influenced by neo-liberalism as the postwar multilateral

² For an interesting discussion on the various aspects of globalization see the dialogue between Anthony Giddens and Will Hutton, „Living with Global Capitalism” in: *Secolul 21*, no. 7-9/2001, p. 30-43.

agreements reflected a widespread commitment for a liberal economic order, which mirrored to a large extent American political economic philosophy and economic preferences (Walters, Blache, 1992: 1-2). Accordingly, the global economy was deemed to be free and open (Gilpin, 1987: 183-190), uphold by a *laissez-faire* that will enable it to unfold through uninhibited forces of supply and demand (Scholte, 2005: 7-8). A huge variety of agents was brought into existence in order to make the world market economy function as free and open as possible and limit the role of the public sector to providing regulatory frameworks that maximize the efficiency of global markets and allow them to function properly – international financial institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in order to name only the two most prominent among them, organizations with trade and economic responsibilities like World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), overly influent international groupings such as the groups G-8 or G-20, dozens of regional arrangements most of them with a predominantly economic focus (European Union (EU), African Union (AU), Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Southern Common Market (Mercosur), North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and so on), multinational corporations³, business associations and economic research institutes. They managed to overshadow over recent decades agencies that fought for human rights, environment or cultural issues. While the influence of each of these particular agents of global governance remained hard to be assessed, it is widely assumed that some of them have been more influential than the others. Among them, there have been usually the IMF, the WTO and the G-8 the ones who have been most closely associated with the process of globalization. They were the prime promoters of liberalization, that is, of removal of officially imposed restrictions on movements of goods, services, money and capital between countries and of deregulation.

Bearing in mind the above-mentioned wide definition of global governance and at the same time taking into consideration the limitations imposed on this essay we will limit the research to those structures of global governance that have an impact on the future global economic architecture. There are at least two reasons that justify such an option. On the one hand, the latest crisis, the most severe in eight decades, has hit hardest the world economy. Its outbreak was accelerated by a series of developments in the years that it preceded. That period of time was characterized by high global growth and relatively stable and low inflation in most countries. Growth was driven by substantial increases in productivity in many countries which, combined with the increased integration of developing countries into the global economy and a strong expansion in trade (Greenspan, 2008: 368), also allowed prices to remain relatively flat for several years. This pattern of growth, coupled with deficient regulation especially after the globalization of markets was introduced in the mid 1990s (Greenspan, 2008: 369), eventually led to over-leveraged financial institutions, businesses and households, which proved unsustainable⁴. The

³ For an enlightening discussion on the complex relationships of multinational corporations with both home and host countries in a globalized environment see R. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, p. 241-252. See also R. Walters and D. Blache, *The Politics of Global Economic Relations*, p. 118-133.

⁴ Persistently low interest rates caused investors to search for higher yields in equities, housing and basic commodities, as well as progressively riskier financial instruments. Asset prices were driven up across a broad range of industrialized and emerging economies, and many developing countries benefited from high commodity prices. The present economic downturn started as a credit crisis caused by investor's loss of confidence in the value of securitized mortgages. These

existing international financial institutions proved unable to cope with the mounting problems generated by this situation. As the most important engine for growth, the United States were the first to be hit by the crisis⁵. From there the crisis spread at a high speed to all corners of the globe affecting to different degrees all economies of the world and revealing profound deficiencies in assuring a co-coordinated policy action at the global level. Under these circumstances it is indisputably worthwhile to evaluate the impact of the crisis on those structures of global governance that have acquired a considerable stature in economic affairs. On the other hand, we acknowledge the fact that while globalization is perceived as a multifaceted process of interdependence, of dispersing the political authority, of 'waxing transnational governance and waning the nation state' (Beck, 2003b: 43), it is the economic side of it that dominates the discourse (Beck, 2003a: 24). From this perspective the role of politics is often reduced to that of forging the juridical and social conditions that make the economic action possible and legitimate.

In undertaking this research project we are going to concentrate on those structures of global governance that have an impact on the world market and their power to influence it in the currently changing international environment. The analysis will be conducted from a transformative perspective (Held *et al.*, 2004: 31-34). This means that the research will proceed from the assumption that under the process of globalization new patterns of global stratification involving states, societies and communities that have to reckon with the fading away of any demarcation line between domestic and international affairs, between internal and foreign policy emerge gradually. We will not concentrate on the future shape of globalization but we will rather focus on the role and power of the most important agents of global governance. The crisis whose outbreak could not be foreseen by economic theory⁶ set off intensive endeavors to trace its roots and ponder effective ways out. For the purpose of the present analysis we will favor a systemic approach to the crisis. The reform of the institutions of global governance will be viewed as one part of a complex solution.

mortgages resulted from the guarantees for the easy loans given for acquiring real estate properties. This policy generated what is now called as America's housing bubble supported by the Bush administration governmental program and based on an intricate and overleveraged financial arrangements. According to economic weekly *The Economist* this boom might be regarded as the biggest boom in history. See ***, „The global housing boom" in: *The Economist*, 16 Jun 2005 on

[http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4079027], 30 June 2009. See also S. Gjerstad and V. Smith, „From Bubble to Depression" in: *Wall Street Journal*, 6 April 2009, p. A 15.

⁵ On the occasion of the London G-20 summit, US president Barack Obama admitted his country responsibility for the current crisis. See M. Hujer, W. Reuter and C. Schwennicke, "‘I take responsibility’: Obama's confession" in: *Der Spiegel*, 6 April 2009 on [<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,druck-617639,00.html>] 30 June 2009.

⁶ According to Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, "most work in macroeconomics in the past 30 years has been useless at best and harmful at worst". See ***, „Paul Krugman's London lectures: Dismal science" in: *The Economist*, 11 June 2009 on [http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13832580] 30 June 2009. Among the very few who dared to forecast a crisis of systemic proportions stands professor Nouriel Roubini of the New York University. See S. Mihm, "Dr. Doom" in: *New York Times*, 15 August 2008 on [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/magazine/17pessimist-t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all] 30 June 2009.

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From the onset we have to mention that the discussions around restructuring world economic architecture are not new. Even before the present economic crisis broke out, globalization came increasingly under intense scrutiny, especially as the undaunted application of the neo-liberal principles and the performances of its main agents indicated for long a mixed record. However, when assessing the impact of globalization there was and there still is a widespread tendency towards stressing particularly its most disheartening sides. According to British professor and political scientist David Held, globalization became contested for a number of reasons (Held *et al*, 2004: 56-110), among them being mentioned the fact that it has been closely associated with the neo-liberal project and the conditionality programs of the IMF and the World Bank that imposed the developing countries to lower barriers while neglecting that developed countries created economic growth 'behind protective walls' and therefore being perceived as unconvincing and hypocritical; and last but not least the fact that it is held responsible for increasing global inequality (See also Stiglitz, 2002: 5-7 and Thorup and Sørensen, 2004). That is why the critics of globalization directed their discontent primarily against its most important agents, namely those most influential institutions of global governance (IMF, World Bank, G8) that ushered in a widespread liberalization accompanied from their standpoint by inconsistencies and double standards. It was supposed to eliminate or at least to reduce trade barriers, foreign exchange restrictions and controls on flows of investments. Eventually, the deregulation that they promoted was not meant as an attempt aimed at discarding any form of regulation. It has only had the purpose of drawing a clear line of distinction between those laws and institutions that were able to support the efficient operation of the markets, which had to be uphold by all means, and those that interfered with market dynamics and distorted its functioning because of the state interventionism, and had to be removed. The results were all the more disappointing as both liberalization and deregulation were promoted across all spheres of governance – global, regional, national, and local with no regard for the real needs of those who were directly affected by these measures (See also Scholte, 2005: 10-11).

The endeavors aimed at reforming world's economic and financial infrastructure emerged with increased strength in the context of the Asian crisis of 1997, but did not led to any breakthrough. Only almost ten years later when a new crisis broke out with increased strength the need of finding ways out for overcoming the misgivings of global governance became stringent. The solutions that have been put forward up to now proceeded from assessing the current situation. This meant firstly, that it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the developing countries are particularly adversely affected by the systemic flaws in the global financial structures, whereas their voice can hardly be heard in the forums trying to address the crisis. Secondly, as the current economic crisis has gained global dimensions, the solutions have to amount to a concerted, comprehensive internationally-agreed response. Thirdly, the role of the institutions of global governance cannot remain limited to supervising the work of the financial mechanisms. They have to become effective and this effectiveness can be measured according to their capacity "to impel actors to behave differently than they would if the institution did not exist or if some other institutional arrangements were put in its place" (Young, 1992: 161)⁷. In other words, without making them efficient in

⁷ This effectiveness of an international institution depends on its transparency or its ease of monitoring and verifying compliance, on the robustness of its social-choice mechanisms or the

averting disproportionate risk-taking in cross-border lending and investment as well as decreasing systemic failures, on the one hand, and involving them in issuing regulations for creditors and debtors, on the other, their ability to avert or cope with a future crisis will at best remain limited. At the same time they have to assume by means of better coordination new responsibilities in combating world poverty and climate change, in providing emerging economies with the necessary liquidity and in supporting the elimination of what Sir Nicholas Bayne identified as the four devils of globalization: loss of jobs, crime and internal disorder, financial panic and the danger of poor countries being left behind (Bayne, 2010). In other words, despite its seriousness, the current crisis can contribute to strengthening multilateralism by reinforcing the credibility, accountability and efficacy of the international financial institutions. The ideal would be to create a sustainable system, capable of reconciling the regulation of global finance with increased social justice.

Before the latest economic crisis erupted the most important forum for achieving a better coordination among the key players in international economic affairs was G8 on issues of macro- and microeconomics, international trade, relations with the developing countries, transnational cooperation in the field of environment protection, energy or terrorism and last but not least political-security matters from regional cooperation to arms control. This forum of the most developed countries emerged gradually as a result of another deep international crisis that hit the world economy in the 1970s⁸. Over the years, their leaders have managed to come up with effective collective measures to different international challenges, to provide guidance and to energize existing international institutions. However, its limits became more than apparent. The grouping has been diagnosed of suffering from a combined lack of being representative, legitimate and effective (Gnath, Reimers, 2009: 8)⁹, hence its reform started to be perceived as both essential and necessary as it lagged long behind schedule. These particular problems were felt as increasingly acute by the G8 leaders themselves who tried to improve at least the representativity of the grouping by inviting to their summits different countries from the

capacity to withstand perturbations or disruptive occurrences in connection with the activities it governs, on its transformation rules or the procedures governing change, on the capacity of its governments to implement its provisions, on the fairness of its distribution of power, on the level of interdependence of its participants and on the power of its intellectual substructures to resist transforming pressures. See Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables" in: J. N. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel, *Governance without government: order and change in world politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 175-192.

⁸ The group started in 1976 in Rambouillet in a format of six (France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan and Italy). The membership of G8 expanded by bringing into its ranks Canada as of 1977 and Russia after a long apprenticeship that started in 1994 and ended formally in 2002 when it was assigned to organize the 2006 G8 summit and assume the responsibility of host. The European Union has been represented since 1977 in the G8 summits by the President of the European Commission and by the President of the European Council when the Presidency of the Union was held by a non G8-member country.

⁹ For a wider discussions on the problems raised by the implication of the new multilateral forums in the global governance see U. Schnecker, "The opportunities and Limits of Global Governance by Clubs" in: *SWP Comments*, no. 22, September 2009, p. 4-6.

emerging Third World¹⁰. Unfortunately, none of these ideas managed to survive the global economic turmoil.

With the economic crisis spreading at high speed, G-20¹¹, a wider group of nations, including the fast-growing nations like China, Brazil and India, evolved into a leading forum for deliberating on the future economic and financial cooperation. The November 2008 summit in Washington was a first positive signal that the G20 is capable of taking rapid action. This was quite a transformation, especially if we take into consideration the fact that G-20 started its work only ten years ago as a forum for finance ministers and central bankers to discuss technical matters of international cooperation in their area of competence. However, the first meetings held in Washington (see above) and London (April 2009) had a rather narrow agenda, limited to the coordination of the fiscal stimuli and financial bailouts. A sea change in the G20 agenda occurred on the occasion of the Pittsburgh summit of September 2009. It is considered that from that point onward G20 started to evolve “from crisis response to global economic governance” (Garrett, 2010: 37). Beyond creating a Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth that enclosed a firm commitment “to promote a resilient international financial system, and to reap the benefits of an open global economy”, the Leader’s Statement of the Pittsburgh Summit made unambiguous pronouncements on the measures to be taken for the policy and institutional reform of IMF and World Bank, the completion of the Doha Round or the establishment of a climate change regime with the help of the World Bank and other regional development banks (*Pittsburgh Summit - Leaders’ Statement*, 24–25 September 2009). Although the Toronto summit of June 2010 did not manage to rise up to the high expectations attached to it due primarily to the disagreement between the European countries interested in laying sound foundations for international finance and the United States which emphasize the need for stimulating economic growth in the first place while deciding on the financial problems at a later point and a general lack of

¹⁰ In 2001, the then Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin proposed a thorough reform of G8 through its transformation into L20 (Leaders 20) comprising almost the same countries that belong to G20. Two years later the president of France made a new attempt to make the grouping more representative by inviting a number of countries regarded as having a systemic importance: Algeria, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and South Africa to the 2003 Evian summit. Another two years on, it was the turn of Tony Blair to propose a new formula for a more representative G8 summit. By inviting Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa to the 2005 Gleneagles meeting, Blair attempted to transform the group into a G8+5 club, but unfortunately neither this formula did survive the presidency of its designer. When Germany took over the G8 presidency in 2007, it tried to revive the old British proposal and added to it the idea of embedding the five countries into a thorough results-oriented discussion on cross-border investment, innovation and intellectual property rights, energy and climate change and development. The German initiative became better known as Heiligendamm Process. The results of the dialogue were to be evaluated by a G8+5 summit in 2009.

¹¹ G-20 consists of 19 countries – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States – and the European Union. Since 2008, the leaders of these countries met four times. In 2010 one additional summit will be held in South Korea. From 2011 the G-20 summits will be held annually. The meetings of the leaders are supported by the activities of a number of working and expert groups and the expertise of the leading international organizations such as World Bank, the IMF, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Labor Organization.

agreement on a future bank levy, it is now expected that the forthcoming Seoul Summit of November 2010 will manage to surmount the misunderstandings and create the premises for reinforcing the G20 position in the structures of global governance. What is also significant for the ongoing discussion is the fact that important leaders do not hesitate to indicate their preference for G-20 over the G-8¹². It is an acknowledgement that emerging markets are ever more important and in the long term will keep growing in importance.

The ascendancy of G20 can be assigned to a certain number of factors. Firstly, it was recognized as a leading forum for managing and steering political processes during the latest financial crisis. Secondly, it responds better to at least some of the problems that were raised in connection with G8 namely those regarding its capacity of being representative and legitimate. G20 accounts for almost 90 per cent of the world's gross domestic product, some 80 per cent of the global trade and 65 per cent of the entire population. Thirdly, it involves in global decision-making countries which play a progressively more significant weight in world economic affairs. Finally, it allows a country like China a smoother integration in a leading club while avoiding a humiliating probation period as it was the case with Russia (Payne, 2008: 532) and, at the same time, to maintain a relative low profile until reaching the position of global leadership it is striving for (Garrett, 2010: 37). Nevertheless, the fact that the crisis has given G20 a hefty thrust and moved it to the forefront does by any means not connote that G8 is going to become obsolescent. On the contrary, when taking a closer look to the agenda of their last summits held in June 2010 in Canada, G8 appears to have stepped aside from the economic realm and accepted the precedence of G20 in dealing with this sort of issues, while maintaining at the top of its agenda non-economic issues such as development, environmental sustainability, maternal and child health and, extremely important, international peace and security (*Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings*, Muskoka, Canada, 26 June 2010). This is in fact again a recognition of the fact that G20 is now to be regarded as the most important economic consultative body.

The emergence of G20 in the driving seat in economic affairs reinforced a certain preference for a different form of multilateralism – more selective, more flexible, more informal as opposed to the classical institutionalized, inclusive and consensus-oriented form of multilateralism. This “club governance” as political process is not entirely new. It built upon the experience of G8 and gained strength during the first decade of this new century (Schnecker, 2009: 1-4). It is more than obvious that it offers the advantage of increasing coordination, of identifying areas of compromise and of supporting as such negotiations and decision-making processes that take place in other formats. However, G20 made a step forward from other G groupings by intervening in steering the reform within well-established international organizations such as IMF and World Bank or establishing obligations for its members. Nevertheless, neither in this case can we speak about an ideal setting or form of multilateral cooperation. G20's newly acquired weight in economic affairs is likewise not at all unproblematic. Most of its problems are in fact common with those encountered previously by G8 or any other club format. They concern

¹² Addressing the Bundestag on 2 July 2009, the German chancellor Angela Merkel stated that “we are seeing that the world is growing together and that the problems that we face cannot be solved by the industrialized countries alone” and that “G-20 should be the format that, like an overarching roof, determines the future”. In her opinion, G-8 will have to remain a forum for preliminary discussions with the “relevant global decisions being made in a bigger format”. See ***, „Merkel Favors G-20 to Tackle World's Problems” in: *Der Spiegel*, 3 July 2009 on [<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,634129,00.html#ref=nlint>] 3 July 2009.

its representativity, legitimacy and effectiveness. To begin with, although it is important that the voice of the developing countries started to be taken into consideration, concerns over how representative are the members of the club continue to resurface especially if we take into consideration the demographic factor (Ramachandran *et al*, 2009). In this context we have to mention also that there are even more radical voices as for instance that of the former Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz who called for replacing G20 with a more representative Global Economic Coordination Council endowed with a mandate “over the whole United Nations system in the economic, social and environmental fields”, whose task “would be to assess developments and provide leadership in addressing economic issues that require global action, while taking into account social and ecological factors” (*Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System*, 21 September 2009). Although the proposal was meant to ensure a better representativity, its boldness and radical character explain the states hesitation in embracing it. Then, the legitimacy problem is connected with the fact that its members were not elected, but regarded as representative for its wide economic agenda. Lastly, the questions concerning its effectiveness stem more or less from the remoteness of its decision-making.

The difficult issue of reforming the institutions of global governance was addressed most thoroughly on the occasion of the last G-20 summits. The focus was laid on the IMF and the World Bank without overlooking however the other financial institutions. Although many of them and especially the IMF had before the crash of 2008 an image and an identity crisis, the idea behind was to help these financial institutions to “manage the crisis and prevent future crises” (*London Summit - Leader’s Statement*, 2 April 2009: 1). In this respect, it was regarded of being of paramount importance to strengthen “their longer term relevance, effectiveness and legitimacy”. In brief, it is about again those very three evils that threaten to erode also the credibility of the more informal, more recent G8 or G20 with the additional remark that in the case of the established financial institutions the process of wearing away is much more advanced. Over the years they were overtly criticized for pursuing a neoliberal agenda of raising taxes, reducing subsidies and liberalizing the markets, a sort of rigid one-size-fits-all solutions policy that ignored the specificity of individual countries. For instance, before the latest crisis, the IMF risked of becoming irrelevant as fewer and fewer countries had borrow commitments with the Fund and the amount of money borrowed from it reached the historical minimum of \$ 2 billion (Brinkbäumer, Fichtner, 2010) out of the \$ 250 billion it had available, due to a large extent to the mixed results of its solutions to the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, perceived rather as serving “the interests of the creditors (including itself) and the developed countries, rather than developing countries” (Karns, Mingst, 2004: 367-370). To add fuel to the fire, its credibility was compounded by its decision-making procedures considered to reflect better the world order of 1944 than that of the 21st century¹³. The voice of the Third World countries some of which providing increasingly the Fund with resources and others contributing to the Fund’s budget with the interests they pay for the loans engaged is still underrepresented in the IMF’s Board of Governors. So alongside a significant increase in resources it was regarded as essential “to reform and modernize the

¹³ In the Board of Governors, IMF’s highest decision-making body, the United States has nearly 17 per cent of the votes and a *de facto* veto power, whereas Europe holds one third of the votes plus an unwritten right to designate the general director.

international financial institutions” in order to ensure that “they can assist members and shareholders effectively in the new challenges they face” (*London Summit - Leader’s Statement*, 2 April 2009: 5). To this aim, it was decided “a shift in quota share to dynamic emerging market and developing countries of at least five percent from over-represented to under-represented countries using the current IMF quota formula as the basis to work from” (*Pittsburgh Summit - Leaders’ Statement*, 24–25 September 2009). At the same time, the schedule for achieving the quota reform has been brought forward from 2013 to November 2010 Seoul Summit (*Toronto Summit - Leader’s Statement*, Toronto Summit, 27 June 2009).

The G20 has given IMF added responsibilities to step up its supervision and new funds to pump into countries suffering the results of the crisis. Now the Fund has about \$ 900 billion at its disposal for a global stimulus plan out of which it already borrowed \$ 195 billion (Klaus Brinkbäumer and Ulrich Fichtner, 2010). It is by all standards a new situation for the IMF as, on the one hand, is shifting between “borrower dependence (relying on fee-paying borrowers for income), independence (with its own investment income) and lender dependence (relying on wealthy members to extend credit lines to it)” (Ngair Woods, 2010: 51) and, on the other hand, it prepares to change its reputation of reacting to the crises to instead attempting to prevent them. There is a pervasive agreement that the measures can contribute to preventing future crises, in particular if we also keep in mind G20’s intention to give the Fund a central advisory role in their mutual assessment process. Nevertheless, there are also dissenting voices as for instance the former IMF’s chief economist from 2001 to 2003 and now Harvard professor Kenneth Rogoff, who after studying economic crises of the past 700 years came to the conclusion that these measures bear already the seeds of the future economic crisis (Brinkbäumer, Fichtner, 2010).

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Conclusions

Globalization came to shape the international environment long before the latest economic crisis broke out and paved the way to the progressive creation of structures of global governance. Although their very existence cannot be likened with a “shift in power from states to global international organizations” (Murphy, 2000: 794), when analyzing the world stage we have to take into consideration the existence of various, closely intertwined sources of authority. Not even the most severe economic turmoil in eight decades that started in 2008 could put on the brake this process. Instead we need to proceed from the assumption that “globalization can’t be stopped”, “it has to be managed or else the global economy won’t work” (“Spiegel Interview with Economist Joseph Stiglitz”, 1 April 2009), because “failure is not an option; the world would not understand it and history would not forgive us for it” (Nicholas Sarkozy, 1 April 2009). In other words, while global governance is undisputable necessary, its structures, especially those charged with economic and financial management need to be urgently reformed as long as even the best equipped of the global institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, proved unable to meet effectively the challenges posed by the economic crisis. Their inability to adapt institutionally to the changing realities of the 21st century and to increase their representativity by recognizing the emergence of new poles of power some of which came to call into question even the regimes they created became more than obvious when faced with a severe downturn like the one that broke out in 2008.

What is now extremely obvious is the fact that G-20 emerged as the crucial global economic forum. This evolution is now considered by many as a major step towards a new international financial architecture and reformed global economic governance regime (Schmidt *et al*, 2009). Others perceive this as a necessary “transfusion of blood” into the structures of international multilateral cooperation (Woods, 2010: 51). As far as the future of G20 is concerned, two areas of consensus appear to emerge. On the one hand, the need to add to G20 an institutional structure in order to increase both its administrative competency and strategic leadership (See various contributors to the Special Section on Global Governance in *Europe’s World*, no. 14, 2010; Garrett, 2010: 37-38). Without it G20 risks to remain little more than a tentative first step without multilateral legitimacy or authority (Schmidt *et al*, 2009: 98-100). What is extremely interesting in this respect is how much European experience has come to inspire those who support this idea. Some of them suggest, proceeding from the experience of the European Council of Ministers to generate more continuity by linking the leadership mandate of the country that hosts the G20 summits with the leadership mandate of the previous incumbent of this position and that of the next (Garrett, 2010: 37). It has also been suggested to increase the prerogatives of the Financial Stability Board created by G20 based on the European Experience with its own Stability and Growth Pact (Begg, 2010: 53-56). On the other hand, G20 agenda will have to move from crisis management to strategic planning for the global economy (Garrett, 2010: 29). Of course, this proposal is dependent upon the first one, namely the need to endow G20 with a minimal institutional infrastructure. This agenda will have to comprise new global financial rules and increased international coordination of national regulations, reviving global trade and either completing the Doha Round or coming up with an alternative to it, adjusting the Bretton Woods institutions to the new power alignments of the 21st century and coming up with a global climate change deal that both the West and the emerging economies can support (Garrett, 2010: 29). Based on the above analysis we share the belief that it is mandatory for G20 to build up its institutional capacity in order to be able to assert its leadership in international economic affairs. In this respect, a first step forward would be to establish a secretariat capable of not just preparing the forthcoming summits, but also of assuming the task of appraising the implementation of its decisions without impeding the open, informal and supple character of the club.

The process of reforming the institutions of global governance, so intensely discussed in the years that followed the Asian economic crisis, was finally set into motion although its ultimate outcome is now still difficult to be predicted. The fundamental structural changes expected to be taken on promptly as an immediate response to the then unfolding crisis are still far from being agreed upon and a gradual reversion to business as usual can now be spurred. There are however high expectations that the “growing pressure for more inclusive, secure and sustainable globalization” is likely to give additional momentum to the emergence of new patterns, institutions and processes in global governance that can address “the need for proactive global systemic risk management” (Schnecker, 2009: 7). However “in a world where economic globalization has outpaced political globalization” (Stiglitz, 2008: 177), the necessity to adjust the existing institutions of global governance to the structural changes both inside and outside their own organizations in order to better cope with future economic systemic risks is and will continue to remain at least for the foreseeable future a very demanding task.

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THE ROLE OF THE GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR IN THE FORMATION OF GAGAUZIAN AUTONOMY WITHIN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

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Abstract. *The aim of our research is to reflect the geopolitical factor implication in the ethno-political process within the Republic of Moldova. The eastern and southern regions of this state represent a big concentration and diversity of national/ethnic minorities. The existence of minorities' Patron states in addition of geopolitical background degrades some impacts in the territorial structure and ethnic politics of the Moldovan state.*

This paper will begin with the outlining of some general and historical aspects of geopolitical background of this region. Also, it will analyze the formation of Moldova's Gagauzian Autonomy in the context of geopolitical strategies of Patron-states or states interested in having an influence in the Republic of Moldova. Understanding the specific of the ethno-political context of the institutionalization of Gagauzian territorial autonomy is essential in order to identify the principal external vectors of influence: Comrat-Tiraspol-Moscow and Comrat-Ankara, and the nature of their relations.

Keywords: *geopolitics, geopolitical vectors, ethno-political conflict, territorial autonomy, the Gagauz.*

Introduction

Geopolitically speaking, the Republic of Moldova has been disadvantaged because of its *position within the "area of turbulence"*. Southern Bessarabia has been over time a veritable conflict hub with a huge destabilizing potential. Here at the mouth of the Danube, there is a *rendez-vous* point not only for aspirations and demands of countries in the area, but also for the interests of great allogeneic powers. This region has never been stable; the control of these lands exerted by the Principality of Moldavia was short-lived, initially until the end of the fourteenth century, then the lands are captured by the Turks and after the Paris Peace, 1856, the territory becomes Romanian again.

In 1812 the Russian Empire annexed these lands directly from the Turkish Empire and not from the Principality of Moldavia, as it happens with the centre and the north of future Bessarabia. Petersburg began a policy of development and colonization of the region identical to the one run in the lands of New Russia. By the mid-nineteenth century Bugeac turned into a kind of Balkan Dagestan. Five basic ethnic groups lived here - Romanians, Ukrainians, Germans, Russians, Bulgarians and Turkish-Gagauzian. The ethnic landscape added Tatars, Jews, Greeks, Armenians and Gypsies. (Serebrean, 2001: 166-167).

USSR had a similar policy to that effect. During both the Tsarist period, as well as the Soviet period, the Russification was a specific element of the ideological principle.

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The Tsarist period was characterised by the "tsarification" of the natives by means of the Orthodox Christian religion, while the Soviet time practised the "Sovietisation" of masses through the Marxist ideology. In other terms, it was attempted to impose the Empire, then the statehood and / or the parallel Russification.

The geographical determinism went hand in hand with the ethnic determinism and it was a landmark in the history of the south region of the current Republic of Moldova. During the armed conflict in Transdnistria, for example, Russia and Ukraine, as we shall see below, supported both directly and indirectly the Transdnistrian separatism, primarily under the pretext of caring for the fate of their countrymen. It was then, although the Bulgarian minority is insignificant in Moldova, when Sofia authorities approached Chisinau for that matter. February 7th, 2002: following the conflict between Chisinau central authorities and Gagauzian authorities, the authorities in Ankara remembered Moldova. Turkey's Foreign Ministry launched a press-release that showed his concern about the "differences" arisen between the central authorities of the Moldova (friendly state) and the representatives of Gagauzian" differences, which according to the Turkish Government, "can lead to tension and instability in Gagauzian". (Gribincea, 2004: 92).

It should be reiterated that national minorities have always been the "Achilles heel" of many countries. National contradictions affect the archetypal structures and the collective unconscious of national groups, which have a high potential for political mobilization and aggression. Therefore, they are very often used in political and geopolitical games, the maximal effect being the destruction / political destabilization of the state and its takeover. (Cabacenco, 2002: 77).

1. Southern Moldova – risks of geostrategic position.

In his recent paper "*On geopolitics*", the political scientist Oleg Serebrean draws attention to certain important geopolitical aspects with reference to the Republic of Moldova:

- "*Concentration of Gagauzian-Turks on a compact area* near the border of the Republic of Moldova was one of the major geopolitical disadvantages of the country.
- The second big disadvantage in the country geopolitics of minorities is that *the four great minorities* – Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauzian-Turks and Bulgarians – *are behind a protective state* struggling to use these minorities as a corridor for influence peddling in the area
- The ethnic factor is the cause of four tension lines radiating around the Bessarabia people: *Republic of Moldova – Russia, Republic of Moldova – Ukraine, Republic of Moldova – Turkey and Republic of Moldova – Bulgaria.*" (Serebrean, 2009: 121).

However, the ethnic factor together with the political factor determined the existence of several conflict hubs in the Eastern and Southern districts of the newly created Moldovan state: *to the east - the Transdnistrian conflict, to the south – the Gagauzian conflict, "Bulgarian case" and the Moldovan-Ukrainian conflict hub* (relating to signing the border treaty).

The complex geography of this southern region of Moldova, which is a discontinuous area, intertwined with Taraclia district makes the situation even more problematic, because the separation of the Gagauzian autonomy will lead to the secession of the district or at least of the much-coveted exclave of Comrat, Tvardita, Perjei Valley, located between the Gagauzian Yeri and Ukraine. Despite all compromises made by Chisinau (creation of Gagauzian-Yeri autonomy, of Taraclia district for the Bulgarian minority, and signing the border agreement with Ukraine), the tensions at the southern Bessarabia do not appear to be fully resolved. Is it possible for the Gagauzian autonomy to

be one of Moscow's weapons against Chisinau? The question is not farfetched if we analyze in detail the different position taken by the Moldovan officials and the Comrat administration towards the recognition by Russia of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence: "The operative measures taken by Russia on the improper actions of the Georgian forces allowed to save the lives of thousands of peaceful citizens and to return the process of negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia onto a peaceful path" says Bashkan Formuzal in 2008 (Țibrigan, 2010).

1.1. Geopolitics of conflicts within South-Eastern Moldova - Ukraine's position

With the restructuring done by Gorbachev, the border problem became an opportunity for tensions and disputes within relations between Chisinau and Kiev. After 1985 the issue of returning the southern and northern Bessarabia to Moldova became a political goal enrolled in the programs of several movements and political parties in Moldova who called on Moldovan leadership to initiate negotiations with Ukraine in view of returning the "Romanian lands from within the southern and northern Bessarabia" to Moldova.

At the head of parties and movements who openly demanded the SSR Moldovan Government to open negotiations with Ukraine in order to return the southern and northern Bessarabia was the Moldovan Popular Front. Until the declaration of independence, under the pressure of public opinion in the country, the MSSR party leadership tried to enter certain actions in order to revise the country's eastern border. Only that these attempts were undecided and late and were left unsuccessful.

After the appearance of the separatist republics within Moldova ("Transdnistria Moldovan Republic" and "Gagauzia") the Moldovan leadership's position against the Southern and Northern Bessarabia has considerably changed. Chisinau started to emphasize the need to comply with the principles of border inviolability and territorial integrity of states and to ask the authorities in Kiev to prevent the Russian Cossacks from entering Transdnistria through Ukraine. The appeal by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine in the Moldovan Parliament dated March 5th, 1992, the Moldovan Parliament members demanded their Ukrainian colleagues to not allow the reactionary circles to interfere in the internal affairs of a neighbouring state, and to not allow the Russian Cossacks from entering Moldova through Ukraine (Gribincea, 2004: 94).

After the Transdnistrian military conflict ended (21 July 1992), the Moldovan leaders tried to obtain support from Ukraine in regulating the conflict from within the eastern districts of Moldova and sought to alleviate the relations with Kiev. On October 23rd, 1992, at the invitation of Moldovan President M. Snegur, Leonid Kravciuk, President of Ukraine, paid an official visit to Chisinau. On this occasion, the Presidents Snegur and Kravciuk signed the *"Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between Moldova and Ukraine"*. Both parties had an interest in signing this Treaty. Chisinau needed Ukraine (who supported the separatist plans of Transdnistrian authorities) to recognize the territorial integrity of Moldova, or in other words that Transdnistria is part of Moldova, and Ukraine needed Moldova to give up its territorial claims on Northern and Southern Bessarabia (Gribincea, 2004: 95).

1.2. Premises and historical-political context for the formation of Gagauzian Autonomy.

It should be noted that the split occurred in Moldova aroused and developed after the political principle. The opposition was not created between Moldovans as "political

nation" on the one hand, and Gagauzian, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Hebrews as "migrants", on the other hand. At that time within Moldova it was not the ethnic groups that were in opposition with each other, but two political powers, two systems: the attitude towards the unification with Romania split the population of Moldova into unionists and partakers of independence, who were at the same time opponents to unification; this brought the activation and strengthening of separatist forces in southern and eastern Moldova.

The evolution of political mobilization of the Gagauzian and Bulgarians, as well as many other similar actions, which took place at the eve of the Soviet Union collapse and continued in post-Soviet space, is represented by interesting facts and documents and is full of all kinds of expenses and myths, (going beyond them or proving them wrong has proven to be a rather complicated task for specialists). (Țveatcov, 2009).

Despite all of the above, we will attempt to formulate some assumptions-causes that triggered the emergence of secessionist movements and the emergence of those movements which led the Moldovan authorities to grant territorial autonomy to the Gagauzian:

- *Active ethnic mobilization policy promoted by the Soviet Union* in order to internationalize the plurality of nations located in the territory. Thus according to the union census carried out in 1989, the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic (MSSR) had the following ethnic structure: 65,5% - Moldovans, 13, 8% - Ukrainians, 13, % - Russians, 3,5% - Gagauzian, 2% - Bulgarian, 1,5% - Jews and others (Anghel, 2004: 68),

- *The territorial split* reflects the interethnic relations' degree of dissention. The distributive variable consists of two elements: the territorial location and the dispersed/compact nature. These realities become more problematic when the territories in question are important in terms of strategy, economy, and military. This dichotomy is directly proportional to the intensity of majority-minority relations. This problem apparently resolved is still a vulnerable feature of the state integration policy. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian minorities are located in the eastern districts, within the Transdnistrian region. The Gagauzian, the third minority in numerical terms on the hierarchy of minorities, and Bulgarians are concentrated in the southern area (Anghel, 2004: 69).

- *Temporal dimension coincidence of the emergence of national liberation movements* of the titular population with those of the Gagauzian ethnic minorities, as well as the period of creation of the new Moldovan state. Thus the state identity (civic identity) overlapped with the ethnic identity. *Moldovan Popular Front* and *Gagauzian Halki* movements occurred simultaneously; at the initial stage there is a mutual support, but later on they manifested conflicting ideas, causing Comrat leaders to opt for external self-determination by creating their own republic.

- *Launch of pro-union slogans.* The idea of unification with Romania remains, at the current stage, as well, one factor that raises acute dissatisfactions among minorities in Moldova. The Gagauzian remember the period of Romanian government (1918-1940) as being not one of the best (Chinn, Roper, 1998: 89).

- *Ideological factor, manifested by excessive Sovietisation and Russification* of ethnic minorities, including the Gagauz. The Soviet identity of Moldova's population was a result of the massive exploitation of communist ideology and propaganda of the former USSR. The Russification of the Gagauz was more massive in comparison with the titular population. The Russification of the Gagauz was mostly linguistic. They currently use an alphabet different from the Turkish language, i.e. Cyrillic. Russian is the one language one that represents at large the language segment of the ethnic consciousness of the Gagauz.

- *Geopolitical factor* – to be exposed and analysed within this research.

- *The inexperience and inability of the authorities* of the newly created state –

Republic of Moldova - to manage ethno-political conflicts.

- *Heavy conditions related to economic situation, to social sphere, to political power, order and administration.* On a particular note, we single out the lowering in productivity and thus lower standards of living of the majority of population, which actually represents a significant factor for the worsening of both ethnic relations, as well as relations between regions and the centre. The struggle for resources, finances, access to key positions in the administration of the economy is increasing the level of public corruption and crime. (Țveatcov, 2009).

However, what began as an ethnic civil war ended after a long process of negotiations, with a compromise between the Gagauz leaders and the Moldovan government, which recently had declared its independence.

On 23 December 1994, in the country's capital, Chisinau, after long and intense debates, the Parliament adopted the *"Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauzian-Yeri) in Moldova"*. The essence of this law is the creation of the Gagauz Autonomy as an "autonomous territorial unit with a special legal status that represents a form of self-determination and it is a part of the Republic of Moldova".

