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A New Beginning!

Analele Universităţii din Oradea
Seria: Relaţii Internaţionale şi Studii Europene

Ioan HORGA

For the young group at the Department for International Relations and European Studies at the University of Oradea, the release of this journal is a new challenge. After five years of fruitful academic and scientific activity with "focus" research in the field of International Relations and European studies, the management of great scientific events and publishing their results in scientific proceedings, this group attempts at making their concerns known in other fields than the study of Europe's current and future borders semantics, a topic confirmed by the *Eurolimes* journal. It is the fourth year and eighth issue of this journal with a good international estimate (EBSCO, Copernicus, GESIS, etc.).

The pages of the journal will approach not only new topics. They will also set to the foreground the work and activity of colleagues who start to have a word in the field they have specialised in on a scientific level. Such a focused topic greatly developed in Oradea by Prof. Ioan Horga in the context of the establishment of the *Institute for Euroregional Studies, a "Jean Monnet" Centre of Excellence"* in 2005 would be the place of subnational stakeholders (local communities, regions, etc.) in the environment of the pluralism promoted by the Global International Society. These subnational stakeholders will be some of the most actively involved in international society thus validating Holsti's thesis according to which international relations are social relations reaching power distribution worldwide (K.J.Holsti, 1992:22). One of the priorities of this orientation for the following years will be the structure, work and results that European Groups for Territorial Cooperation will have on the level of European area postmodernist architecture plan once the functional legitimacy of transnational, interregional and cross-border cooperation units.

The topic of the international relations communication that was a focus in Oradea as early as 2001 with four volumes published as a result of conferences organised here (see references) are actually promoted due to the endeavours of Mrs. Luminita Soproni, who has made up a network of collaborators in the country and abroad. They will be present with surveys and articles in each issue of the journal. One of the priorities of this orientation is represented by the role of mass media as a communication vector in international relations.

The topic of European security in international context that is still at the beginning, yet based on adjacent concerns of our group particularly from a historical perspective are about to be consecrated due to our colleague Dorin Dolghi, who has concerns in the field of security regional organisation, as well as our group of collaborators with concerns in the issue of strategic partnerships and political analysis of regions in instability areas. This topic has many opportunities to swiftly develop considering the Master's degree in European Security.

The topic of internal power relations and political leaders in international relations is still at the beginning and is to be developed by our colleague Cristina Dogot. We know that classic and neo-classic theories stress the role of internal power relations and political leaders in international decision-making from the perspective of the motivation of certain group or state interests (Ph. Braillard, 1977: 120). In the pages of this journal, there will be topics relating to this general issue and other particular aspects, such as countries' geostrategic position, the nature of internal political system, the ideology of governments and types of diplomacy.

Due to the concerns of Prof. Barbu Stefanescu, the field of cultural anthropology in international relations will acquire more than an integrating perspective in the pages of our journal due to the interference with other research topics of our group; it will also acquire a particular perspective considering the plurality of the international scene and its dynamics and foundations. The association of young researchers from Oradea, Romania and abroad to focus on this generous topic will be the setting of a fruitful development of this research topic in the national and international study of international relations.

The demographic aspects in international relations debated through the contribution of our colleague Mircea Brie particularly from the perspective of the relationship between ethnie and confession as a foundation of conflicts will acquire new qualities once certain research topics are brought together, such as: social violence geopolitics, migration and socio-professional integration, interculturality, social and demographic community and national policies.

Specific topics in the field of international law and particularly community law applied to cross-border relations that have been researched by our colleagues and others will be proposed by our colleague Adrian Popoviciu. He is currently setting up a network of collaborators with concerns in the field of law and cross-border public managements. They will contribute with punctual articles in the journal.

The conceptual and methodological dimension of research sources in international relations, a steady concern of our colleague Sorin Sipos, will acquire new opportunities in our journal either by proposing new documents or new investigation methods, or by critically assessing certain sources. Our colleague will watch over conceptual accuracy, methodology and sources used by the authors of surveys that are to be published in the pages of our journal.

The eight focus research topics that the editorial committee propose to readers will not exclude other topics with impact. Yet we will attempt to thoroughly focus the informational flow towards the aforementioned topics. At the same time, there will be situations when one or more research topics will not be in each issue leaving room to more fruitful directions; there might also be topic issues on scientific events organised by the editorial staff.

Each issue of the journal will introduce the most important events organised by the Department for International Relations and European Studies. It will also comprise the introduction of a scientific personality relevant to teaching and researching international relations.

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I. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

UN VOYAGEUR FRANÇAIS DANS LES PAYS ROUMAINS: LE CAPITAINE AUBERT

Sorin Domiţian ŞIPOŞ[*]

Abstract: *Spaţiul românesc a reintrat în atenţia lumii occidentale odată cu Reconquista austriacă începută la 1683, după o perioadă în care Imperiul Otoman părea să domine statornic întinse regiuni ale Europei Centrale şi de Sud-Est. Conflictele militare ruso-austro-turce au readus, treptat, lumea românească în atenţia marilor puteri. Boierii moldoveni au arătat cu prilejul tratativelor de pace că ţările române au beneficiat de-a lungul Evului Mediu de relaţii privilegiate cu Poarta, fiindu-le recunoscute autonomia şi instituţiile. Într-un asemenea context, Occidentul este informat, din relatările celor care au călătorit şi au scris despre spaţiul românesc în secolele anterioare, că la nordul Dunării există un popor de origine romanică, care în trecut s-a bucurat din partea Imperiului Otoman de autonomie deplină. Războaiele napoleoniene sporesc interesul Franţei pentru spaţiul Europei de Sud-Est, pe fondul declanşării ostilităţilor cu Rusia.*

Cine este totuşi Aubert? Să încercăm, pe baza informaţiilor din raport, să-i conturăm profilul. În primul rând, este un fin observator al realităţilor româneşti. Căpitan adjunct de stat-major general în armata franceză, era, probabil, ofiţer de geniu sau dintr-o armă înrudită, dacă ţinem cont de interesul arătat faţă de fortificaţiile întâlnite, de cursurile de apă, de căile de comunicaţie de pe uscat. Formaţia sa îi permite să formuleze consideraţii pertinente asupra sistemului de apărare existent, ba chiar să propună ca în apropiere de Vaslui, loc înalt, aflat la confluenţa mai multor râuri şi drumuri, să fie construită o cetate.

În privinţa scopului călătoriei lui Aubert, de fapt a delegaţiei de ofiţeri francezi, deşi acesta nu face nicio precizare, Guilleminot, în raportul redactat la finalul misiunii, dezvăluie că au urmărit convingerea factorilor politici otomani să încheie un armistiţiu cu Rusia. Călătoria a început în 11 iulie din Tilsit, unde doar cu câteva zile înainte s-a semnat tratatul secret dintre Franţa şi Rusia, care prevedea, printre altele, ca Franţa să-i ofere Turciei medierea pentru restabilirea păcii cu Rusia. Călătoria a început cu o zi înainte de ratificarea tratatului. Armistiţiul dintre Turcia şi Rusia a fost semnat la Slobozia, în urma unor discuţii purtate între reprezentanţii celor două puteri, între 12 şi 24 august, şi unde delegaţii francezi au jucat un rol foarte important.

Indiferent de raţiunile călătoriei căpitanului francez, raportul redactat este o sursă documentară importantă despre spaţiul românesc din primii ani ai secolului al XIX-lea. El a fost conceput într-un moment în care interesele Franţei pentru spaţiul românesc sporeau de la o zi la alta.

Keywords: *capitaine Aubert, voyageur français, Pays roumains,l'Empire ottoman, Russie*

L'espace roumain est revenu au centre des préoccupations du monde occidental avec la Reconquête autrichienne démarée en 1683, après une période où l'Empire ottoman semblait avoir renforcé sa domination sur de vastes régions de l'Europe centrale et du Sud-Est. D'une part, l'apparition, dans les rapports entre les grandes puissances de l'Europe, de la *question orientale*, liée à l'héritage de l'Empire ottoman, maintenait vive l'attention des facteurs politiques sur les réalités du Bas Danube (Andrei Oţetea, 1980: 69-176.). D'autre part, le remplacement, par la puissance suzéraine, des monarques autochtones avec des princes grecs de Phanar, au début du XVIIIe siècle, a fait augmenter l'influence de la Porte, donnant la fausse impression que les frontières de l'Empire ottoman avaient franchi le Danube, que les Turcs avaient effectivement pris en possession les Principautés roumaines. Néanmoins, certains

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milieux occidentaux avaient déjà été sensibilisés à l'espace de la partie orientale du continent, leur intérêt augmentant progressivement dans le temps. Le passage de la «Petite» à la «Grande Europe» était en train de se réaliser et le Siècle des Lumières, par son appétit pour des réalités exotiques, sa notion de «citoyen universel», son discours cosmopolite, allait en offrir un cadre favorable.

Les conflits militaires entre les Russes, les Autrichiens et les Turcs ont, graduellement, ramené le monde roumain à l'attention des grandes puissances. Les boyards de Moldavie ont montré, lors des traîtés de paix, que les Pays roumains avaient bénéficié tout au long du Moyen Âge de relations privilégiées avec la Porte, qui avait tenu pour valables leur autonomie et leurs institutions (Vlad Georgescu, 1970). Dans un tel contexte, l'Occident apprit, grâce aux récits des voyageurs qui avaient écrit sur l'espace roumain pendant les siècles antérieurs, qu'au Nord du Danube il y avait un peuple d'origine romane qui avait autrefois bénéficié, de la part de l'Empire ottoman, d'une entière autonomie(Şerban Papacostea, 1999: 240.). Les guerres de Napoléon augmentent l'intérêt de la France pour l'espace de l'Europe du Sud-Est, sur le fond du déclenchement des hostilités contre la Russie (Pompiliu Eliade, 2000: 176-198; Jean Nouzille, 1999: 3-36).

Le rapport *Notes statistiques sur la Pologne Russe, la Moldavie et la Valachie*, qu'on va analyser, a été rédigé par Aubert, capitaine adjoint à l'État-Major Général de la Grande Armée, et contient dix pages, dont sept sont consacrées à l'espace roumain. À la fin du texte on trouve quelques données d'identification, c'est à dire l'endroit et la date de son élaboration, Paris, le 26 septembre, 1807, suivis par la signature d'Aubert, capitaine adjoint à l'État-Major Général de la Grande Armée (Aubert, 1629/4). Nos efforts d'obtenir des informations sur le capitaine Aubert, afin de clarifier les raisons de son voyage dans l'espace roumain, ont, malheureusement, mené seulement à des résultats partiels. Qu'en sait-on jusqu'à ce moment-ci ? Tout d'abord, nous savons qu'Aubert n'a pas voyagé seul dans les Pays roumains. Il a fait partie d'une délégation constituée, selon les informations consignées par l'un de ses membres, d'Armand-Charles Guilleminot, adjudant-commandant, du commandant d'escadron Simmer, d'un officier russe et d'Aubert (1M 1618/29: 1). Il y avait, donc, trois officiers français et un officier russe. Selon les informations provenant de la même source, et étant donné qu'il détenait le plus haut grade parmi les officiers français de la délégation, il semble qu'Armand-Charles Guilleminot fût le chef de la mission française. Secondement, on sait que la délégation française a quitté le quartier général impérial de Tilsit le 11 juillet 1807 pour rencontrer le Général Michelson, le commandant des forces russes qui se trouvaient dans les Principautés, et le Grand Vizir Celebi-Moustapha Pacha, le commandant des troupes ottomanes du Bas Danube (1M 1618/29: 1).

Aubert commence son récit à Tilsit, où débute son voyage, et se dirige ensuite vers Grodno, Kovel, Luck et Kaminietz. Arrivé à Kaminietz, Aubert tient à faire quelques considérations d'ordre historique et une brève description de la situation de la ville à ce moment-là. Voilà les impressions d'Aubert sur Kaminietz, point stratégique aux frontières méridionales du Royaume de Pologne, qui avait aussi joué un rôle important dans la destinée de la Moldavie.

Cette ville fut jadis citée comme la principale clef de la Pologne. Sa position est assez belle, mais cependant n'a rien d'extraordinaire. On descend près de Kaminiec une très belle rampe de 200 toises de longueur, on traverse ensuite un ravin profond où passe une petite rivière sur laquelle est un pont levis. Ce pont est deffendu par des vieux ouvrages de maçonnerie en partie circulaires. On voit ça et là les débris d'une enceinte. Le pied de la coline sur laquelle est la ville est de pierre calcaire et coupé à pic. On apperçoit sur la droite une ancienne citadelle très irrégulière qu'on répare en ce moment *(*Aubert: 4).

Pour l'officier français, l'espace parcouru avait un passé impressionnant, par opposition aux réalités du présent. Il savait que la citadelle de Kaminietz, dont seulement «

des vieux ouvrages » ou « les débris d'une enceinte » se sont préservés, avait eu la réputation d'être l'une des plus solides fortifications. Le contraste entre le passé glorieux et la déchéance du présent est plus accentué que jamais lorsqu'il décrit la manière de reconstruction du système de fortification: «On apperçoit sur la droite une ancienne citadelle très irrégulière qu'on répare en ce moment. Les nouveaux ouvrages qu'on vient lier aux anciens sont d'un mauvais relief et n'ont aucune solidité. Les revêtements croutent à chaque instant faute d'être en équilibre avec la poussée des terres.» (Aubert: 4).

«En général les routes sont bonnes et le pays très productif. On remarque fort peu d'industrie dans cette partie de l'ancienne Pologne, le peu de commerce qui s'y exerce est exclusivement entre les mains des Juifs.» (Aubert: 4) Le capitaine Aubert, scrupuleux, méticuleux et lapidaire dans ses descriptions, ou du moins tel qu'il se révèle dès les premières pages de son rapport, nous dit qu'«on descend de Kaminiec par une seule rampe jusqu'à Dniestr. De Kaminiec à Choczim il faut passer le Dniestr qui sépare la Pologne russe de la Moldavie. Sa largeur est de 60 à 80 toises. On le passe sur un bac à rames dans l'espace de dix minutes. Les hauteurs qui bordent son lit peuvent avoir sur la rive gauche de 40 à 50 pieds. La rive droite est très basse. Distance 6 lieues»(Aubert: 4). Voilà, donc, qu'au sujet de Kaminietz, comme d'ailleurs dans tout le rapport, on a affaire à avec un véritable guide de voyage contenant le tracé, l'état des routes, les passages sur des cours d'eaux, la largeur du Dniestr, la façon et la durée du passage, la hauteur des rivages etc. On peut mettre la clarté et la concision du discours au compte de la formation du capitaine Aubert, militaire de profession, mais, en égale mesure, aussi de la mission qu'il avait à accomplir dans l'espace roumain.

Arrivé en Moldavie, à Khotin (Hotin), notre voyageur inverse, dans son rapport, l'ordre entre la description de l'itinéraire parcouru et les considérations d'ordre général, présentes à la fin du voyage en Pologne. Dans le cas de la Moldavie, Aubert expose sur une page entière des considérations d'ordre géographique, démographique et politique sur la province. Cependant, dans le chapitre sur la Valachie, Aubert présente ses considérations générales sur le pays à la fin du voyage. Cela et d'autres éléments contenus dans le rapport nous font penser que l'officier français a fait de courtes notes au moment de son voyage, notes qu'il a ensuite ordonnés, en France, comme il a trouvé bon pour rédiger son rapport. Cette anomalie, de faire des considérations générales sur un pays dès qu'on ait franchi ses frontières, doit plus probablement être mise au compte du désir de séparer deux espaces, celui polonais de l'espace roumain, qui se trouvaient à ce moment-là sous dominations différentes. En outre, dans les conditions où l'importance des informations sur les Pays roumains dépasse celles de l'espace polonais, l'auteur a senti, croyons-nous, le besoin d'informer préalablement ses supérieurs du statut spécial des Pays roumains, soumis à la domination de la Porte, provinces moins connues que la Pologne et qui faisaient, avant tout, l'objet de ce rapport.

L'officier français se montre généreux en appréciations sur le potentiel naturel du pays, mais critique à l'égard du système politique, en général corrompu et inefficient pour les habitants du pays, et à l'égard des méthodes de mettre en valeur les ressources de la terre et du sous-sol. Selon ce qu'il écrit, l'auteur du rapport de voyage croit, d'une manière tout à fait surprenante pour nous, que «la Moldavie serait susceptible de devenir une des plus belles provinces de l'Europe, si la population pouvait être augmentée et le pays administré»(Aubert: 4). Pour soutenir ses affirmations concernant le potentiel économique du Pays de la Moldavie, l'officier insiste sur ses principaux ressources:

Le sol, généralement inculte, offre partout une terre végétale qu'il ne faudrait qu'ouvrir pour en tirer le plus grand parti. [...] Des troupeaux très considérables d'animaux de toute espèce composent la richesse de ce peuple entièrement pasteur. Les valées du Dniester, du Pruth, de la Sirette sont extrêmement abondantes en bons fourrages et les côteaux sur lesquels il y a un peu de culture suivant les besoins du pays, produisent du blé turc, de l'orge

et de très belles avoines. La variété des plateaux et leurs différentes expositions les rendraient susceptibles de toute espèce de culture.

On trouve des forêts de chêne et de bois blancs et des taillis qu'on laisse détruire par les troupeaux.

La Moldavie renferme aussi des mines de plusieurs métaux et des montagnes de sel (Aubert: 4-5).

En conclusion, Aubert considérait la Moldavie un pays riche, donc ses problèmes ne relèvent tant du potentiel économique mais, plutôt comme il le remarquait, de la mauvaise administration, généralement parlant.

Pour Aubert, l'Empire ottoman était, sans doute, à blâmer pour la mauvaise administration du pays : «le Gouvernement turc sera toujours un obstacle à l'amélioration de ce pays. Il en retire plusieurs millions par année en négligeant les ressources.» (Aubert: 5) Au fond, le mal de l'Empire, surtout le despotisme des sultans, de même que la corruption, avaient contaminé aussi les provinces qui en dépendaient, et les Phanariotes représentaient les instruments par lesquels la Porte agissait dans les États roumains. À côté du Sultan, ils étaient les promoteurs de la politique ottomane dans les Pays roumains, les bénéficiaires de ce système néfaste mais aussi, parfois, ses victimes. En quelques phrases, l'observateur français surprend le fonctionnement du mécanisme politique de la Moldavie :

La Moldavie est ordinairement gouvernée par un prince Chrétien Grec qui reçoit l'investiture du Grand Seigneur. Les intrigues et l'or sont les plus sûrs moyens d'obtenir une principauté. Celui qui, par son crédit à la Porte et ses richesses, est parvenu à se faire nommer prince, n'a rien de mieux à faire en prenant possession, que de rançonner ses peuples; il faut qu'il se couvre des dépenses énormes qu'il a été obligé de faire. Il n'a d'ailleurs aucune garantie. L'intrigue qui lui a fait obtenir aujourd'hui la souveraineté peut le renverser demain (Aubert: 5).

Ce n'est pas le premier à faire de telles considérations au compte du régime phanariote. La plupart des voyageurs étrangers sont parvenus à des conclusions similaires. Cependant il y en a peu à dire autant en si peu de mots.

Autrement dit, le trône de la Moldavie s'obtient par des intrigues et de l'or. Après avoir obtenu l'investiture du Sultan, les princes régnants paient de larges sommes d'argent afin de rester dans les grâces de celui-ci et des fonctionnaires ottomans, pour garder leur trône le plus longtemps possible. Cependant, le but de ces souverains n'était pas d'enrichir les fonctionnaires de la Porte, mais de faire leur propre fortune et celle de leurs familles. Amasser de l'argent, à son propre bénéfice, des taxes payées par les habitants du pays, était considéré un fait tout à fait normal. De même que la mentalité, présente à l'époque, selon laquelle, après avoir perdu le trône du pays, les monarques gardaient d'importantes fortunes obtenues du labeur de leurs sujets. Un règne plus long signifiait plus de pouvoir et d'argent. Ainsi s'explique la préoccupation de ceux qui se trouvaient sur le trône du pays de garder leur position le plus longtemps possible, faisant dans ce but de grosses dépenses pour éliminer leurs rivaux. L'observateur remarque, indirectement, la crise d'autorité de l'institution centrale, devenue simple fonction entre les mains de ceux prêts à offrir de grosses sommes d'argent. C'est-à-dire que le gouvernement ne se trouvait pas au service du pays, n'en défendait guère les intérêts mais, au contraire, il les éludait. Dans ce contexte, il importait moins si le futur monarque avait des qualités de prince règnant ou s'il était un bon administrateur. L'intérêt du Sultan était que l'aspirant qui offrait le plus d'argent pour son avènement au trône du pays puisse le lui payer. Cette paye était, pourtant, suivie d'autres obligations, car la Porte prenait soin d'encourager aussi des possibles rivaux, afin d'attirer l'attention du prince règnant d'honorer ses dettes. «Tel est le prince Canghieri [Hangerli]», écrivait l'observateur français, «nouvellement nommé à la principauté de Moldavie, qui vient d'être déposé et remplacé par le prince Canimaki [Callimachi].» (Aubert: 6) Que le système

établi par la Porte était la vraie cause de la grave situation économique et politique des Pays roumains le démontrait aussi, selon Aubert, l'aisance avec laquelle les monarques étaient changés, parfois au bon gré des sultans ou des hauts fonctionnaires ottomans. «Il en résulte que celui qui pourrait entreprendre l'amélioration de ce pays, en supposant qu'il en eût l'intention, est dans l'impossibilité de le faire.» (Aubert: 6) Mais le mal, la corruption, l'arbitraire de la Porte par rapport aux monarques phanariotes représentaient un véritable modèle à suivre, bon gré mal gré, par l'élite politique du pays. «Les principaux boyards sont à l'imitation des princes obligés de rançonner les autres, et il n'existe pour personne ni sûreté ni propriété.» (Aubert: 6) Voici que l'absence d'une minime garantie pour la sûreté de la personne et de la propriété représente un autre grand problème des Pays roumains. Elle entraîne l'arbitraire des plus forts et le manque de confiance dans le système politique de cette période-là, générant de la suspicion, de la peur et de la méfiance au sein du peuple.

L'observateur continue sa description de la Moldavie, insistant sur la disposition des villages et sur les voies de communication :

Les villages éloignés qui se trouvent au milieu des plaines de la Moldavie sont construits en clayonnages enduits de terre glaise. D'autres habitations sont creusées dans la terre même et n'ont de saillie que deux ou trois pieds au-dessus du sol. Le terrain qui les environne n'est pas plus cultivé que l'autre et il n'existe pas même un jardin. Tout est couvert d'herbe et l'on ne voit aucune route. [...] Les relais de la poste sont établis dans une baraque et souvent au bivouac. Les chevaux sont par troupeaux dans la plaine et restent toujours dehors. Il faut souvent les aller chercher une ou deux lieues, ce qui retarde les voyageurs. Du reste ils vont assez vite (Aubert: 5-6).

Cette description peut représenter une véritable image d'album pour les représentants des courants littéraires roumains traditionalistes à la fin du XIXe siècle et au début du XXe siècle. Si on s'arrête aux apparences, sans l'examiner à fond, l'image est intéressante; si, au contraire, on y pénètre plus profondément, on se rend compte combien la vie des personnages est marquée par le système politique de cette période. Il s'agit d'une société traditionnelle, sans éléments de modernité, dans laquelle beaucoup de choses pourraient changer pour le bien avec peu d'investissements.

On avait laissé Aubert à Khotin, juste après son entrée en Moldavie. Grâce à l'importance de ce point stratégique pour la Moldavie, on s'attendrait à une plus ample description de la part de l'observateur français. Khotin est une petite ville «située en plaine et renfermée dans un retranchement sans fraises ni palissades, flanqué seulement de quelques demi-tours sans aucuns ouvrages extérieurs. Cette place est considérée comme forteresse par les Turcs» (Aubert: 6). Cependant, on ne peut pas le suspecter de manque d'intérêt pour les réalisations des Roumains. La place de Khotin représentait pour le XVe et XVIe siècles une fortification capable de résister aux sièges. Mais à mesure que les techniques d'assiéger se perfectionnaient pendant les siècles suivants, tandis que le plan de la place restait le même, la fortification est, naturellement, devenue vulnérable.

De Khotin, Aubert part pour Rădăuți, à travers Bălcăuți. «Avant d'arriver à Radoux on passe le Pruth sur un banc à corde. Sa largeur est de 60 toises.» (Aubert: 6) La suivante ville importante est Jassy, la capitale de la Moldavie, où Aubert arrive après avoir traversé quelques localités consignées dans le rapport sous une forme plus ou moins correcte : Ghireni, Ştefăneşti. «Avant d'arriver à Iassi [...] on monte une rampe très rapide et boisée et l'on parcourt un terrain fortement ondulé.» (Aubert: 6-7) La capitale de la Moldavie est la seule ville qui paraisse être plus proche des exigences et des goûts du capitaine Aubert: «La ville de Iassi est assez bien bâtie. On y trouve des bâtiments dans le goût européen, on y voit des équipages et des palais. Les rues sont garnies en madriers pour remplacer le pavé.

La population s'élève à 50 ou 60 mille âmes. La religion dominante est le Christianisme grec.» (Aubert: 7)

Le chemin du voyageur français continue vers Vaslui, par Scânteia et Unceşti. Le voyage paraît à Aubert plus difficile qu'avant : «De Iassi on traverse un pays montueux et couvert. [...] Le chemin est difficile et mauvais. [...] Près de Waslui on remarque une position susceptible de deffendre tous les débouchés de plusieurs valées si elle était fortifiée.» (Aubert: 7) L'officier Aubert a saisi la position stratégique de ces endroits où, plus de trois siècles auparavant, Étienne le Grand avait vaincu les Turcs. De Vaslui, Aubert continue son voyage par Focşani, Socolina, Bârlad, Berheci et Tecuci. Outre que la route est difficile, l'on doit «traverser une valée coupée de ruisseaux et de canaux qu'on passe sur autant de ponts de bois»; «le chemin est très sinueux et mauvais dans le temps de pluie» (Aubert: 7); cette partie de la Moldavie paraît à notre voyageur «un peu plus cultivée, on y voit du blé turc et de l'orge» (Aubert: 7). Le désir de l'observateur de voir des bergers dans tous les habitants de ce pays peut avoir quelques possibles explications. L'élevage du bétail était, en Moldavie, plus pratiqué que l'agriculture, tandis que dans l'espace d'où venait le voyageur l'agriculture représentait la principale occupation. En outre, les terrains de la Moldavie sont favorables à l'agriculture, mais sont utilisés, pour la plupart, comme pâturages.

On atteint Galaţi (Galatz), passant par Mărtinesti, Şerbănesti et Măxineni. «De Maxinen à Galatz on trouve quelques plateaux très découverts.

Galatz est situé sur les bords du Danube. La population est peu considérable.» (Aubert: 8) De Galaţi à Brăila on peut remonter le Danube, dont le cours n'est pas très rapide. Et nous voilà arrivés en Valachie, près de la frontière de l'Empire ottoman. Cela se voit tout de suite dans le nombre sensiblement plus grand de places fortes, dans la présence des garnisons militaires et des constructions de type oriental. Aubert trouve Brăila « une petite ville fortifiée à la méthode des Turcs. Sa situation est assez escarpée. Elle est sous les ordres du Nazir Ameda avec une garnison de quatre mille hommes. Les ouvrages qui servent à sa défense n'ont aucune solidité et sont mal entretenus » (Aubert: 8). De Brăila, le capitaine français monte le Danube vers Silistra et Roustchouk, pour se diriger ensuite vers Bucarest et Focşani. Aubert dirige son attention sur le système défensif ottoman. L'effectif militaire, le type et la qualité des fortifications, les voies de communication sont des éléments fondamentaux dans ses notes. Avant d'atteindre Silistra, Aubert remarque que « l'armée turque est campée sur les deux rives de ce fleuve, sans autre communication que des batteaux. Le quartier général du grand vizir est sur la rive gauche dans une isle près Kalarasch» (Aubert: 8). La forteresse de Giurgiu, conclut-il, est «considérée par les Turcs comme capable de la plus grande résistance» (Aubert: 8). Aubert emploie très souvent la méthode de comparaison dans ses descriptions : il présente le point de vue des autorités sur une question, ensuite il exprime le sien. La forteresse «est située en plaine et fermée d'une ancienne muraille qui paraît avoir être réparée nouvellement» (Aubert: 8). Cette observation est valable aussi pour Roustchouk :

La ville est agréablement située. La rive droite du Danube, très élevée dans cette partie, est couronnée par la ville et présente un coup d'oeil très pittoresque, mais l'intérieur ne représente plus qu'un village. Des rues étroites et sinueuses bordées de murs de terre où l'on voit quelques portes cochères (Aubert: 9).

En ce qui concerne Slobozia, l'officier français sait que c'est l'endroit où a été signé l'armistice entre les Russes et les Turcs, armistice dont la principale stipulation prévoyait la retraite des troupes russes des Principautés: «Elle a été choisie par les plénipotents turcs et russes pour la tenue des conférences relatives à l'armistice conclu le 24 Août dernier entre les deux puissances.» (Aubert: 9) De Roustchouk, Aubert part pour Bucarest, la capitale de la Valachie, ville qu'il trouve « considérable et assez bien bâtie. [...] Elle ressemble assez à Iassi par les constructions et les usages» (Aubert: 9). Concernant la Valachie, le voyageur français affirme qu'elle « ressemble beaucoup à la Moldavie et renferme à peu près les mêmes richesses. Elle est soumise aux mêmes inconvénients sous le Gouvernement de la porte ottomane» (Aubert: 9-10).

Les observations d'Aubert à la fin de son rapport indiquent une bonne connaissance des réalités et dans une certaine mesure restent d'actualité même à présent:

Telles sont les provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie auxquelles il ne manque qu'une administration pour devenir extrêmement florissantes. Mais l'ignorance des Turcs, leurs idées religieuses qui condamnent toute espèce d'innovation et, plus encore, leur haine pour les Chrétiens de quelque secte qu'ils soient, empêcheront toujours que ce beau pays ne puisse se civiliser. Il ne sera réelement fertile que lorsqu'un gouvernement puissant et juste se chargera de le protéger (Aubert: 10).

Qui est, donc, Aubert, l'auteur de ces observations? Essayons de constituer son profil à l'aide des informations du rapport. Il est, tout d'abord, un fin observateur des réalités roumaines. Capitaine adjoint à l'État-Major Général de la Grande Armée française, il fait partie des officiers du corps d'État-Major comme officier de génie ou d'une arme apparentée, si l'on considère l'intérêt qu'il manifeste pour les fortifications, les cours d'eaux rencontrés, les voies de communication terrestre. Sa formation lui permet de formuler des considérations pertinentes sur le système deffensif existant; il propose même de construire une place forte près de Vaslui, endroit haut, situé sur le point de jonction de plusieurs rives et routes. De plus, il connait très bien des aspects de l'histoire récente des deux Pays roumains. Les détrônements des monarques, la conférence de Slobozia, l'attitude de Constantin Ipsilanti à l'automne de l'année 1806 sont compris dans le rapport. Ensuite, ses considérations sur le système politique établi par la Porte dans les Principautés roumains révèlent, à notre avis, quelqu'un qui connaissait relativement bien les réalités de cet espace même avant d'entreprendre ce voyage.

Aubert se montre aussi être franc et direct dans les relations avec les autres, avec les étrangers. Il manifeste ouvertement son antipathie envers les Turcs à cause de l'hostilité qu'ils éprouvent à l'égard des chrétiens, mais aussi à cause de leur réticence devant les idées novatrices. On peut le suspecter aussi de sentiments antisémites. Il n'a aucune confiance dans les fortifications construites selon les plans des ingénieurs juifs, qu'il trouve mal conçus. En revanche, il montre de la compassion pour les Pays roumains à cause de leur statut dans la relation avec la Porte ottomane. Il blâme la domination et les abus des Turcs qui lui semblent injustes. Dans une certaine mesure, Aubert joue donc aussi le rôle d'un justicier.

Concernant le but du voyage d'Aubert, en fait celui du voyage de la délégation d'officiers français, Guilleminot ne fait aucune précision à ce sujet. Dans le rapport rédigé à la fin de la mission, il dévoile toutefois avoir eu comme tâche de convaincre les facteurs politiques turcs de conclure un armistice avec la Russie (1M 1618/29: 24). Cette mission était très importante pour la France, on peut par conséquent supposer que les délégués envoyés à la Porte fussent des personnes instruites et de confiance. Le voyage débuta le 11 juillet à Tilsit, la cité où, juste quelques jours auparavant, on avait signé le traité secret entre la France et la Russie, qui stipulait entre autres, que la France se mettait à la disposition de la Turquie comme médiateur pour rétablir la paix avec la Russie. Le voyage débuta, donc, le 11 juillet, un jour avant que le traité de Tilsit fût ratifié. L'armistice entre la Russie et la Turquie a été signé à Slobozia, à la suite des discussions que les représentants des deux puissances ont eues entre le 12 et le 24 août, discussions auxquelles les délégués français ont joué un rôle très important (1M 1618/29: 24). Il est intéressant qu'Aubert n'a pas laissé dans ce rapport aucune information témoignant de sa participation personnelle aux discussions des deux délégations. Nous sommes enclins de croire qu'il n'y a pas pris part.

Sans tenir compte de la raison de son voyage, son rapport constitue une importante source documentaire sur l'espace roumain du début du XIXe siècle. Ce rapport a été rédigé à un moment où l'intérêt de la France pour cet espace augmentait d'un jour à l'autre (Andrei Oțetea: 195-196).

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DIPLOMATIC PORTUGUESE-YUGOSLAVIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE GREAT WORLD CONFLAGRATION

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Abstract: *The paper belonging to a broad survey is a brief analysis of the history of the European diplomatic relations at the end of WWI, that is, the diplomatic relations between Portugal and the young Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. Several issues are approached: the context of the issue, political relations and particularly the economic relations that are prominent in our research.*

Key words: *diplomacy, legation, consulate, bilateral relations*

The increasing interest of the Portuguese in the Balkans particularly after WWI determined the political environment in Lisbon to react in order to organise and develop the already existing relations in the area. According to the Portuguese law into force, they decided to "set up a second class consular legation in the Balkan Peninsula whose indicated administrative seat shall be endowed with all they need according to legal decisions, with wages for the head of legation according to ministry category [Second Class Minister]". Meanwhile, "as we have lost the current international circumstances, the Consul in Constantinople will have to lead the consulate in Braila as usefully as possible, thus remaining in the already existing administration. He is [also] authorised to transfer the seat of the carrier consulate to that city [i.e. Braila] should there be an interest for Portugal's external trade" (Anuário, 1920: p.236).

In this context, on 24 May 1919, a legislative decree established the first Portugal Legation in the Balkans accredited for Romania, Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians that had been recently acknowledged by the peace treaties after WW1 (ADMAEL, CX 137, 1919, f.2).

At a first stage of the establishment of the Portuguese Legation in the Balkans, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon proposed through the decree of 10 May 1919 (Diario do Governo, 1919) that the main seat for the new legation should be the capital of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, Beograd[1]. The choice was not accidental. Portugal already had diplomatic relations with Beograd as early as the end of the 19th century, when the Consulate of Serbia seated in Madrid, yet with diplomatic tasks for Lisbon was accredited in the Iberian Peninsula. Moreover, Serbia already had a "minister amongst us" at the time.

Unfortunately, Lisbon proposal was rejected by the Government in Beograd whose internal situation was very delicate. The peace treaties at the end of the war and the advantages provided to Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula brought about chaos in Yugoslavia's internal politics.

We consider it important to notice that the initiative to unite the three people south from Danube belonged to one of the most important political leaders, Nicola Pasic, the leader of the Serbian Government who, in November 1914, released a programme of liberation and unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, a major objective in the war with the Central

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[1] In the European reports and documents, probably for pragmatic reasons, they only seldom used the term Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. As the usual term was Yugoslavia, we mention that this term would be mainly used by us in the paper, although the official name Yugoslavia would be adopted only in 1929. (n.n.)

Powers. The next step was the signature of the Corfu Declaration on 20 July 1917 by the head of the Government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ante Trumbic (Ciorbea, 2006: 305). On that occasion, the denomination of the new state was settled as well as the underlying principles of its organisation. "The new state was to be a constitutional democratic parliamentary monarchy under the rule of the Karagheorghevici dynasty" (Zbuchea, 2005: 34). After WWI, the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians "had the most complex internal history of all Balkan nations, their issues being an illustration of several difficulties and fundamental contradictions within national movements" (Jelavich, 2000: 176). The political organisation within the Kingdom was extremely fragmented.

December 1st, 1918 was the date of the official birth of the Kingdom after the representatives of the National Council, taking advantage of the fact that Pasic was not in Beograd, showed to the Regent Prince Alexander the official statement that was accepted. Unfortunately, there was merely a formal unity of the kingdom. The borders of the new state were not settled and there was no unity, not even a theoretical one on the institutional level. Yet, the new Kingdom existed and they already took steps for international acknowledgement. "These actions of the Croat, Serbian and Slovenian leaders have been supported by national revolutionary organisations in Montenegro and Vojvodina" (Jelavich, 2000: 139) that were included in the kingdom. Thus, the initiative of forming the Kingdom was directly connected with the Slavs in the former Habsburg monarchy.

A transition regime coordinated from Beograd followed. As a matter of fact, the state was governed "according to a method practically representing an expansion of the Serbian administrative system. The Serbian army was the only defender in the region. In January 1919, Stojan Protic from the Serbian Radical Party became Prime Minister, Korosec a Vice-Prime Minister, and Trumbic became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A temporary assembly whose members came from the Serbian Assembly, the Zagreb National Council (Jelavich, 2006: 349)[2] and other bodies representing nationalities was appointed" (Jelavich, 2000: 139).

The conflicts occurred right after that. The fusion of two different political systems was difficult. The strongest political party was that of the Serbian Radicals led by Nicola Pasic (Kolarz, 2003: 151)[3], the former Prime Minister. An important role was played by the Peasants' Party from Croatia, which was poorly represented in the *sabor* because of the limited voting system.

The most important statespersons considered that the Yugoslavian national idea was something strange. Croatia and Slovenia were annexed against their will. Yet, if the regions had been annexed to Serbia, it was easy to see that the Serbians were in control and held privileged positions. In the opinions of the Serbians, all political ideas had to come from Beograd then and afterwards. The idea of settling the capital in Sarajevo, a city lying at mid-distance between Beograd and Zagreb, was unconceivable to the Serbians.

Their opinion was supported by King Alexander, who was trying to solve all political claims from a Serbian perspective and not a Yugoslavian one. The idea itself of the official denomination of Serbian-Croat-Slovenian Kingdom was annoying as it "provided the Croats and Slovenians with a certain illusion of equal rights" (Jelavich, 2000: 140).

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[2] National Council in Zagreb (Narodno Vijece) was made up of political leaders of the Croats and Slovenians who had no longer a country during the war. It was a revolutionary government proclaiming the union of the Serbs and Croats in the former Habsburg monarchy. It was the third organisation with no connection with the Serbian Government or with the Yugoslavian revolutionary committee abroad. The same Government voted for the union with Serbia and Montenegro with the idea of making up the new kingdom of the southern Slavs. Supported by the masses, this Government worked as such for one month.

[3] Nicola Pasic was tightly connected with Serbia's involvement in WWI. "He undoubtedly fought to annex Montenegro and Serbian regions in the Habsburg Empire, yet he was against annexing Serbia in any way and the southern Slav Catholic provinces".

After the attack at the House on the Croat leader Radic in the summer of 1928, King Alexander himself stated that it was necessary to separate Serbia and Croatia. "It would be best to separate in peace", he pointed out during a discussion with the former Prime Minister Pribicevic who acted as a spokesperson for the Croats (Pribicevici, 2000: 151).

Yugoslavia's internal situation kept Martinho de Brederode, Portugal's Minister for the Balkans, far from Beograd for two years. He had scheduled a visit to Beograd to make his mission official in April – May 1920, yet the King's health problems urged him to postpone the meeting. "Besides, I talked to my colleague and friend, the Charge d'Affaires of Serbia, who straightforwardly told me that the Ministry [of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians] is in crisis and that I should wait for Vermitch to see if he is able to set up the office; as Your Excellency certainly knows from telegrams and newspapers that there have been bloody conflicts in Beograd because of the railway strike, besides His Majesty's health problems"(ADMAEL, CX 137, nr.42, 1920, f.3).

On 23 June 1921, the Yugoslavian media announced the Government in Lisbon that the "plenipotentiary Minister for Bucharest, Beograd and Athens has not yet shown his accreditation letters in Beograd. We consider it appropriate that the diplomat should show them right away and stay for a little while in Beograd after the ceremony [of showing the accreditation letters], thus following the example of the Minister of Yugoslavia accredited in Lisbon and Madrid with permanent residence in the latter" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 1921, f.1).

A determining factor to postpone the presentation of his accreditation letters in Beograd was their external policy. The relations with Romania, for instance, first tensioned because of the disputes over the Banat, then tending to come to peace due to their common interest in South-Eastern Europe were a real issue. The Little Entente, or the Balkan Entente, was based on the same political line aiming at providing regional security; Czechoslovakia joined the two states. There were several meetings and negotiations between these states and several diplomatic initiatives out of which the meeting between Prime Minister Ionel Bratianu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs I.G. Duca and Nikola Pasic and Momcile Nincic. "The official release issued on this occasion showed that the Governments of Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, as well as of Czechoslovakia and Poland have harmonized their opinions for a *united* action during the forthcoming conference in Genoa with a view to set out joint action principles" (Lazăr, 2007: 467). The aforementioned meeting took place due to the royal engagement in Bucharest in February 1922.

The Romanian-Yugoslavian collaboration negotiations started right after the war, a few months before the arrival of the Portuguese diplomat in the Balkans. The first step was taken by Queen Mary of Romania in April 1919 during a visit to the court of King Alexander of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. The Queen's diplomatic ability that was well-known in all capitals of the world[4] was largely commented by the British media represented in Bucharest by Frank Rattigan, the future friend of Martinho de Brederode, who informed Curzon on the real reason of the Queen's visit to Beograd, that is, the marriage of

[4] The Queen's external policy was not confined to the Balkans. Shortly after the Great Union, she started a tireless diplomatic activity to convince the leaders of France, England, the United States and Italy and to get the support of public opinion in these countries to get Romania accepted within the newly established boundaries by the winners of WWI. In Paris, on 8 March 1919, after the breakfast with Raymond Poincaré, the President of France, she was invited to see the guard of honour at the Elysée, an honour never granted to a queen before. The same day, she was officially elected as a correspondent member of the Belle Arte Academy; she was the only woman amongst the men representing the institution. On this occasion, the Queen met in France the French Minister Clemenceau, a legendary meeting. "At a time when women's involvement in politics or society was not appreciated, Queen Mary dared ask the French statesman's support to return Transylvania up to Tisa and the Banat to Romania after WWI. There is a dialogue that nobody can yet confirm: Clemenceau, also known as "the Tiger" would have said: "Madame, what you ask for is the lion's share!" Queen Mary would have replied without hesitation: "It is what the lioness asks from the tiger!" See: *Maria a României*, on the website http://www.princeradublog.ro/jurnal/maria-a-romaniei/

the King of Yugoslavia with Princess Marioara of Romania, her daughter (AMAEB, r.392, c.208, 1919, f.2).

This marriage was part of Queen Mary's plan to marry her children (Carol, Nicolae, Elisabeta, Maria and Ileana) with heirs to the thrones in the Balkans and Austria to keep a peaceful and confident atmosphere in this part of the world. She had inherited the taste for matchmaking from her famous relative, Queen Victoria of England. "The Queen had been seduced at the Peace Conference by Alexander's seriousness who was a priceless ally of the French, just like her. This dynastic union blessed by Quai d'Orsay facilitated the strengthening of eastern nations group favouring France on the one hand and, on the other hand, it helped overcoming the disagreeable conflicts between Bucharest and Beograd on splitting the Timis Banat that the Romanian Government had a hard time to admit" (Gauthier, 2004: 53). Her personal charm and brightness made the Queen always be surrounded by the most influential members of diplomacy in Bucharest. One of them was Martinho de Brederode, the Minister of Portugal.

In January 1922, he left Lisbon to spend his holidays with the family. It was one of the last visits to Portugal. Up-to-date with the latest events in Bucharest, Martinho de Brederode left Lisbon for the capital of Romania on 16 February 1922 (ADMAEL, CX 138, 1922, f.1). He found Bucharest agitated with the preparations for the events in the royal family.

On 20 February 1922, King Alexander of the young Kingdom south from Danube arrived in Bucharest for the engagement of Princess Marioara of Romania that was held at the Sinaia convent. According to the diplomatic traditions, all diplomats were invited to attend such events. Obviously, the Portuguese diplomat could not be an exception particularly missing the gala dinner at the Royal Palace. According to the schedule, the wedding was due on 8 June 1922 (ADMAEL, CX 138, 1922, f.5; Lazăr, 2007: 467).

In order to participate together with his colleagues to the marriage in Beograd, Martinho de Brededore had to rush the presentation of his letters of accreditation. As advised by T. Anticht, the Minister of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia in Bucharest, "I was supposed to go to Beograd on 15 May in order to have the time to show my accreditation letters before the celebration of the royal wedding [...], but I was delayed to bring with me the signs of the Three [Portuguese] Orders and the autographic letter of His Excellency, the President of the Republic for His Majesty King Alexander" (ADMAEL, CX 138, Beograd 29 May 1922, f.1) that came late from Lisbon. "I am leaving tonight on the 21st for Beograd leaving the Legation of Portugal [in Bucharest] to Sir Derni" [Herbert Derny, Prime Secretary of the British Legation. The head of the legation left for Beograd, too] (ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.3).

The trip of the Portuguese diplomat was full of unpredicted adventures. He travelled by train to Timisoara and then to Beograd. "Many friends and colleagues came to say goodbye at the Northern Station; amongst them was Mr. T. Anticht, Minister of Serbia, and Colonel Milan Vancovici, the military attaché at the same legation" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.3). On the train, Brederode met Wirsen, the Minister of Sweden, "who, just like me, is accredited in Beograd, Bucharest and Athens and resides in Bucharest". He returned the same morning to Athens, where he had presented his letters of accreditation. "The trip by express was dull [for the Minister of Sweden], and the train was always late in the stations". Unfortunately, it was not the same with the train they were on. When they reached the "Ercolabad"[5] station, in Transylvania, on the morning of 22 May, "getting off the train, I asked the train dispatcher how long the train would be late. I was told ten minutes. I used the opportunity to take a look around at the beautiful scenery" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.5). Unfortunately, the train moved in less than five minutes and the desperate

[5] It is the town of Băile Herculane (Erculo bad –Hercules' baths) whose old name was AD AQUAS HERCULIS SACRAS (sacred waters of Hercules). Brederode wrote down the name he heard in English: *Erculo* from Hercules and *bad*, correctly spelled bath (n.n.).

Portuguese diplomat remained on the platform. "Here, nobody can answer a question correctly. I have been told ten minutes as he could have told me five or one or one hundred. He told me the first thing that crossed his mind" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.5), was the conclusion of the still affected Brederode in his report drawn up a few days later in Beograd. When he realized what was happening, he ran for the train desperately shouting to stop. He tried to get on the running train but he fell tearing up his cloths and hurting his elbows and knees. "I was lucky to get up with no broken bones". To complete the adventure, the policemen in the station thought that he was trying to get on the train fraudulently and arrested him. The shouts of the people he knew on the train "stop, stop!" managed to stop the train. After working out the misunderstandings, he could go on with the trip. Brederode's adventure ended at 7 o'clock in the evening of the 23rd of May, when he reached Beograd (ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.2).

On May 23, he wired to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon informing him that "I inaugurated and took over the Legation [in Beograd]". He also asked Lisbon to send his mail to the capital of Yugoslavia, where he needed to stay for a while. Other difficulties followed. Here is what he wrote down in a report dated 23 May 1922: "I was several times to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without ever being able to get to Mr. [Momcilo] Nincici, who came from Genoa two days after our arrival after missing from Beograd for about two months" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 23 May 1922, f.1). For this reason, "he was [almost] always in conference with the State ministers". When he could not be reached in Beograd, he was in the country, "in conference with the venerable President of the Council [Anton Koroseci[6]], aged 76, who had had the misfortune to be involved in a car accident" and was recovering. In this way, "neither me, nor the Ministers of Sweden, Netherlands or America could have a discussion with His Excellency" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.6).

The coming royal wedding caused agitation in the capital of Yugoslavia, too. The city was not ready for such an event. "[Beograd] is a city that could have very beautiful images due to its picturesque position. Yet, unfortunately, the effects of war can still be seen. ... [The Serbs] are fixing the streets that cannot be crossed in a rush. They work from morning until evening. ... They seem to enjoy a lot this royal marriage. And although His Majesty King Alexander is highly appreciated [by his subjects], the police is alerted. They seem to fear some attack. ... However, it is better to prevent than to fix" concluded Brederode(ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.7).

Together with citizens and members of all diplomatic missions (Magalhaes, 2002: 78-97) accredited in Beograd, most of them being accredited in Bucharest too, he was invited to participate to the royal wedding. The short span of time between the moment of his accreditation and the royal wedding caused difficulties for the authorities in Lisbon to send the accreditation letters for the special mission that would be in Beograd. In a *confidential reserved and urgent* telegram sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon, Martinho de Brederode informed that: "all foreign ministers accredited here have already received their accreditation letters for the royal wedding... I think that I am the only one not to have them.... please do me the great favour of accrediting me through a telegram. My situation places me even below the Minister of Chile" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 25 May 1925), pointed out Brederode, feeling hurt. The reply arrived from Lisbon on the 27th of May 1922.

Beograd was waiting for its guests. On June 4, 1922, the Romanian royal family made for Orsova whence they were to take the ship to Beograd. They were welcome with the feast appropriate to the event and rank. 101 artillery gunshots from the mediaeval fortress on the hill, Kalemegdan, was the first action to welcome the Romanians (Lazăr, 2007: 468). In front

[6] Not to be confused with Ante Pavelić, the leader who established the Axis Powers regime in Croatia in 1914. See: *Statul Slovenilor, Croaţilor şi Sârbilor,* on http://wapedia.mobi/ro/Statul_slovenilor%2C_croa%C5%A3ilor_%C5%9Fi_s%C3%A2rbilor#2.

of the Portuguese diplomat, the relations between Romania and Yugoslavia were becoming friendly.

Beyond all these issues, the inability to present his letters of accreditation and the need to organise the Portuguese interest in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians determined Martinho de Brederode to get in contact with influential people who could help him sign an agreement facilitating trade exchange between the two countries. In order to do that, he talked to several clerks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He mentioned in one of his reports Ramadanevici, the Director of Trade Affairs, "a very nice man whom I asked for clarifications several times and who promised me some statistical data" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.5). He needed as much information as possible on this state imports and exports and more. "Unfortunately, Mr. Ramadanovici is to be leaving to Berlin after the celebration of the royal wedding, where he has been appointed General Consul. Yet he promised that the clerk that will follow him would give me some advice with everything I need", pointed out Brederode.

The diplomatic experience and serving the interests of the Portuguese state determined the Portuguese diplomat to analyse and promote the possibility to sign an agreement or to determine negotiations in point preferably in Bucharest with "my dear friend, the Minister of Serbia, T. Anticht". "Obviously, the basis of this agreement should first be free access of a fixed quota of our fine wines. It will not be easy to get this if we consider that people here face a great crisis in Dalmatia, where there is fine wide, yet they have no market for it. However, I think that time and patience will succeed" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.5), said Brederode.

And yet, although fragile, the Portuguese-Serbian trade existed. "[Our] consul told me that there is commercial exchange with Portugal. Lately, some Serbian tradesmen have bought great quantities of wool from Portugal" (ADMAEL, CX 138, 29 May 1922, f.5). A briefing exchange between Beograd and Lisbon informed on the existence of a Commercial Convention signed with Serbia probably before WWI that, after an ordinance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 23 February 1922 "expanded on the territory of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians" (ADMAEL, *CX 137,* 7 July 1923). Considering that Martinho de Brederode did not mention this convention determines us to consider that he had not been informed on its existence. He therefore tried to sign such an agreement himself. Beograd required a copy of the document. The receipt of the documents was subsequently announced in Lisbon.

For an accurate exchange of information and to know the manner of payment of legation and consulate clerks of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beograd sent to Lisbon a chart with this information expressed in dollars. In exchange, they required a resembling chart from the Portuguese legations and consulates (ADMAEL, *CX 137,* 15 July 1927)).