With the adoption of the *Constitution of the Republic of Moldova* on 29 July 1994 some radical deviations are observed on state policy towards national minorities, these changes being made even at the expense of statehood and independence of the country. It is Article 111 of the Constitution (the special status of autonomy), which provides that "localities from the left bank of the Dniester, as well as some localities in southern Moldova may be granted special forms and conditions of autonomy, according to special statutory provisions of organic law". Delivering the provisions of Article 111 of the Constitution were reflected in the *"Organic Law on Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri)"* (no. 344-XIII, 23 December 1994), as defined by Art. 111 as an "autonomous territorial formation with special status" and "form of self-determination of the Gagauz".

This "original" workaround of the ethnic conflict motivated the emergence of warnings coming from the *Council of Europe*: Chisinau was warned that it went too far in satisfying the minorities' demands for separatism of minority and that these actions could serve as a dangerous precedent for other minority areas in Europe. Another warning came on 1 August 1994 from the *Romanian Government*, which issued a statement expressing concern over the *"declaration of an area with special status instead of applying internationally accepted practices of providing" a comprehensive administrative and territorial decentralization* ", finding this fact to be *is essentially the premises for state atomization, possible federalization, with serious consequences on the independence of the Republic of Moldova*" (Macovei, Svetlicinfi, 2001: 21) .

The commentary of Eugene Patras, who agrees with the Romanian Government, called into question the form of autonomy (special status) enjoyed by the Gagauz in Moldova. The author is concerned that such a form of autonomy is given to a minority representing only 3.5% of Moldova's population, wondering whether the fact that *this population which "has 11% of the republic's territory may be a prospective serious grounds for ethnic and political instability"* (Pătraș, 1996: 113).

He believes that this territorial autonomy within Moldova means nothing in practice but a federalization, which in his view comes in contradiction to Art. 1 of the Moldovan Constitution, which states that "Moldova is a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible state". The author specifies that the *"Law on the special status of Gagauzia" shifts de facto a part of Moldova's sovereignty to the new autonomous territorial formation* (Pătraș, 1996: 119).

Contrary to this view, the researcher R. Veber published an article stating that "the very Constitution of the Republic of Moldova provides the possibility of granting special status and the law on Gagauzia did nothing but apply the provisions of fundamental law of the Moldovan state." In this context, the author recalls the *Declaration of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe Council of 26 October 1996* which stated that the granting of municipal regional government to minorities should not be limited by the states which have a federal or regional structure, but it should also be possible and desirable in unitary states, moreover, it does not jeopardize the sovereignty or the territorial integrity (Veber, 1997: 155).

However, the preamble to "Law on Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri)" stipulates that the mentioned law was passed by guiding on the principles of the Moldovan Constitution, in order to meet the Gagauz national needs, their fullest and multilateral development, prosperity of language and regional culture, ensuring equal rights for all citizens living in the autonomous territorial unit, regardless of nationality and other attributes.

It should be mentioned that the Gagauz and Bulgarians, another minority that lives in the same region (opting for the formation of a Gagauzian-Bulgarian autonomy and achieving only the cultural autonomy within the administrative unit of Taraclia) cohabited with the Moldovans in peace and understanding over two hundred years. But with Moldova's aspirations to assert itself as an independent state, as well as the persistent attempts to escape the control of the Soviet parent state, the centre of the former empire expressed dissatisfaction, in reaction to the events taking place in the country and contributing to the emergence of problems-generating situations and internal conflicts. Thus, we note that the Gagauz people, and the Bulgarian minority in Moldova represent communities made up of descendants of migrants and they can only be defined as ethno-cultural minorities, which, as already mentioned, have no right to self-determination. The ethnic genesis of the Bulgarians took place in present-day Bulgaria and nobody can say that their ethnic identity is inseparably linked with the present territory of Moldova. *The ethnic genesis of the Gagauz group did not take place on the land which they currently inhabit*, their identity taking shape before they settled down on the Moldovan territory (Țveatcov: 2009, 48-49).

2. Particularities of Russian determinism in relation to the Gagauz of southern Bessarabia - the evolution of relations.

At the end of the XVI century Bulgaria knew the Ottoman domination. Many residents were leaving the land and sought asylum in the territories between the Prut and Dniester. The number of refugees increased in the XVIII century. This is explained by the miseries which the local population suffered from its occupation by the Christian Russian Empire. It is after these events when the number of refugees from over the Danube grew to 27,000 people. In the beginning they lived in towns and landowners' estates, but gradually began to settle on free land within Bugeac area. It was during these years when the first Bulgarian-Gagauz settlements appeared: Caragaci, Cubei, Enichioi, Vulcănești, Ciișia, Tabachi, Ceadâr-Lunga, Comrat, Satalic-Hadji (Sâmpetru, 1999). Towards the 1850' the Bulgarian-Gagauz population in the area was already about 60 000 people.

The Russian government allowed the Bulgarians and the Gagauz to colonize the empty lands, for exploitation of the southern region of Bessarabia. The Bulgarians and the Gagauz had different conditions from the rest of the empire: they were able to develop forms of capitalist management - the basic rural estates were prosperous. In the 1980's

Bessarabia regions came in first of all the southern Russian provinces specialized in trade agriculture (Moşneaga; Ilaşciuc; Spinei, 1996). This relative economic prosperity of the land could not determine the social status of the population. According to the 1897 census, the Gagauz were some of the most illiterate of all the peoples who lived in the provinces of Bessarabia. The educational process was performed in Russian.

Employment in the Romanian Principalities in 1806-1812 of the Russian armies ended with the Peace of Bucharest on 16 May 1812: Turkey ceded eastern Moldova all the way to the Prut River to the Russian Empire Prut. Such events are accompanied by an intensive and systematic process of colonization and Russification of this territory. Russian garrisons are set in towns and cities. Cities are inhabited by Russian officials, Jewish craftsmen and Bulgarian merchants. Thus the new province knows an ethnic restructuring. Following the census of 1817 it appears that virtually the entire minority population of Bessarabia represents 14% of the total population, approximately 63,390 residents, a new population brought by the Russian regime. This population settles down especially in Bessarabian towns, while the local population is retained in villages due to their occupation - agriculture and cattle breeding - or in the suburbs of cities (Ciobanu, 1992: 24-25). The formation of a rural population thus changing the province's ethnic appearance was materialized through the application of the old *ukases* (29 December 1752 4 December 1762 and 22 July 1763) to the colonists, which had been issued for the colonization of the "New Russia" region, which included to the north of the Black Sea, the Tatar regions conquered by the Russians during the second half of the eighteenth century. By these decrees settlers are given aside from the timber necessary to build the wood houses, additional timber from local peasants in forested regions of Bessarabia (centre and north); in addition to grants and government loans, they received land lots of 60 desetines (66 hectares) while local peasants were given only 12 desetines per family. Bugeac (Southern Bessarabia) is declared *Gosudarstvennaia zemlea* ("state land") and is distributed to settlers (Ciobanu, 1992: 34).

The first to enjoy these privileges are the Bulgarians and the Gagauz. "For them, the Russian government "reserved only in Cahul and in Cetatea Alba lands over 454,000 desetines (504,444 hectares), of which only 57,000 desetines are unusable. *By an Emperor's decree-law dated 29 December 1819* "the Bulgarian refugees and to others coming from across the Danube", *before and after the decree*, were granted a series of rights that were recognized to the colonists of the "New Russia":

- (Art. 1) - Those who came before did not have to pay taxes and were exempt from taxes for a period of three years
- (Art. 2) - The refugees arrived during and after the last war enjoyed the same privileges for a period of seven years
- (Article 3) - Those already settled down, together with the *local inhabitants* who lived among them, could not qualify for this exemption for seven years (Tibrigan, 2010).

Regarding the development degree of their national consciousness during the Tsarist period, the Gagauz encountered many obstacles from the imperial government in their desire to assert themselves as a distinct ethno-social group. The Gagauz population was confused by the authorities with the Bulgarian, being regarded as "Bulgarians from Dobrudja", speakers of Turkish (Mironova, 2009).

The process of infiltration of the Gagauz population in Bessarabia is the same as the Bulgarians. They took refuge in the province coming from Turkish regions, specifically from Dobrogea, with the Bulgarians, but forming separate villages. As the 1817 census

shows, the number rises to about 1205 Gagauz. According to statistics from 1897, they formed 2.9% of the total population of the province situated between the Prut and Dniester, at that time their number was 56,127. Most Russian statistics in the nineteenth century include the Gagauz in the number of Bulgarians, for they were considered to be of Slavic origin, so that the Slavic population number is much higher than in reality. Interesting is also the view shared by some Bulgarian historians who consider the Gagauz to be Christian Bulgarian who underwent Turkization (Țibrigan, 2010).

Only in 1897 for the first time the Gagauz are listed in the official documents as being recognised by the authorities as a separate ethnic group, being called "Turkish-Christians." Another impediment to the consolidation of cultural and spiritual autonomy was the process of Russification. The Gagauz population began to develop the Russian language as their own language, which slowed the process of "approaching" the local population. Also, the Gagauz intellectuals was less numerous, not a force able to contribute to building awareness of a modern Gagauz ethnic conscience. Despite all these obstacles in southern Bessarabia, the Gagauz managed to maintain their cultural entity, ethnic awareness and mother tongue. Even more appreciation should be given to their effort to keep their national character in an environment that cannot always be favourable. Even when Bessarabia was part of the Romanian state, when the Romanian authorities were trying to assimilate people of the region, the Gagauz protected their ethnic individuality (Mironova, 2009).

The *Soviet period* was important to the Gagauz ethnics for cultural evolution. The Gagauz intellectuals develop scientific interest for studying their ethno-genesis and contribute to the cultural development of their identity. The Soviet Union policy in relation to minorities can be divided into several periods: 1946-1961, 1961-1986, the period after 1986.

1) *Years 1946 -1961* characterized by cultural and ethnic revival of the Gagauz in the MRSS. The state had an important and active role in shaping a modern culture with reference: - to contribute to the formation of modern languages and written characters based on the Cyrillic alphabet); elaboration of textbooks in the Gagauz language, including primary school; training of Gagauz teachers in view of subsequent Gagauz language teaching; language teaching in primary and secondary Gagauz schools.

These tasks were achieved at state level and by creating a legal framework governing these matters. The adoption of *Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic of 30 July 1957 on the introduction of Gagauz writing* is considered.

2) *1961 - 1986*. In 1961, the program for development of Gagauz culture stopped. The MSSR government management to gradually abandon all initiatives for cultural development of the Gagauz minority. *The communist government's policy was for assimilation / Russification*. The idea of the Gagauz language is discarded and more focus is put on identity formation based on two languages - Russian and Gagauz (Mironova, 2009).

3) *Year 1986 is characterized by the reform and democratization of the Soviet regime* at the initiative of Mikhail Gorbachev. The tide of events that occurred in the Soviet Union (Perestroika and Glasnost) started in the Southern Moldova a popular movement for the administrative-territorial autonomy of the Gagauz. The process continued until 1994, when, on December 27, the Moldovan Parliament adopted the Law on Special Legal Status of Gagauzia.

In the context of all analyzed aspects related to the establishment of Gagauz as an area of Russian influence, we find that in southern Moldova elements of Russophobia could

not and cannot occur. This is based on the reason that until recently the Gagauz aspirations were linked Russia in any aspect of it. This phenomenon occurs not because of an "inherent" sympathy for the Russians, but because of historical memory about the welfare of their ancestors during the existence of the Russian Empire (this can be pursued in the case of the Germans settled on Volga, in the case of the Dungans in Kazakhstan and so on).

2.1. Moscow's role in the Gagauz conflict

The Gagauz in Moldova have from the ethno-political point of view a double subordination: the strongest link is between *Comrat-Moscow (Tiraspol branch)*, the second and weaker *Comrat-Ankara* (Fruntașu, 2002: 336). To Moscow, the Republic of Moldova is part of the "near abroad" and to which, by virtue of several factors Moscow reserves a "specific" influence. Since 1991, Russia has continued to put pressure on Moldova and its integrity, using as an advantage its economic dependence within the Russian energy and on the Russian retail market (Gangloff, 2005).

On the one hand, some foreign authors insist on a minor and uncertain role of Russia in the Gagauz conflict, speculating the idea that the Yeltsin government apparently did not support the Gagauz. In fact, the main vector of influence of Moscow in the region was the separatist movement in Transdnistria, Dniester being the important sea route of penetration of the Russian influence in southern Moldavia. And if initially the Gagauz separatist movement was able to accept any support (political or military) from the Russians, she finally took on its own rapid growth. As prospects for the future, Russia might be tempted to use the "Gagauz trump", if the unification of Moldova with Romania would have been achieved. In this case the position of Gagauzia on the border between Romania, Ukraine and Moldova, acquires a new strategic interest (Gangloff, 2005).

On the other hand, the local authors consider that the Russian influence in generating and developing ethno-political conflicts was a pretty active and physically present by means of troops near the southern regions of Moldova. They take into account both the Transdnistrian and Bugec regions. Moscow supported the Gagauz separatist movements, resorting to all methods, coercion and intimidation, demonstrating her power by placing Russian armed forces inside the Republic of Moldova. Thus, in the southern districts of the country, landing units were deployed, quartered in town of Bolgrad in Ukraine, invoking the defence need of the native Gagauz population (Creangă:2005, 300).

The close cooperation between Comrat and Tiraspol, the intention to participate in the negotiations on settling the disagreement between Chisinau and Tiraspol as a third subject shows, at least if not hostility towards the central authorities in Chisinau, then lack of respect. The Transdnistrian separatist leader Igor Smirnov has directly shown his availability to support "the Gagauz people fight for consolidation of statehood of the Gagauz Republic. At the same time, Michael Kendigean, one of the leaders of the self-determination movement in the early 1990s, and President of the "self-proclaimed Gagauz Republic", one of the architects of the Gagauz territorial autonomy established on Moldova territory, former President of the Popular Assembly of Gagauz Autonomy during 1998-2002, in one of his statements stressed the friendly nature of power from Comrat and Tiraspol and their merit in building the Moldovan state, by creating antipodes against the national movement that opted for the unification with Romania (Fruntașu, 2002: 337).

Even if the Parliament adopted the *Law on Legal Status of the Gagauz Autonomy (Gagauz Yeri) in 1994* and the so-called "Gagauz problem" has disappeared from the political agenda, the un-solving of the Transdnistrian conflict often influences the situation in the South or the relations between central authorities and the autonomy (the

case of forced resignation of Governor Croitor, who was accused of collaboration and support of the Tiraspol separatist regime (Angheli: 2006, 186-195).

In 2002-2003 several plans of federalization of Moldova were launched as the only way out of conflict. One of them was proposed by the OSCE in July 2002 and was based on federalism principles as understood in the West: proportionality in representation at the centre, leverage between parts, etc. However, this plan accepted by some European states of the OSCE as well included the solution of a silent influence of Russia in Moldova. Periodically, Kremlin recalls the problem be in the form of analysis carried out by people close to President Vladimir Putin, either by concrete plans official submitted to public scrutiny - such as the plan proposed in November 2003 by a staff member of the Russian President, Dmitry Kozak.

He proposed the involved parties to settle the conflict through federalization of Moldova. The plan called "*Basic Principles of the State Structure of the Unified State*" was a draft constitution for the future Moldovan federation and it was proposed directly to Moldova, without approval from the OSCE, which made clear the Russian Federation's intention to not engage the international community in any way, but to keep the problem within the CIS. In view of the *Kozak Plan*, the Federation would have been asymmetrical by the fact that Transdniestria would have been conferred an unequal status than that conferred to Bessarabia.

The Kozak Plan was based on a conception of Soviet origin federalism, its transposition could have been created a confederation with desegregation tendency, since two parties Transdniestria and Gagauz Autonomy – were granted the right to referendum in order to determine whether or not they wanted to belong to the Republic of Moldova and the right of veto over matters of domestic or foreign policy, which would have "contravened their interests". The Kozak Plan proposed three types of powers within the new state: of the federation, of the component parts and some joined ones. This included, however, provisions that threaten to cause blockages and new conflicts. For example, the Lower House, elected by proportional representation, the legislation was about to be passed by simple majority, but needing the Senate, which would be disproportionately chosen by: *13 members elected by the lower house, 9 by Transdniestria and 4 by Gagauzia*. Thus, Transdniestria became a political force that could block laws (Policy Analyst, 2005: 4-5).

This project did not receive appreciation among ordinary people, as well as the pro-Romanian forces. It is envisaged in particular the actions of *Christian Democratic Popular Party*, which held in Chisinau a series of mass protests against the implementation of the Kozac Memorandum. Consequently, the visit of President Vladimir Putin in Moldova for negotiations was postponed. It can be said that these actions served as a favour for a civilized divorce in terms of reintegration (Neukirch, 2003: 94). Referring to this matter, the Gagauz Autonomy authorities said more than once that if the Transdniestrian settlement process gives Tiraspol more powers than Comrat currently has, the leadership of Gagauz autonomy will also demand more autonomy as to be at the same level with Transdniestria.

The consequences of this scenario are extremely serious and dangerous in the short term, but in long term they can lead to impossible situations. In the short term, the Republic of Moldova is faced with another source of pressure that aims to impose Russian as second state language - Romanian language transformed by Article 13 of the Constitution in "Moldovan" is faced with another challenge, this time from the Russian language so that "the Romanian majority and all minorities, except the Russian minority, shall know and speak the Russian language, while the nation's dominant population of the

former Soviet empire shall know *only* Russian. Therefore, we are dealing with a completely distorted so-called bilingualism, which should be called the discriminatory rule of a minority over the majority (Dungaciu, 2005: 107).

During fifteen years of being a territorial structure of the Gagauz autonomy in our state, the nature of relations between central government and autonomy authorities have proven unstable and complex, the Russian external factor influencing their quality and intensity. The oscillation of the autonomy leaders' position between different power centres (Chisinau-Tiraspol-Comrat) often affected the achievement of their own Gagauz interests.

The Autonomous Territorial Unit authorities have repeatedly and clearly expressed their interest towards Russia, considering it as a politico-economic force in the development of the autonomous region. The current head of the administration of the Gagauz autonomy, Michael Formuzal in its pre-election program, launched in 2006 elections for the office of Governor (Bashkan), entitled "*Eleven steps in greeting people*" formulated as a priority of the Autonomy's foreign policy "interventions with the embassies of Turkey, Russia and Bulgaria to Moldova in order to open Consular sections within the Autonomy. These measures will not only strengthen the authority of Gagauzia and the whole country internationally, but will provide the Autonomy's people and our compatriots abroad with legal assistance and moral support" (Formuzal, 2006).

Currently Comrat considers the relations with Russia as a priority in the economic development of the region, which is the main market for traders from the south. Russia's position is often reflected by its actions, by providing material assistance for residents of the Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (UTAG) or statements by its officials. For example, the Director of *Russian Institute of Strategic Studies*, Leonid Rešetnikov, during his visit to Comrat stressed that Gagauzia is a key factor that influences the Moldovan-Russian relations (www.unimedia.md). In turn, Gagauzian Bashkan Michael Formuzal, stated that the autonomy is open to Russian investments, excellent conditions were created for investors and security is guaranteed at the highest level.

3. Turkish identity of the Gagauz – starting point for the relations with Turkey

The first attempts to express the interest of the Turkish authorities towards the Gagauz took place after the creation of the modern Turkish state in the first half of the twentieth century. The mission belonged to *Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver* appointed in 1931 as Turkish ambassador to Romania. He was endorsed by President *Inönü* to run research on the ethnic group called Gagauz, group that inhabiting the southern Bessarabia, part of Romania at that time. He tried to establish what the ethnic-historical relation was between these two peoples and to demonstrate the origin of the Turan origin of the Gagauz.

At his initiative Turkish language teaching courses were organized, welcomed by the Romanian state which accepted to pay salaries to the teachers of Turkish. In the same direction, scholarships were granted for study in Turkey for young Gagauz people. However, the Turkish position was quite persistent on the difference of religion. Some of these young people were forced to abandon the Orthodox Christian religion and to accept Islam. Therefore, the population of the historical southern Bessarabia did not welcome such pressure from the Turks (Gangloff, 2005). *Tanrıöver* hoped however, that despite the confessional differentiation, some Gagauz will wish to be repatriated to Turkey. These plans were suspended after the Soviet invasion of Bessarabia in 1940.

After the annexation of Bessarabia to the USSR, the development of the Gagauz-Turkish relations was impossible to be carried on. Just as during the Ottoman and Russian

Empires, Turkey and USSR relations were unfriendly, especially during the *Cold War* (in the context of Turkey joining NATO since 1952). Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey had tried to establish relations with the Soviet Union. In 1986 the Turkish Prime Minister visited Moscow for economic negotiations within the import of gas from Siberia and the exports of Turkish goods to the USSR. The Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev refused having such meeting (Webster, 2007: 259).

A revival of the Gagauz-Turkish relations took place in 1990. The confrontation between national movements (Popular Front versus Interfront, Gagauz Halki) began for the leaders of Comrat by setting out external relations with Turkey and Russia in particular. The relation with Turkey was necessary to the Gagauz separatist leaders if the new political entity would go through.

In 1991 a new visit by the Turkish President is symbolically organized on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the bilateral treaty signed by Lenin and Atatürk, on behalf of the USSR and Turkey. Following this visit, *Atatürk* reiterates the mission started by *Tanrıöver* and continues the mission to establish and develop links with the great "Turkish nation" through meetings and visits with the leaders of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. (Webster, 2007: 261)

3.1. The Gagauz between external self-determination and ethnical identification – Turkey's position

It is worth mentioning that Turkey's interest for the Gagauz in Moldova is justified based on the common ethno-historical origin. Despite the existence of multiple approaches to Gagauz ethno-genesis, most researchers, including representatives of this ethnic group insist on their Turanian origin. First of all, Turkey against Moldova and the international community, as required by its historical origins, assumed the role of advocate for the Gagauz, together with their support with reference to preserving and developing their culture.

Another important element in the ethno-political developments in the southern republic was Turkey's position towards Moscow, position determined by the following factors:

- 1) *The exercise of political influence in the region - an opportunity that was created after the breakup of the USSR, Turkey consolidating its status of regional power*
- 2) Consolidation of power within the Black Sea area and marginalization of Russians in the Black Sea;
- 3) promotion of Turkish exports, protection of the Turkish and Gagauz minorities, deepening the Turkish linguistic identity (Fruntașu, 2002: 339).

Turkey meanwhile remains firm in favour of maintaining the territorial integrity of Moldova. At this point we can identify the following argument: she tried to diminish in some way the Russian influence in the region, although not directly part of the Turkish security zone, it has enough importance to be able to have a significant impact (Gangloff, 2005).

Turkey's politics, however, at the start of the conflicts in south-east of the republic was a duplicitous: on the one hand, reserved in declarations about Moldova's ethno-political processes, but on the other hand through financial and technical assistance, Turkey influenced the behaviour of the Gagauz leaders and subtly supported the *Law on Special Legal Status of Gagauz Autonomy adopted in 1994*, which according to some

authors has an explosive (con)federal potential, not fully explored by the Gagauz leaders (Fruntașu, 2002: 339).

After the granting of the autonomous status of Gagauzia within Moldova, a series of actions and statements from the Turkish state followed. In 1996 the Republic of Moldova received a visit from the Turkish President Demirel and a large body of Government members, MPs and businessmen. This visit founded the Turkish-Moldovan cooperation, through the interest of Turkey in the autonomous region. The results were materialised by signing a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation, ratified by both countries and the opening in Chisinau of an Official Bureau of Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA). This office is designed to manage the Gagauz cultural and economic assistance provided by the Turkish state. The work of this bureau was fairly modest, some of their projects were related to:

- *Financing a Gagauz publication, provided that it is in the Gagauz language and with the Latin alphabet (note that during the Russian and Soviet domination the Gagauz, like many other people in similar situations, were forced to use the Cyrillic alphabet). Unfortunately this publication was not quite popular among the ordinary population;*
- *Financing of about 10 books during 1995;*
- *Organization of teaching courses "Modern Turk" taught by Turkish professors*
- *Providing scholarships for young UTAG,*
- *Funding the establishment of Comrat State University by \$ 250,000;*
- *The initiative to provide study books to Gagauz was prevented, since they failed to see their utility as teaching materials, (neither the language nor the message (ideas) were understood).*
- *Organization of exhibitions of Gagauz painters, popularizing Turkish culture and traditions courses (Culinary, tailoring, etc.).*

The interest of the Turks for the Gagauz in Moldova remains a long-term interest, the main purpose and intentions of the manifested friendly relations are not only the ethno-cultural aspect, to help them express their identity, but also to contribute to the cultural and linguistic diversity of the two peoples. The future "weapon" for the Gagauz and the Turks to become closer in the near future may be television. This factor was understood by the Turkish authorities, who have contributed to the re-broadcasting of several channels of Turkish TV stations. (Gangloff, 2005).

Turkey can not express an active policy in this respect, since that may harm the development of regional economic interests, but because that two centuries of Russian domination in these areas had some effect. The Gagauz in Moldova were deeply Russified, both in terms of language (most having studied in Russian), but also ideologically. All these actions cultural policies carried out by the Turkish state in relation with the inhabitants of the autonomy can only be welcomed by the Moldovan state authorities, as they contribute to a certain extent to the "de-Russification" of Gagauzia.

3.2. Politics and interest of the Gagauz authorities for Turkey.

In 1990, the current southern Moldova encountered three Gagauz ethnic movements (Vatan, Birlic and Gagauz Halki), which later on merged to form the *Popular Movement Gaguz Halkî*. The leaders of this movement (Michael Kendighelean, Stepan Topal), following the organization of so-called *Congress I of deputies of all levels I of the compact Gagauz populated territories* "declared the Self-proclaimed Gagauz Republic" (Creanga, 2005: 299). In this regard, leaders in Comrat held to seek external support to

achieve their plans to external self-determination of the Gagauz in southern Moldova. So attempts were made to seek the help of Turkey, which could serve as a guarantor for the international launch of the new political entity. Thus, in March 1991 the Turkish President's visit to Moscow served as an open door for the establishment of direct relations with the leaders of Gagauzia. The meeting between the Turkish President and S. Topal (at that time President the so-called "Gagauz Republic") was therefore encouraging a sense of optimism and support from the Turkish side

In the winter of the following year, two Gagauz representatives, Maria Marunevici and Gheorghii Ratkoglu made a visit to Ankara to negotiate issues of Gagauz political, economic and cultural cooperation with the Turkish authorities. We can say that the search of political support from leaders of Comrat bears a profound political context. It is an isolated case in the regional political scene, where the Gagauz requested support from Ankara. During an advanced stage of "Russification" and facing the threat of Romanization (an idea supported by some political forces in the country, which opted for unification with Romania), the Gagauz finally turned to their Turkish identity. This recently discovered "Turkishness" raises, however, some questions (Gangloff, 2005).

4. Conclusions

The Geopolitical space of the Western Europe in the late twentieth century was transformed into an interethnic and intercultural battlefield. Moldova is also affected by this problem. The geopolitical determinism along with the historical and economic assertion is further complicating the foreign policy and the balance in the ethnic politics. In the past history of the geographical space which currently belongs to the Republic of Moldova, this was a concentrated geopolitical field where several countries crossed interests (Romania, Russia, and Turkey). Currently, the young Moldovan state feels the influence of the global geopolitical change, in particular through the ethnic factor. The south-eastern Moldova is the region where the national minorities were concentrated following the strategic policies of the Russian and Soviet Empires.

As stated within this paper, the strongest link of geopolitical subordination in the south is Russia. The emergence and evolution of the two conflicts (Gagauz and Transnistrian) were conducted with the involvement and support of this state. Certainly, in the case of the Gagauz ethnic minority, the direct influence of Russia is weakened; however, the aggressive policy of "Russification" has long-term impacts. This is manifested both in the civic aspect, as well as in the language. The impact of linguistic Russification is complex: the Gagauz use the Cyrillic alphabet used for writing, it is the language of study in schools and universities, it is the language of interethnic communication, including with representatives of the titular population, it is the working / official language within the Autonomy's institutions.

Currently, Turkey's presence in the region is beneficial, with common positive effects for both Moldova, and Gagauzian Autonomy. The primary purpose of the Turkish state is to contribute to the development of the Gagauzian ethnic identity, and to provide assistance in three specific areas: cultural-educational assistance; financial credit; assistance and cooperation through the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA).

Moldova's current role is to not allow the negativist determinism of other states in regulating ethnic relations, as well as ensuring effective policy for harmonization and integration into Moldovan society. Depoliticizing of the ethnic agenda is a primary point in creating stability and development of civic identification among minorities.

Granting territorial autonomy to the Moldovan Gagauz shows a fair policy towards this ethnic segment, but the carrying out and the development of tasks are with both the central government and regional authorities. The stabilization of relations between these two levels of state power, raising them to a new quality level will contribute to the development of this region. In time, Bugeac, under certain favourable premises (ethno-cultural, political and economic), will begin to turn from a risk area into one of possibilities.

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“POWER PLAYERS” WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE (THE CASE OF TRANSNISTRIA)

*Nicolai ȚVEATCOV**

Abstract. *The end of the twentieth century was marked by dramatic changes on the geopolitical ground, which was generated, first of all, by the USSR collapse. Political confrontations that accompanied the process of USSR collapse caused in the early 90's violent conflicts at the periphery of the former Soviet empire (in the Republic of Moldova, for example). The path pursued by the Republic of Moldova from 1992-2003 to settle its conflict was reduced to negotiations with the Transdniestrian separatist administration and to signing of a great number of documents with the participation of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). After some events (for example, refusal of signing the “Kozak Memorandum”) the negotiation format was changed. Two new negotiator representatives of USA and European Union were involved in the process; they expressed their own positions and interests, provided new visions. The Transdniestrian conflict reached an international level and actually is has been discussed within the Council of Europe, European Commission and other international bodies, which is significantly important in the politics of conflict resolution.*

Keywords: *Transdniestria, negotiation process, OSCE, Russia, SUA, Ukraine*

The Transdniestrian conflict, turning in the late 1980's into an open conflict, became a consequence of the crisis recorded in the socialist system within Central and South-Eastern Europe. The main contradiction arisen between the elites of the nomenclature, as well as between representatives of the intelligentsia, from both Chisinau and Tiraspol, was the diametrically opposed attitudes towards the dissolution of the USSR. If the intelligentsia representatives from Chisinau (A. Moșanu, O. Nantoi, L. Lari, Gr. Vieru etc.) were in favour of leaving USSR and of uniting with Romania as a matter of urgency, the Russian-speaking elites from Tiraspol chose to keep a conservative attitude, in favour of preserving the Soviet Union.

On the background of existing disintegration processes, when “towards the summer of 1991 the level of fluctuations, the indices of their concentration around the main state structures reached a critical signification” (Vengherov, 1993: 55-69), the emerged situation served as a catalyst for tensioning the relations and increasing the breakup between the two banks of the Nistru River. In the beginning, it was the first reason: the conflict of economic interests when the so-called “Transdniestrian elite” refuses to cede control of the large industrial factories on the left-hand side of the Nistru

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River. The separation from the USSR and the establishment of the Republic of Moldova as an independent state meant the shifting of the entire state property under the control of the independent republic nomenclature. Thus, during 1989-1991, although not entirely out in the open, a new confrontation of interests was emerging between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Now to the economic contradiction, the Language problem adds up. In Moldova, just as in an entire panel of other Soviet republics, the democratic emancipation took the shape of a revival of the national liberation movement, which added more tension to the existing situation (Mihailov, 1993; Sornicov, 1997).

The military approach of the Transdniestrian conflict in 1992 drew attention of the international community. The consequences of this war have not been surpassed even to this day. This war demonstrated the impossibility of an absolute conflict resolution between Chisinau and Tiraspol, fact that served as an encouragement for the conception of a negotiation framework to seek resolution of the Transdniestrian conflict.

Speaking of the Transdniestrian conflict, we cannot contemplate it separately, because the game between the great powers must be regarded in a much larger plan. The small states within the international practice are usually used as bargaining chips for the big states. We believe that the conflicts within the post-Soviet space (Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh), although of a different nature, should be analysed in a unique context and within a close logical connection. Therefore, the negotiations started in 1992 subsequent to the signing the Moldovan-Russian ceasefire agreement were carried out very slowly and we believe that the arbitration for conflict resolution is crucial.

Interests of Russian Federation within the Transdniestrian Region

In order to analyse the role and interests of Russia within Transdniestria, it is first necessary to single out the fact that Moldova, just like other independent states resulted from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, remains dependant on the former parent state (economically, energetically, information, etc). Any political fluctuation in Moscow has direct or indirect impact on the former union republics.

Russia is a power with greater or lesser involvement in initiating and developing conflicts within the area, as well as in the negotiating process, including the one carried out in the Nistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. Russia's responsibility in triggering and preservation of the Nistrian conflict is noted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), with the ECHR Decision on Ilaşcu group dated July 8th, 2004¹.

Characterizing Russia's politico-military involvement in conflicts on its periphery, Russian analyst Dmitri Trenin noted that "unilateral and forcible intervention by the Russian military, disguised as 'peacemaking' (such status was obtained, with the agreement of the parties, after signing the Convention on the principles of peaceful settlement of armed conflict within the Nistrian area of the Republic of Moldova dated June 21st, 1992), was in fact an instrument of imperial restoration, or at least of a frank pursuit of the Russian national interest"².

Given its lack of energy sources, Moldova continues to remain on the Russian Federation agenda as an important geostrategic point (until the Transdniestrian conflict),

¹ Case of Ilaşcu and others vs. Moldova and Russia (Application no.48787/99), 8 July 2004

² Trenin D. Russian and Western Interests in Preventing, Managing and Settling Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union. // Commonwealth and Independence in Post-Soviet Eurasia. Frank Cass, 1998, p.171.

being one of the support points in the possible restoration of the “Union” and in the restoring of its influence in the Balkans. The important geostrategically-placed Transdnistria serves as an anchor in maintaining Kremlin’s influence on the main states within the region: Ukraine, Romania, Moldova. The Transdnistrian conflict is not argued today as an interethnic or internal conflict, but as a political-economic conflict used by Russia in order to maintain control over Moldova and to thus deny the enlargement of NATO and European Union (EU), as well as the consolidation of GUAM, etc.

On July 12th at his meeting with 130 Russian ambassadors, the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, in an unusual display of post-Soviet deference towards neighbours, emphasized that Russia should not assume that it has the right to dominate its relations with other ex-Soviet states, but should “make Russia’s relations with CIS members as attractive as possible”³. He also mentioned that “the latest wave of EU and NATO enlargement has created a new geopolitical environment on the European continent” and “we must not adapt to it, but rather minimize potential risks and damage to Russia’s security and economic interests”³.

An important role in solving the Transdnistrian conflict is with the geographical factor. The Transdnistrian region shares no border with Russia, being an enclave between Ukraine and the rest of Moldova’s territories. This is why this region is more vulnerable than other areas of conflict within the former Soviet space (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). It is obvious how important Ukraine is in ensuring the survival of Transdnistria, as well as possible partner to Moldova, EU and the US in solving the conflict.

We believe that if the Transdnistrian regime had not been created and supported by Russia, the EU and the US, with their political and economic potentials, would have been more open and active, securing NATO’s and EU’s eastern border, Moldova’s reunification and the geopolitical stability within the area. But the EU and the US became extra cautious when Russia, looking for reaffirmation as a regional superpower in the former Soviet area, refuses to give up the idea of transforming Moldova into an affiliate state to Russian policy. Russian officials, including V. Putin, while speaking about Transdnistria, repeatedly declared that Russia calls on “a status to provide safe guarantees for Transdnistria while keeping Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” – which reads: Russia shall insist on such status of Transdnistria which will be impossible to be changed by Moldova, and which will ensure Russia’s control over this “reunited Moldova”, as well as keeping the stationed Russian troops. Such Russian motive was clearly stated by the Kozak Memorandum, whose co-signing by V. Voronin and I. Smirnov in the presence of V. Putin, scheduled for November 25th, 2003 was stopped (Putin, 12 iulie 2004).

A. Rahr, a program director at the German Association for Foreign Policy in Moscow, mentioned that the political elite in Russia are increasingly treating the collapse of the Soviet Union as a mistake, and that the asymmetric federalization is, in fact, “a model of recovery of former Soviet republics”. The transformation of former Soviet republics into confederations, according to Rahr, would transform the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into a quasi-confederation under unquestionable Russia’s dominance.

Already in 2005 Russia conducted a series of measures that may be considered discriminatory in relation with the Republic of Moldova and which may qualify as unannounced economic war. To achieve the necessary steps in solving the conflict, Russia

³ Do not assume Russia leads ex-Soviet states-Putin. // “Reuters”, July 12, 2004

was trying to destabilize the socio-economic situation in Transdnistria and Moldova in general by shutting down markets for goods produced in Moldova, including those produced in the Transdnistrian region, which traditionally were made in Russia, and by stopping the supply of raw materials and energy resources from Russia, etc.

In view of the above, we can conclude that some political circles in the Russian Federation are most interested in not solving this conflict.

Ukraine's role in the negotiation process

Another active participant to the process of solving the Transdnistrian conflict is Ukraine. She is interested in a quick solving of the conflict as well as in the reintegration of the Republic of Moldova, as the situation created brings a certain discomfort resulting from the illegal exports of Transdnistrian products, from an increasing organised crime, as well as from maintaining tension within the border areas etc. Another reason for solving the conflict in favour of Moldova by Ukraine would be the threat of Russian separatism within its eastern and south-western regions which have a common geographical-ethnic border with the Transdnistrian region, threat persisting all the way to its border with the Russian Federation. It is, of course, the Odessa region where the Russian separatism is not much lesser than in Transdnistria. The border between Moldova and Odessa region is bigger than its border with Romania. And if we look back during the Nistrian conflict, of all regions within Ukraine, i.e. Odessa, the leaders and the society reacted way more negatively towards Moldova.