Portugal's economic interests in Beograd were served by the General Consul there and other two consuls that were to settle in the country out of whom one in Zagreb. These were Alexander Herman and Vocilat Petkovici, traders of Serbian origin directly interested in trading with the Portuguese Republic. They intended to ask permission to go to Portugal and study the conditions of the new market. Deeply touched, Martinho de Brederode wrote down: "I hope that our consular service is well organised in this country that may have a brilliant future and become a great [selling] market for us... Serbia is a rich country yet little developed in need for foreign capital that has been withdrawn" (ADMAEL, CX 475, 29 May 1922, f.8). At the time, there were three financial groups in the Kingdom trying to determine Yugoslavia to make a loan. Unfortunately, the conditions were unacceptable. They required unconceivable guarantees, such as state properties.

Although life in Beograd was extremely expensive, "more than double as compared to Bucharest", there was a part of the population that enjoyed spending money. They brought advantages to the three groups mentioned above. Amongst them, Brederode mentioned in his report, Holgastem Bank, "a bank completely unknown to me and all I have talked to". The Yugoslavian state would be accepted according to Brederode a loan with an interest no matter how high, yet definitely without guarantees(ADMAEL, CX 475, 29 May 1922, f.10).

Before leaving Yugoslavia, Martinho de Brederode intended to go to Zagreb too, but "I did not go and neither did other colleagues of mine because of the lack of certitude concerning the date of our appointment with the Minister of Foreign Affairs" (ADMAEL, CX 475, 29 May 1922, f.10).

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THE SITUATION OF THE JEWS IN SOVIET UNION AND ITS SATELLITE COUNTRIES AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Abstract: *The present study tries to show that, during the last years of the rule of Stalin, the Jews from Soviet Union and its satellite countries were even victims of the communist regime. Initially, during the German persecution and after the war a part of them found a refuge in the ranks of communist party which they saw as the single force capable to oppose to Hitler and later to racism and xenophobia. They were terrified by the horrors of Holocaust and looked for security by joining communism. But they were affected by Stalin's hostile behavior towards the Jews in the last years of his life. It is important to state that the majority of Jews were not communist and that their property was reduced according to nationalization laws and Jewish aristocracy and intellectuals fell victims of communist regimes from Eastern and Central European countries.*

Keywords: *Jews, communism, Stalin, antisemitism, poverty*

At the end of the war, the Jewish communities from Eastern Europe were severely affected. The Jews from the states such as Romania (North-West of Transylvania), Hungary, Poland or other states from communist space were deported in German concentration camps. Once the war had finished, the survivors returned to a great extent in their home countries. Not of them had returned. Some emigrated in Western Europe, United States or Israel. This was the case of Elie Wiesel, Jew from Transylvania, who received later the Nobel prize, who stopped initially in France.

At the end of the war the Jewish population from these countries, lived in conditions of poverty, fear and misery. They did not have sufficient food and shelter. After the Holocaust, a small number of Jewish children was still alive and they had not sufficient food and clothes. In Hungary, the number of Jewish children under 14 years old was 7.712 (Wasserstein, 1996, p. 36). The international organization Joint procured food supplies and medicines for the Jews from communist countries of Europe. Joint helped over 200 000 of Jews in Romania, 120 000 in Hungary, 65 000 In Poland and 42 000 in Austria (Wasserstein, 1996, p. 36).

In the communist parties from the countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the Jews played an important role. In Poland, for example, there were Jews who were important members of communist party such as Roman Zambrowski, Hilary Minc, Jakub Berman. In Romania, minister of Foreign Affaires was Ana Pauker.

The individual Jewish property was returned only in part and with difficulty. Several non-Jews became owners of Jewish property and did not want to give it back when the Jews had returned from Holocaust. The communists considered the Jews, to a large extent, as owners of considerable fortunes, and according to their ideas of equality, opposed to the retrocession of Jewish properties to their owners. In Czechoslovakia, according to a law, the property with no owners were taken over by the state and, thus, a great part of Jewish property.

The Jews were also affected by the economic policies of communist states. The Jews who did not returned found their property robbed, their houses destroyed. They re-entered in

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the property of their assets with difficulty, encountering the opposition of the nationals of these countries. We can not talk of an integral restitution of Jewish property, their houses were robbed in the fascist period, the actions and money lost their value. They were subjected to the same nationalization laws as the nationals of communist countries. As a consequence their factories, stores, land were taken over by the state. In Romania and Hungary, the property of the ones who returned from Holocaust and which was not the subject of the process of nationalization continued to be administered by the Jewish Communities of each state.

Among the ones who returned a large extent tried to contribute to the development of their countries, placed now under the "umbrella" of Soviet Union. It must be said, from the very beginning, that, initially, the Jews did not fear of communism, on the contrary they perceived it as the only force capable to stop the nazism. For them, the arrival of Red Army was an act of liberation because thus it put end to the departures of "death trains" in German concentration camps. Soon it became obvious that, communism was an order imposed by force which caused the sending into prison of the interwar world' elites. It became obvious that Stalin was a tyrant who made numerous victims. A high number of Jews, according to the path created at the end of XIX century by Theodor Herzl, wanted the creation of their own state, Israel, where they emigrated in large number when the conditions imposed by the Soviet Union allowed it. Until 1948, Palestine was under British mandate and the British opposed to the emigration of Jews in Palestine. But these emigrations produced illegally. A large extent of the emigrants came from these communist states.

Although a lot of Jews from the satellite countries of Soviet Union emigrated to Israel during the communist period, a part of them chose to integrate in communist states, to become party members or even representatives of communist superior classes. The orientation towards communist ideas was old. It can not be contested the participation of the Jews to the Revolution of 1917 and their involvement in the first years of Russian communism. But there are also explanations. During the governance of Russian tsars, the Jews were the subject of several discriminations, they were living in a separate zone of residence, they were considered also as scapegoats for the mistakes of tsarists government. Hostile feelings existed and numerous were in modern epoch and at the beginning of XIX century the pogroms whose victims the Jews were. During the war, Stalin had a politics less antisemite towards the Jews from Soviet Union. He created, in this sense, an Anti-Fascist Jewish Committee. After the creation of Israeli state, for short time, he encouraged the zionism (Johnson, 2001, p. 21).

In their relation with communism, they were also victims, the last years of Stalin being characterized by a campaign oriented against cosmopolitanism, so also against the Jews. In Soviet Union, it takes place the process against some Jewish doctors accused because they would have contributed to the death of Soviet leaders. In Czechoslovakia it takes place the Slanski trial, the accused being mostly Jews. In Romania, Ana Pauker, important member of communist Nomemklature was eliminated from power.

Slanski trial began in November 20 and it ended in November 27, 1952. From 14 accused, 13 were Jews. The accused were forced to acknowledge that they worked as imperialist spies, police informers, trotkist partisans and agents of titoist-burgeoisist-nationalist conspiracy (Hodos, 1987). They were accused that they planned to eliminate the president of the state, Klement Gottwald. It existed an antisemite aspect of the process. So Slansky was accused that he had contacts with Granville, a representative of international zionism[1]. After the Slansky trial, Geminder, Frejka, Frank, Clementis, Reicin, Sva, Margolius, Fischl, Sling, Simone were sentenced to death and executed at December 5. The rest of the accused were sentenced for life prison.

[1] (George H. Hodos, 1987*)* "Granville said that his main source of information was Slansky, the solid pillar of his spy net, the most intelligent Jew that he (Granville) ever knew".

In 1948, Stalin started the campaign against titoists, and starting with 1952 he extended it against the Jews (Hodos, 1987). In Romania, the victim of this campaign was Ana Pauker. The victims of the campaign from 1952 were the Jew Ana Pauker and the Hungarian Vasile Luca. Dej succeeded to implement this innitiative being supported by the Russians. His intention was to get away of Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu. Ana Pauker was considered responsible because she had contributed to an increase of members of Romanian Communist Party. The campaign against the Jews was obvious since 1949 when a dozen of members of Jewish Democratic Committee were arrested, including relatives of Ana Pauker (Hodos, 1987).

But in a parallel way with the communist structures, so it remembers the chief rabbi of Romania, Moses Rosen (Rosen, 1991), it took place the community life with the sinagogue, with Jewish celebrations, with Jewish specific food, with people involved in the practice of Judaic cult. This parallel space did not fit to the official politics of the state which tried to set people apart from their religion or it tried in a forced manner to assimilate national minorities and to create a pattern of "good" citizen of Romanian state. Jewish community life, although much more restrained in comparison with interwar period was observed by Security, and it was a considerable number of party activists who were trying to have the adherence of "Jewish streets". It was a considerable number of Jews who denied their religion which they saw as a cause of their persecution during Holocaust. A lot of Jews did not want to acknowledge that they were Jews or kept hidden this thing, they tried to enjoy the advantages of the communist state, they tried to enjoy the new life. A lot of the Jews were all their life traumatized by the horrors of Holocaust, some of them involved in Security, becoming the masters of history.

In comparison with the years of the war, we have to acknowledge that the communist system was more generous, offering the same advantages to the Jews as to the other citizens. Now they could study at all levels in Romanian schools and universities, they could get a job even of superior level, they had conditions of life and work much better than in concentration or labor camps. But on the other side, in their actions of social purification, of elimination of cultural and economical elites of the interwar period, the communists hit also the enterprisers in industry or Jewish bourgeoisie who were sent to prisons and eliminated. For instance, Ana Pauker was also accused that she ignored the marxist-leninist approach. She was considered responsible as being involved in the right wing deviation, she opposed to collectivization. She was also accused that she entered in contact with foreign intelligence from Israel. She had to renounce to the position of minister of Foreign Affaires. But because of Stalin and Molotov, she was not sent in prison or executed.

In Soviet Union the anti-Jewish legislation was abolished. The Jews participated massively to Russian Revolution. The political orientation of Russian Jews was more mensevic, than bolshevic. The zionism was forbidden and it was considered as a manifestation of burgeois nationalism. In the same time the schools which taught in idis, the Jewish newspapers and theaters flourished. The Jews received an autonomous area in Birobidjan. Other Jews moved in national districts in Ucraine and Crimeea. The Jewish population of Birobidjan was never higher than 30 % from the total number of people of the region and was no higher than 1% from the total number of Jews in URSS (Soljeniţîn, 2004).

When Israel declared independance at May 14 1948, the president Truman acknowledged this state *de facto*, while Stalin acknowledge Israel *de jure* (Johnson, 2001, p. 526). In 1953, a month before he died, Stalin broke the relationships with Israel (Johnson, 2001, p. 533).

In 1948 started in Soviet Union an "anti-cosmopolite" campaign in cultural field whose leading leader was Jdanov. The Jews were considered "cosmopolitans without roots". The Jews who activated in cultural field remained without jobs. The Jews were expelled from

the sphere of science, art, press. The Jewish newspapers, schools, theatre and other Jewish institutions, and also a lot of sinagogues were closed. In parallel, the zionism is now condemned. The Jews were encouraged to remain in Soviet Union, not to emigrate in Israel. The Jews were considered no more as a particular nation. The Soviets maintained relations with the Arabs and were not in favor of emigration in Israel. This campaign against Jews culminated in 1953 with "blue gown affaire", initiated by Stalin himself, a campaign against Jewish doctors who were accused that they would have contributed to the death of certain Soviet leaders. This campaign was not something new, Stalin started to have antisemite feelings some time ago.

During this time it took place anti-Jewish events. So, at Kiev, at the beginning of September 1945, a Jew, an NKDV member, because of the hit he suffered from some militaries, determined the fact that the local inhabitants attacked the Jews from the city and thus 5 Jews were killed (Soljeniţîn, 2004, p. 414)..

An important institution was Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee whose role increased in time (Soljeniţîn, 2004, p. 419). This had 70 permanent members, a newspaper, a printing house. It played a double role, it had to be the representative body of the Jews in Occident and in front of Central Committee. In September 1946 he stopped its activity, as being considered a zionist and reactionary body. The dezmembration of Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee produced gradually. Important personalities as Fefer and Zaskin were arrested (Soljeniţîn, 2004, p. 421).

In the context of Russification of the Soviet Union' culture, the Jewish intellectuals were elliminated from the sphere of Russian culture. The Jews were excluded from the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Science, the Institute of Juridical Science (Soljeniţîn, 2004, p. 422). The cultural Jewish institutions were closed.

In August 12, 1952, 13 of the most important writers of idis language were killed on Stalin's order. Thus were killed Peretz Markish, Leib Kvitko, David Hofstein, Itzic Feffer and David Bergelson.

In 1953, Stalin's antisemitism reached a maximal point. It was arrested a group of Jewish doctors accused that they would have contributed to the death of some Soviet Leaders. Stalin died before to start a new wave of arrestments and executions. On March 5 1953, Stalin died. These manifestations became a state politic because Stalin was the leader, but they were also a consequence of a paranoid behavior of Stalin concerning the Jews.

Stalin's antisemitism started to take shape mainly since 1948. In January 1948 the Jewish-Russian actor Solomon Mikhoels was killed and this fact seems to be the beginning of antisemite stage of Stalin. The change towards anti-zionism took a longer time, but it became out in the autumn of 1948 (Johnson, 2001, p. 526).

The Jews of Bulgaria were not deported excepting the ones from the occupied Tracia. A large extent of Bulgarian Jews lost their property. They were in a precarious situation after the war and had no proper clothes.

In the study of Arieh J. Kochavi, *British Diplomats and the Jews in Poland, Romania and Hungary during the communist takeovers* it is showed that at the end of the Second World War, excepting the territories of USSR, they still remained important communities of Jews also in other states of Soviet block such as in Romania, Poland and Hungary (Kochavi, 1995). The article of Kochavi describes the situation of the Jews from the three countries between the years 1945-1947 reflected in the reports of some British Diplomats, as Great Britain tried to stop a possible wave of emigrants coming from these countries. In 1945, more than 100 000 of Jews registered in Bucharest with the intention to emigrate in Palestine, them being encouraged also by the Red Cross. In Hungary, the Jews who returned from concentration camps found it impossible to re-organize their community and religious life. This aspect motivated the zionists to try to emigrate in Palestine. More Jews were involved in Hungarian

political life: Matyas Rakosi, important leader of Communist Party, Erno Gero, the minister of Transport, Josef Revai, a prestigious journalist, Zoltan Vas, mayor of Budapest. The author shows that the most difficult situation was of Polish Jews where in August 1945 they were only 50 000 of Jews left. Initially Polish government did not stop the Jews to go. Approximately 300 of Jews were killed in Poland after 1945 as a consequence of antisemitism.

In Hungary, several leaders of Communist party were Jews such as Matyas Rakosi and Erno Gero so as other important communists. In Hungary, it started the show trial Laszlo Rajk while in Czechoslovakia started a hunt for a "Czechoslovakian Rajk", namely Rudold Slansky, Jew, who was accused of zionism.

In Czechoslovakia, the communists succeeded to have the control only in 1948 and here the antisemitism was less encountered than in other regions. A part of the country was annexed by Soviet Union as a price for the liberation of country by the Soviet Union. Because of the fear of Soviet antisemitism, several Jews declared themselves Chzeck and Slovaks. A great part of Czechoslovakian Jews found a refuge in the American zone of domination of Germany.

In Poland, antisemitism knew exaggerated forms as the pogroms. In Poland, the anti - Jewish persecutions coming from the Polish side continued to manifest both during the war, but also after the instauration of the communism. A lot of Polish were antisemite because of the fact that a high number of Jews was present in the ranks of Polish Communist Party. In Poland, the victims of the Anti-Jewish persecutions after 1945 varied between 600 and 3000 of persons (Szaynok, 2005, p. 265-283).

Polish antisemitism took even the form of pogroms whose victims the Jews were. So was the pogrom of Kielce and Przeborze. The author Bozena Szaynok in its study *The Role of Antisemitism in Postwar Polish-Jewish Relations* considers that the murder of the Jews became a usual fact (Szaynok, 2005, p. 265-283)..

In the same time, a reason of the murder of the Jews both in the time of the war and after the war was the wish to get or to maintain the use of Jewish property by Polish ethnics. A common approach in the European communist states concerning the Jews was that them created and implemented the communist system. They encountered thus the opposition of the nationals of these countries who, in general, rejected the communism, this system being imposed from outside by Soviet Union with the secret consent of the other allies.

It can not be denied the fact that the Jews were also victims of the communists. This is reflected by the fact that before the war, they were, to a great extent, the exponents of a social superior class who fell into disgrace when the communism was established. There were also pretexts, justifications, most often fabricated, which the Polish used to justify their antisemite actions. Such accusations were the ritual murder, cases of coercition with the intention to make the Jews go or to take their property, crimes committed after robbery, other atacks directed against the Jews (Szaynok, 2005). In 1946, 125 000 of Jews arrived from Soviet Union. Because of some incidents which took place in Kracow, 5 Jews were killed. Starting with the year 1946, the number of Jews who emigrated in Palestine increased. During the Stalinist epoch, the zionist parties were dissolved. The Jews became active involved in the Security of Polish state.

During the years 1948-1953, numerous were the antisemite activities. So in May 27 1945 at Przeborze took place a pogrom. The Jews' need of security, under these circumstances, was obvious. Danuta Blus-Wegrowska in an article about the situation of the Jews in Poland after 1945 defined the existent atmosphere from those years as "pogromlike"[2], in other words specific to a pogrom. In Kielce took also place a pogrom which started with the

[2] Danuta Blus-Wegrowska, "Atmosfera pogromowa" Apud Bozena Szaynok, *op. cit.,* p. 271.

accusation of ritual murder. It is probable that the number of the victims of this pogrom was 42 (Szaynok, 2005, p. 272).

Polish intellectuals, after this pogroms, denounced antisemitism, but they represented the voice of elites. Polish community and also the Jewish one distanced themselves. In the context of the change of Soviet Union's politics towards Israel, Polish state changed also its attitude. Jewish Community was subjected to the control of political sources and of Security. An israeli official was arrested in Warsaw, so as the ex-chief of Jewish Committee of Lower Silesia (Szaynok, 2005, p. 281). Poland's attitude towards Israel remained as hostile as in the Stalinist period.

In 1946 in Poland took place an antisemmite campaign which involved entire Polish media. As a consequence of certain anti-communist Polish manifestations which took place in Polish universities, the blame was put on the cosmopolitans and the Jews were considered as scapegoats (Stola, 2005, p. 284-300).

In the book of Jay Howard Geller, *Jews in Post-Holocaust Germany, 1945-1953* (Rapaport, 2005) it is described the situation of Jewry both in German Democratic Republic and in the German Federal Republic in post-war period. A part of the book refers to Eastern Germany. Jewish leaders tried to show the sufferings endured by the Jews, while the communists considered the Jews as being equal with the German nationals. In Eastern Germany the problem of reparations was not brought into the foreground. In the Western Germany the situation was different and, as a consequence of Luxembourg Agreement, the western German state decided to pay compensations to Israel. Like in other communist states, in Eastern Germany, Jewish political leaders were put under trial.

In Romania, during 1945 – 1953, several Jewish organizations were constituted which in time disappeared and their role was taken over by Jewish Democratic Committee, an institution controlled by communists who wanted to supervise closely the Jewish Community. As it results from the files existent in the National Archives branch of Oradea, the Jews from Oradea and the ones from Romania tried in the first years after the war to recuperate their houses and furniture confiscated during the fascist occupation, they tried to support and to offer to their fellows counseling with the support of the community. They tried to organize cultural activities, they offered to the Jews who had no qualification the chance to learn a job, they tried to support the ill people and the orphans. At the beginning, they achieved all these things with the suport of some institutions of their own (sanitary, educational, orphelinates), which ulterior entered in the posession of Romanian state. A number of Jews became communists, and they denied their origins, but most of them chose to emmigrate in Palestina (Israel after 1948). During the British mandate in Palestine, the communist supported the immigration of the Jews in Palestine, as counter reaction to the British power. They did not abandon the idea to spread their system in Israel, and the ones who emigrated were politically prepared, thing which did not have the expected success. In the same time, the zionism was condamned by Romanian Communist Party, a lot of zionists being interogated. Radu Ioanid in his book *Răscumpărarea evreilor* argues that for every Romanian Jew emigrated in Israel, the Jewish state paied money to Romanian authorities, a condamnable fact, kept secret even in present times (Ioanid, 2005, p. 95-117).

As a conclusion, we can state that the situation of Jews from the communist space was far from good during the years 1945-1953. They were affected by the war, later by Stalin's antisemmitism and by the policy of communist states to punish the interwar period's elites. Jewish mentalities were not compatible with communism, it was only a particular historical situation which determined a part of the Jews to become communists.

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THE PERCEPTION OF THE TRIANON TREATY IN THE COMMUNIST PERIOD. CONFRONTATION OR HARMONY BETWEEN TWO IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS?

Istvan POLGAR*

Abstract: ***The perception of the Trianon Treaty in the communist period. Confrontation or harmony between two ideological currents?*** *The general opinion of the Hungarian historians, Trianon finds a special place between the phenomenon of the rise of nationalism and the rise of Marxism, both arising in the context of world revolution.*

Nationalist interpretation of Hungary's neighbors, to the Trianon is justified, but is different from the negative interpretation of the Hungarians. They consider that the Trianon marked the setting free of the Danubian people from the yoke of tier, for them the peace process is the postulate of justice and truth.

On the other hand, the Marxist interpretation of Trianon, especially the Soviet one, slipped out threw a big flexibility to the views of Westerners, although by then the Soviets strongly denunciated until then the peace process "imperialist-capitalist – bourgeoisie' of Paris.

Key words: *Trianon, Hungary, Romania, perception, communism*

The general opinion of the Hungarian historians, Trianon finds a special place between the phenomenon of the rise of nationalism and the rise of Marxism, both arising in the context of world revolution. "Bourgeois nationalism and revolutionary Marxism, two concepts of Western origin, are the two doctrines that provided universal humanity, but have contributed more to divide than unify nations, so it is not surprising that the interpretations of the Treaty of Trianon bore real controversies"- believes Stephen Borsody (Borsody, 1982:15).

Of course, we can see that the nationalist interpretation of Hungary's neighbors, to the Trianon is justified, but is different from the negative interpretation of the Hungarians. They consider that the Trianon marked the setting free of the Danubian people from the yoke of tier, for them the peace process is the postulate of justice and truth. Moreover, the reaffirm of the Trianon's regulations at the Peace Conference in Paris after the Second World War can be seen as revenge started by the Allies against Hitler, because he abolished the Trianon.

The same author says that all controversies related to nationalist interpretations on the peace process were a hopeless exercise. "In a neutral approach, on an academic realm, the attention would have been focused on the views of the Western powers, who devised the Trianon, and would complete by admitting the conception of their own peace process. This happened in a period of peace in Europe, but also a bad time to clarify the conditions for a just peace. The repudiation of Munich and the events that generated them and which preceded the Second World War, followed by the peace process in 1946, have created conditions for the Allied Powers to speak honestly, democratically "- says Borsody.

In other words, he admits that there were created conditions for a fair peace for the Danube region, followed by positive effects[1] (Borsody, 1982:97). But, such a thing could not

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[1] *After reviewing border with Hitler, the proportion of majority and minority in Hungary has been more serious, but with slightly better than in central and eastern European countries favored by the Trianon. In 1941, Hungary reached a Hungarian majority of almost 80% in its territory expanded to most of the Member winners, such as 70% in Czechoslovakia and Poland, 72% in Romania and 83% in Yugoslavia. Cf Stephen Borsody, op. cit., p. 97*

have been accepted in 1946, in the process of the Nazis at Nuremberg and the growing Soviet influence in the area, the process of redrawing the borders of Hungary developed under the auspices of Hitler was not the timeliness of a fair justice to the idea of ethnic the boundaries set by the Trianon.

On the other hand, the Marxist interpretation of Trianon, especially the Soviet one, slipped out threw a big flexibility to the views of Westerners, although by then the Soviets strongly denunciated until then the peace process "imperialist-capitalist – bourgeoisie' of Paris. In this regard it is important to recall the document entitled "Resolution on the national question in Central Europe and the Balkans" prepared by the Fifth Congress of the 'Commintern' in 1924.

In its preamble clearly saying that: "Saint-German, Versailles and all their subsequent treaties have been dictated by the victorious powers of the Entente, who have created such a small number of imperialist states such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece, all made the fight against the proletarian revolution. These countries were formed by the annexation of large areas of foreign population and have become centers of national and social oppression.

Following this direction, the 'Commintern' resolution proclaiming "the right of all nations to self-determination, up to total separation" and promised support for "the political separation of the oppressed peoples of Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece.

A separate problem, in paragraph 8 of resolution, with the name "Hungarian issue", says the need for increased communist activities among the Hungarian population of the territories annexed by Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, launching the slogan "right to self of these Hungarians to their separation the states that have attached. Finally, the issue of section 9 of the resolution, "Transylvanian question" claims PCdR slogan proposed by the "separation of Transylvania to Romania" and the formation of an "independent regions of Transylvania' (The Communist International, 1924-1925:93).

After World War II, however, the Soviet disapproval was less vehement against the peace agreements ending the First World War, bringing very slight adjustments to Western claims that were partisans to a total restoration of the Trianon. "Unfortunately, they were overloaded when the meaning of international proletarian justice, so their attitude was not any less harmful than the West, eventually have pursued their own interests of the moment - considers Borsody (Borsody, 1982:16).

Under the Marxist revolutionary terminology around the new peace conference in Paris, in these terms could be defined the Soviet attitude on Trianon. In the author's view, during the post-revolutionary " period of the Danube Basin, the communist parties of the Soviet countries have adopted a very different optics to the problem.

As expected, the most embarrassing performance in the process of rewriting the history seems to be that offered by the Hungarian Communist Party, which in the name of proletarian internationalism-approved the understanding of Trianon imposed again after the Second World War (Borsody, 1982:17). The rulers' gesture from Budapest had brought them popularity and sympathy from the neighbors, but not from the Hungarians, who have interpreted it as an insult and an injury made to the memory of the former Greater Hungary.

Romanian and Hungarian Communist historians have primarily sought common elements for building a unitary ideological conception about the views of the nature dualism of a number of Hungarian politicians of the opposition, which included Mocsáry Lajos, leader of the Liberal Independence Party.

He disagreed with the idea of "single Hungarian nation" (*Magyorország története*, 1983:170) which he was against of in the most objective way in his works at the diet. "The national issue is from our point of view a vital issue - said Mocsáry - and we can not resolve

the difficult situation created by it, unless we recognize that our country is not a unitary one, but a country with many languages" – then he strongly asked the deputies to choose "or Austria and the dynasty, or the nationalities and people".

The Hungarian historians now admit that the mid-nineteenth-century Austro-German bourgeoisie is in no position to accept the support from the Hungarian bourgeoisie in the rejection of federalist ideas, which would have undermined the leading role in the economy and markets in Europe while Central and expansionist tendencies in the Balkans.

Meanwhile, the compromise negotiated by the Deak Ferenc Hungarian magnates allowed retaining further hegemony on nationalities, even at the cost of abandoning a part of Hungary's state sovereignty.

According to Hungarian communist historians - taken over by those from Romania – the reconciliation with Austria was fully accepted, there were no differences of opinion about the form it will take (Păcurariu, 1988:293): "It was born as a compromise that maintained and kept the power factors of absolutism: the dynasty, high bourgeois and military bureaucracy true dynasty of descent feudal landlord class. The multinational monarchy has limited the solving of serious national problems sharing its unified empire, previously located "over the nations", and in two state portions organized on a national base. Thus it was granted a significant part of the Austro-German and Hungarian power of dominant classes and, providing them the leadership in the two component states of the empire over other nations that constituted the majority population (*Magyorország története,* 1983:777) .

About causes which have led to the Empire's disaster, the Hungarian historians believe they can be summarized to the restriction of political rights given to the component nationalities of the dualist state, process for whom are guilty the ruling classes of the Austrians and Hungarians, frightened by the prospect of the collapse of the monarchy. 'The reactionary ossification of the dualist regime was reinforced by the multinational composition of the monarchy. Widening of political rights, the attraction of new social strata in politics, would have been necessarily followed by the political independence of the submissive and right less nations, weakening of the dualist system based on Austro-German and Hungary hegemony of dominant classes. For this reason, the ruling classes, led by fears of national dissolution of the monarchy, have struggled with all the power to suppress the independent political activity of the broader masses, to paralyze it, limiting their political life in the narrow circle of parliament and clubs parliamentary parties (*Magyorország története*, 1979:789).

For the purposes of the above stated, the Communists are calling on the conclusions reached by Szekfü Gyula, one of the parents of new interwar Hungarian historiography, which objectively considers that "In the organization of the new Hungary and in solving the national issue it has manifested the liberal nationalist conception of Hungarian political shell, which did not recognize the country's borders only one nation policy, the Hungarian, and deny the existence of separate national not Hungarian people. (Gyula, 1920:183). Other ideas expressed in the interwar period by Szekfü remain censored for now, being relaunched in a new form in the middle of the ninth decade of last century.

Francis Păcurariu subscribes too to Szekfü ideas, considering that, at the signing of the dualism, the nationalities of the Empire have seen themselves again in front of a state of facts which they disapproved in 1848-1849, and more, the former enemies joined hands now and want to build a more restricted politic regime. (Păcurariu, 1988:183) From this spring the centrifugal and even separatist tendencies of all people incorporated under the scepter of the monarchy.

Analyzing more deeply the political situation of the nationalities of the empire, against the growing process of limiting their rights managed by the Austro-Hungarian rulers, Vasile Netea moves too the conclusion that the events conducted throughout the First World

War, and which led to the collapse of the monarchy, are on the normal track of the consequences of anachronistic policy towards nationalities.

In this sense, the First World War was the pretext, but the instrument by which the oppressed nationalities found opportunity to escape and to serve their own national states. Designed by the Court as a mean to prevent, through an agreement with the Hungarian aristocracy, the centrifugal tendencies of the empire, it was to become, by killing the right to equality and independence of other peoples, the starting point of deep cough and actions to submit, which will end only with its the collapse in 1918 "- highlights the author referring to the two-tier building." (Netea, 1974:351).

To support his convictions, Vasile Netea brings undeniable historical arguments on the waves of protest issued by leaders of all nationalities in the Empire. Focused on the case of Transylvania, the author evokes the intervention analysis of Romanian deputies Joseph Hodoş, Aloisiu Vlad and Sigismund Borlea in the Parliament of Budapest, which they call for respect for the judgments of the Diet at Sibiu in 1863-1864, those who recognized the equality of the nation and Romanian tongue along with other nations, and cancellation documents promulgated by the Diet dualism in Pest. Romanian applications will address and the content "pronouncement" written by George Bariţiu, in which it was clearly stipulated that the Romanians' 'don't recognize to the Diet in Pest its right to make laws for Transylvania and nor the Transylvanian deputies that became members of it as legal official of the country' (Netea, 1974:351).

Equally appreciated is the thinking expressed in the pages of the magazines Jászyi Oszkár "Társadalmi Szemle (Social Review) and" Huszadik Század "(Twentieth Century), where the Hungarian politician saw the prosperity of the Hungarian people and democratic transformation of Hungary only by the right of "the recognition of the right of any nation to freely develop its language and culture' (Netea, 1974:729). However, in its vision didn't fit under any circumstances the idea of relating the national issue to the possibility of political auto determination of the Hungarian nationalities.

The progressive Jászyi Oszkár was equally rehabilitated by the Romanian and Hungarian historians, being emphasized the objectivity he proved in analyzing the situation of the Dualist Monarchy in its period of decline (Jaszy, 1934). A distinguished specialist of the problem of nationalities in Austria-Hungary, he wrote that if the collapse of empire is not a mechanical process, certainly it will be an organic one.

His clairvoyance will have to be confirmed in the coming years. A pertinent analysis of the forecasts would be made later by the Archduke Otto von Habsburg[2]. [3]And it was agreed that a fundamental reconstruction, the direction of democratization and federalization Dual Monarchy, was more than necessary.

Other authors agree too that despite of the fact that to the end of the war the nationalities' complaints erupted in different forms, however, among the citizens of the monarchy still existed a force of cohesion among the armies of the monarchy under the foreign land, exception being only the armed groups in Czech Republic, supplied by Allied

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[2] The case of Austria-Hungary was also examined by the Archduke Otto, son of Emperor Charles, the last of the monarchy, under the title „*Danubian Reconstruction*" în *Foreign Affairs*. 20 (1941-42), p. 243-252. Apud. Stephen D. Kertesz, *The Consequences of World War I: The Effects on East Central Europe*, in Bela K. Kiraly, Peter Pastor, Ivan Sanders, *War and Society in East Central Europe*, Vol. VI, *Total War and Peacemaking. A Case Study on Trianon*, Social Science Monographs, Brooklyn College Press; Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1982, p. 40

[3]Under the impact of the events of 1918, Count Ottokar Czernin he wrote in a pessimistic tone; Austria-Hungary is going to collapse; and that; We can not fight alongside Germany on the Austro-Hungarian land, because there are doubts the collapse of Germany, and wounds that monarchy will receive in this tussle will be no less than of all those who suffer now, it will die along with Germany if it is considered so well in *In the World War,* New York, 1920, p. 36-37. Apud: Stephen D. Kertesz, *op. cit.*, p. 40

propaganda (Glaise-Horstenau, 1931-1938). Also the administration, even if it was consisted of a national mosaic, remained loyal to the end, especially Foreign Affairs Ministry [4].

Starting from private examples, the progressive Hungarian historians try to alleviate the critic tone to the dualist regime, even if they partly recognize its negative side. " In this state, there were affirmed, even if limited, but appreciated after the Eastern – European measure, not just formal but also institutionalized and socially accepted those rights and freedoms, those economic and political frameworks, which offered the nationalities bourgeois opportunities and national organization – they consider, and then they consider in a critic way that: ‘ it is true that in this state arise to perfection the method of national oppression and hatred almost at the level of worship’ (*Magyorország története*, 1983:155) .

In what concerns the radicalization process of denationalization of the nationalities of the Empire, Vasile Netea sustains that this started with the promulgation of "the law of nationalities" in the Diet at Budapest in 1868. The legislative act that met both the consent of so-called "liberals" and "tolerant" of Deák Ferenc and József Eötvös’ camps and those of Kálmán Tisza's conservatives, known for their extremist speech.

To the Hungarian project, which in the vision of the Hungarian leaders had to "establish a strong and conscious activity chauvinistic", as the Prime Minister Bánffy Dezsö expressed in 1895, has been backed by a democratic project developed by representatives of the nationalities of the empire, but remained without echo in the Parliament Hall. The latter required that "in Hungary, the following people of the country: the Hungarians, Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks, Germans and Ruthenia’s are recognized by the fundamental law as (Netea, 1974:362) ‘regnicular’ nations, equally righted, as political nationalities with language also equally entitled ' claims unacceptable according to the Premier, who considered that "a fantasy about a state of law (...) is dangerous" and would mean a capitulation to the idea of "nation and unified policy in Hungary (*Magyorország története,* 1983:155) .

In light of these realities, the Hungarian historians will say however that the fall of the monarchy was not caused slowly by internal conflicts[5]. They believe that the federalization of the country's social reforms perhaps would have led to the revitalization of the monarchy, but already there were serious discontents and the external revolutionary movement encouraged them, and, in the end, the attitude of the Western winners was decisive. They will further

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[4] In this respect, says Austrian Minister for Britain in the interwar period that ;my job was made available to any person, or German, Hungarian, Polish, Ruthenian, Romanian, Czech, Croatian, Italian or Serbian, from either side of the monarchy, inspired only of patriotism - not aware of another case where someone put the interests of the nationalities in the state. Apud: Sir George Franckenstein, *Diplomat of Destinny* New York, 1940, p. 25

[5] In the first part of the war, the Entente powers not plănuiseră destruction of Austria-Hungary. With all due respect to President Wilson, Colonel House its report that in agreement with heads of state in the West, he believes that the maintenance of political Austro-Hungarian is necessary. Cf Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol III, Boston, 1928, p. 335-336 When President Wilson was sent on December 4, 1917, the Congress with a proposal to declare war on the Habsburg monarchy that: We don't want to reduce or rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire, is not our business what they will do with their life, or economic or political, neither we nor required to dictate in any way. We are only interested in their affairs, large or small, to remain in their own hands. Cf. *Foreign Relations 1917*, p. XI-XII

Under Section 10 of the 14th Wilsonian points: We want people of nationalities that make up Austria-Hungary, to be protected and be guaranteed the freedom of autonomous development. Similarly, on January 5, 1918, British Prime Minister Lloyd George, said that Britain did not fight to destroy Austria-Hungary and that its collapse was not part of the war aims.

Incomprehensible to these statements and principles remain the promises made to Italy and Romania throughout the war, and later other nationalities, who could not perform without destroying the monarchy. Moreover, in the last months of the war, Allied propaganda had a radical change to the issue of Austro-Hungarian Emperor Charles witness the revelations made by Clemenceau in Overture peace process in April 1918.

It is possible that the Western advice could have been under the spell of their own propaganda, a role in the formation of such views with Czech leaders playing their project to create Czechoslovakia. . Cf. Victor S. Mametey, *The United States and the Dissolution of Austria-Hungary*, in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, (Oct. 1950), p. 256-270

sustain that the leaders of various nationalities were encouraged to do so, supported and trained to fill their conational fellows' minds that there is no reason to stick with the old monarchy[6]. "This change of attitude may explain why most nationalities, bypassing any other political considerations, have preferred to side with the allies" - concludes Stefan Osusky.

The points of view will still remain different in what the isotics, and the population of the two countries will receive the consequences of the Treaty of Trianon. "For Hungarians, the word Trianon is equivalent to their national catastrophe, a negative connotation related to fancy Versailles palace gardens"-says Stephen Borsody (Borsody, 1982:15). In his view, the Treaty of Trianon is simply the end of a tortuous process of reorganization of Europe under the principle coordinates of the nationalities and the nation-state, i.e. a controversial materialization of peace to the continent in terms of print European nationalism, criticized by some, but supported by others.

Starting from the well known view of Hungary on negative interpretation of nationalism promoted at the Trianon, he believes that the treaty not only sanctioned dismantling of historical Hungary, but also dismantling the Hungarian people[7]. In statistical terms, Trianon left in the maimed territory of Hungary only two thirds of the ethnic Hungarian population, while the rest remained in the new exaggerated enlarged three neighboring states, such as Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, or even five parts, considering the Sub - Carpathian Hungarians, assigned to Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union Ruthenia, in the aftermath of World War II.

Instead, the union of all Romanians into a unitary nation-state is perceived by all historians and analysts of the regime as a revolution, an act of emancipation and the emancipation of the Romanian nation, scattered until then in various provinces of the empire. Moreover, this revolution is characterized as an atypical, which is peaceful, out of the well known patterns of the violent revolutions that took place over time in Western Europe or closer to the time December 1, 1918, in Russia. 'The most important revolution unleashed on the land of Transylvania was in 1918' - states and Victor Jinga (Jinga, 1995:460) - without destroying lives and heritages, without hatred and vengeance, the majority people on this earth has proven, through thoughtful action and highly important decisions, a very high coefficient of its political and revolutionary capacity.

It is qualified as revolution also by Roman Ciorogariu, an objective witness of events, in two volumes of his memoirs, a revolution of national liberation, wearing an union act in a divine aura as a work of God. "The day of the national unification began with worship services in both churches - tells Ciorogariu, then the Orthodox Bishop of Oradea – At us, the choir sings a march Guard, instead of an orthodox song, and Romanian Awake. At the "better die fighting" the hand rises to oath and play all in tears. Under the spell of this time ends the Mass with Bishop John Pap: "Thee who has risen from the dead and gave resurrection to the Romanian people" (Ciorogariu, 1994:70).

In the same terms it is described the union event and collective volume dedicated to the history of Romania. "With adoption of the Declaration of Alba Iulia on December 1, 1918 it was concluded the most significant event in the history of the Romanian people, the

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[6]The statement belongs to Stefan Osusky, one of the founders of Czechoslovakia during a meeting with Emperor Charles, overcome by the inherent downfall of the state, and explained in detail by Masaryk and Benesh, who in 1915 worked on the collapse of the monarchy. The fate of the empire was already decided in Paris, London and Washington when Emperor Charles nationalities submitted bids to save the monarchy. Cf. *Freedom and Union* (May 1949), p. 22

[7] Of the approximately ten million Hungarians in the new territory of Hungary there are about 67%, the rest was divided states inheritance, as follows: 16% in Romania, Czechoslovakia and 10% in 6% in Yugoslavia. A small number of Hungarians remained in Austria, a loss which never aroused resentment Hungary compared to others. The new frontier of Austria and Hungary was governed by a plebiscite, after which the city remained Sopron Hungary . – Cf. Stephen Borsody, *op. cit.*, p. 15

achievement of Greater Romania. The new Romanian state that comprised an area of 295,049 km2 and a population of 18,052,896 inhabitants has been internationally recognized in the peace treaties concluded at Paris in 1919-1920. The whole Romania, as all states up to the end of World War I, in the space between the German and Russian one, it was not the creation of the Peace Conference, but the direct consequence of the collapse of multinational empires of Europe''.

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II. COMMUNICATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Renaud de La BROSSE ⇔ *Régulation des médias et démocratisation: l'expérience européenne*

Dorin I. DOLGHI ⇔ *Legitimacy, Institutions and the Communication Strategy in the European Union*

Ioan HORGA, Diana GAL ⇔ *Quality Assurance in Higher Education in the Central and East-European Countries After EU Enlargement (2004)*

RÉGULATION DES MÉDIAS ET DÉMOCRATISATION: L'EXPÉRIENCE EUROPÉENNE

Renaud de la BROSSE*

Abstract: *Searching for fundamental freedoms, independence, security and prosperity were the main drivers of changes and political elections from the countries of Central and Oriental Europe in the last twenty years. The image of the Western Europe was perceived by the former Soviet countries' population as an association between the individual politic freedoms and the economic welfare.*
In the media sector, there are delineated two external vectors of democratization which contributed to adopting a reform in the media and political field (especially threw creating the media's independent regulators) in the countries of Central and Oriental Europe: The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe and European Union.

Keywords: *media, democracy, regulatory, Central and Oriental Europe*

Pour l'Europe de l'Est, l'année 1989 a marqué la fin d'un modèle politique dans lequel les médias, considérés dans la terminologie léniniste comme l'arme la plus puissante du Parti (communiste), étaient des instruments idéologiques au service exclusif de l'Etat[1]. Comme tout autre moyen de production, les médias étaient la propriété de l'Etat ou de ses appendices (syndicats, mouvements de jeunesse, etc.).

Ce dernier jouissait d'un monopole sur la collecte et la diffusion des « informations », de même que sur leur production (impression, etc.). Il n'existait pas dans ces pays de secteur médiatique privé, a fortiori à vocation commerciale. La sujétion totale des médias au pouvoir politique, ce dernier ayant un représentant (du Parti) au sein de chaque rédaction[2], faisait qu'il n'y avait conséquemment pas nécessité - un tel système l'excluant même a priori - de mécanisme de régulation ou d'autorégulation des médias. Les différents partis communistes d'Europe de l'Est étendaient, en effet, leurs tentacules au sein même de tous les organes de presse.

En Union Soviétique, tous les médias étaient supervisés par le Département de propagande du Comité Central du P.C.U.S. En Tchécoslovaquie, c'était au Bureau fédéral de la presse et des informations (FUTI) de veiller au strict respect de l'application de la politique du Parti Communiste en matière de presse. En Roumanie, chaque organe de presse avait un conseil et un comité de rédaction comprenant des membres du Parti Communiste. Idem en République Démocratique Allemande, où les cadres du Parti socialiste unifié communiste (S.E.D.) étaient implantés au sein de toutes les rédactions, etc.

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[1] Ainsi que l'a justement noté James Curran à propos de l'Union Soviétique, constat que l'on peut étendre aux pays satellitaires, dans un tel système les médias *« éduquent les individus dans les principes du marxisme-léninisme; (…) aident à la coordination et à la mobilisation du peuple pour la réalisation des objectifs qui doivent être remplis; (et) même les divertissements médiatiques ont un rôle en ce sens qu'ils fournissent des modèles pour l'émulation et l'instruction et que l'on attend d'eux qu'ils ne subvertissent pas les définitions officielles de la société Soviétique ». Traduction personnelle. In « Rethinking the media as a public sphere»*, p.35.

[2] Sur ce point, *cf.* les témoignages des journalistes roumain Ioan T. Morar, *« Roumanie : la nostalgie de la censure. Court essai pimenté de témoignages de l'Absurdistan »*, et tchèque Igor Pirek, *«République Tchèque : témoignage »*, in *Médias et démocratie dans le monde*, Textes réunis sous la direction de Florian Sauvageau, Université Laval, Québec, Canada, octobre 1994, pp.5-7.

Bien de l'Etat, le secteur des médias était concentré entre ses mains et celles de ses représentants, le pluralisme des médias n'était que formel et de façade, aucun autre point de vue que la vérité officielle ne trouvant à s'y exprimer.

A ce propos, comme le relève Jens Cavallin, chercheur à l'Université suédoise de Kalmar, la chute du Mur de Berlin a été suivie « d'une libération et d'une démocratisation graduelle de l'Europe centrale et orientale (…), qui a débouché sur un pluralisme des opinions exprimées dans les nouveaux médias indépendants de ces régions ». « En dépit de dérapages sanglants, comme la guerre yougoslave », conclut-il, « le pluralisme a été établi dans la plupart des pays de cette partie de l'Europe »[3]. Alors que dans le reste des Etats (de l'ouest) du continent la tendance générale à la fin des années 1980 était marquée par une concentration accrue des médias et, dans son sillage, par une réduction du pluralisme médiatique[4], l'immédiat après chute du communisme à l'Est et la soif de liberté d'expression qui l'a accompagnée ont vu la naissance d'une kyrielle de nouveaux journaux (par privatisations ou créations) et, plus tard, de nouvelles chaînes de radio et de télévision.

Pour autant, si, après 1989, le secteur de la presse s'est assez tôt extirpé des prétentions des politiques à le contrôler – tombant de Charybde en Scylla, c'est-à-dire sous le contrôle des dures lois du marché (Gulyas, 1999: 61-74)… - celui de l'audiovisuel est quant à lui resté plus longtemps exposé aux incursions partisanes. Cette situation a, il faut le souligner, été facilitée par le flou juridique succédant à l'effondrement des régimes communistes – notamment en matière d'encadrement du secteur médiatique audiovisuel en général et de la régulation en particulier… - et par la survivance de mentalités héritées de près de quarante-cinq années de totalitarisme. Quoi d'étonnant, dans ces conditions, comme l'expliquent Miklos Sükösd et Péter Bajomi-Làzàr, que « la croyance répandue en des effets directs et massifs des médias, le désir irrésistible en découlant de les contrôler et une tradition de journalisme partisan, aient constitué l'héritage culturel des nouvelles démocraties en matière de médias »[5] ?…

Dans le cheminement vers la démocratie libérale emprunté par les Etats ayant tourné le dos au communisme, l'appel de l'Europe et l'attrait pour celle-ci ont été déterminants. La quête de libertés fondamentales, de prospérité, d'indépendance et de sécurité ont été des moteurs essentiels des changements et des choix politiques intervenus au moment de la chute du Mur. L'image[6] de « l'autre Europe », que percevaient les populations des pays ayant été contraints d'adopter le modèle communiste au sortir de la Seconde guerre mondiale, associait étroitement libertés politiques individuelles et bien-être économique.

Dans le secteur spécifique des médias également, deux vecteurs externes de démocratisation – le Conseil de l'Europe et l'Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (1), d'une part, et l'Union Européenne (2) d'autre part - ont concurremment poussé à l'adoption d'une réforme en profondeur du champ politique et médiatique (ne particulier à la

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[3] *Cf.* son article *« European Policies and Regulations on Media Concentration »*, In *International Journal of Communications Law and Policy*, February 11, 1998, page 2. Traduction personnelle de : *« the liberation and gradual democratisation of Eastern and Central Europe (…) led to a pluralism of views expressed in new independent media in those regions. Despite bloody backlashes, such as the Yugoslav War, pluralism was established in most countries in this part of Europe »*.

[4] *Cf*., par exemple, le Rapport sur *La diversité des médias en Europe*, préparé par le AP-MD (Panel consultatif du Comité directeur du Conseil de l'Europe sur les moyens de communication de masse sur les questions concernant les concentrations des médias, le pluralisme et la diversité). Division médias, Direction générale des droits de l'homme, Conseil de l'Europe, Strasbourg, décembre 2002, 34 p.

[5] In *"Political democratization and media democratization"*, *op.cit*. p.13.

[6] Sur le rôle des médias internationaux diffusant leurs programmes à destination des populations des pays du Bloc soviétique, *cf*. Tristan Mattelart, *« Le rideau de fer au péril des radios internationales »*, in André-Jean Tudesq (dir.), *Les médias acteurs de la vie internationale*, Médias et Nouvelles technologies, Editions Apogée, Rennes, 1997, p.118.

mise sur pied de régulateurs indépendants des médias) dans l'ensemble des Etats de l'Europe centrale et orientale (3).

1) L'influence du Conseil de l'Europe et de l'Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe

Le premier vecteur de démocratisation politique à l'œuvre dans le domaine des médias au cours de la décennie 1990 a résidé dans l'action parallèle du Conseil de l'Europe et, plus accessoirement, de l'Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe, tant en faveur de la promotion et de la protection de la liberté de la presse que du pluralisme des opinions exprimées par médias interposés.

a) Le rôle prépondérant du Conseil de l'Europe

L'entrée de tout nouvel Etat membre au Conseil de l'Europe est subordonnée à l'adhésion et au respect par celui-ci des principes et valeurs démocratiques qu'il s'est donné lors de sa création, et qu'il a constamment réaffirmés et enrichis depuis[7]. A ce titre, comme tout autre Etat membre, il lui est suggéré d'harmoniser sa législation avec celle de ses homologues, à partir des principes et valeurs dégagés par le Conseil[8]. Or ce dernier, en matière de médias, centre toute son action autour de l'article 10 de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme proclamant la liberté d'expression et d'information[9]. Selon la philosophie sous-jacente propre à cette organisation, pour que les idéaux démocratiques qu'elle s'est donnés subsistent et perdurent, la liberté d'expression et de la presse devraient trouver à s'exercer sans entraves dans chaque Etat membre.

Ainsi, il existe une incitation très forte dans le sens d'une démocratisation de la société en général et du secteur des médias en particulier, et donc conséquemment à l'adoption d'un cadre législatif et réglementaire libéral par chaque pays. Entre 1990 et 1999, décennie exceptionnelle d'un point de vue historique[10], le Conseil de l'Europe a joué un rôle d'incitation particulier, en tant que structure d'accueil privilégiée des nouvelles démocraties européennes, passant de 23 à 41 Etats membres (dont 17 pays d'Europe centrale et orientale)[11].

Même si cela n'a pas toujours été facile, ce n'est donc pas un hasard si, dans leur grande majorité, les Etats issus de l'ex-Europe de l'Est ont tous adopté, à partir du début des années 1990 - chacun à leur rythme et souvent en plusieurs étapes - un nouvel arsenal institutionnel et juridique afin de réguler le champ médiatique. L'objectif d'autonomie du

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[7] Pour qu'un État puisse en effet adhérer au Conseil de l'Europe, ses institutions doivent être démocratiques et il doit respecter les Droits de l'Homme, ainsi que le stipulent les articles 3 & 4 de ses Statuts adoptés à Londres, le 5.V.1949. Article 3 : *« Tout membre du Conseil de l'Europe reconnaît le principe de la prééminence du droit et le principe en vertu duquel toute personne placée sous sa juridiction doit jouir des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales. Il s'engage à collaborer sincèrement et activement à la poursuite du but défini au chapitre I^er^ ».* Article 4 : *« Tout Etat européen considéré capable de se conformer aux dispositions de l'article 3 et comme en ayant la volonté peut être invité par le Comité des Ministres à devenir membre du Conseil de l'Europe. Tout Etat ainsi invité aura la qualité de membre dès qu'un instrument d'adhésion au présent Statut aura été remis en son nom au Secrétaire Général ».*

[8] Principes et valeurs rappelées notamment dans la *Résolution (84)21 sur L'action du Conseil de l'Europe dans le domaine politique*, adoptée par le Comité des Ministres le 21 novembre 1984 lors de sa 75ème Session.

[9] *Cf. supra*.