The fact that approximately 600 thousands Ukrainians live in Moldova would explain why Ukraine wishes to establish neighbourly relations with Moldova. At the same time, she tends to protect the interests of Ukrainian population living in Moldova, in order to avoid a possible process of Ukrainian immigration to their historical homeland, which can cause some type of humanitarian issues.

All the same, invoking the protection of the Ukrainian population in Transdnistria, Ukraine wants to use the status of peacemaker in order to strengthen its regional and international positions (fact visible in the document proposed by the Ukrainian President V. Iușcenko at Vinița in 2005 in the "7 steps towards democracy"). The guarantor and peacemaker status creates a positive impression about Ukraine and is also welcomed by the West, which will in future try to use Ukraine as a counter argument against Russia.

At the same time, we must take into account the fact that the Ukrainian products have invaded the Moldovan market and especially the Transdnistrian market. In the last years the cheaper but not of less quality products have virtually eliminated Russian and sometimes local products from the market. Ukraine is currently the main exporter on the Moldovan market.

The Transdnistrian conflict resolution process, including the possible involvement of the EU and the US, depend largely on the political developments in Ukraine. Despite the pro-European statements of the new administration in Kiev, Ukraine, for instance, was not associated with the EU and the US decision to introduce ban on movement within its territory for the leaders of Transdnistrian regime. Moreover, Ukraine allows the Russian military planes flying to Tiraspol to pass through its airspace without permission and control of the Moldovan customs.

At the same time, it is necessary to consider the possibility of using Ukraine in the economic blockade of Transdnistria under the pretext that the Transdnistrian economic agents carry out illegal economical operations prejudicing the interests of the Ukrainian

state. Of an utmost importance are the actions launched by Ukraine (under pressure from the U.S. and the European Union) in order to stop the illegal export / import of goods within the region, allowing the crossing of only those goods bearing the Moldovan customs stamp, as well as its contribution to the establishment of the European Union Mission to monitor the crossing points of Moldovan-Ukrainian border which greatly contributed to a decrease in smuggling.

The role of OSCE within negotiations

An active participant to the negotiations is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Moldova. The OSCE is a global player, involved also in the settlement of crises in South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. As the Ukrainian side, the OSCE shares a joint interest in preserving the territorial unity and inviolability of borders of the Republic of Moldova. The OSCE Mission was sent to Moldova in April 1993 in order to contribute to the process of negotiations on the Transdniestrian conflict settlement.

It is worth mentioning that any conflict, especially a military one within the European territory causes the anxiety of the international community. The Transdniestrian conflict put on guard the European countries, as various states meet their interests here: Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and particularly Russia, which does not preclude the extension of the conflict on the entire Europe. Thus the purpose of this organization was to expedite the resolution of all differences between Moldova and Transdniestria. Having this in view, the OSCE tirelessly, but without much effect (given its financial dependence to the significant contributions of the Russian Federation, member of OSCE), insisted on the evacuation of troops and ammunition of the former 14th Russian Army from the territory of the sovereign state. At the same time, the OSCE Mission helped reduce the conflicts between the Moldovan authorities and so-called Transdniestrian officials.

Thus, one of the main objectives of this organization in this region is to create autonomy in some areas, preserving the territorial integrity of Moldova. Referring to this fact 55, Member States of the OSCE declared openly: Moldova should be an independent sovereign state existing within its current international borders.

It seems that the OSCE should act as an observer and consultant of the warring parties that is afraid to offend any party, making it less effective in resolving the crisis within the separatist regions.

Interests of the European Union

During the consultations from Odessa, 26 to 27 September 2005, it was decided that the five-sided format of negotiations (established with the Moscow Memorandum of 8 May 1997) will be amended by providing the status of observers to the representatives of the EU and the US. And the fact that the Russian puppets in Tiraspol have not been used to block this decision means that Russia already cannot deny the right of the EU and the US. to have their own interests in this area of the former Soviet space. It is also clear that the EU and the US prefer the 5+2 format to be retained as a smokescreen behind which the real interests game will run.

The next wave of expansion planned for January 1st, 2007 will bring the European Union at a distance of 90 km on a straight line of conflict, which will make the new regional security in the EU be seriously affected; this means that the EU will seek to engage more actively in solving the conflict situation. This is already visible, especially lately, with the establishment of the monitoring mission for the Transdniestrian "cargos" crossing in order to avoid border smuggling on segments uncontrolled by Chisinau central

authorities. But the EU energy dependence on Russia makes it first be extremely cautious in its actions and, on the other hand explains why the EU has so far avoided getting involved and openly discuss this issue with Russia. The interests of the enlarged Union, unlike the Russian ones, will be affected primarily by regional instability due to the common border with Moldova.

Thus, the interests of the European Union have been caused by several factors:

- The development of a policy for the EU "Wider Europe", in which the EU is more active in dealing with crises at its periphery. In discussions on "Wider Europe", Transdnistria is referred to as a conflict region where the EU should not get involved. The European Commission release on relations with new neighbours states that "EU must assume a more active role to help solve disputes in Palestine, Western Sahara and Transdnistria ... A greater EU involvement in crisis management would be a direct demonstration of the EU desire to assume greater responsibilities in resolving conflicts in the countries included in the New Neighbourhood Policy.

- Launching by the EU of the first civil and military operations of crisis management in Bosnia and Macedonia, which confirms the operational capability of the EU to directly contribute to crisis management at the periphery and to raising the ranking of EU as a Security Actor.

- Not withdrawing the Russian troops from Transdnistria by the end of 2002, according to the Istanbul OSCE provisions (OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, Article 19, November 19, 1999) showed that the EU cannot rely on other countries when the security of its border is affected. In other words, if the EU wants to have stable, democratic, viable and prosperous neighbours, it has to be directly involved in achieving these objectives. Not withdrawing troops from Transdnistria has shown the European Union that to solve this problem we need broader actions than those undertaken within the OSCE.

- EU understands that "Transdnistria is a magnet for organized crime, and can completely destabilize or undermine the building process of the Moldovan state, the political consolidation and sustainable development of the region and therefore of the Union. EU sees a clear interest in resolving the challenges of a *common* defiance.

The perception of the EU as a civil power would not arouse negative associations among the population of Transdnistria, or the Russian political class, unless NATO gets involved. In addition, Russia has traditionally had a favourable attitude towards developing military and civilian capacities for crisis management by the EU, even wanting greater cooperation with the EU crisis management. In this respect, Transdnistria would be a first test⁴.

The role of the United States of America

U.S. President George W. Bush administration has formulated for his second term the need to pay more attention to the Black Sea region and to South Caucasus. Until recently this region was considered to be away from political battles, being regarded by the U.S. as an area of exclusive interest of the Russian Federation. The U.S. and the EU must focus more on commitments undertaken during the OSCE Summit in November 1999 by Russia that it would withdraw its troops and munitions from Moldova and

⁴ Popescu N. New opportunities for solving the Transdnistrian problem through the mechanisms of modern Europe. <http://www.ipp.md/>

Georgia. These military bases are used as a means of putting pressure on countries in the region and encourages the irresponsible policy of the separatist state configurations⁵.

The North-Atlantic Alliance and the enlarged EU can provide a unique opportunity for resolving conflicts in the new states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, especially those located within the strategically important Black Sea region. The recent round of NATO and EU enlargement provides an opportunity to transform the Black Sea area - South Caucasus - Caspian Sea into a region of stability, peace and cooperation, especially since this region is very important due to its considerable oil resources and the possibility of tracing the vital pipelines that will join it with the Western Europe (Baku-Seycan Oil Pipeline Project), thus diminishing to maximum Iran's and Russia's capacity to influence the EU's energy security, as demonstrated in the winter of 2005-2006 by stopping the supply of gas delivered to Ukraine and decrease in the amount supplied to the European Union⁶.

Recently, on October 31st, 2005, President V. Voronin stated that Moldova has documents from the office of Saddam Hussein, which confirm the arms supply and the manufacturing lines of arms and weapons to Iraq from Transdnistria. It is obvious that such documents might pop up in Chisinau only from the Washington administration. It means that the US as well launched a warning to Russia for the latter to abandon its destructive position in the Transdnistrian problem.

The United States' vision of these conflicts differs in several important aspects from the European Union's vision and it could play a crucial role in the prospect solving of these conflicts. The fact that the countries of the Black Sea region and South Caucasus have been included in the "New Neighbourhood Initiative" of the European Union still does not clarify their European perspectives. However, there is no clear prospect for Moldova's accession to the Stabilisation and Association Process launched for the South-East European countries, although there are clear reasons that are determined by the inertia of absorption of the 10 states that joined in May 2004 and the problems with the European constitution. The EU have not yet had a clear strategy for the integration of these countries included in the New Neighbourhood Policy.

Conclusions

Please note therefore that to truly know the role played by one state or another in the conflict settlement process, including the Transdnistrian one, it is necessary to first identify its interests, which will allow the nature of the mediator influence to be assessed within the process of negotiations. Hence we decided to offer a more reliable assessment of the role as mediators in the negotiation process, namely Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, EU and US. All the same, we found it appropriate to consider the degree of joined interest of the parties mentioned for the resolution of the Transdnistrian conflict, while analyzing the positions of judges in the matter of determining the status of Transdnistria.

⁵ Outside View: Russia's Caucasus Gambit. By F.Stephen Larrabee United Press International on November 22, 2004

⁶ Vladimir Voronin: Moldova are dovezi ca Tiraspolul a vindut armament Irakului
<http://www.azi.md/print/36565/Ro;www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?DocID=623410&Issued=2351>

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IV. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT

Josef ABRHÁM, Lucie RÝSOVÁ ⇔ *Regional Differentiation, Agglomeration and Clusters (Theory and Case Study of the New EU Member States)*

Ioan HORGA, Istvan SULI-ZAKAR ⇔ *Contributions of Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen to Shaping the Border Into a Space for Knowledge and Development*

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REGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION, AGGLOMERATION AND CLUSTERS (THEORY AND CASE STUDY OF THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES)¹

*Josef ABRHÁM**, *Lucie RÝSOVÁ*

Abstract. *The economies of the new EU Member states have, in the past two decades, undergone marked changes, which substantially manifest themselves even at regional level. The transformation of the economies of the Central and Eastern European states was on the regional level, very significantly connected with differential tendencies. In all new EU Member states there has been from the beginning of the 90s to date a continuous deepening of regional disparities on the economic level. Besides changes in the location of GDP, there has also been a great shift in the structure of business structures. Grouping firms into the developing sectors of industry and services has largely changed the structure of regional structures on the territory of the new EU Member states. The goal of this study is to clear up the current situation and trends of regional differentiation and agglomeration (regional clusters) of the new EU Member States.*

Keywords: *new EU Member states, regional disparities, regional clusters*

Introduction

The economies of the new EU Member states have, in the past two decades, undergone marked changes, which substantially manifest themselves even at regional level. The geographical placement of economic activities is more influenced by market factors and the influence of the international environment than by the administrative decisions of the state. The transformation of the economies of the Central and Eastern European states was on the regional level, very significantly connected with differential tendencies. In all new EU Member states there has been from the beginning of the 90s to date a continuous deepening of regional disparities on the economic level. Besides changes in the location of GDP, there has also been a great shift in the structure of business structures. Grouping firms into the developing sectors of industry and services has largely changed the structure of regional structures on the territory of the new EU Member states.

The goal of this study is to clear up the current situation and trends of regional differentiation and agglomeration (regional clusters) of the new EU Member States. The examined sample consists of the ten New EU Member States: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (the analysis does not contain two states: Malta and Cyprus).

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To monitor regional differences in economic level, gross domestic product per capita expressed in purchasing power parity is used as an indicator which is also suitable for international comparisons, since it addresses issues of the effects of price levels and exchange rates. A substantial issue in the assessment of regional disparities represents a selection of examined territorial units. In our analysis we will come out, for reasons of comparability, from the unified classification of territorial regions of the European Union, which divides the territory of all member countries into the so-called NUTS regions. Specifically, we will follow namely the units at NUTS 2 level, only in certain evaluation we enter the regions at the level of the NUTS 3.

In analysing the clusters, we use the data from two renowned international institutions. One is the evaluation of the development of clusters according to the World Economic Forum, and, above all, the concrete information on the clusters' development from the database of the European Cluster Observatory².

This electronic database includes comparable data on all 27 Member states of the EU, and concentrates only on those clusters with a high qualitative level. Clusters are identified on the basis of regional employment. Geographical dimensions are followed on the NUTS 2 region level.

1. Theoretical Base

1.1. Contemporary Regional Growth Theories

Within the framework of regional economics a number of theoretical concepts have been developed trying to explain the conditions and factors that effect the economic growth and competitiveness of regions. Under the following a brief outline of the selected theoretical concepts is provided which is very topical from the view of the contemporary regional development. We will focus on a neoclassical theory, a centre – periphery (development economics) concept and two theoretical concepts that got in the forefront in the two last decades – a new theory on growth and new economic geography. Besides the basic assumptions of each individual concept, namely the implications for both the economic growth and regional policy will be examined.

Among the key assumptions of the neoclassical theory belong namely the orientation on the factors of the supply side, perfect competition and decreasing returns to scale. The basic statement of the neoclassical theory is summarised in the model by R. Solow. This concept is based on standard function of production which covers two basic inputs (factors) of the long economic growth. On Solow's function of production so called method of growth accounting is based which decomposes the product rate of growth on the contribution of labour, contribution of capital and the total capital productivity (in other words progress in technology). In the process of this, the factors of labour and capital have the impact on the growth of product per capita only in the short term. In the long term the economy converges to its stable state and as a crucial determinant of the per capita growth of product the progress in technology is considered (Holub and Čihák, 2000).

More advanced concepts based on a neoclassical theory (e.g. Heckscher-Ohlin model) abandoned the condition of the closed economy. On the contrary, they assume a perfect mobility of production factors that initiates both transfer in capital and migration flows among regions which contributes to the balancing of costs of production factors and the convergence of the regions (the neoclassical balancing progress). Trades together with a

² European Cluster Observatory on-line (<http://www.clusterobservatory.eu/index.php?id=44&nid=>).

working market economy are mentioned as crucial factors of growth in these models. Regional policy influenced by the neoclassical concept backs on the statement that the market economy mechanism itself assures the optimal allocation of sources and contributes to the convergence of the regions³. Thus the subjects of regional policy should concentrate namely on the removal of market imperfections, assurance of the availability of information, the support of the mobility of the production factors in the space and the removal of the excessive state interventions in the economy (market and price deregulation).

Theories of the group of centre-periphery (development economics)⁴ are significantly different from the neoclassical concepts as far as their statements are considered. They do not consider the fluctuations within the economic system as the short failures which are balanced through the effects of market factors but as a permanent phenomenon. They define regional growth as an unbalanced process and in the long term they expect the gap in the economic level of the developed and underdeveloped regions to broaden. The causes of a differentiated regional growth can be found, according to them, predominantly on the demand side. Regional policy inspired by the concepts of development economics is based on the argument that the responsibility for the solution of market failures lies to a significant extent on the state (Blažek and Uhlíř, 2003: 86-105). Namely foreign direct investments, reallocation of both state enterprises and institutions into the less developed regions or regional development funds are perceived to be propelling forces of the regional development (Martin, 2006: 9-10).

New economic growth theory (endogenous growth theory) does not represent, despite of its title, a completely break-through approach. This theory which has many modifications and models⁵ enriches and modifies the neoclassical growth theory. It focuses namely on the endogenization and the inclusion of the technological progress into the models of the economic growth. Furthermore it gives bigger importance to knowledge and human potential. The positive externalities of a human capital together with the transfer of knowledge enable to abandon the law of diminishing returns from the factors of production which was typical in case of Solow's model. The regional difference in the productivity and growth are therefore explained through the differences in the technological and human capital endowment (Jones, 2002: 155-162). As the main factors of the economic growth are being mentioned new growth theory, investments in research and development, innovation activity, the level education, investments in a human capital, efficiency of the management of knowledge and innovations etc.

New economic geography works alike new growth theory on neoclassical assumptions but it abandons the preconditions of the law of diminishing returns of scale, comparative advantages as well as the preconditions of perfect competition. According to new economic geography, for the industrial and commercial specialization of the regions the external savings, imperfect competition and increasing returns of scale are more significant. New economic geography strives to find answers to the fact that there are still significant differences among countries and regions from the view of specialization, competitiveness and industrial dynamics. The origin of the long term specializations is

³ In case of Solow's model only the conditioned convergence is mentioned i.e. the convergence of the economies with the similar characteristics of production function.

⁴ As the examples of development economics models we can name e.g. growth poles theory (F. Perroux), cumulative causes theory by G. Myrdal, polarized development theory by J. Friedmann or the model of growth regional differentiation by Prebisch.

⁵ New growth theory is connected with the thesis of P. Romer, R. Lucas, G. Grossmann, E. Helpman, etc.

explained by this theory as the result of the agglomeration processes. Among the crucial factors of the competitive advantages of the regions it names predominantly the concentration of qualified workforce, sufficient industrial concentration of enterprises, developed supplier-customer relations and the accessibility to specialized infrastructure and technologies (Krugman, 1995). More advanced concepts of new economic geography name working industrial clusters among the key factors of the regional economic growth.

1.2. *Clusters in theoretical concepts*

In the theory of regional development we place information on clusters and agglomerations in the whole scope of the concept, which examines, above all, themes linked to the growth of poly-, agglomerative advantages, economic geography innovative systems, and so on. The first person to deal with the phenomenon of the territorial concentration of economic activities was the British economist **M.A. Marshall**; already at the end of the 19th century. He pointed to the so called **industrial districts**, which had a rather large amount of companies. According to Marshall, mutual interconnectedness brings the individual subjects advantages, mainly in the form of local savings [e.g., a greater supply of specialised workers, the availability of sub-supplier branches and services, support for the transfer of technology and knowledge between local firms and the like]. In addition to the above stated mechanisms, Marshall further mentions the operation of a certain atmosphere of reciprocity, to be precise, the creation of formal and informal contact, jointly shared customs, traditions, production and labour approaches and so on [Rýsová, Dobřík, 2007]. Other authors, besides A.Marshall have dealt with the reciprocal concentrations. **G.Garforli** considers **industrial districts** as an important source of competitiveness. This all shows industrial districts to be one of the significant examples of the organisational form of post-Freudian flexible specialisation. Among their characteristic signs, according to the aforementioned, belong the following:

- A high level of the division of labour creates firm ties both within and outside the branch.
- A high amount of specialisation of production at firm level stimulates the accumulation of specialised knowledge and facilitates the integration of new technology.
- The creation of an efficient system of spreading information and knowledge at local level guarantees a rapid and effective transfer of technology between the participants.
- A high number of local participants leads to opportunities for seeking the best solutions as well as for examining research methods used by individual participants.
- Raising the level of relations between economic subjects has a favourable effect on the spreading of technological and organisational innovations, as well as increasing overall effectivity of the local production systems.
- The concentration of economic activities and increased use of technology influences the level of qualification of the workers (Rýsová, Dobřík, 2009).

Another view of the agglomerative effect can be found in the theory of field growth, which is connected with the work of **F.Perrouxe**. In the original Perrouxe version (Perrouxe, 1950), **field growth** is understood from a branch perspective. The author differentiates between the so called 'driving' and 'driven' branches. „He defined driving branches as rapidly developing branches, which are dominated by the big, constantly innovating firms, sending strong development impulses to their surroundings, that is, to

firms in the driven branches so that they grow even faster than other, comparable firms“ (Blažek, 2003)

The original growing fields theory underwent many modifications in the course of its development. The most important „interventions“ which significantly enriched the theoretical framework are the **theories of centres of growth and axes of growth (J.R.Boudeville)**. Boudeville, like Perroux, considers the motor of growth to be the developed [driving] branches, which contribute to the development of the connected [driven] branches. Perroux, however, does not include the effects of expansion with certain areas. Conversely, Boudeville presumes faster development of those regions which are localised driven branches, because it is calculated from the significant multiple effect of these branches on the rest of the economy of the region (Boudeville, 1966: 192).

We can call the book of **M.E. Porter (1990): „The Competitive Advantage of Nations“** a pioneering work in the area of clusters. In this work, the cluster is defined as a *„geographically close grouping of mutually interlinked firms and dependent institutions in a given discipline [e.g., even universities, scientific research institutions, chambers of commerce and the like], and firms in related fields which compete together, cooperate, have joint symbols and complement each other“* (Porter, 1990: 157). Later on, M.E.Porter brought his original definition up to date and developed it like this: *„Clusters are local concentrations of mutually linked businesses and institutions in a given field. Clusters include groups of interconnected industrial sectors and other subjects important for economic competition. They consist of, for instance, suppliers of specialised inputs and providers of specialised infrastructure. Clusters often expand vertically into marketing channels and customers, as well as horizontally to producers of complementary products and companies in industrial branches, related by virtue of skills, technology or joint inputs. Many clusters also include governmental or other institutions - such as, for instance, universities, standard setting agencies, research teams or business associations - which provide specialised training, education, information, research and technical support“* (Porter, 1998: 78).

Porter understands clusters as one of the main sources of microeconomic competitiveness. According to him, the main factor of competitiveness of a state or region is productivity, with certain used sources. Among the microeconomic requirements for the growth of productivity, Porter, in his current publication, includes: firms' performance and the refinement of their strategy, the quality of the microeconomic business environment and the level of development of the clusters. We can put **R. Baldwin** and **Ch. Wyplosz's** publications among the modern approaches to the study of **agglomeration and economic geography**; in which the motives for the existence of agglomerative power are analysed. They argue that agglomerations get stronger *„when the spatial concentration of economic activities form the motives which support further spatial concentrations“* (Baldwin, 2008: 258).

They define the main cause of agglomerative power as the so called ‚demand and cost connection‘. The demand connection is formed by the presence of a large market, which lowers trading costs. The cost connection is the availability of inputs [raw materials, plant and machinery, specialised services]; in other words, proximity to the supply chain. There exist, of course, opposing forces, the so called ‚dispersal forces‘ (e.g., the price of land and realty, labour costs, strong competition), which work against the strengthening of the agglomerate.

Spatial placement of economic activities, then, depend on the mutual interaction of agglomerative and dispersal forces (Baldwin, 2008: 258-259).

2. New EU Member States: Regional Differentiation and Agglomeration

2.1 Regional Disparities in Economic Performance

For the New EU Member States both the continuing regional disparities within individual states and also the global backwardness of those regions compared to the EU average are characterised (EU-27). Just four regions of the researched states achieve higher GDP/per capita than the EU average (Prague in the Czech Republic, Bratislava in Slovakia, Zachodna Slovenia and Közép-Magyarország in Hungary) and only seven regions go beyond the level of 75% of the EU average GDP/per capita (besides mentioned regions also Bucuresti in Romania, Mazowieckie in Poland and Střední Čechy in the Czech Republic), which is crucial for the classification among the most underdeveloped regions within the framework of the economic and social coherency policy of the EU. The GDP/per capita of the other regions fluctuates from 26% to 73% of the enlarged EU average. The position of the ten most and least developed regions of the New EU Member States is shown in Table 1.

Regional GDP per capita in the New Member States, 2007 (highest and lowest GDP per capita)

Table 1

Most developed NUTS II regions	As percentage of EU-27 average	Most backward NUTS II regions	As percentage of EU-27 average
Praha (CZ)	172	Észak-Magyarország (HU)	40
Bratislavský (SK)	160	Nord-Vest (RO)	40
Zahodna Slovenija (SL)	107	Lubelskie (PL)	37
Közép-Magyarország (HU)	103	Podkarpackie (PL)	37
Bucuresti (RO)	92	Észak-Alföld (HU)	36
Mazowieckie (PL)	87	Lubelskie (PL)	33
Střední Čechy (CZ)	75	Sud-Est (RO)	34
Vzhodna Slovenija (SL)	73	Sud-Muntenia (RO)	34
Jihovýchod (CZ)	72	Severoiztochen (BG)	32
Jihozápad (CZ)	71	Yugoiztochen (BG)	31
Estonia (EE)	69	Sud-Vest Oltenia (RO)	31
Moravskoslezsko (CZ)	68	Yuzhen tzentralen (BG)	27
Severovýchod (CZ)	66	Severen tzentralen (BG)	27
Západné Slovensko (SK)	66	Nor-Est (RO)	27
Jugozapaden (BG)	62	Severozapaden (BG)	26

Source: EUROSTAT on line

(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/introduction)

When we consider the regional differentiation within individual states, we can find some common features which are characteristic for the all the countries researched. This is primarily the so called double dichotomy:

- central and peripheral polarization of the central region compared to the rest of the country,
- differentiation between the western and eastern regions of the researched states, to be precise, it concerns the variations in the development of the regions which are located nearer to, and farther from, the developed EU countries [it does not always have to be Eastern and Western countries].

The dichotomy centre – periphery is characterized by the unique dominant position of the capital city and its surroundings, compared to the rest of the country.

Capitals are the centres of modern sectors, they have high levels of the above-average research and development potential as well as the educational potential and they also show an above-average attraction for foreign investors. The economic level of central regions reaches, in extreme cases, more than 200% level of the national level.

The most significant dominancy within the states, where we evaluate the regional structure on the level of NUTS II, is shown by the central regions of Slovakia and Romania. In case of Slovakia the economic level of Bratislava exceeds 3.4-times (measured on the basis of GDP/per capita in PPP – Purchasing Power Parity) the value of the least developed region (Východné Slovensko) and the value of the second most developed region 2.4-times (Západné Slovensko). Bucuresti goes beyond the level of the least developed region of Romania more than 3-times. The lower degree of differentiation of the central regions of Poland is given mainly by the greater dimensions of the NUTS II regions, compared to the Czech Republic or Slovakia. Higher region, say, includes further areas besides the capital, what makes its higher heterogeneity from the point of view of economic level. The typical example of such a NUTS II region like that is the Polish region Mazowieckie, which includes a number of areas with a considerable concentration of agriculture.⁶

Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia represent, as a whole, the separated regions of NUTS II, but if we consider the regional level NUTS III, we can claim, that even here the central regions considerably exceed the national average in the evaluation of economic development. Less significant polarization of the central region on NUTS III level is obvious in the case of Lithuania (GDP/per capita of Vilnius comes to some 140% of the national average).

Another phenomenon of the regional differentiation of the New Member States is the higher level of development of the western areas, which are situated near the markets of the developed EU Member and therefore, they can make profit from the higher inflow of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) as well as from a better availability of the western markets compared to the peripheral eastern regions. The extreme form of this dichotomy is e.g. northwest area of Hungary, where the inflow of FDI was strongly displayed. Both western regions (Nyugat-Dunántúl and Közép-Dunántúl) represent the areas with above-average potential of growth. The major economic stimulus was represented in the last decade by the FDI, which contributed to the restructuralization of the industrial structure and to the development of innovation and export oriented branches (Kiss, 2001: 16). Another example of the west-east dichotomy is Slovakia, where this phenomenon is highlighted by the location of the capital in the western part of the country near one of the most developed centres of the EU – Vienna. The crossing of two dichotomies here causes a multiplication effect. The substantial differences in economic level between the western and eastern parts can be seen also in Poland and on the level of NUTS III also in case of Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia.

The peripheral regions of the new member states are, conversely, to be found in geographically advantaged areas [this is from the point of view of proximity to the core areas of the EU]. The nine least developed regions of the current EU are in only two countries - Bulgaria and Romania (e.g., Severozapaden, Severen Tzentralen a Yuzen

⁶ A higher dimension of a Central Region can be seen in the case of Poland as a well chosen, as it ensures to the capital also in the following financial perspective (2007-20013) the opportunity to draw a larger volume of financial means from the structural funds of the EU

tzentralen in Bulgaria; or, Nord-Est, Sud_muntania a Sud-Vest Olstenia in Romania]. We can also find other backward areas in the Eastern borderlands of the new memberstates, which are significantly less attractive from the view of foreign investors. A typical examples of non-developed eastern regions are the regions of East Slovakia (Východné Slovensko) and Hungary (Észak-Alföld and Észak-Magyarország) and primarily the areas of East Poland (Podkarpatskie, Podlaskie, Lubelskie and Warminsko-Mazurskie), where the proportion of employment in agriculture exceeds 30% and, moreover, there is only a low development of economic activities in industry and services, which supports the over-employment in the agricultural sector as well as its low productivity (Römisch and Ward, 2004: 96).

The exceptions in term of east-west differentiation are represented only by two of the researched states — the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Lithuania. The Czech Republic is characterized, besides the polarization of the central region, by a relatively homogenous structure in term of the economic level. The regions Moravskoslezsko and Severozápad are stricken by the change of the structure of the productive base that reflects itself in the increase in unemployment. Despite the relative homogeneity in the economic level of the Czech regions, with the exception of Prague, we can claim, that better development opportunities are shown uniformly by the regions located on borders with the developed regions of Germany and Austria (e.g. Jihozápad or Jihovýchod) rather than with the peripheral areas (e.g. Moravskoslezsko). The regional structure of Lithuania is characterized by a greater balance than in the case of Estonia and Latvia, thus we can distinguish the more developed (the outskirts of the capital or the Klajpeda Region) as well as the peripheral areas (e.g. the Altyus Region on the borders of Byelorussia). The economic differentiation, however, does not correspond to the spatial distribution to the eastern and western part of the state (Vošta, 2005: 122-124).

Regional Disparities in GDP per capita (PPS), 1995–2006

Table 2

State	Coefficient of variation in %							
	NUTS 2 Regions				NUTS 3 Regions			
	1995	1999	2003	2006	1995	1999	2003	2006
Bulgaria	19,4	21,4	23,7	31,0	24,5	53,0	56,6	36,7
Czech Republic	19,6	22,1	24,9	25,4	16,6	22,1	24,9	25,3
Estonia	-	-	-	-	29,9	35,1	40,1	44,7
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	10,9	17,2	24,2	27,6
Latvia	-	-	-	-	31,6	40,0	46,0	46,8
Hungary	25,7	32,1	34,2	37,6	31,4	37,6	37,2	42,4
Poland	13,3	17,7	18,3	19,5	-	17,2	17,4	34,4
Romania	-	23,8	47,1	46,5	12,8	24,4	29,3	34,4
Slovakia	26,7	26,0	27,8	30,1	28,3	27,2	28,7	34,5
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	19,0	19,6	22,2	22,4

Source: EUROSTAT; own calculations

When monitoring regional variations, not only is their current state important, but, above all, their development in time. In our analysis we shall concentrate on the development of regional variations between 1995-2006. We are following the regional differences on the basis of the variation coefficient of the regional whole at the level of NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 [in countries which are represented as a single whole, or we follow two NUTS 2 regions; we monitor only single, whole, regions of NUTS 3].

We use variation coefficients which were calculated as part of the indicative deviations of all regions in the national average GDP per capita. Regional deviations are parts which are linked to the entire population of a region. The results of the variation coefficient are expressed in percentages.

From table 2 we can see that the values of the variation coefficient grew fairly markedly in all countries under examination, both on the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 region levels. The dimensions of disparity is, of course, different according to the individual countries. NUTS 3 are notable in Hungary, Estonia and Latvia. Conversely, they are substantially lower in Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania. The greatest regional differences between the NUTS regions are seen in Romania, and they are much lower, again in the Czech Republic and Poland. However, the fairly low regional differences on NUTS 2 level in Poland are compensated for by big subregional disparities. The greatest differences in NUTS 3 regions are, besides in Poland, in Hungary and Estonia. On the other hand, the smallest differences can be seen in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Slovenia is a special case among the new member states. It is a small and fairly developed economy, where regional differences do not play a substantial role. What is more, their development has not shown in the past decade such growth as in the other countries under examination.

2.1 Regional clusters

Most expert studies carried out on the basic requirements of regional clusters agree. The concentration of firms, as a rule, is defined within the framework of the same, or similar, economic branch, which works inside the frame of a narrow (small) geographical space.

In order to statistically underpin the clusters, we need, of course, a concrete definition of the region and a detailed set of conditions expressing the agglomeration of firms. In this regard, there has not been, to date, any single approach put forward. We can find a whole host of methods for measuring and evaluating clusters.

In our analyses we use the data from two renowned international institutions. One is the evaluation of cluster development according to the World Economic Forum, and above all, the concrete information on the clusters' development from the database of the European Cluster Observatory⁷. Both institutions provide different types of data on clusters.

The World Economic Forum evaluates the complete development of clusters in its yearly report: „The Global Competitiveness Report“. In this publication, the overall cluster development in individual countries is compared. According to the current results in this year book (see table 2), it may be said that the development of clusters does not belong among the strong points in the comparative profiles of the countries under examination. If we compare the overall situation from the point of view of the Index of global competitiveness of the development of clusters, we can see that all the new members achieved better grades in the total index. Cluster development, for the moment, does not belong among the main comparative advantages of the new EU member states, which is not very surprising, of course. Clusters represent a source of competitiveness of the highest quality, and their significance grows with the increasing living standards and cost levels of the economy. New EU member states, for the moment, are mainly drawing from less sophisticated sources of competitiveness (e.g., favourable relations of productivity and labour costs, business friendly tax systems, and the like), which in the past decade were sources of solid growth dynamics.

⁷ European Cluster Observatory on-line (<http://www.clusterobservatory.eu/index.php?id=44&nid=>).

The group of new EU member states does not form a completely homogenous group. On the basis of the World Economic Forum's rankings, we can divide the 10 countries under examination into three groups:

- The Czech Republic and Slovenia achieve fairly even results in cluster development and overall evaluation. What is more, they go the highest of the new EU memberstates [in 3 and 4 tenths], which is accounted for, mainly, by the degree of development of cluster policy and other instruments, which have been developed in both countries over many years ;
- Estonia and Slovakia appear to be markedly backward in the development of clusters in comparison to the overall evaluation. In the cluster rankings they are at 6 and 7 tenths out of the more than 130 countries evaluated.
- The level of cluster development in other countries is very lowly valued. In this year's rankings they moved around 100 points.

Ranking of the New EU member States in the Global Competitiveness Report (2010-2011)

Table 3

State	Cluster development	Overall ranking
Bulgaria	108	76
Czech Republic	34	31
Estonia	77	35
Lithuania	92	53
Latvia	113	68
Hungary	99	58
Poland	104	46
Romania	100	64
Slovakia	67	47
Slovenia	42	37

Source: World Economic Forum on-line (<http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/index.htm>).

The database of the European Cluster Observatory includes comparable data on all 27 member states of the EU, and concentrates only on those clusters which are on a qualitatively high level. In order to ascertain the quality of the branch speciality and agglomerations, the so called star classification is used, according to which clusters can gain one, two or three stars. Three stars are seen as the highest achievable evaluation. The following are the qualifying criteria:

- **The size** of the cluster is set by its overall employment rate. To gain stars it is necessary for the employment rate in the cluster belongs among the highest in the frame of the European clusters under examination. Stars are awarded to only 10% of clusters with the highest employment rate.

- **Specialisation** is set according to the specialisation coefficient, which is done like so:

$$\text{Employment rate in the branch category/overall employment in the region}$$

$$\text{Employment in the branch category in the EU/overall employment in the EU}$$
 In the case that the resulting coefficient value reaches 2, or more, the cluster gets a star.

- **Dominance** is expressed on the basis of the share which the cluster has of total employment in the given region. Stars are awarded to the 10% of clusters with the highest share within the frame of the sample under examination.

According to currently available information [July, 2010], there have been identified 480 clusters in the new member states, which gained at least one star under the methods used by the European Cluster Observatory. The most clusters are located,

logically, in the bigger countries; 147 in Poland, 100 in Romania and 74 in the Czech Republic. Whilst in each of the Baltic states, or in Slovenia, there can be found roughly 10 clusters, of which at least one got a star. This corresponds to the dimensions of the given country. There are now only 51 high quality clusters which were awarded three stars. If we examine the clusters established according to the NUTS 2 regions, then first place goes to the central regions of the countries under examination [Közép-Magyarország, Mazowieckie, Prague, Bucharest, and so on]. From the point of view of branch dominance, then they are the following sectors: Processed Food, Heavy Construction Services, Transportation and Logistics, Financial Services, Hospitality and Tourism, Metal Manufacturing, and Building Fixtures, Equipment and Services.

The branches concerned include almost half the people employed in the clusters covered by the so called star classification; European Cluster Observatory. Even allowing for substantial structural changes, which the new member states underwent in the past decade, there remains a structure of the clusters which is somewhat different from that of the developed countries of the EU [e.g., Sweden, Germany, and so on]. The clusters in the new EU member states focus more on the labour intensive sectors. Whilst some of the service sectors [e.g., business services, education and the like], or knowledge clusters, which are less a part of the employment rate than in the developed countries.

New EU member States: regional clusters

Table 5

Cluster category	Top regional clusters by total employment			
Processed Food	Mazowieckie, PL (55.000)	Wielkopolskie, PL (51.000)	Lithuania, LT (49.000)	Slaskie, PL (36.000)
Heavy Construction Services	Lithuania, LT (61.000)	Slaskie, PL (53.000)	Slovenia, SI (45.000)	Yugozapaden, BG (44.000)
Transportation and Logistics	Közép-magyarország, HU (50.000)	Sud-Est, RO (49.000)	Mazowieckie, PL (45.000)	Pomorskie, PL (45.000)
Financial Services	Mazowieckie, PL (71.000)	Közép-magyarország, HU (43.000)	Bucuresti, RO (31.000)	Praha, CZ (29.000)
Hospitality and Tourism	Közép-magyarország, HU (28.000)	Sud-Est, RO (27.000)	Praha, CZ (22.000)	Bucuresti, RO (20.000)
Metal Manufacturing, and Building Fixtures	Moravskoslezsko, CZ (51.000)	Slaskie, PL (44.000)	Slovenia, SI (43.000)	Sud-Est, RO (36.000)

Source: European Cluster Observatory on-line
(<http://www.clusterobservatory.eu/index.php?id=44&nid=>).