[10] Sur cet aspect historique particulier, *cf.* l'ouvrage de Denis Huber, *Une décennie pour l'histoire. Le Conseil de l'Europe 1989-1999*, *Conseil de l'Europe*, Strasbourg, 1999, 314 p.

[11] Les dates d'adhésion au *Conseil* des Etats issus de l'ex-Europe de l'Est, y compris de l'ex Union Soviétique, s'établissent chronologiquement ainsi : Hongrie (6.11.1990) ; Pologne (26.11.1991) ; Bulgarie (7.5.1992) ; Estonie (14.5.1993) ; Lituanie (14.5.1993) ; Slovénie (14.5.1993) ; République Tchèque (30.6.1993) ; Slovaquie (30.6.1993) ; Roumanie (7.10.1993) ; Lettonie (10.2.1995) ; Albanie (13.07.1995) ; Moldova (13.7.1995) ; Ex République yougoslave de Macédoine (9.11.1995) ; Ukraine (9.11.1995) ; Fédération de Russie (28.2.1996) ; Croatie (6.11.1996) ; Géorgie (27.4.1999) ; Arménie (25.1.2001) ; Azerbaïdjan (25.1.2001) ; Bosnie-Herzégovine (24.04.2002) ; Serbie (3.4.2003) ; Monténégro (11.05.2007).

secteur des médias vis-à-vis du pouvoir politique, la nécessaire protection de la liberté d'information de même que la responsabilisation des médias – toutes prônées par le Conseil de l'Europe, ont « naturellement » conduit ces Etats à choisir de confier la régulation du secteur à un organe indépendant, sur le modèle de ce qui se faisait déjà à l'Ouest. C'est ainsi que vont éclore de nouvelles instances de régulation, venant enrichir le parterre d'institutions sœurs existant ailleurs sur le reste du vieux continent.

Ainsi assistons-nous à un vaste mouvement au cours des années 1990. Il se prolongera la décennie suivante. L'adoption d'un nouveau cadre législatif et réglementaire en matière de communication audiovisuelle voit la « confiscation » de la régulation du secteur au profit d'instances administratives indépendantes des autorités politiques. En Tchécoslovaquie, la nouvelle loi sur la communication audiovisuelle, adoptée en 1991, donne naissance à une instance de régulation indépendante - à laquelle succéderont deux instances nationales distinctes au lendemain du « divorce à l'amiable » de la Tchéquie et de la Slovaquie : le Rada Ceské republiky pro rozhlasové a televizní vysílání[12] pour la République Tchèque et le Rada pre vysielanie a retransmisiu[13] pour la Slovaquie. L'Assemblée nationale polonaise vote, en décembre 1992, une nouvelle Loi sur l'audiovisuel entrée en vigueur le 1er mars 1993 et qui crée le Krajowa Rada Radiofonii I Telewizji[14]. En Roumanie, le Consiliului Național al Audiovizualului[15] est créé en 1992 par la loi sur l'audiovisuel[16].

Dans les Etats Baltes, l'Estonie s'est dotée en 1994 d'une nouvelle loi sur l'Audiovisuel, dont l'article 31 crée le Ringhäälingunõukogu[17]. La Lettonie a mis sur pied en août 1995 le Nacionālā radio un televīzijas padome[18]. Et la Lituanie, la Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija[19], en vertu de l'article 47 de la nouvelle Loi sur l'accès du public à l'information[20] adoptée en 1996. Fin 1995-début 1996, la Hongrie adopte une nouvelle loi sur la radio et la télévision, qui instaure la Országos Rádió és Televízió Testület[21]. De son côté, la Bulgarie, fonde le Conseil National Audiovisuel, suite à l'adoption d'une loi sur l'Audiovisuel en 1998. En Albanie, la loi sur la radiotélévision publique et privée de septembre 1998[22] crée le Këshilli Kombëtar i Radios dhe Televizionit[23].

Pour des raisons historiques évidentes, liées aux évènements survenus au cours de la décennie 1990, les Etats issus de l'éclatement de l'ex-Yougoslavie se sont, quant à eux, plus tardivement attelés à mettre en place de telles instances de régulation. En Slovénie, la loi sur les mass-média adoptée en 2001 crée le Svet za radiodifuzijo[24]. Par une décision du Haut Représentant (de la communauté internationale) pour la Bosnie-Herzégovine en date du 2 mars 2001, la Commission indépendante pour les médias et l'Agence de régulation des télécommunications, installées à la suite de la loi sur les télécommunications de 1999, ont

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[12] Conseil de l'Audiovisuel, dont l'activité est actuellement régie par la Loi sur l'Audiovisuel du 17 mai 2001 (N°. 231/2001 Coll.).

[13] Conseil de l'Audiovisuel et de la Télédiffusion, dont l'activité est régie par la Loi sur l'Audiovisuel du 4 octobre 2000 (N°.308/2000), qui a succédé au Conseil de la République Slovaque pour la communication audiovisuelle instauré en 1992 par la Loi N°294/1992.

[14] Conseil National de l'Audiovisuel, entré en fonction le 28 avril 1993.

[15] Conseil National de l'Audiovisuel.

[16] Loi N°48/1992, remplacée par la Loi N°504/2002. Voir le numéro 534 du Monitorul Oficial (Journal Officiel) du 22 juillet 2002.

[17] Conseil de l'Audiovisuel. Voir la Loi RT I 1994, 42, 680 entrée en vigueur le 15 juin 1994.

[18] Conseil National de l'Audiovisuel.

[19] Commission lituanienne pour la Radio et la Télévision.

[20] Loi du 2 juillet 1996 N°.I-1418.

[21] Commission Nationale pour la Radio et la Télévision.

[22] Loi n°. 8410 du 30 septembre 1998. Amendée par la Loi n°. 8657 du 31 juillet 2000, la Loi n°. 8794 du 10 mai 2001, la Loi n°. 9016 du 20 février 2003, la Loi n°. 9124 du 29 juillet 2003, et la Loi n°. 9677 of 13 janvier 2007...

[23] Conseil National de la Radio et de la Télévision.

[24] Conseil Audiovisuel Slovène.

laissé place à la Regulatorne agencije za komunikacije Bosne i Hercegovine[25], dont le mandat et les responsabilités ont été fixés par une nouvelle loi sur les communications, entrée en vigueur le 21 octobre 2002[26]. Le Parlement Serbe a voté une nouvelle loi sur l'Audiovisuel en 2002, dont l'article 6 annonce la création d'une Agence Républicaine pour l'Audiovisuel, autonome et indépendante de tout autre organe étatique[27]. En Croatie, c'est la loi sur les médias électroniques adoptée en 2003[28], qui a installé le Vijeće za elektroničke medije[29], organe de régulation indépendant. La Macédoine a, pour sa part, établi un Conseil Audiovisuel, conformément à ce que prévoyait l'article 22 de la loi sur l'Audiovisuel votée en 2003[30]. Le Monténégro, enfin, dernière des ex-Républiques yougoslaves à s'être déclarée indépendante, s'est dotée de l'Agencija za radio-difuziju[31].

b) L'appui accessoire de l'OSCE

L'Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (1994), héritière de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, qui a été lancée en 1975 par la conférence d'Helsinki, a également œuvré à ancrer les instances de régulation de la communication dans le paysage médiatique des anciens pays communistes du Bloc dit de l'Est. Cette incitation se retrouve tant dans les prises de positions officielles de l'Organisation, que dans l'action concrète de lobbying qu'elle mène sur le terrain des Etats membres. Sans entrer dans le détail de celles-ci, il convient néanmoins de rappeler au moins deux déclarations du Représentant Spécial de l'OSCE sur la Liberté des Médias, en faveur de l'indépendance des organes de régulation vis-à-vis de tout type d'interférence externe. Celles-ci ont une portée politique symbolique d'autant plus grande qu'il s'agit, en l'occurrence, de déclarations conjointes avec les représentants d'autres organisations internationales et continentales.

Dans une Déclaration commune adoptée le 18 décembre 2003, le Représentant Spécial de l'OSCE sur la Liberté des Médias, le Rapporteur Spécial des Nations Unies sur la Liberté d'Expression et le Rapporteur Spécial de l'Organisation des Etats Américains sur la Liberté d'Expression notaient ainsi : « All public authorities which exercise formal regulatory powers over the media should be protected against interference, particularly of a political or economic nature, including by an appointments process for members which is transparent, allows for public input and is not controlled by any particular political party»[32].

Quelques années plus tard, en 2007, à l'occasion de la 9ème rencontre sur les « Mécanismes Internationaux pour la Promotion de la Liberté d'Expression », le Représentant Spécial de l'OSCE sur la Liberté des Médias et ses homologues pour les Nations Unies, l'Organisation des Etats Américains et la Commission Africaine des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples, s'inquiétaient, dans une déclaration commune sur la « Promotion de la diversité dans les médias audiovisuels », « (…) du risque de détournement des systèmes de régulation des médias au détriment, entre autres choses, de la diversité, particulièrement là où les organismes de contrôle ne sont pas suffisamment protégés contre les interférences, politiques ou autres »[33].

D'une façon générale, l'action menée par l'OSCE sur le terrain en faveur des instances de régulation, outre la surveillance de l'action des Etats membres dans le domaine des médias et de la liberté d'expression via la réalisation de rapports nationaux annuels,

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[25] *Agence de Régulation pour les Communications de Bosnie-Herzégovine*.
[26] *Cf. Journal Officiel de la République de Bosnie-Herzégovine*, 31/03.
[27] *Cf. Journal Officiel de la République de Serbie*, N°.42/02 (19 juillet 2002).
[28] *Cf.* Law on Electronic Media, *Official Gazette* No. 122/03.
[29] Conseil pour les Médias Electroniques.
[30] *Cf. Journal Officiel de la République de Macédoine*, n°20/97 et 70/2003.
[31] Agence Audiovisuelle du Monténégro.
[32] *Cf.* http://www.article19.org/pdfs/igo-documents/three-mandates-dec-2003.pdf
[33] *Cf.* http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2007/12/28855_en.pdf

consiste le plus souvent, conjointement avec d'autres acteurs internationaux et de la société civile, à diffuser les standards européens en la matière et à appeler à leur respect par les nouveaux régulateurs[34]. Ce lobbying prend la forme de réunions fréquentes visant notamment à promouvoir le fonctionnement de ceux-ci en réseau et à leur faire adopter les dispositions indispensables à leur fonctionnement à la fois plus efficace et plus transparent[35].

2) L'attractivité de l'Union Européenne

Parallèlement et en appui à l'action du Conseil de l'Europe et de l'OSCE, l'Union Européenne a elle aussi constitué un vecteur de démocratisation politique important dans le domaine des médias. Quoiqu'à l'origine la Communauté Européenne, et plus tard l'Union Européenne, aient approché la question des médias du strict point de vue de l'intégration économique et de la création d'un marché unique (Cavallin, 1998:8), l'incitation politique faite aux Etats candidats à se conformer aux standards européens en matière de médias et de régulation a été forte.

a) Intégration économique et régulation

Le constat dressé sur ce point par les chercheurs hongrois Miklos Sükösd et Peter Bajomi-Lazar est très explicite à propos de l'harmonisation de leurs systèmes de régulation avec la Directive européenne sur la « Télévision sans frontières » - condition parmi d'autres à leur adhésion à l'Union : « By the time of accession, these states are expected to harmonize their regulatory systems with that of the EU. In the field of audio-visual policies, they should include into their legal systems and enforce the requirements of the <<Television Without Frontiers>> Directive that prescribes a 50 percent quota for European made programs in the entertainment field»[36]. Le droit de la concurrence[37] constitue sans conteste le socle de la régulation de l'espace médiatique au sein de l'Union (de la Brosse, 2004: 283-296), puisque son adoption et son respect par les Etats candidats sont en effet une condition pour que ceux-ci puissent y accéder. Il faut rappeler que c'est là l'un des nombreux critères économiques devant être explicitement inscrit en amont dans leur législation et/ou leur réglementation. Le passage d'un Etat où - monopole de l'information oblige, tout média appartenait à la collectivité (au parti communiste de facto) à une société ouverte caractérisée par l'existence de médias privés du secteur commercial ou associatif, a en effet nécessité l'adoption de règles garantissant la concurrence.

Dans la perspective d'une cohabitation entre un secteur public sous tutelle étatique et un secteur privé, il est revenu aux instances de régulation des médias créées de jouer les arbitres. L'Union Européenne a ainsi misé sur la mise en place d'instances de régulation indépendantes et efficientes pour garantir et promouvoir une concurrence ouverte et saine dans le secteur audiovisuel, de façon à éviter toute distorsion concurrentielle qui ne

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[34] L'atelier d'expertise sur *« L'indépendance des autorités de régulation dans le domaine des médias et des télécommunications »*, co-organisé le 24 avril 2008 par l'OSCE et l'Union Européenne à Sarajevo à l'intention de l'*Agence de Régulation pour les Communications de Bosnie-Herzégovine* en constitue à nos yeux un parfait exemple. Source : http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2007/03/23751_en.pdf

[35] *Cf.* par exemple les conclusions et les recommandations de la *Conférence régionale des organes de régulation de l'Europe du Sud-est*, organisée les 10 et 11 septembre 2004 à Przno au Monténégro par l'OSCE avec le concours du Conseil de l'Europe et ayant réuni les régulateurs de Serbie, du Monténégro, de Bosnie-Herzégovine, de Macédoine, d'Albanie, de Croatie, du Kosovo et de Slovénie.

[36] Directive EC 89/552, modifiée par la Directive EC 1997/36, p.21.

[37] On doit ici noter les limites d'une telle approche, au sens où une situation de concentration excessive de médias aux mains d'une seule personne ou d'un seul groupe, tout en pouvant constituer un pouvoir d'opinion dominant menaçant la démocratie, n'est passible de réaction que dans le cas où ce pouvoir serait en position commerciale dominante… Sur cette question, *cf.* Dr. Carmen Palzer et Caroline Hilger, *« La surveillance des médias à l'aube du 21ème siècle – organisation et compétences des autorités sous le signe de la convergence »*, in *Iris Plus*, Observations juridiques de l'*Observatoire européen de l'audiovisuel*, Edition 2001-8, 12 pages.

manquerait pas de découler d'une situation dans laquelle un Etat serait à la fois partie (opérateur audiovisuel) et juge (régulateur)…

Dans sa Directive sur les Services Audiovisuels de décembre 1997, la Commission Européenne mentionne explicitement le rôle spécifique joué dans ce secteur par les instances de régulation de la communication compétentes et indépendantes.

b) Régulation et critères politiques

Aux critères économiques définis lors du Sommet Européen de Copenhague de juin 1993 (d'où l'expression « critères de Copenhague »), s'ajoutent également des critères politiques tout aussi importants. L'Union Européenne a, en effet, pris soin de subordonner toute nouvelle adhésion à leur acceptation et à leur intégration dans l'appareil légal des pays candidats[38]. Parmi ces principes et valeurs partagés figurent, entre autres, la reconnaissance et le respect effectif de la liberté d'expression et donc de la liberté de la presse. A ce propos, il convient de noter que l'Union, tout comme l'Association Européenne de Libre-Echange (AELE), a requis la ratification par les pays candidats de certaines des conventions phares adoptées par le Conseil de l'Europe – a fortiori la Convention de sauvegarde des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés Fondamentales (dite Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme), et son article 10 sur la liberté d'expression et de presse, comme condition préalable à leur adhésion future.

De la même façon, la Commission Européenne a, au cours des négociations d'adhésion liées à l'intégration de l'acquis communautaire, veillé systématiquement à leur mise œuvre effective à travers différents instruments, dont ses Rapports annuels nationaux faisant, pour chaque Etat candidat, l'état des lieux en la matière.

Autres signes du soutien apporté par l'Union Européenne à l'indépendance des instances de régulation de la communication, la Commission a publié, en novembre 2007, une communication dans laquelle elle faisait état de ses propositions pour le Réexamen du cadre réglementaire (de 2002) pour les communications électroniques[39]. Elle y proposait d'y inclure de nouvelles règles pour renforcer l'indépendance et les pouvoirs des instances nationales de régulation. Parallèlement, elle a aussi pris l'habitude de réunir régulièrement[40] les autorités européennes de régulation pour encourager leur coopération autour d'enjeux démocratiques communs[41].

L'incitation du Conseil de l'Europe à l'adresse des pays candidats et des Etats membres pour qu'ils adoptent (et respectent) les standards européens tant en matière de liberté d'expression que de régulation des médias, l'obligation posée par l'Union Européenne aux futurs membres de se conformer à l'acquis communautaire dans les domaines économique (droit de la concurrence) et politique ont été suivies d'effets. On a, d'une part, assisté à la généralisation des autorités de régulation audiovisuelles dans les anciens pays de l'Est, sur le modèle de ce qui se faisait déjà à l'Ouest. D'autre part, une fois créées, celles-ci se sont, dans

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[38] Ceci suppose notamment la mise en place d'une législation spécifique à l'audiovisuel qui soit conforme à l'acquis communautaire. Sur ce point précis *cf.* l'étude que Iulia Ciubotaru a consacré à la Roumanie, *« L'audiovisuel en Roumanie et l'influence de l'Union Européenne »*, Mémoire pour l'obtention du diplôme de Master droit et science politique, Spécialité « Spécialistes de l'Europe centrale et orientale », sous la direction de Théodore Georgopoulos, Année universitaire 2005-2006, Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, pp. 11-23.

[39] *Cf.* http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/fr/lvb/l24216c.htm

[40] La première a eu lieu le 17 mars 2005 à Bruxelles sous la présidence de Viviane Reding, Commissaire européenne chargée de la Société de l'information et des Médias.

[41] A l'occasion de la seconde réunion des autorités européennes de régulation réunies à Bruxelles le 24 mars 2006, la Commissaire déclarait ainsi : *« Cette coopération doit – d'abord et surtout - reposer sur la liberté d'expression et la liberté des médias, qui sont les fondements de notre société démocratique pluraliste en Europe, la diversité culturelle et le ralliement à nos valeurs européennes communes en ce qui concerne la société (…) ». Cf. Les autorités européennes de régulation de la radiodiffusion renforcent leur coopération transfrontalière dans le cadre de la directive « Télévision sans frontières »*, Bruxelles 24 mars 2006, IP/06/374.

les pays candidats, mises au diapason des directives et autres recommandations de Bruxelles sur les médias et la communication. A cet égard, il est symptomatique de trouver, sur les sites Internet de nombreuses de ces autorités, de longs développements sur leurs efforts déployés afin de se conformer à ce « bagage » communautaire[42]…

Autre manifestation de l'influence du Conseil et de l'Union, les changements importants et rapides intervenants dans le paysage de la régulation des médias de certains pays, dès lors que sont attendus des bénéfices politiques et économiques importants par leurs autorités politiques nationales[43]. Dans chacun d'eux, cela s'est traduit par une vague importante de réformes et, en dépit d'importantes difficultés - voire de résistances - par une relative démocratisation de leurs paysages médiatiques.

3) Démocratisation médiatique et politique en Europe centrale et orientale

Miklos Sükösd et Peter Bajomi-Lazar se montrent catégoriques quant aux fruits récoltés à la suite de l'adoption, par les Etats de l'Europe centrale et orientale, de nouveaux cadres législatifs et réglementaires en matière audiovisuelle et de régulation de ce nouvel espace médiatique. Celui-là serait dorénavant caractérisé par son ouverture : « It is no exageration to state that the first wave of broadcasting reform has played a historic role in the democratization of the media, and indirectly in the political democratization of East Central Europe »[44].

Cette analyse est par ailleurs corroborée par l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe qui, dans sa Recommandation sur les médias et la culture démocratique[45], notait avec satisfaction en 1999 que des progrès immenses ont été enregistrés, depuis la chute du Mur de Berlin, dans cette partie de l'Europe pour ce qui touche à la liberté d'expression et d'information.

Pour autant, beaucoup de chemin leur reste alors à parcourir tant il est vrai que, remarquait deux ans plus tard l'Assemblée, « l'indépendance de la radiodiffusion du service public et la nécessité d'instaurer une autorité de régulation du secteur de la radiodiffusion véritablement indépendante, comme le préconise la Recommandation Rec (2000)23 du Comité des Ministres, demeurent un sérieux défi pour presque tous les pays anciennement communistes et ne sont pas encore totalement considérées comme allant de soi dans les démocraties établies »[46]…

Ce bémol vient opportunément rappeler que l'on ne saurait jauger des progrès accomplis à l'Est en ayant pour unique ligne de mire la situation à l'Ouest, modèle par ailleurs loin d'être en tout point idyllique… Il est selon nous plus opératoire de considérer la démocratisation des médias, mais aussi de la société, comme un objectif vers lequel il faut tendre constamment tout en admettant l'impossibilité de jamais l'atteindre complètement, un peu à l'image de l'horizon qui s'éloigne du marcheur à mesure que celui-là croit s'en approcher. Par démocratisation, nous ferons donc, avec Agnes Gulyas, référence à l'évolution des fonctions politiques dévolues aux médias en direction ou vers un objectif de médias pluralistes et libres (Gulyas, 1999:61).

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[42] *Cf.* les portails Internet des autorités de régulation de Bulgarie (http://www.cem.bg/r.php?sitemap_id=140) et de Roumanie (http://www.cna.ro/) par exemple.

[43] A titre d'exemple, les changements de taille intervenus en Croatie entre 2000 et 2004 ont eu pour principale raison, selon le Gouvernement croate lui-même, la nécessité d'aligner la législation au regard des standards européens et de se conformer aux exigences de l'Union Européenne. *Cf. Television across Europe: regulation, policy and independence. Croatia*, *Open Society Institute*, 2005, p.13.

[44] *Op.cit.* p.14.

[45] Recommandation 1407 adoptée en 1999.

[46] In *Recommandation 1506 (2001) sur la Liberté d'expression et d'information sur les médias en Europe*, adoptée le 24 avril 2001 par l'Assemblée lors de sa 10ème séance.
Source http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/frec1506.htm

L'arsenal des lois sur l'audiovisuel passées depuis le début de la décennie 1990 dans les Etats de l'Europe centrale et orientale ont eu génériquement pour objectifs la modernisation des secteurs de la presse écrite et de l'audiovisuel – grâce notamment à l'ouverture aux investissements étrangers, la protection de la liberté de la presse et l'encouragement à davantage de pluralisme des opinions par médias interposés. La nouvelle régulation de l'espace médiatique instaurée progressivement dès les lendemains de la chute des régimes communistes a eu deux résultats majeurs : d'un côté, la démonopolisation du secteur audiovisuel par l'autorisation d'opérateurs privés et l'apparition des médias commerciaux et, de l'autre, la transformation des médias contrôlés par l'Etat en médias de service public dotés de budgets de fonctionnement adéquats (Sükösd, Bajomi-Lazar).

a) Les acquis de la démonopolisation des ondes

La libéralisation du secteur médiatique dès 1989, alliée à la soif d'expression et d'informations de publics sevrés de médias critiques durant plusieurs décennies, a littéralement fait exploser le nombre de radios et de télévisions, après la multiplication exponentielle[47] de la presse écrite[48]. Dans le cas de la Hongrie, le nombre de demandes de fréquences radiophoniques en 1989 avoisinait déjà 90 (Giorgi, Pohoryles, 1994: 45)… Fin 1992, le nombre total de dossiers déposés pour l'obtention d'une fréquence radio tournait autour de sept cents en Pologne (Giorgi, Pohoryles, 1994: 119).

Autre exemple, la Roumanie, où le paysage audiovisuel allait lui aussi connaître une importante expansion : on y comptait en 1995 pas moins de 5 chaînes publiques – dont 2 nationales et 3 régionales et jusqu'à 36 chaînes privées[49]. Dans ce contexte particulier, les instances de régulation des médias, dès lors qu'elles étaient opérationnelles, ont été les artisans de cette ouverture au pluralisme audiovisuel[50], en même temps qu'elles devaient être les garantes du caractère transparent et apolitique des procédures de sélection des candidats à une fréquence, en fonction de critères objectifs connus à l'avance. Quand certains opérateurs privés diffusaient dès avant l'adoption des lois audiovisuelles instaurant notamment les instances de régulation, ces dernières sont venues organiser le secteur audiovisuel et ont procédé, comme en Pologne[51] où existaient de nombreuses radios pirates – à distinguer des radios de l'Eglise catholique nationale[52], à leur légalisation sous réserve de satisfaire à certaines conditions.

D'une façon générale, les instances de régulation de la communication mises en place dans ces pays ont contribué à la dépolitisation des procédures d'attribution de nouvelles

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[47] Les chiffres donnés par Agnes Gulyas pour la Hongrie et la Pologne parlent d'eux-mêmes : *« An immediate effect of the democratisation and marketisation of the sectors was an increase in the number of titles. In Hungary while in 1989 some 1800 publications were registered in total, by 1991 the number rose to 3200. According to Seregélyesi during the first part of the 1990s more than a thousand new periodicals, which included everything from newspapers to local newsletters, were launched in the country annually. In Poland the number of press titles increased from around 2500 in the mid 1980s to 3300 in 1989 and to 4448 in 1994»… Op.cit.* p.62.

[48] Dans son rapport *Etude sur la propriété des medias européens: menaces sur le paysage médiatique*, la Fédération européenne des journalistes introduit pourtant un distinguo entre presse nationale et presse étrangère : *« Durant les années qui ont suivi la chute des régimes communistes en Europe centrale et de l'est, l'invasion par les groupes médiatiques occidentaux ont empêché ou freiné le développement de groupes indépendants ou nationaux »*. Bruxelles, septembre 2002, avec le soutien de la Commission européenne, p.5.

[49] *Cf.* Adrian Staii, *« La conquête du marché audiovisuel en Roumanie : stratégies et enjeux »*.
Source http://w3.u-grenoble3.fr/chaire_unesco/Textes/Staii.htm

[50] Adrian Staii précise ainsi, pour la Roumanie, que le Conseil National de l'Audiovisuel annonçait, courant 1997, avoir émis des licences d'émission pour 148 chaînes de télévision tous types et 1352 sociétés de distribution par câble… *Op.cit.* p.2.

[51] *Media in Transition : The Cases of Hungary, Poland and Czechia*, op.cit. p.126.

[52] Pas moins de 14 radios appartenant à l'Eglise polonaise et disséminées sur le territoire national avaient en effet d'ores et déjà été légalisées en vertu d'une Loi de 1989 sur les relations entre l'Etat et l'Eglise catholique. *Cf.* article 48, paragraphe 3 de la Loi.

fréquences et ont participé, sur la durée, à l'autonomisation du champ médiatique par rapport aux pouvoirs exécutif et législatif. A cet égard, il convient de souligner les liens existant entre bonne gouvernance de la société et régulation médiatique : l'émergence d'une société transparente, garante des libertés nouvellement conquises, dépend en effet grandement des instances chargées de promouvoir et de renforcer la libre communication, tant dans le secteur public que privé, condition sine qua non à l'existence d'un espace public de discussion démocratique par médias interposés (de la Brosse, 2005: 118-123).

Parallèlement à l'introduction de critères objectifs transparents dans le processus décisionnel devant conduire à l'attribution d'une fréquence audiovisuelle, ce sont aussi des règles garantissant un accès équitable et équilibré aux médias publics pour les différentes forces politiques nationales qui ont été établies. Il s'agit là d'un progrès essentiel pour qui connaît le contexte historique de mise sous tutelle de l'information avant 1989 et, à la suite de la chute du Mur, les errements auxquels a pu conduire dans certains pays la confiscation des médias au profit quasi exclusif d'un parti ou d'un leader politiques[53].

b) La crispation autour de l'avenir des médias publics

Bien entendu, l'ensemble de ces nouvelles règles, en même temps que le bon fonctionnement des autorités récemment créées en matière de régulation des médias, trouvent leurs limites objectives dans le comportement des autres acteurs et, en premier lieu, des forces politiques nationales. Autrement dit, les difficultés et les blocages d'ordre politique rencontrés, peu ou prou, dans chaque Etat, nous renvoient au poids des mentalités héritées du passé et à la persistance de vieux réflexes nés de la croyance, chez les hommes politiques, en l'effet massif et direct des médias (particulièrement audiovisuels) sur les publics…

L'évocation de l'épisode qui a opposé, quatre années durant, en Hongrie la Télévision nationale et le gouvernement en constitue une bonne illustration. Selon Renàta Varga, « la guerre des médias » de 1990-1994 y a été marquée par une « période d'affrontements entre la télévision souhaitant suivre son chemin de démocratisation et le pouvoir qui voulait garder à tout prix le contrôle de ce média »[54]. Au lendemain des premières élections libres de juin 1990, la nomination à la tête de la télévision hongroise d'un sociologue indépendant, Elemér Hankiss, a de facto, sous son autorité morale personnelle (Schmutz: 61-67), entraîné une indépendance rédactionnelle de la télévision nationale vis-à-vis du gouvernement. Or, cette distanciation a très tôt débouché sur des frictions avec le nouveau gouvernement issu du Forum Démocratique, vainqueur des élections législatives face aux anciens communistes…

Chose paradoxale, mais en apparence seulement, la conception héritée de l'ancien régime selon laquelle la télévision se devait de soutenir le gouvernement a été reprise par la nouvelle majorité parlementaire issue de l'opposition démocratique. D'après celle-ci, le principe d'une télévision porte-parole du pouvoir n'avait pas à être remis en cause dès lors que ce dernier était marqué du sceau de la légitimité octroyée par le scrutin universel (Deveaux, 1995:77). Les refus du président de la Télévision hongroise de servir de simple caisse de résonance aux messages du gouvernement, de purger cette institution de ceux que l'aile la plus radicale de la nouvelle majorité parlementaire désignait par le qualificatif péjoratif de « sympathisants soviétiques », de même que sa volonté de la transformer en

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[53] A titre d'exemple, nous renvoyons le lecteur aux travaux que nous avons réalisés sur l'ex-Yougoslavie et particulièrement sur la Serbie. *Cf.* notamment *« Les voix de la guerre »*, in *Dernière guerre balkanique ? Ex-Yougoslavie : témoignages, analyses, perspectives*, Général d'armée (cr) Jean Cot (sous la direction du), Fondation pour les Études de Défense, L'Harmattan-FED, mai 1996, pp. 165-181, mais aussi notre rapport pour le *Tribunal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie* (*TPIY*) : *Propagande politique et projet <<d'Etat pour tous les Serbes>> : conséquences de l'instrumentalisation des médias à des fins ultranationalistes*, TPIY, La Haye, janvier 2003, 107 pages.

[54] *Cf. « La télévision hongroise sous l'emprise du pouvoir »*.
Source http://w3.u-grenoble.fr/chaire_unesco/Textes/vargatexte.htm

télévision moderne et indépendante, vont donner lieu à une guerre de tranchée avec le pouvoir qui se soldera par le départ de Hankiss, contraint à la démission en janvier 1994. L'une des conséquences de cette « guerre des médias » aura été le retard important pris dans l'adoption d'une nouvelle loi sur l'audiovisuel (21 décembre 1995) et dans la mise sur pied d'une instance de régulation – rendues possibles par la victoire du Parti socialiste de Gyula Horn lors des élections législatives du printemps 1994, et exigées par le Fonds Monétaire International ainsi que la Banque Mondiale.

La décennie 1990 a souligné en Europe centrale et orientale combien il était difficile de couper le cordon ombilical entre médias d'Etat, en cours d'évolution vers un statut de médias publics, et autorités politiques nationales. Rien n'est en effet définitivement acquis en la matière, le politique, de par sa nature, étant toujours enclin à s'ingérer dans la gestion des médias publics - y compris dans les démocraties dites « établies », dans lesquelles la nomination des responsables des médias publics a a priori été « dépolitisée », car confiée aux organes de régulation de la communication. Les démêlées, par médias interposés, ayant opposé le président de France Télévision, Patrick de Carolis, et le président français, Nicolas Sarkozy, à propos de l'avenir et du financement de cette institution publique[55], de même que le souhait exprimé par le chef de l'Etat de revenir sur le mode de nomination des responsables des médias du service public par le Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel pour la confier au politique, en l'occurrence à lui-même en temps que Président de la République, en sont une démonstration[56]. L'argument avancé par l'intéressé selon lequel une telle mesure reviendrait à « dépolitiser » un mode de nomination qui serait de toute façon sujet à des interférences politiques occultes, et donc en quelque sorte à mettre fin à une hypocrisie, pourra laisser songeur l'observateur le plus incrédule… qui plus est venant d'un responsable politique qui, par le passé, s'était employé à dénoncer la mainmise de l'un de ses prédécesseurs sur la télévision publique[57].

Les nouvelles lois audiovisuelles et institutions régulatrices ne valent donc que ce que vaut leur maillon le plus faible, c'est-à-dire le facteur humain censé les appliquer, les animer et les respecter. Ce qui dans un contexte de démocratie établie devrait théoriquement aller de soi peut en effet s'avérer plus problématique dans une phase de consolidation démocratique – dont le succès dépend in fine de l'évolution des mentalités pour venir « coller » à l'esprit des nouvelles règles du jeu.

Nul étonnement, dès lors, à constater que l'action des nouvelles instances de régulation a parfois elle-même été entachée par certaines irrégularités, par exemple dans les procédures d'examen des dossiers de demandes de fréquences ou plus classiquement dans la surveillance de la structure de la programmation. Renata Varga[58] cite ainsi deux cas de

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[55] Source http://www.politique.net/2008070201-television-publique-sarkozy-carolis-rue89.htm.

[56] Selon le journaliste Emmanuel Berretta de l'hebdomadaire Le Point du 29 septembre 2008, *« sa loi audiovisuelle, épée de Damoclès maintenue au-dessus de Carolis, lui permettra, une fois adoptée, de révoquer et de nommer le président de France Télévisions par simple décret (la mention "décret pris en conseil des ministres" a disparu de la dernière mouture du projet de loi...) »*. Patrick de Carolis s'est d'ailleurs opposé à titre personnel à ce dessaisissement du CSA, déclarant au passage : *« Je suis très fier d'avoir été élu par le CSA pour qui j'ai une très grande estime »* expliquait-il en soulignant qu'il ne ferait aucune concession sur l'indépendance du groupe : *« jamais je ne soumettrai une grille de programme ou un concept d'émission à un quelconque visa en dehors de l'entreprise. Que cela soit dit »*.

Sources :http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-medias/guerre-d-usure-entre-nicolas-sarkozy-et-patrick-de-carolis/1253/0/277964 et http://www.politique.net/2008070201-television-publique-sarkozy-carolis-rue89.htm.

[57] Le 15 septembre 1989, Nicolas Sarkozy, alors porte-parole du Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) dénonçait en ces termes la mainmise du président François Mitterrand sur la télévision publique : *« Les deux directeurs généraux des chaînes Antenne 2 et FR3 qui viennent d'être nommés sont deux anciens proches collaborateurs du président de la République socialiste et du Premier ministre, Monsieur Pierre Mauroy. Force est de reconnaître aujourd'hui que la politique l'a emporté sur les choix professionnels »*. *Cf.* la vidéo sur le site http://www.politique.net/2008070102-television-publique-sarkozy-change-d-avis.htm.

[58] *Op.cit.*

dysfonctionnements graves dont se serait rendu responsable en 1997 le régulateur hongrois, le Országos Rádió és Televízió Testület (ORTT). Le premier a trait à une différence de traitement entre un opérateur privé et la télévision publique pour non respect de programmation - cette dernière ayant été dispensée de verser une amende - pour cause de situation financière désespérée, que la chaîne commerciale a, pour sa part, bel et bien dû acquitter… Le second renvoie à l'attribution d'une fréquence à un opérateur privé dont le dossier n'était pourtant pas complet, en l'occurrence les données manquantes sur la structure de son capital l'auraient disqualifié au nom de la loi anti-concentration.

Passe-droit intentionnel ou vice de forme involontaire ? L'un comme l'autre mettent en relief le caractère faillible de l'élément humain dans la prise de décision. Face à ce risque, qui peut après tout paraître « normal », au sens d'inévitable, si l'on considère la nature même de l'homme, la nouveauté, par rapport à la période communiste, tient au fait que ce type de comportements, hérités du passé ou dictés par un intérêt particulier, sont dorénavant dénoncés en démocratie par les autres acteurs (médias, journalistes, public, etc.) et sont donc susceptibles de recours en justice, comme cela a été le cas par exemple pour l'ORTT.

Il ressort des développements précédents combien a été importante l'incitation politique de certains acteurs internationaux dans l'émergence en Europe centrale et orientale d'un cadre législatif et réglementaire rénové en matière de liberté de la presse et de communication, ainsi que dans la décision de mettre sur pieds des organes indépendants de régulation des médias.

Cet appui multidimensionnel en faveur d'une démocratisation du système médiatique, et de la place centrale accordée à la régulation, nous apparaît basé sur la conviction que la démocratisation de la société elle-même pourrait en dépendre.

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LEGITIMACY, INSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Abstract: *In the past years there are an increasing number of attitudes and events that suggest a chronic need for a better communication between European Union and its citizens. One of the main issues concerns the perception, among citizens, of a lack of legitimacy and transparency of EU and its institutions. In order to identify and analyze some of the causes, we suggest that an important variable that should be considered is the communication strategy of the EU. In this article we explore some interpretations of legitimacy that can be associated to the perception of EU's institutions among the European citizens and the main points expressed by the European Commission with regard on the Communication Strategy.*

Keywords: *citizens, communication, institutions, integration*, *legitimacy*

Introduction

In the past years, the European Union and the integration process were challenged by European citizens in different contexts. The main challenge occurred when France and Dutch people rejected the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and later, the new reforms proposed by the Lisbon Treaty were initially rejected by the people of Ireland. Another important indicator that underlines the mistrust, indifference and non-participation was the presence for voting within European Parliament elections in June 2009. Also, the political, social and economic effects of the current global crisis allow the development and fuels different euro skeptical opinions among European citizens. Within national and European political debates, the integration issues were not sufficiently addressed and related to the needs and expectations of the citizens. Therefore, the lack of a clear communication strategy can be seen as one of the main causes of the present "democratic deficit" and legitimacy crisis.

Other institutional and decision-making issues can be found permanently on the European Agenda in the past two decades. A brief overview on the intergovernmental conferences (IGC's) demonstrates that a permanent need for reform was a priority of the EU. Practically, since the signing of Maastricht Treaty, other IGC's and debates flown continuously in the integration process (Amsterdam, Nice, European Convention on the Future of Europe, Lisbon). Today, the combined results of those negotiations cannot provide clear answers for European citizens not even for all national governments.

The "finality" of European integration, seen as a political model structured on the federal basis is more distant today than five or ten years ago. It is obvious that the Europeans (both groups and individuals) cannot overpass the models and values of the last century. As Joschka Fischer said in 2000, the problems of the 21st century cannot be solved with the fears and formulas of the 19th and 20th centuries (Fischer, 2000).

Having in mind this past-future relationship, the next challenges of European integration could be separated within two interpretations. Firstly, if we assume that the national identities are stronger than European identity, a rational explanation can underline the perception regarding the "democratic deficit" and the negative support in the past years. As long as the EU is not capable to provide better answers and solutions than the national

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governments, the people of a particular state would not support EU. We should not underestimate the fact that the past two enlargements (2004, 2007) brought also new nationalisms that strengthened the opposition views in the old EU member states.

A second interpretation, this time oriented on the individual, may suggest that each European citizen has its own needs and expectations, as well as any national citizen has needs and expectations from his/her government. The individual is more likely to get closer and support the authority which satisfies better its own preferences. Therefore, as long as the European Union provides better answers to the individual (such as individual rights and liberties within the EU territory), the integration will be supported. If not, the individual will be oriented on the national government as a solver for its expectations and will reject the EU's solutions.

Another particular factor consist in the way in which the authority, EU or/and national governments, communicate with the citizens. The above interpretations should be associated in the discourse of European integration. Normally, any specific government must participate and fulfill its obligations as an EU member, but the political puzzle in Europe will always contain some governments which, on specific issues, are more interested on the national agenda than the European agenda. On the other hand, the EU policies and actions influence both national governments and the European citizens as individuals. Better policies and proper communication is required in order to gain support and legitimacy, especially for the European institutions.

The main challenge in terms of communication is to connect the EU discourse and action with the national and sub-national discourse and to address proper answers at different levels of governance. It is clear that EU does not have the same channels of communication as the national leaders and the European issues are many times translated in national terms, according to political preferences.

Widespread concern about the legitimacy of European integration can be traced to the reception of the Treaty on European Union agreed by governments in Maastrict 1991. European governments had long pursued European integration assuming that the public gave them a "permissive consensus" toward deeper cooperation (Føllesdal, 2004: 3). The ratification processes demonstrates that governments must pay much closer attention to public opinion and opposition elites.[1]

We suggest that in order to overpass the "democratic deficit" and to gain legitimacy, the main challenge for EU is to implement, as a long term strategy, more coherent communication policies in order to determine a switch in loyalties and to acquire support from the citizens. If EU will fail in this matter, the integration dynamics will be affected.

Legitimacy and the EU

Generally, legitimacy may be considered as the foundation of governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right (Sternberger, 1968: 244). Other interpretations suggest that legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society (Lipset, 1983: 64).

It is assumed that the legitimacy could be characterized as the observed connection between the government and those subordinated. The lack of legitimacy therefore, describes the government's lack of a right to command its subordinates, as well as emphasizes the subordinates' right to disobey a particular authority (Muntean, 2000: 4).

[1] Danish people initially rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (51% against) and in France the ratification was very tight (51% in favour).

The issue of legitimacy in the European Union arises in relation to new types of political formation, new centers of power and new policies, which represents both a united and divided society. Also, the EU represents both an intergovernmental organization and a supranational entity. The only certainty is that the EU is a continuously emerging supranational entity whose success in the future became more dependent on the citizens' support.

Because of the perceived problem of the democratic deficit, the European Union is often regarded as lacking adequate means of legitimization from the citizens of the Union. The ability to issue commands, which are seen as binding because they are legitimate, is one of the central pillars of a stable political order.

Within this complex interdependence system of rules, values and expectations, the main question is: *What kind of legitimacy EU needs?* The practice of democracy demonstrates that there are two main approaches, derivate from past experiences of national democratic systems. In the terms of Abraham Lincoln's famous description of the main elements of democracy, *input-oriented* legitimization refers to *government by the people*, whereas *output-oriented* legitimization refers to *government for the people* (Thomassen, Schmitt, 2004: 377-378).

The basis of legitimacy of these different kinds' or rather different aspects of democracy is different. From the perspective of input-oriented legitimacy political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the will of the people – that is, if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community. From the perspective of output-oriented legitimacy political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question (Scharpf, 1999: 6), in our case the European Union.

Therefore, the EU needs to legitimize its role and actions taking into account these input-output approaches. In our opinion, the more realistic approach should be based on the output legitimization, because the European citizens expect action and solutions to their needs. As long as the EU is capable to manage different kind of policies with positive consequences that can be felt by the people, the people will react with support towards EU.

We should not underestimate the role of input-oriented legitimization also. Many Europeans feel that their interests are not represented fairly in the EU institutions and consequently they do not accept the role and authority of European institutions. The only democratic participation is related to the election of European Parliament but the perception of its relatively isolated presence (with the exception of co-decision procedure and budgetary control) is not sufficient.

According to the multi-level governance approaches, the EU consists in different levels of authority that interact within a complex system of shared competences. Each level and/or authority has a specific role but often they overlap and bring into question the issue of legitimacy. Here we can track several interpretations of legitimacy that can be translated into variables for analysis.

Firstly, the EU draws is legitimacy from a legal perspective, considering that the states have created the European Union according to all legal requirements. Democratic member states have transferred limited parts of their sovereignty by treaty, forming *de facto* European constitutional order in order to better achieve their goals by coordinated action. The ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the legality of the Maastricht Treaty explored and accepted this account – within limits. The Union's authority is illegal when such limits are surpassed (shared-competences – principle of subsidiarity) (Føllesdal, 2004: 7).

Secondly, legitimacy may be discussed as a compliance of the authorities with EU regulations as o form of „permissive consensus", but in the past years politicians are acting to reduce the risk of populations turning down the treaties, or refusing to comply (Føllesdal, 2004: 7).

Thirdly, the EU's legitimacy is sometimes seen as enhanced when it identifies and implements solutions that actually secure certain goals otherwise unattainable. This requires that preferred joint outcomes can only be obtained with the problem-solving capacity of the EU, and that they are in fact so identified, decided on and secured. Such objectives may include economic growth, peace in Europe, human rights compliance, or a sustainable environment, to mention but a few (Føllesdal, 2004: 7).

All this interpretations demonstrates that within EU legitimacy may be considered contextualized depending on different stages of integration and/or different issues and policies that are promoted.

The state – institution model of legitimacy is essentially derived from the legitimization of state power. Thus, while the effectiveness and viability of a state's power depends on the degree of its political institutionalization, the legitimacy of the power of the particular state's institution is located on and contributes to the same level as the legitimacy of the whole state itself. In other words, the identification of the degree of legitimacy of a particular institution (on either the national or supranational level of the state's existence) allows, to a certain extent, the analysis of the legitimacy of the entire entity (Muntean, 2000: 2).

The lack of democratic accountability on the institutional level of the supranational EU is the major problem, which contributes to the EU legitimacy crisis. It is anticipated that an increase in democratic accountability and control in the relationship between the European Commission and the European Parliament will adequately contribute to an increase in political legitimacy of not only the EU as a supranational system of governance, but also of the EP as a central institution of this system (Muntean, 2000: 4-5).

Legitimacy of the EU institutions

A relative clear image on the role and activity of the European Council and the Council of Ministers exists among the European citizens, mainly because they recognize and accept the intergovernmental dimension of these institutions. Some questioning on legitimacy arises with regard on the Commission and the European Parliament as supranational institutions.

Among the several dimensions of legitimacy there is an apparent incapacity of the Commission to convince the citizens on the benefits of integration and about its own role in the integration (Edwards, 2008: 4). From the input-oriented legitimacy perspective the Commission represents one of the key players in the integration due to its impartial and neutral role regarding the national interests. Also, its position as a guardian of the Treaties and the representative of the Community interests shall give to the EU executive body a positive image and support. On the other hand, the results delivered by the Commission activity lead us to appreciate its output legitimization. Here we can identify several factors that affect its legitimacy.

Firstly, the general perception that the Commission officials are working behind close doors in Brussels, allow them to generate and promote policies that are not transparent and consequently they do not take into consideration different national, regional or local preferences.

The Community interest represented by the Commission is understood as a package of technical measures associated with the less common denominator of national interests (Nugent, 2001: 10). In this regard, the actions taken by the Commission were oriented on the promotion of a large degree of openness and transparency (COM, 2000; COM, 2001) of its activities but the communication strategy has a lack regarding the use of communication tools.

Secondly, the image of the Commission was strongly affected in 1999 when the Santer Commission resigned due to some allegations regarding fraud, nepotism and mismanagement (Committee of Independent Experts, 1999). The internal reforms of the

Commission initiated by Romano Prodi only partially resolved the problem and many citizens still have doubts about its activity.

The political and intergovernmental debates in the past decade (2000 IGC, the Convention on the Future of Europe, the 2003-2004 IGC and the 2007 IGC) underline the importance of the Commission within the "community method" and its legitimacy seen as derived from the European Parliament vote of investment

With regard on the European Parliament, we may agree that the input legitimacy is democratically based due to the procedures of direct election and representation. Since 1979, the EP is directly elected and it may be considered the most legitimate institution of EU. During the time, its competences and control were extended within the decisional processes through is role within the co-decision procedure. Still, there is a perception that the political configurations within the EP do not represent entirely the political preferences at national levels.

The European Parliament as a directly elected legislative body of the European Union has attracted different and sometimes contradictory definitions of its activity since its first direct elections in 1979. Different opinions consider the EP as an institution with a limited influence, if associated with the traditional role of a legislative entity. Other considerations insist on the emerging role since the Single European Act and the treaties that followed, which placed the EP as a „more equal partner" with the Council and „the only directly accountable participant in the EU constitution-building" (Muntean, 2000: 5). The empirical evidence (opinion pools) demonstrates that the EP might be considered as the most legitimate institution of the EU system.

Still, the European institutions in spite of the inter-institutional agreements on transparency and internal procedures, have failed on the communication with the citizens. Only recently we have witnessed some initiatives with regard to consider the communication as an instrument dedicated to cover the democratic deficit of the EU.

The European communication strategy

The failure of Constitutional Treaty, led to a large debate about how Europeans understand EU and how the citizens identify themselves with the European project. At the end of the European Council on 18 June 2005, Heads of State and Government adopted a declaration on *"the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe"* (European Council, 2005). This declaration called for a *"period of reflection"* following the negative votes in France and the Netherlands on the European Constitution.

The EU was prepared for the scenario of a rejected constitution not with regard on communication but on procedural issues to follow. In the case of rejection, a two years period will follow on the reflection, debate and suggestions. In June 2005 the Heads of State and Government called for a period of reflection, enabling a "broad debate to take place in each of our countries, involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national Parliaments and political parties" (European Council, 2005).

In this context, the Commission has proposed a *Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate*, not as a rescue operation for the Constitution, but to stimulate a wider debate between the European Union's democratic institutions and citizens (COM, 2005: 3). It has to be seen as complementary to the already existing or proposed initiatives and programs such as those in the field of education, youth, culture and promoting active European citizenship. Some observations contained in the Commission's document are very relevant in order to understand the context, the realities and the perceptions about what went wrong in the relationship between EU, member states and the citizens.

Firstly, we can notice that the Commission focused on the causes of the miscommunication, especially on the acceptance that the citizens lost their confidence in the EU, according to Eurobarometer results in 2004-2005 (COM, 2005: 3).

One of the main questions in this debate was: *What Europeans need from the EU?* The analysis of the Commission identified several elements that should guide the search for the answers:

- to feel that they are an important part of it;
- to know what the EU Institutions are doing for them and how they are working; to see that the EU is really working for them;
- to understand and be aware that the "great policies" (foreign and security policy, international relations, etc) are really important, necessary and are generating concrete benefits for them and a better future for their children;
- to feel, to see and to understand that the EU is close to them and understands their problems and needs; to feel – and be convinced – that the EU is listening to them;
- transparency (institutions seem physically and psychologically rather very distant);
- to understand better where the EU wants to go, especially with the new entrants; to know which values the EU will stands for (Magagnotti, 2008: 2-3).

Plan D aimed the involvement of the citizens in policy substance and to increase ownership. It offered ways and means, by which the Commission could bring various policies to the citizen's attention, generate debate and provide a channel for citizens' concerns to be brought to the attention of European decision makers.

The „White Paper on a European Communication Policy" issued by the Commission on 1st of February 2006 recognizes the gap between EU and its citizens (COM, 2006) because the communication has remained too much of a "Brussels affair" which has focused largely on telling people what the EU does and less attention has been paid to listening to people's views (COM, 2006: 4). The European Commission is therefore proposing a fundamentally new approach - a decisive move away from one-way communication to reinforced dialogue, from an institution-centered to a citizen-centered communication, from a Brussels-based to a more decentralized approach (COM, 2006: 4).

Therefore, the Commission is proposing to define the common principles of the communication strategy. Based on the democratic traditions, the freedom of information and expression, which were recognized in the treaties and in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, other important principles also lie at the heart of communication:

- **Inclusiveness.** All citizens should have access in their own language to information about matters of public concern. This means that information should be made widely available through a wide range of channels, including the mass media and new technologies such as the Internet. It also means that people from all walks of life in all EU countries should be helped to develop the skills they need to access and use that information. This is particularly important in the case of minorities, disabled citizens and other groups that might systematically be excluded from participation in the public sphere.
- **Diversity.** European citizens come from widely diverse social and cultural backgrounds and hold a wide variety of political views. EU communication policy must respect the full range of views in the public debate.
- **Participation.** Citizens should have a right to express their views, be heard and have the opportunity for dialogue with the decision-makers. At EU level, where there is an added risk that institutions are remote from the citizens, this principle is of particular importance (COM, 2006: 6)

A second approach proposed by the Commission, was to empower the citizens by focusing on providing the tools and facilities – the forums for debate and the channels of public communication – that will give as many people as possible access to information and the opportunity to make their voices heard. Future work in this area shall aim at three main objectives: improving civic education;[2] connecting citizens with each other and connecting the citizens and public institutions**.**

The third approach was focused on the work with the media and the new technologies, based on the assumption that the media is on of the key players in any European communication policy (COM, 2006: 8). Still, the national communication channels, especially private ones, did not paid enough attention to European issues due to the economical and commercial immediate opportunities and therefore the media coverage of European issues remains limited and fragmented.