Conclusions

The transformation of the economies of the states of Central Europe was, at the regional level, very significantly connected with differential tendencies. In all the New EU Member States there has been, from the beginning of the 90s to date, continuous deepening of regional disparities at the economic level which show themselves in two basic trends. In part, there is obviously a substantially more positive development of the

central regions (regions, where capitals are situated) compared to other areas and partly a faster development of the regions in the Western parts of the New EU Member States bordering on other developed Member States of the European Union.

Regional disparities in the New EU Member States result from a number of economic, social and geographical factors. In the last decades after 1989 the significance of the individual differential factors, however, changed. The effects of globalization as well as the integration into both the European and world economy assert themselves in a larger scale. The New EU Member States still do not rank among so called core areas of the world economy but they represent typical follow-up areas which are characterised by relatively low costs of inputs, an offer of qualified workforce, a more favourable tax environment and the stability of political and economic environment. Thus the globalization shows itself namely through the increased inflow of foreign direct investments and the shift of production from the neighbouring developed countries of the European Union. The flows of capital and the transfers of knowledge and technologies, however, prove in the territory of the New EU Member States substantially differently which leads to different dynamics of the economic growth of the regions. The regions of the capitals together with the areas with a more favourable position relating to the core areas of Europe have a better competitive position.

In a midterm run, we estimate, that the development of the regional structure of the New EU Member States will be thus probably characterised by the changeover of convergent and divergent trends. We can expect either the convergence of the economic level of the regions of the observed states to the standard of the developed EU Member States. And this is quite logically the main goal of the contemporary pro-growth policies of the New EU Member States (most regions of these countries are classified within the European Union as underdeveloped areas under the level of the EU average). This process, however, will be long-term and especially unbalanced in term of single regions. Furthermore, it can be predicted in continuing of differential trends at a regional level but with lower dynamics of those disparities. In the period after the accession to the EU, there will be a faster economic growth of economic development and competitiveness of the regions with favourable development conditions on the assumptions that they can better utilize the advantages of the functioning of the single market.

Cluster development, for the moment, does not belong among the main comparative advantages of the new EU member states, which is not very surprising, of course. Clusters represent a source of competitiveness of the highest quality, and their significance grows with the increasing living standards and cost levels of the economy. New EU member states, for the moment, are mainly drawing from less sophisticated sources of competitiveness (e.g., favourable relations of productivity and labour costs, business friendly tax systems, and the like), which in the past decade were sources of solid growth dynamics. Currently, however, the economic standards and price levels of the new member states are gradually approaching those of the developed countries of the EU. The challenges posed by cluster development and other instruments of higher quality, will subsequently have to be more integrated into the framework of economic policy.

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CONTRIBUTIONS OF INSTITUTE FOR EUROREGIONAL STUDIES ORADEA-DEBRECEN TO SHAPING THE BORDER INTO A SPACE FOR KNOWLEDGE AND DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract. *Using the Hungarian-Romanian border as a solid example, this paper will attempt to prove how borders have changed from the hard, close, exclusive border to the soft, open, inclusive frontier. We have highlighted the Hungarian and Romanian authors' scientific contributions, with a special emphasis on the members of the Debrecen-Oradea Euroregional Studies Institute (IERS), the "Jean Monnet" European Centre of Excellence, as well as on the developed joint projects. These contributions have created a certain level of expertise in the development of cross-border cooperation that could be transferred for the benefit of similar situations, arisen with the EU enlargement eastwards, such as the EU's eastern frontier on the Slovak-Hungarian-Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan section.*

Keywords: *Hungarian-Romanian border, frontier, IERS, EU's eastern frontier, cross-border cooperation*

The border has marked the rise of modernity and also the geopolitical system of nation-states. Borders are no longer dividing lines akin to the traditional notion of a frontier in the sense of a line demarcating one state from another; they have become considerably weakened and are more diffuse, often sites of overlapping communities and regions. There are some interesting examples of the border becoming a site of cosmopolitan reorientations in previously divided identities. The relevant examples that can be cited are changing cross-border relations in South Tyrol, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Hungarian-Romanian border area (Delanty, 2007: 65-66).

The Hungarian-Romanian border, throughout the 20 years from the fall of communism and the 90 years from the Trianon Treaty, has changed its status of hard, close, exclusive border to that of soft, open, inclusive frontier. In the two decades after the events of 1989-1990 we have witnessed not only a shaping of the geographical border in terms of boosting the cross-border traffic flow or the cross-border cooperation, but also a mutation from the ethno-national mentalities to a cosmopolitan mentality. In fact, actually speaking, it is not only a revelation of a culture of cohabitation, but a rediscovery of a coexistence pattern previous to drawing national borders.

It goes without saying that the academic environment has played a major role in the entire equation of shaping up a transnational and deeply European cosmopolitan mentality. One example of the highly successful *Universitas translimes* lies in the very close

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collaboration between the Universities of Debrecen and of Oradea (Nagyvarad), which took the shape of numerous student and teacher exchange programs, projects, conferences, workshops, summer schools, etc. For each of the two universities their most important partner is located 60km away, which makes them a true European academic pole.

Amongst many examples of good cooperation, the project of Debrecen-Oradea Euroregional Studies Institute, the “Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence (www.iser.rdsor.ro) is the real icing on the cake. Born as a joint project in 2005 and funded by the Jean Monnet Action, IERS (Debrecen-Oradea Institute for Euroregional Studies) managed to bring together experts in border issues, border cooperation and regional development of the two universities, and for some time specialists not only from the two countries, but also from neighbouring areas (Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine).

The ISER action has been concentrated on two axes:

- a) Contributions to shaping the Hungarian-Romanian border into a space for knowledge, development and competitiveness
- b) Contributions referring to shaping the European borders subsequent to the latest EU enlargement

1. Contributions to shaping the Hungarian-Romanian border into a space for knowledge, development and competitiveness

Further to the Institute’s semi-annual sessions, the research contributions of IERS members and not only took the shape of published volumes; these books approached two types of issues, both with incidence of shaping up not only the Hungarian-Romanian border area, but also other neighbouring border areas. Also, the *Eurolimes* journal (Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies), semi-annual publication has been dealing with particular aspects of the new border meaning.

As for the **regional and Euroregional development at the Hungarian-Romanian border** there has been a highlight on the role played by smaller or larger town from within the border area in creating development poles. The towns are centres of the economic space of their counties and the value of the inner potential depends on the distance from the county-seat. (Penzes, Mollnar, 2007: 25-37). A particular attention has been paid to the role that Debrecen and Oradea can have in creating a genuine *eurometropolis* (Suli-Zakar, 2009: 144). The moderate opportunities of the mutual agglomeration of Debrecen and Oradea are shown by the minor potential difference of the settlements locating between the two great towns (Toca, 2009: 253-260). The role played by Oradea in the local development of some urban communities in Hungary is also to be noted. Also, between 2006 and 2007 IERS developed a joint development strategy of Debrecen and Oradea, materialized in a package of measures adopted by the two cities public administrations (Horga, Toca: 2008, 73-82).

In addition to the two towns (Debrecen and Oradea) and counties (Bihar and Hajdu Bihar) seen as development engines for the Hungarian-Romanian border area, the IERS members also looked into other settlements: Satu Mare (Romania)– Szabolcs-Szatmar-Berg (Hungary) (Benedek, 2006: 371-380) or Timisoara –Szeged (Gulyás; Sisák, 2009).

The economic dimension of the Hungarian-Romanian border area development was one of the priorities of the studies and research run within the IERS. Having the analysis of the economic potential of the most active counties at the Hungarian-Romanian border as the starting point (Penzes, Mollnar 2007: 25-36), the IERS team carried out studies of regional planning and co-operation within different spots of the Hungarian-Romanian border (Nagy, 2008: 167-174), together with studies of socio-economic and

natural indicators of rural settlements development in the Hungarian-Romanian border area (Stasac, 2006: 397-402). Aspects related to the economic management of the local public authorities within the border area during post-accession (Şoproni, Horga, 2009; Kozma, 2008), as well as the comparative analysis of social-economic-infrastructure indices in the micro-regions of the Hungarian-Romanian border counties represent scientific concerns with reference to the political decision area (Abonyiné Palotás, 2008)".

Before and even after 1989, the economic growth of the counties located at the Hungarian-Romanian border was regarded as an uncertain investment by both states, as these were peripheral areas. But with the evolution of Hungary and Romania towards EU accession and their subsequent joining, the development philosophy has been greatly changing. Even to this date the two countries have failed to see a priority in developing these areas, but as the borders have changed and become much more fluid, thanks to the increasing economic exchanges between the two countries, the peripheral border areas stand a chance to development not only in connection with the general development of the two countries, but also by interaction with the neighbouring area. This paradigm shift is obvious in both the furnishing of the border space, but mostly in the development of an economy based on increasing competitiveness (Bosnyák, 2006), where the transport network complementary element plays a fundamental role (Veres, 2006).

The involvement of the Institute for Euroregional Studies in developing an economy based on competitiveness has materialized in several actions. First of all, it created a partnership with the employers' associations from Bihor and Hajdu Bihar Counties and this led to the publishing of a monthly business newspaper, which aims to create partnership opportunities for joint economic projects. Second of all, IERS got involved in prospecting the labour market for recruiting and training of ITC specialised personnel for T-System/Deutsche Telekom and for Debrecen. Third of all, IERS is involved in developing analysis for training of human resources from within the area (Toca, 2006; Teperics, 2006; Teperics, 2007; Gödör, 2008).

One of the major dimensions of a competitive economy is the tourism. From this perspective we can speak of a veritable turntable of the tourism located within Bekescsaba-Gyula-Debrecen-Hajdusobolso (in Hungary), Moneasa-Tinca-Baile Felix-Oradea-Sacuieni (Romania), areas that have the most important thermal water springs in Central and Eastern Europe. The rising spa tourism tends to become a real economic engine for the region. Romanian tourists from border counties can be found in the spa resorts from across the border just like the Hungarian tourists can be found in the Western Romanian resorts, especially those that have a mountain settlement. It is obvious that such phenomenon with diverse social and cultural forms - Romanian police and the Hungarian counterpart patrolling together the roads to and between the resorts and spas in Hungary or Romania, or handicrafts and gastronomy festivals held on both sides of the border - could not have failed to be in focus of the ISER, as phenomenon for analysis, expertise and diagnosis for the policy makers (Várhelyi, Müller, 2008; Csordás, 2008; Bujdosó, Tóth, 2008). Also, the development of the shopping tourism within the Romanian-Hungarian border area is not only a result of the advantageous cross-border cooperation, but also an interesting object for analysis (Tömöri, 2006; Tömöri, 2010). The cross-border cooperation in healthcare was the subject of a successful thesis elaborated within the ISER (Ambrus, 2008).

Certainly, such phenomenon of the cross-border cooperation is due to the actions of certain actors, trained, educated in this spirit, actors that acting through public institutions, economic agents, NGO's, schools and universities, have made it possible for a

highly disputed border, one of the most militarized before 1989, to become a dynamic factor, both economic and social. Such a change has aroused the interest for research undertaken by the observers “far” from the local bias, research that show the Hungarian-Romanian border as a place of good practice in changing the borders in Europe (Delanty, 2007: 65-66; Banus, 2007: 134-136; Hinfray, 2006; Khonde, 2009).

The territorial marketing takes a very important place among the projects developed by IERS, designed to emphasize the cross-border investment opportunities for Hungarian-Romanian border space. Starting from the idea of a joint development strategy for Debrecen and Oradea, designed to create a pole of competitiveness with relevance within the Central European space, the Institute members have published studies and research designed to show how to carry out an efficient territorial marketing within the border areas (Komádi, 2006), to show how to use the cross-border cooperation and border location attributes within marketing area of expertise (Kozma, 2006; Soproni, 2006) or how to use a region brand (Transylvania) in developing the marketing within the Hungarian-Romanian border (Şoproni, Popoviciu, 2006).

The process of creating an economically and socially dynamic area within the Hungarian-Romanian border space is based on developing a new culture of diversity. What we have here are two different concepts of diversity, one that is primarily based on multiculturalism and the rights of citizenship and one that is more ethnopluralist and is generally directly concerned with regional and ethnic autonomies. It is not clear how the current notion of diversity, as constrained as it is by national borders, is able to suggest a way forward. So my third thesis states that the Central and Eastern Europe has a long way to go in linking citizenship with diversity, while on the other hand Europe as a whole will need to move beyond the currently bifurcated conception of diversity. The problem of ethnopluralism has a direct bearing on the question of borders since much of the problem is due to the fact that many national minorities are linked to a majority population group in neighbouring countries (Delanty, 2007: 65). In such cases where there are contested borders, different and conflicting collective memories, minority rights relating to religion and language, political representation and so on, considerable progress has been made with respect to moving towards reconciliation and negotiation of conflict (Delanty, 2007: 66)

Within this context, IERS has organized debates regarding the other person's corresponding image across the border settlements where Hungarian and Romanian communities live. (Blomquist, 2006; Tátrai, 2008); the practice of intercultural dialogue in the multi-ethnic settlements of the border space (Hoffman, 2006; Hoffman, 2008; Hoffman, 2009); the impact of Euro-Atlantic integration of Hungary and Romania onto changing the cultural paradigm within the common border area (Zainea, 2006); the role of cultural and educational relations in the development of a cross-border cosmopolitan culture (Toca, Stoica, 2010), the role of the border traffic in creating a new border culture (Ciocan, 2006)

Since within the development of cross-border cooperation in Europe there have still been disturbance factors, resulted from habit and national legislative and administrative practice, IERS has undertaken for the Hungarian-Romanian border to conduct studies and analysis of the action of the European, national and local legislations (from the two countries) in boosting this process. The impact of fiscal measures in both countries on cross-border cooperation and the trends in legislation harmonization again in both countries to boost the cross-border cooperation have been the subject of studies published under the auspices of ISER (Carmaciu, 2010; Ursuta, 2010). Further to a Phare project, CBC/2006, a compendium of law applied to cross-border cooperation was

elaborated under ISER auspices, a useful document for any entrepreneur partaking to projects and activities with Hungarian-Romanian cross-border characteristics.

The implication of ISER in scientific, research and development projects at the Hungarian-Romanian border comes to actually prove how a long term exclusive border has been turning into an inclusive border. A discontinuous border has become a true borderland, a strong development core in a region located on the outskirts of Hungary and Romania.

2. Contributions referring to shaping the European borders subsequent to the latest EU enlargement

The enlargement of the European Union towards Eastern Europe gave the European Borders a new dimension, i.e. a promoter of peace. This was possible because the Eastern border of Europe was integrated into an agreed and mutually accepted agreement (Pfetsch, F.R, 2007: 18). According to Etienne Balibar, Europe is a borderland (Balibar, 2004). Jacques Rupnik speaks not only about Europe's frontiers, but also about the new frontiers "inside Europe" (Rupnik, 2003; Rupnik, 2007). Thomas Christiansen writes about fluid frontiers (Christiansen and all, 2000). Olli Rehn considers that the notion *next frontier* is more suitable than *border* for testing ground for the EU soft power (Rehn, 2006).

Based on these findings, in 2005 IERS launched the *Eurotimes* journal, a journal that would express the new paradigm of the EU borders, post-enlargement to CEEC (2004-2007). It is interesting that I had the same idea (Horga, 2006) without any prior contact between us that far, with the paradigm stated by Kalypso Nicolaidis in 2003 (Nicolaidis, K., 2003) and resumed in 2007, when he writes that *Eurotimes* is "un paradigme qui lie l'integration a l'interieur et a l'exterieur, les liens interculturels, interethniques et interclasses tisses au sein de l'Union d'aujourd'hui et les liens inter-Etats tisses avec ses nouveaux membres potentiels" (Nicolaidis, 2007: 287).

Our journal aims at presenting the way in which the changing in the meaning of internal frontiers takes place as it has been seen evolving from the national perspective towards the community one; and the way in which the meaning of the EU's external frontier changes from an exclusive community perspective to a flexible inclusive one. The balance between open frontiers and closed frontiers (Delanty, 2006), confirming the borders – transcending the borders (Dimitrovova, 2007), intercultural dialogue and the impact of media (La Brosse, 2007; Malovic, 2007), the role of media in changing the meaning of borders (Horga: 2003; 2007), interethnic relations (Soproni, 2006; Follrichova & Rouet, 2007), interreligious relations (Marczewska - Rytko, 2006; Bazin, 2007), across border social relations are terms used in the first three issues of our journal (*Eurotimes*, 2006/1-2; 2007/3) and will also be used in the following ones.

In its five years of existence, *Eurotimes* has become a debate gallery on shaping the Eastern and South-Eastern borders of the EU towards turning them into bridges or cores of cooperation and development. Concrete results have been published with respect to cooperation at the Hungarian-Romanian-Slovakian-Ukrainian or Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian: cross-border cooperation mechanisms and European Neighbourhood Policy; transport and infrastructure; the role played by minorities in developing the cross-border cooperation; the role of education in developing the intercultural dialogue at the EU Eastern borders.

We followed these steps under the circumstances in which the greatest part of the papers deal with the changing in the meaning of frontiers between the new EU member

states. This change proves to us that the researchers, mainly those from the newly integrated countries, but not only them, are more interested in a pragmatic perspective than in a cosmopolitan one.

Europe – an Inclusive Frontier is the direction promoted by *Eurolimes* in its debates. The European frontiers are not mere geographical space and peoples living on both sides of the borders, but they refer to a much larger context including migrants, refugees, transnational communities (Nicolaidis, 2007: 287).

The concept of borderlands with respect to current developments in European societies, especially in the context of the recent enlargement of the EU and the changing nature of borders with a view towards offering an assessment of the notion of a post-western Europe was developed by G. Delanty (Delanty, 2006; Delanty, 2007). The new assessment is of the periphery, periphery that can be seen as a zone of re-bordering. Within such periphery the relation between the inside and the outside is complex and ambivalent; while often taking exclusionary forms, this is a relation that can also be viewed as the site of cosmopolitan forms of negotiation (Bideleux, 2006).

Under the umbrella of rethinking the European frontiers (Maron, 2007), *Eurolimes* has fostered various debates within the context of enlargement.

The processes of adhesion the East-Central European countries to the Euro zone was other subject present in the *Eurolimes* (Kundera, 2007). The statistical analysis indicates that only few countries have fulfilled the convergence criteria distinguished under the Maastricht Treaty which doubted the usefulness of applying the named criteria to countries undergoing transformation. In the author's view, the benefits for the PECO countries subsequent to their partaking to the Euro zone will be greater than the economic costs. The entire publishing space of the journal was given to the effect of economic crisis on the European economic frontiers (*Eurolimes*: 2009).

The human trafficking in Eastern and South Eastern Europe is an important subject in the IERS debates (Ciocan, 2006; Gavrila, 2007; Szabolcs, 2010). Trafficking victims often miss critical opportunities for social, moral and spiritual development. In many cases, the exploitation of the victims is progressive, a child trafficked into one form of labour may be further abused in another (Gemie, 2010). The countries are requested to strengthen their border control in order to prevent and detect human trafficking. Establishing and maintaining direct channels of communication should strengthen cooperation among border control agencies. It also means close cooperation between different national actors, e.g. the Police, prosecutors, NGO's and others, with border control authorities.

The **Image and Identity of the Frontiers of the New Europe** is another subject discussed within IERS. We can notice the contradictory images of perceiving frontiers: from the process of relativized frontiers towards the idea of bringing frontiers under discussion in the context of globalization (Duna, 2009); from the opening of the East and Central Europe to the depreciation of the concept of frontiers and sovereignty up to the west countries' temptations to close borders both to the immigrants and to the countries that would like to accede to the EU (Rupnik, 2007: 304). The changing in perceiving frontiers in the transformational context during the last decade in Europe (Tavares-Ribeiro, 2003) and accepting these changes have become important ideas in the enlarged Europe.

Fabienne Maron considers that the effects of 2004 and 2007 enlargement combined with the raising mobility, the old and new migrations, the important exchanges with the rest of the world through commerce, education, travelling, globalization have

increased the interaction between cultures, religions and the languages inside and outside Europe (Maron, 2007; Iştvánfóyá, 2009)

In this multicultural European society and in its enlarged space permanently changing, the role of media and intercultural dialog is of a great importance both for keeping the Union's cultural diversity and for enforcing its cohesion by promoting the respect for the common values (Chabanna, 2009; Silaşi, Dogaru, 2009). Media and dialogue also give Europe the possibility to make connections with neighbouring countries (Horga, 2007; La Brosse, 2007; Malovic, 2007). In this situation, the frontier becomes borderline, in a positive sense, because it gives the possibility to share values, ideas and projects (Rezsohazy, 2007).

The intercultural dialogue has its roots in recognizing the differences and multiplicity of the world we are living in (Pinheiro, 2008). These differences in opinions, points of view, or values can be identified both inside the culture itself, and between different cultures. The intercultural dialog considers these differences by trying to understand the other and it opens an interaction aiming at sharing ideas and values (Marga, 2009). It also encourages us to define our own cultural frontiers and suggests to communicate beyond these frontiers or place them under question. Borders can be political, economic, cultural, etc. but they can also be linguistic (Horga, Brie, 2010). As all kinds of borders, language borders are dynamic and they highly depend on political border shifts (Climent - Ferrando, Ugalde, 2006).

The borders as a political reality can become a cultural reality. The borders can distinguish, as defining the element of "otherness": the other is he who lives on the other side of the border - not to speak about the problem when the "other" is living within the own community, the problem of the minorities, people belonging to the same political community, but unified by a different cultural code (Antes, 2008; Banus, 2007; Contogeorgis, 2008). Physical borders are mentally assumed as cultural borders. These mental borders can divide the world in closed cultures. The mental borders try to separate in an absolute way the own culture from the culture of the "other" (Banus, 2006: 202).

IERS has entered the debate regarding the new signification of the EU Eastern frontiers in the context of a new approach to the principle of subsidiarity by the Lisbon Treaty (Horga, 2010), not only from a theoretical perspective, but also specifically addressing a part of the EU Eastern border space, located within the immediate proximity: the Romanian-Hungarian-Ukrainian border (Mytryayeva, 2008) or Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian border (Dandis, 2009). Another special attention is paid to the dimension of the cross-border cooperation in the economic, social and cultural areas: attracting investment with special legal regime of economic activity in border regions between Ukraine and the EU (Yehorova, 2009); construction of intercity railway passenger traffic between Hungary and Ukraine (Sebestyén, 2008); complex rural development, habitat rehabilitation and ecotourism in the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian triple border region (Raffay, 2010); tourist-territorial development program in the Hungarian, Romanian Ukrainian border (Radics, 2008; Ilies, Drugaş, 2006; Sturza, 2006); educational cooperation along the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian border (Teperics, 2007).

The points of view expressed by the authors in the articles published by Eurolimes and the IERS organized conference books prove that the perspectives upon the future of Europe cannot be foreseen without taking into account the identity and the frontier dimension, because Europe is a mainly open society. The present day European crisis has raised the problem of the frontiers (Geremek, 2007: 21). The successive accessions have overrun the internal separations (Tavares-Ribeiro, 2004) and have broken the mental

blocking of how the geographical horizon of European integration is perceived. During this process, the European frontiers are defined in terms of Geography, axiology and political will. For example, the accession conditions from Copenhagen establish the European frontiers by referring to the fundamental values accepted by the countries that decided to be part of the EU (Păun, Ciceo, 2010; Pop, 2009). It is important to mention that these values do not push Europe to closure after each wave of accession, because contemporary processes and phenomena-mondialization and interdependent markets - stop this danger (Bauman, 2004).

The contents of the current issue make clear the idea that Europe does not want to become a state defined by certain frontiers. The existing images of a crisis, as well as certain doubts, are a part of the European construction process. The solutions to these problems are to be found both in the process of deepening the internal reform of EU, of defining the European citizenship through an inclusive process, by reconciling the historical memory, by harmonizing the developing pattern based on competition with the social pattern, by accepting the role of immigration in the European society. On the other hand, the solutions must be found in building a common memory and in accepting diversity as dimension of a dynamic deontological code in which the notion of frontier has the meaning of dialog rather than of dispute.

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COMPETENCES OFFERED BY THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY PROGRAM – AN ARGUMENT FOR QUALITY IN ROMANIAN ACADEMIC EDUCATION

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Abstract. *In order to face the challenges imposed by a competitive society, you must be competitive, that means to satisfy the customer's requests to the highest standards. The academic education is no exception to the need for quality training of future generations of specialists able to cope with multiple demands of contemporary society, relying heavily on the quality of supply and educational benefit. In this context, defining skills Bachelor's degree graduates play an important role in determining the quality of the educational offer. Even if this process is still in its infancy in Romania, important steps have been taken for developing the National Qualifications Framework. In turn, the National Qualifications Framework for academic education must be aligned to the requirements of national and even European occupational standards. Starting from the two theoretical concepts that are basis of the whole defining process of competences, the quality of the Bachelor's academic programs and the occupational standards, we propose to analyze the activities of the personnel of the European Studies and International Relations Department of the University of Oradea, of establishing the competences for the graduates of the International Relations and European Studies academic Bachelor studies. The process is an interesting and complicated one because the international relations and European studies are two inter-disciplinary fields, at its ending result a set of abilities and competences that must be compatible with the highest European standards.*

Keywords: *quality, academic education, abilities and competences, practice*

Introduction

The services are activities useful to the society, but that do not have as a result obtaining of products. In the services sphere are covered many activities, like trade, tourism, education, health, popularization of science, art and culture, defense, state administration, maintenance and repair of personal and public goods etc. The quality, a substantial part of services represents (STAS ISO 8402/1991) all the properties and characteristics of a product or service, which gives it its ability to meet the needs expressed or implied. Therefore, the quality of a service is not determined by the characteristics and properties which it has, but also by the extent to which the needs are expressed by the user or beneficiary, and other necessities which are not stipulated, but

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must be met. Among the quality characteristics of the service¹ the most important are: accessibility, competence, credibility, efficiency, flexibility, honesty and trust. Another aspect of quality is the degree of utility and it refers to the extent in which the service satisfies the customer's needs and therefore, in the case of the service entered in the market cycle, is sold (international standard ISO-9004-2/1991).

The definitions referring to the services, the quality of characteristics and the degree of their utility, shown above, let us frame the academic activity, including here the educational act as well as the research, in the category of services that contribute to the welfare of the society, generating the knowledge that is transferred to the social-economic environment (the Torino Polytechnic Rector, March 2007, Bucharest).

Moreover, according to the international standard ISO-9004-2/1991, the education is a service in which work internal and external customer-supplier relationships, and is similar to those operating in the business world. The quality of education measures the degree of the adequacy of service characteristics and service provision to the demands of society represented by operators, parents and especially students - as the main beneficiaries (Drăgulănescu - coord., 2000: 58).

A priority of the European Union agenda, as part of educational policy development process in different countries including Romania is developing qualifications frameworks in academic education. Moreover, in May 2000 the Council of Europe set 2010 as deadline by which Europe must become "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustaining the economic growth with more and better jobs and a greater social cohesion". Starting from the premise that the whole lifelong learning has become a necessity in Europe, the barriers between institutions and countries does not impede the access to education and training, but restricts the efficient use of already acquired knowledge and skills, educational policy makers at European level and called for implementation of a European Qualifications Framework considered a meta-framework to strengthen the links between national and sector frameworks, to facilitate and promote transparency, transfer and recognition of qualifications and competences at an European level. From this perspective, the current situation of the academic education in Romania is as follows (the *Strategy of the National Agency for Qualifications in Academic Education and Partnership with the Economic and Social Environment 2007/2009*):

- developing the National Qualifications Framework for academic education is a priority that both the government and the economic and social partners have identified it. It will be then included in the National Qualifications Framework which will include all qualifications officially recognized in Romania;
- funding the National Agency for Qualifications in Academic Education and Partnership with Economic and Social Committee (ACPART) by H.G. 1357/ 03.11.2005 as the national authority in the field by reorganizing APART;
- passed the *Law 288/2004 on the Organization of Studies from the Academic Education* referring to knowledge, general skills and specific learning outcomes related to the cycles of the Bologna system studies;
- the *Education Ministerial Order* was issued on the application number 3617/16.03.2005 regarding the *Generalized System of Transferable Credits*;

¹ The *characteristic of quality* is any feature or property of a service that is essential to satisfy the customer needs, or giving the ability to be useful (International Standard ISO-9004-2/1991 - *Management and Quality System Elements. Guide for Services*)

- it was issued the Ministerial Order no. 4868/07.08.2006 regarding the *Diploma Supplement* as document of European value (part of the Europass portfolio)
- it was adopted the *H.G. 1175/2006 on the List of Fields of Study Inside the Academic Education*, universities will decide on the principle of university autonomy, the qualifications to be awarded in these areas of course graduates;
- ACPART initiated the registration approach for academic education qualifications in the National Register of Academic Education Qualifications.

As shown, there is no currently legal document or a specific methodology for determination of qualifications in the academic education and a rigorous and coherent national qualifications framework (structure, registration and classification).

In this context, the responsibility of defining the most suitable and effective competences and skills for graduates of undergraduate study programs of universities is becoming a major target and also an additional argument for external reviews of key service quality (firms and employer organizations) as well as of graduates as in their double quality of internal customers (active participants in the educational process) and external customers (Drăgulănescu, 2007: 7).

Therefore the whole process of defining those skills and abilities may vary from one academic education institution to another, each department that manages a program of study assuming the steps for identifying and defining the powers given to graduates of a program of study, and their adaptation to the requirements of economic and social environment, mostly local, in which the university operates.

The two theoretical concepts that formed the basis of the whole process of defining competencies are quality programs of Bachelor and occupational standards. Once defined and analyzed, they will be landmarks for the case study that we propose, namely the collective approach of the Department of European Studies and International Relations (SERI), inside the University of Oradea, establishing competencies for graduates of the program of Bachelor's degree International Relations and European Studies (RISE). This process is more interesting and more complicated because the area RISE is an interdisciplinary field, with subjects from various fields like law, economics, international relations, political science, history or sociology. Also, because the Classification Profession has not clearly defined a profession for the graduates of this specialization, the performance, competencies defined respectively, were then "verified" by comparing them with the competencies defined for the field of European Studies at European level and employers with labor market requirements in Europe.

1. The quality of the academic licensing programs

The services of a university are considered of "quality" only when the university's products and processes satisfy the needs, requirements and expectations of customers and other internal and external partners. In other words, a university is of "quality" when, in addition to being resolved, the appropriate waiting, community socio-economic issues part forming specialists, in areas/sectors for which there is adequacy of labor market demand, endowed with skills, abilities, attitudes and behaviors that allow them to be employed shortly after graduation, to become immediately useful to organizations employing and to integrate rapidly in their technical, economic and social environment (Drăgulănescu, 2007: 7).

Developing the educational offer in a certain field of academic education begins with the design stage of the program of studies. To this end, the academic management of

the faculty or department nominates a working group which aims to design the desired study program, which must be based on (Atanasiu, 2005: 2):

- the analysis of socio-economic need and academic curriculum development, identifying the target group of customers - prospective students and employers;
- identifying the legislative framework that allows the development of curriculum and requirements arising from the national regulations, local or institutional
- possible considerations and arguments related to strategic management of university and how it is interested in the curriculum development;
- identifying the program objectives, customer requirements relating to occupational and social skills expected by them after completion of the study program;
- identifying the expected results of studies designed program, expressed by portfolio skills, abilities, skills, you will get future students;
- summary information on similar programs of studies identified in national and international tender.

Following the above analysis the team series from the Department of Oradea has developed the mission, objectives and results of the study of international relations and European studies, stating the remit offered diploma and graduate academic qualification obtained.

The next phase of project development program is the university curriculum development, this step comprising the following (Atanasiu, 2005: 2):

- detailed definition of skills curriculum offered to students after graduation;
- characterizing the teaching and learning process and the formation of desired skills
- developing the curriculum based on a predetermined methodology in terms of quality management;
- content, curriculum load, the total number of credits and their breakdown semesters of study;
- indication of vertical specialization, including curriculum subjects, and vertical and horizontal linkages between courses, the degree of inclusion of other subjects than specialized or interdisciplinary subjects, the relationship between theory and applications;
- scheduling;
- designing the discipline records for all forms of didactic activity: lectures, seminars, tutorials, projects, etc. These documents contain information on: course objectives, basic content of the course/seminar/practical work, students' knowledge assessment methodology, teaching methodologies and technologies used in knowledge transfer, minimal bibliography, and the used informational technology infrastructure.
- the forms of student assessment knowledge, with consideration of assessment methods, the frequency of assessment, evaluation standards, responsibility for conduct of the evaluation;
- the management of teaching on years of study, semesters, weeks, hours;
- identifying the human resources needed and available, respectively the teaching grades, academic title and specialization in the field of personnel involved in carrying out the educational activities, etc.;
- identifying the financial resources and assets required.

Based on these theoretical fundaments, the SERI Department team designed the curriculum of Bachelor's degree RISE program form of modules, from the nature of interdisciplinary and also multidisciplinary field. In a graphic representation, (Fig. 1) these modules are confined in the area noted above, the curriculum knowing a qualitative trend continued since 2003, when the specialization has received the authorization to operate temporarily until 2009 once with the accreditation of the program of study.




Fig. 1 The curriculum structure of the RISE specialization

The composition of modules (Table 1) was set to be respected the ARACIS standards for the RISE specialization, but also to respond effectively to the local and regional economic environment. Thus, the curriculum includes core modules (law, economics, history, European studies, political science and international relations), special (foreign languages and practical knowledge) and complementary (physical education).

Composition of modules in the curricula of Bachelor's degree program of International Relations and European Studies² **Table 1**

MODULE	THE CURRICULA DISCIPLINES	MODULE	THE CURRICULA DISCIPLINES
Economy Communi- cation	Introduction in Economy World Economy Negotiation Techniques and International Communication Secretary and Managerial Assistance Public Relations Relational Marketing Media and Inter- cultural Dialogue in the New EU	Political Sciences	Introduction in Political Sciences The Analyze of International Conflicts Geo-strategy and Geo- politics The Romania's 20 th Century Politics and Diplomacy
Law Cross-border Cooperation	Introduction in Law International Law Communitarian Law	International relations	Introduction in International Relations The Theory of International Relations The History of International Relations, the 17 th -19 th Centuries The History of International Relations, the 20 th Century The Sociology of International Relations International Institutions and Organizations
History Culture Society	The History of Political Ideas Introduction in Anthropology Culture and Society in the 17 th – 19 th Century Inter-cultural Dialogue European Demography Collective Mentalities	Foreign Language Knowledge	English French German Italian Spanish
European Studies	European Identity European Idea European Construction European Institutions	Practical Knowledge	Elements of Quality Evaluation Projects' Management Management of Financial- Banking Activities Public Management and Governing Logistic, Active and Transport Management Human Resources Management Informatics Web design, Multimedia

² The data were collected from the curricula of the RISE specialization, see www.igri.ro, the official web site of the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relation, <http://www.igri.ro/download?func=fileinfo&id=151> accessed on 19.07.2010

The first module has two components: economy and communication, grouped due to scientific concerns of the SERI Department. Their research activities in the Jean Monnet Module Media and Intercultural Dialogue in Europe Without Borders led to the introduction in the curricula of the courses Media and Intercultural Dialogue and intercultural dialogue in the new EU, training of specialists in the field of regional studies, which have the capability of understanding and communication with people from different cultures, can lead and manage international teams, have skills of relationship management and media partners in the European regional being pursued then by the masters program in regional development and EU institutional communication.

The Law module consists of three basic subjects listed in Table 1, cross-border cooperation component is being mentioned, especially in the masters program due to the subjects as Cross-border Law, Cross-border Cooperation, European Legislation on Cross-Border Cooperation and European Neighborhood Policy and Cross-Border Cooperation.

Another feature of this curriculum is the last two modules. The component of the foreign languages module was thus established that the five foreign languages to be studied for three academic years by level of linguistic competence, in order to shape and develop communication skills in the public sphere, international relations, business and training and vocabulary development in IT. The students' knowledge has been supplemented with elements of British culture and civilization, namely French, Spanish, Italian, German, being continued into the master cycle with elements of diplomacy. The practical knowledge module was created to broaden the scope of competence of students in RISE, emphasizing in the last period by the economic - social environment the quality management and project management of European funding. The regional and Euro-regional character of the geographical positioning of Oradea, led to the filling of the practical module with knowledge in the field of public management and governance, financial - banking activities and human resources. The existence a strong company subsidiaries of Deutsche Telekom in Debrecen was a good reason for introducing in the curriculum of four semesters of training in IT.

2. Occupational Standards and National Qualifications Frameworks in Academic Education.

The pressure on state academic education institutions (public) to achieve the most competitive activities is increasingly high due to the emergence of new training market players - especially private universities and non-university organizations - which are not financed from state budget and are forced to perform an activity as more dynamic and efficient. In this context, a particularly important role in managing the quality of academic education in Romania goes to the different categories of standards used as referential for "what is" and / or "how to" in each university included in the national quality assurance system. Between them, the category of interest, in terms of our scientific approach, is that of occupational standards (Drăgulănescu, 2008: 3).

Occupational standards - known worldwide also as the standards of competence or qualification standards - defining the skills needed for effective implementation of specific activities of certain occupations (regardless of level - basic, secondary / middle, upper, etc.. In which training was conducted). They serve as referential in assessing a person's competence as providers of training in various training programs and by employers, thus providing the much needed link between education and business sector (Drăgulănescu, 2008: 7).

Occupational standards apply equally to all persons who practice a given occupation, regardless of their level of experience, competence representing the ability to apply, transfer and combine knowledge and skills in different work situations and environments to achieve the required activities at work, the quality level specified in the occupational standard. Therefore, to be competent in an occupation supposes to possess and apply specialty knowledge, to analyze and determine decisions, to refer to creative tasks first, to work in teams, communicate effectively and efficiently, adapt to specific working environment and handle the unforeseen circumstances.