According to the Commission, action should focus on the following targets:

Giving Europe a human face: The European Union is often perceived as 'faceless': it has no clear public identity. Citizens need help to connect with Europe, and political information has greater impact when put in a 'human interest' frame that allows citizens to understand why it is relevant to them personally. EU institutions and all levels of government can do more to 'give a human face' to the information they provide.

The national, regional and local dimension: European citizens need access to a steady flow of common information if they are to see the European dimension of common issues. This is where pan-European media and the specialized press have an important role to play. But European issues also need to be discussed in the national and local context. Some of this would flow naturally from a greater commitment on the part of national and local politicians and institutions; but it also needs the proactive involvement of the EU institutions, not least to put European policies in a local context.

Exploiting the potential of new technologies: Digital technologies, such as the Internet, can offer new channels for communication on European issues, new forums for civic debate and new tools for cross-border democracy. However, political leadership is needed if Europe is to fully exploit the Internet's potential and ensure that it does not create new divisions in society. The *i2010 Initiative* already seeks to close the gap between the information society 'haves and have nots' – addressing such issues as equal opportunities, ICT skills and the inequalities between Europe's regions in terms of Internet access (COM, 2006: 9).

Regarding the question on *how to involve the media more effectively in communicating on Europe?* the European Commission considers that a European communication policy should encourage public bodies at European, national and regional level: to supply the media with high-quality news and current affairs material, to work more closely with broadcasters and media operators, to establish new links with regional and local communication systems and to pro-actively use new technologies. Also, the EU institutions should be better equipped with communication tools and capacities and they should explore with a wide range of media players how to better provide the media (pan-European, national and local) with material which is relevant for them, with a view to adapting the information to the needs of different countries and segments of the population (COM, 2006: 10).

The most challenging approach was identified to be the issue of understanding the European public opinion based on the appreciation that in modern democratic societies, policy-makers devote a great deal of attention to analyzing public opinion, using tools such as opinion polls and media monitoring and also based on the fact that European public opinion is complex and diverse, reflecting different national perspectives (COM, 2006: 10). To this extent, the Eurobarometer has grown into a major European database which regularly

[2] EU programmes can be of direct support in fostering the European dimension such as Leonardo da Vinci, Socrates, Erasmus, Youth in Action, etc.

observes public opinion in all EU Member States and in candidate countries, interviewing thousands of people each time.

According to the Commission, a partnership approach must involve all key actors. The Member States have a long-standing commitment to cooperate with the European institutions on informing people about Europe and creating national links with Brussels. More should be done to ensure that the EU institutions work in parallel to improve communication.

The main objective of Plan D is "listening better", "explaining better" and "going local" to engage citizens. It fostered a type of consultation on the future of Europe which was complementary to the stakeholder and general public consultations on specific policy proposals (COM, 2008: 4).

The period of reflection came to an end in June 2007, when the European Council agreed on a mandate for a new intergovernmental conference (IGC) to reform the institutional framework of the Union. The IGC was concluded in October and the "Reform Treaty" was signed in December 2007 in Lisbon. These events opened a new phase, with ratification of the new treaty to be followed by the European elections in June 2009.

In October 2007, the Commission adopted a Communication on „Communicating Europe in Partnership" (COM, 2007). Its overall objective is to strengthen coherence and synergies between the activities undertaken by the different EU institutions and by Member States, in order to offer citizens better access and a better understanding of the impact of EU policies at European, national and local level.

Media is considered to be the main instrument to implement the communication strategy. Television and radio, as the primary media used by citizens of the European Union, have a key role to play. In line with the Commission's White Paper on a European Communication policy, Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate and Communicating Europe in Partnership, better use of the audiovisual media should aim at supplying information in a form that is attractive to users, promotes active European citizenship and contributes to the development of a European public sphere (COM, 2008: 4). TV, radio and Internet seems to be the most direct channels of communication and consequently and specific actions are taken in this matter.

Conclusion

We can argue that within EU there are several limitations regarding the communication strategies. This proposition can be tested in several contexts and at different levels. The main gap in the EU communication strategy is the lack of a clear and common vision about what is EU and what kind of political structure EU wants to be.

From the perspective of European institutions, it is obvious that the European project has ambitions to overlap the status and the perception regarding its intergovernmental nature. Among member states, there are groups that insist on the importance of nation state as a particular factor of European identity. Sub-national levels are more oriented on local and regional approaches of EU based on the principle of subsidiarity.

Therefore, we must acknowledge that the structure of EU, the position of different European and national actors within the system, cannot be comprehended within a single framework or approach where to be found independent variables and relationships in terms of hierarchies and competences. We can accept the multilevel governance approach in order to avoid intergovernmental and supranational debate. Still, no clear channels of hierarchical communication are set. The spread of authority legitimates different European, national and subnational entities in the decision making and implementation of different policies. It is obvious that the multilevel governance approach can legitimate several channels of communication that can be related with legitimacy and democracy expectations. Each subject

(citizen, group or organization) is more likely to be loyal, to support and sustain the level where its interest is better satisfied.

If we reconsider the options for legitimization (input-oriented and output-oriented) and the role of the citizens, we can identify the main cause that lead to confusion: overlapping competences. Therefore, several questions arise: Who has the authority to take decisions? Who has the authority to implement decisions? Who is paying? And who benefits?

We appreciate that the answers must be considered backwards. Firstly, Who benefits? The answer is clear. Any democratic system has the main subject the citizens. Accordingly, each system who defines itself as democratic should have a citizen oriented approach, taking into account the main needs and expectations. As long as EU has a several approaches (community interest, national interest, regional and local interests and citizens interests), many times the supranational, national and sub-national ambitions cannot be the same.

If we go further, the payment issue shares different opinions. Each individual, group or organization is willing to contribute financially as long the payments are spent on satisfying their preferences. Nobody wants to see his/her money spent on projects that does not represent their interests. Therefore, each European policy must have citizen oriented approach from this perspective. Of course, we don't claim that what is paying locally should be spent locally. Here is the role of communication where we should understand and accept the payments on projects and policies in other EU countries and understand how the contributors from other EU states support projects in our interest. The sense of solidarity and complementarity must be kept.

Regarding the implementation of the decisions, we agree on the strengthening the appropriate levels able to act efficiently and transparently in order to show the citizens that whatever is done is done for them. The implementation of a measure (even if is technical) must have as a secondary effect the development of a sense of trust and confidence for the citizens. The same effect must be felt on the citizens' perception on how their interest and preferences are considered within the decision making processes which lead us to the conclusion that a large degree of transparency must be ensured by each actor involved in the process, especially the EU institutions.

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QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE CENTRAL AND EAST-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AFTER EU ENLARGEMENT (2004)

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The present analysis has been inspired by the book entitled ***The Quality Assurance in Higher Education in the Central and East-European Countries – Agenda Ahead,*** **edited by Jan KOHOUTEK, UNESCO-CEPES, Studies on Higher Education, Bucharest, 2009,** presenting the outcome of the Research Plan *Tertiary Education in the Knowledge Society* (identification code MSM0023775201) of the Centre for Higher Education Studies, Prague, Czech Republic, and the attempts to show the *Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area* (ESG) at the level of the quality assurance agencies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the volume on *Accreditation and Evaluation in the European Higher Education Area* edited by Stephanie Schwarz and Don F. Westerheijden and published in 2004, has allowed a more consistent pondering on the development of *Quality Assurance* in Central and Eastern European countries.

Analysing the precedents of the process of *Quality Assurance in the European Higher Education Area* in Central and Eastern Europe moulded by the post-communist experience of higher education quality and marked by the American model of assessment and accreditation, particularly in Hungary and Romania, as well as by the British model in the Baltic states, Jan Kohoutek sees the quality of answers provided by the process of implementing ESG in a natural continuity axis (J. Kohoutek, 2009). In Central and Eastern Europe, it starts from the pre-Bologna previous experience to assure quality considered as a first generation one, certain advantages in practising ESG implementation practice, and from a certain regional interoperability provided by the *Network of Central and Eastern European Quality Assurance Agencies in Higher Education* (CEEN), established in 2002, as well as practice diversity belonging to the process dynamics to assure the quality of higher education.

Moreover, by a systematic assessment of the importance of certain factors by both the appearance of *assuring* quality as a political issue, *as well as* in expressing a special policy in the field, the conceptual framework can provide fruitful perspectives *through* transnational differences and resemblances. Jan Kohoutek says that "whether CEE accreditation schemes will remain "first generation", or if (and when) they will evolve towards a second-generation approach with mutual recognition of agencies' practices that are up and running is hard to predict, given the absence of a generally valid pattern" (J. Kohoutek, 2009: 48).

Developing the idea of ESG implementation appurtenance to the general phenomenon of implementation, we have to state that implementation supposes two distinct notions: implementation as a process (execution policy) and implementation as a result. Moreover, the two distinct notions lead to different qualities: responsibility, which is at the core of the relation between objectives and results, and confidence characteristic of the carried out policy (process of implementation).

The process of QA assessment in Central and Eastern Europe goes from a quality control system using tools belonging to the centralised state to an assessment of quality

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assurance based on democratic principles. At the beginning of the 1990s, the reform propositions offered by foreign experts were based on implicit assumptions that they had sufficient knowledge of the country's transformation specifics, on the possibility of attaining consensus on "the quality issue", on how it should be solved, and by what methodology. The foreign experts may have been proposing solutions of the theoretical and rational planning type: implement a system-wide regulatory measure in line with the national specifics (i.e. from the US accreditation concept, the CEE countries, as a rule, adopted only assessment against threshold standards, leading to approval/accreditation; the misunderstandings and confusion stemming from the foreign expert's language of theory may have made the task no easier for those muddling through the quality assurance issues in implementing newly devised quality assurance schemes in the CEE countries. This stage balances between national needs for assistance in quality assurance and misunderstandings and confusion stemming from the foreign expert that is called by the authors of the chapter as being *symbolic* (Kohoutek: 279).

In the mid-1990s, implementation of quality assurance policy in the CEE countries changed *from symbolic to political and administrative* steps: the quality assurance agencies that had been created; minimal quality standards have been settled. According to F.A. Van Vught, the implementation of these measures resulted in establishing an institutional quality compliance culture (Van Vught, 1989). The initiation of the Bologna Process agendas such as structured study has made an impact on the implementation of CEE quality assurance practices, making them increasingly time-consuming and labour intensive, due to the necessity to accredit every new degree program. It is evident that the preference in all the Central and Eastern European countries for accreditation rather than quality assessment alone occurred because, at the time of transition, a priority was to establish some sort of quality control for the higher education sector

The adoption of the ESG guidelines for quality assurance agencies, which, if fully implemented, will put the agencies under the obligation to undergo periodic external reviews and keep to accountability standards factor into the quality assurance policies of the CEE agencies, making them more "*experimental*" than ever before. The hypothesis of the authors of the chapter is checked by comparing the activity of quality assurance agencies from five countries: Latvia, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and the Czech Republic, with the support of five variables (objectives, control, areas, procedures, uses) brought to the foreground by Perellon (Perellon: 2005). A thorough analysis shows the primacy of the application of accountability-oriented evaluation for the accreditation/approval concept, as suggested by the agencies' scope of activities (areas) and procedures applied (based on the general quality assurance model), and publication of results (uses) , with taints referring to the models in Latvia and Poland.

The syntheses carried out so far have shown that the ESG implementation process on the agenda of quality assurance of the Bologna Process mainly suggests the fact that it is an open method of coordination and a means of persuasion on ESG implementation governance except for the cases when there is a better alternative. At the same time, knowledge on the ESG implementation process is generic and has a low prescriptive level, which makes the ESG implementation process open to local interpretations, as well as the possibility to alter it by enabling the lower level stakeholders, which is essential for the success of ESG implementation. Last but not least, considering the indivisibility, responsibility and confidence in the implementation process, the ESG implementation, as any policy implementation, has to determine a demonstration of the responsibility procedures of any agency assuming the enforcement of the implementation programme. Unfortunately, the syntheses referring to the study of implementation suggests little on the success and difficulty individual agencies face at the time of ESG enforcement. For this reason, in the latter part of

the book we will make a comparative analysis of national agencies expertise in certain CEE countries (Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia).

In 2005, Latvia adopted the *Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance in the Higher Education Area* (ESG), elaborated by ENQA and its partners. The Higher Education Quality Evaluation Centre (HEQEC) that became a foundation in 2004, is the institution concerned with strategies to assure quality in Latvia. This institution seeks not only to assure active participation of this country to shaping the *European Higher Education Area*; it also stresses the particularity of this participation, which has been brought to the foreground by the three objectives pursued during the ESG implementation process: assessing Latvian programmes and institutions with the support of mixed experts (Western, Baltic and Latvian) in a wider European context (due to Western experts); assessing Latvian programmes and institutions in accordance with similar regional experience (due to Baltic experts); ensuring that assessment is carried out in accordance with the Latvian standards and regulations (due to native experts) (Agnese Rusakova, Andrejs Rauhvargers: 2009) .

At the same time, the benefits of using international experts are obvious for the particularity of the Latvian system of assuring quality and consist of transparency, international credibility and "European dimension". These are strong arguments for a national debate with employers, parents, other interested individuals and the society in general. This model has also diminished the involvement of the state in a higher education system with strong personal connection amongst which finding a free independent expert for each field of study was pretty complicated. From this point of view, the positive experience in Latvia could be interesting for other countries aiming at introducing periodical assessments with the involvement of foreign experts.

In the current quality assurance system in Latvia, external quality assurance of institutions and/or programmes is carried out in a cyclic manner according to the ESG 2.7 Standard. After the first round of accreditation ended in 2002, each programme and institution has to be accredited every six years. The year 2007 marked the end of the second cycle of programme and higher education institutions accreditation. This country has implemented the ESG almost to the full with few exceptions referring to: *ESG 3.5 Standard*, yet the HEQEC website provides detailed information on the HEQEC orientation and a detailed description of the applied methodology; *ESG 3.8 Standard,* HEQEC does not currently subcontract or externalise the organisation of the assessment process for activities provisioned in the statutes.

In the conclusions, the authors of the survey show that the Latvian ESG implementation model is facing new challenges important for the future. Some formal requirements of the existing accreditation framework need to be reconsidered. For instance, "the academic community is considering the idea to introduce the accreditation of a department, rather than of personalities" (Agnese Rusakova, Andrejs Rauhvargers: 2009, 110). The good collaboration with stakeholders provides many opportunities to developed activities of HEQEC quality assurance. An example in point refers to different assessments, less traditional types of studies, such as distance learning, part time and part time intensive studies. An important issue is the acknowledgement of Lifelong Learning and its corresponding insertion in the existing academic system. At the same time, it is necessary to substantially improve the assessment of the results obtained after the study of a professional programme related to the requirements of labour market.

From the point of view of the institutional framework in the QA field, in Hungary, together with the Hungarian Accreditation Committee (HAC), established in 1992 and reformed in 2005 as an independent national body of experts assessing quality in education, research, and artistic activities in higher education, the Hungarian Ministry of Education and Culture and the Higher Education Institutions (the Higher Education and Scientific Council and the Hungarian Rectors' Conference) have definite responsibilities.

From the point of view of the ESG implementation process, the HAC responsibility is not to assess the availability of QA assessment models but rather with checking if the QA system of an institution leads to a higher quality of education and research and services activities. HAC assesses an institution on three levels. First, the HAC Accreditation Guidelines for institutional accreditation comprise the indicators for an internal system of quality assurance that should be covered irrespective of the type of institution. Secondly, each external assessment team includes a QA expert delegated by the HAC Quality Development Subcommittee, a body required by law. Finally, a member of this subcommittee controls the report of the external team confronting it with the institutional chart and can alter the report before final approval and accreditation in the HAC plenary meeting (Christina Rosznyai: 2009)

Within the eight year assessment cycle, HAC provides QA assessment from the point of view of the institution, study programmes and other educational forms in a system *ex-ante* – institutional (new institutions and new faculties), programme (bachelor and masters) and other educational forms (doctoral schools at universities, professorial positions) and in an eight year system *ex-post* – institutional (institutions and their faculties), programme (degree programme) and other educational forms (doctoral schools).

From the point of view of the ESG implementation process results, we have to say that HAC was among the first European QA agencies to undergo an external evaluation by an international panel. In spring 2008, a second review was conducted to comply with ESG and for continued ENQA membership. External experts have considered that HAC fully conforms to five out of the eight second level ESG standards and six out of the eight third level ESG standards. Their proposals mainly focused on ESG 2.3, 2.4, 2.8, 3.4 and 3.6.

The achievement of these standards has to be related with opportunities and challenges for HAC. They are expressed around three main aspects: overregulation of higher education and HAC; an unstable legal environment; and the HAC resources. Many of these challenges, as well as many aspects relating to them are common to several countries at this stage of implementing the Bologna Process. Some, such as an excessive regulation, can be an issue mainly persisting in Central and Eastern European educational systems.

Nevertheless, the commitment of all interested parties in higher education for ESG implementation is expressed, as shown in the gradual ESG adoption by all higher education institutions. The HAC external assessment report tests the way these organisations work according to the European standards out of which the majority were HAC main principles for a great part of its history. Currently, the main opportunity for higher education in Hungary and HAC in particular is the fact that changes needed to keep up with alteration in the European Higher Education Area and the Bologna Process were initiated long time ago and the actions started to implement the ESG are no longer numerous and are not the most difficult.

In Poland, there are two main accreditation systems: the state system represented by the *State Accreditation Committee (PKA)* that started its activity in January 2002, and the "academic" system represented by the academic accreditation committees for different groups of study programmes, usually of a certain type, provided by higher education institutions. The academic committees of university accreditation represented by the Academic School Rectors' Conference (CRASP) cooperate with the *State Accreditation Committee*. Many of these committees were drawn up before the establishment of the *State Accreditation Committee* (Ewa Chmielecka; 2009*).*

Thus, the process of ESG implementation in Poland has to be considered from a double perspective: state – PKA is a state institution and its office belongs to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education; academic – represented by the ten academic accreditation committees.

The Ministry established the PKA and is the main recipient of its findings. PKA reports to the ministry its opinions and conclusions on: establishing universities, granting the universities with the right to provide higher education in specific study structures or depending

on the levels of education, establishing faculties within higher education institutions located in other localities, assessing the quality of the programmes provided in certain study structures, assessing the quality of training systems, and conformity of higher education.

The ten academic accreditation committees that legally are non-governmental bodies offer national-level accreditation for Bachelor programmes (licencjat/inżynier) and the Master degree (magister). Their evaluation standards are generally more demanding than the *State Accreditation Commi*. Academic accreditation is voluntary and it takes place every three to five years. The accreditation procedures adopted by all the committees are very similar, although they can differ in some details, and assume certain steps: appointment of expert groups to develop specific standards and criteria for assessing the quality of education for specific fields of studies; application of a HEI unit offering course in a given field of studies for accreditation of this field; establishment of an evaluation panel to conduct a comprehensive review and assessment of a field of studies offered at a specific higher education institution; a review of the report at a plenary session of the Committee and the taking of the accreditation decision.

As far as the ESG implementation stage is concerned, even if in Poland there are the aforementioned two accredited systems, there have been substantial progresses at all levels. By analysing the elements of each ESG standard level, one can notice that although both accreditation systems meet these standards, they do it differently, while sometimes there are contradictory situations with no solution for the time being. For instance, Point 2.7 Periodic Reviews, PKA cycles last for six years, while in the case of the *Foundation for the Promotion and Accreditation of Economic Studies* (FPAKE), one of the ten accreditation committees, the first accreditation is granted for three years and subsequent accreditations for five years.

There are still major challenges for the ESG implementation process that Polish stakeholders have to face.

In the near future, all higher education institutions in Poland will have PKA accreditation and it is likely that the number of institutions willing to have a special distinction will accede with difficulty to the FPAKE accreditation through an attractive method. However, the FPAKE authorities are aware of the fact that limiting its operations to Poland would finally lead to losing its current position as compared to agencies enrolled in the European Register that may enter the accreditation market in this country. Yet the greatest challenge in the coming years will be adopting accreditations to the National Framework Qualifications standards ongoing in Poland considering the design of curricula using instruments based on results of learning – knowledge, skills and attitudes – is still new.

Accreditation of the degree programmes in Slovakia is defined by the Higher Education Act as a process in the context of which the Accreditation Commission (AC), at the request of a higher education institution, assesses its capacity to implement a degree programme (Act of 2002). Based on the standpoint of the AC, the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic makes a decision granting the right of the higher education institution to provide the academic degree corresponding to the accredited curriculum. The objects of accreditation are: degree programmes and award scientific-teaching degrees of docent and professors. The Minister of Education may ask for complex accreditation to be performed even prior to expiry of the six-year period (J. Jurkovic: 2009).

In 2006 – 2008, all public higher education institutions, all state higher education institutions, and one of the private higher education institutions have been assessed by the European University Association. The higher education institutions prepared self-evaluation reports according to the same standards, and subsequently underwent a peer review by the EUA working group. The final reports by the individual higher education institutions identified strengths and weaknesses of the institutions and recommended actions to be taken. The project was initiated by the higher education institutions and financed by the Ministry of

Education of the Slovak Republic, under the condition that the higher education institutions should publicise their final reports. At the same time, a Sectoral Report was developed, which gives an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the higher education system in the Slovak Republic as a whole (J. Jurkovic: 2009, 175).

Concerning the ESG implementation, at present time, it is not the primary aim of the AC's work to improve or assess the internal system of quality assurance of higher education institutions, but AC is strongly involved in the external assessment of higher education institutions. This fact leads to an interconnection between the internal quality assurance instruments of the institution and the external assessment of quality by the AC (J. Jurkovic: 2009, 175). There is an interconnection between public structures represented by the Ministry of Education and higher education institutions and AC as an independent QA assessment structure concerning the definition of assessment criteria (of public competence) and the assessment procedures (of private competence). Implementation of the recommendations is rather an internal affair of the higher education institution, and the purpose of the recommendations is to sustain the results achieved in research and educational activities until the next complex accreditation. Generally speaking, the present setting of the rules on external quality assurance is compatible with ESG Standards 2.1-2.8. However, some of the arrangements, including those pertaining to the work of the AC, have a special setting for historical reasons, and are not fully compatible with the ESG. At present, there is a joint project with the AC of the Czech Republic, which includes cooperation in preparing for an external review against ESG standards.

When analysing the Slovak experience in ESG implementation from the perspective of the relation between opportunities and challenges, it will be necessary to mention certain aspects that have to be considered in the future: the question of developing internal quality assurance mechanisms for higher education institutions; introducing a system for monitoring and improving them in the context of the external system for quality assurance. There is a need to reassess the present conditions in order to better respond to the missions and tasks of institutions, especially in the case of professionally-oriented higher education institutions; it is necessary to refocus on the assessment criteria, which are currently aimed at fulfilment of minimum standards, to account for continual improvement of institutional quality processes, monitoring student progress, and harmony between the aims of degree programmes and student achievements. The status of the AC and its financing should be given further consideration, as should be the relation between the AC and higher education institutions, and between the AC and the Ministry, particularly as concerns potential conflicts of interest of the Commission's members impacting on the independence of the Commission's procedures.

Evaluation of the quality of higher education institutions in the Czech Republic, in line with international developments, is part of the *Long-Term Plan for Educational, Scientific, Research, Development, Artistic and Other Creative Activities of Higher Education Institutions for 2006-2010* (Long-Term Plan). The Accreditation Commission, as the agency legally responsible for external quality assurance, is in charge with the accreditation process. Its responsibilities are clearly defined in its founding acts in 1998. With the expenses covered from the budget of the Ministry, the AC is composed of twenty-one members, appointed by the Czech government on the basis of a proposal by the Minister. To prevent conflicts of interests, the Act requires that the members of the AC should not be academic officials (H. Šebkova: 2009, 210).

The AC working programme includes the evaluation of private higher education institutions, faculties of public higher education institutions (the first evaluation of a whole public higher education institution was planned for the second half of 2008) and of accredited activities provided by both public and private higher education institutions with the aim to provide recommendations for improvement (pp 207-208). The activities developed by the AC can be as

follows: evaluation of higher education institutions; elaboration of standpoints on applications for accreditation; elaboration of standpoints on applications for granting state permission; elaboration of standpoints on the establishment/division of faculties, for setting the type of higher education institutions; preparation of documents and conceptual materials; collaboration with external partners at both national and international level; implementation of the Bologna Process principles, namely ENQA standards (H. Šebkova: 2009, 212).

As far as ESG implementation is concerned, The AC's 2007 annual report states that the AC is committed to the ESG principles with a view to gaining full ENQA membership, contingent on successfully undergoing the ESG review, the granting of which entitles the AC to be included in the European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education (EQAR). The way in which its members are selected, and also its composition, are considered an adequate guarantee of the AC's independence from any "third parties such as higher education institutions, ministries or other stakeholders" (ENQA, 2005) that might influence the outcomes of quality assurance processes (expert panel's conclusions and recommendations).

From the point of view of meeting the *ESG standards for quality assurance agencies*, considering that AC is funded by the ministry with public money, not all needs are covered for the functional needs of the institution, which makes it vulnerable to meet the ESG 3.4 Standard, claiming financial autonomy of assessment agencies. As far as the *Implementation of ESG Regarding External Quality Assurance* is concerned, AC has met most standards with few taints. Even though the elements of the external review processes correspond to the ESG 2.4. Standard, the relevant ESG principles have been implemented only partly (H. Šebkova: 2009, 223) Also, if the AC's regulations on publishing reports on external quality evaluation, and the easy accessibility of the reports, are fully in harmony with the ESG 2.5 Standard, the structure and content of the reports sometimes differ significantly, as well as their style and tone. Even though the ESG 2.7 Standard is met, however it is not possible to argue that the evaluation of accredited activities and the evaluation of institutions are dynamic and continuing processes with the recurring review defined in advance.

Discussing about constraints and weaknesses of the QA system in the Czech Republic, external evaluators of the system consider that the strength of the Czech higher education quality assurance is that "it is a mature system with widespread participation among Czech academics" (File et al., 2006) and positively assess the AC activity "for a regular and recurring review of programmes". Practically, two strong points of the QA Czech system can be distinguished: the high level transparency of the AC's procedural criteria, which are publicly available on the AC's website and the international cooperation of the AC.

Out of the weaknesses of the QA system in the Czech Republic mentioned in the OECD assessment report in 2006, we remind the following: the composition of the AC's work groups in terms of the representation of employers, students and other stakeholders is not optimal; it is criticised that the AC's judgements are made on the basis of inputs rather than outputs, and that the accreditation process focuses mostly on personnel and material resources (i.e. input-oriented indicators such as numbers of professors, available facilities, etc.), not taking into consideration "the wider scope of institutional performance such as institutional management and governance and student support services; low diversification of the Czech tertiary education system, to which the accreditation procedures currently in operation contribute (H. Šebkova: 2009, 227-228).

The challenges and the agenda that the AC faces can be derived from the recommendations of the OECD experts and from the AC's self-evaluation: the activities must be more effective and create space for discussion of conceptual issues; the need for diversification of tertiary education; the consultation of the stakeholders outside of higher education in the selection of Commission members; opportunity to facilitate the development of internal quality assurance processes; shift between accreditation of degree programmes and the accreditation of institutions ; the variety of institutional approaches to internal evaluation

should be considered an opportunity for the future; putting greater focus on conceptual work and policy objectives for quality assurance development along with wider consideration and/or the dissemination of examples of good practice.

Following John Brennan's (1999) argument on the lack of attention paid to the institutional dimension in the body of literature on quality, and, importantly, the lack of empirical evidence on implementation of the ESG at institutional level, thus pointing to a "black box" in the sense of factual knowledge of the corresponding policy processes, the last part of the book comprises two case studies from the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, Czech Republic. Chapter 9 comprise details on the implementation of the ESG by UWB, while Chapter 10 sets the case of UWB implementation of the ESG in the context of the university's policy, learning from participation in three projects oriented at quality improvement.

Going through the experience of Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic in the field of the ESG implementation, we can draw the conclusion that the adoption of ESG in 2005 can hardly be regarded as a supranational policy initiative of the type that blows away without making any impact at all. These were followed by the elaboration of rules qualifying agencies to be listed in the *European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education*, based again on a review against ESG. ESG implementation is likely to have achieved a reasonably high position on the agendas of agencies whose activities centre on assuring higher education quality primarily within state or federal border. At the same time, we may say that the quality assurance agencies in Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic are generally compatible with ESG, with contextual variations of national quality assurance practices. Although the ESG experimental implementation pattern makes room for contextual interpretations by implementing actors, it is not unreasonable to expect certain adjustments to agencies' quality assurance practices.

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III. CROSS BORDER COOPERATION

PERSPECTIVES FOR A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF DEBRECEN - ORADEA CROSS-BORDER AGGLOMERATION

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Abstract: *The paper is based on the idea of the project „Debrecen - Oradea cross-border agglomeration (2020), mainly on the results from the first stage of this project – the sociological research which took place in the two target cities, Oradea and Debrecen, on three target groups and especially on the SWOT analyses. According to the results of the research corroborated with the Development Plan of the Bihor County and the Regional Plan of Development for the North- West Region we tried to draw up some directions to get from the idea of a project and concept „Debrecen - Oradea cross-border agglomeration,, to an efficient and functional unit for the two communities, considering the regional, national and European perspectives,,*

Keywords: *cross-border collaboration, sociological research, SWOT analyse, development strategies, Euro region*

In the „Debrecen - Oradea cross-border agglomeration (2020)", project started in 2007, it was intended the idea of following certain steps through which it is wanted the development of an efficient and functional cross-border agglomeration between the Romanian and Hungarian borders, between Bihor and Hajdu Bihor counties and between Oradea and Debrecen.

The project was thought to be one on long term, until 2020 to be more precise, following the steps:

a) a sociological research at the level of Oradea and Debrecen and a press campaign in order to promote the project, its importance and its benefits;
b) a step in studying the impact of this project (2007);
c) the draw up of the Community Strategy for the Debrecen - Oradea cross-border agglomeration (SCADO);
d) implementation of the SCADO.

In order to elaborate the strategy for the two communities Oradea and Debrecen we must take into consideration two development plans which include the communities, and here we refer to the Romanian cross- border space:

- Regional Plan of Development, The Regional Frame development strategies 2007-2013 for the North- West Region, North Transylvania.

Therefore for a more efficient strategy which will also consider the opinion of the population that lives into the target area we will take into account the results of the sociological research corroborated with the two plans for the elaboration of the SCADO strategy. We must also remember that Oradea is in the area of action of the two plans.

Considering the fact that for the research that we led in the two communities Oradea and Debrecen, we had three target groups: 50% students, 10% persons employed in institutions, people over 25 years old, the most important target were the students. We consider so because depending on the evolution of this project which will end in 2020, the students will be the ones that will benefit at maturity from the cross-border agglomeration that is now a concept and in the end from a functional structure, improved by new cross - border

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elements which will be incorporated in this cross - border area according to the European regional policy and not only.

From the research that we led, after applying the research instrument on our target groups we obtained a series of results which help us understand the past of the two communities situated on the two sides of the border.

The cross-border communication is realised in a rate sustained by the community from Oradea and from the opposite part. From Oradea there were visits with different purposes in the Hungarian city: 30,2% (one visit), 9,6% (two visits), and 5%(three visits), and from the Hungarian part we have 25% (one visit), 4,6% (two visits) and 2,5% (three visits). From this dimension of the research we can extract the idea that Romanians make visits, if we cumulate the three categories (from a visit to three visits) 44,8% of the ones questioned, have connections with the neighboured community in different purposes while the Hungarian community have only the percentage of 32,1% that represents the people that visited the city

The purpose of the visits in the neighboured communities varies. They will be named in the following table (Țoca Constantin, Horga Ioan, *Sociological research. Thinking the future together the Debrecen – Oradea cross border agglomeration,* in Neighbours and Partners: on the two sides of the border, Edited by Istvan Suli – Zakar, Debrecen 2008, p.76):

Purpose of the visit	Oradea	Debrecen
Tourism	13,8%	8,8%
Transit	11,6%	1,3%
Shopping	13,6%	15%
Business	5,8%	4%
Relatives/Family	3,6%	6,7%

The tourism is a purpose to know the neighbour space, which is in a balance in percentage at this category. From this we can understand that the cross-border communities are chosen for the leisure time, relaxing and getting to know the traditions and the customs of the areas.

As a transit, 11,6 % of the community from Oradea uses the capacity of infrastructure of the neighboured state because of space attractions are much more attractive promoted to be viewed against the eastern area where appear differences in this area unlike the 1,3% on the Hungarian side.

Shopping on the other side of the border are preferred by the both communities. Here we can remember certain times in which due to economic development of the two neighbouring nations, due to advertising and promotions cross-border shopping was preferred, that is the translation to a neighbouring area in order to meet certain individual needs.

The business area is also well represented, which certifies our cross- border business on various fields in the two communities, here we noticed a balance of 5.8% and 4% of the respondents who have business in the neighboured state or even partnerships, joint ventures Romanian - Hungarian that collaborate on various fields.

The history of the two nations has left on both sides of the border separated families, and this is why we noted the visits of the relatives who remained in one of the two sides of the border between Romania - Hungary.

Besides the visits of the relatives there are also included visits for: conference, regional and international seminars, joint projects, cultural - entertaining, medical situations

To achieve the above goals related to visits one both side of the border the most used means of transport was the private car for the Romanian 33.3% and Hungarian 25.8%, this means was preferred because of the short distance between the two cities, Oradea and Debrecen, where and when the scroll of distance, namely the existence of infrastructure that exists E60, a part.

Minibuses were preferred by the community especially in Oradea, considering the fact that there are regular trips between the two cities. Debrecen is an attraction mainly for shopping purposes because of differences in products that can be found there, the quality of their existing promotions related to the price.

Means of transport by railway was the least used 0.7% of the Romanian and a much higher 3.3%Hungarian. There is a problem with the lack of infrastructure portions of the two cities, communication is accomplished through a channel in a roundabout which increases the distance and time traveled between two points.

In our research we have inserted a SWOT analysis to try to apprehend the internal elements: strengths and weaknesses, external factors: opportunities and threats in the target cities Oradea and Debrecen. The SWOT analysis attempts to highlight the strengths of the two communities, once shown to be further emphasized and exploited, identifying weaknesses, as much as possible isolated, minimized, eliminated or transformed through different methods and with the help of specialists in strengths. External elements, in particular opportunities should be exploited, taken advantage of them to the efficient development of both communities in order to achieve the concept of cross - border agglomeration Debrecen - Oradea, on the other hand threats should be treated as such and found solutions to be prevented in order not to affect cross - border development.

Following the SWOT analysis we can see several strengths of the two cities Debrecen and Oradea: the cultural - educational dimension is the strongest, there are mentioned cultural objectives, the architecture of the buildings, churches and the institutional dimension, academia and educational environment.

Cultural - educational dimension has historical roots and furthermore the most important thing is the fact that there have been cultural - educational actors that managed over time to preserve this dimension and to promote it in the same time.

Just as we noted previously one of the purposes for which people were visiting a neighbouring area was the shopping, which we find it as strength turned into shop centres and trade centres, with lots of shops where trade prevails.

The modernization of the city is noted for local actions for the renovation, furnishing and principally the beauty of both cities through upgrading of the landscaping.

A note on the strength of both communities is tourism, both cities with their suburbs have a remarkable tourist potential based on natural resources exploited out of which benefit people of both communities and which attract tourists to the same extent.

Turning to weaknesses, the main drawback is the infrastructure in general for the community of Oradea and particularly the road infrastructure is an impediment to more rapid development through easier access to points of interest and attraction of potential investors in the areas concerned and as we know essential for the sustainable development is the existence of infrastructure.

As the main cross-border opportunities were identified: tourism, development of cities, investors and not the last EU projects and funds to develop the scale of the two cities.

Among the threats was highlighted the political side which can be an item that can not be fully controlled, which is in a constantly changing and which is reflective at administrative level.

Infrastructure in poor condition may give little interest from investors who can be an engine of development for the two regions.

Analyzing the Regional Plan of Development for the North - West Development Region we identify several priorities, guidelines for developing (Strategic Development Framework 2007-2013 Regional Development of North - West Region, North Transylvania, p. 146-149):

- Economic competitiveness: increasing the attractiveness of the region by improving competitiveness and stimulating economic activities and innovative activities in order to obtain products with high added value.
- Availability: increased availability of the region by improving the regional infrastructure in order to encourage economic and social activities of regional development poles.
- Human resources: human resources development in order to increase employment by upgrading the education system, development
- Rural Development: promoting sustainable development and diversification of rural activities.

From the SWOT analysis conducted under document mentioned above relating to the North - West Region Development we can extract (*Ibidem p.*174-176):

- Strengths: the region's strategic importance in terms of logistics (Romanian city Oradea is the closest to Budapest), important university and research centre, diverse regional economy with several sectors of excellence, proximity to European markets, investments in infrastructure business, strong tradition in crafts (wood, ceramic, glass), the existence of urban plans, resources, protected areas, tourism developed, low unemployment, steady growth in student numbers, high labour market access.
- Weaknesses: poor infrastructure, large share of population in agriculture, agriculture, urban agglomeration, regional marketing, lack of tourism products, high rate of unemployment among young people, IT, technology transfer.
- Opportunities: important flows of capital, rural tourism, increasing demand on the labor market
- Threats: increased pollution, environmental degradation, inadequate administrative capacity, complex European legislation, budget, poor quality infrastructure, neglect of cultural heritage, lack of infrastructure development, lack of regional tourism marketing, adverse demographic developments.

According to the Development Plan of the Bihor County, the overall objective is reducing as quickly as possible the disparities at the county level, at economic, social and environmental level and improving living standards through interventions in priority areas identified and specific objectives are to ensure increased competitiveness, employment through human resource development, sustainable environmental protection (Bihor County Development Plan 2007-2013, p.11).

Strategy to achieve the overall objective and specific objectives is based on identification of priority sectors in the needed assistance. The analysis undertaken in this direction has identified as priority in the need for swift intervention to reduce disparities in economic, social and environmental and improving living standards of residents of Bihor County and to ensure increased competitiveness, full employment and protection environmental sustainability, the following sectors: tourism, rural development, competitiveness, environment, human resources, transport, urban regeneration (Ibidem, p. 11-12).

Following the SWOT analysis and interpretation of the results of the research and development of the two plans relating directly Bihor County, Oradea and the cross - border area we proposes some strategies and courses of action.

We have to consider the fact that the target areas Debrecen and Oradea are at the confluence of three main structures, namely: North - west (Romania) and Regional Development Region Éjszka - Alfold (Hungary), Bihor - Hajdu Bihar Euro region, Carpathian Euro region.

As ways of action at that cross - border agglomeration at Debrecen - Oradea we suggest:

- realization of a marketing-border;
- promotion of the tourism- dimension;
- development of tourism services to attract tourists;
- creating a cross -border brand in the agglomeration;
- development of infrastructure;
- promoting and developing the educational element;
- development of both cities according to there urban plans;
- enhancement of the landscaping;
- preservation of cultural elements, historical buildings with heritage value of national or even global through renovation and maintenance;
- development of close, standing at the of the level of both the two cross -border administrations;
- development of regional multi-points;
- attracting European funds on cross- border cooperation;
- the worth of the cultural element as strength for attracting tourists;
- attract foreign investors, in order to create jobs and hence sustainable development;
- provide incentives for potential investors;
- development of industrial parks-related infrastructure to facilitate access of foreign investors in the area.

SWOT Analysis comparative communities Debrecen Oradea (István Süli-Zakar, Institutum Socio-Geographiae Universitatis Debreceniensis, ACTA Iuventutis Geographica, Debrecen, 2009, p.218-219)

S Strengths Internal Factors			W Weakness Internal Factors			O Opportunities External Factors			T Threats External Factors		
Indicator	**O**	**D**	**Indicator**	**O**	**D**	**Indicator**	**O**	**D**	**Indicator**	**O**	**D**
Cultural objectives	54	19	Infrastructure	78	26	Tourism	55	39	Infrastructure	79	-
Institutions	45	-	Local administration	29	-	City development	46	7	Local administration	29	-
Building Architecture	40	-	Transport	28	74	Investors	44	-	Transport	28	-
Shopping centre	44	-	Justice	24		Cross border projects	32	5	Justice	24	-
Academic background. University	39	108	Jobs	24	54	Jobs	25	6	Jobs	24	12
Commerce	40	-	Green spaces	24	-	Frontier	22	5	Green spaces	14	-
Border, Custom-house	22	-	Old buildings	24	-	EU Integration, EU	15	6	Old buildings	20	-
Geographical location	27	10	Agglomeration	7	-	Scholarships	10	-	Agglomeration	7	-
Transport	20	11	Industry	8	-	Infrastructure	10	-	Industry	8	-
Churches	23	7	Agriculture	8	-	European Funds	8	-	Agriculture	8	-
Industry	16	-	Services	6	-	Academical background	6	-	Services	6	-
Infrastructure	22	9	Security	4	8	NGO – s	6	-	Dwellings	7	-
Tourism	16	57	Dwellings	7	-	Relations	-	24	Politics	-	17
Green spaces	16	-	Pollution	6	-	expressway	-	14	Geographical position	-	9
City modernization	9	17	Geographical position	-	15	Education	-	11	Migration	-	7
preuniversitary background	9	-	Mentality	-	7	Regional point	-	10	Big companies	-	5
Services	-	13	Social institutions	-	6	Culture	-	5			
Health	-	13		-	-	Sport	-	6			
The leading of the town	-	18									
Regional point	-	12									

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THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY, MASS-MEDIA AND CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION

Mircea BRIE[*]

Abstract. *Cooperation seems strictly necessary, and from this perspective the media can bring, with direct involvement of authorities, a contribution to strengthening the connections and the relationship between people and institutions. A company located in a process accentuated by globalization can not be conceived without taking into account the role of the media, to influence and control exercised by it. The impact of media is different, depending on which a public nature, but according to the typology and the different forms of media. The impact is different when we take into consideration the press, radio or television.*

The cultural contact are the importance of media in promoting common, human values, is very high. If this cultural space is doubled by a politic delimitated area, the media's role is even more significant. Cross-border cooperation and joint initiatives involves the development of interstate relations but also people. As a result of developing relations of good neighborliness in space requires new definition and the reclassification of border.

Good Neighborhood is a basic condition for maintaining security in the border area, it is a principle of international law, legal form of the formulation containing the principle of the obligation to make, and the obligation not to do. Thus, the obligation to make can be expressed by the rule which requires subjects of international law to act as good neighbors. Media Action appears in this perspective as an important factor for the transmission and control of legal or social rules.

Keywords: *neighborhood policy, mass-media, cross-border cooperation, border, multimedia*

1. The European neighborhood policy and the "new external border"

The community perspective on external relations envisages as a support and starting point *the European Neighborhood Policy* whose results have been noticed by the European Commission as positive (Communication, 2007). This and the external policy of the European Union directly support two other general tools with impact on external border: pre-accession policy (potential candidates to accession are included) and the development policy for third countries (Hubeny-Berlsky, 2007: 313). In such a community construction both between members and in the direct neighborhood relations at the external borders, stress has to be laid on dialogue and constructive cooperation amongst all parties. A special role in this equation is played by promotion of education and human capital through different programmers' funded and supported by the European Union, such as the partnerships under the TEMPUS programme and the convergence with the Bologna process and the Lisbon Agenda (Communication, 2007).

Under the influence of the European neighborhood policy, the concept of external border of the European Union tends to acquire new means of expression. On the one hand, we see a flexibility of contacts between the two sides of the border. Such a trend is enhanced by the means of cross-border cooperation through Euro regions and European instruments successfully implemented at the external border. On the other hand, the remarkable actions of the European Union through which they attempt to implement policies for regional cohesion at the current borders is, according to some analysts, the proof that the European Union is consolidating the current external borders, thus considering, at least for the moment, the option of slowing down

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the enlargement to the east without effectively closing the gates to this enlargement[1] (Matuszewicz, 2007: 109). Irrespective of the reasons for the European neighborhood policy, we can see that there is a change of attitude on external border due to its implementation. In such a situation, regions and people outside community structures can benefit from programmes and instruments of a policy bringing them closer to community citizens. Through its programmes for territorial cooperation at the external border, the neighborhood policy significantly contributes to developing a more homogenous system (Hubeny-Berlsky, 2007: 317) and the "integrated regional development" (Hubeny-Berlsky, 2007: 317). These policies are also required by the need to promote harmonization of economic policies to contribute to achieving economic cohesion on a regional level. The attenuation of important commercial unbalance between EU and its neighbours by enlarging the common market beyond the external borders of the community is thus an imperative responding to the European policy for good neighborhood (Matuszewicz, 2007: 110). We can conclude to pointing out that the implementation of the European neighborhood policy leads to altering the perception of external border; moreover, the implementation of European instruments for cross-border cooperation tends to move current border to the outside by building a new symbolic one including a peripheral privileged area having the advantages of neighborhood. Nevertheless, this policy has limits. For example, in spite of the "opening", we feel in the discourse of European officials referring to a possible enlargement of the European Union by Turkey's accession, that it would lead to some issues in managing the European neighborhood policy – some of the new partners might be Syria, Iraq and Iran. At the time, the EU is not ready to face such challenges.

2. Role of mass-media in promoting cross-border cooperation

Media has a huge power over public opinion in forming a community or relaying values. A society involved in an increasing process of globalisation cannot be conceived without considering the role, influence and control of the media. We do not refer to mere control, as we can consider that media is more and more obviously an important actor in governing (Dugget, 2002: 13). From this perspective, we can see the trends of contemporary societies and the role granted to mass-media in the process of democratisation, in relaying and promoting human values.

The impact of mass-media differs depending on the nature of the public it addresses to and the typology and different forms of mass-media. The impact differs when speaking about written press, radio, or television. Each has its public to which it is related while the message is more often than not the same yet with different impact.

From the enumerated perspectives, media is not only an instrument of influence over society. It also becomes an important means through which one can hear the voice of groups outside governance or civil society.

In the area of cultural contact, the importance of mass-media in promoting human values is very high. If this cultural area is doubled by an area of political limits, mass-media has a more significant role.

In contemporary Europe, accent is laid on cross-border Euroregional cooperation. Considering this element, an important role in moulding good relations on both sides of the border is played by the media.

The transparency and opening of institutions, as well as people's participation to decision-making are important factors in society democratisation. The language of communication between institutions and populations beyond political and cultural barriers is mass-media (Palmer, 2004: 20-22). Nations' transition to democratisation is measurable through

[1] Connecting the "orange revolution" in Ukraine, the European Commissioner for external relations and European neighborhood policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, stated on the 1st of December 2004 that „*la question de l'Ukraine dans l'UE n'est pas à l'ordre du jour. Mais il est clair que nous ne fermons aucune porte*".

institutional transparency including the media in that particular country. Interstate cooperation is illustrated by the existence of joint media projects, by the voice of public opinion expressing joint possibilities, opportunities and needs of two spaces now united in a single identity – the identity of human values.

The information transmitted is not enough unless it is objective, impartial, plural or satisfying. It also has to be transparent. It is not enough to answer public's questions. It is highly important to let the public express their opinion and answer the issues raised themselves (Doulkeri, 2004: 175-180).

Cooperation on cross-border level with a view to promote human values supposes respecting some principles and laws. *Transparent information* involves good knowledge of decision-making and government actors. Secondly, it is important that there is *transparent participation* to decision-making both directly and through representation. Finally, the third principle refers to *stakeholders' skills*. In this last situation, it is very important to measure state institutions' capacities to respond to people's requests and needs. Mass-media may intervene each time when public interests are damaged. Beyond these principles, freedom of press and expression in press is highly important.

From the perspective of cross-border area, we have to consider an aspect relating to mass-media as a phenomenon; information can be used to create a false perception or to preserve a tense situation thus generating nationalist and extremist movements on both ethnic and religious grounds. Another aspect concerns the role and involvement of mass-media in the process of moulding public opinion. In this sense, we can see that most actions of mass-media are informative rather than formative.

Border area supposes good neighbourhood. The issue, we may say the whole "drama" of international relations, is relations between neighbours. As a doctrine, good neighbourhood is defined as "a state of facts", as "unavoidable" (neighbours are given by history and geography) existing ever since peoples and states have been established and generating two aspects at borders (Ciocan, 2003): preserving security by managing conflicts and preserving cooperation between neighbouring states.

Good neighbourhood is tightly connected with the concept of "border", yet the role of border has altered in time. It has changed from barrier to meeting point between different realities discovering the opportunity of complementarity beyond rigid conceptions on national sovereignty. In the cross-border area of good neighbourhood, "small diplomacy" has a special role under the influence of official relations it expresses (Ciocan, 2003). An institution necessary to the state, border police is a power directly involved in the process of increasing cross-border cooperation and indirectly involved in integration. The positive activity in "small diplomacy" area gives security and confidence as good governance is expressed as a principle. Together with border police, we have to stress the importance of other institutions greatly contributing to cross-border relations. Thus, we have to refer to some basic notions on legal condition of borders. Border condition, according to the definition provided by literature in the field (Niciu, 1999: 246) is settled by each country law according to agreements signed by the countries. In this way, countries intend to provide good neighbourhood, avoid border conflicts and defend their borders.

Democracy and respect for human values are important indicators to measure the process of transition of former communist countries to liberalisation of political regime. An important role in this process is promoting regulations imposed by law, human rights and social constraints. For these reasons, mass-media has decision influence in accurately and constructively transmitting information.

Some of the most important aspects shown in a society process of democratisation refer to absolute rights to freedom and power division. The essence of the idea thus transmitted through media channels has to be that man is free and has the right to this freedom (Edelstam,

2002: 102). Another role of law is to divide power, as we pointed out. In democratic countries, institutions have built a division of power. The basic idea is to create different points of view as well as different opinions or means to control the way of carrying out the laws. The democratic state has to protect the individual. From this perspective, media has the role to guarantee the information and to voice these rights and freedoms.

Law and governance do not have to be a secret. All laws have to be published and made known to citizens. Information should not be transmitted one way, there has to be a ceaseless dialogue between citizens and political actors. Mass media play a core role as a go-between in this process. Their role is even more important when referring to cross-border cooperation, cross-border area, and respect for human values in this area.

Cross-border cooperation supposes joint initiatives and actions to develop interstate and human relations. As an effect of relations development in good neighbourhood area, there is a need for a new definition and classification of borders. Border legal regime can be classified according to modern desiderata (Ciocan, 2003) as follows: *unilateral regime* designing norms elaborated by a state to regulate different border activities, or activities relating to border; *joint* or *bilateral regime* of the border made up of joint norms adopted by two states regarding the border between them; *Euroregional regime* made up of norms elaborated by regional organisations, norms with impact on the activity of member states borders; and *community regime* of the border made up of joint norms adopted by supranational organisations relating to their internal and external borders. The duty to cooperate is inherent to the principle of good neighbourhood.

Good governance is a basic condition to preserve security in cross-border area; it is an international law principle; the legal means to formulate the principle comprises both the *duty to do* and the *duty not to do*. Thus, the duty to do can be expressed through the norm compelling international law subjects to behave as good neighbours.

From this perspective, media action is an important factor to relay and control legal or social norms. In authoritarian regimes, media is under strict control of state. In a democratic state, the independence of the press is and has to remain a reality. From this position, media makes a great contribution to the act of governance.

It is not a secret the fact that in Eastern European societies press has had a core role in facilitating communication between public and administration when the latter could not adopt a series of norms presenting all legal and institutional changes. Practically, newspapers, radio and television have often replaced the institution of administration when critical moments occurred on the level of communication (Corcodel, 2002: 294). This kind of press involvement envisages border region, as well as border and cross-border area.

Cooperation in cross-border area supposes the existence of "global audience" (Palmer, 2003: 19). Even though we can speak of nations' crisis, it is very important to point out that human values are most accurately represented in this environment. Going beyond cultural barriers it obviously has the quality of stimulating exchanges including the cultural ones. Media and broadcasting channels, both traditional and new communication technologies greatly contribute to making what is now known as global society.

Good governance and free press must be promoted simultaneously. They cannot exist separately, yet they cannot live together. They both need to stimulate and promote each other (Iorgovan and Vasiu, 2003: 36).

In Europe, a solution and opportunity is creating multimedia channels to inform the society. An important trend of the European institutions or Euroregions is cooperating with mass media. Cross-border cooperation includes socio-cultural cooperation (Czimre, Suli-Zakar and Teperics, 2003: 98). The same authors propose creating newspapers, radio or television channels in a cross-border framework (in this case, it is the area of the Carpathian Euroregion) (Bujdosó,

2003: 193-195). At the same time, they propose establishing positions and jobs for people with skills to cooperate with mass media.

An interesting concept is *image building* (Bujdosó, 2003: 193-195). From this perspective, we have to be familiar with a whole process and a series of strategies needed to cooperate on higher levels (national and international) or lower levels (local and regional). Cooperation is strictly necessary and from this perspective mass media may make an essential contribution to strengthening relations between people and institutions with direct involvement of authorities.

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LA PLACE DE LA FORMATION DES TECHNICIENS DE LA COOPERATION TRANSFRONTALIERE POUR L'EURO REGION BIHOR –HAJDU-BIHAR EN HONGRIE ET EN ROUMANIE[1]

Maurice BUANGI KHONDE[*]

Abstract: ***The role of the specialists cross-border cooperation training for the Euro region BIHOR-HAJDU-BIHAR***

The cross-border cooperation in the BIHOR-HAJDU-BIHAR euro region, around the Hungary and Romania's frontier needs to be reinforced for the new 2007-2013 EU Program. This target can be achieved with the support from the specialists in the cross border cooperation development projects.

Unfortunately, those specialists are not available yet. How to solve this problem? So this paper focuses to underline the importance to cover this gap by using the educational institutions already based in that euro region, for example, the Institute for Euro Regional Studies and by getting expertise from the other Euro region in the Western side of Europe as the MOT , Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière, in France.

In this way, it will be possible to involve more people in the euro region initiatives in the coming years and to cover several fields of the cross –border cooperation issues: environment, infrastructure, SME, SMI, Tourism, etc…issues.

Key words: *Formation – coopération transfrontalière – programmes 2007-2013 – projets européens*

Luminaire introductif

Le besoin de la formation des techniciens de la coopération transfrontalière mérite une attention particulière chez les Etats nouveaux membres de l'Union Européenne du fait des enjeux du programme 2007-2013 de la Politique Régionale. Leurs régions limitrophes ont été élues dans ce programme. Ce qui cadre avec l'objectif de la coopération européenne territoriale au quel fait partie la composante « coopération transfrontalière ». Ainsi, des résultats sont attendus de ces pays au fil des années de cet exercice. Or, sa mise en œuvre nécessite auprès des acteurs concernés la maîtrise des connaissances dans différents domaines transfrontaliers, y compris celle des procédures de *BRUXELLES*, requises pour initier des projets de demande des financements des fonds structurels. Quoique quelques progrès soient réalisés dans ces pays en cette matière, il est encore loin d'envisager la pérennisation de ces actions et surtout d'y assurer de l'impact social au sein des populations sans des techniciens de la coopération transfrontalière. En effet, même les obstacles à la coopération transfrontalière énumérés par le Comité Economique et Social Européen pourraient être ôtés par la formation de techniciens de la coopération transfrontalière de chaque côté de la frontière (*Journal officiel de l'Union Européenne 2007/C/256/23*, Bruxelles, le 27/10/2007).

C'est ainsi que nous nous proposons de souligner davantage la place de leur formation dans ces activités en nous servant du cas de l'Euro région BIHOR—HAJDU-BIHAR au regard des défis de l'Union Européenne qu'elle doit relever d'ici 2013. En effet, les prévisions

[1] Cet article a fait l'objet d'une présentation du workshop de samedi 7 juin 2008 à l'Université de Debrecen en Hongrie dans le cadre du Séminaire International sur le Dialogue Interculturel et Politique de voisinage européenne dans la région des Carpates du 04 au 11 juin 2008. Dans ces deux concepts- clé du Séminaire à savoir, « Dialogue Interculturel » et « Politique de voisinage », figurent un seul dénominateur commun qu'est la frontière sous toutes ses formes: visible et non visible avec toutes ses complications qui nécessitent des techniciens transfrontaliers. D'où la place de cet article dans ce Séminaire…

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budgétaires UE au titre de l'objectif de la coopération transfrontalière s'élèvent pour la Hongrie à 279 127 680 Euros et pour la Roumanie à 308 930 782 Euros, avec une ventilation annuelle courant 2007 de 48 428 927 Euros pour la Hongrie et de 56 487 600 Euros pour la Roumanie, contre 48 512 610 Euros pour la Hongrie et 56 667 138 Euros pour la Roumanie courant 2008 („Décision de la Commission du 15 mai 2007", N° C (2007) 2047).

Il va sans dire que l'utilisation de ces budgets n'a pas suivi faute entre autres des personnes qualifiées pour monter des projets y afférents. Pour démontrer l'importance de cette formation, nous nous servons d'une approche analytique appuyée sur une intuition assez nourrie d'une compilation documentaire. Fort de cette démarche, nous sommes parvenus à une sorte d'inclinaison en entonnoir pour qui a permis d'obtenir des indications pragmatiques de la mise en œuvre de la formation des techniciens transfrontaliers pour l'Euro région BIHOR -- HAJDU-BIHAR.

Le corps de notre texte commence par un tour d'horizon sur l'historique des relations bilatérales entre les deux pays, la Hongrie et la Roumanie eu égard aux frontières (I). Puis, nous dressons la brève présentation de l'Euro région BIHOR—HAJDU-BIHAR (II). En cas de besoin de plus d'information sur cette Euro région, son site web comporte y répond suffisamment („West Pannonia").

Ensuite, nous démontrons la nécessité de développer davantage la formation des techniciens transfrontaliers (III).

I. Historique des relations bilaterales entre la Hongrie et la Roumanie sur leurs frontieres

Des textes légaux de coopération existent entre la Hongrie et la Roumanie au niveau de leur espace frontalier commun (Romania and Hungary. Treaty of Friendship, 24 février 1972; „Hungary and Romania. Treaty of understanding, 1996). Parmi ces textes, il y a lieu d'évoquer les bonnes vieilles intentions entre les deux Etats de coopérer d'amitié entre les deux pays, et ce depuis déjà janvier 1948, puis en 1972 et enfin en 1996, bien avant leur adhésion à l'Union Européenne où les frontières politiques entre les membres sont abolis.

Trois raisons expliquent ces intentions. En premier lieu, ces traités s'appuient sur la philosophie de bon voisinage, de respect mutuel, de la collaboration entre les deux pays, ainsi que celle de leur engagement vis-à-vis des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales. En même temps, il se réfère au désir commun en Hongrie et en Roumanie pour que l'Europe devienne un continent uni où la coopération entre les peuples de différents pays devrait contribuer au développement de leurs relations. En deuxième lieu, ces traités donnent une place considérable à la protection des minorités nationales. Ils se réfèrent aux instruments juridiques internationaux et européens consacrés à la sauvegarde de la stabilité et de l'entente en Europe, ainsi que de la consolidation de la démocratie dans les deux pays. Il s'agit de la Charte des Nations Unies, de l'Acte final d'Helsinki, de la Charte de Paris pour une nouvelle Europe tout comme tant d'autres documents de l'OSCE, l'Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (*Documents d'actualité internationale*, n° 34-35-36, 1975: 642). En troisième lieu, le dernier de ces textes a été conclu dans un contexte régional de la guerre des Balkans en 1996. Comme on le sait, la Roumanie et la Hongrie partagent toutes deux une longue frontière avec les républiques de l'ex-Yougoslavie. Des conflits sanglants survenus en 1992 en ex-Yougoslavie n'ont pas laissé insensibles les responsables de ces deux Etats. D'où l'importance de la bonne entente entre les populations vivant à leurs frontières.

Cependant tous ces textes ne parlent pas de la possibilité à donner aux collectivités locales de la Hongrie et de la Roumanie pour que ces dernières prennent des initiatives de nouer des relations de coopération entre elles de part et d'autre de la frontière.

Le rôle de l'Etat, selon l'esprit de ces textes, reste encore prédominant, contrairement au souhait de la Convention cadre de Madrid en ces protocoles additionnels 1 et 2 (Conseil de

l'Europe, *Rapport explicatif sur le Protocole Additionnel 1 et 2 de la Convention de Madrid)*. Il a fallu l'amorce des négociations d'adhésion à l'Union Européenne avec son corolaire du transfert de l'acquis communautaire à tous les nouveaux membres, dont les Euro régions constituées des populations des collectivités locales, pour qu'enfin les deux Etats mettent en place des dispositifs législatifs et réglementaires à cette nouvelle dynamique.

C'est dans cette mouvance qu'est née l'Euro Région BIHOR – HAJDU –BIHAR.

II. Presentation de l'Euroregion Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar

L'Euro région BIHOR – HAJDU – BIHAR a vu le jour le 11 octobre 2002 par la signature d'un Accord de coopération officiel (Hinfray, 2006: 179). A la frontière de deux Etats, elle couvre 13 755 km² et compte ensemble 1, 15 millions d'habitants. Elle tire son origine de la grande Euro région des Carpates (Hinfray, 2006: 175). C'est par souci de mieux prendre en compte des besoins liés à la vie quotidienne des populations concernées dans l'élaboration des projets que cette Euro région de taille plus réduite a trouvé la pertinence de sa création. Ainsi, elle s'est détachée de l'Euro région des Carpates, jugée trop vaste du fait qu'elle englobe 5 Etats, Roumanie, Hongrie, Slovaquie, Pologne et Ukraine, qui n'est pas encore membre de l'Union Européenne.

Cet accord a été précédé des activités de jumelage entre les deux départements. C'est le couronnement de la convention de collaboration établie en 1997 entre deux associations de communes de ces deux départements du fait des actions déjà menées dans les domaines du tourisme, de la conservation de la nature, des arts et cultures, etc… Puis ont suivi 3 années de raffermissement des relations entre les deux parties avant qu'on ne commence à élaborer des projets transfrontaliers communs tout en procédant par des appels d'offres diffusés par le canal de leur site officiel du web.

Le document élaboré dans le cadre du programme PHARE CBC 2000 indique que le programme de stratégie de développement de la zone transfrontalière roumano- hongroise souligne la nécessité d'une stratégie de coopération entre ces deux régions, tant qu'elle soit basée sur des relations bilatérales directes et qu'elle soit adaptée à la stratégie de développement pour l'ensemble de la région. Son organisation et son fonctionnement sont bien exposés sur la page de son site web. Mais à part les deux structures de type associatif qui organisent des activités de tous les deux côtés, il n'y a pas d'autres initiatives ou activités où les populations sont directement responsables. Et, il n'y a pas encore eu des actions de formation des citoyens à la prise en charge de cette Euro région, notamment dans l'élaboration des projets de demande des fonds européens pour des initiatives des actions de développement local.

L'implication de la Société Civile et des ONG d'origine locale ou d'émanation internationale dans cette Euro région est restée au niveau de bonnes intentions. Or, il est évident qu'en matière de formation des techniciens pour des projets de coopération transfrontalière. Dans tous les cas, l'Euro région BIHOR—HAJDU-BIHAR a été marqué par sa phase d'émergence. A ce niveau, la structuration n'avait pas encore mûrie. Néanmoins, au même titre que les autres Euro régions des pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale, membres de l'Union Européenne, cette Euro région bénéficie de l'expérience des Euro régions de l'Europe de l'Ouest, les pionniers de la coopération transfrontalière. Elles sont aujourd'hui des modèles de référence du fait qu'elles sont déjà parvenues à la phase de l'européanisation. En effet, les trois grandes phases figurent dans la construction des Euro régions, à savoir, l'institutionnalisation, la régionalisation et l'européanisation.

Par ailleurs, l'Euro région BIHOR – HAJDU – BIHAR a également souffert des freins dus à la résistance des centres des pouvoirs à rendre autonomes les collectivités locales. Comme le dit C. Raffestin (Saez; Leresche; Bassand, 1997: 26) dans son expression chère de ***mythe de la disparition de l'Etat***, les reflexes de la forte résistance des Etats – Nations de années 70 et 80, n'ont pas favorisé l'accélération de ce processus. Il a fallu attendre le. Livre vert de la

Commission Jacques Delors, précurseur du marché commun de l'Europe sans frontière en 1992, lequel a servi des bases des réflexions au traité de Maastricht de 1993 (Bodineau; Verpeaux, 1998: 118).

Or, aujourd'hui, cet obstacle n'existe plus dans le contexte de l'Europe sans frontière. C'est là que se pose la problématique de la formation de leurs acteurs en matière de coopération transfrontalière.

III. La formation des techniciens transfrontaliers se justifie-t-elle ou pas?

Nous avons réalisé que jusqu'à cette étape de nos recherches, il y a encore du retard dans le lancement des actions de formation des techniciens transfrontaliers dans cette Euro région.

Dans l'historique de la création de l'Euro région BIHOR –HAJDU-BIHAR, nous avons noté que ce sont des élus locaux de part et d'autre de cette frontière qui ont manifesté la nécessité de la mise en œuvre de cette coopération. D'où, il existe dans le fonctionnement d'une Euro région des acteurs multiples. Ceux qu'on peut considérer des primitifs, ce sont des membres de la société civile.

Ce la se vérifie même aux origines des euro régions, notamment en faisant allusion à la première Euro région de 1958 apparue à la frontière germano-néerlandaise (EUREGIO autour de Gronau), il ressort que les Euro régions en tant que zone d'opération de la coopération transfrontalière, ont été conçues comme des bassins de vie transfrontaliers des populations vivant de part et d'autre d'une frontière, placées dans des relations de proximité („Guide pratique de la coopération transfrontalière").

Entre ces populations se développent des circuits d'interdépendances de nature diverse qui dépassent même le cadre de leurs élus locaux. D'ailleurs, ces derniers ne sont pas les premiers acteurs naturels de la vie de la coopération transfrontalière. Les premiers acteurs naturels de la coopération transfrontalière se sont toujours retrouvés en dehors des cercles des élus locaux, dans le rang de la société civile et des commerçants.

En parcourant le site web de BIHOR—HAJDU-BIHAR, la présence de tous ces acteurs de la société civile n'est pas très visible

A titre d'exemple, en 2003, sur les 35 projets de demande de financements du côté roumain soumis à l'Euro région, 15 seulement, soit moins de 50% qui ont été financés ; et du côté hongrois, sur 20 projets, 7 seulement ont eu des financements (HAJDU BIHAR BIHOR Euro Region, „Presentation of the Euro Region. History of the Euro Region").

Cette contre - performance peut être comblée par des programmes de formation très pragmatiques et adaptés à chaque catégorie d'acteurs impliqués dans les différents projets de l'Euro région.

Or, du côté de l'Union Européenne, le principal instigateur de cette politique, il existe une attention particulière portée sur le renforcement des capacités humaines des pays candidats pour ce qui est des réformes administratives. Mais ces efforts ont eu des effets au niveau central des pouvoirs et pas dans les périphéries.

A ce sujet, le Guide Pratique de la Coopération Transfrontalière élaborée par la Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière stipule qu'il y a 3 éléments qui contribuent à la pérennisation des Euro régions („Guide pratique de la coopération transfrontalière")

- la gouvernance politique et l'appropriation citoyenne
- des moyens techniques pérennes et une culture de travail partagée
- l'inscription des stratégies transfrontalières dans les politiques locales, régionales et nationales.

Au regard de ces 3 éléments, nous pouvons nous demander à quel niveau se situe l'Euro région BIHOR—HAJDU-BIHAR. La gouvernance politique a réellement une emprise dans

cette euro région du fait que le portage de ses projets et même sa mise en œuvre sont assurés par les élus locaux de deux côtés de la frontière.

Néanmoins, quant à l'appropriation citoyenne, l'on est en droit de se demander s'il y en a vraiment eu. En effet, à part son site web, il n'y a pas eu d'autres canaux de communication mis en place depuis 2002 pour diffuser ses programmes auprès des populations de deux côtés de la frontière. Or, avec le seul site web, la couverture de la population reste faible.

A ce sujet, Eurostat („*Fracture numérique en Europe*") note qu'en 2004, 16 % de la population âgée de 16 à 74 ans avaient l'utilisation de l'ordinateur et 12 % avaient une connexion Internet en Roumanie. La situation n'était pas du tout fameuse en Hongrie parce que la même étude révèle que pour le même segment de la population, 41% seulement avaient l'utilisation de l'ordinateur et 26 % avaient la connexion internet… Quant aux moyens pérennes et à une culture de travail partagée, des efforts ont été réalisés grâce au monitoring de la Commission Européenne.

En effet, l'institutionnalisation de cette Euro région se fonde, comme celle des autres Euro régions nées de la vague du cinquième élargissement de l'Union Européenne, sur l'adoption de l'ensemble des politiques de l'acquis communautaire centrées sur la décentralisation, la bonne gouvernance, la transparence, etc… Néanmoins, leur mise en œuvre se bute à des complications. Par exemple des délais d'étude des dossiers très long qui laissent des goûts amères auprès des souscripteurs surtout lorsqu'ils doivent attendre longtemps pour recevoir une réponse négative à leur demande de financement.

Pour pallier tant soit peu à cette situation, point n'est besoin de rappeler le rôle que devront jouer des techniciens transfrontaliers bien formés dans divers domaines de développement de ces deux départements. Des pratiques déjà réalisées dans d'autres Euro régions peuvent servir d'exemple.

Comparaison n'est raison, dit-on mais nous pensons qu'il est parfois raisonnable de comparer. Et c'est dans ce sens que MARON Fabienne („Les nouvelles frontières de l'Europe: repenser les concepts") affirme, de son côté, que dans ce cas, comparer et partager les bonnes pratiques revient à mettre en oeuvre un dialogue entre les théoriciens et praticiens. Elle appelle cela l'évidence d'une « ***Plateforme européenne*** ».

Du fait qu'il y a des Euro régions déjà mures en Europe Occidentale pouvant servir de modèle, les nouvelles Euro régions, comme BIHOR-HAJDU-BIHAR, n'ont pas d'excuse pour justifier la lenteur de leur croissance. En effet, si celles-là ont souffert à la fois du manque de modèle et des pressions de résistance de la part de leurs Etats, celles-ci jouissent en même temps d'une palette des références avec des bonnes pratiques et de l'appui de la superstructure Union Européenne. Ce qui fait défaut à ce jour, c'est la carence des techniciens transfrontaliers.

De la part de l'Union Européenne, il y a depuis 2006, le nouvel outil juridique de référence qu'est le GECT, le Groupement Européen de Coopération Transfrontalière, paru dans le règlement communautaire 1082/2006 le 31 juillet 2006. Son objectif est de faciliter la gestion des programmes et la réalisation d'actions de coopération transfrontalière sur l'ensemble du nouvel espace de l'Union Européenne. L'Euro région BIHOR—HAJDU-BIHAR a toute l'opportunité de se munir de cet outil juridique.

Quant aux bonnes pratiques, il y a plusieurs études qui ont été menées et qui ont produits des schémas pouvant servir de source d'inspiration pour la mise en place des canevas directeurs des programmes de formation des techniciens transfrontaliers. Au niveau local, il existe la coopération entre l'Université de Debrecen dans le département HAJDU-BIHAR en Hongrie et l'Université d'Oradea dans le département BIHOR en Roumanie. Avec leurs centres de recherche ; ces universités peuvent bien confectionner des fiches de formation des techniciens transfrontaliers dont a besoin cette Euro région pour ses stratégies de développement.

Le Centre d'excellence « Jean MONNET » de l'Institute for Euro Regional Studies, l'IERS, qui fonctionne simultanément à Oradea et à Debrecen sur des thématiques de développement des Euro régions, est à mesure de mettre son expertise à la formation techniciens transfrontaliers destinés à piloter des projets de développements de cette jeune Euro région.

Des expériences vécues dans d'autres pays européens peuvent aussi servir des sources en cette matière. En France, nous citons les publications de la MOT, la Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière.

Conclusion

La problématique de cette rédaction était de rechercher à justifier le bien-fondé de former des techniciens transfrontaliers pour l'Euro région BIHOR—HAJDU-BIHAR. Plusieurs indices ont plaidé dans le sens de mettre en œuvre cette initiative. Parmi lesquels, il y a la survie et la pérennisation de cette Euro région qui repose sur l'appropriation de ses actions par les populations qui y vivent. Les forces vives de ces populations se localisent naturellement dans les rangs de la société civile. Or, nous avons constaté que Ce sont plus les élus locaux qui sont en affiche sur cette Euro région que les acteurs de la société civile.

L'autre indice est le fait que la pratique des opérations transfrontalières structurées nécessite une certaine expertise de la part des animateurs des Euro régions ou de la part de leurs assistants. Cela est d'autant plus évident que ces opérations doivent s'inscrire dans un contexte global de stratégie de développement intégral de l'Euro région dans une perspective européenne. Or cette expertise nécessite une formation ou une initiation, comme on le constate dans d'autres Euro régions.

L'autre indice est l'obligation des résultats par rapport aux échéances budgétaires UE 2007-2013. En effet, l'Euro région BIHOR—HAJDU-BIHAR est élue dans les objectifs de la politique de cohésion sociale de l'UE et à la mi deuxième année de ce programme de 6 ans, il n'y pas encore des stratégies définies et publiées. Avec ce rythme, on risque d'être surpris d'arriver à la fin de la période 2007-2013, sans qu'une action soit réalisée dans cette direction de stratégie de développement.

Bien au-delà de tout, l'environnement et les circonstances politiques nationales dans les deux pays sont visiblement favorables à la mise en route des stratégies plus ragaillardies pour cette Euro région. En effet, son positionnement au carrefour des grandes capitales, BUDAPEST, BRATISLAVA, PRAGUE, CHISINAU, BELGRADE et BUCAREST, contribue à en faire une grande métropole européenne pour la cohésion sociale, en vue de désengorger ces villes capitales, et en même temps stopper l'exode rural vers ces capitales. On note qu'en Hongrie, par exemple, 70% des activités industrielles sont concentrées autour de BUDAPEST.

La formation des techniciens transfrontaliers est à ce grand rendez-vous, tout comme l'Euro région BIHOR--HAJDU-BIHAR est au grand rendez-vous de la construction de l'Europe des régions, l'Europe des citoyens.

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IV. EUROPEAN SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE OSCE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE - PERSPECTIVES FROM THE ROMANIAN CHAIRMANSHIP POINT OF VIEW-

Titus FIZEŞAN*

Abstract: *The present article explores the developments within the OSCE, within a historical context when Romania had the position of Chairmanship in 2001 and tries to suggest that some national interests can be translated and reviewed in the international debates among the member states, according to a clear organizational agenda. One of the main challenges of the institutional reform of the OSCE was to develop a functional framework where specific European conflicts can be managed before their violent manifestation. To this end, the developments within the OSCE had a major contribution to regional stability and several influences can be tracked in Romania's position toward a more open and positive approach of the conflict management.*

Keywords: *OSCE, stability, conflict, management, security*

The paper analyzes briefly the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), focusing on its strengths, challenges, and opportunities in the European architecture, trying to offer a clear view on how Romanian Chairmanship during its mandate (2001), might be a viable model for a positive future of the institution. The first part deals with basic security issues that characterize the organization and the security environment. The second part, the most consistent part of the paper deals with the Romanian Chairmanship, the challenges that had to be faced, goals, achievements and most important, the steps forward that the OSCE has made during that year. Finally, the third part focuses on the most agreed possible scenarios for the future of the OSCE in relation with the other international organizations in the view of the most important scholars of the organization.

Despite the fact that at the academic level there is generally appreciated that the OSCE's role in early warning, conflict prevention, crises management or post-conflict rehabilitation has seriously decreased or even vanished, in our opinion this contradicts the reality and we will argue as it follows the theses that in the next years the need and efficiency of such an organization will be similar to the military ones, not only because of its Pan European dimension and the diversity of the participating states, but mostly by its unique expertise and flexibility.

From a certain perspective the sceptical view perception can be interpreted as a general confusion of the realities, as the organization is often associated to the long chain of intergovernmental conferences prior to the year 1995, that, indeed created not just the bases for the organization, but also its institutional framework, but which are not, these days, the main characteristic of the OSCE.

Probably more than any other international organization (excepting the Council of Europe), the OSCE is actively acknowledging the whole international community about democratic norms and values whilst offering its participating states „informational packages" needed to follow its own model, offering expertise in the field of democracy, legislation or market economy.

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Unlike the Council of Europe, NATO or EU, the OSCE incorporated all the states that expressed their political willingness to be a participating state and thus assume its rules and standards, as organization's main objective is the transformation of their collective identities and perceptions. The strategy was to increase the number of members (the term used is *participating state*, though in our opinion *member* is more appropriate), to give them the feeling of belonging to the community and only after they formally accepted the institution's rules, practices and structure to „socialize" the elites and citizens using a continuous diplomatic interaction and a variety of means for building stabile communities. By this approach the OSCE not only considerably increased its legitimacy (and the area covered), but also avoided to create sensitive feelings that the other institutions did (exclusion, inferiority etc). One very important aspect is that within the organization, both - rights and responsibilities are the same for each participating state, and so are the opportunities to affirm in its institutions (Chairmanship in Office, for example).

Another important strategy was to create common values and find responsibilities, using its legitimacy in order to transform certain areas, mainly former Communist countries in a deep need of radical changes, starting with perception. The steps followed the principle that firstly a domestic democratic regime is needed and only after a minimum of this internal democracy is achieved to be adapted step by step to the principles and norms of the OSCE.

The Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the initial name of the OSCE had a comprehensive approach of security since its beginning and it covered more dimensions („baskets", according to the original names) – political/military, human, economical/environmental (Vetchera, 1996: 42). Its working agenda included a wide range of topics related to the international affairs, starting with basic security rules and regulations that characterize the military behaviour (confidence building measures), specified in the first basket, carrying on with economical relations stipulated within the second and touching the human dimension which is the topic of the third. Beside that it is the only forum designed explicitly for Europe, but joining together not only European participants but also non-Europeans, finally – gathering together three distinctive groups – Western Allies, Eastern Allies and the neutral ones.

As it is the result of an evolution based on the adaptation of its own structures and mechanisms to the challenges and threats that the end of the millennium and its beginning posed, the OSCE had a different evolution compared to the other international security organizations, as it was not in the position to redefine its security approach nor its ways of action after the Cold War ended.

Even so, like other regional security structures the OSCE faced substantial changes as it became extremely obvious that no European security institution is able to manage the whole range of problems that the continent was facing and thus to define its own security identity, based on four major elements: geopolitical, functional, normative and operational. The advantages that the OSCE can take into account reside in this respective especially from its comprehensive approach of security (military, political, economical and human), the participation on equal bases of all the states, the principles, norms values and standards and, finally the instruments, mechanisms and unique experience in the field of preventive diplomacy by early warning mechanisms (OSCE Handbook, 2000: 3). By making use of all these advantages, the OSCE focuses its objectives and steps on conflict prevention / conflict management, consolidating the respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law, by promoting all the aspects of the civil society and a common space of security.

To all these aspects that place the OSCE on a privileged position amongst the other international organizations dealing with security matters, at the level of expertise we can add another important specificity – the decision taken by consensus set into practice by intensive consultations, constant and opened political dialogue, norms and values and also very

important, a system of contacts and co-operation mechanisms with other international organizations or institutions.

The priorities of the OSCE are settled according to these important characteristics and thus co-operative security is more efficient in our opinion in edifying democratic societies, based on the rule of law and on eliminating the real, perceptible lack of security and one of the most important, avoiding the further development of new political, economical or social divisions (MAE, 2001).

These few remarks show however an idealistic image of the organization, while in reality all these advantages were not often materialized in successful missions. Most of the drawbacks are, paradoxally the result of too much democracy within the institution itself. Excepting few organisms of the OSCE that can operate independent by the political will of the participating states (High Commissioner on National Minorities or the Representative for Freedom of Media), other decisions reach very difficult consensus. Under these circumstances the most important decedent on the actions and steps to be taken during a year is the Chairman in Office – the foreign minister of the country that hold the position (more precisely, his or her representative).

Our study which is an excerpt from a broader one related to the Romanian Chairmanship of the OSCE and, according to the sources we studied, argues that it was one of the most successful, especially towards improving co-operation and consolidating the institutional framework of it and how it might be a useful model in the future.

As it offered one of the greatest opportunities to consolidate Romanian credibility and emphasize its importance, both within the organization and Euro – Atlantic affairs, the OSCE Chairmanship represented, in our opinion, the first chance for Romania to express its view and influence in the security environment after the Communist regime.

The moment was also an important one, if we take note about the weak position that Romania was enjoying as actor in the international relations. It was well known and even openly expressed the fact that the new position was crucial in achieving several foreign policy goals. The previous lack of credibility led to an imperative need to demonstrate not only that the state can be a trustable partner, but also a good leader, willing to prove its ability in achieving organization's main aims: creating prosperous communities of peaceful states on the basis of mutual respect of the common democratic values.

The institution of the chairman in office is considered to be the highest authority, as the person that holds this position - the Foreign Affairs Minister of the respective participating state – together with his/her team has the responsibility and, of course, opportunity of establishing and imposing political guidelines for the year to follow, according to his/her own views or priorities.

Handling the helm of the OSCE to Romania might be considered an exceptional gesture if we take into account its status. Several aspects still remain difficult to be interpreted. As it was granted at the Istanbul Summit (November 1999), it was clear that nobody could anticipate the results of the elections due next year (December, 2000).

Though it was the fourth former communist state to take the mandate of the chairmanship, Romania did not have the same good image that the other ones had. Beside the fact that it was far too difficult to anticipate the personality encharged for Romanian foreign affairs, there was the inconvenient that the most probable winner (PDSR) was perceived at that time as a successor of the Communist Party. Even later on, this perception was present among scholars of the OSCE and as a result there were limited expectations.[1]

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[1] One of the most important is, in our opinion, Arie Bloed, well known for his experience in the OSCE matters, but also for his broader experience in the field of international relations and law. His article, "Romania,- the new CiO of the OSCE", *Helsinki Monitor*, vol. 12, nr. 1/2001, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, p.48, is very useful in this respective

Things were different however inside the country. The new position was officially considered a major investment for Romanian foreign policy and diplomacy as it offered the opportunity to gain international prestige and political capital (MAE, 2001).

The aims, as they were settled, focused on several clear aspects: consolidating a stabile peace in a Europe based on solidarity and the spirit of co-operation, increasing the OSCE's role as a forum for political dialog by widening the political consultations process in a transparent way and full respect for the interests of all the participating states, consolidating the operational capacities of the organization, emphasizing its main characteristic, of being an active instrument in preventing, managing and offering expertise in post conflict management, optimizing its current activities, field missions, institutions and instruments and developing a framework for co-operation with the other Euro – Atlantic institutions[2]. Nevertheless, Romania had been involved in organization's affairs since the Helsinki process started proving its interest in developing co-operation among the participating states, together with other small and medium European countries from what we could call „moment zero" of the conference.

There were certain obvious advantages in holding the leadership of the organization. However, at that moment in order to become efficient and fulfil its mandate, OSCE needed major reforms, as its initial main role in managing conflicts was yet reduced. As the institutional framework was very complex and complicated most of the field missions failed, leading to as called „frozen conflicts".

As very well emphasized by Professor Victor Yves-Ghebali, all these conflicts have in common an ethnic dimension, related to the complex dimension of the nationalism, and called ethno-nationalism (Ghebali, 2002: 29).

Most of the Communist countries took as a choice the democratic system as governing was concerned after the end of the cold war and that created understandable and sometimes reasonable expectations. Most of them were impossible to be realized by the states as a result of political and economical inefficiency or in the field of minorities' rights. Joint with the legislative chaos that followed the totalitarian regimes, these set backs further undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the states' authorities. This is an excellent background for the nationalist ethicized movements, at a glance irrational, but which proves in an end to be inspired by perfect rational goals and only use the irrational component (Ghebali, 2002: 33).

The main problem in case of ethnic conflicts is that they are turned into ethnicized conflicts. Continuous discrimination of the minorities by the authorities result in an increasingly process of cutting communication and rising barriers among the two groups and that ends, under the auspices of ethno-nationalism to claims superficially related to the original (and real) problems (Ghebali, 2002: 29).

This apparently theoretic model developed by professor Ghebali explains the core of the frozen conflicts managed by the OSCE. It is obvious in this respect the case of Moldova that, naturally, concerning its history represented a priority to be solved by the Romanian chairman. Taking the model above mentioned we can notice that the Transdnistrian separatists (usually former privileged soviet officials or soldiers) though they legitimate their actions on behalf of the ethnic dimension, it is in practice of an ideological and political nature as, lately, several rights were conferred to the Russian population without any improvement. Moldova's intentions to get closer to Romania could not be received to have a positive impact on the former communist hierarchy, mainly Russians (Ghebali, 2002: 30).

All these separatist actions were possible only with the support of the kin state. Though the troops are insignificant as number of soldiers, the stockpiles of ammunition are

[2] As they were expressed on the official site of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of the year 2001

consistent and the redraw of soldiers is justified as related to it, though at the Istanbul Summit it was agreed that both, troops and ammunition should be taken to Russia latest 2002 (Neukirch, 2003: 340).

The use of ethnicity is even more obvious in the case of Yugoslavia. Beside some understandable and inherent inconvenient, the federation formed a viable political entity and its breakaway was not, at least in our opinion, imperative, especially concerning the fact that all the states composing it have now as a priority EU membership. It seems now extremely clear that the conflicts were a result of a good strategy of the political leaders that made use of the irrational ethno-nationalist component to put into reality very rational purposes – having the power (Ghebali, 2002: 30).

The rational ethicising of the conflicts in the Serb regions – Kosovo, Voivodina and Sanjak by Milosevic, served as a model and it was used in an approximate manner by Tudjman in the relations of Croatia with Serbia and Bosnia – Herzegovina. The strategy chosen by Milosevic in Kosovo was still a failure hard to be predicted, as the ethnic conflict was real and even over escalated.

These two cases of ethicised conflicts are, in our opinion, representative in the case of all frozen conflicts. It is obvious that they are a result of exploiting the ethnic component, joint with the reluctance of authorities to take into consideration a minimum standard of rights for national minorities. However, we do not intend to affirm that if all of them have in common a theoretical pattern they should be treated all according to such a pattern. We are aware that each conflict has its own particularities and sensitive topics are different in different countries. It still can be a start in approaching any of the existing ones, and even more important in early warning in case of possible sources of new conflicts.

By the time of the Romanian chairmanship the OSCE had several efficient instruments in conflict prevention (we refer mainly to the High Commissioner on National Minorities and Office for Democratic Elections and Human Rights), but not very well defined competences.

All these create a complex image of the sociological and historical dimensions of the conflict areas. Fortunately, the Romanian experience in dealing (successfully) with minority matters was, in our opinion, far more developed than in any other participating state. Even taking into consideration the real nature of the problems it was clear that the expectations of the kin states were in most of the cases far subjective. In this respect we think that Romania did not use completely its experience and expertise in the minority rights field, in the sense of offering itself as a model, even if the situation was not as stable and positive as several years after the mandate.

Though the title sounds impressive and the chairman has the necessary means to impose his/her political views, we cannot affirm that it is also only his/her responsibility for successes or failures, as they are a result of actions of all participating states. It was well known at the beginning of the mandate that the expectations coming from different powerful participating states (mainly Russia and the USA) were in many cases contradictory thus making one choice very difficult. On the other hand there was little hope for Russia to get involved into co-operation, though considering that most of the conflicts were placed in former soviet area, this was supposed to be the main task.

However, after the failure of the Vienna Ministerial Council, where Russia constantly blocked consensus on the documents to be adopted, it was perfectly clear that gaining back its confidence is the key element for solving the other problems.

Things tended to improve however at the beginning of the Romanian chairmanship. Russian Agenda (PMRF, 2001) emphasizes the existent unbalances within the OSCE and offers a wider one, meant to cover dimensions that at the time lacked even in old democratic

participating states, which in our opinion represent basic values of the organization, but exist mainly in theory and less in reality.

It was and still is famous the principle of double standards, as missions focus only in Eastern part of the continent, outside of the EU and deal exclusively on human dimension. One might argue that the EU has its own tools and mechanisms to deal with such matters and as they prove to be efficient, there is no need for supplementary financial efforts from the OSCE. On the other hand, all the elections are monitorised by the ODIHR and its reports are all the time extremely critical and objective.

While this aspect can be considered a misunderstanding some other proposals were usefully and they were taken into consideration by the Romanian chairman. As heads of the missions enjoyed total freedom and independence it was obvious that it was difficult to keep a degree of control over the respective mission. Russian proposal, set into practice in 2001 was referring to increase the number of reports and to be elaborated on a regular basis. This was applied not only for the heads of the missions, but also for the other institutions, making things easier to be kept under control.

Strengthening the role of the Preparing Committee and elaborating more accurate working procedures served as guarantees that sensitive topics will be debated behind doors, thus reducing the work within the Permanent Council and – when appropriate – if the agenda reaches consensus to be adopted as a document.

As far as the activity of the chairperson is concerned, he/she is restricted to act otherwise than according to the OSCE official position, not to make statements that did not reach consensus nor express his/her personal views (PMRF, 2001).

While these problems were solved during the year 2001, NATO's intervention in Kosovo was perceived as unacceptable, as it became clear that OSCE will never be in the position of replacing the Alliance (Oberschmidt, Zellner, 2002: 5). Furthermore, Russia accused that the OSCE Verification Mission from Kosovo supported and stimulated a military intervention, as *de facto* was subordinated (at military and intelligence level) to NATO and served just as a cover for war preparations (Matveev, 1999: 63). This seconded position of the OSCE and Russia in this mission conducted to another unfortunate decision – it was realized that Russian Federation has a much important role to play within the UN in this crises (Oberschmidt, Zellner, 2002: 6).

The compromises that Russia made at the Istanbul Summit created the false perception that it became a weak state willing to go further in compromising. It was underestimated that a weak Russia means, usually a weak leadership. The results of the elections, however, reminded this pattern's opposite – a strong president means a strong Russia. As Western participating states did not take this aspect into account, a new Istanbul it was not only an irrepetable event, but became the symbol of failure for Russia (Oberschmidt, Zellner, 2002: 6).

Widening the co-operation framework with the other international organizations, on a regularly base, by mutual participation at different institutional levels at the initiative of the Romanian chairmanship played however a key role in regaining Russia's confidence, or at least, making it less suspicious and unwilling to co-operate.

Co-operation will increase after September, 11th, and it was extended to other fields, like terrorism. Though the OSCE has no expertise, nor means to deal with this phenomenon, it was a brilliant idea, as it acted like a catalyst for the other international entities that were able to do that in the first case, or were hosting terrorist groups.

The success of reaching consensus on opening a new mission in Yugoslavia was due, in our opinion – most probable to the confidence we were mentioning. Extending informal meetings before Council's work offered the possibility to reach compromises and identify

common goals easier. Naming Max van der Stoel as Special Representative was a positive thing, as it was well known for his experience in dealing objectively with minority issues.

Far beyond this, another important concession from Russia was the new mission in Cechnya, even if it was just for humanitarian purposes. This might conclude our short theses on Romania's importance in re-involving Russia in co-operation on sensitive topics, like frozen conflicts (most of them created and maintained by it).

Nevertheless, the evolutions that followed in the years after proved even more as the lack of diplomacy of the chairpersons that succeeded conducted into an end again to a hostile Russia and to steadily increasing hostilities in several countries.

The year 2005, by its triple symbolic significations for the OSCE – 30 years since the Helsinki Final Act was signed, 15 years since the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and 10 years since the formal transformation from „conference" into „organization" represented a key moment in the self-evaluation of the organization. The Final report considering its efficiency but also the reform proposals of the „Panel of Eminent Persons", appointed by consensus a year before were drawn in a joint formula of the OSCE institutions, or related to it, Parliamentary Assembly, Center for OSCE Research, Helsinki Monitor (Ghebali, 2006: 53) and last, but not least Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.[3]

From Ghebali's perspective, there were three determinant causes that maintain the OSCE in crises position: the changing parameters as far as European security are concerned, incomplete institutionalization and the position of Russia (Ghebali, 2006: 54).

Concerning the first aspect he notices that the European security environment faced two fundamental transformations – first one related to the attack of the United States in 2001 and the second one provoked by the dimension of NATO and EU enlargements (Ghebali, 2006: 54). The reaction of the OSCE to that was rather symbolic and referred to eliminating the funding of terrorist actions by combating the illegal traffic of any kind (drugs, arms, human beings), though it can not be neglected the important role in the improvement of the police related activities in different participating states o border monitoring.

There are many opinions that the enlargement of the two above mentioned identities has deepened the conviction that the political relevance of the OSCE is continuously going down due to its low potential to offer firm military warranties or consistent economic aid like NATO or EU. Beside, the predicted evolution of the European policy concerning security and defence and its new capabilities in the management of the civil and military crises, its resources and credibility are not only shading the OSCE, but also replacing it from the traditional security architecture (Kronenberger, Wouters, 2004: 54).

Still, in Ghebali's opinion, statements that the OSCE is facing the moment of completely loosing its relevance is exaggerated and has no bases, as the effects of the enlargements are not instant first and they can not be overestimate (Ghebali, 2006: 55).

NATO's and EU's extensions are characterized by the existence of certain limits, both geographical and geopolitical. That confers the OSCE an extremely role to play in the areas that have no perspective to become members of NATO or EU (Caucasus, Central Asia and, for the time being, part of Balkans). Regarding the enlargement of the EU, it is unlikely to get consolidated so quickly in all its member states (especially those belonging to the Former Soviet Union and even of those that were its satellites), as it operates in a less flexible manner than the OSCE.

As far as NATO is concerned, the still ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq led to a deterioration of the trans-atlantic relations, and an improvement of this situation being can be identified only in formal discussions. The OSCE's capabilities on one hand and on the other hand those of NATO and EU are asymmetric, characterized by complementarity and in

[3] Within its "OSCE Cluster of Competence", it groups representatives of the academic world, diplomats, employees of the OSCE.

the actual security environment, none of the three could properly face the challenges and threats in an isolated way. Therefore, for a medium size term a decisive exclusion of the OSCE from the security architecture is very unlikely, the most probable scenario being the interaction on the basis of comparative advantages.

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THE WASHINGTON – LONDON - BUCHAREST AXIS IN PRESIDENT BĂSESCU'S EXTERNAL AND SECURITY POLICIES: 2004 – 2008 – DESIDERATUM AND REALITY -

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Abstract. *Stated by the President Traian Basescu on the 13th of December 2004, and generated by the wake of the strategic Partnership between Romania and USA and the strategic Romanian – British relation, the external and security political strategy named The Washington – London – Bucharest Axis was a priority for the period of his term.*

Aiming the Pontic geopolitical space and its security and energetic issues, the strategy did not have the support of an official political – diplomatic document, neither a formal recognition from the USA and Great Britain. The Romanian political establishment did not agree the strategy formula, being throughout its consequences the apparition of a premiere in the Romanian political life – the co-habitation of a presidential administration, obviously atlantist, with a Cabinet declared European. More, it generated, in the Community environment, questions upon the place of the Romanian presidential Administration in the USA – EU strategic relation.

Thus, the strategy had the support of some explicit American gestures and policies. For instance, we are referring to the installation of some military devices into the Dobrogea facilities, the sustaining of the Nabucco energetic project, the Black Sea Form for Dialogue and Partnership – a Romanian initiative, or the lodge of the Black Sea Fund for Regional Cooperation – an American initiative. The concrete effects of the Romanian moves circumscribed to the Strategy of the Axis were significantly limited by its cope with the Pontic policies of the Russian Federation and Turkey's.

Of course, the consequences of this strategy will continue extending, and the debate on the theoretic support's consistency – liberal, and the discrepancy between the presidential politic will and the sub-regional strategic geopolitical reality will film the interest of the politic analists and historians of the recent history.

Keywords: *Access agreement, political axis, Formal Black Sea, The Black Sea Fund, Traian Basescu.*

The purpose of our research paper is to underline some aspects related to the projects and evolution of an external political strategy, that of the *Axis,* adopted by Romania after 2004, but familiar to our country from the 1940's. The problem raised by the axis in the foreign affairs and security matters of Băsescu's presidential administration includes both new initiatives and processes (specific for the present administration) and older ongoing ones, consequences of the deep geopolitical and regional strategic transformations after December 1989.

The topic taken into consideration has its starting point in the discourse held by the newly elected President on 13th December 2004, in which he argues that: "In our foreign affairs, the most important thing, besides our belonging to the NATO, is the strategic relationship with the USA and Great Britain. *The Washington-London- Bucharest Axis* will be a strategic axis for the Romanian president" (Băsescu, 2004: 16-23). The use of this phrase caused many comments and analyses, regarding both the term axis, almost proscribed in European politics, and the parameters and the meanings of the political construction. Of course, the analysis, even if it is a partial one, of an evolving phenomenon, may be marked by

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the absence of a certain temporal perspective, the poor information support given by the Law of Archives and the extraordinary capacity of reality to surprise us in us in our thinking. We are continuously evolving in this field, as the phenomenon mentioned above is important, it produces effects and history is being written now. We have the duty to be present. For reasons of communication economy, we intend to approach the topic only from the point of view of Romanian perspectives and interests. The analysis will concentrate on the way in which *the Axis* policy modelled the existing realities on coordinates of major interest for Romania and the fields that the axis was meant to operate in, namely external politics and national security politics.

In December 2004, President Băsescu declared *the Washington-London- Bucharest Axis* as a priority for Romania's foreign affairs during his mandate. The intention was not a new treaty or a political-diplomatic or military institution. The intention was to create points of orientation, coordination and alignment of Romania's external and security policies for a medium period of time: 2005- 2009. A series of analysts, politicians and Romanian political think tanks as the "Ovidiu Şincai" Institution, named this orientation as the *Băsescu Doctrine* ("Ovidiu Sincai" Institute, 2006: 3). The above mentioned guide marks confirm explicitly the existence or the will to create and develop a certain type of relationship between Romania and the two states indicated by the names of their capitals. Why the USA and Great Britain? Because in the President's opinion at that time, these were the only states interested, in the real sense of the word, by the Black Sea problems and the conflicts frozen in its region, including the Transnistrian one, which is of major interest for Romania (Băsescu, 2005).

Some ideas connected to the theory of the axis as a type of international relationship

The theory and practice of international relations, of diplomacy in general, uses a wide range of bilateral and multilateral relationships, promoted under many names. We can mention here terms such as alliance, arrangement, axis, pact, charter, coalition or convention, gentlemen's agreement, treaty, deal, trilateral, cooperation organization, partnership, pentagon etc. President Traian Băsescu, the author of the expression, has never indicated that his intention was to create a political diplomatic treaty with judicial power, and as the national and regional political realities do not show an explicit and effective step for this purpose, we will take up the President's view. From a geopolitical perspective, we can say that an axis-type relationship requires and describes a proactive, offensive and dynamic action perspective.

From this point of view, the term that best describes the operational meaning of this type of relationship, is that of vector. Certainly, the classical meaning of the axis could be brought into discussion in this particular case. *The Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis* could be such an example of an axis-vector, with an operational direction through the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We confirm the idea that this was the consideration according to which Băsescu's Administration conceptualised the foreign affairs strategy of *the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis*, as an operational vector through the open area of the Black Sea, the enlarged Middle East, and Central Asia. According to this logic, but in an opposite way, we can define *the tri-, penta- or hexagon* constructions. Clearly, they describe a closed or semi-closed area, with a maximum operational direction oriented mostly towards the internal area and reduced towards the exterior. These are relational constructions meant to create and to be "stability and cooperation islands." This was Constantinescu's rationale according to which he conceptualized and made the complex and multiple system of trilateral agreements operational[1]. These are typical constructions for a politically unpolarized region, lacking

[1] Romania has a good experience in initiating and using this type of partnership. In the interwar period, together with the Czech Republic and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes, Romania was founding the Small Agreement, with the purpose of "preserving and organizing peace." For the same reasons, in 1934, Romania,

integration and subordination towards influential spheres. During the interwar period, and that following the Revolution from 1989, Central and Eastern Europe experienced these constructions.

From the point of view of diplomacy and international law, this type of interaction can be written down in a document with diplomatic and judicial purposes, or it can be a relationship based on a gentlemen's agreement. An example of the first type of relationship is the fascist axis of World War II, while an example for the latter seems to be *the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis*. We are using the word "seems" here because, unlike the Romanian-American strategic partnership for instance, it is not based on a diplomatic document with judicial power, publicly and officially accepted at the highest levels by the two partners, in the case of the axis, the Americans and the British have neither recognised nor accepted this political construction. Of course, the lack of a document regulating the situation offers the entities the possibility of belonging to a relationship and the advantage of freedom of expression, option and modulation. In the same time, the lack of discipline offered by a judicial act can make the internal relationship relative and dilute the impact on the external environment, especially when one or several partners do not recognise or do not officially claim the relationship or the name of axis given to it.

An element that is unique for other interstate political relationships is the psychological aspect that of a profound negative perception of the European public opinion regarding the term and the meaning of axis. The negative feelings are induced by the tragic experience of World War II, caused and sustained by *the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis.* We consider that this is precisely the reason for using the term *Troika* by the states belonging to *the Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis*. From this point of view, the expression used by president Băsescu was not a fortunate choice and it was sanctioned by mass –media and political analysts. Even the president avoided to use the term axis, although he was referring to the ad-hoc Washington- London- Bucharest relationship (Băsescu, 2006).

Certainly, some of the objectives taken into consideration by president Băsescu, when he referred to this relationship in different proportions and with different nuances, are of common interest. These form the skeleton on which the axis was built. We can add here a series of objectives belonging to the USA and Great Britain, states with global interests. Mutual support is a condition for success in the accomplishment of these objectives and a means of compensating reciprocal involvement (Băsescu, 30 October 2006).

We can specify some of the common interests: securing the Pontic region, both against conventional military risks and unconventional risks caused by frozen conflicts and

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Turkey and Yugoslavia, and partly Greece, founded the Balkanic Pact Agreement. After 1996, Romania initiated a remarkable series of such arrangements, for example the trilateral agreements Romania-Bulgaria- Greece, Romania- Ukraine- Moldavian republic, Romania- Ukraine- Poland and Romania- Bulgaria- Turkey. President Emil Constantinescu mentions in his memoirs the objective and the advantages of these trilateral partnerships that Romania initiated during the last years of the 20th century. Objectives that concerned the national strategic interests of Romania and its partners, and the regional security interests as well. They were meant to encircle Romania with a network of friendship relationships that could consolidate its security, a pro-occidental orientation of Ukraine and the Moldavian Republic, insuring the collaboration of the neighbours to make safer Romania's Southern, and Eastern borders. The system of regional relationships on a trilateral structure insured the avoiding of the difficulty raised by binary political games, the structures' flexibility and their stabilizing capacity, of reciprocal balancing of the partners and overcoming traditional tensions. It replaced the logic of the competition with that of cooperation and it permitted the passing from a game with zero risks, to a game with positive score, in which all the participants have something to gain. In the absence of some firm and explicit security arrangements and the uncertain NATO integration perspective, the trilateral formula was appreciated as a viable solution for Romania's interests and the surrounding area's interests. These arrangements did not produce visible diplomatic effects, but the rationale remained valid. Thus, in November 2007, the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Cioroianu announced Greece and Romania's intention to revitalize the trilateral that included Bulgaria as well.

the vicinity of the Iraq military scene and of an Iran engaged in an aggressive nuclear arming process.

Securing the sources and the routes of energy transportation from the Caspian and Central Asian regions to Europe and Romania's involvement as a major platform of energy transit.

The consolidation of the transatlantic relationship, as well as that of the NATO, through the integration of Georgia and Ukraine in the alliance.

The successful evolution of the anti-terrorist campaign.

Among the possible interests specific to some of the partners, we can mention:

The construction of a potential alternative to a Turkey more preoccupied by its own internal and regional agenda (Huseyin Bagci and Saban Kardas, 2003), with a civil society more and more inclined towards Islamism and increasingly disappointed by the evolution of the integration process.

Securing the enlarged Middle East region and the involvement of a great number of actors in the problem, including the campaigns from the Iraqi and the Afghan military scenes.

Next, our purpose is to underline, based on a synthetic analysis, some relevant aspects for the effectiveness degree of this unique axis in the two operational regions, in external politics, and the security of the Romanian state.

In Romania's foreign affairs, the following aspects were taken into consideration:

a) The Băsescu's Administration intention was to be the instrument and the mechanism of implication policies and the strong American and British presence in the Romanian interest region, the enlarged Black Sea area, and the Transnistrian issue under the condition that the interests and the approach of the three states in these regions, expressed are more or less directly or indirectly, similar (Băsescu, December 2006).