In this context, the National Qualifications Framework which will include all qualifications recognized officially in Romania is actually an occupational standard. In turn, the National Qualifications Framework for Academic Education, part of the National Qualifications Framework, aims primarily to establish national standards for learning outcomes in terms of knowledge, skills and competencies (*ACPART Strategy for developing national qualifications framework in academic education 2007/2009*).

3. Defining competencies for the RISE Bachelor's degree program

The descriptors on which they could then build the skills of graduates of International Relations and European Studies (Table 2) have specialists who participated in drafting the *Law 288/2004 on the Organization of Academic Education Studies*, identification of two main categories of skills: general and specialized. The first category may be divided into two subcategories: knowledge skills, functional - act.

Descriptors for the skills program International Relations and European Studies³

Table 2

CATEGORIES OF COMPETENCES		DESCRIPTORS
General competences	Knowledge competences	Knowledge, understanding and use of domain specific language appropriate for communication studies
		Ability to explain and interpret processes events, conditions, theories/ideas and trends studies falling within
	Functional-act competences	Application and transfer of technical conceptual skills, and problem solving in the field of study
		Critical reflection and evaluation capacity of the concrete situations under value judgments form
Specialty competences	Specialty knowledge	Requirements on knowledge and understanding of reproductive processes
		Specific cognitive abilities
		Professional skills

In accordance with these descriptors, the staff of the SERI Department, based upon the curriculum for undergraduate study program RISE, identified the following key skills (<http://www.igri.ro/images/stories/pliant%204.jpg>):

³ The data were taken from the *Law 288/2004 on the Organization of Academic Education Studies*

1. General Competences:

1.1. Knowledge Competences:

- Communication skills in international relations and European studies in at least two foreign languages
- knowledge the foundations of theories of international relations and European construction process
- acquiring the knowledge of the common heritage of culture and civilization, by understanding the central and eastern European tradition as part of common European history and knowledge of Romanian contribution to European Heritage
- interpersonal and public communication skills at a higher-level and intercultural mediation
- ability to interpret dynamic international environment and to exploit results
- ability to link similar problems in different cultures

1.2. Functional – action competences:

- Ability to use the information technology in order to develop argumentative tests specific to the international relations and European studies and offer appropriate solutions for solving the problems
- ability to edit documents and reports specific to international relations

2. Specialty competences:

- Understanding the assumptions and components of the European project and a relevant understanding of the European institutional development
- ability to take economic and legal components of European studies and international relations, in the field of national and European cooperation
- the ability to manage the informational flow between different levels of institutions (academic, political, governmental, non-governmental, media or business, and private institutions) and the European ones or institutions specializing in international relations in Europe and in the world
- the ability of a qualified management of information between Romanian and foreign structures in the field of the European integration of Romania, in the European funding programs domain.
- the ability to understand the development of the international system from antiquity to the present, as well as actors, mechanisms and processes of contemporary international relations.
- organization of fairs, exhibitions and national and international conferences
- managing the relations with international business partners (customers, suppliers)
- using the multimedia tools for web design and highlighting the economic and human potential of an economic agent (national, multinational or transnational)
- higher managerial assistance
- using the elements of logistics for a company of intern or international transport
- manage the quality assurance issues

The number of acquired skills after graduating the International Relations and European Studies specialization, inside the University of Oradea is much higher, those previously mentioned as representative in the context of the theme of our research.

4. Conclusions

The intangible products offered by universities on the market are knowledge and skills in various forms such as: training of specialists in various specific areas (through education, training, training, etc..) Research, design consultancy, expertise, academic community members involved in various aspects of social life, etc. (Teodorescu, 2009: 220).

An important tool that provides the fundamentals necessary for strategic planning of education and training, responding to labor market needs, structuring opportunities for people to enter and advance in the labor market is the occupational standards. Their structure⁴ facilitates and allows the modularization of university training programs, thereby ensuring their flexibility, which is found and where the curriculum program Undergraduate International Relations and European Studies.

The title and the Bachelor's Degree are assigned to a graduate program of studies demonstrating the accumulation of knowledge and ability to understand aspects of the study area in which he was formed after completion of undergraduate studies, including current issues in the field. He can use both knowledge and his ability to understand phenomena through a professional approach in business and acquired the necessary skills demonstrating reasoning and problem solving in the field of study considered. Finally, the graduate's ability to collect and interpret relevant information and to develop judgments which may include reflections on social, ethical and scientific importance and ability to communicate information, ideas, problems and solutions, both in interaction with professionals and non-professionals (Atanasiu, 2005: 3).

From the data presented above, one can say that the skills and competencies identified for International Relations and European Studies Program respect the national indicators mentioned the above. At European level, for field analysis, the process of finalization of these indicators was completed in 2005 by a team of researchers from the University of Deusto and University of Groningen. Among the skills descriptors for the first cycle of university studies, scientists from the two universities were noted: work in an interdisciplinary area, communicate orally and an international language using the appropriate terminology, show understanding of the multi-disciplinarity of the area and the connections between its disciplines, demonstrate understanding of ideas and concept of Europe and European integration, demonstrate understanding of European institutions and decision making processes (Gonzalez, Wagenaar, 2005: 96). According to these descriptors the team of researchers was able to determine skills and competencies for the European Studies graduate, noting that they do not differ greatly from country to country within the European Union (*Idem*, p. 334).

Of the 28 identified skills and competencies important for our approaches are:

- ability to comment on or annotate documents appropriately in relation to critical issues in European Studies;
- ability to communicate orally in foreign language using the appropriate terminology in this subject area;
- ability to communicate orally in one's own language using the appropriate terminology;

⁴ An occupational standard includes: unit of competences - major activities, specific, independent, detailed description of each unit, related competence elements - showing the structure of the major key actions, performance criteria - indicating landmarks associated to the qualitative results of the actions of elements jurisdiction (including attitudes and behavior); range of variables - providing information on the range of contexts and conditions which take place the main activities and a guide for evaluation - giving information regarding the necessary proofs to demonstrate the competence of a person inside each unit of competence

- ability to define suitable research topics contributing to debates on European integration;
- ability to work in a multicultural team;
- ability to work on a interdisciplinary area
- ability to interpret European events, development and policies in national, regional and local frameworks;
- awareness of the complexity of the EU enlargement and integration processes;
- awareness of the complexity of the process of wider European Co-operation;
- awareness of and respect for points of view deriving from different European and non-European national and cultural backgrounds;
- knowledge of business studies, economics, European cultures, geography, history, international relations, law, philosophy, politics, sociology and demography;
- knowledge of the history of ideas of Europe and European integration;
- knowledge of EU institutions and decision – making processes;
- knowledge of the national, regional and local impact of the integration process in Europe.

Comparing the two sets of skills, the European one and that established by the SERI Department of Oradea, one can see many similarities in their definition, the one in Oradea having in addition the component of international relations. Therefore we can say that from this point of view the established set of skills for undergraduate study program International Relations and European Studies at the University of Oradea it is framed within the European requirements, their own elaboration process is also one similar to that conducted in EU countries.

Another "verification" of competences established by the team of Oradea, which we proposed at the beginning of the study, is compatible with the requirements of the local economic, national, regional or European environment. Relevant in this regard are the skills required for employment European officials. They were presented by Steven Joseph, head of Task Office of the EU, in the work of the international conference curriculum Exchanging Experiences and Teaching Methods held in Rome on July 2, 2010 and are grouped into three dimensions of performance: personal characteristics and cognitive abilities, technical expertise (knowledge and skills) and behavioural competencies (how I do my job). The key indicators set by Steven Joseph, the number seven to which he added a further competency applies to AD5 and ADL grades, are: analysis and problem solving, communicating, delivering quality and results, learning and development, prioritising and organising, resilience, working with others and leadership (official site of SENT NETWORK). According to these descriptors, the skills required for employment as a European official are:

- identifies the critical facts in complex issues and develops creative and practical solutions;
- communicates clearly and precisely both orally and in writing;
- takes personal responsibility and initiative for delivering work to a high standard of quality within set procedures;
- develops and improves personal skills and knowledge of the organisation and its environment;
- prioritises the most important tasks, works flexibly and organises own workload efficiently;
- remains effective under a heavy workload, handles organisational frustrations positively and adapts to a changing work environment;

- works co-operatively with others in teams and across organisational boundaries and respects differences between people;
- manages, develops and motivates people to achieve results.

A simple scroll of the two data sets (the requirements for employment as a European official and skills acquired by attending the program of undergraduate International Relations and European Studies, University of Oradea) is sufficient to observe that the abilities and skills offered by the analyzed program of studies successfully correspond to the requirements of European employers.

In conclusion, in a society with a competitive market, to keep you on the market and to be prosperous, it must be competitive, that means to satisfy the customer's requests, to report yourself to the highest standards and to produce quality. The educational component is no exception to the need for quality, especially the academic education, preparing future generations of specialists able to cope with multiple demands of contemporary society, depends largely on the quality of supply and educational benefit of university education environment (Teodorescu, 2009: 220). In this context, the process of defining skills of the Bachelor's degree graduates has an important role in determining the quality of the educational offer. Even if this process is still in its infancy in Romania, important steps have been taken for developing the National Qualifications Framework. In turn, the National Qualifications Framework for academic education must be aligned to the requirements of national occupational standards and even European. Therefore, the effort of the SERI staff from the Department of Oradea is an example of good practice in what concerns the combining of the ARACIS standards with the requirements of the local and regional economic environment. The outcome approach is the transmission of a piece of knowledge and skills which results in a set of skills and competencies consistent with the highest European standards. Also, the whole process of determining these competences is an approach for improving the quality of university programs.

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EU STUDIES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Mariana BUDA^{}, Maka KHVEDELIDZE^{**}*

Abstract. *The main objective of the article is to examine the challenges of EU Studies in the South Caucasus in accordance with the process of European integration as exiting political and geopolitical strategies of the region can be considered as the platform and a kind or “need assessment” for the development and successful implementation of the EU Studies. A particular attention is paid to the objectives of the institutions oriented to the development of the EU Studies.*

Keywords: *European studies, South Caucasus, European Neighborhood Policy, Action Plan, development*

Geopolitical advantages and disadvantages

In the new reality very often the geographical and geopolitical strategies of the region can be identified as the key sources for the implementation of different objectives within the scope of political, economic, social, educational or cultural priorities. The South Caucasus is the example of the region reflecting the transparent reality on all the levels mentioned above.

The Caucasus or Caucas is a geopolitical region located between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The Caucasus is represented by the North Caucasus: *Russia (Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Adyghen, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, Krasnodar Krai, Stavropol Krai* and the South Caucasus (Transcaucasia): Georgia (including disputed Abkhazia, South Ossetia), Armenia, Azerbaijan (including disputed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic).

This is a transitional region between Europe and Asia, The South Caucasus contains three states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Geographically, the region is populated by some fifteen million people, links the Caspian Sea basin to the Black Sea on an east-to-west axis, and is the juncture between the greater Middle East, Turkey and Iran, and the Russian Federation.

It is bounded by the Caucasus Mountains in the north, the frontier with Turkey and Iran in the south, and the Black and Caspian Seas in the west and east respectively.

Surrounded by the three regional powers Iran, Russia, and Turkey and located on the crossroads of Europe and Asia, the South Caucasus has also been at the center of post-cold war geopolitical rivalries. To a considerable extent, the significant oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea, specifically in the Azerbaijani sector, have amplified regional rivalries for political and economic influence in the region.

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The conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh hang like the “Sword of Damocles” over the South Caucasus. They have drained the region politically, economically and emotionally¹.

South Caucasus territorial disputes (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) remain unresolved and keep hampering regional development and stability. Besides a peaceful resolution of these conflicts, challenges for the three countries are numerous: one of them is the consolidation of newly established democratic regimes with the needed completion of on-going reforms and the general improvement of governance conditions (fight against corruption, decentralization, transparency/ accountability, protection of human rights, etc.). Another important challenge is to introduce a more equitable distribution of the benefits from economic growth into economic policies (despite impressive growth rates, socioeconomic disparities remain a major problem). A better inclusion of vulnerable social groups in relation to various types of public services deserves further attention, especially insofar as internally displaced persons are concerned.²

The importance of the EU relationship differs significantly in each republic, leading to diverging stances on official EU integration strategies. Georgia has clearly chosen the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, at the same time antagonizing Russia. Azerbaijan has so far maintained a relatively pragmatic foreign policy. While Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey are increasingly developing their economic ties (e.g Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline), Armenia remains isolated (two main borders closed) and strongly depends on Russia. Armenia currently does not view EU membership as a vital element of its foreign policy. The South Caucasian states have not yet become concrete candidates for EU membership, nor do they seem to have such prospects in the foreseeable future.³

For the United States, NATO and the EU, the South Caucasus is an area of opportunity, in terms of the exploitation of the region’s energy reserves and its geographic position. Both the United States and Europe actively promote the concept of regional cooperation, including security cooperation among the states of the South Caucasus.

Its particular importance to Europe and the USA is the most of the additional Caspian oil and gas outputs is likely to move westwards to European and Mediterranean markets, although some oil will move by tanker the giant US East Coast market.⁴

Delivery of the gas and oil originated in this region going towards Europe is an important factor contributing to the stability of the European gas and oil market:

The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) (also: *Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline*, *BTE pipeline* or *Shah-Deniz Pipeline*), running from the Sangachal terminal near Baku to the Georgian-Turkish border, is a key element in the gas exports system from the Caspian, which should be accompanied by the development of transportation systems through neighboring countries to the EU markets. In longer perspective South Caucasus Pipeline will supply Europe with Caspian natural gas through the planned *Nabucco*, *Turkey-Greece* and *Greece-Italy* pipelines.

¹ Lynch Dov, The EU in the South Caucasus, CONFERENCE “Abkhazia in the Context of Contemporary International Relations, Pitsunda, The Republic of Abkhazia: June 29 - July 1, 2004[<http://www.circassianworld.com/Lynch.html>]

² Caucasus Analytical Digest, No.5, 16 April, 2009

³ Hayrapetyan Grigor, Baghdasaryan Vardan, *Integration of European Higher Education System and Participation of Armenia in this process*, Centre of European Law and Integration [http://www.celi.am/eng/Portals/0/Documents/European_Higher_Education&RA_eng.pdf]

⁴ Alieva Leila (2006), *EU and South Caucasus*, Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, [http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2006/2006_Alieva.pdf]

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is crude oil pipeline from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field in the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. It connects Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan; Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia; and Ceyhan, a port on the south-eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey, hence its name.

The Baku-Supsa Pipeline (also known as the Western Route Export Pipeline and Western Early Oil Pipeline) is an 830 kilometers (520 mi) long oil pipeline, which runs from the Sangachal Terminal near Baku to the Supsa terminal in Georgia.

The Baku-Novorossiysk Pipeline (also known as the Northern Route Export Pipeline and Northern Early Oil Pipeline) is an 830 kilometres (520 mi) long oil pipeline, which runs from the Sangachal Terminal near Baku to the Novorossiysk terminal at the Black Sea coast in Russia. The Azerbaijani section of the pipeline is operated by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and the Russian section is operated by Transneft⁵.

EU Studies – key Indicator of European Integration?

Thus Caucasus is a “bridge” and “transit area” not only of the material goods, but is a conductor of the political and cultural influences. It can play a role of the promoter of understanding and dialogues between the East and the West. It proved to be capable of synthesizing, absorbing external influences and producing unique forms of modernization and Europeanization, which had a significant impact on the greater East.

Since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in January 2007, the South Caucasus has become a region of direct concern to the EU’s strategy in its wider neighbourhood.⁶ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three newly independent states of the South Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – have been considered the most strife-ridden regions on the European periphery. The European Union appeared on the South Caucasian scene in the early 1990s. From the outset, the EU promoted two kinds of security in the region: internal security, which is threatened by political tensions and separatist conflicts; and external security, which is influenced by geopolitical rivalries and strained relations among regional actors. To alleviate the situation, the EU has undertaken diplomatic efforts in conjunction with the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe (CoE) and NATO, as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and GUAM.¹ EU policy-makers have further realized that a coordination policy is needed with each of the principle regional powers. Most importantly, effective EU action regarding the South Caucasus and the Caspian basin depends on the level of coordination it achieves with Russia, Iran, Turkey and the United States.

Existing political and geopolitical environment gives the birth to the necessity of the development of European studies in the South Caucasus⁷. As universities are the key institutions for the development of the “healthy mind” in the new reality of the world, they create the platform for the knowledge expansion being vitally important on the national and international levels.

⁵ 2008 research Assessment Exercise: the outcome, December 2008 Ref RAE 01/2008
[<http://submissions.rae.ac.uk/results/outstore/RAEOutcomeFull.pdf>]

⁶ *THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: Challenges and Prospects*, edited by Graham Avery and Yvonne Nasshoven, Trans European Policy Studies Association 2008, Brussels
[<http://www.iir.cz/upload/CV/Kratochvil/TEPSA.kniha%20ENP.pdf>]

⁷ Smith Mike, *Chair of the European Studies Sub-Panel, The UK, Exchanging the Ideas on Europe*, RAE08: The Outcome for European Studies. Issue No 59, UACES NEWS, March 2009–June 2009
[<http://www.uaces.org/pdf/newsletter/n59p1.pdf>]

The highly competitive reality in the South Caucasus highlights the implementation of the European Studies reflecting the strategic ambitions of the region among the international players around the world. The process of getting closer to Europe is identified within the European integration process.

European integration is a positive and major feature of the new governments' foreign and economic policies. *Europeanization* of the South Caucasus is yet at an initial stage, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and ENP Action Plan (ENAP) marked a new approach for the South Caucasus countries.

Whereas the EU is by far South Caucasus countries' first economic partner, knowledge about The EU and its integration process, as well as the understanding of the meaning of the integration process between the EU and the South Caucasus Countries, of PCA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement) and ENP, are still very low in the country. This makes the training capacities in European studies in the country not only a crucial need, but also a strategic issue.

The development of European Studies, as a new academic field in the South Caucasus region is not only a tool for a better understanding of the European Neighbour and of EU matters. It is also a major contribution to the building of competencies which are critical for efficient democracy and economy.⁸

The successful and rapid progression of the European integration process has increased the need for comprehensive expertise in European affairs at all levels of the government and in the private sector. Implementation of different EU projects highlights the pivotal role of the European Studies priority being the result of the region's overall European approach. *Institute for European Studies (IES) at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (TSU)*,⁹ together with *Batumi State University*¹⁰ and *Telavi State University*¹¹. The IES delivers a MA degree in European studies (MAES), elective courses in other faculties and is a hub of distance teaching for regional universities. It also offers lifelong teaching in European Studies for different target groups. Planned outputs:

- A national higher education consortium of IES with its hub at TSU;
- Enhanced facilities at TSU and regional institutions to develop, implement and support courses in ES and knowledge about Europe;
- Learning programs enabling individuals to function more effectively in public and private sector employment;
- Staff adequately trained in student-centered approaches to teaching and learning, transparent recruitment, and assessment in line with European quality insurance methodologies;
- Greater awareness by the university and potential employers of graduates of the benefits to be gained from student-centered/demand-led courses.

The Institute for European Studies is strongly linked to the four TSU involved the faculties: Faculty of Economics and Management, Faculty of Humanities, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences.

⁸ *The role of the European Union in the South Caucasus*, European Breakfast with Vytautas Landsbergis Euro MP, Group of the European People's Party and European Democrats, Vice-President of the Delegation in the EU-Armenia, EU-Azerbaijan and EU-Georgia Parliamentary Cooperation Committees 5 December, 2008. Centre for International Relations and Development Studies

[http://www.cidob.org/en/news/europe/the_role_of_the_european_union_in_the_south_caucasus]

⁹ <http://www.ies.tsu.ge/index.php?act=project>

¹⁰ <http://www.university-directory.eu/Georgia/Batumi-State-University-BSU.html>

¹¹ <http://www.university-directory.eu/Georgia/Telavi-State-University.html>

The objectives of the *Institute for European Studies (IES)* definitely specifies the European approach as the main academic indicator in search of the European integration process. Examining the curricula of the academic programs of the institute, the priority can be given to the legal aspects of the EU activities, most probably creating the profound background for the general legal understanding of the EU policies for the country being on the threshold of the democratic challenges. The IES definitely changes the framework of the “academic background” and the “political observation” on the university level and it will not be too much to say that on the civil society level, considering the fact that the university is the beam of the society dedicated to the respect of the democratic values. The centre highlights the strategic change necessity on the university level with the leading priorities observing the overall reality in the country; and on the base of the long-term academic research the network of this new initiative gives the rise to the birth of the healthy over viewing approach in close collaboration with the European universities, as their experience and, most importantly, their evaluation strategy answers the questions being displayed towards Georgia in the new “European Agenda” of Georgia¹².

The Centre for European Law and Integration at Yerevan State University (Armenia)¹³ is aimed at different objectives that mainly cover the following areas:

- Interdisciplinary research in European Law, Economics and Politics
- Organizing Europe-related academic workshops, conferences, seminars
- Gateway to and from academic institutions outside YSU (other Centers in the region as well as in universities in the EU)
- Services to the public (e.g. training courses, public lectures)
- Implementation of MA Program on European Studies

Existing interdisciplinary studies programs offer students the possibility to analyze the process of European integration beyond disciplinary boundaries and to gain extensive knowledge in some of these aspects. Student-oriented strategy is the following:

- advanced knowledge of the European Union in its legal, economic and political dimensions
- deep understanding of the history and political systems of the Western, Central and Eastern European countries, as well as political and economical transformation processes that are taking place in the region;
- skills and knowledge to discern the factors that influence the making of domestic and foreign policies in the states of Eastern and Central Europe;
- skills to analyse the development of the region in the context of contemporary international and regional cooperation;
- methodological skills to undertake and produce an independent research project.

The transition process of Armenia vis-à-vis “europenisation” and “russification” characterizes the specific curricula background. The centre mainly promotes the actions and the long-term objectives of the EU-oriented society in Armenia. But it should be mentioned that the pragmatic political reality specifies the significant role of Russia and the Russian-oriented ideological coexistence. The centre examines the advantages and disadvantages of “double” orientation approach and divergency between these two

¹² Hayrapetyan Grigor, Baghdasaryan Vardan, *Integration of European Higher Education System and Participation of Armenia in this process, Centre of European Law and Integration* [http://www.celi.am/eng/Portals/0/Documents/European_Higher_Education&RA_eng.pdf]

¹³ <http://www.ysugu.am/web/>

approaches can be explained within the academic programs underlining the much more “profitable future” of Armenia in alliance with the EU¹⁴.

The priorities identified for the South Caucasus Countries in the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans are reflected within the leading fields of European studies; namely *EU Law*, *European Law*, *EU Economic Studies*. In this case European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans can be characterized as the “needs assessment” for the development of the EU Studies.

ENP AC Priorities:¹⁵

Azerbaijan

- Contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
SIMILAR LANGUAGE TO ARMENIA PRIORITY 7.

- Strengthen democracy in the country, including through fair and transparent electoral process, in line with international requirements.

-Strengthen protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in compliance with the international commitments of Azerbaijan (PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN).

-Further convergence of economic legislation and administrative practices.

-Enhancement of cooperation in the field of justice freedom and security; including in the field of border managements.

Armenia

-Strengthening of democratic structures, rule of law, including reform of the judiciary and combat of fraud and corruption.

-Strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in compliance with the international commitments of Armenia (PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN).

-Encourage further economic development, enhance poverty reduction efforts and social cohesion, thereby contributing to the long-term objective of sustainable development, including the protection of the environment.

-Further conversion of economic legislation and administrative practices.

-Contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Georgia

-Strengthen rule of law through reform of the judicial system, including the penitentiary system, and through rebuilding state institutions. Strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in compliance with the international commitments of Georgia (PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN).

-Encourage economic development and enhance poverty reduction efforts and social cohesion, promote sustainable development including the protection of the environment, further conversion of economic and administrative practices.

-Enhance cooperation in the field of justice freedom and security including in the field of border management.

¹⁴ Yilmaz Fatma, *The EU and Isolating Armenia*, Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey 23/3/2007 [http://www.gab-ibn.com/IMG/pdf/Ar8-_The_EU_and_Isolating_Armenia.pdf]

¹⁵ *Analysis of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP Action Plans for South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)*,
http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00003063/01/Analyses_of_European_Neighbourhood_Policy.pdf

Thus *Democracy, human rights, international law and market economy* principles are the essential elements on which the EU-South Caucasus partnership is based¹⁶.

European Studies provide valuable competencies for teaching, conducting independent research, or considering a career in:

- Public sector and governmental agencies
- NGOs, international organizations and European institutions
- Political organizations
- Business and other private sector
- Advisory organization
- Media and information centres

Existing centers represent important think-tanks in the field of European Studies and active players in the field of legal approximation and European Neighborhood Policy monitoring process. It will provide high quality information, knowledge and education on European Integration to academics, policymakers, civil servants and other interested parties¹⁷.

The centers' objectives entail the following:

- Development of comprehensive information databases (of books, working papers, portals, EU official documentation, statistics etc) to be provided to all interested persons for free.
- Coordinate, initiate and undertake academic research carried out in the field of European Studies.
- Create a network of EU-related researchers the aim of involving them in various projects initiated by the Centre and its counterparts in the field of European integration studies.
- Support introduction of courses in different fields of European studies at the universities alongside with the consortium members.
- Participate in legal approximation process through drafting and expertise of national legislation in cooperation with concerned authorities and stakeholders.
- Implementation of joint projects with recognized European Universities and think-tanks.

Conclusion

Regarding the fact that the EU is one of the strategic partners for the South Caucasus within the scope of economic, educational and political issues, general knowledge about the EU, European integration process seem to be of crucial importance. Thus training capacities in the European studies is a crucial need and a strategic issue. Successful European integration process of the region apparently increased the need for the consequent experience in the EU affairs in all the sectors. Existing geopolitical environment has been reflected within the EU Studies highlighting the main priorities of the region in collaboration with the EU. The centers of European studies, being the pivotal think-tanks in the field of European studies, emphasize the main priorities and objectives oriented towards the better understanding of the EU identity and mutually beneficial linkages.

¹⁶ Nuriyev Elkhan, *EU Policy in the South Caucasus, A view from Azerbaijan*, CEPS Working Document No. 272/July 2007 [<http://aei.pitt.edu/7544/01/272.pdf>]

¹⁷ *Analysis of European Neighborhood Policy (ENP Action Plans for South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)* [http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00003063/01/Analyses_of_European_Neighbourhood_Policy.pdf]

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CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF PUBLIC HEALTH CARE POLICIES IN BIHOR COUNTY IN THE NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT

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Abstract. *This article carries out an analysis of public health policies in Bihor County as compared to those on national level and those of EU countries taken as models, targets towards which we aspire as a country which has recently joined the Union. It is to be mentioned that the analysis uses quantitative indicators and statistical sources. It dwells on the idea of a direct correlation between the economic development and the adopted social model on the one hand and the quality of the medical environment, on the other hand. The final conclusion drawn is that, even after the year 2000, Romania has invested reduced sums in public healthcare as compared to highly developed European countries, owing to which the quality indicators on public healthcare fall behind the average European ones. It can also be estimated that in the period of economic and social crisis that is drawing near, the scarcity of resources will negatively influence all healthcare indicators and the quality of people's life.*

Keywords: *social model, social development, healthcare policies, general death rate, child mortality, lifespan.*

1. Introduction

Approaching the analysis from the point of view of a social dimension, the topic can be enlisted in a larger sociological approach, specific for the paradigm of social development. Social development can be defined as the "direction a country, region, community, institution takes in order to reach a desirable state that has been set as an objective in a process established well beforehand and achieved through a complex of conjugated actions" (Zamfir, Stănescu, (coord.), 2006: 11). The definition suggests that social development should not take place at random, outside clear objectives, strategies and planning as well as without important resources being involved. Social development implies economic growth though the latter one remains insignificant as long as it does not bring improvements in the entire social life (Midgley, 1997, 189). Public policies are required in order to bring corrections to checks market policies are met with, to maintain social stability and create a national and international environment able to promote a sustainable development on global level. This type of development should trigger social

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justice, tolerance, responsibility and participation. Social development does not especially address people or groups in need, but the development of society on the whole.

2. Characteristic Features of Public Welfare Models

The main objective for social development is to attain public welfare. Public welfare involves providing a community with the necessary goods and services so that to achieve a life standard that is considered proper at its level (Zamfir, Zamfir, (coord), 1995: 23). In professional studies three types of welfare could be identified (Preda, 2002: 16-17):

- *Social welfare* which refers to providing and getting welfare collectively;
- *Economic welfare* which is ensured through the mechanisms of the market and national economy;
- *Stately welfare* which means social welfare ensured by the state.

The mechanisms that ensure social welfare can be *direct* these being derived from the functioning of the market (mechanisms for distribution of incomes generated by work - bonuses, salaries, wages) and *redistributive* (transfers). The sources of welfare can be: *human beings* that provide themselves all that they need for living, *the family* and the group surrounding a person, through the generation of support that they offer the members of the group, the *market* by allotting the resources and incomes resulting from the “social actor’s” part-taking on the work market and the competition it creates, competition that is motivating in achieving performance, *the state*, through the social policies it formulates and implements mainly by social security and social assistance; *the civil society* through voluntary organizations, communities, non-profit organizations, the church (Preda, 2002: 19).. To all these *international organizations* should be added which do not act directly on individual or public welfare, but intervene indirectly through the market or the state.

In order to secure social welfare, the state acts through the social policies it formulates and implements, policies that aim at providing public services (like: education, health care, defense, culture), at providing social protection and security which has two main components: social insurance and social assistance (Zamfir, Zamfir, 1995: 22-23).

The first introduction of social insurance is attributed to the two conservative reformers Otto von Bismarck and von Taaffe who between 1871 and 1891 were the first to introduce insurance laws in Germany. Otto von Bismarck remains the father of the first insurance laws of Germany which represented the first involvement of the modern state in ensuring contribution- based social protection to citizens.

Nowadays two insurance systems can be distinguished in European states:

- The Bismarck type insurance systems of Germany, Belgium, France, etc where the principle of work connected insurance is dominant. These systems are based on the quota paid by the workers and the employer, quotas that are more or less connected to the incomes.
- The Beveridge type systems of Great Britain, Denmark, and so on, where a general insurance system is dominant and the conscription is based more on needs rather than on income and where a differentiated conscription system is dominant. This latter system is based on the general access to services.

In as far as the state intervention is concerned in providing welfare, two somehow ideal models can be identified that manifest more as tendencies rather than a description of real cases in a “pure state”.

We are speaking here of the *universal type of welfare state* which was flourishing between 1950-1975. The main objective of this state was to reduce social inequality which could be achieved through a heavy taxation system alongside with providing general

services, ensuring a decent standard of living for the entire population which implied high social costs (Zamfir, Zamfir, 1995: 332). Opposed to this, we have the minimal-residualist state (Vic, 1996, *apud* Voicu, 2005: 50), which took off after 1975 in developed western countries and whose model builds on the idea that the market is the one that can fairly distribute resources in society. That is why the state should not intervene unless there is shortage of resources.

State involvement in providing social welfare for individuals is present in all societies with some differences, of course. The concept of welfare state defines "a social institution which produces, organizes and regulates goods and services and is responsible for offering people both goods that they have agreed on and services to protect families and individuals against social contingencies and to stabilize the socio-economic environment." (Cace, 2004: 40).

Gosta Esping-Andersen has drawn up a classification of welfare states according to the degree of decomodification of social services, the impact of service and support distribution and the merger of state and market in providing pensions. He identifies three types of welfare state (Preda, 2002. 46): *the liberal welfare state, the conservative corporate state, the social-democrat welfare state*. Other models of welfare state have been added to the typology created by Gosta Esping-Andersen like, for instance, the *Mediterranean* one (specific for Spain, Portugal and Greece) based on quite low taxation depending mostly on inter-family help (Ferrera, *apud* Giddens, 2007: 23). Other models can be added to the above typology like the one of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe which have tried to create *post-communist states of western type*.

Empiric reality proves that there is no unique social model in Europe. Each construction resulted from the combination of some elements of the "trilemma" quoted by Gosta Esping-Andersen who builds on the idea that in a modern economy it is impossible to find a well-balanced budget, low level of economic inequality and high level of occupation of workforce. This was the starting point for Gosta Esping-Andersen in describing the three types of welfare state *as ideal types*, useful in understanding the described reality, but whose borders have grown vague by now. Lately, the idea of the necessity of a European social model has been launched in order to ensure the welfare of the citizens of these countries (Giddens, 2007: 23-58).

3. State intervention in providing Public Welfare

Starting from the typologies presented, it appears clearly that the state is one of the most important sources of social welfare through *social policies*. It can intervene directly in providing welfare (social insurance and social assistance) or indirectly by intervention in market mechanisms and civil society.

Social policies are present in specific legal provisions, administrative decisions, social programs, income transfers (taxes, pensions, allowances, scholarships, grants, etc within the systems of social insurance and assistance) as well as in financing, producing and providing social assistance for the people. (Mărginean, 2004: 11).

Social protection or social security can be defined as a set of policies, programs and steps meant to reduce poverty and vulnerability, to diminish people's exposure to risks by providing social welfare and security especially for those who, through their own effort, can not secure for themselves minimal life standards. "The target of social security system is to support people, groups, and communities in difficulty who can not lead, through their own means, a life at standards that are generally accepted as minimal." (Zamfir, Zamfir (coord.), 1999: 233).

For a better understanding of terms most frequently used in the field of *social policies*, a clearer definition of notions is required. The concept of social protection (all social benefits) includes:

- *Universal social benefits* or *non-contributory ones* mean those benefits that are given to all citizens irrespective of their being at risk or not, and without their having previously contributed to a certain fund. Free access to education, emergency medical services, child support are all included here. All these benefits are financed by the state out of taxes as a citizen right.
- *The social security system* which aims to satisfy needs of people at social risk (unemployment, work accidents, old age, abandoned children, abuse and exploitation, family violence). They are based on resources collected from contributing individuals and the distribution of insurance resources towards those insured against risks or their descendents according to their insurance policy. It should be mentioned that the insurance system may be stately (public) or private.

The social protection system can be financed from different sources such as: the central budget, local budgets, social funds (social insurance fund, unemployment fund, health insurance fund) (Pop, 2005).

Social justice is a concept closely related to that of social protection or inclusion used especially by the theoreticians of the post-industrial society, being correlated with the way in which social wealth and incomes are redistributed as compared to the improvement of the equality of chances.

4. Quantitative Analysis of Health Status in Romania and Bihor County as compared to States of the European Union

Interest for providing optimal health conditions for the entire population, irrespective of their contribution, based on the principle of solidarity can be considered as part of the universalistic system of social benefits.

One important indicator regarding the attention paid to people's health by society refers to the *rate of expenses devoted to healthcare in the GNP*. In this respect, in 2006, Romania, with 3.5%, recorded the lowest percentage from the GNP dedicated to healthcare from all the countries monitored that year. In order to understand better the position of Romania it is interesting to observe that countries with percentages close to that of Romania are: The PR of China (4.5%), Estonia (5%), The Russian Federation (5.3%), Turkey (5.6%) while in most European countries the rate is more than 6%, some of them even over 9% as is the case of Italy (9%), Holland (9.3%), Denmark and Belgium (9.5%), Austria and Greece (9.9%) or Portugal (10%), Germany (10.4%), France (11.1%). The health situation of the population can be measured with indicators like death rate and mostly child death rate as well as population morbidity rate.

In comparison with EU countries, in 2008 Romania, with a death rate of 11.8‰ ranked among the countries with the highest mortality rate in former communist countries after Bulgaria (14.5‰), Leetonia (13.7‰), Hungary (13‰), Lithuania (13.1‰), Estonia (12.4‰). In the same year, the countries with the lowest mortality rate were Ireland and Cyprus (6.4‰)

Mortality rate (number of deceased in one thousand inhabitants), an indicator relevant for getting to know the living standard of the population including the development level, is distributed symptomatic in Bihor County compared to the Romanian level in the transition period (1990-2008).




Chart no. 1- regarding the evolution of general mortality rate in Bihor County as compared to the national level between 1990-2008.

In as far as the general mortality rate is concerned we can observe that throughout the entire analyzed period, before 1990 as well as after this year, Bihor County, without exception, records higher values as compared to the national ones. On the other hand, data give evidence that both on county and on national level the time span after 1990 is characterized by high values of general mortality as compared to the previous period. The year in which the highest mortality rate was recorded both on county and on national level is 1990 (12.7‰ on country level and 14.9‰ in Bihor County) after which year the mortality rate is decreasing up to the year 2000 when it reaches values approximately two thousands lower than on country level (11.4 per a thousand inhabitants and in Bihor County (13.1‰). After the year 2000 a the mortality rate is rising again up to 2002 when it started to decrease remaining at values of 11.8‰ on national level and 12.8‰ for a thousand inhabitants in Bihor county.




Chart no.2 regarding the evolution of mortality rate according to residential areas in Bihor County compared to those on national level between 1990-2008

Mortality manifests depending on the *residential environment* clearly projecting living and health care conditions which are very different in rural and urban areas to

which we can add that, according to statistics, in rural areas the population is much older than in urban areas.

Even in urban areas the mortality rate is rising starting with 1990, the growth is slower (from 8.2‰ in 1990 as lowest value to 9.9‰ in 2005, or from 9.5‰ in 1990 as the lowest value to 11‰ as the highest value in 1996 in Bihor County). In rural areas, on the other hand, both the starting point in 1990 (15.8‰) and the highest level of 118.5 in 1996 in Bihor County and 13.4‰ in 1990 and 16.5‰ on national level are by far higher than the figures recorded in urban areas. Mortality rate represents one of the indicators that quantifies most significantly, the inequality of living conditions between the rural and urban areas.

The indicator mortality rate shows strong differences as well when we compare the mortality rate of women as opposed to that of men.