Romania would have liked to be an instrument unifying the subregional interests of the USA and Great Britain and to mobilize their capacities in solving them. Referring to Băsescu's initiative of *the Black Sea Forum*, Mark Pekala, the American vice-secretary, underlined the Forum's role in the process of forming the American policy in this region (Mark Pekala, November 2006).

The massive American and British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the reluctant Turkish attitude towards Romanian and American policies in the Pontic region led to a relaxation of the American-British participation and initiatives in this area (Mathew Bryza, 2007).

b) The President's ideal would have been a development on a superior level of bilateral relationships, defined by strong and active strategic partnerships. President G. W. Bush confirmed a visible and strong expression of the new Romanian strategical orientation's effects through the common conference with President Băsescu in 2005 and the parameters of the Washington visit (*The Common Press Conference of Presidents G.W. Bush and Traian Băsescu* on 20th March, 2005). The level that was attained led to the Bilateral Agreement regarding the activities of the American troops in Romania on 6th December 2005. although the special trilateral relation was not explicitly disapproved or denied by Washington or London, Romania did not manage to convince the partners involved to make an official gesture of clearly recognizing the existence of the axis or signing a political, judicial or diplomatic document, a situation which led to a decrease in the axis' visibility and effectiveness.

Despite this, the political involvement on the governmental level existed and took place on different coordinates, as, for example, that of public- private partnerships, in the case of *the Black Sea Trust Fund for Regional Cooperation.* For the USA and Great Britain, from an official point of view, the axis exists only on a rhetorical level from the Romanian side. Moreover, the policies and the development programmes sustained by the two partners in

collaboration with Romania were diminished by the lack of a solution in the case of some of the Romanian public's desiderata, as well as a series of events with negative emotional impact. We are referring here to the exclusion of Romania from *the Visa Weaver* American Program, the introduction of some restrictive clauses regarding the issuing of British work permits for Romanians starting from 1st January, 2007, the hostile attitude of the British mass-media, the circumstances regarding the involvement of American diplomats in Romania in car accidents, or the costs of the scandal regarding the acquisition of the frigates *Queen Mary* and *King Ferdinand* from the U.K. in 2005.

In addition to this, we can mention the lack of a continuous political coordination in regional problems, such as the recognition of Kosovo's independence, and the nature, means and rhythm of promoting the policy of modifying the Black Sea and its straits' status, through the creation of an international and liberal access which led to a weakening of Romanian-Turkish relationships. One of the major deficiencies was the lack of Romanian ambassadors in Washington and London for long periods of time, more than a year, or that of an American ambassador in Bucharest for 6 months. The high level of trilateral cooperation in international, security and operational politics in the military theatres, did not generate positive developments in other Romanian interest areas. We can refer here to the eradication of the visa system for Romanian citizens.

c) Raising Romania's prestige and visibility on a sub-regional and regional level.

The promotion of the axis was meant to secure a supplementary prestige, profile and visibility contribution for Romania in its region, a plus of balance in a sub-regional frame dominated by a more and more aggressive Russia and an allied Turkey, but deeply concentrated on the internal agenda, an agenda which insists on the allied and neighbour status of Romania and Bulgaria, and which describes a strange closeness to the Russian pontic policies. The materialization of the Romanian axis strategy is to be found in the affirmation of some initiatives and the development of some political processes at the Black Sea, which expressed the American and British policies and perspectives on the pontic region as well. We will mention here the Romanian initiative of *the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership* in Bucharest, on 5th June, 2006. An initiative from which the USA formed *the Black Sea Trust Fund for Regional Cooperation*[2], a step mentioned by Jack D. Crouch II, the national security vice-counsellor of the American president and intensively supported by a personality like Bruce Jackson[3].

Receiving the support of the Axis partners in promoting political sub-regional initiatives is an important and successful objective[4]. Another weighty example is the maintenance of the American support for the *NATO Summit* in April, 2008, at Bucharest, in

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[2] The Black Sea Trust Fund for Regional Cooperation was created by the German Marshall Fund of US, as a result of the discussions between the USA and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, discussions started already in 2002. Over 30 mil. $ were allocated for the next 10 years for projects regarding civic participation, trans-border initiatives and regional cooperation, and the cooperation between local and national NGO's from the Pontic Regions.

[3] Bruce Jackson is the president of the Project for Transnational Democracies in Washington. In an interview with *Cotidianul*, he stated that: "I have always thought that Romania will start playing an important role in South-Eastern Europe and in the Black Sea region, just as Germany and Poland play a key-role in Northern Europe. This is a great step in this direction. It is for the first time when the states from the region organized themselves in this way, with a substantial support from the USA… The USA have always considered that Russia has a voice, but does not own a veto in the region."

[4] *Press release, the meeting between Romanian president Traian Basescu and British Prime-minister Tony Blair*, "The British Prime- minister and the Romanian President drew attention to Romania's strategic importance as NATO Eastern border line and, starting from 2007, the border of the European Union, and they agreed to cooperate to include the issues raised by the enlarged Black Sea in the Euro Atlantic agenda., 31st January, 2005, London.

spite of the fact that the Romanian president was undergoing a suspension process (Cioroianu, aprilie 2007).

Moreover, one of the main aims was to promote the image of an active, consistent Euro Atlantic Romania, a generator of security and solutions, informational leader in South-Eastern Europe and the pontic region. The firm transatlantic Romanian orientation allowed its external policy to anticipate the western European trend of surmounting transatlantic conflicts determined by the American policy in Iraq and the war of the international coalition led by the USA and also to re-unite the two great partners, the USA and Europe.

Sustaining atlantism in Europe is another objective of Romania's foreign affairs. Without a link of direct causes, the axis came after the effects of another axis, defining a reality that was difficult to be accepted by the emerging of central and Eastern European democracies: *the Paris-Berlin–Moscow Axis*. A reality made official at Strasbourg (Jacques Chirac and Boris Eltin's *Common Press Release*) on 10th October, 1997, and re-confirmed in 2003 (See also *Joint Declaration by Russia, Germany and France on Iraq*), through the active and manifest opposition against the American policies towards Iraq.

The reaction of the European ex-communist states was vehement and was materialized, among other things, through the *Vilnius Group's Letters* on 5th February, 2003,[5] and the *Letter of the 6 ambassadors*[6], in the case of Romania, published on 4th February, 2007, in the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica*. Romania's support of the NATO expansion in South-Eastern Europe and the Caucasus is also included in its atlantist orientation. The president's perspective insured the development of stable, coherent and predictable foreign and security policies although, after the change of its political structure, the government's purpose was a visible re-orientation towards European coordinates. The strong demand to withdraw Romania from the Iraqi war and the tough reactions towards the American and British ambassadors in Bucharest are notorious gestures. They did not affect, however, the Romanian politics oriented towards the axis, an aspect confirmed by the annual presidential discourses held in front of the diplomatic body in Bucharest (Băsescu, January 2006).

In spite of the fact that a clear political orientation was desired, for different reasons, such as communication deficiency, discourse manipulation and official political gestures of the internal opposition, the superficiality or the calculations of different external political groups from the Community area, the effect was often confusing or opposite to the desired one.

Thus, although in his discourse on 13th December, 2004, Traian Băsescu repeatedly stated that the main objective of his external policy was the European integration The perception of a primordial relationship with the USA and Great Britain was willingly or unwillingly acknowledged and even that of a Romanian political fracture between the EU and the USA (Băsescu, April 2005). In the presidential expression, a distinction is made between the external political objective and the external political instrument: "The main aim of our external policy is doubtlessly the European integration on 1st January, 2007" (22 Magazine). Then, Traian Băsescu added: In our foreign affairs, the most important thing will remain, beyond our belonging to NATO, the strategic relationship with the USA and Great Britain. *The Washington-London-Bucharest Axis* will be a strategic axis for the Romanian president" (22 Magazine).

Asked during an interview before the European integration if he was supporting the strategy of the axis, Băsescu answered: "I am. It is a security solution for Romania" (Băsescu, October 2006). After the European integration, it will remain valid and the option will

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[5] *http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=19022*

[6] We are referring here to the Letter of the Ambassadors of Great Britain, Romania, Canada, the USA, Holland and Australia, *http://www.repubblica.it/2007/01/sezioni/esteri/afganistan-12/lettera-ambasciatori/lettera-ambasciatori.html*

manifest itself through supporting the necessity of strengthening transatlantic connections (Băsescu, October 2006). The organization of the *11th Summit on Francophonia* between 27th and 29th September, 2006, made by Romania and the presidential visits to Ukraine, Russia and two emergent power centres, China and India between 2005-2006, did not manage to balance the perception of an excessive external policy oriented towards America. Its invocation strengthened the impression that Romania plays the role of the "American Trojan horse", impression held both by political circles from the EU (The article Romania- the American Trojan Horse in Europe, *Le Monde*, 6th April, 2005), and from the pontic region, mainly Turkey (Barcin, 2007). The adopting of the axis strategy did not lead to a unity of perspective on the Romanian political establishment in this issue.

On the contrary, the orientation of the foreign affairs strategy was exactly one of the reasons invoked by the social democrat party when requesting the President's suspension[7]. In addition, the government, represented by its minister of foreign affairs' voice, considered the presidential strategy of the axis to be just a typical elective campaign declaration (Cioroianu, 2007: 5), and the first minister C. P. Tăriceanu, declared Romania's relationship with the EU as the most important strategic axis in our foreign affairs (Press release on 27th March, 2007).

In this context, we can notice some equal reactions, but of a geopolitical direction completely opposed to that of *the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis*. We are referring here to the National Initiative Party's recommendation, made by Cosmin Guşă, supporting a re-orientation of foreign politics on *the Washington-Moscow-Bucharest Axis* and the abandonment of the "amateurish" presidential project[8]. The "Ovidiu Şincai" Institute brings a vast critique of *the Washington- London- Bucharest Axis* as well[9].

Without a steady Romanian economic growth and a strong positioning as a significant energy transit platform, we consider that the security and visibility brought about by the special relationships with the USA and Great Britain will not be sufficient to sustain the officially undeclared intention of becoming an effective and acknowledged regional leader.

In Romania's security policy, the following aspects were aimed at:

a) Raising Romania's degree of security with emphasis on the military aspects:

Train Băsescu stated, at the conference on 13th December, 2004 that: "the most important element guaranteeing our national security is the strategic partnership with the USA and Great Britain"(Roncea, 2005: 15). The development of this vision on the basis set by the Iliescu Administration, will reach its peak with *the Romanian and American pact regarding the activities of the American Forces in Romania*. The establishment of these military facilities on Romania's Black Sea coast is extremely important.

Moreover, an increase in the degree of our national security was gained though the American President's acknowledgement of one of the most important consequences of the bilateral partnership and of America's direct involvement in preserving Romania's security[10]. An additional and necessary contribution was desired, beyond the contributions and the resources of a doctrinal self-censored NATO in the pontic region[11] and under the conditions of

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[7] *The President's Suspension Proposal*, adopted by the Social Democrat Party, point V.1 President Basescu publicly declared from the beginning of his mandate the Romanian politics' orientation towards the Washington-London- Bucharest Axis, without taking into consideration the Government Program and without consulting Romania's Government and Parliament. *www.psd.ro/documente.php?newf_id=3*

[8] *http://www.event365.ro/Gusa_opteaza_pentru_axa_Washington__Moscova-n11360.html*

[9] Reports of the "Ovidiu Sincai" Institute: *Traian Băsescu, Six Months of Presidential Mandate: Results and Perspectives: Government through and for Crises and the Analysis of Romania's National Security Strategy,* http://www.fisd.ro/rap.html

[10] The *Common Press Conference of Presidents G.W.Bush and Traian Băsescu* on 20th March, 2005, *http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050309-3.html*

[11] Article 1 of the Treaty mentions that: "The parties involved commit themselves to solve through peaceful means any international dispute they could be involved in." Article 5 of the Treaty is activated only by "an armed attack

a clear lack of interest, policies and resources allocated by the European Union (Băsescu and Rice, December 2005). A European Union marked thos days by an obvious security dilemma regarding this region. On the one hand, the need to develop regional cooperation, the opening of new customs services, the encouragement of exchanges and commerce. On the other hand, the logics of communitarian security, traffic control, borders' security, and lack of involvement in local tensions etc.

A dilemma of perspective right on the status of the Black Sea: a border or a bridge? An aim of the axis policy is represented by the support give to Romania for fast growth of its naval military capacities. The two frigates acquired in Great Britain are part of the solution. Extremely important in the argumentation of continuity in our plans regarding the main directions of Romania's foreign affairs at the beginning of the 21st century, regardless of the general doctrine orientation of the governments and the presidential administrations succeeded, it is also the fact that the buying agreement was signed by the Năstase government, being accomplished by the Tariceanu government and Basescu's Administration. The same continuity can be noticed in the support given to Romania in its NATO and European integration or in the development of the Romanian-American strategic partnership.

On the other hand, surprisingly, *the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis* is not to be found in *Romania's National Security Strategy* from 2007, neither as n expression nor as a concept despite the fact that it was launched as "a priority in the external and security politics for the next five years"[12] (2005- 2009, n.n.). Moreover, it cannot be found in Tăriceanu's Government program either (2005- 2008) (*Governing Program 2005- 2008*).

Although some political analysts predicted the appearance or the activation of a long series of threats and vulnerabilities caused by the axis strategy, they did not occur, were of low intensity or their effect could not be felt. For example, dangers as: Romania becoming the hostage of transatlantic tensions, of a delayed European integration, losses caused by entering regions with chronic tensions and the effects of a presumably American attack on Iran.

b) Raising the degree of military security in the Black Sea area:

In an interview given for the French public opinion (Băsescu, aprilie 2005), the President mentioned the rationale and the objectives of this axis politics, stating the need for securing the Black Sea area, considered to be of crucial geostrategic importance.

In this way, the intention of the Băsescu Administration was to establish a special relationship with the USA and Great Britain, as it considered only these two states as being interested in this matter. In the same time, the new neighbourhood policy of the EU and the way in which ist was materialized, was considered as insufficient and "soft" for the complexity of the issue.

One of the main ways of materialization of the axis vision's declared objective is the internationalization of the Black Sea and the access in its aquatorium.

During a meeting between President Băsescu and the Master students from the Security Studies, University of Bucharest, I asked the following question: "To what extent does the Romanian – American strategic partnership effectively sustain Romania's policy at the Black Sea, in the relationship with Ukraine and the Transnistrian problem?" The answer was clear: "The stages of consolidating the Romanian- American strategic partnership are based on two levels: first of all, a legal and active presence of American forces at the Black Sea through the installation of military bases in the Black Sea region. The second objective of

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against one or several parties" and Article 6 mentions the meaning of the expression "an armed attack against one or several parties." *NATO Textbook*, Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 2001, p. 562.

Point 36 of the *Declaration of the NATO Summit in Bucharest* specifies and recognizes only the role of the initiatives and the security and cooperation mechanisms existing in the Black Sea region, without taking up any role for the NATO. *http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049f.html*

[12] *Romania's National Security Strategy- European Romania, Transatlantic Romania: for a better life in a democratic, safer and more prosperous country*, http://presidency.ro

the strategic partnership with the USA and with Great Britain as well, is the internationalization of the Black Sea… The UA are involved and interested in finding a solution to the transnistrian conflict" (Roncea, 2005: 117-118). Romania was in favour of a robust and non-restrictioned presence of the allied naval forces and of the USA, which would discourage dangerous developments of frozen conflicts, especially the transnistrian one, in Romania's proximity.

In this way, it sustains the American ideal (Volker, February, 2006) of connecting the alliance's maritime security measures from the Mediterranean Sea – *Active Endeavour*[13], with those from the *Black Sea-BlackSeafor*[14]. In addition to the well- known Turkish opposition, Russia's reaction can be exemplified both through the vice prime minister's remark[15], and the ideas mentioned in *the Annual Report of the Russian diplomacy in 2007 (The Annual Report of the Russian Diplomacy for 2007*). These evolutions, together with the American recommendations regarding the adaptation of Romanian and pontic policies (Briza, 2006), determined the Presidential Administration to re-plan its policies for this area, by not bringing into discussion the validity of *the Montreaux Treaty (Băsescu,* February 2008*)*.

c) Raising Romania's energy security and its transformation into a major regional platform of energy transit.

In this area of major interest, two affirmations are of utmost importance: that of the American state-secretary's European and Asian assistant who stated that the USA were developing a new strategy of amplifying regional cooperation in the energy field, and that Romania was at the heart of this problem (Briza, October 2006). In addition, that of President Basescu, confirming a vicinity of American and Romanian visions in this field (Băsescu, December 2006).

As *the New Energy Policy of the EU* was elaborated in 2007[16], and *Romania's Energy Strategy for 2007-2020*[17] exists as a project, the American interest in the resources and means of hydrocarburates transport from the Caspian area has at its basis *the National Energy Policy*, issued in 2001[18]. The principal energy security project of major interest for Romania is *Nabucco* to which we can add the strategic partnerships between Romania and Azerbaijan and Romania and Kazakhstan[19] concentrated on the economic and energy side (Băsescu, January 2008). A project whose creation was signed by the EU and the states involved on 27th June, 2006. a project appreciated by some analysts unattainable in the absence of a European energy policy, or as a "utopia" of the modern world", as in the Romanian businessman Dinu Patriciu's vision. However, a strategic project for the USA, together with the *Baku-Ceyhan pipe*, in their policy of breaking the Russian monopoly on European gas supply. We consider that the development of the *Nabucco project*, a major interest in Romania's energy security policy, prevails; Romania's capacity to bolster the project is limited and the American and British support is neither visible nor efficient enough.

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[13] Official information: *http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/index.html*

[14] Official information: *http://www.blackseafor.org/English/AnaSayfa.asp*

[15] « Two leaders, Russia and Turkey, states that have modern naval forces, are responsible for the security at the Black Sea. (…) The security of the Black Sea has to be guaranteed by the *countries from its proximity. Turkey is closely collaborating with Russia in this respect.", Gândirea Militară Românească*, nr. 2 /2007, p.129.

[16] It succeeded the *European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*, adopted on 8th March, 2006.

[17] *Romania's Energy Strategy for 2007- 2020*, DRAFT, *http://www.minind.ro/presa_2007/mai/Strategia_16_mai.pdf*

[18] *National Energy Policy 2001*, http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf

[19] *The Declaration of Partnership and Cooperation between Romania and the Republic of Kazakhstan*, 9th Sept., 2003.

Conclusions

It is difficult to draw a conclusion regarding a political process undergoing a full evolution at the moment, when the political actors which conceived it and the ones that are involved in it are active, especially if we are referring to a process with planned effects and evolutions for a medium and long period of time, such as general bilateral relationships. Obviously, using updated public information, the analysis has a temporarily limited vision and a restricted coverage of the issue, a fact which imposes periodical political returns to it. The conclusions can be only partial.

Contrary to the domestic public opinion, *the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis* it is not and it was not meant to be an international law institution, a diplomatic and political treaty. It is not an external politics and security treaty. In his discourse on 13th December, 2004, President Băsescu underlined two times the fact that: "The min foreign policy objective is the European integration on 1st January, 2007" (Băsescu, December 2004, 22 Magasine). The Axis is an instrument of external policy. It was not the result of a national or political-strategic orientation of a party; it was President Băsescu's strongly personalized vision. Although it is strongly atlantist, and the reactions coming from some of the community politicians were prompt, (we are referring here to the German and French representatives in the European Parliament) the Romanian external policy and security orientation, expressed in the strategy of the Axis did not lead to a Romanian conflict with the EU, at least not on an official and declared level. A proof for this reality is Romania's European integration on time[20].

For many reasons, the Axis did not obtain a full support from the Romanian political class. These reasons are connected to internal political fights, in which *the Axis Doctrine,* as it was characterised by Adrian Severin, was used as a confrontation instrument between political parties and institutions, although we are talking about a common interest of the President and the government after 2005. A common interest of an atlantist political vision of the President and a European vision of the government, with multiple causes and consequences[21], including *the Axis* issue[22].

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[20] Thus, the vice-president of the Social-Democrat faction from Germany's Federal Parliament, Gernot Erler, in an interview given to Ziua newspaper on 4th May, 2005, said that: „...we are a little puzzled by this Axis option. Why is Brussels, the European Union excluded from this Axis? This is not a positive sign…and all this mentality related to the Black Sea issue is an old type of thinking. Geopolitics is not a priority for Romania now…We cannot understand Basescu's message regarding this axis and the implication in the stability policy at the Black Sea… It is a classical influenced type of politics and it is not appropriate for Romania to think of a force position in the region." The German diplomat (easily passing by 55 years of unfortunate history of the newly established Eastern European democracies with Russia and the tragic Ribbentrop- Molotov Pact re-affirmed Germany's special role in soothing Russia's "concern" regarding the loss of influence in the ex- USSR region: "Germany has a special role here, we already have a friendly relationship between Putin and Schroeder…" On the contrary, the public policy promoted by the German Chancellor transmitted: "We salute Romania's policy at the Black Sea because it brings stability in the region.", mentioning the fact that Germany and Romania have a common opinion on the necessity of a good transatlantic relationship. Susanne Kastner, ex- vice-president of the German Parliament, declared in an interview given to Ziua newspaper on 10th December, 2005, after a meeting with the Romanian President that: ,"The discussions were constructive. One of the topics was the Washington- London-Bucharest Axis. Certainly, it was necessary to eliminate some misunderstandings, because this aspect caused a certain amount of skepticism in Berlin, but, from the explanations I received, we consider that we can accept this idea to a certain degree, in the sense that it refers to security problems. I have the impression however, that there is a Bucharest- Berlin Axis as well." In what France's reactions are concerned, the article "Romania- America's Trojan Horse in Europe" is suggestive. The article appeared in Le Monde, on 6th April, 2005. In *Le Figaro*, President Băsescu stated that: "I see myself obliged to notice that only the Americans and the British are really interested by the states belonging to the Black Sea cost."

[21] Common interests that had as one of its effects the in Romania's external policy the resignation of Andrei Ungureanu Minister. The internal conflicts are the expression of the general status of the transatlantic relationship between 2003 and 2007. We consider that the amplification of the Community acquis acquisition and Romania's European integration at the beginning of 2007, imposed pressures on the pro-

The Romanian-American relationship is much more visible, active and consistent than the Romanian–British one, confirming the American prominent ole in the Euro Atlantic politics in the enlarged Black Sea area. *The Axis strategy* is based actually on the Romanian strategic partnership with the two states.

The efficiency of the Axis is difficult to evaluate due to the extremely complex rapports and relationships. In order to further emphasise this aspect, I will shortly present three significant episodes related to the efficiency of *the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis.*

The first refers to the American and British ambassadors' reactions regarding the Romanian judicial system issues and especially the questionable quality of the modifications brought to the Penal Code, confirmed by the General Prosecutor's Office. In spite of the fact that some of the Romanian politicians vehemently attacked the American diplomat's observation (Taubman, October 2007), made in the spirit of American transnational diplomacy, the British ambassador in Bucharest immediately and firmly sustained it (Barnett, November 2007)[23]. The German and the Dutch ambassadors' similar reactions later followed these actions.

The second refers to the American and British ambassadors' reactions regarding President Basescu's suspension. Just before the referendum on 19th may, 2007, surprisingly enough for the mass media and the public, the President of the Social Democrat Party, Mircea Geoană, was visited by the American ambassador, Nicholas Taubman on 5th may, 2007.

The visit to the Social Democrat Party was followed by the British ambassador's visit, Robin Barnett. One of the consequences was the rejection of the National Liberal Party's proposition of withdrawing the Romanian military troops from Iraq in the National Security Supreme Council by the temporary President, Nicolae Văcăroiu.

Two declarations are relevant: that of the Social Democrat Party's president: "In this agitated period of time it is not a good thing to make major decisions which could imply important changes in our external policy. (…) There is a legitimate request from the USA to be predictable in our external policy" (Geoană, May 2007). Daniel Fried's declaration (state secretary Condoleezza Rice's Adjunct) came to Bucharest with a clear message: "I do not wish to see Romania giving up its engagement, just as you would not like to see the USA giving up its engagements, including those regarding Romania's protection (Fried, May 2007)".

Finally, the third episode refers to the fact that the main political strategists of the National Liberal Party and of the Social Democrat Party are specialists from the USA and Great Britain. Thus, Arthur Finkelstein, an ex-strategist of some of the American presidents and Tal Silberstein, an ex-campaign-s strategist for Adrian Năstase, are the National Liberal Party's strategist. In the same time, the Social Democrat Party asked for consultancy from the British firm "Penn, Schoen and Berland Associates," whose London General Manager is Matt Carter, the chief of the electoral campaign of the British Labour Party in 2004.

American and pro- British Romanian politics. The scandal regarding the possible existence of CIA detention centers in Europe affected Romania at the end of 2005 and with developments in 2008, amplifying the perception of unconditioned and non-discriminatory ally of the USA.

[22] When referring to the possible consequences of the Prime- Minister's attempt to withdraw Romanian troops from Iraq, President Băsescu said that: "Interviewer: Do you really consider that he could have done this gesture intentionally, willing to destroy a diplomatic relationship, for example with the USA and Great Britain? Băsescu: It is obvious what is going on. Interviewer: This is a very serious accusation. It is almost an accusation regarding the destruction of Romania's national interests. Băsescu: Actually, this is what withdrawing from the war really was. An aggressive assault on Romania's national interest, the destruction of a relationship…"

[23] Robin Barnett:: "We share the American Government's concern that, in the case that they are approved in the present form, the modifications could diminish the Romanian authorities' capacity (…) and also the efficiency of the Romanian- British cooperation against the criminal phenomenon which affects us all." *Communicate of the British Embassy* in Bucharest, 15th Nov., 2007.

Three disparate episodes reflect a certain effectiveness of the Washington- London-Bucharest Axis. Regarding mostly Romania's participation to the re-defining of the geopolitical and security parameters in the enlarged Black Sea region, the effectiveness of the Axis strategy also comes from way in which this connects itself to the main pontic powers, the Russian Federation and Turkey (either as partnership or conflict). Together with the Romanian American Strategic Partnership, we consider that *the Washington-London-Bucharest Axis* is one of the boldest Romanian political and security constructions after December 1989, although its effectiveness is reduced on a short period of time and weakened by the lack of an official and explicit confirmation from London and Washington, together with the lack of a support including clear political and strategic gestures from the two Occidental capitals and of structuring institutions, diplomatic and judicial documents.

From political and strategical point of view, the pontic region has been blocked for many decades: on the one hand, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and later by a Russia continuously looking for its lost power and manipulating with cynicism prices, taps and pumping stations. On the other hand, a Turkey found in a profound historic dilemma: towards the West, welfare but also the enrolment discipline of the Community system, or towards the East and a possible leading position in the Arabian world, and consequently abandoning Kemalism and returning to Islamism.

Romania can and has to play a significant role at the Black Sea. *The Washington-London-Bucharest Axis* can be one of the handy tools, to the extent that the USA and Great Britain are willing oficialli to accept, beyond consistent and operational strategic partnerships with Romania, an axis-type relationship.

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V. CONCEPTS, METHODS AND OPTIONS

ROMANIAN RURAL HISTORY AND A METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON HISTORICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Barbu ŞTEFĂNESCU*

Abstract. *On the level of the Romanian historical research, methodological cooperation between history and social anthropology (ethnology) is claimed by two aspects of becoming reality: massive rural presence on a historical scale and persistence of an important rural segment to this day. Adherent in time particularly to means of communication specific to orality, rural world, its major segment, the peasant one, responds better to an ethnological interrogation rather than to a historical one; at the same time, the development under our eyes of certain cultural life aspects joint with other times, facilitates ceaseless checks of historical evolutions, comparisons with what is at their end, realities of contemporary societies. Hence the double perspective, the permanent check between history and ethnology or the fact that each dialogue partner borrows methodological perspectives. Ethnologists need it to join a temporality always necessary and clarifying for the envisaged cultural aspects, while historians need it to question the specific documentary heritage from aspects supposed by rural existence on its anthropological level as beings with certain cultural particularities.*

Key words: *historical anthropology, romanian rural history, interdisciplinary, methodological cooperation, traditional community*

More and more aware of its limits, history as a discourse has become open to several interdisciplinary collaborations in the past century; it has learnt that it is in its best interest to turn to "competitive solidarity", to accept playing its role "in a platoon where comrades support one another, are rivals, each rushing their step hoping to be the first..."(Duby, 1992:154). Nowadays, "history can no longer afford to provide answers at the interference point with other anthropological disciplines" (Zub, 2004: 246). For the historian, collaboration with cultural anthropology becomes compulsory when aspiring to give birth to ordinary people, the "silent of history"(Jacques Le Goff, 1986: 88), those who do not write and about whom one writes under certain circumstances (Barbu, 1996: 11), those at the background of the historical scene for whom there are no methodological means. In its turn, anthropology, declaring itself as a "confederative discipline", "defined itself rather as a territory of interdisciplinarity" in its attempt to make its own discourse a "discourse of discourse" (Auzians, 1976:8, apud Zub 2004: 120).

The success of the tight collaboration between the two disciplines is individualisation of *historical anthropology* that can also be defined as the discipline whose representatives – historians – enforce an anthropological perspective to historical documents after they have understood that in their initiatives to research predominantly oral societies, anthropologists have identified methods to get closer to discrete masses from the point of view of written expression. Out of the need to recover the history of ordinary commonplace people that are not interesting to positivist historiography not because their recovery is not important for historiography, but because its way of relating to a document could not afford it, the new historiography has generously resorted to anthropology investigation means. When redefining history as a discourse, there might have been clear-cut statements, such as the one belonging

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to Georges Duby according to whom all interdisciplinary collaborations belong to history, while ethnology (anthropology) is the most fertile (Duby, 1992: 258).

The fact that historians since Braudel have given up considering evolution through linear and monolithic temporality (Zub, 2004: 115) has greatly contributed to deepening the collaboration between history and anthropology. The relativisation of historical time, identifying parallel temporalities within the same society, temporal segments with slow evolution little sensitive to modernisation proposals, has been another important premise to develop the survey on rural societies evolution avoiding the means of event history yet using anthropology, the one favouring continuity and solidarity with other temporal segments. The long duration as set out by Braudel is particularly illustrated by peasant history, which would unavoidably bring history next to anthropology.

In its turn, discourse of historical type proves to be indispensable for disciplines involved in interdisciplinary dialogue providing a "causal order", "an evolution sense making any becoming intelligible" (Zub, 2004: 125). Particularly social sciences find in history "a vast source of experience providing unexpected parallels, analogies, systematisation conclusions" (Zub, 2004: 128).

On the level of the Romanian historical research, methodological cooperation between history and social anthropology (ethnology) is claimed by two aspects of becoming reality: massive rural presence on a historical scale and persistence of an important rural segment to this day. Adherent in time particularly to means of communication specific to orality, rural world, its major segment, the peasant one, responds better to an ethnological interrogation rather than to a historical one; at the same time, the development under our eyes of certain cultural life aspects joint with other times, facilitates ceaseless checks of historical evolutions, comparisons with what is at their end, realities of contemporary societies. Hence the double perspective, the permanent check between history and ethnology or the fact that each dialogue partner borrows methodological perspectives. Ethnologists need it to join a temporality always necessary and clarifying for the envisaged cultural aspects, while historians need it to question the specific documentary heritage from aspects supposed by rural existence on its anthropological level as beings with certain cultural particularities.

The highly visible peasant recurrence in modern and contemporary Romanian society as well as other specific elements of cultural evolution has nourished a research thread of the Romanian rural reality with the help of ethnography and ethnology. Romanticism inspired by Herder, the "Samanatorul" movement, the latter paradoxically revived at the communist epoch, an ideologically anti-rural trend promoting the disruption of traditional rural structures through forcefully urbanisation, favoured ethnographic surveys; in the latter case, ethnography had to support a nationalist regime concerned with finding Romanian priorities of technical and aesthetic order to impose as a first identity element a beautiful moral Romanian village.

At the same time, we have to underline that Romanian ethnologists – lacking academic background in the field – were in turn recruited by geographers, sociologists, a stage that has not been overcome for the time being, when they are mainly historians and thus have felt the need to adjust strictly ethnologic considerations based on field research with a diachronic perspective.

Starting with the conclusion that in the entire Romanian history the village and peasants are major elements and thus rural history is meant to be a focus irrespective of the historiographic trends, historical reality acquires further rural trends when considering Transylvanian realities where Romanians have lived in quasi-exclusive rural environment for a long time while elite segments have been often reduced to the rural ones (Ştefănescu, 1998: 32); a world of villages and priests, as Iorga pointed out (Iorga, 1902); hence the often claimed need to recover the peasant element of Romanians' history. From this point of view,

rural history topics have been always included as historiographic priorities even though the results did always not rise to the occasion.

We do not mean that the Romanian historians and ethnologists did not understand the importance of the rural as a historical reality and that they did not try to value it; yet they did it in the spirit of the leaders of the time with the available historical methods. There were also voices such as Nicolae Iorga who felt possible means of subsequent development of the Romanian rural history and the duty to write a history of "the small ones" (Cernovodeanu, 1991: 126-128). There have been also historians, such as David Prodan, who have used their talent exclusively to serve peasant history, that is, the history of the Transylvanian Romanians (Zub, 1994: 30). He saw the mediaeval and early modern Transylvanian rural reality through the serve's condition and the relationship between peasants and feudal masters accrediting the idea that it is in these relationships that we should find the key to understand old regime peasant society. Today, we know that no matter how important, relationships with tutelary authorities (seniors, state, church) are not the most important, or are not the only important ones in traditional community life (Ştefănescu, 2004: 21, 37). The most numerous aspects of rural community life develop beyond indiscrete suspicious and interested look of the representatives of different authorities; peasant societies mainly live bent over themselves (Muchambled, 1990: 68-72). Hence one of the major desiderata of historical research on peasant world: to investigate with the means of the anthropologist the deepness of its intimate universe through intertwined threads of sociability, the mechanisms of a symbolic thought, of a spirituality dominated by popular Christianity, the integrating role of the ritual (Stefanescu, 2004: 37-149, 278-320), the mobiles of resistance to change, and so on. Little by little, the peasant turns from "exploited" and "fighter" to an individual whose humanity is mainly culturally expressed.

How did the anthropological perspective materialise in the historical reality of the Romanian rural world as main achievements?

1. Assuming a technological perspective characteristic of cultural anthropology: agricultural technology, peasant crafts and industries have become topics of research in another chart; although the term technique has acquired from an anthropological perspective a wider comprehension adding spiritual techniques to the material ones to support the efficiency of acts; the economic fact cannot be fully conceived by the economist when starting beyond the economic, writes Braudel; in traditional societies, a whole bunch of spiritual techniques (faiths, rites and rituals) accompany the most diverse economic activities; they abandon thesis approach in the case of the relation between agriculture and grazing that previously led to avoiding grazing, which is undoubtedly one of the most important aspects of the Romanian rural history;
2. Reconsidering the "emergence of the body" (Le Goff, 1986: 167-168), the interest for food, other physical and physiological conditions, house, clothes, interest for family, woman's condition, different sensitivities, etc. This allowed either approaching types of sources if not necessarily new, less usable from a positivist perspective, or the reinterpretation of certain classic sources from other perspectives; as we discuss about sources, we have to notice that most historians who have successfully experienced in the field were compelled to "create" their sources, that is, they proceeded to unveiling archives providing seriously elaborated historiographic constructions with positivist support;
3. Technological history and particularly agricultural techniques, as well as history of the human body have made it necessary to raise the question of man's relationship to environment in traditional communities again; in broad lines, people at previous epochs faced the same type of problems as we do nowadays in

our relationship with natural environment. Nevertheless, as compared to the predominantly city man of today, they had "a different contact with nature" (Le Goff, 1986: 611). Undoubtedly, centuries ago, man was more subject to the "dictatorship of physical environment" (Le Goff, 1986: 620) imposing its rhythm with authority. Its gaudiness and effects either physical or mental are at the foreground of memory so that it leaves the impression that peasant history is a ceaseless range of catastrophes. According to the available documents, either from internal peasant communities – for instance, the small notes on church books –, or external sources – estate documents, accounts – "it is a fantastic accumulation of catastrophes" (Le Goff, 1986: 620). Through its dynamic character, through the great fluctuation from one year to another, climate out of all natural elements influences the most the rhythm of life and work of a society much more sensitive to its fluctuations than nowadays. The individualisation as a discipline of *historical climatology* and the successes of its representatives in gathering, ranging and interpreting the information on the time has allowed the correlation with economic activities, technical developments, demographic and social phenomena, collective mental. Yet the rich data concerning calamities can make up "a wall of eternal lamentations..." if not placed every time "in the long run so that good crop span existed to the same extent..." as Fernand Braudel pointed out(Le Goff, 1986: 620).

4. The fact that historians have assumed the issue of societies devoid of written form as the Romanian society used to be until modern times by ceaselessly repeating ceremonies, customs, faiths, symbols, etc., makes it possible the persistence in time of popular culture structures and so its information capacity: "Rites and customs are – with few exceptions – old and complex cultural syntheses genetically belonging to a certain civilisation and mentality" (Pop, 1989: 5) and tightly connected to it is the reconsideration of oral testimonies as sources of information for history particularly for those aspects for which the dry spirit of archives documents is not satisfactory. Oral testimonies can broaden the informational basis or may make up checkpoints in the evolution of documented phenomena (Stefanescu, 2004: 48). Mainly the working of rural world as an oral society makes that gesture, word, symbol, or ritual are specific means of communication and not the written word that could only be accessed at the beginning of modern epoch. Therefore, it is difficult to recover the intimacy of rural world only through the classic methods of the historian that may either work with documents directed to relationships with authorities mostly expressing their perspective on the village or using facts issued by rural world through people used to draw up documents, particularly complaints yet inevitably expressing something of their soul, introduce patterns characteristic of the epoch able to increase the efficacy of initiatives, to increase the drama of the situation, etc. Hence the need of the individual approaching a peasant issue to be careful and endowed with the means of the ethnologist to "read" beyond the written words, that is, to look into orality on a historical scale. It is a difficult mission on a world that we might accidentally consider as the focus of ethnology and anthropology only, disciplines that do not have the advantage of the temporal factor, the change and becoming and favouring the a-temporal and inertia, a perspective that can be both harmful and dangerous for the historian (Le Goff, 1986: 169-172). The long duration of Braudel that finds its theoretical arguments in an apparently immobile world cannot be confused with the stagnation or immobility that have been often debated. Tradition itself does not mean in any society an immutable dowry

handed down from generation to generation in its entirety. No generation has the feeling of tradition betrayal if they abandon certain elements to favour others as the social core does not change. Here are a few elements to which the historian has to pay attention, to double the anthropologist, to amend its static vision; as he is equally compelled to pay attention, identify and stress in his writing the elements of continuity, to give credit to those continuities to which the anthropologist is sensitive, to set the balance between the pressure of the new and the conservative resistance.

5. Translation to a new social history of the rural beyond Marxist simplifications we might say. First, a rural shown from a wider perspective adding rural, social and intellectual elites to the peasant element; the rural also means a long time and the presence of the senior, his acultural pressure, as well as property relations aside the conflicts with the communities. We have more and more attempts to prospect intra-community relationships between individuals, family groups, relatives, age and sex solidarity. In the history of the rural life, there is always an autonomous life segment beyond the intersection with authorities of any type, a life underneath the official one on the individual, family, community, intercommunity levels that are often hidden and make that the countryside life show does not develop entirely on a public level imposed by a generally recognised norm system. To this segment belongs the attempt to evade that a peasant society has developed in time and that has entered its existential code accompanying it in the long run: peasant history has always an illicit, eluding side concerning norms in different directions. Despite the unfriendly environment where he has to live, "the peasant lives and survives. How can this be explained?", wonders Victor Tapié and his answer is: "Through the effect of a mentality that will become more and more inaccessible to the world of our industrial and technical society, a mix-up of wisdom and cunningness, an empirical manner of opposition, refusal and obstacles against pressures exercised on him. He used to hide a part of his income to the lay or clergy senior just like the revenue service..." This is a perspective difficult to support with documents, but we are already used to the idea that only accepting the risk to seek from a certain perspective, one has the chance to find it.
6. Recovering spiritual and sensitive rurality in their relationship with God, the Church, forerunners' world, forces that have certain autonomy of action from Divinity; there has been a successful recovery of attitudes towards death and the manner of perceiving time and space.
7. The study of acculturation as proposed by the modernisation trend on the Romanian rural has continued from another perspective at different levels: modernising offensive of the Habsburg state carried out either directly or through intermediaries and having popular, enlightenment and physiocrat accents; the impact of industrialisation on rural world at modern times, as well as that of demographic behaviours; the shock of enforced collectivisation, industrialisation and urbanisation during communism, the shock of European integration, etc.
8. Concerns with implementing in rural world history some methods and suggestions coming from anthropology in parallel with widening the documentary basis, a difficult and laborious task, that is often made up of fragments difficult to assemble for want of the whole provided as a comparison term by anthropology. It is easier to interrogate sources from the perspective of historical anthropology. Sources apparently commonplace such as investigations carried out in peasant environment questioned through the means of the anthropologist can support surprising historiographic constructions. We have

questioned from the perspective of historical anthropology a document previously used from the point of view of economic and social history and we had quite clear answers on the peasant world system of values in the 18th – 19th centuries, on the relationship between written form and orality, on aspects of historical imagology, on the way of perceiving time and space, on the system of values, and so on (Stefanescu, 1998). A variant of this method is interrogating some types of sources on a previously delimited topic. We have experienced that on a special category of sources, such as notes on church books that are diverse as topic, and we sought for answers on the relationship between forms of sociability, acts of violence on the level of traditional communities and rites to resettle community peace endangered by serious community crises (Stefanescu, 2004). Ethnology has brought not only important contributions to widening the topic of historical research on daily life, celebration and ceremonial, etc.; it has also imposed on the level of historical research well-known methods in its specific field, such as the comparative method, comparison in time and space and, relating to the last perspective, the regressive method of bringing the past closer from a present inevitably lying at the end of some historical evolutions made up of an important checkpoint of any initiative of historical knowledge (Le Goff, 1986: 169). "Let us start from contemporary society and return to it", wrote down Nicolae Iorga quoted by Alexandru Zub (Zub, 2004: 142). In some forms, either visible or dissimulated, the past subsists in the present, which claims for that "trip against the trend of centuries" that Braudel speaks about (Braudel, 1984: 13). If in general the retarding trend is more obvious in peasant societies and thus preserves as life facts surprising elements of archaeocivilisation, this trend is more obvious in the Romanian rural world and so the latter can be studied in its existential dynamics, an advantage that the historian does not have as he is generally facing the coldness of archives testimonies that, no matter how complete, refer to characters that do no longer live; the study of these elements has the great advantage of being carried out by the thorough and interested specialist. The comparative dimension assumed by the historian at the suggestion of ethnology is one of the most important methodological contributions in the field of revolute reality research: comparisons in time "in the language of long durations" as proposed by Braudel, as well as comparisons in space. Just like sociology, ethnology successfully proposes turning to the regressive method, the method of bringing the past closer from the present perspective, the present – past dialectics. Ethnological history has the advantage of generally allowing going beyond a series of enunciations made by the positivist history on the line of understanding and explaining even if benefitting from the same documentary sources; it allows another type of reading often commonplace documents with apparently no informational content for the historian as such or to the benefit of an issue considered by the historian as a second class issue. We should not ignore that the information resulting from ethnological investigations has acquired the value of historical information. By writing down facts, practices, etc., belonging to orality, ethnological investigation turns them from ethnological sources into historical sources favoured by the experienced eye of the specialist; what would we, as historians of the peasantry, do without the notes of Nicolae Stoica de Haţeg, Dr. Vasile Pop, or without the investigations of Haşdeu or Nicolae Densuşianu.

The broad field of interdisciplinary collaboration between history and cultural anthropology dominated by historical anthropology should not be conceived as a neat space devoid of traps. Therefore, following the example of well-known historians, we also draw the

attention that this collaboration should not be carried out without judgement but by strictly respecting all the rules of the game. There is often the temptation that the lack of information on issues belonging to previous centuries should be simply replaced with the results of ethnographic research carried out in mid-20th century. Lacking checkpoints on regressive initiative, nothing entitles us to state that documented reality in the 20th century is identical to that of the 18th century for instance. Documented realities in the 20th century lying at the end of a historical evolution forms an important term of comparison which is not unimportant. Thus, it is advisable to be cautious when providing a historical dimension to ethnographically documented phenomena.

This balance does not have the ambition of being strictly historiographical comprising for each reminded direction the main contributions inventoried with names of authors and titles. It is not that it would not be worth it. On the contrary, the space of the present paper does not allow such an initiative. It may induce the idea that historical anthropology still has a wide range of development and deserves to be approached more than before firstly considering the consistent rural segment that Romanian history contains. In parallel with other methodological options that it does not exclude, it can provide further knowledge on the rural world lacking written documentation. Provided that we do not generalize the always limited possibilities of the disciplines involved in the dialogue. In such a dialogue, we always have to stand on the side of a discipline claiming collaboration and being the main beneficiary of the initiative (Stefanescu, 2004: 42).

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ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

Luminița ŞOPRONI*

Abstract: *Globalization, technology and the increasing importance of business contribute to a growing public demand for corporate responsibility. The global transactions are nowadays at the crossroads due to the fundamental changes that take place in the world; the business sector has an essential role in indentifying and promoting the solutions to the problems that are blocking the responsible and sustainable economic development of a society. The corporations cannot act isolated in achieving this part, for they have to unify their efforts with their governments, local communities and other institutions and international organizations.*

Keywords: *ethics, international business, corporations, codes of conduct*

Among the eternal business issues we can find the ones related to ethics and behavior. Every time we make a decision or accomplish an action, we wonder if our conscience is clean, if we behave properly. Many wonder what ethics is and how it alters our behavior towards others, especially in a business environment where the competition and profit chase determines us to hesitate or to act out on making decisions.

Ethics is a system of moral principles and methods of applying them. It offers the instruments needed for these to be applied. It holds the language, conception and models that allow the individual to make moral decisions (Ionescu, 1997: 204). Ethics is the science about morals, about right and wrong (Popa, Filip, 1999: 249).

1.1. Business in the international context

The company becomes interested in the international environment when it engages in operations (sales, services, finances and payments, investments) with other states. It needs to pay close attention to the specific of the cross-border operations that come with illicit or illegal temptations. It also needs to keep the intercultural dimension in mind: the product, the service or exported activity will be inserted in a different society, with its own customs, behaviors, codes and values. In international business, considering ethics is based on knowledge of foreign lifestyles and customs and especially of the existing moral principles.

Alongside of technical reason (effective or not, profitable or not, certain or not), the company faces moral reasons coming from customers, partners, social institutions (family, school, church), regional institutions, states and public or private international organizations. Each of these entities has its own vision of the world, therefore determining its behavior and judgment.

1.2. Ethics in international business

According to Velasquez, business ethics represents "a specialized study of moral right and wrong. It concentrates on how moral standards apply particularly to business policies, institutions, and behavior" (Velasquez, 2006:16). Goodpaster has a similar approach: "Business ethics . . . is the study of business action—individual or corporate—with special attention to its moral adequacy" (Goodpaster, 1997:51). Based on these core definitions, Schwartz and Weber consider that "business ethics involves any formal activity taking place among individuals, organizations, or other entities operating within or related to a business

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context that involves the explicit interaction and/or application of ethical (i.e., moral) standards" (Schwartz, Weber, 2006:386).

Business ethics is an important component of each manager's education, but managers dealing with international operations deal with countless ethic problems that are not found in the internal context. Specific ethic problems that rise in international affairs are due to several factors, amongst which:

- the diversity of political and law regulation systems;
- the diversity of economical organizing forms and levels of economic development;
- insufficient regulations, especially in less developed countries;
- existing conflicts between national and regional economic interests;
- the influenced area and power of the multinational corporations, as well as their ability to elude law regulations;
- corruption in some areas of the world.

Business ethics does not exist in an empty space. Other related business and society concepts or frameworks, such as corporate social responsibility or corporate citizenship, could infiltrate an exploration of a nation's business ethics activity (Schwartz, Weber, 2006: 386).

In order to be able to respond to ethic challenges encountered in international business, managers must understand the increasing complexity of the global business environment and its ethic issues and to develop strategies for decision making and for forming and implementing corporate ethic policies, keeping in mind the conditions imposed by the international business context.

There are differences between firms in how they approach the practice of ethical management. This variation may be attributed to exogenous factors such as socio-cultural factors, and the type and quality of the legal system, as well as endogenous factors such as the form of the organization and the manner in which the relationships between the various stakeholders in the firm are defined (Batten et al., 2008: 3).



Figure 1. Types of firms

Source: Heidi Neck, Candida Brush, Elaine Allen, "The landscape of social entrepreneurship", in *Business Horizons*, Volume 52, Issue 1, January-February 2009, p.16

The specialists have identified several types of companies, depending on the manner in which they are dealing with the ethical problems (Neck et al., 2009: 15-16):

- *Social Purpose Firms* – which are founded on the premise that a social problem will be solved, yet the venture is for-profit and the impact on the market is typically perceived as economic)

- *Traditional Firms* – which focus primarily on economic mission. They have no explicit social mission beyond running a good and profitable business through the exploitation of market-based opportunities.
- *Social Consequence Firms* – similar to the traditional firm, except that many of their practices have social outcomes, although these social outcomes are not the reason for the firm's existence but an outcome of doing business. The term *corporate social responsibility* most closely aligns with this form of company.
- *Enterprising Nonprofits* – which have earned income activities which very much apply the general principles of entrepreneurship. Additionally, these organizations focus on growth and economic sustainability, and may be funded by venture philanthropists.

There are also *hybrid forms* that have a combination of behaviors and characteristics that are found in more than one type.

Corporate social responsibility, along with such variants as corporate citizenship and sustainability is the new business credo. Many leaders of the business world have come to realize the consequences of globalization for their companies, therefore defending a consensus regarding the fact that companies are liable towards the communities they serve and rely on. This proves that companies in real world are not those rational actors of Adam Smith, led by their own interest and not by good intention. Milton Friedman (Smith's modern American successor), which specifically rejected the notion of corporate social responsibility in a still widely quoted 1970 New York Times Magazine article entitled "The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits" is contradicted as well by the economic reality. That is why Tom Price considers that „Adam Smith and Milton Friedman must be spinning in their graves" (Price, 2009: 3).

Many companies argue this trend of thought, which claims that "the business of business" is to make a profit for the share holders, leaving ethics to the philosophers and priests. This standpoint forgets to admit the fact that business cannot prosper in amidst of poverty, ignorance, disease, persecution and anarchy. James W. Rouse, founder of The Rouse Company said "Profit is not the legitimate purpose of business. Its purpose is to provide a service needed by society. If this is done efficiently, companies will be profitable". Clearly, he felt there is no tension between responsible behavior and business success. Companies that effectively exercise their social responsibility, in fact, maximize their stake holder value in the long term (Tarantino, 1998).

A 2005 survey of 1,189 U.S. businesses realized by the Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce found that almost all (98 percent) large companies make corporate citizenship a priority. And two-thirds of large businesses incorporate citizenship into their business strategy (Dyer, 2005). This strong commitment reflects factors such as advocacy group pressures, fear of (or efforts to shape) government regulations, recruitment and retention of top employees and efforts to make their companies more attractive to investors and customers.

"The Coca-Cola Company must be both a great business and a great corporate citizen", Coke Chairman and CEO E. Neville Isdell said (*Corporate Responsibility Review*, The Coca-Cola Co., 2006:8). General Electric "must be a great company with the capability, reach and resources to make a difference," GE chief Jeffrey R. Immelt said. "But we must also be a good company, because true impact means defining success in ways that go well beyond the bottom line" (*2006 Citizenship Report*, General Electric Co., 2006). After being attacked for buying products from Third World sweatshops, Nike began to publish its supply-chain information and to engage in other good-citizen activities. The Environmental Defense advocacy group has served as a consultant to FedEx, Wal-Mart, DuPont and other corporations trying to improve their environmental records (Price, 2009: 2-4).

The company is not a neutral mechanism that balances costs and revenues, but a social institution similar to a family, association, political organization which forms the human environment. It has its own ethics in order to be able to function alongside of its economic partners. The company's ethics issues result from its inclusion in a wider social environment, with its institutions, codes and values. It may be wrong about economical principles (settlements, avoiding competition laws, disloyal competition…) or its partners' interests (tax evasion, crime concerning work law, abuse of social goods, and inequity towards the minority of shareholders…). It may make mistakes through negligence and underestimation of damage caused. Ultimately, it can show no respect towards the members and values of another company, which isn't necessarily illegal, but brings to discussion the legitimacy of looking to the company with respect.

People want to work for companies that are socially responsible and that create directions for them to be as well. Companies also realize that a healthy community is a great place to operate a business, to hire people, to locate a store, a great place for people to come and shop. The health of the community represents a platform for economic success.

In international business, complexity rises from the combining of two or more national spaces, with its specific restrictions and values, without eluding the international environment with its own standards. The difficulty increases along with considering administrative, logistic and financial techniques which are clearly less familiar than those of the national environment.

1.3. Ethics principles and behavior in business

The mobility of work force, capitals, goods and technology lead to an increasing globalization of transactions and its effects. In this context, laws and instruments of the market are necessary but insufficient to form a behavior. It is necessary that companies feel responsible for their policies and actions and to respect the dignity of all those involved.

Aware of the fact that their company can be a strong factor of positive social change, some international organizations have come up with sets of principles that are to be considered a base for dialogue and action for companies in search of social responsibility.

1.3.1. Codes created by international organizations

The Principles of Business drafted by the Caux Round Table

The Caux Round Table, organization that aligns managers of European, Japanese and American companies, has the mission to favor industrial initiatives and those in the business world as a vital force of innovation and change, in a world that is in a profound alteration. Founded in 1986 by Frederik Philips, the former president of Philips and Oliver Giscard d'Estaing, vice-president of INSEAD, it was initially aiming to reduce increasing techniques between economic blocks. It would initially pursuit to develop constructive relations both in the economic and social area between participant countries, looking into the urgent responsibilities that they had in common towards the rest of the world.

Looking into Rvuzaburo Kaku's recommendations, president of Canon Inc., the Round Table stopped to look at the crucial role that leaders of companies had in reducing social and economical inequities that threaten the planet's peace and stability. They need to establish relations based on trust, understanding and cooperation, starting with respect towards high moral values. Therefore, responsible action of each individual in its own sphere of influence will be possible.

The participants of the Caux Round Table are convinced that the business world needs to have an important role in improving social and economic conditions. Thus, in 1994, they have come up with a set of business behavior principles, called *Principles for business*, which translates aspirations, and offers a global standard that companies can relate to

concerning business behavior. This code allows the common values to be identified and the different ones to be conciliated, describing a common conception about a practice behavior that is acceptable to all and respected by all. These principles are originated in three fundamental ethic notions: the Japanese notion of "kyosei", respect and protection of human dignity and responsible stewardship. Kyosei refers to living and working together for the common good, in a manner that combines cooperation and prosperity with healthy and loyal competition.

In 2009 CRT *Principles for Responsible Business* comprise seven principles and more detailed Stakeholder Management Guidelines covering each of the key stakeholder dimensions of ethical business practices: customers, employees, shareholders, suppliers, competitors, and communities.

The CRT 7 principles for business are: Recognize stakeholder constituencies; Create wealth for development of the world; Act with sincerity, candor and truthfulness; Respect the law; The World is one economic community; Sustain the environment; Avoid corruption and illicit dealings[1].

The principles for business are widely used not just by business companies and organizations, but also by universities from all over the world and are included in several different books and publications. They have been offered as a guideline for companies in order to create, examine, implement and monitor their own principles, as real value of each set of principles resides in its utility and implementation in daily activities.

The economic development does not occur independently from social, cultural and political institutions. The institutes, values, and practices that participate in shaping wealth creation are the social capital of a society. This is the reason why starting with 2005, Caux Round Table makes a top of countries taking into consideration an indicator called *Social Capital Achievement (SCA),* which measures the social capital of a country. SCA is an aggregate of three community sub-systems: economic activity, social/cultural variables, and legal and political institutions. The economic components for the SCA rankings embrace GDP per capital and sovereign currency ratings. Relevant cultural variables and social richness are modeled by indices of corruption, economic freedom, political freedom and human development. Legal and political institutions can be assessed through measures of the rule of law, 12 core best practice standards for management of financial institutions, and other governance indicators.

Countries with high levels of social capital achievement are more economically prosperous and provide a higher quality of life for those who live in them. Countries with low levels of social capital are more prone to poverty, and more severe economic, political, and social inequities. On the top places (SCA > 0.78) there are countries like Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Australia, Luxemburg, Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland, whereas on the final places (SCA < 0.30) we can find Venezuela, Tajikistan, Angola, Turkmenistan, Chad, Sudan, Guinea (Young, Lindstrom, 2009).

Behavior principles of Caux Round Table require that the company makes the rules of the game in order to be an agent of positive social change. They have probably touched a sensible cord, as today they are the most widely accepted ethic standards of business behavior. They are therefore an outstanding accomplishment. This accomplishment, however, induces a challenge: principles lose their meaning unless they cause action. Therefore, the time has come for companies to behave according to these rules.

Global Sullivan Principles

Issued in 1999, the *Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility*, developed with the input of several multinational corporations, provide a framework by which socially

[1] Caux Round Table, "Principles for Business", *Caux Round Table* website, http://www.cauxroundtable.org/index.cfm?&menuid=8

responsible companies and organizations can be aligned.[2]

The principles include eight broad directives on labor, business ethics and environmental practices of multinational companies and their business partners. The *Principles* were written by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, whose original Sullivan Principles provided guidelines for companies doing business in South Africa during the period of apartheid. Companies endorse the *Principles* by publicly pledging to integrate them into their operations. Continuing support requires that companies provide an annual letter to Reverend Sullivan restating the company's commitment and outlining progress to date.

Business ethic rules for Rotary International

Rotary International is one of the largest aid organization in the world (more than 30.000 clubs and 1.2 million members) formed of business people who encourage the usage of high ethic standards in all areas and contribute to the good understanding and peace in the world. It has elaborated one of the most highly used ethic codes in business, called "The 4-Way Test". According to it, each person needs to ask themselves the following questions referring to things they think, say or do: Is this true? Is it just for all those involved? Will it lead to good understanding and consolidation of friendship? Will all those involved benefit from this?

They are banal questions, but represent some of the most important ideas that should be pursuit in life. "The 4-Way Test" is universally valid. It was created in 1932 by a member of the Rotary club who was dealing with the most difficult situation that can occur in business: bankruptcy. Even during the Great Crisis he gave credit to these simple questions in order to save his company. Ever since, the test has been translated in over one hundred languages and has been published in numerous publications.

In 1989, Rotary International has created a broader and more specific to the business world set of rules concerning ethic standards, called *"Declaration of Rotarians in Business and Professions"*:[3]

As a Rotarian engaged in a business or profession, I am expected to:

- Consider my vocation to be another opportunity to serve;
- Be faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the ethical codes of my vocation, to the laws of my country, and to the moral standards of my community;
- Do all in my power to dignify my vocation and to promote the highest ethical standards in my chosen vocation;
- Be fair to my employer, employees, associates, competitors, customers, the public, and all those with whom I have a business or professional relationship;
- Recognize the honor and respect due to all occupations which are useful to society;
- Offer my vocational talents: to provide opportunities for young people, to work for the relief of the special needs of others, and to improve the quality of life in my community;
- Adhere to honesty in my advertising and in all representations to the public concerning my business or profession;
- Neither seek from nor grant to a fellow Rotarian a privilege or advantage not normally accorded others in a business or professional relationship.

Business relations are built on trust. Trust is the most important element within a work relation. When reflecting upon the way in with your actions will affect others, think of it on long term and do whatever you can to say the truth, in order to be fair to everybody, to create good understanding and friendship and be sure that whatever you do is for the benefit of all. This is the philosophy of those at Rotary International, which determines ethics to become a non-problem (Hart, 2000).

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[2] Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility, http://www.globalsullivanprinciples.org/principles.htm

[3] Rotary International, "Declaration of Rotarians in Business and Professions", http://www.sumterrotary.org/Declaration.pdf

Global Reporting Initiative

The GRI[4] (issued in 1999, but development is ongoing) is an international reporting standard for voluntary use by organizations reporting on the economic, environmental and social dimensions of their activities, products and services. Using input from reporters and report users, the GRI has sought to develop a list of specific indicators for reporting on social, environmental and economic performance. The GRI, since it is a non-financial reporting framework, does not provide recommendations on business conduct, but the framework is necessarily underpinned by norms for business conduct. The GRI is led by the Coalition of Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) and includes NGOs, corporations, consultancies, accounting firms, business associations, academics and others. UNEP provided some financing. The GRI does not assess companies' conformity with its reporting guidelines.

In March 2009, the board of GRI adopted *The Amsterdam Declaration on Transparency and Reporting,* which contains a call on all governments to extend and strengthen the global regime of sustainability reporting.[5]

1.3.2. Ethics within the global community

Although a mutual effort is required, many consider that there must be a leader in the area of business ethics and social responsibility. Business people and international organizations agree that the business environment is the one which needs make this effort. Governments still place national interests ahead of the global ones and local communities often fail to notice the strong connection between the global prosperity and their own prosperity. Many other institutions have one purpose, excluding the others: environment protection, protection of the workers' rights and ceasing corruption.

Scandals connected to globalization make the front page of newspapers daily. Many of these incidents have something in common: they represent an ethic issue or lack thereof. In order to prevent this, many global companies create behavior codes just as IBM or Xerox have done a long while ago. These companies, like others, such as Levi Strauss, Siemens, Nortel, ITT Corporation, Matsushita Electric and Canon go even further and include their messages in their business practice and daily affairs, turning these into vital documents with global applicability (Tarantino, 1998).

Many companies build credos of their organizational philosophies and state their fundamental values, which include ethic values as well. Avon Cosmetics, Toys R Us and Otto-Versand (the largest company of postal sales, with headquarters in Germany) are the first to have signed the first universal standard of ethic resources: Social Accountability 8000. SA 8000 is an initiative of the Council for Economic Priorities, a research organization based in New York. It offers a common general environment regarding ethic resources for companies of any size and any type from all over the world. It is based on the principles of international human rights norms as described in International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It measures the performance of companies in eight key areas: child labor, forced labor, health and safety, free association and collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours and compensation. SA8000 also provides for a social accountability management system to demonstrate ongoing conformance with the standard.[6]

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[4] Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/

[5] Global Reporting Initiative, „The Amsterdam Declaration on Transparency and Reporting", http://www.globalreporting.org/CurrentPriorities/AmsterdamDeclaration/

[6] Social Accountability International, http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=472

Global companies exert a strong influence on society, with both benefic and negative effects. Social contributions of global corporations are connected to creation of new work places, the improvement of life standards in the host areas, the ease of access to modern technology offered by business or management expertise, the introduction of ethic practices within the competition and the creation of relations within the community based on social responsibility. The disadvantages induced by business globalization include power abuse within nations where institutions exert a reduced control, bribe and corruption, loss of work places, disrespecting the human rights, involvement in political affairs and influence abuse, pollution and negative effects upon the environment.

There are factors that increase the chances of success of the non-ethic behavior in international business when

- within the host culture, men have more power than institutions;
- there is an unbalanced distribution of power and wealth in the host culture;
- the company's values of internal cultures are offered by the market;
- competition in that particular branch is very strong.

Thus, it is necessary that all global companies adopt and respect a series of guidelines in order to be able to solve some problems of a certain community and for their influence upon society to be positive. They need to:

- develop politics concerning non-discriminatory usage of work force and to promote equal work opportunities;
- respect the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and expression;
- maintain ecologic balance, to protect the environment and to adopt measures to avoid environmental deterioration;
- elaborate a "win-win" type of economic partnership report for each host state and to engage long term relations with the host countries.

Behavior codes in global business

The primary purpose of each corporation is to administrate its business effectively, without thinking that *the only business of business is business*. It needs to profit by the favorable opportunity that is offered to contribute to a greater stability and prosperity. Many leaders of the business world have come to realize what the implications of globalization are to their companies, defending a unity concerning the fact that companies are responsible to the communities they serve and depend on the necessity of elaboration of business behavior codes.

There are two kinds of ethical codes of conduct for multinational companies. We can make the difference between *corporate codes of conduct* and *codes of conduct for multinational corporations. Corporate codes of conduct* are individual company policy statements that define a company's own ethical standards, while *codes of conduct for multinationals* are externally generated and to some degree imposed on multinationals.

Corporate Codes of Conducts

Companies have adopted their own codes "voluntarily" or in direct response to publicized scandals. Public relations preservation of brand image and humanitarian concerns have both been cited as motivating factors in the formation of such in-house guidelines. The codes can take a number of formats and address any issue – workplace issues and workers' rights being just one possible category. Also, their implementation depends totally on the company concerned. Potential authors of a code are the founder, board of directors, CEO, top management, legal departments and consultants. The process can involve employee representatives and/or randomly or otherwise selected employees.

Worldwide interest in corporate conduct was initially awakened in the 1980s by scandals in the defense industry and on Wall Street. Companies viewed business ethics as a way

of promoting self-regulation and diminishing government intervention and regulatory action. Corporate interest quickly led to the „institutionalization" of business ethics programs, consisting largely of codes of conduct, ethics officers and ethics training. Among the first companies to establish codes were *General Electric* and other defense contractors.

Corporate codes of conduct existed prior to the movement of the 1980s. For example, *Johnson & Johnson's Credo* was published in 1943. As early as 1935, general Robert Wood Johnson urged his fellow industrialists to embrace what he termed „a new industrial philosophy". Johnson defined this as the corporation's responsibility to customers, employees, the community and stockholders.

Following the pricing scandals that rocked the defense industry in the 1980s, *General Electric* became a prime example of an American corporation in need of an image overhaul. In response, the company created a corporate ombudsman's office, originally for the purpose of examining its government defense contracts. The company also drew up a summary of in-house rules on ethical concerns, called "Integrity: The Spirit & the Letter of Our Commitment", which is eighty pages long and is available in most languages that are spoken in the *General Electric* worldwide network[7].

The 1990s saw a proliferation of corporate codes of conduct and an increased emphasis on corporate responsibility. These emerged in the aftermath of a period that saw a major shift in the economic role of the state, and in policies toward transnational corporations and foreign direct investment (Jenkins, 2001).

The Conference Board (a non-profit, non-advocacy business membership and research organization, connecting senior executives from more than 2300 enterprises in over 60 nations) considers three categories of codes[8]:

- *Compliance codes:* directive statements giving guidance and prohibiting certain kinds of conduct.
- *Corporate credos:* broad general statements of corporate commitments to clients, values and objectives.
- *Management philosophy statements:* formal enunciations of the company or CEO's way of doing business.

Batten et al. have identified three dimensions of ethical practices in corporations (Batten et al., 2008:4):

- *Written codes of ethics*
- *Forums for the discussion of ethics,* which provide an informal mechanism for developing and monitoring ethical practice in the firm.
- *Environmental sensitivity* – formal written environmental policies and practices.

There are many issue areas dealt with in corporate codes: issues related to the employee's contract with the company (workplace safety, confidentiality of employee records, employee privacy) and issues focused on employee honesty (purchasing guidelines and security of proprietary information). Codes in the United States are more likely to include sections on the security of proprietary information, while workplace safety is a more frequent subject of European ethics statements. Most codes include some formal statement of the company's fundamental principles.

Fundamentally, a code of conduct depends on its credibility: the extent to which it is taken seriously by industry, unions, consumers and governments. Credibility, in turn, depends on monitoring, enforcement and transparency: the extent to which foreign contractors and

[7] International Labour Organization, „Corporate Codes of Conduct", http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm
[8] *Ibidem*

subcontractors, workers, the public, non-governmental organizations and governments are aware of the code's existence and meaning.

There are four major criticisms of company codes:

1. Vaguely Defined. Corporate codes do not specify precisely the limits of their responsibility. Does the code only apply to the direct employees or also to the employees of the subcontractors and suppliers? And if so, who is considered to be a subcontractor or supplier? Does the code apply to all products? A good code needs to answer these questions. Most company codes do not.

2. Incomplete. They address a limited number of issues. Many company codes exclude the right to organize, refer only to child labor or in other ways are not complete.

3. Not Implemented. An important flaw in company codes of conduct is the lack of information on how these codes are being implemented and monitored. Companies often say they instruct their buyers or send special teams to implement and monitor their codes. It is impossible to know if they really do so consistently, because records of these activities are not publicly available for scrutiny or follow-up. Research shows that sometimes they do, sometimes they do not. Sometimes only a questionnaire is sent which management is required to fill in. This implies that anything written about company codes could possibly be true: that the code could be nothing more than a piece of paper that serves a public relations function or, the other extreme, that an extensive implementation and monitoring system might have been developed by the company. Often companies do not have a consistent policy in this respect; they check in some places and monitor some issues, while other places and issues are ignored.

4. Not Independently Monitored. Even if a company has a good code of conduct and it has done it's utmost to implement it, company-controlled or internal monitoring assumes a willingness to take the company at its word only. Staff of the company, special division, subsidiary or external company involved in such monitoring efforts only report to the company that has hired them. Those outside of company management have no way of knowing if violations have been found, how many, what kind and what steps have been undertaken to improve the situation, to name just a few obvious questions.

Codes of Conduct for Multinationals

The Codes of Conduct or Guidelines for Multinationals are not of the companies' own making, nor are they agreements between companies and the entities which create the codes. In some cases, however, multinationals are involved in the drafting process. The fact that these codes are externally established standards while other corporate codes of conduct are of a voluntary and internal nature has important implications when considering their implementation in corporate practice. The value of such codes consists in setting minimum standards and raising the level of general multinationals behavior, raising consciousness about the need for standards and in providing guidance for laws that can be adopted at the national level.

The first international code of conduct for multinationals was created by the *International Chamber of Commerce*: "Code of Standards of Advertising Practice" in 1937. Since then, the Code has been revised a number of times and a number of new marketing-related codes have been introduced by the International Chamber of Commerce. These include the "International Code of Sales Promotion", "International Code of Practice on Direct Marketing", "Code on Environmental Advertising", "International Chamber of Commerce Code on Sponsorship" and the "International Code of Marketing and Social Research Practice". The codes of the International Chamber of Commerce set rules for member companies and intend to restrict inter-company competition to certain acceptable forms, in order to help prevent

competition from damaging the environment or society in locations where the companies operate.[9]

In response to pressure from developing countries and human rights groups, several international organizations developed ethics guidelines addressing the conduct of multinational companies. In 1976, the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) adopted its *Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises*[10]. The Declaration constitutes a political commitment, adopted by the governments of OECD member states, to facilitate direct investment among OECD members. The Declaration contains the *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*[11] (revised in 2000), which deal with general policies, information disclosure, competition, financing, taxation, employment and industrial relations, the environment and science and technology. The Guidelines are recommendations covering some areas of business conduct addressed by governments to multinational enterprises. While observance of the recommendations by enterprises is purely voluntary, adhering governments sign a binding decision to participate in Guidelines implementation and to promote their observance by enterprises operating in or from their territory. The code is aimed specifically at improving the climate for investment and to put an end to discrimination against multinationals.

The ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy[12], issued in 1977, is a global instrument designed to provide guidelines to governments, employers and workers in areas of employment, training, conditions of work and industrial relations. All core labor standards are covered in the Declaration. Although it is a non-binding instrument, its implementation is nevertheless the object of regular reviews and there is a procedure for examining disagreements concerning its application by means of an interpretation of its provisions.

In relation to multinationals, these codes of conduct are recommendations. Even if the codes have been agreed by a number of sovereign states or such over entities as have been granted international personality by sovereign states, they do not have a status of international law, which would set a binding effect on multinationals operating in those states which have adopted or joined the code. Hence, codes of conduct for multinationals impose no legal, but only moral obligations on companies.

Anyone may introduce a code. Besides governments and intergovernmental organizations, codes have been introduced by trade union organizations, employers' organizations, various environmental, consumer, investor, religious, ethical and other organizations and by various groups protesting certain international phenomena. Some of the codes have been adopted multilaterally, some unilaterally. Codes of conduct for multinationals may address any issue relevant to their activities. Codes have in fact addressed a wide variety of issues, including: relations between multinationals in world markets (for example, with regard to advertising, marketing, sponsorship and competition in general), labor markets (for example, terms and conditions of work and equality), environmental standards (for example, emissions, waste or safety in production and transportation) and health and safety issues related to individual products (for example, toys, baby milk substitutes and other products).

These codes of conduct can take various forms. Their credibility depends on three main factors: the governments that have adopted them or companies that have subscribed to them (in number, size or nationality), the nature of the substantive provisions of the code and any related

[9] International Labour Organization, „Codes of Conduct for Multinationals", http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/main.htm

[10] OECD, „The Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises", http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/oecddec.htm

[11] OECD, „The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises",

[12] International Labour Organization, „Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy", http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/triparti.htm

monitoring mechanism (such as investigation methods, reporting on investigation result and dissemination of reports).

Conclusions

Business globalization, with its multiple consequences, has been accelerated during the previous years by three phenomena: advance in communication technology which has created an explosion of information; massive cross-border flows of capitals, goods and services; abolishment of communism. However, despite opportunities for social progress being greater than ever, the benefits of globalizations are not equally distributed, hence human dissatisfaction and risk of social agitation.

Many global companies have become huge; they operate in a manner that doesn't keep borders in mind and cross many Nation States with their qualities of entities and have the largest influence upon global trade. Meanwhile, distrust and lack of understanding of business in some places make it difficult for business, as well as the benefits that it can bring to the society, to progress.

Given the circumstances, the business world needs to come up with new initiatives. Its primary responsibility is to act with competence, respecting the interests of all its actors. But for its own sake and that of the society as a whole, it should become more active in search of solutions for global problems and the development of a growing cooperation with governments and other institutions.

In the era of "global village", transnational companies operate under the critic watch of mass media, international organizations and citizens. Their respecting the human rights, business partners and consumers is perceived more as a normal part of their responsibility as well as respect towards culture and environment; the more so, as these companies operate in an uncertain and risky political environment.

Behavior codes, as an expression of value and optimization of values, represents an integral part of corporative governance. In order to act based on ethic principles within the contemporary market, global companies need to make sure that these behavior codes have become culturally coherent to all their employees. When is a behavior code not enough? The answer, relatively simple, is: when there is a cultural contradiction between the desired behavior and the existing practices.

Solving the complex problems created by globalization needs a joint effort of business environments, governments and other institutions. If acting separately, these powerful players would fail. But collaboration allows them to use local patterns in international context and to find multiple solutions to complex issues. Partnership accomplished in several cities where companies work together with local authorities, central governments, educational institutions, emergency services and interest groups may be adapted to the case of global initiatives. Although the difficulties in accomplishing efficient and long term collaboration are hard to ignore, the business world needs to have initiative and to persevere in this process.

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DAVID MITRANY, PORTRAIT OF AN UNRESTLESSNESS' THEORIST

Adrian Claudiu POPOVICIU*

Abstract: *David Mitrany proposed a new international order based on transnational cooperation. Writing at a time when Europe underwent a deep crisis, Mitrany managed to provide the functionalist theory arguments favouring regional and global integration. His main concern was efficient management of limited resources as a core premise for sustainable cooperation and what he defined as "a working peace system".*

Key words: *Theory, Functionalism, Working Peace System*

Given his vast experience as a journalist, diplomat and informed observer of international relations during the most important events of the first half of the twentieth century, it is not surprising that the work of David Mitrany, not sophisticated theory, defining its approaches creed since 1948: "There seems to be the fate of all transition periods that reformers are more likely to fight than to align a theory to solve a problem. I am not a theory. I represent a worry" (Taylor, 1975: ix).

The matter to which he dedicates his life work was how to approach the states to address issues that transcend territorial boundaries. "Approach" which he adopted in treating this problem is known as "functionalism".

David Mitrany comes to propose a new international order based on transnational cooperation. Writing at a time when Europe was crossed by a deep crisis, Mitrany managed to provide to its functionalist theory arguments in favor of global integration, but also regional. (Griffiths, 2003:310)

His main concern was related to the efficient management of limited resources as an essential precondition for a sustainable cooperation and the creation of what he defined as "a functional working peace system" (Păun-Păun-Ciceo, 2003: 309)

Mitrany's theoretical work may be circumscribed into efforts to an international system that would not allow the emergence of conflicts.

The main points of the functionalist agenda as it was laid down by Mitrany are the priority to human needs or public welfare and the opposition to the sanctity of the national state, up to questioning the national state's capacity to meet human needs.

The period in which David Mitrany published it is about 61 years (1914 – 1975), having as reference points:

- The Southeastern Europe (especially Romania)
- Society and economy
- The evolution of the international system.

The analysis of the young London School of Economics graduate reveals a true analyst of political developments on the continent around the year 1914. In March the same year, in one of his articles in *New Romanian Magazine*, presents Briton Max Waechter's initiative for the establishment of the *League for European unification*. The ultimate aim of the British project, seemed to be agreed also by Edward II, was the achievement of the United States of Europe, but a fundamental objective was the elimination of rivalry and competition between the Entente and Central Powers.

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In 1915, he participated in determining the volume of *Balkans*, coordinated by Nevill Forbes, with a chapter entitled *"Rumania: her history and politics"*. Two years later, he returns with a study called *Greater Romania: A Study in the national ideas*.

Starting with 1924, his concerns extend also upon the constitutional organization of Romania after the war. Thus, in the article *New Rumanian Constitution*, published in the *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, the author makes use of a constitutional history to explain the need for a new fundamental law. Beyond the historical approach, Mitrany submits under his analysis three general themes: land reform, voting rights and constitutional guarantees. His conclusion is clear: "the new constitution creates a strange situation [...], the country is at risk, in the near future, to a series of constitutional heartbreaking crises" (Mitrany, 1924: 119).

Until 1930, Romania remains a favorite theme of Mitrany's studies, in works like: *The Land & the Peasant in Rumania. The War and Agrarian Reform* (1917-21), *The Progress in International Government* (1933) and *The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe* (l936).

Thus, *The Land and the Peasant in Romania*, is part of the collection volumes *Economic and Social History of the First World War*, *Romanian Series*, published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment Foundation. Even if the work has never been translated and published in Romania, Nicolae Iorga presented it in a plenum of the Romanian Academy.

Although Mitrany is known mainly as the creator of functionalism, more than half of his writings concern the theme of Romania and the area of Southeastern Europe, and between them, the peasants' land problem is analyzed more deeply. Despite the considerable extent of the work, 630 pages, Mitrany limits his analysis only on Romanian land reform and the manner in which World War I influenced it. (Mitrany, 1930: XXIII) The over twelve chapters and a section of conclusions, Mitrany is trying to capture, in a relevant analysis, the land reform, using in this, historical and economic, sociological or political information. (Mitrany, 1930: 567) Based on the analysis of a policy outlining the social and political freedoms, Mitrany succeeds in the second part of his work, to take stock of the legal framework which held the land reform, and only then in part three shows how the reform was implemented and its effects.

Even though over several centuries of foreign domination peasants were abused occasionally, the national government managed quickly and systematically to suppress those few remnants of the rights of those who held a piece of land. In this regard, Mitrany states that "if the anarchy of the first period of modern history, the peasant's store, occasionally, was searched and cleared of things, during the national independence, development of state and ruling class, the peasant was left with nothing, not even what to wear. Romanian people's history reveals a strong and simple correlation between increasing national government and social decline of the peasantry. "(Mitrany, 1930: 568)

Although 1906 was one of national splendor, there were 40 years since ascending the throne of King Carol I, 1907 is one of the peasant revolts, symptom of foundation weakness and sign of the need for state reform, which was recognized by the leaders until 1913, however late, the country being involved in wars in the Balkans.

Mitrany believes that there is a close causal connection between war and land reform. A land reform applied under normal conditions would have been achieved in the selection of beneficiaries on certain economic standards. Under Romanian reform, however, the land was not given to those who could best use it, but those who suffered more in the war. In support of this consideration Mitrany recalls that peasant leader Ion Mihalache had to admit that using "other criteria would cause a moral revolt in the countryside" (Mitrany, 1930: 569).

Even if the agrarian reform brings tranquility in rural areas, it will produce an economic-agricultural gap between Romania, on the one hand, and the major European or American states, on the other, due to the inability of large landowners, especially of new small

owners to equip with advanced agricultural machinery and tools. This view presented by Mitrany in the third part of the work is enhanced and the information provided in the interview given by professor Gustav Cassel on this issue in *Revue d'Economie Politique. (Revue d'Economie Politique, January / February 1929).* With all these economic shortcomings, land reform has facilitated the work of postwar reconstruction of the Romanian economy. In its report to Congress of Agriculture at Rome in June 1927, M. Ionescu-Siseşti said that "in my opinion, let alone the importance of social, agricultural land reform restored the damage caused by war. Without intervention resume cultivation reform would be much more difficult and much delayed. "(Mitrany, 1930: 573)

Repeated several times, Mitrany's opinion that land reform is not shared by the entire political class, citing the opinion of a Liberal minister, supported in parliament, relating to agriculture, that deserves special encouragement, its progress depending on natural elements such as soil and rain. An opposing view was presented in parliament by Iuliu Maniu (speech on August 4, 1927), he stressed that Romania is a country land, all other branches of economic activity depending on it. "After decades of an unnatural economic policy, geared towards industrialism, forced the enormous sacrifices demanded from the State and consumers, it's time to inaugurate an agricultural policy. Such a new orientation of economic policy is all the more necessary that the reform has four fifths of the country land in the hands of small growers.'' (1921 speech)

Although the reform was carried out with several shortcomings, Mitrany recognizes that it facilitated the process of recovery of Romania's agriculture, thus helping the development of other economic branches, and in the end the consolidation of the newly unified national state is accelerated.

It is best known for his essay *Marx versus the Peasant,* which was translated and published in Romania in 1929-30 in economic independence. What it can be seen is that the land reform issue is addressed by Mitrany in a multidisciplinary approach, which combines legal analysis economic, sociological, psychological, cultural and political.

The Effect of the *War in Southeastern Europe* remains one of the most influential works of Mitrany in 1930. The theme of his study was often addressed in the interwar period, especially since it is an attempt to understand the developments that occurred after World War I in Central and Eastern Europe. It gave one of the first historical perspectives, social, economic and political effects of war in this part of the continent. In a review of Mitrany's book, Harry Howard argued that this volume is not a research paper but rather a summary of the volumes of the Carnegie (Endowment for International Peace) on the effects of war in Central and South East "(Howard, 1938: 627).

Mitrany's approach, despite stingily that reveal their sources, reveals his admiration for the project submitted in 1906, by AC Popovici in the *United States of Great Austria*. (Crisan, 2008: 9) On the general, the author states "the effects of the Great War were the same everywhere .[...] Its effect on a state with one nation may be one of unification. But when a multinational state can only be one disruptive. If modern war requires nation-under-arms, and nation-under-arms can not exist without national unity, this means that a multinational state assumes a fatal risk when undertaking this move. For a state that is divided national or social, there can only save it in a state of peace, or perhaps a return to armed professionals completely formed. "(Mitrany, 1936: 237)

The work which brought him fame in the Western academic world, and the historiography of studying the international relations was the brochure published in 1943 entitled *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization*. In this way, practically Mitrany gets into the great theoretical debate since the mid-century developments on the international system. The first public forms its functionalist approach to international relations was made in the conferences which he

claimed at Yale University in 1932. He argued, since then, that the main obstacle to a global society is in a "worship" of political borders.

The solution that Mitrany proposes to the world is "a functional integration of activities and materials on a worldwide cultural transfer on a regional basis" (Mitrany, 1975: 10). In this context, he supported several conferences that he published in 1933, titled *The Progress of International Government.*

After twenty years in Romania, where he perfected the primary and secondary education and the military service, David Mitrany leaves for a period of three years in Hamburg where he attended the Colonial Institute, the forerunner of the University of Hamburg. Here, while its evening school is also working to finalize a business office in order to maintain himself. (Mitrany, 1975: 3)

Here, he got acquainted first with social problems and various ways to improve them, which will be a catalyst for Mitrany's later faith in finding solutions for peace and prosperity, "when an old acquaintance -- before reaching one of the best lawyers in town then and judge - on a Sunday I went to meet a group of workers of a factory to a head office, a Toynbee Hall as British or American, working class district of Rothenburgsort . For Eastern Europe, place and purpose were something like a revelation, in part responsible for the acceleration of an old desire to go to England while most young people in Romania was Paris (...). "(Mitrany, 1975: 4) So the fall of 1912 finds Mitrany in London, where he begins to pursue sociology, under the direction of LT Hobhouse[1] and political science under the guidance of Graham Wallas. Resort search of areas of sociology and political systems were given the Romanian origin: "Born and educated in Romania, we saw the mass of people of a country rich in terms of natural living conditions were worse than the much condemned period Turkish occupation.[2] A country with state compulsory primary education but is still 70% degree of illiteracy, a country with advanced voting but where most people live on land (no house), which does not even have a true representative of the peasantry in parliament, although peasant class have always represented in their own ad hoc meetings were occasionally met before Romania to win independence. "(Mitrany, 1975: 3)

By 1914, David Mitrany attended the London School of Economics and socially active in the establishment of a Society Shaftesburg (Fairlight Hall, Tooting), becoming a member of the Advisory Committee of Tooting Juvenile Labor Exchange, where, with George Protheroe[3], editor in *The Quarterly Review*, he joined the British army as field staff. After the war, with the help of George Protheroe, now a official at the Department of History in the Foreign Office, was hired as a consultant for South East Europe and then took part in writing Peace Handbooks sites, prepared by the Foreign Office Protheroe. (Mitrany, 1975: 6)

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[1] "LT Hobhouse was a liberal and having a close personal bond with CP Scott and The Manchester Guardian, and Graham Wallas was one of the founders of the company Fabien. Both graduates of Oxford and they were both away from the traditional method of study and teaching of political theory, both were true scientists, allergic to the slightest whiff of dogmatism. Hobhouse, essentially a philosopher, gave a definition of politics as a science, which for me remains fundamental: that political scientist role was not to predict events, but to uncover and make clear "relationship between things. This, I am sure, was warning that opened my mind the real nature of modern political thought, the meaning and its limits, as a science, and one way is the central idea behind the whole philosophical functionalist theories. "(D . Mitrany, The Operational Theory of Politics, London, Ed Martin Robertson, 1975, p. 16)

[2] In *The Land & the Peasant in Rumania. The War and Agrarian Reform* (1917-21) David Mitrany reports, being surprised by the discovery that came into conflict with traditional writings. that during the Turkish regime, peasants who had 3 steers were classified as poor, and after independence became a top category. (this one presents in his memoirs, D. Mitrany, *The Operational Theory of Politics*, London, Ed Martin Robertson, 1975, p. 48)

[3] Sir George Walter Protheroe, (14 October 1848 - July 10, 1922), English writer and historian, President of the Royal Historical Society.

The period immediately following World War termination is a very effervescent, Mitrany considering that liberals and radicals shared British war aims, many liberals, but also some conservatives saw the opportunity to achieve national freedom in Central and Eastern Europe. Since 1916 member of the League of Nations Society[4], participated during 1917, the conference circuit of five lecturers[5], who share their political ideas in various British cities, with the Workers Educational Association. Mitrany's topic was *"small states and a League of Nations"* (Mitrany, 1919: 6) "which was a favorite, because the origin and foreign accent" (Mitrany, 1919: 6). This study presented a scheme of regional transformation and purpose of which was represented at the highest international level of small states. Starting from the idea that the League of Nations was too remote, the regional intermediate element will be necessary to resolve these states, but for the best possible representation of their world. Mitrany believes that this study is the starting point in what then became A Working Peace System. (Mitrany, 1919: 6)

Mitrany's international work led him to refuse any offer from any political party because "I felt it a moral principle I should not join any political party or ideological group even Mason (whose position was different from that of Member) (Mitrany, 1919: 8). Although they worked very well with the Quaker-II (members of a peaceful and austere Protestant religious society founded in sec. XVII and widespread in Britain and the U.S.), "were the only ones telling the truth and was not compromised" (Mitrany, 1919 : 9), but membership in the period 1918-1931, the Labor Party's Advisory Committee on International Affairs[6], the issue of minorities and international organizations.

After the disband in April 1919 is the British Army, The Manchester Guardian's editor, CP Scott, makes Mitrany an offer of employment for four weeks during the summer because it had gone on a foreign affairs editor, and issues was on foreign headlines from Paris to Europe and then worldwide. Here lies almost four years, "the best school where any student could achieve political principles and policy learning trial. (Mitrany, 1919: 7) Even if experience as a columnist at The Manchester Guardian has a special ability in Mitrany considered specialist "in the analysis of causal relations" (Mitrany, 1919: 17), the most relevant experience in defining to a specialist on foreign policy has acquired a European as Assistant Editor, with Professor James Shotwell, as CEO of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Department Economic and Social History of the World War (Social and Economic History the First World War).[7]

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[4] League of Nations Society was an organization set up in the United Kingdom in order to promote international justice, collective security and peace among nations, becoming the largest and most influential British organization, in 1931 approximately 407,000 members. (source: http://library-2.lse.ac.uk/archives/handlists/LNU/LNU.html)

[5] G. Lowes Dickinson, Leonard Woolf, H.N Brailsford, A.J. Grant si D. Mitrany

[6] Between 1918 and 1945, the Labor Party has worked with some of the most prominent names in international relations by creating "Advisory Committee on International Relations", which produced a lot of statements, reports and analysis. In it were part of Norman Angel, HN Brailsford, C. Delisle Burns, CR Buxton, Noel Buxton, GDHCole, G. Lowes Dickinson, RP Dutt, WN Ewer, Hugh Dalton, Susan Lawerence, J. Ramsay MacDonald, D. Mitrany, ED Morel, Hon Oswald Mosely, A. Ponsonby, S. Saklatvala, E. Snowden, HM Swanwick, RH Tawney, GB Thomson, Ben Tillett, Arnold Toynbee, JC Wedgewood, FE Wise, Leonard Woolf, W. Gillies)

[7] "And it was a random appointment, which came within days of leaving the Guardian editorial in 1922, when I came to London to discuss an academic post. (...) While entering the main door of the London School of Economics, Professor Shotwell was about to leave her. Had come to see him on Graham Wallas, and he had just been to see the Beveridge, who was head of the editorial committee of the British section of history. We met little in Paris during the Peace Conference, and as he and Mrs. Shotwell had to leave the next morning in Cornwall, asked me to dine with her that evening to share with me some of his plans for history. We spent a lovely evening, I had little to say except that I left The Guardian and I discussed a teaching post with Wallas. 24 hours later I had telegraphed from Cornwall, asking me to accompany him as assistant European. "(Mitrany, 1975: 65)

The period he spent at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace stretches over seven years, until 1929, while the desire for knowledge of economic systems, namely economic planning will satiate the numerous information you will find the prestigious education institution. With the trend of channeling ideas came to economic planning and "a greater need to look with clarity the causal relationship between things" (Mitrany, 1975: 18).

From this period dates the relationship of friendship which has had with M. Keynes and the first projects for the application of functionalist philosophy, which during the Second World War, will materialize in the essay *"A Working Peace System an Argument for the Operational Development of International Organization "*(Mitrany, 1943)

Starting from the idea of causality simple things and the intrinsic links between them, Mitrany tried to build, with the rule of "not belonging to one group or party faithful to a set of ideologies, but it was no sacrifice (except perhaps to dispense with advancement opportunities) "(Mitrany, 1975: 38), bridges over doctrinal or institutional differences between the groups, enabling them to unite to deal with common problems.

A first project, curious and bold, launched in the late 20, aimed at creating a group of 200 people, non-political organization with the sole purpose "of any problems, and then publish its findings simply as a fact . '(Mitrany, 1975: 38) The idea was well received by some, "perfectly with my former professor prospects, LT Hobhouse, deeply concerned that civil society was too detached from political issues."[8], and the other was regarded with reservations. Category they fall and M. Keynes, who wrote on February 16, 1927 and following: "Dear Mitrany, Many thanks for your letter. I'm afraid I doubt greatly that one so-called non-partidistă group could ever take their toll importance in a certain way. Currently Liberal Industrial Research Committee, established by the Liberal Summer School, I think that is all that is possible in the direction of the supporters. The whole thing might prove unnecessary long time. But at least for now inclined to give him a chance this line of development. I see no place for these groups outside the existing organizations. It is a choice between them and purely individual action, in my opinion. Yours, respectfully JM Keynes. "(Mitrany, 1975: 80)

As can be seen from throughout his Mitrany, has not ceased to believe in his ideas, and after more than 30 years of the onset of functionalist theory "can see that things have taken place so that an assessment of senior non-partisan and policy issues would have served the country well now, and maybe the policy should be eased. The occupation government to spread much further than anyone would have expected at the time, problems that arise are even more complex effects and implications of even more difficult to assess, in part because of uncertainties "planned" international economic actions' (Mitrany, 1975: 40).

Also during the active period at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he has taken the initiative of action resulted in a "successful failure" (Mitrany, 1975: 41). In 1928, working as a correspondent and in particular for South-East for education issues, also in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at a meeting in Paris where Endowment had the European office, Nicholas Murray Butler, president of the institutions but also of Columbia University, has proposed to bring together the Balkan countries. "The same soothing exploration, and somewhat to my surprise, I received the tacit agreement of the four governments in the Balkans for an informal conference of experts to discuss the economic problems of the region. There were only two conditions, both to prevent some obvious reasons: it should not be any call for public funds - and Endowment was ready to take care of it, as if it were a matter of only ten thousand U.S. dollars, and meetings should take place on

[8] "Someone told me that his friend, CP Scott, Parliament attempted but abandoned after two years without even take a speech, although his editorials (director of The Guardian NN) have been the subject of discussion in Western media, and that also the brilliant JA Hobson has never attempted to enter active politics. "(Mitrany, 1975: 39)

neutral ground, not in one of the four countries. Hospitality was provided by a private house in Geneva. "(Mitrany, 1975: 42) With all preparations made, this event never took place as King Alexander I of royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia choked plan for now, but were also curious late at Endowment, which Mitrany learned about much later. While this first project was a failure during the Second World War, Mitrany takes the initiative, managing to gain the respective governments, then in exile in London, because some experts in those countries to participate in the achievement study on the economic development of the Danube region. The two principles on which they were imposed Mitrany: the governments delegates must work as independent experts on, and the second rule aimed inclusion in the group of experts available in London from enemy states: Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

After its establishment, the experts "have worked without any means, but a collective patience and their tests were so constructive that PEP[9] is committed to publish them under their responsibility. One aspect of their work was significant in this context the expert group reached very practical ideas. I worked for two practical suggestions: one was for transportation on the Danube, the pattern of TVA[10], the Iron Gates between Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia (the latter two are now engaged in such projects). Concerning the second suggestion I talked to President Benes. As Russia, I asked, tolerant of such a project on the Danube, where they were unlikely to participate in technical and personnel resources at the end of World War II? Give them the presidency, is an old matter of prestige in the region! he replied promptly. "(Mitrany, 1975: 42)

For David Mitrany period of 30 is very rich in active teaching, but also a greater involvement in international relations. Between 1931-1933 he is Visiting Professor at Harvard University, in 1932 is Dodge Lecturer at Yale University, between 1933-1939 is a professor in the School of Economics and Politics, the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University and the 1939-1942 is a counselor at the Foreign Research and Press Service of the Foreign Office. From this period dates the first conference on functionalism as a way of managing international relations. In 1932, when he was at Harvard gave a conference entitled "The Political Consequences of Economic Planning", which will form the raw material of the conference held in the winter of 1932 as Dodge Lecturer at Yale University. Published as "The progress of international government (Mitrany, 1975: 85-104) by publishing Yale University in 1933, the conference was the starting point for a series of international conference on governance which has hosted prestigious university. This period of intense searching method which can ensure the welfare and international peace is completed by exposing the functionalist idea during World War II, when he worked at the Foreign Research and Press Service of the Foreign Office. "In the first months of the war, before things happen, I sent a memorandum, the two pages of the new nationalism that was prone to be affected by the war - The new nationalism and the new internationalism." (Mitrany, 1975: 19) In this essay concludes on the possibility Mitrany large to produce large riots, with new requests for autonomy, but unlike the nationalist wave in the middle and end of the nineteenth century, whose essence was the cultural-political This period is one of the social-nationalism, that is an amalgamation of claims of independence, mixed with claims of social progress. Therefore, claims Mitrany, however paradoxical it may seem, that new social-nationalism can provide a tremendous opportunity for international cooperation as soon as hostilities ceased. His argument on the current socio-nationalism sprang from the fact that most resistance movements during the war were the French Resistance. Another idea supported by Mitrany visa effect of social unrest everywhere, which stifled any possibility of reprinting the moment in 1919, that a diplomatic peace conference, the traditional type, to end

[9] PEP - NGO is a permanent research group attended more than one hundred experts, who are industrialists, trade unionists, officers, academics

[10] Tennessee Valley Authority(TVA)

the war. There is only one possibility in Mitrany's ideology to maintain some influence on such political currents refractory by the possibility of obtaining rapid recovery of economic and social life. "These ideas and anxieties, the social and political failures were carefully decanted at the end of 1941, in a brief article on the international organization functionalist."[11]

Even if memorandum of Mitrany was not received very well, experts of the Foreign Research and Press Service, linked by education, have seen the functionalist approach in terms of diplomacy, always shade the balance of power "(Mitrany, 1975: 20), he continues his research on functionalist approach, especially since work on plans for federations FRPS Czech-Polish and Greek-Yugoslav, to stop Soviet expansion, on this issue Mitrany considering that "Soviet Russia is bound to dominate any regional constellation of East "(Mitrany, 1975: 21). To draft a peace conference to end the war, experts from FRPS were very difficult task to prepare a set of manuals developed for potential negotiators Britain, despite being involved in these actions Mitrany considered that with the devastation of supplies and transport across Europe, with around twenty million people to be repatriated, with groups of rebel resistance in many countries, are very small chances for a peace conference right support, to negotiate and afford to tell people where excited it was where and whom to obey.

In his memoirs, Mitrany presented on this period, two cases on which he worked and which have influenced the functionalist approach. The first is that relating to the case of Germany after the War, there are only two variations on it in his Mitrany: a) alloy group remains united and use their dominant power to establish an effective system of international security, and then implement specific measures to solve the "German problem was not necessary, b) alloy group is divided again into two parties that compete with each other, then any special measures would be unnecessary since each party had tried to draw Germany own camp. "At that time, nobody would have thought that the Russians will penetrate to the heart of Europe, and competition led to the political division of Germany between the two sides." (Mitrany, 1975: 22)

The second issue, rather secondary to management of the war, was that concerning the future of Trieste, offered an opportunity to test a functionalist solution while FRPS insist on federal plans for Eastern Europe. "Yugoslavia had some very difficult moments during their wartime refuge in London. There have been tensions between ministers and officials and their fellow Serbs Croatian Peasant Party, and the many king, the majority of them supporters of the home. Inevitably, there were differences between foreign policy and tactics. A question for which the Croats and Slovenes was felt strongest claim of Trieste. So three of their officers came to see me at Balliol[12], to ask how they could submit their claims to better FRPS. I was a very good choice, our colleague Dr. Seton-Watson and could help better, because I had no inclination or ability to diplomatic forays, and so rather than give advice on the door to official beat my visitors found themselves listening to arguments about how to reformulate the claim based on functionalist directions. After I pointed out that the decision of peace conferences are appearing often in negotiations, in part because of what was fair and honest because of conflicting demands were not always obvious without proof, however is at a port outskirts of long coastlines could be claimed by either party as a vital part for this. "(Mitrany, 1975: 23) Mitrany His advice to the three representatives of Yugoslavia to organize, to eliminate the enmity between neighbors , to Trieste in an international free port, something like the old Hansa city, under an autonomous administration. To his surprise, several days

[11] Memorandum prepared by D. Mitrany the Foreign Office, under the title Territorial, ideological, or Functional International Organization, which was subsequently published in D. Mitrany, The Operational Theory of Politics, London, Ed Martin Robertson, 1975, p. 102 -- 122

[12] The place where the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) functioned.

later wrote to his visitors were convinced that the project of self Trieste was correct and that taking into account their own government.[13]

Since his efforts to promote his concept Mitrany about organizing international relations are always struck by a refusal by the Foreign Office, in late 1942 decided to resign from the Foreign Research and Press Service of mind to commit to developing theoretical of functionalism. After resumption of the ideas presented in the FRPS in 1943 published an essay *"A Working Peace System Argument for the Operational Development of International Organization,* who said in his memoirs:" The essay was part of an immediate[14] success which surprised me (it printed quickly several editions and was translated into many languages), I think the simple fact that people were already bored of diplomatic and ideological controversies, and vague plans for grand projects and approve something that opens a perspective of practical activities. At that time and that state of mind you had to be given other titles - nations united! or a one world for peace and prosperity, or something like that. "(Mitrany, 1975: 25)

After the war, he learned that his Mitrany better said "by smuggling copies obtained were used by resistance groups in the Netherlands, Scandinavia and elsewhere for their discussions about the prospects for post-war, after liberation." (Mitrany , 1975: 20)

In addition, Altiero Spinelli, a founder of the European Union, makes a direct and explicit comment on the importance of functionalist approach: "The juxtaposition of the federalist movement stood what was called the functionalist approach. Public officials, politicians and experts from various European countries were not accustomed to think of solving problems across parts of European federalist. The only experience is offered to us by supranational two great world wars, the fighting allies considered it appropriate to set some special authority to the military and economic (unified commands, joint procurement procedures and material for war, the common monetary items, etc..). Achieving these tasks were delegated to a supranational authority, while policy decision-making power remained in state hands. It was pretty easy to transfer this way of thinking in the field of European reconstruction, which is due to a Romanian, David Mitrany, which became the theoretician of functionalism. Jean Monnet in years of war has developed the idea of applying the functional approach in the coal and steel industry and hence arose the European Coal and Steel Community, the first and so far the only example of a supranational authority functional. Functionalism, born in the minds of senior civil servants, seemed to be more practical than a close political federalism. Not directly addressed the issue of limiting national sovereignty and was based on the known experiences of European politicians. It is hoped that by increasing the number of specialized institutions will reach a new threshold when the organization of a supranational European powers will become natural and effortless. In contrast to the federalist, functionalists have not ever held, but their ideas have spread everywhere. When people of European states faced with the problem of European unification, they joined the functional approach, adopting the views federalist with hesitation and half were worried only when forced by necessity."[15](Haines C. Groves, 1957:37)

A similar comment is made by Emily Balch[16] in the letter of August 16, 1951 by D. Mitrany: "I read with great interest a few things you have written to model functional international organization, including an essay of 1943 published Working Peace System the

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[13] Ten years later, ie June 8, 1953, one of the three visitors he sends a letter to him reveals how much has been praised wartime advice, advice that saved the intransigent insistence on a nationalist position.

[14] The first three editions were published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatman House) and the fourth edition was published by the National Council, London, is quickly exhausted.

[15] Spinelli's point of view was expressed at the conference "The Status of European Integration" held in Bologna, May-June 1956, under the patronage of the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University

[16] founder of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946

Royal Institute of International Affairs. It should very much appreciate it if you could find time to show some more recent and more elaborate expressions of what you have in mind that I could study. My ideas have long been developed in the same direction. (...) I wish that the honests and the loyal their lawyers (those of federalism note) to pay more attention to the difficulties and dangers premature governmentalism's of international relations and to give more consideration to different approaches, as it seems to me very promising and rich of functionalism. - I think now that I have to try to bring together obiter scripta in an essay or a small volume. Is there any chance that, if they can realize this idea, you would contribute to a preface that would be very important in promoting it? - Any comments, criticisms or suggestions at all that will be highly appreciated. (Mitrany, 1975: 76)

Even if we return to this issue in chapter four of lucrăii, we must stress the importance of the time you have spent at Harvard University (1931-1933), when Mitrany can observe and study a remarkable experiment by its organizational elements functionalist, refer to the Tennessee Valley Authority. A remarkable performance practice, but was even more remarkable as a political innovation in an old federal system, governed by a rigid constitution. AVT's main purpose was to control water, the electricity generator, affecting a river that spans seven American sovereign states. In his opinion Mitrany by this experiment was a great transformation Constitutional made no formal change in American fundamental law. Each action has been addressed as a problem in itself, each function was allowed to rise more gradually, and in each case the authority was left to develop the functions and powers in relation to actual performance.