Chart no.3 regarding the evolution of mortality rate according to residential areas in Bihor County compared to those on national level between 1990-2008

Both on national level and on Bihor County level, the mortality rate affects more the male population as compared to the female one, differences being even more visible in Bihor County varying between, 1.4‰ in 1990 and 3‰ in 1996, the greatest difference while on national level the highest difference can be seen in 1993 – 1.2‰ and 2.7‰ in 1996.

Correspondingly, a higher mortality rate associated with birthrate and migration generated, in the period of time under surveillance, natural negative growths, mostly on county level as compared to the national average (-0.9‰ on national level and -2.5‰ in Bihor County in the year 2000 the differences tending towards equalization (-0.1‰ in 2008) according to evolution of the above mentioned indicators.

The main *causes of death*, mentioned the analyses carried out in healthcare institutions throughout the county, are: *cardiovascular diseases* (approximately 61% out of the total cases of death) followed by *malignant tumors*, *illnesses of the respiratory system*, *accidents*, *poisoning*, *intoxications*. Death owing to cardiovascular diseases and ischemic cardio-diseases under the age of 65 places Romania in the top among Eastern and Central European countries and that is a fact to be underlined.

Main causes of death in Bihor County between 2007-2008

Table no. 1

Year	2007		2008	
Causes	Nr. of deaths	to ⁰ / ₀₀₀₀ inhabitants	Nr. deaths	to ⁰ / ₀₀₀₀ inhabitants
Tuberculosis	18	3,04	26	4,39
Malignant Tumors	1278	215,59	1349	227,65
Circulatory System	4845	817,30	4673	788,61
Respiratory System	430	72,54	415	70,03
Digestive Apparatus	416	70,18	441	74,42
Accidents	343	57,86	310	52,32

Source: Bihor County Healthcare Board

In as far as child death rate is concerned figures show a strong decrease between 1970-1990 and grew slower between 1990 and 2005. What is interesting and requires some explanation is the fact that in Bihor County, between 1970 and 1980 child death rate is lower as compared to that on national level while after 1990 it became constantly higher. Even more than that, in 2007, child mortality rate in Bihor County rose with 2.6‰ in 2005 in rapport with the national level. Starting with 2007, a change has occurred as in Bihor County a lower child mortality rate was registered compared to the national average.

Regarding Mortality Rate and Child Mortality Rate in Romania between 1990- 2009

Table no. 2

	Child mortality rate (to 1000 born alive)		Mortality (deaths to 1000 inhabitants)	
	Bihor	Romania	Bihor	Romania
1990	28,0	26,9	12,7	10,6
2000	24,7	18,6	13,1	11,4
2005	15,3	15,0	13,5	12,1
2008	10,1	11,0	12,7	11,8
2009	14,5	-	13,2	-

Source: National Institute of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, Romania and Bihor County, 2009

It is important to mention that in 2008, Romania, with a child death rate of 11‰ born alive, is the country with the highest child death rate among the 27 countries of the European Union relatively close data being registered in Malta, 9.9‰, Bulgaria with 8.4‰, while other developed countries record child mortality rates as follows: 1.8‰ (Luxemburg), 2.1‰ (Slovenia), 2.5‰ (Sweden) and 2.6‰ (Finland).

The evolution of people's health condition is expressed by indicators which reflect the level of socio-economic factors as well as that of the cultural ones. Child mortality rate is an important indicator of the general health condition being inversely proportional with the socio-economic development. Analyzing the regress of child mortality rate reported to the BIP per capita and the expenditure on healthcare from the GNP show that Romania has a worse position as compared to other countries whose GNP is comparable with that of Romania.

The factors that determine the decrease of general and child mortality depend mostly on measures in social and sanitary policy as well as on the increase of general schooling and sanitary education of the population.

General and child mortality influence the lifespan outlook of the population which in the EU shows an evidently increasing tendency, tendency which is present in Romania too, but at a slower rate.

Average Lifespan




Chart no. 4- Regarding the Evolution of Lifespan in Bihor County as compared to the National one between 1990-2008

The data reveal common tendencies on the two analyzed levels. Between 1970 and 1990 data show hope for a longer lifespan both on national level and in Bihor County and then start to decrease up to 1997 since when it has started a steady increase. As figures show it, the average lifespan of the population in Bihor County is lower than that of Romania on the whole as the lowest value on national level is 68.58 years compared to 67.2 in Bihor (1.38 years less between 1970-1972) the highest value on national level being 69.76 years and 68.3 years in Bihor between 1985-1991. In the period between 2005-2008 the lifespan on national level was over 73 years, while in Bihor it was approximately a year shorter in the same period of time. In as far as the lifespan of the two sexes is concerned the tendencies are close too, given that women have a longer lifespan than men with the mention that in absolute values both sexes show a shorter lifespan in Bihor than that on national level. Comparatively with the period between 1970-1972 women's lifespan has grown with 4.8 years while that of men's lives with 3.3 years between 2005-2007. If we compare figures on national level with those of the north-western part of Romania where Bihor County is also situated, we can see that the latter shows a lower lifespan than the national one and even lower than the one of the region it belongs to.

In the year 2008, comparison of international figure show that Romania, which had an average lifespan of 69 years for men and 73 years for women, was ranked among countries like Hungary, lower values having been recorded only in Lithuania (65 for men and 77 for women), Leetonia (66 and 77), Estonia (67 and 79) . A much longer lifespan has been recorded in countries like Austria (78 for men and 83 for women), Italy and France (79 and 84) Holland (78 and 82), Spain (78 and 84), etc.

We can conclude that both the general and the child death rate are much higher in Romania than that of the developed countries of the European Union which are considered to be targets to be reached. On the other hand, Bihor County records mortality rates and mostly child mortality rates over the level of national ones. In order to find an explanation for this, we are going to analyze a few indicators regarding the *quality of healthcare* both in Romania and in Bihor County.

The Evolution of Healthcare Personnel in Romania and Bihor County between 2003 -2008

Table no. 3

		2003	2005	% compared to 2003	2008	% compared to 2003
Doctors	Romania	46919	47388	100,99	50267	107,13
	Bihor	1554	1185	76,25	1544	99,35
Dentists	Romania	9447	10249	108,48	11901	125,97
	Bihor	378	365	96,56	483	127,77
Pharmacists	Romania	7703	9283	120,51	11704	151,94
	Bihor	308	280	90,90	460	149,35
Medial healthcare staff	Romania	120740	123453	102,24	132464	109,71
	Bihor	3510	3722	106,03	4081	116,26

Source: Statistical Year Book of Bihor County and for Romania data from Tempo database

In the year 2008 the number of *medical staff* increases as compared to 2003 at an even higher rate in Bihor County as compared to the national one with the exception of doctors whose number diminishes with 10%, reaching 99.35% of the figure of 2003 and of pharmacists whose number, though increased in that period with 149%, the increase is lower than that on national level.

Another indicator used for international comparisons is the one concerning the *number of doctors and dentists for 1,000 inhabitants* which has explanatory power in reference to the health state of the population. In this case too, closely connected to the above presented data, Romania does not take a place for the advantage of its citizens. In 2006, with a number of 217 doctors for 1,000 inhabitants, Romania 24th among the 27 European Union countries being ahead of only Great Britain which had 160 doctors to 1000 inhabitants, Cyprus with 195 and Poland with 199 doctors. At the same time, most of the countries have over 300 doctors for 1,000 inhabitants, some of them even over 400 like Belgium with 420 or Greece with 501.

The Evolution of Healthcare Personnel in Romania and Bihor County between 2003-2008 (staff for 1,000 inhabitants)

Table no. 4

Medical and healthcare staff				
		2003	2005	2008
Doctors to 100000 inhabitants	Romania	216	219	234
	Bihor	259	200	260
Dentists to 100000 inhabitants	Romania	43	47	55
	Bihor	63	60	80
Pharmacists to 100000 inhabitants	Romania	36	43	54
	Bihor	51	50	80
Medium healthcare staff to 100000 inhabitants	Romania	556	571	616
	Bihor	585	640	690
Medium healthcare staff to one doctor	Romania	2.6	2,6	2,6
	Bihor	2.3	3	3

Source: Statistical Year Book of Bihor County 2009, for Romania data from Tempo database, Statistical Year Book of Bihor County 2008/ printed

The situation has improved both on national and on county level in as far as the main indicators for health quality are concerned. Thus the number of doctors for 1,000 inhabitants rises from 216 in 2003 to 234 in 2008 nevertheless the increase on county level being less significant. Important increases have taken place in the material support

for healthcare, mostly in the increase in the number of hospitals, medical and dentist surgeries, especially following the process of privatization.

Consequently, the quantitative aspects concerning the material endowment can not explain the high mortality rate, including the high child mortality rate of Bihor County. The low quality of healthcare services provided on national level, reflected in the indicators that have been analyzed comparatively with those of the European Union can be perfectly well explained through the applied healthcare policies mirrored mostly by the reduced expenditures on healthcare in Romania, facts that negatively influence the quality of healthcare activity.

Specialists (Giddens, 2007) consider that in the new society the main causes of problems that have to be solved are not so much connected with the lack of equipment, but mostly with *adverse lifestyles*. Problems like obesity, psychic illnesses, cardiovascular diseases, smoking, the use of drugs, all originate in bad diets and vicious life conditions. Pollution, traffic congestion are not generated by the lack of resources, but by their overuse. Such problems can only be solved by a drastic change of lifestyle, a difficult thing to do as lifestyle involves habits and stereotypes deeply embedded in behaviour.

On the other hand, the open character of the new society which offers the individual liberty to choose among different lifestyles, people's need for autonomy self-consciousness and affirmation of self-respect are all elements that facilitate the process of change. The problem is that such changes depend, almost entirely, on changes of lifestyle on individual level. The role of the government and other public and private organizations resides in finding *efficient ways for combining the incentives with punishments* in order to target individual behaviour towards desired models. Societies have provided numerous models of changes of attitudes and behaviour by combining the above mentioned elements starting with the introduction of compulsory use of seatbelts in order to reduce the number of fatalities in traffic and down to smoking and AIDS. Reality has proven that, in spite of vehement opposition of contesting elements, governmental policies, when correctly applied, can show spectacular effects.

The change of lifestyle also involves the spirit of the notion of *positive social protection* as it appears to be more efficient to intervene with actions of prevention than to treat the "illness" after its symptoms manifest irrespective whether the intervention takes place on individual level or represents the result of the intervention of external factors.

Returning to the healthcare system in Romania, the findings on the level of common sense suggest the scarcity of resources will generate an evident depreciation of the general state of health in the times to follow both in as far as the material resources are concerned, support through compensation of necessary medical supplies and in the quality of the medical act through low motivation of the human resources in healthcare, fact which will generate a certain mobility of this category.

Conclusions:

- The model adopted by the political decision makers to provide welfare to citizens determines the quality of population's health in a country, an essential dimension of the quality of life.
- An important indicator regarding the attention devoted to population health by society is the one that regards *the share of funds devoted to healthcare within the GNP*. From this point of view, in the year 2006, Romania, with 3.5% recorded the lowest percentage of GNP allotted to healthcare of all the countries monitored in

that year, while many developed countries allot over 9% of the GNP up to 11.1% (France).

- Correspondingly, in 2008, Romania with a death rate of 11.8‰ was ranked among the countries with the highest mortality rate, similar with other former communist countries while countries with the lowest mortality rate like Ireland and Cyprus recorded death rates of 6.4‰ per one thousand inhabitants.
- In the entire period under surveillance, Bihor County recorded, without any exceptions, values higher than the national ones, even if lately, the general mortality is on the decrease. General mortality manifests itself in different ways depending on the *residential environment* clearly showing the life conditions and healthcare situation, very different in rural areas from the urban ones, to which we can add that in rural areas the population is more aged. Both on national and on county level, the mortality rate more seriously affects the male population as compared with the female one, differences being even more notable in Bihor County. Among the main causes of decease *cardiovascular diseases* can be mentioned (approximately 61% if the total deaths) followed by *malignant tumors, respiratory diseases, accidents, poisoning and intoxications*. It is to be mentioned that deaths caused by cardiovascular diseases and ischemic cardio-diseases under the age of 65 situate Romania on the first places in Central and Eastern Europe.
- In as far as child death rate is concerned, it shows a tendency of strong decrease starting with 1970 and down to 1990 and is slowing down between 1990-2005. What appears to be interesting and requires some explanation is the fact that in Bihor County, between 1970 and 1980, child death rate is lower than that on national level while after 1990 it constantly records higher values than that on national level.
- Mortality influences another indicator that refers to the quality of life and that is the *lifespan of people*, indicator that in Romania is on the increase as well. In 2008, international comparisons which show that people in Romania had a lifespan of 69 years for men and 77 years for women situated Romania on medium European level, higher values being recorded in countries like: Holland (78 and 82), Spain (78 and 84), etc. It is worth mentioning that lifespan in Romania also depends on the residential environment of the citizens who have a higher lifespan in urban areas.
- In an attempt to clarify the causes of the mentioned differences the material endowment and the rate of healthcare staff to 1,000 people were analyzed and the results reveal that even though data show a slight improvement in this respect, figures remain below the ones recorded in developed countries. For instance, in the year 2006, with a number of 217 doctors to 1,000 inhabitants Romania is 24th among the 27 countries of EU.
- Common sense observations suggest that the scarcity of resources will generate a significant deterioration of people's state of health in the next period of time in as far as resources and the support of medication through compensation are concerned alongside with poor quality of medical assistance through the low motivation of the human factor in healthcare which will generate a high mobility of the latter.

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
V. EVENTS

International conference
« Nouvelles approches des frontières culturelles »
4-6 March 2010, Oradea, Romania

Currently, two research teams at the Universities of Metz and Nancy in the field of Humanities and Social Sciences coordinate an interdisciplinary research project (NAFTES) that has expanded internationally since 2008 by joining more and more European and international universities. The coordinator of the project is Prof. Dr. Didier Francfort from the University of Nancy2.

The University of Oradea has been a partner in the project since 2009 through the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations.

Given the context, according to the NAFTES schedule, in March 2009, an international conference on *Nouvelles approches des frontières culturelles (New Approaches on Cultural Borders)* was hosted by the University of Oradea through the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations represented by Prof. Dr. Ioan Horga, as well as the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea - Debrecen and the University Nancy 2. The event brought together researchers from different universities throughout Europe and Central Asia (Oradea - Romania, Nancy - France, Strasbourg - France, Warsaw - Poland, Metz - France, Istanbul - Turkey, Turku - Finland, Saint-Quentin en Yvelines - France, Oslo - Norway, Baku - Azerbaijan, Pantheon University of Athens - Greece).



According to the terms of the project, the scientific event in Oradea approached a currently highly debated issue, the issue of cultural borders in a general context, when physical borders tend to fade away. During the debates, several theoretical aspects on the European cultural borders were approached, as well as practical issues, case studies envisaging UNESCO's involvement in the matter, the situation of Turkey, Georgia, Portugal and Romania, and the issue of interculturality on the artistic level (dance, music, and gastronomy). Some of the papers presented during the session have been chosen to be published in issue no. 9 of the *Eurolimes Journal* focused on the topic of *The Cultural Borders of Europe*.

The event has had continuity particularly on the level of academic collaboration between Oradea and Nancy also providing the opportunity to enlarge the relations of the University of Oradea with universities in Europe and Central Asia. There were also discussions on starting new projects, such as the partnership between the Tara Crisurilor Museum in Oradea and the Luneville Castle lying 25 km away from Nancy, France.

The meeting ended with the visit to the most important tourist attractions in Oradea: the Vulturul Negru Palace, the Moon Church, the Tara Crisurilor Museum, St. Nicolas Church, the synagogue, the fortress

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International Conference
“Regional Development and Territorial Cooperation in Central and Eastern
Europe in the context of the CoR White Paper on Multilevel Governance”
(Oradea, Romanian, 20-21 May 2010)

Regional development is the main challenge for the states from the area of Central and Eastern Europe after their accession to the European Union, and territorial cooperation is an efficient means for the harmonious and balanced integration of the EU's territories, with a view to modernize the regions lacking economic and social development. With the major goal of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion, the EU's economic development policy supports the efforts by each Member State of mitigating the interregional disparities through transfers of financial resources to the backward regions. Multilevel governance engages, at the highest level, the participation of the regional and local authorities to the elaboration and implementation of the development programs and plans; hence, the initiative of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) to open up a large debate forum on the subject of the involvement of the sub-national authorities was well received by the entire spectrum of stakeholders, from the regional and local levels to the business community, civil society and academic field. The conference is part of the public debate initiated by the CoR starting June 2009 and ending in September 2010.



The Institute for Euroregional Studies (IERS) of the University of Oradea (coordinated by Professor Ioan Horga, PhD.) could take the credit for being one of the most active European institutions engaged in the debate. After being the only Romanian institution and among the very few within Central Europe which expressed a clear point of view on the White Paper of the Multilevel Governance of the Committee of Regions (in December 2009, see [vezi www. cor.europa.eu/pages/eventTemplate.aspx](http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/eventTemplate.aspx)) through this conference, IERS, having previously earned its status as an European centre of excellence in the field of regional studies and regional cooperation, partook in the second stage of debating on the White Paper of the CoR. The current debate was organized by four research structures of the most important Romanian universities, with expertise within the European problems: The Institute for Euroregional Studies of the University of Oradea, The “Altiero Spinelli” Centre for the Study of European Governance of Babes Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, The Academic Club for European Studies (CASE) of the National School for Political and Administrative Studies Bucharest, The “Alicide de Gasperi” Centre for European Studies of the Western University of Timisoara. The conference was attended, by the partner Universities of Debrecen/Hungary and Uzshorod/Ukraine, plus another 27 representative authors from the academic environment of Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, Italy, Moldova, Portugal, Spain, France, together with the Vice-President of the Group of Research and Action for European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels; this not only proves the conference high standards, but also the organizers' capacity of mobilizing, for debate purposes, different points of view from various countries, both member states and non-members of the EU (Ukraine).

The conference brought together 82 papers presented in plenary meetings and two workshops: Regional Development: Performances and Perspectives; Territorial Cooperation and *CoR White Paper on Multilevel Governance*.

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 University of Oradea

**International Symposium
Imperial Politics in the East and West of the Romanian Space
Oradea - Chişinău, 3rd edition, 10-13 June 2010**

Although it is too early to give the final ruling, we can state that progress has been made by the Romanian historiography further to the scientific partnership between the University of Oradea, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, and the State University of Moldova, the Romanian Academy, through the Centre for Transylvanian Studies and the “Țării Crișurilor” Museum in Oradea. The accomplishments are equally scientific and human-related. The Conference and the subsequent volumes *Romanian borders within European context*, Oradea, 2008; *Historiography and Politics in the East and West of the Romanian Space*, Chişinău-Oradea, 2009 and today *Imperial Politics in the East and West of the Romanian Space* are but a few of the scientific accomplishments. Why a scientific symposium titled: *Imperial policies in the Romanian Space*? To some it may seem outdated; to some it may sound elitist. The idea came from our colleagues in Chişinău, more exposed to imperial and post-imperial policies. We are attempting to investigate the imperial policies consequences to the Romanian territory, in general, and in particular, to its eastern and western extremities. Please note that the study follows not only the negative consequences, as shown by a certain part of the communist historiography, but also the modernization policy conducted by the Viennese Court, the religious policy that gained a spot for the Romanians within the Transylvanian groups. From the methodological angle, the comparative method in which we approached our research allowed for the emphasis of both particularities and similarities between the economic, administrative, religious, military and cultural policies promoted by the empires acting on our territory: Ottoman Empire, Habsburg Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as the Czarist Empire and later on the USSR.



Another level of analysis pursued the medium and long run effects that the imperial policies had on the Romanian society, in general, and on the western and eastern Romanian population, in particular. The abundance of historical sources, many of them having so far been closed to the public, allows the quest for new approaches using the newest research methods. The symposium had the following sections: Empires, Imperial Patterns and Policies: Sources and Historiography; Politics, Administration and Society within the Medieval and Early Modern Empires; Politics, Administration and Society within Modern Empires; Imperial Constructions and Strategies within Romania in XX Century; Contemporary Consequences and Echoes of the Imperial Policies. There was also a section where the scientific publications from Chişinău, Oradea and Cluj-Napoca were presented.

Among the attendees to the symposium we mention Acad. Ioan-Aurel Pop, Director of the Centre for Transylvanian Studies; Prof. Barbu Ștefănescu, PhD., University of Oradea; Prof. Ioan Horga PhD., University of Oradea; Prof. Sorin Șipoș, PhD., University of Oradea (Chair of Symposium); Prof. Ion Eremia, PhD., State University of Chişinău; Lecturer Igor Șarov PhD., State University of Chişinău; Lecturer Ion Gumenăi, PhD., State University of Chişinău; Lecturer Ovidiu Mureșan PhD., “Babeș-Bolyai” University from Cluj-Napoca; Lecturer Șerban Turcus, PhD., “Babeș-Bolyai” University from Cluj-Napoca.

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Conference
“Dimensions of the European security”
Oradea, 15 October 2010

The event on “Dimensions of the European security” was the first public manifestation on debates related to the security studies at the University of Oradea, for the academic year 2010/2011. It corresponded to the opening ceremony for the new year of MA program in European security at the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations and the announcement of the first issue of Romanian Journal of Security Studies.

The event gathered speakers from different domains related to security, both theoreticians and practitioners. Iulian Fota, presidential adviser on security, presented an argument on the reform of international system and the security challenges that occur within these transformations. General (ret.) Mihaiu Mărgărit, former chef of Military Intelligence Department of Romanian Army presented a perspective of the intelligence sector reform, related to the present security challenges within democratic regimes. Professor Constantin Hlihor underlined the importance of reevaluation of the main security concepts within social sciences and security studies, based on the relationship of security-insecurity and its perception. Professor Adrian Ivan stressed the importance of security studies within the academic structures in Romania.



As hosts, Rector Cornel Antal and Dean Ioan Horga insisted on their intervention on the support and enhancement of scientific research and didactic activities on security studies at the University of Oradea.

Within the same event, there were launched the most recent books on security studies. Nicolae Toboșaru, *The Romanian-US strategic partnership*; Maurice Vaisse, *The International Relations after 1945*; Paul Robinson, *Dictionary of International Security*; Stephany Lawson, *International Relations*.

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University of Oradea

VI. HONOURED PERSONALITY

**TO UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR DOCTOR ANDREI MARGA
ON THE OCCASION OF AWARDING THE DOCTOR
HONORIS CAUSA DEGREE OF UNIVERSITY OF ORADEA**

LAUDATIO

Dear Rector Andrei Marga
Dear rector Cornel Antal
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today, at the University of Oradea, in the name of the Faculty of History, Geography, and International Relations, we have the great honour to sustain publicly the reasoning according to which our distinguished guest associates to both the teaching staff and to the identity building of our university at the harmonizing juncture of common interests of the academic institution in a democratic society.

Professor Marga's presence does nothing but to acknowledge the existence of direct and indirect links between the academic society of Oradea and Cluj. At the same time his visit suggests the harmonization of the interests of the Romanian academic communities with regard to the expectations, opportunities and social constraints.

The distinguished professor Andrei Marga represents one of the prominent personalities of the Romanian society, who, during the last decades has brought an important contribution to the development of knowledge and to the promotion of the European values in the academic community and in the society of Romania.

We can start by concluding that from a scientific point of view all his contributions are remarkable in the contemporary philosophical debates, where as a professor and a researcher he has opened new directions for investigation and has developed pragmatic interpretations regarding the adjustment of the contemporary society to the dynamics and challenges of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st.

But before drawing the conclusions we should consider him as a paragon in his career, academic life and his capacity to adapt to more or less democratic regimes, characteristics which are relevant when we want to fully understand the degree to which his career and achievements can be a landmark for the young generations and bring about the critical recognition of his colleagues.

In this moment of celebration we should observe that the landmarks promoted by Professor Andrei Marga are relevant when bringing into discussion the importance of the academic in the society. When referring directly to Professor Andrei Marga's activity we can ascertain that the paragon he promotes suggests the following:

First and foremost, the academic is a teacher and his identity is shaped by his relation with the student during the investigation of the topics in discussion in courses and seminars and during the study of the classic and unconventional texts, thus continually contributing to maintain a scientific debate.

Secondly, the position assumed as academic makes him take part and brings his contribution to scientific debates where the national and international dimension is overcome by such rapports as reality/truth/reason/argument/applicability. Contemporary topics (even the philosophical ones) have no frontiers because the problems of this world and the influence of globalization do not correspond to the geographical boundaries any

more. Hence, Professor Andrei Marga has complied with and involved in the dynamics of the European and international interdependencies regarding the reconfiguration of the international system mainly in the academic community on the ground of the transformations of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st.

Thirdly, the academic career asks for investigations and research activities upon unprecedented topics done either by means of direct use of certain opportunities or as an answer to certain external variables. We can affirm with no doubt that professor Andrei Marga has assumed his role as a researcher with responsibility because he has taken interest in, he has informed and interrogated the national, European and international dynamics. Even more, his contributions suggest solutions, options and opportunities regarding approaches that can be adapted to a decisional and managerial level.

Fourthly, we must point out that professor Andrei Marga as a rector of the Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj Napoca has succeeded in imposing a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary dimension of the academic studies. The approach he suggests is based on the appreciation of a competitive European environment that must begin with assuming and adapting identities which contribute to build a comprehensive image of the international society through their cultural heritage.

The management model of the University of Cluj represents an intercultural landmark all over Europe as it goes beyond the traditional-national dimension of the Romanian universities and opens means to collaborate with the international communities on the basis of competition and value promotion.

Last but not least we must admit that the international recognition, the diplomas, the state decrees and the honorary degrees Professor Andrei Marga has been rewarded bring about the idea that the performance landmarks are overcome by the achievements.

Beyond all these dimensions which make up professor Andrei Marga's personality, there is the man Andrei Marga. He was born in 1946 in Pietris, Bistrita/Nasaud county, he has a Bachelor Degree in Philosophy, he graduated the Babes-Bolyai University Cluj Napoca in 1971, he has also specialized in sociology. In 1975-1976 and in 1980-1994, as a scholar he attended documentary internships in different prestigious universities in Europe and USA. 1976 marks the beginning of his important scientific research: his doctoral thesis dedicated to the German philosopher Herbert Marcuse.

The opportunities after 1989 have been seen as sources which have enhanced professor Marga's pro-European orientation which belongs to the concepts deriving from the cultural heritage of Europe and results into a formula that gathers identity dimensions which spring from philosophy, religion, nationalism, political doctrines and cultural-identity manifestations drawn upon the good, and welfare seen as elements belonging to democratic interpretations and adaptations to the global medium. From this point of view Professor Marga's conclusions directly refer to topics with fundamental importance regarding the adjustment of the Romanian society to the dynamics of European integration and the pressures of globalization.

The man Andrei Marga is defined through his almost 40 year activity as a teacher and a researcher at the Babes Bolyai University, Professor Marga has won the prestige and appreciation among students and academics in the country and abroad as titular of contemporary philosophy and argumentation theory courses. His domains of interest have expended towards the Philosophy of European Unification, American Pragmatism, Religion in the Globalizing Era, University Development and Management. His activity as a publicist in the last two decades is representative for Professor Marga's searches concerning answers and solutions to the great challenges of the contemporary world and especially those of the Romanian society. Shortly, we may mention the 32 books signed as

single author, tens of studies and articles published in different languages in social science journals and volumes.

The recognition of his qualities, lead to Professor Marga's nomination as Minister of the National Education Ministry (1997-2000). In this position he proposed a deep reform of the Romanian educational system, organized in 6 chapters.

Andrei Marga represents a complex personality as teacher, philosopher, rector, Minister and political man of the contemporary Romanian society. Through his example in career and every day life he is a paragon of what academics should be in the life of the city. It is a quality which, unfortunately is still missing with many academics. His presence in the public life is also a guarantee that there are still people who can ensure the democratic values.

By awarding the Doctor Honoris Causa Degree to Professor Andrei Marga, rector of the Babes-Bolyai University, our university expresses its gratitude for his work and activity and signifies the acceptance of the principles and values promoted by professor Marga in public life by the academic community of Oradea

Following the decision of the Senate of the University of Oradea, Professor Andrei Marga joins the academics of Oradea and it is our great honor to confer the Doctor Honoris Causa degree of our University. We assure the rector of our consideration, admiration and gratitude and we also hope it is mutual.

Oradea, 20.05.2010

University Professor Ioan Horga, Ph.D

THE SPEECH OF THE RECTOR OF BABES-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY FROM CLUJ-NAPOCA, PROF. ANDREI MARGA PHD PRESENTED IN MAY 20, 2010, WHEN HE RECEIVED THE TITLE OF DOCTOR HONORIS CAUSA OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ORADEA.

**ABOUT
UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE**

Andrei MARGA

The language used in the discussion about universities in Europe has changed during only one generation of academic leaders. The place occupied not long ago by terms such as *academic freedom*, *seminar essay*, *lecture*, *academic professorship*, *rector*, *academic senate* is now replaced by rather new notions such as *accountability*, *workload*, *lesson*, *university teacher*, *president*, *council of administration*, *outcomes*. This last row of notions does not completely remove the previous one, but it modifies its importance and, in fact, its meaning.

Recently, the new language has promoted the English term, with French origins, of *governance* for the description of the organisation and in explaining the functioning of universities, as well as in actions taken to improve their achievements. Let us go over the difficulties for the translation of the expression into neo-Latin, Germanic or Slavic languages and let us only mention that, when taking *governance* into consideration, not only does one have a language change in approaching the universities, but also a profound change, related to the approach, and even to the culture, having significant implications and consequences. This change is perceived by few people, therefore, *governance* has remained a confusing notion and has often been wrongfully understood, as “*governing*” or “*management*” or “*administration*” or “*legislation*”.

I would like to clarify what *university governance* means and to show where its thematizations are nowadays (1). One cannot understand the *university governance* without taking into consideration the mission and functions of the university (2) and without noticing where values intervene (3).

1.

As mentioned earlier, the shift to the approach of the *governance of the universities* was not only a language change, but more than that – i.e. a change of conception and, after



all, of the organisational culture and of the culture in its large meaning. It has been related to five mutations that took place in the modern society, in a relatively short period of time.

The first mutation was the change in perception, which took place in the management of communities and organisations: the human being was no longer considered just the object of the decisions, but a participant in their implementation, while the profile of the decision-maker was included in the discussion. Otherwise said, the rules of interaction within communities and institutions, such as the quality of the *leadership*, started to be questioned. The approach of *governance*, including of the *governance* within universities, has intervened along with a democratization process, which was considered to be indispensable in order to increase the achievements of the organisations.

The second mutation that led to the approach of governance within universities was the massification of higher education. After 1968, in Europe and afterwards all around the world, one could notice the substantial increase in the number of students, which led to transformations in the entire organisation of the universities: their multiplication and diversification, a new geography of faculties, the increase in the number of teaching staff, the reorganisation of chairs etc. The leadership of universities could not have remained untouched: it had to thematize interaction rules in complex units, where achievements depended not only on the quality of central decisions, but also on the so-called “local” decisions, where “power” was inevitably redistributed. The approach of *governance* in universities has come up as an answer to the needs for the restructuring of the leadership, under the conditions given by the massification of higher education.

The third mutation was the appearance of the industrial society, which requested from universities not necessarily truths, but rather useful knowledge for the economy and the administration, not necessarily people of culture, but rather specialists in technology, economy, administration. Universities were taken out of their isolation in relation to the economy and the administration, and they were transformed into a part of the economy and of the governmental projects. The approach of *governance* in the case of universities was encouraged as a measure of optimization of the productive functioning of an institution which has to make its own decisions by virtue of the autonomy.

The fourth mutation related to the approach of *governance* in universities was the emergence of the “knowledge society”. The competences - professional, communicative, interactive - have become crucial within society, while the innovations and the discoveries have proved to be indispensable for the competitive economy. As a consequence, universities started to be considered under the aspect of their consequences in the formation of specialists and in the production of innovations, while the economic dynamic proved to be dependent on the calibre of the higher education and of the scientific research. The approach of *governance* within universities has gained ground as an action for the identification of and emphasis on those factors that increase the achievements of those institutions.

The fifth mutation that determined the shift to the approach of *governance* within universities was the globalization of the economy and of communications. The globalization has extended the market on which the products are valued, including the products of the universities. The higher education institutions could no longer remain the mere prolongation of the old national cultural projects, but they entered into the wide and intensified competition of the globalized markets. Mention should be made once again that “globalization” is different from “internationalisation”¹ and it does not lead to the standardization of the solutions. If well understood, globalization leads rather to efforts of self-organisation in order to obtain

¹ See Andrei Marga, *The Internationalisation of the European Universities*, in Andrei Marga, *University Reform Today*, Cluj University Press, 2005, pp. 386-389.

achievements capable of winning in the competition extended to the maximum. The approach of *governance* proves to be the path towards a better self-organisation for the production of competitive achievements in the era of globalization.

Certainly, the approach of *governance* within universities has imposed itself on the background of the increased interest of the states for the formation of specialists and for applied scientific researches, as well as in relation with the preoccupation of governments to lead higher education taking into consideration the university autonomy as a pre-condition for achievements. I shall not insist here upon this history of the interweaving of the history within the universities with the evolution of the states' politics and geopolitics, even though the shift towards *the approach of governance* remains part of the social and political changes from the modern society. However, in order to clear the situation in which we are today, I would like to emphasize the fundamental changes that have taken place during the last decades in the academic politics of the governments.

As such, after the preoccupation for the widening of the access to higher education prevailed in the European countries, and this preoccupation strengthened after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, as a consequence of the year 1968, at the end of the '90s the problem of the efficiency of higher education came to the forestage. The old theme regarding the *university autonomy* was complemented with the theme of the *responsibility* and, more recently, with that of the *accountability*. As it has already been mentioned in a convincing way in the **Magna Charta Universitatum** (1988), the universities are institutions that are not efficient unless they enjoy autonomy; governments have integrated this truth in legislations that encourage them to assume the autonomy, the responsibility and the practice of the *accountability*, as well as in policies oriented towards the functionalization of universities as actors of the development programmes. The project funding, the differentiation of the types of funding, the stimulation to use the resources of alternative funding, the periodical evaluations by specialised agencies, the emphasis on the formation of competences of the future graduates, the credit transfer system, and many others are composing elements of *this approach of the university as part of the economic, administrative and social programmes*. Within this framework, a new understanding of *governance* has gradually imposed, where the emphasis is put on rules, on the existing societal framework and on the achievement that has to be reached. In the article **Higher education governance in Europe: autonomy, ownership and accountability - A review of the literature** (2006), Jochen Fried presented the current understanding of the concept of *governance* as follows: "*a. Governance means regulation, steering and control (Steuerung or Regelung in German) within the context of a given (social, political, economic, institutional) order; b. It can be described and analysed as «a set of practices whereby independent political and/or economic actors coordinate and/or hierarchically control their activities and interactions... Governance structures are therefore formal and informal institutional devices through which political and economic actors organize and manage their interdependencies» (Hirst & Thompson, 1997: 362); c. these structures ultimately serve to enhance or promote the legitimacy and efficiency of the social system by way of organising negotiation processes, setting standards, performing allocation functions, monitoring compliance, reducing conflict, and resolving disputes*"². Here, one can see the concept of *governance* as connoted and predominantly used in the academic practices nowadays.

² Jochen Fried, *Higher Education Governance in Europe: Autonomy, Ownership and Accountability*, in *Higher Education Governance between Democratic Culture, Academic Affiliations and Market Forces*, p. 83.

What were the results of the implementation of such a concept of *governance*? I hereby answer by characterising the current situation of the education and by delineating an alternative.

In the European reflection on the academic formation, one can identify a negative evolution, which one can make intuitive by looking at the dominant concepts in the public debate on education. For instance, at the beginning of the 19th century, in Europe, there was a shift from the medieval university to the institutionalisation of a new educational ideal due to the concordant action of the four classical faculties - sciences, medicine, law and philosophy - and to the conceptual processing owed to Kant, Hegel and Fichte. The result was “*die Universität als Institution einer philosophisch begründeten Ganzheit aller Wissenschaften, die universitas literarum*”³, organised according to the “neo-humanistic conception on formation (*neuhumanistischen Bildungskonzeption*)”. The university was destined for education, while education (*Bildung*) was conceived by Humboldt, in his famous **Theorie der Bildung des Menschen** (1793), as “*den Begriff der Menschheit in unserer Person, sowohl während der Zeit unseres Leben, als auch noch über dasselbe hinaus, durch die Spuren des lebendigen Wirkens, dar wir zurücklassen, eine so großen Inhalt, als möglich zu verschaffen*”⁴. At that time, education (*Bildung*) also gathered, in its purpose, in its content and in its means, at the same time, the individuality and the values of cohabitation, the integration in the present and the memory of the past, the acquiring of a profession and the reflection on its importance within the community, as well as ideas, values and norms from local traditions and universal forms. In the terms used by the “neo-humanism”, the individual and the general were always connected, they presuppose one another. It is from this connection that the classic university of the modern era resulted and it spread on a large surface of the world.

Nietzsche was among the first ones who noted that the education (*Bildung*) conceived by his predecessors from the era of the romantic enlightenment remained only an ideal. In **Über die Zukunft unsere Bildungsanstalten** (1872), the philosopher blamed the fact that schools became “*Anstalten der Lebensnoth*” subordinated to the needs of the economy, technology and administration, so that “*Anstalten der Bildung*” remained very few⁵. “*Die Schule hat keine wichtigere Aufgabe, als strenges Denken, vorsichtiges Urtheilen, consequentes Schließen zu lehren: deshalb hat sie von allen Dingen abzusehn, die nicht für diese Operationen tauglich sind, zum Beispiel von der Religion*”⁶ - Nietzsche wrote.

Theodor W. Adorno caught a later stage of those “*Anstalten der Lebensnoth*”, where they were no longer preoccupied with “*strenges Denken*”, but they became instead a part of the current enterprises and policies. In **Theorie des Halbbildung** (1959), he spoke of “the decay of the education (*Verfall der Bildung*)” and gave a univocal diagnosis: one could have spoken of “*sozialisierte Halbbildung, der Allgegenwart des entfremdeten Geistes*”⁷. This meant an education from where the purpose of things and actions disappeared together with the installing of “the dictate of the means, of the rigid and poor utility (*Diktat der Mittel, der sturen und kargen Nützlichkeit*)”. “*Das Bewusstsein geht unmittelbar von einer zur anderen Heteronomie über; anstelle der Autorität der Bibel tritt die des Sportplatzes, des Fernsehens und des «Wahren Geschichten», die auf den Ausspruch des Buchstäblichen,*

³ Nachwort, on *Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten*, Reclam, Leipzig, 1990, p. 292.

⁴ Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Theorie der Bildung des Menschen*, in Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Werke*, Band I, p. 235.

⁵ Nietzsche, *Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungsanstalten*, in *Nachgelassene Fragmente. Kritische Studienausgabe*, Hrsg. Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinavi, 1980, Band 10, p. 717.

⁶ Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, in *Kritische Studienausgabe*, Band 2, p. 220.

⁷ Theodor W. Adorno, *Theorie der Halbbildung*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2006, p. 8.

der Tatsächlichkeit diesseits der produktiven Einbildungskraft sich stützt”⁸. Theodor W. Adorno caught in severe but justified terms the decline of the education (*Bildung*), which marked the universal culture of the last two centuries, in the “cultural”, mercantilist and conformist “industry” of the late modernity.

The diagnosis of the situation has changed once again, becoming even more negative: in **Theorie der Unbildung. Die Irrtümer der Wissensgesellschaft** (2006), Konrad Paul Liessmann spoke of the “*Unbildung*” (the term can be translated as “the lack of education”), i.e. the ceasing of the “regulative function” of the former education (*Bildung*). “The estranged spirit (*der entfremdete Geist*)” Theodor W. Adorno was mentioning passed to “the acclaimed lack of spirit (*akklamierte Geistlosigkeit*)”. “*Darin sprach sich ein Programm aus, das mit jenem Geist, der seit Humboldt und Hegel als Subjekt und Objekt von Bildung fungierte, nichts mehr zu tun haben wollte. Ohne Geist, also ohne den Versuch, die harte Rinde der Empirie zu durchdringen und auf einen reflexiven und selbstreflexiven Begriff zu bringen, also ohne das was Adorno den Wahrheit als letzte Referenz von Bildung nannte, kann von dieser nicht mehr die Rede sein*”⁹. The education (*Bildung*) was replaced by the formation of “skills and aptitudes (*Fähigkeiten und Kompetenzen*)” under the conditions set by the “suspension of that individuality that once was both addressee and actor of the education”. This way, the persons entering into the education get to be considered just as “*human capital*” and the entire educational organisation is transformed according to the economic programmes. In the meantime, “*hat die Bildung nicht länger die Funktion der Reproduktion der ständischen Strukturen der Fachbildung, vielmehr wird sie auf die Vermittlung von Grundkompetenzen verpflichtet, die notwendig sind, um sich auf dem offenen Markt zu behaupten. Sie dient nun der Produktion und Reproduktion von Humankapital, das Rendite erwirtschaften soll*”¹⁰.

Even though the evoked diagnoses present a negative evolution, having sometimes radical accents, mention should be made that the clues in their favour are not missing and they have become a practical problem. In fact, the lack of orientation in the current societies, the multiple and recurrent crises that are affecting them, the proliferation of the “negative futurism” (“let us leave the things just the way they are, as it could be worse!”), the closing of the horizons (“we cannot see any chance of changing!”), the civil passivity, the paralysis of the will are also the sign for the erosion of the education.

On the other hand, an indicator of the negative transformation within universities is also their attempt to escape from their mission and their self-conception in terms of functions. If Humboldt still saw the university as “*Gipfel in dem alles, was unmittelbar für die moralische Kultur der Nation geschieht, zusammenkommt*” and, closer to our time, in **The American University** (1973), Talcott Parsons spoke of the differentiated functions of the university – “*research and preparation of succession in science; academic training for the profession; general training; contribution to the cultural self-understanding and to the intellectual illumination*”¹¹ – then, in the newer conception of the universities, the mission is reduced to functions, while functions are dissolved in the adaptation to the society given by serving its programmes. The cultural, moral or even civil engagement of the university is less and less discussed. “*An industrialist view*” upon the university is embraced without any

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

⁹ Konrad Paul Liessmann, *Theorie der Unbildung. Die Irrtümer der Wissensgesellschaft*, Piper, München, 2008, p. 70.

¹⁰ Richard Münch, *Globale Eliten, locale Autoritäten. Bildung und Wissenschaft unter den Regime von PISA, McKinsey&Co.*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2003, p. 30.

¹¹ Talcott Parsons, G. M. Plat, *The American University*, Cambridge University Press, 1973.

condition and it has a net option: “For the twenty-first century, the agenda must not be about structures and processes as ends in themselves. The future agenda must be about people: the students customers, their needs and what, as graduates, they can contribute including in their employers”¹².

The charges brought to the present situation of the universities are very precise: one of the most important sociologists of our days, Richard Münich wrote in **Globale Eliten, lokale Autoritäten** (2009): *The New Public Management ist das zentrale Instrument der neoliberalen Regierungskunst, die auf Verhaltenssteuerung durch Märkte, Quasimärkte, Wettbewerb und Anreize setzt. Dieses Steuerungsmodell muss komplexe Leistungen auf eine überschaubare Zahl von Parameter reduzieren, an denen sich Steuerungsinstanzen (Prinzipale), Gesteuerte (Agenten), Akkreditierungsagenturen und Kunden orientieren können*¹³. The implications are profound: the expert reuniting knowledge and consciousness is replaced by the clerk who is focused on reading quantitative parameters; the decisional autonomy of the professor is replaced by the integration into programmes; the deprofessionalization of the teaching staff is legitimate if measurable parameters are reached; the bureaucracy of the audit takes the lead over the professionals that have remained, while the teaching and scientific research activities are deformed under the pressure of the purely quantitative indicators that have to be reached; the agencies for evaluation and accreditation become decision-making bodies for professional affirmation and the professional ideal becomes the satisfaction of their standards or the obtaining of grants; a bureaucracy of the quality control watches over the implementation of the standards without assuming responsibility for the outcomes; the university professors lose their former authority and become a sort of clerks bearing pretentious titles; the educational relationship between the professor and the student is replaced by the relationship between the bidder and the client; the future closes down in this achievement horizon that many people consider to be the only one possible, the proof being the fact that almost no political party questions “the new political management”.

I consider that, no matter how arguments are used, this diagnosis is true. It is realistic to admit that „die neue Form von Governance ist mit dem neuen Bildungsmodell wahlverwandt, d.h. die Strukturen ergänzen sich gegenseitig. Das neue Bildungsmodell sellt Bildung auf Wissens-und Kompetenzerwerb um und zerlegt den Prozess in einzeln abgeprüfte Kurse, die nahezu beliebig kombiniert werden können. Die Vielzahl der damit verbundenen Einzelprüfungen eignen sich als Leistungsindikatoren für das »Qualitätsmanagement«. An die gemessenen Erfolge wird dann an den Universitäten die so genannte »Leistungsorientierte Mittelverteilung« (LOM) geknüpft. Dieses System belohnt die Zerlegung eines Studiengangs in eine möglichst große Zahl kleinster Kurseinheiten mit entsprechenden Teilprüfungsleistungen”¹⁴. However, this negative diagnosis does not comprise the whole truth about the present situation. I believe that *we are, at least in Europe, at the end of a cycle, which is signalled by a major change: the thematization of excellence in education, especially in universities, which engages the reorganisation of governance*. This implies, from the very beginning, the elucidation of the mission and functions of the university as institution.

¹² Graham Day, *One Individualist View*, in *Universities in the Twenty-First Century*, Paul Hamley Foundation, National Commission on Education, London, 1994, p. 28.

¹³ Richard Münich, *op.cit.*, pp. 74-75.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 76.

2.

Placed in a late modern society that recorded structural change and was 'challenged' from many directions, yet determined, on the other side, to reconcile to some extent contradicting imperatives (such as, for instance, gaining economic relevance and promoting autonomy), the university is forced to explicitly clarify its profile and to reorganize itself. Many of the universities' dilemmas can be solved by clarifying this profile. This means, above all, clarifying its mission and functions. But how can one establish today the mission of the university?

From the very beginning we have to say that the mission of the university does not allow for a reduction to a 'list of aims' that are so frequent in the statutes of nowadays universities¹⁵. This mission can be established now – without deriving it from general outlooks, which have become unrealistic, on knowledge and society and avoiding a restrictive functionalism, which, in turn, is incapable of taking over the diversified functions that contemporary universities fulfill - by taking as a starting point the lasting experience of prominent universities¹⁶. From this point of view, if by *mission* we understand the specific task designed for an institution, then it can be said, with enough factual grounds, that the mission of today's university is preparing specialists at the higher level of knowledge in order to increase knowledge and to improve people's living conditions.

Several important delimitations are implied with this determination: the mission of the university is not reduced to training, since it includes higher education and the formation of abilities to develop knowledge; this mission cannot overlap scientific research, since it is directed to training; the mission of the university is not exhausted through services, since these are conditioned by training and by its own scientific research.

If by *function* we understand the activities that need to be carried out in order to fulfill the mission, then it can be said, with sufficient reasons, that the functions of the university are multiple. Talcot Parsons delineated, in **The American University** (1973), four functions of the university: research and the preparation of the new generations of researchers; the academic training for a profession; general training; contributions to cultural self-understanding and intellectual enlightenment¹⁷. In the view that is made possible today, the functions of the university are more and they let themselves ordered differently, as they have complex inner links.

The mission of training specialists at a superior level of knowledge, in order to increase knowledge and to improve people's lives, can be achieved today - under the circumstances in which the universities ensure the cooperative search for truth and use their autonomy as an indispensable premise of their excellence, as well as under the circumstances in which the technological, economic and social development of communities depend on this excellence - only if the university assumes *multiple functions*. The following functions are just as important as they are evident: the training of specialists capable of taking over and further the knowledge developed through higher education; carrying out competitive scientific research; training specialists able to take on and put into practice the application of knowledge through higher training; providing updated technologies through

¹⁵ See, for example, Graham Impey, Nic Underhill, *The ELT Manager's Handbook*, Heinemann, Oxford, 1994, p. 9 and f.

¹⁶ See Andrei Marga, *Die Mission und die Funktionen der Universität heute*, in Winfried Böhn und Martin Lindauer (Hrsg.), *Die Universität in der Gesellschaft. Verantwortung und Chancen für die Zukunft*, pp. 183-207.

¹⁷ T. Parsons, G. M. Platt, *The American University*, Cambridge University Press, Mass., 1972, chapter 2.

technological innovation; analyzing the evolutions in the economic, social and administrative environment; the assessment of situations and the commitment to civil rights, social justice and reforms. Therefore, the functions of the university are nowadays comprehensively assumed and have the best chances of success if the university is considered a formative institution for *sharing and increasing knowledge*; *being a center of competitive scientific research*; a formative institution for *taking over and applying knowledge*; a source of *technological innovation*; a forum for the *critical analysis of situations*; a place for *commitment to civil rights, social justice and reforms*.

Each of these functions is to be understood systematically, taking into account the present conditions of a university's actions. For instance, the university as a formative institution has to be rethought within the framework of the strong internationalization of the contents and the organization of higher education, just as the university as system of services for the community should be regarded in the framework of globalization and of the increased competition on the products markets, and the university as a forum of critical analysis should be considered against the background of the strong tendency towards functional differentiation within modern society.

This range of functions - one can rightfully say - makes one realize the enduring establishment of the university in European societies without the *passeist refuge* into a past that has inevitably become a part of the museum, and without *the surrealist claim* to a future inevitably more complicated than one thinks. It means an understanding of the university in which this institution continues - conversely - to ensure *the cooperative and argumentative search for truth*, as a benefit of autonomy, without reclusion and without allowing itself to be dissolved by the evolutions around it.

This range of functions certainly has an explanation based on the understanding of the university mission and on the historical evolution. More important, however, than the possibility of this explanation, is the fact that this range of functions allows us to depart, on a solid factual basis, from *the aporias*, the reflection on university seemed to enter in recent decades. We can, for instance, resist giving in to the claims according to which the 'university has died' under the burden of functionalist grounds, highlighting the clues of the cooperative search for truth and of the functional autonomy of the university. We can resist giving in to the temptation of reducing university education to the training naturally required by the economic environment, by highlighting the university as a formative institution for the expansion of knowledge and as a center for competitive scientific research. We can face the temptations from inside the universities to imagine them as places for the non-committed search of truth, isolated from the events of society, affirming, in a beneficial way, the university as a source of technological innovation, a forum for critical analysis and a place of commitment to civil rights, social justice and reforms. We can steer clear of the temptation of deforming university courses and seminars, transforming them into places for mere information for action, by developing the university as a formative institution for the taking over, sharing and expansion of knowledge, a center for competitive scientific research and a system of specialized community services. We can, in support of this range of university functions, in an era of the proliferation of institutions only self-entitled as universities and of unprecedented requests addressed to higher education, to clarify once again, with the necessary rigor, what a university proper means today, and therefore, when we deal with '*true universities*'¹⁸.

Already through their mission and explicitly through their functions, *universities embody values, a function based on certain values and promote values within society*. In

¹⁸ See *Magna Charta Universitatum*

fact, universities embody values, but they remain competitive institutions (in forming specialists and knowledge renewal), so that they never let themselves be reduced to only one value, no matter which value that is (therefore neither to academic freedom and university autonomy, nor to equity, for instance, no matter how indispensable any of these values is). *The values of higher education are multiple and they have to be assumed together.*

3.

Where do values intervene in the organization and functioning of a university?

As any other institution or system in the differentiated societies of the modern world, *the choice of values* is inevitable within a university. Eventually, wouldn't a value-based (let's say "truth" or "efficiency") university or system engage an option regarding the other values (for instance, "freedom" or "equality"), in fact the hierarchy of values? Doesn't the promotion of certain values (for example, "equity") involve an option related to competitive values (for instance, "efficiency")? One may say that, even tacitly, a university or a system of higher education, no matter how rigorously organized they might be, from the legal, administrative or technical point of view, request values and imply options among values. Values are unique, in a precise meaning. Therefore, the practical problem is not that of the existence of values within universities as institutions and within the systems of higher education, as this existence is certain and does not constitute a topic of discussion. The problem is another one: having in view the mission and functions of the university and of the higher education system, *what values does a university have to assume?*

Universities represent competitive institutions in the professional formation and education of one's personality, scientific research and community services, promotion of knowledge and a highly intellectual approach, the function of which is based on rules (legislation, internal regulation, strategies, operational planning etc.). Any institution functions according to some rules. Is the reference only to its own rules enough for the institution to function according to them? Or to function with competitive achievements? The answer is "no" because, in fact, anywhere in the world, in the case of any institution, not only does *the implementation of rules depend on the values* assumed by those involved, but those values open the horizon where the rules themselves are applied. Values represent conditions for the possibility and efficiency of rules.

We would like to debate this assertion by an analogy with the inspiring argumentation of the need for the functioning of democracy to be nurtured by *cultural ideals*¹⁹. The ideals intervene in the rules of democracy at two decisive moments. First of all, ideals intervene in the genesis itself of the rules ("il ne faut pas oublier que de grandes luttes pour des idéaux ont produit ces règles") and, afterwards, they intervene when rules are applied (rules cannot become common laws without having the individuals animated by the ideals that made rules possible). In the case of democracy, one may speak of ideals such as tolerance, non-violence, gradual modernization of the society, fraternity, which have turned the rules of democracy into reality and support their implementation.

In their turn, universities function based on certain ideals, which also intervene at least at two points: in the genesis of rules and in the support of their implementation. For instance, the rules of the seminar have been possible only under the condition of assuming *the ideal of the cooperative pursuit of the truth*, and the rules for the knowledge exam cannot be successfully implemented unless all the persons involved are guided by *the ideal of knowledge expansion* and of *the maximization of their own competences*. And examples can

¹⁹ Norberto Bobbio, *Le futur de la démocratie*, Seuil, Paris, 2007, pp. 131-133.

go on. The university has emerged and optimally functions only under circumstances in which those who bring it to life are animated by certain ideals.

The reverse relation is also valid. Values represent a condition for the possibility of the rules, but *values themselves can only be promoted under the conditions of certain adequate rules*. Let us take as an example the current debate on equity related to the access to universities. It is well known that the university is an institution open to any citizen that accomplishes certain requirements as to the amount of knowledge and skills they possess. The social achievement of an academic system consists exactly in being accessible to social categories as diverse and wide as possible of the population in the society. In fact, each person must have the chance to attend courses of higher education according to his/her personal life project. In other words, *equity* represents the founding value of the university. But this value does not actually become real if the system of higher education is in such a way differentiated that those persons with uncompetitive incomes occupy most of the places in permissive universities that lack achievements. Equity does not allow its separation from *quality*, so that university practices affect it from this point of view as well.

Values condition the obtaining of achievements within institutions. For instance, if one takes into consideration the preliminary situation of activities, what we call “good work”, then one may say that professional skills and abilities, which imply scientific knowledge, are definitely of crucial importance. Are these skills and abilities, as well as the scientific knowledge that upholds them, enough in order to obtain “good work”? In fact, there is always a difference between “being member of a profession” and “acting like a professional”, and for many reasons “the individual must be able to step back from daily life and to conceptualize the nature of work and the nature of community”²⁰. Current pedagogies confirm, once again, that “science can never constitute a sufficient education” and that “science - even with engineering, technology and mathematics thrown in - is not the only, and not even the only important, are of knowledge... Other vast areas of understanding - the social sciences, the humanities, civics, civility, ethics, health, safety, training of one's body - deserve their day in the sun, and, equally, their hours in the curriculum”²¹. *Achievements, therefore beginning with “good work”, depend not only on professionalism, but also on the action of those involved, just like the professionals.*

Values are a necessary condition not only for the productive functioning of systems (political, legal, economic etc.), but also for the productive exercise of leading positions. The way in which this exercise is made allows us to make a *distinction between the boss (one who acquires authority only in the name of his/her appointment or election), the manager (one who gains authority based on the ability to lead a system in order to reach an established achievement) and the leader (one who has authority due to his/her ability to establish goals, which have to be reached by the system, and alternatives to direction and action)*²². The issue of values appears in each person's case, and the research carried out during the last years, dedicated to the management of institutions, has signaled phenomena such as “the impoverishment of emotionality”, “the isolation among people”, “the attempt to become noticed at any cost”, “the unproductive waste of energies”, “the wrong evaluation of the limits of one's own power”, “the internalization of the pressures around until the paralysis of the will”, “arbitrary decision”, personality problems under different forms. The observation that

²⁰ Howard Gardner, *Five Minds for the Future*, Harvard Business Press, Boston, Mass., 2008, p. 129.

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 14-15.

²² See Andrei Marga, *Multiculturalism, Interculturality and Leadership, in Higher Education in the World*, 3, GUNI, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2008, pp. 114-118.

the only constant in an individual's life is self-awareness, exposed to a constructive change²³, is available in all cases. And this "*self-awareness*" marks the behavior of any person, even though the communities and systems that surround his/her life are present in the anonymous structures of his/her own living. On the other hand, the more "self-awareness" communicates with the acquired knowledge, is willing to be informed by culture, makes the synthesis of the data and engages with its entire being, the more a person can examine more profoundly whether the reality given by experience is the one he/she wants and whether his/her own approach has alternatives or not. It has been rightfully said that, on the conception level, the individual has the experience of his/her sincerity²⁴ exactly in philosophy. This statement is valid, in fact, in relation to *the culture* acquired by that person.

Today European universities are confronted with "*challenges*" specific to the new century: "extending education" by "continuing education", "massification of traditional academic training" and increasing the importance of postgraduate studies, "globalization of the qualification market", internationalization of training, multiplication of higher education providers, setting up a comprehensive electronic world library, expansion of the long distance higher education system, profiling of "constructive learning", transition from the formation of "individuals" to the formation of "persons"²⁵. And in a society that has entered a financial and economic crisis, there are other "challenges" that are added to the above-mentioned "challenges", i.e. the challenge of "ensuring an institution's own sustainability", of articulating new knowledge and identifying the means to overcome the "crisis existing in the late modernity", of facing "the risks existing in the globalised society".

Impressive phrases - "the demise of metanarratives", "the dictatorship of relativism" "the emergence of a multicultural and intercultural society", "pay or decay", "the imperative to develop cutting edge research" "the emergence of green economy", "toxic loans and toxic developments", "the hour of nooethics, besides ecoethics and bioethics", "the crisis of the existing development model", "the mission of the university is to transcend any narrow utility", "the competition of the universities" etc. – signal *changes in the higher education environment*. They represent a clue to the need for changes in the academic organization.

The *dilemmas* confessed, in the last decade, by universities themselves are pressing: should they continue the tradition or should they reorganize? Should they continue classicism or should they embrace functionalism? Should they promote the humanities and reflexive sciences or should they orientate towards technologies? Should they be selective or should they transform into mass-universities? Scientific research or education? Elitism or accessibility? Equity or competitiveness? Academic specialization or comprehensive specialization? Financing only from public resources or multiplication of the financing resources? Tuition or tuition-free studies? Transparency of activities or concern for competition? Formation for a wide domain or skills creation? Efficiency or achievement? Preparing graduates capable of doing or persons capable of acting? Forming visions or

²³ Klaus-Jürgen Grün, *Wozu benötigen Führungskräfte Philosophie? Autonomie und Freiheit durch methodisches Denken*, Ronnenburger Kreis, Bidingen, 2004, p. 11: „die einzige Konstante im Leben eines Menschen ist sein Selbstbewußtsein, und dieses ist ständiger Wandlung ausgesetzt“.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 52: „in der Philosophie macht der Mensch Erfahrung mit der eigenen Aufrichtigkeit“.

²⁵ See, for further details, Andrei Marga, *The Reform of Education and the Challenges of the Next Century* (2000), in Andrei Marga, *University Reform Today*, Cluj University Press, 2005, pp. 111-135. See also Andrei Marga, *Academic Consequences of Globalization. Open Markets, Autonomous Organizations, Creative Minds*, in Malcolm H. Field, James Figan (eds.), *Education Across Borders. Philosophy, Policy, Pedagogy. New Paradigms and Challenges*, Waseda University, Tokyo, 2005, pp. 17-28.

forming competences? Matching education systems or preserving diversity? Internationalization or endogamy? The decisions taken by university administrations are confronted nowadays with these dilemmas.

Solving the above-mentioned dilemmas does not mean that *risks* do not appear. For several years now, the perceptible risks for higher education institutions are: under-funding; losing the competitions of the globalization era; migration of its own specialists; dependence on private financiers; unemployment of graduates; changes on the labor market; political extremism in some contexts and several others. Some of those risks started to grow deeper during the crisis that began in 2008.

One may say that the *educational profile of the university* must be clarified and, in some cases, radically redesigned. One may notice that the development of civic skills (the ability to systematically formulate and test hypotheses, to argue, to comprehensively approach an issue, to take up civic initiatives) has to become an important priority. On the other hand, one cannot provide competitive training without foreign languages and without participating, with original projects, in the innovation process. The existing teaching methodology and pedagogy must be reconstructed, book reading should be revived, and formation must accompany professional training.

In its turn, *the cultural profile of universities* has to be questioned nowadays. Students need to be trained so that, at the end of the very first cycle, they possess the abilities, skills and competences enabling them to embrace and solve concrete problems. Their training must be oriented towards the concrete demands of technology, economy, administration, and culture. The universities can reach a high level of performance by building upon their students' training in the solving of concrete problems, upon their knowledge of the technical, economic and administrative environment and upon a certain institutional culture. Entrepreneurial training has become part of general education. A university graduate gains in competitiveness if he/she is an entrepreneur as well as an executor, if he/she is willing and capable of assuming not only concrete professional responsibilities, but also institutional and public ones too. A withdrawal into individualism, be it that of one's profession, is no longer productive.

In the last decades, many academics and students have made confusion *between the study of social sciences and the ideological indoctrination*, and ended up virtually eliminating these sciences from their curriculum. It is also true that most of those who taught such disciplines were not prepared enough for today's social sciences. However, the study of sociology, philosophy, argumentation, management, political organization is essential for students, and universities' curricula should be organized properly²⁶. The social sciences that need to be cultivated are radically different from those we used to have prior to the historical changes in the world, and the professors called upon to teach them are different. Above all, however, a competitive university is that where the students can integrate their specialized knowledge into a conception that enables them to systematically approach the problems, to formulate hypotheses and put them to the test, to examine conflicting points of view and to argue their opinions, to bring in new perspectives and solutions.

The capacity of a university is properly measured by the extent to which it develops *the ability to critically examine* one's own institutional and general culture. "Critical

²⁶ See Patricia Kelly, *Internationalizing the Curriculum: For Profit or Planet?*, in Sohail Inayatullah and Jennifer Gidley (eds.), *The University in Transformation. Global Perspectives on the Future of the University*, Bergin&Garvey, Westport (Connecticut), London, 2000, pp. 161-174; Philippe Breton, *Convaincre sans manipuler. Apprendre à argumenter*, La Découverte, Paris, 2008.

reasoning” and “critical argumentation” are indispensable components of a curriculum nowadays. On the other hand, the history of the last decades has also turned *multiculturalism and interculturalism* into important pillars of intellectual relevance, multiculturalism having new sources nowadays. Besides the historical multiculturalism – the situation in which, on the same territory and as a consequence of history, the different cultures or different ethnic or religious communities coexist – we have today a multiculturalism of migration – the situation in which, on the same territory and as a consequence of the immigration, different cultures with different origins meet – and a multiculturalism of restructuring – the situation in which, in the area covered by an institution or a company, the different cultures, relative to different professions, generations, genders etc. meet. *Against the multiculturalism we encounter in the era of globalization, the interculturality and the intercultural education become a task.* Universities are related to the cultivation and the *promotion of outlooks* on the human, social and cosmic world, but these very outlooks are grounded in a critical examination of traditions, in learning from better experiences and in a constant pondering upon the consequences of various visions.

VII. BOOK REVIEWS

Jan Sadlak, Klaus Hüfner, Remus Pricopie and Laura Grünberg (editors), *UNESCO Forum on Higher Education in the Europe Region: Access, Values, Quality and Competitiveness. Topical Contributions and Outcomes*, printed with the support of Government of Romania represented by the Ministry of Education, Research and Innovation, Bucharest, 2009 ISBN 92-9069-193-X, 241 p.

UNESCO – CEPES and the Government of Romania, represented by the Ministry of Education, Research and Innovation, organized on 21-24 May 2009 in Bucharest, the UNESCO Forum on Higher Education in the Europe Region: *Access, Values, Quality and Competitiveness*. The event, organized in collaboration with the Council of Europe, the European Commission, OECD, the European University Association, the European Students' Union and International Education, was convened in the context of regional meetings preceding the 2009 World Conference on Higher Education – *The New Dynamics of Higher Education and Research for Societal Change and Development* (5-6 July 2009, Paris).

The Bucharest Forum provided strong evidence that the last decade was rich in new developments in higher education. It also was an opportunity to record the vast expertise, creativity and readiness in the Europe Region to look anew at the challenges facing higher educations.


The UNESCO Forum reflected also on the outcomes of the Ministerial Conference of the Bologna Process, to be held from 28 to 29 April 2009 in Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium and paid due to the attention to relevant activities and findings of the World Bank, and other UN institutions, as well as other organizations such as the European Association for International Education and the Academic Cooperation Association.

The documents and debates at the Forum have illustrated different national experience in institutional and governmental policies, models and practices allowing the formulation of possible scenarios and policy recommendations for future action at the national, regional and international levels. This provided the basis for the elaboration and adoption of the *Bucharest Message to the 2009 World Conference on Higher Education – Experiences and Recommendations from the Europe Region*. It also facilitated the further development of UNESCO – CEPES as part of an overall program of the Organization.

This volume, a post-conference publication, is composed of two parts: a selection of the main documents of the UNESCO Forum and a CD-ROM with all the documents and texts of the Forum, including the written interventions from respondents and participants. In this way, a testimony of the richness ideas circulated on the occasion of this major regional conference in the area of higher education is offered to all those interested in future of higher education in Europe Region and worldwide.

The following four topics have been identified as being of specific strategic importance and regional relevance:

1. **Access.** The massification of higher education in the Europe Region is no longer a policy objective but a reality and a confirmation of universal aspiration. This new situation has prompted new challenges. In this context, the paper signed by Peter Scott, considers trends and development in access in North America and Europe have always been, and remain, the key drivers of higher education development – despite the emphasis on other dimensions such as quality and workforce demand. Access, as expressed through the social demand for higher education, has not only determined the overall size of



contemporary higher education system but also deeply influenced their practice and values. Despite mixed results produced by the strategies followed in the past and uncertainties of the three scenarios for the future identified by the author, there is little prospect that access would cease to be the dominant factor for the development of higher education - although it can be almost exclusively defined in terms like "fair access" and "widening participation". Instead access is likely to be interpreted in much broader and more fluid terms giving rise to new strategies and policies.

2. **Values.** Values, ethics and moral responsibilities have for centuries shaped the European 'idea of a university'. The recognition of 'academic values' has also been part of higher education in other regions. For the Arab world, presented, in his paper, by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal, as being a world full of contrasts and prejudices, the university must provide a context in which people are encouraged and guided in the exploration of life in its various forms, developing not just skills, but also the intelligence and wisdom to help further collective human journey. In terms of education value-oriented and values-based, Andrei Marga brings through his study, the problems facing today's major universities. According to the author, higher education institutions are at the same time open and obliged to ensure competitive scientific research, high quality education and specialized services for the community. Universities try to ensure their stability within a world that challenges them to take initiatives. They are asked to integrate in the functioning of societies and to explore better alternatives for their organization and evolution. The major conclusions and policy implications arising from his analysis are:

- higher education is the engine of the technological, institutional and cultural development of local, national and global communities;
- universities have to establish their mission and functions, taking into consideration the reality of present society;
- higher education remains, even under the conditions of the diversification of financing sources, a public good that society has equally the right to be interested in and the duty to adequately support from a financial point of view, as well as from the legal regulations point of view;
- multiple values - academic freedom, university autonomy, protection of truth, social responsibility, integrity, argumentative cooperation, equity, creativity – result from the well understood mission and functions of the university, and these values have to be assumed together in new and variable context of the individuals' life development;
- the values of the university can be legitimated by considering them as advanced conditions, but they do not reduce their content to the use of instruments, as they have a rider meaning, and the programmatic preoccupation of the university for the formation of a creative and responsible personalities is of present acuteness, in a new era of modernity;
- values are crucial to overcome the financial and economic crisis, started in 2008; new organization and governance and management solutions, a new language to lead beyond the positivist – utilitarian, functionalist or traditionalistic approaches are indispensable in universities and their economic, administrative and cultural environment;

3. **Quality.** Quality considerations have always been part of higher education. In addition, more then ever before, the quality concern has been internationalized. This new context has brought about important initiatives, for European Region, those are introduced under the agenda of Bologna Process. The most important challenge today in Europe is the need for wider cooperation in order to develop regional and national standards and procedures for quality assurance, combined with the will to safe guard the diversity of higher education system. In his paper Jürgen Kohler found that European institutions and stakeholders are invited to shape the various trends towards vesting responsibility for quality

in higher education institutions effectively yet wisely. As regards in-house activities within higher education institutions, part of this operation will be the development of true quality culture in the broad sense, which will take longer than expected for ownership component as well as for the managerial element inherent to the concept of quality culture. In the context of this growing attention to the quality and excellence movement in the Europe Region and the increasing academics as well as political nature of the debate in quality is aimed to distill potential useful ideas and good practices in promoting excellence in higher education and tackle issues of recent approaches and developments in quality assurance.

4. Competitiveness. One of the most visible changes since the 1998 is the more pronounced presence of competitiveness and attractiveness in higher education policies at the institutional, national and regional levels. An important consideration for the introduction, under the Bologna Process, of convergent structures of programs and degrees, mutual recognition of academic qualifications and periods of study, together with an increase in study programmes' in international languages (in particular English), was the strengthening of the competitiveness such as that of the European Union under the Lisbon Strategy as well as the recognition of its reliance on research and innovation for which higher education plays a crucial role. Various ingredients that make higher education in the European Region today competitive and focusing on topics such as competition for students, competition for new provides, competition for funding as well the complexity of assessing excellence, the challenges of measuring excellence in diverse higher education system where institutions have distinctive missions, structures and process, and the relations between competitiveness and cooperation and academic solidarity as well as sharing experience on good practices already implemented in various countries in the area of improving competitiveness of the respective higher education system and institutions. Population decline and changes in age distribution are affecting higher education systems in most countries in the Europe Region, with a consequence that higher education institutions see the need to compete for students both nationality and internationality, with the risk that international migration be required in order to overcome short ages of skilled labor. In this context new competencies for new demands of the labor market must be anticipated and increased opportunities for higher education and lifelong learning need to be created for improving and upgrading the skills of the work force.

In conclusion, the Bologna Process has demonstrated how reforming higher education in an international cooperative manner can be undertaken and implemented. The decade of its implementation can be recognized as a "regional initiative of global relevance". The other regions might find, with appropriate modifications, the approach and mechanisms applied under the Bologna Process to be useful when formulating strategic goals in their respective national and regional higher education settings.

In a growingly interdependent world, the reform of higher education at the regional, national and institutional level also needs to be carried out in an international manner, while at the same time respecting the local context. A facilitating role of UNESCO could be of great relevance and could play a key role in initiating more cooperation among the different regions.

The participations in the UNESCO Forum on Higher Education in the Europe Region, affirm that higher education and research are now entering a new stage of development. Undoubtedly, higher education has become a very complex system which requires an adequate intrinsic knowledge about its structures and functioning. And although the crucial role of higher education is recognized, there remains a need for seeking appropriate policy directions and the formulation of adequate solutions.

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Maurice Vaisse, *International Relations after 1945*, The Institute of Euro-regional Studies, University of Oradea Publishing, 2010, ISBN 978-606-10-0102-6, 285 p.

Maurice Vaisse Văisse graduated with a History *Agrégation* in 1967. He has been a professor of contemporary history at Reims University, and is now a professor at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris, where he teaches history of international relations. Since 2008, he has headed the scientific council for historical research at the Ministry of Defense. Văisse is a member of the commission of diplomatic archives, and heads the Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques français, tasked with the publication of diplomatic notes. From 1981 to 1995, he has headed the Association pour la recherche sur la paix et la guerre (Arpege). From 1985 to 1986, he was an auditor at the Institut des hautes études de la défense nationale. From 1986 to 2000, he headed the Groupe d'études français d'histoire de l'armement nucléaire (French study group for history of nuclear weapons). He presided the Centre d'études d'histoire de la défense (Centre for studies of Defense History), and has been a technical councilor to the Charles De Gaulle Foundation between 1995 and 2001. Văisse has, furthermore, sat on numerous peer committees, notably for *Relations Internationales*, *Politique étrangère*, *Défense nationale*, *Cold War History Review*, and the *Retour aux textes* collection of la Documentation française. Since 1991, he has co-directed the *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, and since 1996, the *Histoires* collection of Bruylant Editors. Văisse sits on the administration council of Liberté pour l'histoire. Văisse is the father of Justin Văisse, who also is a prominent historian.

The main distinctions he received for the scientific activity are Knight of the Legion of Honor (1994), Officer of the Ordre national du Mérite (2000), Doctor *honoris causa* from Oradea University (Romania, 2002), Prize of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques for *Diplomatie et outil militaire*, 1992, Prize of the Institut de France for *Sécurité d'abord*, 1981, Membre of the Franco-British Council.

Among the various well known papers of the author, the present one, *The International Relations after 1945*, has the structure and typology of a manual and it is addressed especially to the teachers and students from the International Relations sphere. Being at its first publishing in Romanian language, the paper appeared under the initiative of the Prof. Univ. PhD Ioan Horga and under the aegis of the Institute of Euro-regional Studies, the Jean Monnet Excellence Center, inside the University of Oradea. In the over 280 pages, Maurice Vaisse, in a very clear and descriptive way, managed to present the essential data of this extremely complex subject.

The paper approaches the international relations issue after the Second World War, when, as the author states, "the world that it is born ... is profoundly diverse than the one before". The breach, after 1945, between the allied powers that won in the Second World War, lead to the structuring of the international relations around the rivalry between the Soviets and the Americans and implicitly the cleavage between the East and West. In the center of his attention there always were the events inside the Cold War, being emphasized the crisis of the end of the bipolar world, the decolonizing process, the change of international reports. The last three chapters were reserved to the end of the bipolar world and the imperial order after 2001.




At the beginning of the '90s, the collapse of the Soviet Empire shackled the bipolar system, the world being today trained in a reorganizing process that oscillates between the single-polarity and multi-polarity. Threw the approached subjects – which cover the historic perspectives, the most influent theories, the practice and conceptual issue of the international security etc. - , the volume can be used during the whole way of the academic studies and masters, as well as by those interested in an introductory academic treatment of these themes.

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Eurolimes, vol. 9, ***The Cultural Frontiers of Europe***, The Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies “Jean Monnet” Centre of Excellence), Spring 2010 Edition, 183 p., ISSN: 1841-9259

This latest issue of *Eurolimes* is titled “The Cultural Frontiers of Europe” and is dedicated to the Europe of culture. What is Europe and foremost, what is the Europe of culture? Is the term “border” current or would it be more accurate to use “frontier” instead? And what is “accurate” in a world where the more fluid frontier has been leading us to new quests, to shape the Old into New, to keeping the essence while facing the osmosis called “intercultural” (i.e. dialogue, exchange, communication, transfer, diversity, etc.). These are a few aspects of the European current queries that this issue of *Eurolimes* addressed.

The Journal is constructed around three central themes. In the first section, Georges Contogeorgis (Athens), Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (Coimbra), Sharif Gemie (Glamorgan) and Maria Vekua (Tbilisi) examine “The Birth and Evolution of the Intercultural Frontiers”. Prof. Contogeorgis, in his article titled “Cultural Europe and Geopolitics”, looks into the nearing between the fields of culture and geopolitics immediately after WW II, taken further by the Cold War and the subsequent ending of the bipolar world and deepened by the “peculiar antagonistic tug-of-war between the European Union and the USA in the environment of globalization”. “The Europe of culture prevails over all political structure” reads Prof. Tavares Ribeiro’s article titled “Europe of Cultural Unity and Diversity”. The progress of society involves nowadays deep changes and deteriorations in the identity of each nation: lifestyle, economy, science, mass media, state structures (Church, army, university), and while knowing that the language is the irreplaceable support of cultures, the world has been facing a “certain Americanization of mass”. The paper argues that we cannot anymore speak of a European culture influencing national cultures, but of a Europe of cultures. Prof. Gemie contemplates the situations of the refugees in his article “Re-defining refugees: nations, borders and globalization. Starting off from the Malkki-Kibrian debate, the article gives the insight of what a refugee is and questions the “centrality of « home » to refugees”. We are offered two vantage points on the refugee, how the state treats the refugees and how the refugees see themselves. The Georgian Maria Vekua defends Georgia in the context of cultural communications, studying the background and the perspectives of cultural relations between Georgia and Europe, in her article “Georgia and Europe in the Context of Cultural Communications”.



The second section, "The Europe of Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue" houses four articles. "A few aspects on intercultural dialogue: interwar Romania as seen by the Portuguese Diplomat Martinho de Brederode" by Alina Stoica and Sorin Sipos (Oradea) reveals the interwar Romania through the eyes of a diplomat coming from the other end of Europe, in a precarious period ground by the effects of WW I. What precisely were the connections between Lisbon and Bucharest and how were they developed, if at all, are two questions to which this article attempts to identify documented answers. In the second article, "Rural cultural border", Barbu Stefanescu (Oradea) studies the rural world and finds it contaminated by the "dominant urban". The "cultural elements of archeocivilization, imprinted with past age traits" slowed down the transition to modern urban. The paper argues that Europe needs its identity elements, be they local, national or regional, and what better way to have such elements than to preserve and exploit the cultural heritage (rurality) of the entire Europe? On the same note, Chloe Maurel (Paris) makes an in-depth analysis of the UNESCO's impact on the world cultural heritage ("From the East-West major project (1957) on the Convention on Cultural Diversity (2007): UNESCO and Cultural Borders"). Nicolae Paun and Georgiana Ciceo (Cluj-Napoca) look at Turkey's possible accession to the EU in terms of comparison to Europeanness ("The limits of Europeanness. Can Europeanness stand alone as the only guiding criterion for deciding Turkey's EU membership?")

Last but not least, the third section titled "Artistic Intercultural Expression" contain three studies carried out by Didier Francfort, Denis Saillard and Jean-Sebastien Noel. In Didier Francfort's "De l'histoire des frontières cultures à l'histoire culturelle des frontières et à l'histoire des cultures frontalières. Pour une rupture de perspective et de nouvelles approches", we get familiar with the notion of cultural border by looking into international researches on human body related fields, such as dancing or cooking, then into the frontier imposed by music during the annexation of Moselle by Germany and then into the nowadays cinema. Denis Saillard's "Nourritures et territoires en Europe. La gastronomie comme frontière culturelle" studies, as the title states, the links between food and territory, highlighting cultural transfers together with transnational features. Jean-Sebastien Noel, in "Klezmer "revivalisms" to the test of real or supposed cultural borders: the stakes of memory and objects of misunderstanding", argues that Jewish discourses based on "roots" and "authenticity" raises in a very particular manner the "question of cultural borders as a question of representation".

Section four houses the Focus Study done by Ioan Horga and Mircea Brie (Oradea) on "Europe: A cultural Border, or a Geocultural Archipelago".

In addition to the aforementioned section, there are also sections containing book reviews, the Institute's European projects (organization of international conferences) and last but not least, some words about the authors who published in this issue of *Eurolimes*.

All studies span in the direction of the new cultural frontiers of Europe, attempting to take up as many vantage points as possible. The Journal is useful for the general reader or researcher within international relations, European studies, history, anthropology or other related areas, presenting frameworks for analyzing these fields. The originality of the articles lies in the interdisciplinarity approach on the relationship between culture and geopolitics, an area which attracts increasing attention among scholars and students.

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Dorin CIMPOEȘU, *Republica Moldova între România și Rusia. 1989-2009 (The Republic of Moldova between Romania and Russia. 1989-2009)*, Ed. Casa Limbii Române Nichita Stănescu, Chișinău, 2010, ISBN: 978-9975-4129-0-2, 427 p.

This book represents the most comprehensive analysis on the internal developments of the Republic of Moldova and its relations with the Romania and Russia in the past two decades. The author, managed to cover this subject within a PhD thesis in History, defended in February 2010 at the University of Bucharest. His historical research exemplifies an interdisciplinary approach where elements of recent history, political science and international relations are gathered within a scientific structured book. More than that, the author's experience within the Romanian diplomatic mission in Moldova offer him a more deeply perspective Moldova's international relations.

The structure of the book, offers a comprehensive framework for the understanding of the geopolitical and historical positioning of Moldova in international relation. The introduction is focused on the historical background of Basarabia (Republic of Moldova) in the disputes between Romania and Russia. The first chapter emphasizes the preferences and interests of Romania and Russia toward the Republic of Moldova, as a territory that has been a permanent dispute between the imperialist ambitions of Moscow and a struggle for Romanian unity in the past two centuries. Also, the new international order set after the end of Cold War and the dissolution of Soviet Union, which allowed the expression Moldavian international identity and its independence, led to the formation of specific policies of the Moldavian neighboring states, especially Romania and Russia.

The internal political transformations of the Republic of Moldova are analyzed within the second chapter, suggestively entitled "The political governing in the recent history of Basarabia" (May 1990 – July 2009). The author makes deep analysis on the internal preference formation of each government and power coalitions, related to the overall Moldavian effort to enhance its democratic system and its identity. As it can be observed from the political context and political groups' preferences, the internal dynamics were always influenced by the support of either Russia, for neo-communists and Romania, for pro-europeans. The analysis is focused on internal elections, the successive governments' preferences and the political compromises among different political parties. A particular attention is focused on what the author name it as a "soviet communist restoration" after 2001, in the context of the ascension to power of Vladimir Voronin and the shifts in the internal and external policies of the Republic of Moldova.

The third chapter is dedicated on the Romanian - Moldavian bilateral relations during the center-right government that allow a more flexible approach on issues regarding the national identity of Republic of Moldova. One of the most delicate issue within the internal and international dynamics of Moldova - the Transdniestrian region – is analyzed also within a distinctive chapter (Chapter four). This delicate issue is actually represent a case study that emphasizes the dependence of the Republic of Moldova on the external support and influence from the East and the West (Romania and Russia).

The relations between the Republic of Moldova and Romania during the communist restoration are investigated in the fifth chapter which underlines the turn of Moldova's preferences toward a more closed view on Moldavian identity. The



deterioration of bilateral relations and the political discourse between the officials is examined within the sixth chapter. Again, the issue of Transdniester region is scrutinized in the context of the communist regime in a distinctive chapter.

The overall approach used by Dorin Cimpoeșu in its book is historically based on political preferences. The sources, the bibliographical notes and the annexes are demonstrating a great effort of investigation. The book represents an excellent instrument for everyone who is interested in the understanding of the recent history of the Republic of Moldova. Still, we recommend a critical reading in order to overpass the author preferences that indicates a of degree subjectivity. This should be assumed as a deep emotional involvement of the author and his interest on the Romanian heritage of Moldavian identity.

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Alexander Dubček e Jan Palach. Protagonisti della storia europea, A cura di Francesco Leoncini, Rubbettino, 2009, 409 p., ISBN 078-88-498-2243-4

“Alexander Dubček e Jan Palach. Protagonisti della storia europea” est le titre du volume édité par Francesco Leoncini, professeur d’histoire des pays slaves et de l’histoire de l’Europe Centrale à l’Université Ca’ Foscari de Vénice et présenté le 9 février dans la Salle de Réunions du Palais Antonini de Udine, Italie. Le volume a été présenté dans le contexte de l’anniversaire de 20 ans après la chute des régimes communistes en Europe. Le nouveau livre soigné et préfacé par Francesco Leoncini est une contribution très innovatrice à la littérature de spécialité au sujet du Printemps Tchécoslovaque, par son organisation et notamment conception et par la richesse de la documentation.



Le volume est une compilation d’essais de nature philosophique, sociologique et historico-culturelle et offre une image générale sur les 8 mois pendant lesquels s’est déroulé l’expérience politique au-dessus mentionnée, mais également de la période immédiatement suivante à l’invasion. En même temps, nous trouvons une excellente mise en valeur et une très bonne explication de la situation internationale de ce temps-là, mais surtout de la position du Parti Communiste face aux événements. Une série d’interviews, qui en fait composent le volume en lui donnant de l’authenticité, nous confère l’image d’ensemble vis-à-vis des événements qui se sont succédés en ’68 et également ce ceux qui ont suit jusqu’à la Chute du Mur de Berlin. L’originalité du livre et ce qui le fait unique en fait est donné par les quelques confessions des personnages qui ont réellement pris part aux événements, mais aussi l’insertion iconographique existante.

Alexander Dubček et Jan Palach ne sont pas l’expression d’un pays ou d’un système de gouvernement disparu en ce moment, mais les protagonistes d’un épisode qui pose toujours des points d’interrogation à la conscience et à l’historiographie européenne. Ce chef d’œuvre, le fruit de plusieurs années de travail, est une contribution innovatrice vis-à-vis du Printemps Tchécoslovaque, notamment par la richesse des documents présentés. Dans le contexte politico-social-culturel de ce temps-là prend naissance le désir et la sollicitation du Jan Palach, adressé d’abord en contre de la gestion de la crise par Dubček, considérée défaitiste et qui accepte toutes les prétentions soviétiques, en essayant faire conscientiser les citoyens de ce qui allait se passer. Alexander Dubček et Jan Palach,

le chef d'Etat et l'étudiant, sont néanmoins les protagonistes de l'histoire ou d'un épisode de l'histoire, où un simple garçon veut par son geste de sacrifice suprême changer la conscience du peuple et la médiation politique, en se mettant dans le feu et en brûlant de vif dans le Marché Wenceslas de Prague. C'était sa manière de protester vis-à-vis de l'invasion de la Tchécoslovaquie par les troupes du Traité de Varsovie. L'invasion militaire des troupes conduites par l'URSS au mois d'août 1968 a eu l'intention de stopper la libération qui commençait à être introduite par le gouvernement d'Alexander Dubček par ce qu'on appelle le Printemps de Prague. Palach a été le premier d'un groupe d'étudiants qui ait fait un pacte de s'autoimmoler, mais la majorité d'étudiants a changé d'avis lorsque Jan Palach leur a raconté, en mourant, les douleurs qu'ils souffriront. Les autres deux étudiants qui ont respecté quand même le pacte et se sont autoimmolés ont été Jan Jajic et Evzen Plocek. Jan Palach a été considéré martyr, et pendant le régime communiste a été le symbole pour une Tchécoslovaquie libre.

Donc, par une succession originale d'interviews, le livre analyse le cadre international de ce période-là, la position du Parti communiste italien, l'année '68 et le développement des événements qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à la chute du Mur de Berlin, mais sans oublier que la „leçon” tchécoslovaque, même des années après, a toujours le pouvoir d'influencer et d'inspirer et de faire penser les gens.

Francesco Leoncini est parmi les plus originaux interprètes, sur le terrain international, de l'histoire tchèque, slovaque et de l'Europe centrale, ce qui est évident dans son volume. Son originalité réside justement dans sa capacité interprétative de placer la tradition culturelle tchèque et slovaque et de la rendre actuelle dans ce moment de crise pour le modèle néolibéralisme par un message d'humanisme démocratique et socialiste. L'idée transmise c'est qu'il faut toujours se souvenir des événements importants de l'histoire et qu'il faut noter également les sacrifices qui ont marqué certains moments. C'est ce qui nous fait plus sensibles et nous aide, peut-être, à ne pas répéter certaines erreurs du passé.

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Sorin Șipoș, Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Igor Șarov, Ion Gumenâi (coord.), *Politici imperiale în Estul și Vestul Spațiului Românesc (Imperial Politics in the East and West of the Romanian Space)*, Editura Universității din Oradea & Editura Cartdidact din Chișinău, 2010, 583 p., ISBN 978-606-10-0190-3; ISBN 978-9975-4001-2-1.

The cooperation between the University of Oradea and the State University of Chisinau reached the publication of the third volume appeared as a result of joint conferences and that have the subject *Politici imperiale în estul și vestul spațiului românesc (Imperial Politics in the East and West of the Romanian Space)*. The volume was published as a result of the cooperation of State University from Chisinau, University of Oradea, the Centre for Transylvanian Studies from Cluj Napoca of the Romanian Academy and the Museum of Țării Crișurilor from Oradea.

The volume brings together more than 30 papers grouped in five sections: 1. Empires, models and imperial politics: issues and historiographies, 2. Politics, administration and society within the Empires from Middle Age, 3. Politics, administration and societies within the Empires



from Modern Epoch, 4. Constructions and Imperial strategies in Romanian space in XX century, 5. Consequences and echoes of imperial politics in recent history. Authors such as Emil Dragnev, Barbu Ștefănescu, Andrei Cușco, Victor Taki, Gabriel Moisa, Igor Șarov, Florin Sfrengeu, Șerban Turcuș, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Ion Eremia, Mihai Georgiță, Sorin Șipoș, Florina Ciure, Ioan Ciorba, Bodo Edith, Cristian Apati, Valentin Tomuleț, Ion Gumenăi, Ludmila Coadă, Andreana Brândaș and Emilia-Adina Gale, Mircea Brie, Ovidiu Mureșan, Radu Românașu, Dana Pantea, Adrian – Claudiu Popoviciu, Octavian Țicu, Florentina Chirodea, Polgar Istvan, Gheorghe Palade, Antonio Faur, Teodor Candu, Penka Peeva, Alina Stoica, Mihai Drecin, Ion Zainea, Cristina Dogot, Sergiu Musteață, Titus Fizeșan, Ioan Horga, Dorin Ioan Dolghi, Luminița Șoproni, Constantin Țoca express interesting points of view related to the history of Romania and Bessarabia, found at the confluence of three great empires.

The papers presented in the volume includes topics such as byzantine inheritance in Eastern Europe, historical reality and historiographical ideas between the Austrian „iron yoke” and Turkish „wooden yoke”; construction of Bessarabia, Imperial and National models; historiographical imperialism at East and West of Romania; Russian historiography between political and historical discourse; anti-imperial attitudes in Latin-Hungarian chronicals; *Dominus totius mundi*, Christianitas and Transylvania at the beginning of XIII century; The politics directed against the „schismatics” from Transylvania and western parts in XIVth century; the Moldavian – Russian treaty from 1656; Confession, religion and society under the Turkish rule in Oradea; the religious policy of the Court of Vienna in the Principality of Transylvania (1692-1701): the case of Romanians; between Habsburgs and Ottomans: Francisc Rákóczi II in the light of newly discovered venetian documents; measures of combating hunger from the first half of XVIII th century – beginning of XIXth century; the effects of the politics of protection of Austrian state on the peasantry from Bihor; the implementation of matricol protocols in orthodox parishes from Bihor (1779-1847); Repercussions of the regime of tsarists domination on the genesis and evolution of the commercial bourgeoisie from Bessarabia (1812-1830); The confessional politics as an element of denationalization seen by imperial Russian strategies at its western boundaries; the impact of Imperial politics on the periphery: the role and the place of the institution of *zemstva* in Bessarabian society; Orthodox reaction to the politics of catholicization. Other papers are focusing on the following topics: Juridical reglemmentations concerning the family in Austrian and Hungarian legislation from the second half of XIX th century, Romanian projects of federalization in XIXth century and at the beginning of XX century; Austro-Hungarian School Politics in Transylvania and the attitude of Romanian Parliament (1890-1907); The image of England in the activity and stories of Romanian diplomats in XIXth century; European Commission of Danube (CED), functionalist model in international relations arena; Bessarabia from Russian empire to Greater Romania: A study of Interdependency between the process of integration and the Soviet interference; Law Academy of Oradea during the period of transition from Hungarian authorities to the Romanian ones (1919-1921); A Romanian-Hungarian political dispute: the count Istvan Bethlen about the historical mission of Hungary in Central Europe and Balkans; The impact of Soviet rapt from June 28 1940 on the intellectuality from Bessarabia; Reports of French diplomats about the Soviet ultimatum in the summer of the year 1940; From the history of the administrative-territorial organization after the setting free of Bessarabia from the Soviet occupation. Case study: Vasieni village, Lapusna county (July 1941-March 1942); The 1945 Moscow Conference and the United States Policy on the Diplomatic Recognition of Bulgarian and Romanian Governments; The postbelic crisis and its repercussions on the

daily life in Romania, in the view of Martinho de Brederode; The External Politics of Popular –Democrat Romania from obedience to Moscow to national demnity (1958-1968); The historical speech related to the territory from Eastern Romanian space, in the years 1966-1977, and the censorship. A comparative perspective; Romanian public administration from communism to reform and Europeanization; The teaching of history in the Republic of Moldova and the tentatives of adherence to Soviet imperialist practices; The failure of a mediation between two imperialisms – OSCE and the frozen conflicts from ex-Soviet space; Imperial Trends in Global International Society; Political Geography in the area of Black Sea. The role of Romania; The Empires of communication – global campaigns that lead the world; Oradea -crossborder city – a historical analysis.

The volume offers a view on the history of Romania and Republic of Moldova on a large segment of time, starting with the antiquity and ending with the contemporary times and recent history. The analyze is elaborated, detailed, precise and many of the aspects presented in this volume treat in detail subjects that are not generally known by the large public. The book successfully completes the missing pages in Romanian and Bessarabian history because of the lack of information about the common past of the two countries pursued during Soviet era.

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Ukraine - Romania - Moldavia: Historical, Political and Cultural Aspects of Their Relations in the Contemporary European Processes Context. Collection of scientific articles. Volume III, 480 p., ISBN 978-966-399-196-2, edited by Bukovynian Centre of Political Studies, 2009

This book is the result of international collaborations between the University's of Ukraine, Romania and Moldavia, that present an article or an research at the International Scientific Conference <*Ukraine – Romania – Moldavia: Historical, Political and Cultural Aspects of Their Relations in the Contemporary European Processes Context*> trough 18 – 19 September 2007 at the Yuriy Fed'kovych Chernivtsi National University in Ukraine.

The volume was published in 2009. It is divided into 5 chapters, each one focused on a different aspect of the Ukraine – Romania – Moldavia relation. The first chapter is entitled *Ukraine – Romania – Moldavia Relations: Lessons of the historical experience*, and includes articles from Teofil Rendiuc, Iuri Makar, Tadeu Yațeniuk and studies from Bogdan Bodnariuk, Marian Tokar and Sorin Șipoș. The studies and articles present the relations, changes, political situation and human development and integration of the 3 countries in different time points, from the late middle ages and 18th century testimonials of the French officer Lazowski till the 2002 tally in Romania. In the second chapter *Safe Dimension of the Relations: Energy and military-political aspects*, we are taken to problems more of the contemporary issues from a security point of view, focusing on military collaborations and energetic collaborations, for the 3 countries. The articles are from Galina Drozdova, Evheny Burdelny, Viktor Petrov , Oleksandr Pelin and Oksana Ivats, which have a very long experience on the researched fields. The article of Galina Drozdova is axed on the post soviet situation of the



Ukraine and Moldavia. Evheny Burdelny talks about the migration from an EU point of view. Viktor Petrov article presents the long road of the Romanian Integration in EU and that is should be consider a guide book for the Integration of Ukraine in the EU structures. Oleksandr Pelin and Oksana Ivats article shows that Ukraine different regions could collaborate not only economical but political with countries that are form the Black Baltic-See Axe, better than with the Counties of the Mediterranean Black See Axe. The third chapter *Politically-Legal, Socially-Economical and Social Relations between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova, their European Integral Constituent* has articles referring to the political, economic and social relations according to the future integrations in EU structures of the tree states relating in relation one with the other and separated. From the point of view of Vira Burdiyak, Valentyna Teosa, Valeriy Moshnjaga, Serghiy Palihovych, Vladlen Makukh, Adriy Balynskyi, Olga Surnina, Serhiy Hacman, Evheniya Yuriychuk, Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga and Vasyl Veren'ko. The article of Vira Burdiyak focuses on a new trend that all the post soviet countries are on the European Union Integration. The articles present the steps that the 3 states took to get closer to their goal. The Valeriy Moshnjaga article presents the evolution of the Moldova – European Union relations and the importance of being member of an international structure like the European Union. The Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga article encourages the Ukraine and Romania to take advantage of the Regional Development Programmes to stimulate Cross-border Collaboration. The fourth chapter *Formation of the Joint Approaches towards Studying and Practicing of administration of the Ethno-National Processes in Relations between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova* is focused on the articles that studied the Ethno-National relations between the tree states and the way those relations are directed to develop a better human collaboration and understanding from an European Integration point of view. The articles authors are Yuriy Ostapets, Natalya Rotar, Nadiya Babych, Anatoliy Kruglashov, Constantin Tkachyov, Irina Petrova, Igor Gavrada and Natalya Nechayeva-Yuriychuk. The chapter has only internal point of view, missing external ones. The Natalya Rotar article presents the situation from a ethnic and national point of view regarding the component of the Ukraine political parties in the 2006 and 2007 Parliamentary elections. Igor Gavrada shows in his articles that the Chernivtsi Oblast area, from an mass media point, has a very high tolerance to intercultural relations. The fifth chapter *Cultural, Scientific and Educational dimensions of the relations between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova* presents the human aspects of the bilateral and multilateral collaborations between the three states. The authors of the articles are Anatoly Lysiuk, Anatoliy Kruglashov, Volodymyr Eftemiy, Oleksandr Korol, Alexandru Nedelea, Yaroslav Kirpushko and Alena Dimchuk. The article written by Oleksandr Korol, Alexandru Nedelea is a comparative analysis of the tourism development in Ukraine and Romania from different points of view.

In the end I would like to highlight that this book, has highly academic statute and if you are interested in the Ukraine-Romania-Moldavia relations this is the book you don't want to miss.

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Nicolae Toboşaru, *Parteneriatul Strategic dintre Romania si SUA (The Strategic Partnership between Romania and the USA)*, Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2010, 528 p., ISBN 978-973-595-112-2

The book represents and is the result of many years of assiduous research materialized in a PhD thesis which was presented at the University of Oradea. It takes on a unique role of exploring a recent and delicate topic. The author analyses Romania's transition process from a communist society to a capitalist one. This process involved the reformation of the Romanian society through implementation of democratic values and integration into the western fundamental institutional structures such as NATO and the EU, and finally into a Strategic Partnership with the USA. The latter proved to be a positive influence over the two national objectives. The study focuses primarily on the period between 1997 and 2008 and comprises the revelation of historical, geopolitical and geo-economic and strategic aspects. The publication portrays the significance of Romania from a geopolitical point of view. It plays the role of an eastern European *limes* as an operator in the eastern flank.



The book is divided into four chapters: targeting the problem of the historiography, the historical landmarks, the history of the Strategic Partnership between Romania and the US and finally, its geopolitical significance. It is preceded by the foreword of the former president of Romania – Emil Constantinescu. The author outlines the circumstances and historical foundations along with doctrinal and strategic parameters. He identifies and characterizes the partnership's identity, conceptual and functional parameters. The author also aims for the objectives, directions of action, principles, work tools and mechanisms used, the evolution stages, the actors, resources involved and finally, the results.

The work demonstrates with its bibliography the lack of publications focused on this issue both in Romania and in the United States. This aspect is conveyed in the first part of the book.

In the second part, the author questions on an important issue: is this partnership a natural result of an evolution into a logical historical development of bilateral relations, or is it just an accidental and spontaneous aspect? According to the research, Nicolae Toboşaru concludes it is by no chance an accident, but a corollary of a rising trend line marked by a new chapter written in the history of Romanian-American diplomatic relations. His arguments emphasize on the historical relations between the two states, which began in 1850 when the first American consul travelled to Romania, continuing with the visit of the American president, Richard Nixon to Bucharest in 1969, and culminating with the initiative of the Romanian part of a Strategic Partnership. The paper has the merit of giving fluency to events that were often disparate, which is the result of countless hours of research, patience and clear thinking of the author for the interpretation of some delicate materials.

In the third part, *The History of the Strategic Partnership between Romania and USA*, the author deals with the nature of the semantics of theoretical, political and diplomatic partnerships. He agrees on a minimalist definition for the meaning of a partnership: an association of two entities for achieving common goals or convergent, by their nature and resources deployed to achieve the objectives that could have strategic

significance. This kind of relationship allows the overcoming of political, economic or strategic barriers. This aspect was put into practice by the US at the end of the 20th century, with the disappearance of the bipolarity and affirmation of the American monopole.

In Romania, all three presidential mandates included in the period between 1997 and 2008 are presented in their process of strengthening the strategic partnership between Romania and the USA. The Constantinescu administration managed to change the status of Romania from being a US partner to a direct strategic partner, starting July 22 1997. It can be noticed that starting with the accession of Romania into the EU on January 1, 2007, the position of the Strategic Partnership in security and foreign policy documents of strategic orientation is diminished. This is explained by the author as a superficial political trend of diminishing the pro-American perception of Romania and emphasizing instead on community solidarity.

In the fourth part, *The Significance of the Geopolitical Strategic Partnership between Romania and USA*, the author focuses on the geopolitical aspect of the partnership, the implications of this relation upon the post-December geopolitical profile of Romania, and on the geopolitical and strategic implications of the partnership upon the relations of Romania with the EU. The arguments revolve around Romania's geographical, economic, strategic and demographic coordinates, which place the country in the South-Eastern European and Black Sea region. It represents an Eastern European border, where the Romanian-American relations have clear and significant geopolitical valences with extended effects in sub-regional, regional and even global level.

In conclusion, it can be alleged that Romania has correctly appreciated the security of the Euro-Atlantic region as unbreakable and the dilemma of the Euro-Atlantism versus Europeanization is false. Nevertheless, the Strategic Partnership with the USA is a necessary and accessible way of supporting Romania's struggle to adhere to European values and institutions. It was not conceived as an alternative to Romania's position outside the first wave of the Alliance's expansion or as a gift. On the contrary, it serves both partners and represents a necessity for the parties involved.

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Romanian Journal of Security Studies, Volume 1, No.1, Fall 2010, Oradea University Press, ISSN 2069-0703, 100 p. (www.rjss.ro)

The most recent academic journal that emerged within the Oradea University represents an editorial project in security studies, organized around the MA program in European Security, at the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations. As security studies has known a transfer from specialized institutions toward public universities, there is a need to cover the scientific debate on different approaches of security issues in the international and national contexts. The Romanian Journal of Security Studies aims to gather scientific papers, research results, analysis and opinions related to national, regional and international security environment in order to engage visions of security challenges within a scientific debate. The *RJSS* aims to promote an interdisciplinary approach of security issues to cover the whole spectrum of scientific



perspectives that can contribute to a comprehensive framework for a better understanding of influences and interdependencies of all types of risks, threats and vulnerabilities.

The first issue of *Romanian Journal of Security Studies* is dedicated to the dimensions of the European security and gathers seven articles that underline different approaches of security, from different perspectives. We notice that the Foreword is signed by the former Romanian President Emil Constantinescu who brings his arguments for the need and opportunity of the journal within academic and societal debates.

The first article is signed by Napoleon Pop, and is dedicated on the economic-financial crisis and its impact on international security. The economic aspects related to security suggest a deep influence of economics in the configuration of preferences and expectations related to security. Another article is investigating the transformation of intelligence and it brings arguments for a shift in the perception and role of intelligence in the contemporary political national and international system. The author, Gen. (ret.) Mihail Mărgărit, as a former Chief of Romanian Military Intelligence, uses his expertise to underline the importance of intelligence within a democratic system but also suggest the need for transformation.

Dacian Duna contributes with a paper on the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the integration theories. His investigation relates different theoretical approaches that can explain and relate security dimensions of the European integration. The transatlantic dimension of Romania's trans-Atlantic dimension of national security strategies is evaluated by Nicolae Toboşaru and emphasizes the overall transformation of the Romanian security system in the context of Romania –US partnership and the Romania's integration into NATO. Dorin Dolghi is questioning the security identity in the European Union, from a constructivist perspective and suggests that the EU experience leads toward a transfer of the national oriented preferences toward a supranational/European level, from the perspectives of the citizens.

The governance of security in contemporary international relations is analyzed by Claudiu Țabrea who addresses this issue to the theoretical and analytical debate. His arguments used to underline the governance of security suggest that there is a need for a major shift in the perception and the management of the security issues in international environment. Another dimension of security is addressed to unconventional threats that in this case are related to natural disasters and their approach as a security concern. To this end, the article proposed by Ana Zamfor investigates the floods in Romania, between a national problem and a European alert.

The overall structure of the first issue of RJSS emphasize the importance of such a debate in academic community and civil society, especially that in the past decade there is a major turn from military approaches to a more societal oriented approaches. Also, the journal can be a useful instrument to develop new directions of scientific investigation on security matters that have been ignored or insufficient addressed in the Romanian university system. We can expand this statement on the overall European scientific community.

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Antoinette Fauve - Chamoux, Ioan Bolovan (coord), *Families in Europe between 19th and 21st centuries. From the traditional model to the contemporary PACS*, Presa universitară clujană, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, ISBN 978-973-610-931-7, 818 p.


The book “*Families in Europe between 19th and the 21st centuries. From the traditional model to contemporary PACS*” published under the coordination of Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux and Ioan Bolovan in 2009 approaches various subjects related to the history of European families between 19th and 21st centuries, such as family models in historical perspective, fertility and reproductive behaviour in Europe between 19th -21st centuries, church and family, state and family, the dissolution of the family in past and present and family diversity.

Authors from Romania and abroad present interesting studies related with the history, evolution, models, character of families in Eastern and Western Europe. Such authors are: Jan Kok, Adrian Silvan Ionescu, Ljiljana Stankov, Dana Maria Rus, Rozeta Bici, Barbu Ștefănescu, Dalia Leinarte, Emil Țîrcomnicu, Tünde Turai, Péter Őri, Lumir Dokoupil, Ludmila Nesládková, Radek Lipovski, Carmen Albert, Siegfried Gruber, Catherine Sumnall, Peter Teibenbacher, Ferene Ajus, Wilko Schröter, Traian Rotariu, Lavinia Popp, Maria Cojocar, Florica Ștefănescu, Adrian Hatos, Mihaela Hărăguș, Constanța Vintilă – Ghițulescu, Marius Eppel, Gabriel Gârdan, Rebecca Kippen, Valeria Soroștineanu, Lucian Dorel Turcu, Andra Carola Pinca, Corneliu Pădurean, Oleksandra Macmillan, Jelena Lakus, Daniela Deteșan, Diana Covaci, Elena Crinela Holom, Alina Ciupală, Ioan Bolovan, Sorina Paula Bolovan, Claudia Septimia Peteanu, Bogdan Crăciun, Mircea Brie, Nicoleta Roman, Luminița Dumănescu, Simona Adam, Nagy Imola Katalin, Șarolta Solcan, Anca Dohotariu, Eugen C. Ghiță, Zsolt Vasile Grigoruț, Laurențiu Ovidiu Roșu. They present interesting lectures on topics related with families in Europe in past and present.

An interesting study is the one written of Jan Kok, *Family systems as frameworks for Understanding Variation in Extra-marital births, Europe 1900-2000*. The author presents the situation of Family and Extra-marital births in Netherlands and Romania. He analyzes these aspects for the period 1900-2000. He makes a comparison between these two countries and his research results was that in Netherlands the rates of extramarital births were the lowest in Europe while in Romania was the highest in Europe. This situation was possible, considers the author, because in Romania to give birth to an illegitimate child was not perceived as something negative, while in Netherlands the society tried to stop extra-marital relations.

Adrian-Silvan Ionescu describes the situation of Romanian Family during transition times, 1800-1859. In those times, divorces were frequent, „the partners were often changed and nobody thought this is an immoral habit”. Infidelity was often encountered.

Ljiljana Stankov in the article *The Foundation of a Family - Comprehension and Advice on the Pages of a Female Magazine The Housewife (1879-1941)* describes the situation of the magazine *The Housewife* of the first Serbian Women Association. She makes a portrait of the role of this organization: “The magazine had an active role in the field of women progress, but a lot of space was dedicated to female role in family life, marriage preparations, advice on raising daughters, the positive and negative characteristics of future brides, female features that should be stimulated or controlled,



etc. The authors were the educated women (writers, teachers, professors, actresses), but also the men, assistants - professors, priests, writers. The article were also about the female position in other European societies”.

In the article of Dana-Maria Rus, *PACS – a Valid Alternative for Traditional Marriage?* She talks about the fact that consensual unions, concubinaje and PACS (Civil Solidarity Pact) tend to replace the concept of traditional marriage. The author describes PACs as „a contract signed by two major individuals of different or same-sex in order to organize their common life”. The unions are more and more frequent in Western Europe.

Rozeta Bici writes the article *The Establishment of Albanian Families between the 19th and the 21th centuries in the frame of British Case Study*. The study makes a comparison between Albanian society and the British one. In both societies family is an important value.

Barbu Ștefănescu emphasize the problem of cohabitation in bread that means that brothers or sons who marry continue to live with their parents. The Austrian state wanted to tax as may properties as possible, but in the rural world, the practice was to keep the number of properties reduced.

Péter Öri in the article *Marriage customs and Household structure in Hungary at the end of the 18th century. The case of county Pest-Pilis-Solt (1774-1785)* describes firstly the household structure and then the marriage customs. In Hungary, both Eastern and Western models of marriage were encountered.

In the article *Family models in Banat (19th -20th century)*, Carmen Albert shows how it decreased the population of Banat because of the practices of its inhabitants in 19 and 20 century. Also the Hungaria families from Banat faced the phenomenon. Together with infant mortality and the rate of deaths, the decrease of population in Banat was established.

In the article of Ferenc Ajus, *Fertility, modernization, religion and land availability in Transylvania, 1900-1910*, it is underlined that the period of 1880-1910 was the period of modernization and industrialization in Transylvania. In the south part of Transylvania it started the fertility decline while in north it was an increase rate of fertility. The society was affected by infant mortality, migration, literacy, secularization.

In the article of Wilko Schröter, *Overview about the German Fertility Development, Theoretical Models and Effects of Pro-Natalistic Population Politics*, it is described the historical development of fertility in Germany, from XVIII century till the years 1950-1960 with the baby boom, then with the decrease in the fertility rate. Approximately one third of the women born after 1965 have no children.

In the article of Traian Rotariu, *Marital and Extramarital Fertility in Latter-Day Romania* the author analyzes the extramarital births in Romania. The biggest number of extra-marital births are encountered at women of less than 20 years old who do not have the compulsory level of education. The childrens, in this case, are not planified.

Lavinia Elisabeta Popp and Maria Cojocaru in the article *Causes contributing to the Decrease of Fertility in Contemporary Families* mention among the cases contributing to the decrease of fertility, about abortion which is influenced by economic factors. In opposition, there are families reluctant to have children but with a high economic status. Another cause of abortion come from dismembered families.

In the article of Mihaela Hărăguș, *Different Reproductive Patterns in Romania: An Urban-Rural Comparison* shows that, in rural areas, fertility was higher than in urban areas. In 2005, the author shows that, in rural environment, the rate of fertility was 1.55 while in urban environment was 1.17 and explains the causes for which the rural environment was more favourable for reproductive patterns.

Constanța Vintilă-Ghițulescu in the article *Church and Domestic Order in Romanian Society (1750-1834)* explains the features of the relation between state-church-family during the period 1750-1834. The church continued to keep its privileged of judging and sentencing in cooperation with the state which applied its decision.

Ioan Bolovan and Sorina Paula Bolovan in the article *The impact of World War I on the family in Transylvania* emphasizes the fact that the sons and husbands being left on the front, the family of the husband tries to involve more and more in the life of the daughter in law. The family life was affected by the war and the conditions of the time. After the war, family life in Transylvania went back to normal.

Mircea Brie in the article *Male and Female Authority in Traditional Rural Society* asserts that wives and husbands had their particular role and attributions in traditional rural society. The author's opinion was that the community and the church were on the side of the man. The women has authority in the field of household. The author talks about a triple relationship husband-wife-land. The life of the individual is influenced by weather and nature. The author asserts that in traditional rural society „There are two types of relationships between the spouses. 1. The case of those under their parent, relatives, customs watch, when the woman has an inferior status; 2. The case of those emancipated, „evading” the traditional, when the husband accepts woman's „equality”.

The article of Luminița Dumănescu, *Child raising practices in Transylvania in the second half of the 19th century* reffers to aspects from child life concerning its food, clothing, hygiene and psychical care, diseases and attitudes towards them. The authors provided us an image about how the children were raised in the past.

In the article of Nagy Imola Katalin about *19th century family life and women's roles in Transylvanian literatures*, the author compares the novel of Ioan Slavici, *Mara*, and Janos Kemeny, *The witch of Waters*.

The other papers focus also on the issues of family and society in past and present. The book is worth reading for the elaborated approaches of the authors who reconstitutes the life of the individual in traditional societies, but also in the contemporary world.


Anca OLTEAN (olteananca@hotmail.com)

Catalogue of Published Works Department of International Relations and European Studies*


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


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
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


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


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


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
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