Turning to the period before the end of World War II, Mitrany receives an unexpected offer from a multinational corporation Unilever. The starting point of this offer is in discussion with Paul Mitrany's Rykens, working, during the war, the problems of reconstruction with the Dutch government in exile, then became president of Lever Brothers & Unilever NV. Thus postwar Mitrany considered the dividing line between economics and politics will be very fine, and issues and economic decisions will have a close relationship with government decisions and policy. In 1943, Unilever & Lever Brothers Mitrany it proposes to a post of international issues of the company's board. Although Mitrany considers this step as an "experiment for both sides, and I thought that could last at least a year or two" (Mitrany, 1975: 30), working with Unilever dates until his retirement in 1960. Also during this period, 1946-1956, Mitrany continues teaching and research at the School of Economics and Politics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.

The experience that lived by Mitrany in Unilever is very useful for testing how functionalism, the theory believed by the end of his life and who has not made further explanations or additions or interpretations. However the experience at Unilever makes Mitrany to redefine its contribution in international relations: taking a left-handed teacher, who knew very little, have agreed from the outset that I should have the right to attend leadership meetings (refer to the Unilever board's note), in order to hear and to know everything that happens. For them it was a clear risk that and they took on their honor, for me it was a total surprise, but while that makes me humble. Not only that I distorted my own doubts about the experiment, but also brought an inner glow to how academics were able to look "big business".

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JACQUES DELORS ET LA VISION SUR LE PROCESSUS DE L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE

Cristina Maria DOGOT*

Abstract: *The present article tries to underline the role of a key personage of the process of the European construction, Jacques Delors. Unanimously recognized as a being as important as the "founder fathers" of the European Union, Delors contributed to the adoption of two major documentsof the Europea Union: the* Single European Act *and the* Treaty of Maastricht. On the other hand, Delors was the artisan of two important European Union policies: social policy and the monetary policy (materialized by the European Monetary Union).

Key words: *Jacues Delors, European Commission, Europe, European Union, subsidiarity, federalism*

Interférences intellectuelles, professionnelles et politiques

Jacques Delors est connu et reconnu aujourd'hui comme un de plus importants présidents de la Commission européenne et comme l'un des « pères fondateurs » de l'Union européenne appartenant au « deuxième vague », à coté de personnages comme Helmuth Kohl ou François Mitterrand. Les mérites de Delors sont de plus en plus importants qu'il est arrivé à la présidence de la Commission dans une période difficile pour l'espace communautaire, considérée d'euro-sclérose ou d'europessimisme, mais durant laquelle il a réussi d'imposer certaines directions très importantes pour le futur de l'Union européenne. (Hurwitz 1996; « Reluctant saviour… » 1994)

La carrière, qui peut être considérée politique, de Jacques Delors (né à Paris en 1925) est commencée dans le contexte de la deuxième guerre mondiale. Ainsi, l'année 1944 est l'année décisive de la renonciation à une carrière artistique bien convoitée (Maris 1993, 53-4) et du choix de la carrière bancaire, même si à partir d'un poste de fonctionnaire. La même période corresponde au début des études universitaires en économie, les cours de soir (Drake 2002, 53, 59), pour qu'en 1950 il adhère[1], après une période d'appartenance au *Mouvement républicain populaire* et à la Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens (CFTC, à partir de 1964 CFDT – Confédération française démocratique du travail (Delors 1994, 15, 17), la dernière étant une institution au-delà de toute confession, à la création de laquelle Delors a contribué aussi (Drake 2002, 60), une organisation syndicale fondée en 1919 sous l'influence de l'encyclique papale *Rerum novarum* (Meyret 1994, 27). En 1953 Delors sera membre du groupe *Reconstruction*, d'orientation réformatrice socialiste, un groupe scindé de la section CFTC de la banque ou Delors travailla, et qui éditera l'opuscule *Les Cahiers Reconstruction*, auxquels Delors collaborera avec des articles d'analyse socio-économique, sous le pseudonyme Roger Jacques (Meyret 1994, 30; Drake 2002, 59). C'est la période quand Delors commence la série de conférences dédiées aux membres du syndicat et participera aux congrès organisés par les syndicats chrétiens (*Ibidem*). Entre 1951-1961, Delors serra le délégué du CFTC dans le département *Plan et investissement* du *Conseil économique et social*

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[1] Selon même les affirmations de J. Delors, parce qu'il était catholique pratiquant. (Delors 1994, 35) Ce livre c'est vendu dans le premier mois d'apparition en 135.000 exemplaires, c'est qui a été considéré à peu près un miracle. (« Reluctant savior… » 1994)

de France, une fonction qui signifiera le début de la carrière politique J. Delors (Meyret 1994, 39-40)[2]. C'est de cette position que Delors sera sollicité dans l'action d'élaboration des études sur des différents processus économiques internes, des études dont la qualité lui apportera une position plus forte dans le département où il travailla et le déterminera à quitter tant les positions occupées dans la banque et dans la CFTC (Drake 2002, 60). Le février 1962 Delors deviendra le chef du département pour les problèmes sociaux du *Commissariat général du Plan* (Meyret 1994, 41; Delors 1994, 31), les problèmes sociaux étant le sujet préféré de J. Delors, l'*élément essentiel de l'action publique, le but de toute son activité* (Delors 1994, 33).

Delors développera une vie civique très active, toujours dans des associations ayant une vision gauchiste (même s'il a été aussi soupçonné d'avoir de sympathie pour le libéralisme économique), mais jamais proche des mouvements communistes : le 1952, membre du group *Reconstruction*, il a adhéré aussi à l'organisation *La vie nouvelle*[3]; en 1955 il s'est enrôlé dans le parti *La jeune République* (*Ibidem*, 15)[4] pour qu'en 1956 il soutien le *Front républicain* (Drake 2002, 65), formation qui l'année suivante, à coté de *La jeune République*, rassembla plusieurs petites groupes de gauche dans l'*Union de la gauche socialiste*, formation qui deviendra, en avril 1960, *Parti socialiste unifié*, où Delors sera membre dans le bureau politique, à coté de Michel Rocard.(Meyret 1994, 32, 38 ; Delors 1994, 15 ; Drake 2002, 65) Dans l'année 1957 Delors rejoint le *Bureau confédéral de recherches, d'analyses et d'études* (BRAEC) du CFTC (Meyret 1994, 31 ; Drake 2002, 59). En 1959 Delors a fondé son premier club politique, *Citoyen '60*[5] et la revue *Cahiers '60*, dont le rédacteur sera jusqu'en 1965 et dont l'objectif établit était celui de renouveler et de disséminer les idées socialistes, d'éparpiller au niveau européen *l'humanisme inspiré par le personnalisme chrétien* (Drake 2002, 22 ; Delors 1994, 15), la promotion d'esprit civique actif et la décentralisation du pouvoir, conformément aux principes du socialisme pragmatique du Proudhon et de Fourier. Même s'il ne s'était pas jusqu'alors constamment préoccupé du principe de subsidiarité ou de celui de la construction européenne, Delors était favorable à leurs application comme fondement pour la diminution de la souveraineté nationale et la création des entités régionales (Drake 2002, 62-3). Les clubs des années '60 ont donnée à la vie politique française des grands thèmes de débats : les problèmes mondiaux, la démocratie, la décentralisation, la modernisation de l'économie, la construction européenne (Delors 1994, 30), raison pour laquelle Delors a été toujours impliqué dans ce type d'association de débat. La deuxième partie des années '60 Delors fréquenta le club *Jean Moulin*, une société de débats semi-secrète qui réunissait périodiquement à la résidence du président de l'Assemblée nationale française (Meyret 1994, 59), pour qu'à la fin des années '60, mécontent *du débat politique actuelle…, de la modalité de soulever les problèmes et par les réponses données à ceux-ci*, Delors créa un nouveau club, qui interdisait la participation des hommes politiques encore actifs, le club *Echange et Projet*, muni aussi d'une revue, *Morceaux choisis* (*Preuves* 1994 ; Drake 2002, 72). Les actions de ce club étaient influencées par trois courants politiques : le socialisme français du trinôme Fourier-Proudhon-Mounier ; celui du langage

[2] Delors a travaillé le temps partiel pour garder son indépendance devant le syndicat auquel il était affilié. (Drake 2002, 59-60)

[3] Une organisation qui s'avait proposé comme objectif la dissémination du personnalisme chrétien, qui essayait d'approprier ses membres par des actions communes, très souvent liées de leur vie privée, religieuse et publique. En dépit de toutes les affinités d'entre cette association et la vie chrétienne, J. Delors n'a pas adhéré ni à SFIO ni à l'association chrétienne-démocrate, mais il a préféré de fonder des différents clubs de débat politique, chacun avec sa propre publication. (Delors 1994, 18-19; Meyret 1994, 21; Drake 2002, 62)

[4] Meyret considère cette association, qui en 1954 comptait environ 2000 militants qui soutenaient, dans le hebdomadaire homonyme, *la réalisation d'une gauche unitaire, dans le service de l'homme*, l'alter ego politique du mouvement *Reconstruction*, découplé de CFTC. (Meyret 1994, 32-3)

[5] Delors considérait les nombreux clubs qu'il avait créés comme le creuset de la pensée politique française, une possibilité de se situer dans le même temps impliqué et loin de la vie politique. (Drake 2002, 61, 63)

radical des mouvements de mai 1968 et celui des démocrates réformistes, qui envisageaient tant la prospérité et la justice sociale pour tous les individus que le progrès démocratique (Meyret 1994, 65). En 1969 le club de Delors fusionnera avec deux formations fondées par Michel Rocard, pour former un autre, nommé *Convictions*, pour que plus tard, les années '80, Delors soit l'un des fondateurs du mouvement social-démocrate *Démocratie 2000* (*Ibidem*, 37)[6]. Cette activité assidue dans le cadre des clubs était la modalité par laquelle Delors considérait qu'il pouvait s'impliquer dans les problèmes politiques au-delà de toute enrégimentassions partisane et d'utiliser sans souci les relations économiques de son période d'activité professionnelle. (*Le Monde* 1999, 9) De l'abri du club *Echange et projets* Delors eut critiqué tant l'incapacité de l'Europe de se rapporter aux défis internationaux (la crise pétrolière, la mondialisation et les changements de l'ordre internationale) que le processus décisionnel européen également. Ainsi, la Commission européenne était considérée trop faible et accusé d'une faute d'esprit d'initiative, pendant que le Parlement devait devenir plus efficace et le Conseil de Ministres plus important pour le processus décisionnel. Delors a bien maintenu cet esprit critique et engagé même plus tard, quand il ne sera plus actif dans les structures institutionnelles européennes, et il a continué à militer pour la formation d'une nouvelle génération d'européanistes. Ainsi, en juillet 1996 Delors a créé le club *Notre Europe*, avec l'objectif déclaré d'*étudier et de rechercher la formation de l'Europe, du passé, des civilisations et des perspectives de celle-ci* (Drake 2002, 218).

Comme on peut bien observer, les activités civiques de J. Delors ont été presque toujours parallèles avec une activité politique plus ou moins évidente. Ainsi, Delors a soutenu quelque temps l'activité politique de Pierre Mendès-France, mais le radicalisme de plus en plus évident l'a déterminé de quitter le *Parti Socialiste unifié* à la fin des années '60 (Meyret 1994, 38 ; Drake 2002, 65), pour qu'en 1965 soit engagé dans la campagne électorale pour l'Assemblé nationale de Fr. Mitterrand (Meyret 1994, 46) et entre 1969-1973 dans la fonction de conseiller sur des problèmes industriels du Premier-ministre Jacques Chaban-Delmas (*Ibidem*, 59 ; Drake 2002, 69). Ensuite, dans la période 1968-1973, Delors a été le secrétaire général du *Comité interministériel de la formation professionnelle et de la promotion sociale*, et en 1973 il a été nommé comme conseiller général de la Banque Nationale Française (Drake 2002, 68). Le mai de l'année suivant Delors a soutenu la candidature de Fr. Mitterrand pour les élections présidentielles (*Ibidem*), pour qu'en octobre il devint membre du *Parti Socialiste* (Meyret 1994, 67). Même s'il a contribué à plusieurs campagnes électorales de Mitterrand, Delors n'as jamais accepté d'être candidat[7], de dépendre de la volonté de l'électorat (Drake 2002, 40, 75), préférant toujours les positions de fonctionnaire. Ainsi, suite à la soutenance accordée à celui-ci, Delors a reçu une poste dans le gouvernement Mitterrand, ses tâches visant les problèmes de l'intégration européenne, étant nommé, dans le même temps, le délégué du Parti Socialiste pour des relations économiques internationales. C'est de cette position que Delors a créé son propre group de travail sur *les conceptions communautaires économiques et sociales* (*Ibidem*, 74-5). Suite aux élections parlementaires de mars 1978 il n'a pas reçu aucune fonction dans le nouveau cabinet, mais en septembre il sera élu comme président de la *Commission économique et monétaire* du Parlement européen, dont le membre il deviendra en 1979 (Meyret 1994, 73-5 ; Delors 1994, 219 ; Drake 2002, 56, 75). En 1981 on le trouve J. Delors de nouveau dans la campagne électorale de Fr. Mitterrand, comme conseiller sur les problèmes économiques et sociaux, après la réussite de Mitterrand étant désigné le Ministre de l'Économie et de Finance. Il garda cette fonction jusqu'en 1984 (doublée de celle de maire de Clichy-la-Garenne (Delors 1994, 18 ; Idem 1996a, 107 ; Drake

[6] Delors considérait la gauche politique sa *famille politique*. (Drake 2002, 55, 64, 84)

[7] Ils sont des voix qui affirment que Delors a « la peau très mince » ou qu'il est trop « naïf, sans ambition et confiance en soi pour réussir en politique », même si juste ce caractère et l'image d'une personne principielle lui ont donné beaucoup de popularité. (« Reluctant saviour… » 1994)

2002, 77)), quand il sera nommé président de la Commission européenne (Meyret 1994, 80 ; Drake 2002, 33, 76). Même si après la fin de son mandat présidentiel communautaire, Delors était considéré un des candidats favoris pour la présidence de la France, mais il a bien refusé de s'opposer à Jacques Chirac pour obtenir cette fonction (Drake 2002, 82). La carrière européenne de Delors a continué plus tard, quand le secrétaire général de l'OCDE lui a proposé la fonction de conseiller spécial (*Ibidem*, 213).

La Commission européenne, le double nouveau départ

La désignation de Delors comme président de la C.E. est considérée par certains auteurs (Meyret 1994, par exemple) comme imméritée, l'argument étant une série d'articles non favorables signés par J. Delors et concernant certain structures institutionnelles européennes établies à partir de l'année 1950 et contre certains méthodes utilisés pour assurer la fonctionnalité de ceux-ci[8]. Toutefois, les opinions négatives de Delors n'étaient pas singulières à l'époque, certaines factions fédéralistes développant aussi un discours sceptique sur les méthodes de l'intégration européennes du ce temps-là. Une des principales soucis de Delors était celle concernant la possible incapacité de France de faire face aux pressions économiques du processus de la construction européenne, spécialement si l'Allemagne aurait récupéré le décalage (Meyret 1994, 120, 122-3)[9]. Finalement, R. Meyret observe que

[8] C'est la période à coté de Rocard qui est considérée une pendant laquelle Delors s'est montré moins favorable au processus de l'intégration européenne. (Drake 2002, 66-7) En ce qui concerne la signature des Traités de Rome, Delors s'interrogeait si la France *pourrait préserver sa position devant l'Allemagne… si la France ne sera pas étouffée par l'Allemagne*. (Meyret 1994, 122) Toutefois, plus tard Delors considérera que « la seule réponse satisfaisante et acceptable au problème allemand… c'est le renforcement de certaines caractéristiques fédéralistes… qui assurent à tout pays son existence ». (« Delors, the history man », 1989) D'autre coté, le parti *La Jeune République*, dans lequel Delors était membre depuis 1953, n'était pas favorable à la réalisation de l'Europe de six, ayant aussi peur d'une possible renaissance de l'Allemagne. Pendant cette période, Delors a signé deux articles dans le journal du parti, l'un considérant le projet de l'EURATOM comme une nouvelle offensive de ceux qui avaient échoué dans le projet de la Communauté Européenne de la Défense, une offensive fondée même sur les idées des opposants de la CED (parmi lesquels on peut compter Delors et son group aussi) : *ce nouveau combat pour l'Europe de Six implique, en fait, une conception de la politique étrangère qui n'a jamais été la nôtre, dans la mesure où elle tend à considérer comme définitive la coupure de l'Europe en deux bloques*. (Delors 1956) Le deuxième article, apparu sous le pseudonyme Roger Jacques, mettait en évidence l'opposition de la gauche française à l'idée d'une marché commune qui aurait pu fortifier les principes libéraux juste parce que la France aurait pu se trouver dans l'incapacité de faire face à *l'expansion commerciale d'Allemagne* or elle aurait dû diriger toutes ses ressources pour faire face à la concurrence industrielle et agricole. De plus, Delors considérait que la liberté des personnes et des capitaux pourrait constituer le fondement de mouvements anarchiques de populations, ce qui constituait une menace pour le marché du travail. Dans l'opinion de Delors la solution pourrait être soit la renonciation, de la part de la France, à la qualité de membre du marché commune, ce qui éliminait toute possibilité de coopération européenne, soit l'acceptation de l'unification politique et économique, mais sous la condition que la France gardait encore son rôle en ce qui concernait les États sous-développés et la possibilité de ressusciter *la gauche et le syndicalisme français*. (Jacques 1952). D'autre coté, Delors considérait l'inégalité des États de la « petite Europe », l'existence d'une économie peu ou pas du tout contrôlée, la possible cartellisation de l'industrie et les pressions de celle-ci sur le politique (un domaine forcé ainsi à intervenir) comme des sources de certains déséquilibres et ainsi de l'échec du marché unique. Très originel, Delors considérait comme avantageuse l'implication dans le processus de la construction européenne (dont le fondement devait être la mise en commun des certaines ressources naturelles, économiques et financières des pays membres) des pays comme Pologne ou Yougoslavie. Mais tout devait être réalisé avec l'information de l'opinion publique sur l'incapacité du marché commun d'être une panacée pour toutes les difficultés des États occidentaux. (Meyret 1994, 124-6)

[9] L'idée apparaitra aussi dans une autre publication de Delors, où il soulevait le problème de la future de la France et de l'identité françaises dans plusieurs contextes : dans le nouvel contexte international et suite à l'évolution du processus de la construction européenne ; dans celui de la fin de la guerre froide et après la réunification de l'Allemagne ; après la réalisation de l'unification monétaire et l'approfondissement de l'unité politique ; dans le contexte de la guerre de l'Yougoslavie et suite à la situation économique et politique des anciens États communistes. Au-delà de touts les éléments positifs ou négatifs du processus communautaire, Delors considérait

l'opposition initiale de Delors dérivait de ses idées politiques, contraires aux principes libéraux qui constituaient à l'époque le fondement du processus communautaire. Delors n'excluait pas complètement la coopération communautaire, mais il la considérait encore impossible pour cette période-là et n'était pas d'accord avec l'idée de la construction européenne sur des principes libéraux et chrétiens-démocrates uniquement. (*Ibidem*, 124-6) C'est la raison pour laquelle, après la signature des Traités de Rome Delors et les groups socialistes dirigeront vers l'implémentation d'une tendance sociale à l'Europe unie (Descamps 1971). Toutefois, cette préoccupation était une collatérale pour Delors et ses prochains, leur idéal étant la réalisation du socialisme mondial[10], où l'achèvement de l'Europe unie était seulement le premier pas. Le problème n'était donc la création d'une Europe de patries ou des peuples, mais les moyens de réalisations de cette entité, la civilisation qui commençait à se créer et qui de devrait être une civilisation socialiste. Bien d'accord avec les libéraux, qui considéraient comme impossible la création d'un seul coup de l'union européenne, Delors considérait l'Europe, à savoir *l'inverse de la nation*, était *une étape nécessaire vers un monde socialiste* (Delors 1963). L'attitude de Delors et des groups qui s'opposaient à la construction européenne était uniquement une d'opposition idéologique, et non contre le principe de l'union en lui-même, et elle ne sera pas continuée quand la nécessité de la collaboration de toutes les doctrines politiques pour l'achèvement du processus de la construction européenne et le dynamisme de ce processus seront conscientisés par les principaux protagonistes. Les préoccupations des sociale-démocrates pour l'éparpillement de leur doctrine continueront aussi, en 1989 en publiant un opuscule avec le titre *Europe sans frontières: les socialistes et l'avenir de la CEE*, où Delors signait l'article *Une nouvelle frontière pour la social-démocratie: l'Europe?*. L'auteur se demandait si *l'Europe était devenue le lieu, sinon le moyen actuel d'accomplissement de l'intuition sociale-démocrate*, et ainsi *l'instrument conscient d'un nouvel ordre économique internationale*, ce qui pourrait résoudre les problèmes du désarroi monétaire et financière mondial causés par l'interdépendance économique accrue (Delors n.d.).

D'autre coté, H. Drake, considérait que les idées internationalistes de Delors, même si d'origine socialiste, le prédisposait à une carrière de succès dans sa nouvelle activité, ses inquiétudes concernant la méthode de la réalisation de l'union européenne fallu (dérivées de la situation économique et sociale de la France de la période respective) pouvant être considérés bien fondées. La Commission européenne, par son rôle d'initiateur des politiques supranationales, par la combinaison du pragmatisme et également de l'idéalisme dans ses reformes, était considérée par H. Drake l'occasion longtemps rêvée par un *visionnaire pragmatique* comme J. Delors. (Drake 2002, 56-7)

Accusé par R. Meyer d'une trop large mobilité politique[11] et considéré d'avoir être toujours un perdant en ce qui concerne la réussite d'obtenir certaines positions politiques, un *orphelin politique* même selon les mots de Delors (Meyret 1994 ; Drake 2002, 55), H. Drake n'apprécie pas la carrière politique de Delors comme préméditée, mais plutôt le résultat du hasard (Drake 2002, 34). Membre de certaines associations politiques différentes pendant les années '50-'60, il n'a été jamais intéressé d'obtenir aucune fonction dans les différents cabinets et même les a refusées les fonctions proposées, ayant un discours assez critique contre la politique nationale française (*Ibidem*, 33-5, 40, 52-3, 55, 64). Delors n'a pas eu

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que l'objectif de l'union européenne devait rester *la création d'une communauté de citoyens responsables*. (Delors et Clisthène 1992, ix, 4)

[10] Meyret affirme le fait que Delors est arrivé en Europe par le mondialisme. (Meyret 1994, 135)

[11] Meyret le considère J. Delors un socialiste (doctrine de gauche) qui, *inventant l'Europe sociale*, s'enrôla dans le group sociale-démocrate (doctrine de centre-gauche), les Bruxelles étant la place commune, le *centre* de sociaux-démocrates et des chrétiens-démocrates (centre-droite). Choisissant la réalisation d'une Europe sociale (une Europe de prélevassions et des transferts), Delors a décidé, à Bruxelles, comme un vrai social-démocrate on peut dire, la redistribution et non la production. (Meyret 1994, 130)

l'ambition d'une carrière d'homme politique, mais de théoricien des idées politiques de gauche[12], se gardant à l'abri de l'élite politique de l'Institute d'Etudes Politiques et de l'École Nationale Administrative (*Ibidem*, 51-2), même si la fréquentait. Cette incapacité de Delors d'adaptation à la politique nationale française est considérée la cause pour laquelle il a été envoyé à Bruxelles (*Ibidem*, 83). Mais, indifféremment de la fonction occupé, en France ou à Bruxelles, Delors a eu toujours l'image d'un *technocrate engagé* (Meyret 1994, 31 ; Drake 2002, 215). Dominique Wolton, à son tour, partage cette opinion et affirme que Delors n'a était jamais le partisan des programmes politiques trop enthousiaste et qu'il a critiqué, en 1966, le programme de la Fédération de la gauche démocrate, celui du Parti Socialiste Uni et le programme unifié également, les considérant trop loin de la réalité. (Delors 1994, 27) Afin de réussir dans ses actions politiques, Delors (qui se considérait un *pessimiste actif*) nommait dans les fonctions qui présupposaient l'élaboration et la dissémination des idées politiques les uns de ses adeptes ; il apercevait la carrière politique comme un dilemme entre l'implication et la perte de l'indépendance ; il avait de confiance dans la capacité persuasive du dialogue et de l'explication et croyait sincèrement dans la réalisation de d'une société plus ouverte et informée. (*Le Monde* 1982)

Cette absence de l'attachement prolongé pour une certaine formation politique, son image d'une personne capable d'accepter le compromis entre les différentes visions politiques (Drake 2002, 128) sera considérée par H. Drake le point fort de Delors quand il a été nommé le président de la CE, parce qu'il a réussi ainsi à s'adapter à la nouvelle situation (Drake 2002, 54) et de ne se limiter pas à une approche à court terme de sa tache (*Ibidem*, 126). La méthode, complètement différente de celles de ses précurseurs, d'aborder le problème de l'approfondissement de l'unification européenne et d'assumer le rôle de président de la CE sera considérée, finalement, comme le début d'une nouvelle étape, plus dynamique, en ce qui concerne l'implication du président de la CE dans le processus de l'intégration et aussi pour le rythme (plus alerte à partir de 1984) de ce processus.

L'Europe : une nouvelle vision, une nouvelle dimension

En ce qui concerne la période du début comme président de la Commission européenne, Delors a affirmé qu'elle était une pendant laquelle l'idéalisme était encore perceptible, mais qu'il était aussi besoin d'un liant, *celui de la nécessité* (Drake 2002, 208), concrétisé par Delors dans le *Livre blanc* de 1985. Au cours de son activité de fonctionnaire européen Delors s'avait formé la conviction que l'image de l'Europe était un *rational, favorable à l'intégration uniquement parce que l'intégration était la meilleure voie pour la France et l'Europe, et non à cause des convictions concernant une forme idéale pour les relations internationales* (Rollat 1993, 258).

Visionnaire et pragmatique également (Drake 2002, 129), Delors a été un homme politique atypique, qui avait arrivé dans un système organisationnel sans précédent, qui *avait un caractère expérimental* et était demi-imaginaire : le système européen (*Ibidem*, 29). Toutefois, Delors a réussi le faire paraitre moins complexe en ce qui concerne la méthode de le diriger, plus « théâtrale » même qu'au cours de la présidence de Monnet, qui, même s'il voulait bien la création d'un système politique européen supranational muni d'institutions, objectifs, procédures et règles spécifiques, il avait minimisé l'élément politique de sa fonction (*Ibidem*, 99, 32). Le premier mérite de Delors l'a constitué l'adoption d'un autre rythme de travail dans la C.E. (*Ibidem*, 133), l'acquiert de l'appui des leaders nationaux pour la reforme

[12] H. Drake parle de l'existence, dans la structure intérieure de Delors, d'*un mélange entre pragmatisme et utopie* qui l'a aidé de se sentir mieux à Bruxelles que dans la politique nationale. (Drake 2002, p. 52) Un autre argument à la faveur de l'affirmation de H. Drake est offert même par J. Delors, quand il exprime sa conviction intime que la subsidiarité, un concept et une pratique européenne qu'il aimait à utiliser, ne pouvait pas être l'apanage d'aucune doctrine politique ou économique, ni libérale ni sociale-démocrate. (Delors 1992d, 174-5)

des institutions communautaires, même si au début il n'avait pas du mandat dans ce sens (*Ibidem*, 157), et l'adoption d'un style « pédagogique » (*Ibidem*, 134) à l'intérieur de la Commission. D'autre coté, Delors a démarré son mandat avec la conviction de la nécessité de renforcer l'influence de la Commission, possible uniquement par l'adoption d'une nouvelle stratégie pour les activités de cette institution, par le développement du niveau de collégialité, l'acquiert du rôle de médiateur devant les États membres et la diminution de la dépendance de ceux-ci, afin de faciliter le processus décisionnel (Delors 1996c, 42-3). Les premières six mois de sa présidence, Delors a visité tous les États membres, afin de consulter les chefs d'État et de gouvernement et les autres leaders d'opinion sur le futur de la Communauté européenne (Drake 2002, 143 ; « La communauté européenne… » 1991, 14). Il a proposé aux pays membres la réalisation de quatre objectifs : la défense commune ; la monnaye commune ; la réforme institutionnelle ; une plus profonde intégration économique et l'achèvement du Marché commun (l'accomplissement des Traités de Rome). Afin de légitimer ses initiatives, Delors les a soumis au vote même au cours de son discours d'investiture[13], situation singulière dans l'histoire du processus de la construction européenne. Aucun projet n'a pas été voté en unanimité, sauf celui qui visait la création d'un Marché commun, qui deviendra ainsi son projet de début (Delors 1994, 220 ; Drake 2002, 145, 155, 201). Les objectifs proposés devraient être réalisés par la méthode de *l'engrenage* ou *des petits pas*, ayant le consens pour tout objectif qui devait être réalisé (Delors 1996c, 14).

D'autre coté, Delors a été le premier leader européen qui impliquait directement l'auditoire, en s'adressant avec l'appellatif « députés » aux parlementaires européens, insistant ainsi sur leur qualité d'être directement élus dans un système politique qu'il le considérait de type fédéral. Il utilisa toujours le terme « nous » pour induire l'image d'un seul corpus pour le Parlement et la Commission également. Ensuite, Delors a élaboré plusieurs analyses personnelles sur la situation communautaire, exposant une Commission ayant tant des objectifs que des faiblesses, mais aussi des solutions pour les différents problèmes et méthodes personnelles pour les solutionner. (Drake 2002, 159-160)

J. Delors a été le président d'une Commission qui, suite aux crises des années '60, générée par la vision de de Gaulle sur le problème de l'unité européenne, était incapable à se prononcer comme une institution ayant une identité et une volonté propres (*Ibidem*, 107, 111-2)[14], aucun État national membre n'étant pas vraiment préparé pour accepter le transfert au niveau supranational d'une partie de sa souveraineté pour certains domaines uniquement pour contribuer au relancement du processus de la construction européenne (Delors 1996a, 93) ou de changer sa culture politique uniquement au nom de certaines réformes sociales (Drake 2002, 82). Le problème auquel Delors devrait lui faire face a été d'exercer une influence sans avoir le pouvoir, d'avoir légitimité au-delà de toutes les sources démocratiques formelles, ce qui était difficile à réaliser sans une Commission visible sur la scène politique européenne et internationale également, et si lui-même, comme président, ne se comportait pas comme un égal des chefs d'États membres, se créant lui-même une image publique et politique de plus en plus visible[15]. Les objectifs proposés ont été assez motivants que Delors a utilisé tous ses capacités de leader et toute son expérience professionnelle, pour les réaliser, spécialement que les conditions politico-économiques de l'époque lui étaient bien favorables (*Ibidem*, 87, 110).

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[13] Où il a déclaré qu'il était *le partisan de nouveaux horizons pour l'Europe* et *favorable à l'unité européenne*. (Delors 1992c, 48)

[14] Parmi les présidents qui ont suivi à W. Hallstein aucun n'a essayé de reprendre les politiques de celui-ci, même si des événements importants ont existé : François-Xavier Ortoli (janvier 1973-janvier 1977) a contribué à la première élargissement de la Communauté ; Roy Jenkins (janvier 1977-janvier 1981) a lancé l'idée d'un système monétaire européen ; Gaston Thorn (janvier 1981-janvier 1985), même s'il est considéré comme un président assez peu important, il a milité pour l'abandon du compromis de Luxembourg et pour le renforcement du rôle politique de la Commission. (Drake 2002, 112-8)

[15] *Ibidem*, pp. 30, 32-33, 54.

Finalement Delors est arrivé à donner à sa fonction une résonance analogue à celle de chef d'État, mais toujours soutenant qu'il ne voulait pas s'ériger dans une voix des peuples d'États membres, mais uniquement de créer à ceux-ci une possibilité de s'exprimer (*Ibidem*, 39), parce qu'à son avis la Commission, par son activité diplomatique, avait comme principale dette *de se faire utile aux gouvernements des États membres* (« Interview… », 1999). H. Drake considère Delors, comme président de la Commission, comme *le premier chef d'État apparu accidentellement* (Drake 2002, 6)*, un nouveau type de leader politique… non élu… limité dans un rôle de bureaucrate subordonné… aux interlocuteurs légitimés au niveau national…* et dont *la légitimité d'actionner comme leader a été problématique et contestée* (*Ibidem*, 20), mais dans le contexte dans lequel l'union européenne était considérée *un défi pour le mode de conceptualiser la démocratie, l'autorité et la légitimité de la politique contemporaine* (Laffan 1999, 330)[16]. En 1985 Delors est devenu le leader d'une institution ayant moins de pouvoir décisionnelle que toute institution nationale, étant parfois intentionné affaibli par certains leaders nationaux anti-européanistes (ou des européanistes limités), comme Ch. de Gaulle, M. Thatcher, ou même par certains leaders favorables à la construction européenne (V. Giscard d'Estaing, Fr. Mitterrand). (Drake 2002, 26) Toutefois Delors a réussi à munir la Commission avec un certain type d'autorité de décision, qu'il a exploitée et transformée, l'a optimisée, personnalisée et légitimée, avec l'accord des la majorité de chefs de gouvernement d'États membres, tel qu'elle pouvait être comparée avec le pouvoir de décision d'un chef d'État, reconnue au niveau européen et international également[17]. C'est la raison pour laquelle on peut affirmer que Delors a été le président de la Commission qui a réussi au moins partiellement d'atteindre l'objectif de pères fondateurs de réaliser une union de plus en plus étroite de citoyens européens. C'est la présidence de Delors quand la Communauté européenne, *l'objet politique non-identifié*[18] qu'avait dépassé toutes les normes théoriques et pratiques de la démocratie, est devenu le sujet de plusieurs analyses et études, a réclamé la formation de plusieurs spécialistes. (Drake 2002, 22, 28)

Toutefois, ils sont toutefois nombreux les analystes qui considèrent difficile à apprécier les possibles stratégies intégrationnistes de J. Delors ou si celui-ci a eu *des intentions concrètes et réalistes… des projets… au-delà de toute vision évolutive, optimiste et parfois abstract de l'Europe*, comme celle de *l'union qui offre la force*. Si on considère ses efforts de créer une *nouvelle société* en France, par l'institution d'un processus décisionnel décentralisé et transparent, de la démocratie sociale et de principes personnalistes, il ne sera pas exclu que Delors avait eu un plan pour une *société européenne* fondé sur les mêmes principes, indifféremment du niveau de la rhétorique d'un tel plan. (*Ibidem*, 127, 129) Il est bien possible qu'au début de son mandat Delors eut souhaité la création d'un espace économique plus cohérent, et ensuite une union économique et monétaire, des idées difficile à appliquer même à long terme à cause de l'opposition des États membres (*Ibidem*, 128-9). Toutefois, en 1986 ont commencé à apparaitre mes premiers articles qui mettaient en question les stratégies de Delors. (*The Economist* 1986; *The Independent* 1986) Les réponses ont été recherchées dans le *Livre blanc* de 1985, qui soulevait la question de la compétitivité économique européenne (Drake 2002, 130, 147), et également dans une série de documents antérieurs de la présidence de la CE de J. Delors, ce qui a prouvé que la nomination de celui-ci

[16] Même si l'union européenne était quelque chose d'inédit parmi les institutions politiques, elle était analysée selon les mêmes principes que les États nationaux. (Drake 2002, 21)

[17] Par exemple, le gouvernement britannique de M. Thatcher a reconsidéré sa position à partir du moment quand le problème de remboursements financiers parait en train de se résoudre ; Fr. Mitterrand a essayé d'offrir un encadrement européen aux politiques économiques nationales françaises à partir du début de la présidence française de la CE. (Drake 2002, 139)

[18] Le syntagme a été utilisé par Delors dans le discours pour la session inaugurale de la conférence intergouvernementale de Luxembourg, le 09 septembre 1985. (*Bulletin…*, 1985(9), 8)

dans cette fonction a été minutieusement préparée[19]. Ainsi, en 1959 Delors a exposé, dans la revue *Citoyen '60*, *les solutions socialistes pour la réalisation du Marché commun*, considérées une exposition détaillée du programme présenté à son nomination dans la fonction de président de la CE et qu'il le réalisera ensuite. Le Marché commun fondé sur les principes libéraux n'aurait pu assurer le développement relatif égal de toutes les régions, d'où la mission de la gauche de lui donner une nouvelle orientation, en transposant l'accent sur *les possibilités offertes par les Traités de Rome mais encore non utilisées*. Delors préconisait la réalisation *d'un système européen de planification … la nationalisation ou l'internationalisation de grands cartels industriels ou bancaire qui constituaient une barrière devant la politique commune*. Afin de réaliser d'une vraie unité européenne, l'étape suivante du processus de l'intégration qui venait de commencer, il était nécessaire le dépassement de l'ancien ordre monétaire par l'adoption d'une monnaye commune, par l'homogénéisation des règles fiscales et par la réglementation commune des crédits et des banques[20], par accorder à l'exécutif du Marché commun du droit de défendre les politiques commerciales des États membres. (Meyret 1994, 128-9) L'édification d'une Europe sociale engageait la nécessité, pour Delors, l'implication des syndicats, indifféremment de la branche qu'ils représentaient, le résultat s'imposant à le constituer *l'harmonisation de la durée des congés payés, des conditions du travail, des normes de sécurité et d'hygiène…* et *les salaires… !* (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, 1974). La réalisation de l'Europe imposait plusieurs actions, les principaux étant, dans l'opinion de Delors, *encourager les mobilités et la coopération ; anticiper les implications sociales, monétaires et internationales de ces mobilités ; l'évolution du processus de renouvellement des institutions européennes*. (Delors and Clisthène 1992, 35) Delors affirmait que l'Europe unie était possible d'être réalisée uniquement si les citoyens européens s'apercevaient impliqués dans le processus communautaire, et ainsi solidaires entre eux, mais afin de réaliser cette implication et solidarité il était nécessaire que tous les citoyens européens bénéficiaient de mêmes conditions de travail et de vie. (*Ibidem*, 39) Le fondement de l'Europe politique ne pouvait pas avoir uniquement une nature économique, mais aussi sociale (Delors 1992c, 37 ; Idem 1992d, 174), le début du processus de la construction européenne étant également, dans l'opinion de Delors, le début de la consolidation des États providence modernes (Delors 1996a, 92).Toutefois, la diversité et la complexité de la réalité sociale, économique et politique européenne imposait la nécessité d'un modèle sociale adéquat (Delors and Clisthène 1992, 116), tant plus que l'Europe se trouvait dans la recherche d'une certaine identité dans la nouvelle compétition économique, compétition dans laquelle tous les citoyens devraient se sentir solidaires comme devant un destin commun. Compte tenant de la période de l'apparition du syndicalisme en Europe et de la multiplication des modalités d'intermédiation des relations d'entre individus et groups, d'une coté, et d'entre les groups et société d'autre coté, Delors considérait nécessaire la coopération de toutes les ressources d'intelligence et compétence européennes afin d'obtenir des résultats économiques remarquables. Cette coopération pouvait être réalisée uniquement par le biais d'un *agent collectif*, ce qui jusqu'alors s'avait réalisé uniquement à un niveau sectoriel, un changement ou une nouvelle cohérence du processus d'engagement des pays européens dans le processus d'intégration s'imposant avec nécessité. (*Ibidem*, 117-9) La solution (possible) prévue par Delors la constituait *l'invention de nouvelles formes de socialisation*, correspondant aux

[19] *Agence Europe* no. 3931, du 20 septembre 1984, p. 3, fait la mention *qu'un vrai document politique était mentionné* dans le programme présenté par J. Delors au Parlement Européen en janvier 1985 ; *Agence Europe* 3973 du 28 septembre 1984, l'éditorial a le titre « Jacques Delors prépare sa présidence »; *Agence Europe* no. 3986 du 08 décembre 1984, p. 5, écrit sur le rencontre non officielle de Belgique, de 07 décembre, du collège de commissaires européens récemment nommés, où Delors supervisait la distribution des portefeuilles. (Drake 2002, 144, note 1)

[20] En 1988 J. Delors déclarait, devant le Parlement européen, que *dans dix ans 80% de la législation économique, peut-être même fiscale et sociale, seront d'origine communautaire*. (*L'Expansion* 1994)

nouvelles conditions globales, à partir du modèle des partenariats économiques et territoriaux et appliquées au niveau européen (*Ibidem*, 121-2), tout en créant ainsi des nouvelles solidarités (*Ibidem*, 123). Le processus *d'administration de la transition* (*Ibidem*, 124), de la transformation d'une société passive dans une active (*Ibidem*, 147) était possible à achever par l'adaptation des modèles sociaux généralisés au niveau individuel des pays occidentaux au niveau communautaire (*Ibidem*, 158).

La méthode Delors

L'évolution de l'image de Delors n'est pas surprenante pour H. Drake, parce qu'à son avis la Commission peut être considérée *une source potentielle du leadership charismatique, nécessaire pour unifier les sociétés*, le leader charismatique étant dans ce cas-là une personne dont l'autorité a réussi à s'imposer aux États membres (Drake 2002, 101). Comme président de la C.E. (06 janvier 1985-23 janvier 1995), J. Delors (ou *M. Europe* ou le *Tsar d'Europe*, comme il a été surnommé) (« The Rise of Mr. Europe » 1989 ; *Newsweek* 1989 ; *Le Point* 1991), a contribué à la mise en pratique de l'Acte unique européen, en juin 1985 ; au renforcement de l'Union économique et monétaire[21] ; au lancement de l'union politique, en 1990, matérialisé par le Traité de Maastricht (1992) et le deuxième Livre blanc, accepté en décembre 1993 ; à l'élaboration de certaines initiatives concernant l'Europe sociale (Delors 1994, 219 ; Radice 1994, 96). Toutes ces réalisations sont des éléments extrêmement importants pour le processus de la construction européenne, Delors lui-même affirmant que la période de sa vie de laquelle il est le plus content est celle de son activité européenne (*Ibidem*, 367). Cette activité a été réalisée non uniquement par un programme politique (Drake 2002, 82), mais aussi par une méthode qui lui y est propre, la « méthode Delors ». Ainsi, J. Delors a commencé son activité du même domaine duquel a commencé Jean Monnet[22], l'économique. Toutefois, les résultats ont été différents, par suite de la spécificité que Delors a amené, celui-ci considérant la Communauté comme un engrenage dominé par l'effet de *spill-over*, à savoir *la propriété endogène d'une union économique de se perfectionner avec les temps*, les autres méthodes, plus directes en ce qui concerne la réalisation de l'unité politique, ayant des résultats négatifs pour le processus général de l'intégration (Meyret 1994, 143 ; Delors 1996c, 8). La « méthode Delors » est, à l'avis de son auteur, premièrement une proposition et non une possession ; *l'exercice d'une influence sans posséder presque aucun pouvoir* (Drake 2002, 15) ; expliquer *comment* on peut réaliser le processus de la construction européenne et aussi *être crédible* ; *rechercher le consensus et garder de bonnes relations entre les leaders des États membres et la Communauté* (Delors 1996c, 156) ; actionner d'une telle manière que les chefs de gouvernement des États membres peuvent s'attribuer le mérite des progrès enregistrés dans le processus de la construction européenne et proposer un calendrier et l'obligation d'obtenir un résultat. La méthode ne pouvait pas être valable que dans le moment quand la construction européenne aurait été perçue par la classe politique des États membres et par l'opinion publique comme *un processus qui va de soi*, progressant au même temps que la vie politique nationale et, si possible, sans des contradictions entre eux. (Delors 1994, 224-5) Delors a soutenu l'approche néo-fonctionnaliste de l'intégration européenne, considérant comme irréalisable le changement de la culture politique des États membres au nom des certaines réformes sociales (Drake 2002, 82). La finalité de l'unification européenne a été

[21] Toutefois, J. Delors a reconnu qu'il n'a été pas le premier qui a lancé l'idée d'une telle union, ses précurseurs étant, en 1987, Edouard Balladur, le ministre français des finances, et le ministre allemand des affaires extérieures, Hans Dietrich Genscher. D'autre part, en 1988, à Hanovre, Helmuth Kohl avait proposé la création d'une nouvelle commission, composée par des gouvernements de banques centrales et d'un group d'experts, mais à ce moment-là Delors considérait la Commission européen déjà en avance et non préparée pour des efforts supplémentaires. (Delors 1994, 229-230)

[22] La méthode Monnet concernait une « dynamique évolutive », la création des certaines solidarités réelles entre les nations. (Sabourin 1994, 133)

même du début considérée d'être une politique, et Delors ne l'a jamais abandonnée comme idée, mais, aussi que les pères fondateurs, il est aussi parti du domaine économique, assez faible en 1984, pour arriver finalement à la fin politique (« La communauté européenne… » 1991, 14).

La nouveauté de l'approche de J. Delors la constituait l'accent sur le long terme dans l'accomplissement des projets (Drake 2002, 156) et l'établissement des dates limites pour chaque projet[23] comme solution de mettre en fonction du mécanisme communautaire, ce qui a déterminé les adeptes de la méthode fédérale de considérer J. Delors plutôt un pragmatique qu'un visionnaire en ce qui concerne le processus de la construction européenne (Delors 1994, 221). Le premier pas de Delors l'a constitué l'élaboration, en 1985, avec la soutenance des États communautaires (Drake 2002, 152), du *Livre blanc*, à savoir *d'un cahier des charges pour réaliser le grand Marché sans frontières* (Delors 1994, 222), considéré une nouvelle version du projet des pères fondateurs, concernant le domaine de *la grande politique* avec les moyens du *bas politique* (Marquand 1989, 212). Dans le cadre du Conseil de Milan de juin 1985, Fr. Mitterrand et H. Kohl ont proposé un plan de réalisation du Marché unique qui concernait aussi la réalisation d'une Europe politique, mais Delors, le considérant le troisième plan Fouchet, l'a refusé. La réponse de Delors à ce plan c'est matérialisée dans l'Acte unique européen. (Delors 1994, 223-4)

H. Drake propose trois étapes de l'activité de Delors à la présidence de la C.E. :

- **1985-1989**, les efforts pour le progrès de l'intégration de la perspective du Marché commun : l'adoption de l'AUE, qui renforce le prestige et l'influence de la Commission ; l'adoption (1987) du *Paquet Delors I*, comprenant des mesures financières qui ont facilité la réalisation du moment 1992 ; l'adoption de la *Charte sociale*, au Conseil Européen de Strasbourg (1989), le moment de la création de la *Cellule de prospective* et du *Groups de conseillers politiques*, un group de débat dans le cadre de la Commission, ayant comme objectif le renforcement du rôle de la Commission dans l'implication de la société civile, et spécialement des intellectuels, dans l'élaboration des politiques européennes, intensifiant les contacts avec les associations religieuses et scientifiques européennes (Drake 2002, 169, 174, 180).
- **1989-1992**, la période de la décadence[24], quand la légitimité de Delors comme personne et président de la Commission a été mise en discussion. En janvier 1990[25] le principal objectif communautaire le constituait la fortification du Parlement et de la Commission, par la transformation de la Commission dans *un exécutif vraiment responsable devant les institutions démocratiques de la future fédération et ses membres élus démocratiquement*. Delors a marqué les lignes générales d'une sorte d'union politique qui englobait une politique extérieure et de sécurité commune, établissait un processus plus efficace de prendre les décisions et d'actionner, ce qui a offert à l'Union européenne un certain degré de *personnalité politique* et a détermine que Delors soit considéré *très maximaliste* (Endo 1998, 170-190 ; « La communauté européenne… » 1991, 14).
- **1993-1995**, la période de l'élaboration du deuxième *Livre blanc*, dont les principaux éléments soulignés ont été *la croissance, la compétitivité, les places de travail*

[23] Cf. Dominique Wolton *…un homme, un calendrier, un objectif, un mécanisme….* (Delors 1994, 222)

[24] Alain Touraine considère qu'il s'agit d'un déclin du modèle européen social-démocrate, provoqué partiellement de l'effondrement des régimes communistes, et spécialement à l'absence *de la capacité d'action politique, de la force de conception sociale* et à l'existence d'un État dévorateur tant pur l'espace politique que social. A son tour P. Hassner attribue ce déclin aux contraints de l'ouverture et de la concurrence internationale, qui influencent les politiques sociales. (« La communauté européenne… » 1991, 17, 25) Pour Delors la solution pour faire revivre la social-démocratie la constitue la restructuration de la société sur des nouveaux fondements et la responsabilisation de l'individu. (*Ibidem*, 19-20)

[25] C'est l'année quand l'Europe s'est retrouvée *entre survivance et déclin*. (Delors 1996a, 96)

(Delors 1996a, 98), et la nécessité d'assurer la solidarité entre les générations (*Ibidem*, 100).

Cette évolution de l'activité de Delors a transformé le discours inaugural offensif de 1985 dans un discours défensif pour la fin du mandat, un discours orienté vers *l'idéal*, vers un certain modèle de société européenne (Drake 2002, 130, 202, 208), modèle qui devait le réformer périodiquement parce qu'il *sclérose* (Delors 1996a, 97). Delors a défendu le modèle intégrationniste social-démocrate et a fait des efforts pour trouver les meilleures solutions à la *crise politico-intellectuelle de la social-démocratie* de la fin des années '80. A l'avis de Delors, le conflit d'entre le problème de l'élargissement et l'approfondissement pouvait être solutionné par la création d'une personnalité politique à l'Europe unie, objectif réalisable par la réalisation d'une défense commune (« La communauté européenne… » 1991, 24).

Fédéralisme et antifédéralisme chez Jacques Delors

Jamais membre dans une organisation européaniste (Drake 2002, 41), Delors semble d'être arrivé à la présidence de la Commission sans avoir un programme et une méthode intégrationniste claire, mais surtout avec une vision d'ensemble sur le continent (*Ibidem*, 39). Même si ont existé des opinions qui ont considéré que les réalisations européennes de Delors peuvent être considérées de nature fédérale[26], celui-ci ne s'est jamais revendiqué de l'idée fédérale, même s'il a utilisé souvent le terme pour décrire certaines de ses politiques. L'exemple suivant peut être considéré assez illustrant : [le fédéralisme est] *c'est un ensemble humain qui implique une claire répartition des compétences entre différentes échelons… Je n'ai, pour ma parte, jamais été l'adepte d'États-Unis d'Europe, mais d'une Europe fédérale qui englobe un échelon européen, un échelon national, un échelon régional* (*Témoin* 1993(1)). Cette affirmation peut être considérée comme une source de confusion, mais Delors a bien clarifié les choses en affirmant que tout débat sur la répartition des compétences et le transfert de souveraineté doit être réalisé suivant *la grille de lecture fédérale* (Delors 1992d, 164). Il était donc nécessaire à utiliser les méthodes ou les instruments fédéraux uniquement comme source d'inspiration pour concilier ce qui parait irréconciliable (Delors 1992b, 248 ; Idem 1992e, 316), cependant non pour arriver au fédéralisme, mais seulement pour créer les fondements pour l'application du principe de subsidiarité[27] dans le processus de la construction européenne, pour réussir l'exonération du centre des taches qui pouvaient être assumées par les institutions nationales capables à les assumer, mais aussi pour que les institutions nationales délèguent certaines attributions au centre (Delors 1992d, 173)[28]. *L'approche fédérale* à laquelle Delors faisait référence signifiait en fait l'action d'assumer le principe de subsidiarité, ce qui aurait permis aux petites entités de l'Union européenne d'actionner séparément, mais uniquement si celles-ci pourraient la faire mieux que les grandes entités (Idem 1992d, 165). Delors a dépassé ce cadre, soutenant la nécessité, dans le sens de l'élargissement de l'Union, d'une *recentralisation* de la construction européenne, à savoir assurer l'équilibre d'entre les niveaux communautaire et national, local ou même international (Idem 1992d, 168).

Selon l'avis de Delors, il était *le temps que les Douze réfléchissent à une amorce de gouvernement européen* (*Le Monde* 1988), et proposait *de mettre en chantier dès 1990 les institutions de la fédération européenne* (*Le Monde* 1990), son idéal européen étant

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[26] Certains théoriciens considèrent que Delors a utilisé des méthodes cachées (politiques pour la réalisation d'une union économique de plus en plus étroite) pour arriver aux résultats fédérales pour le domaine politique. (*Reshaping Europe…* 1992, 67) Autres voix considèrent que Delors « était plein d'idées fédéralistes » et qu'il s'est dépassé lui-même ». (« Toujours Delors ? » 1992)

[27] Principe que Delors le considérait comme *une pédagogie de l'approche fédérale*. (Delors 1992d, 176)

[28] A l'époque ont existé toutefois des critiques à l'adresse de Delors à partir de cette utilisation du principe de subsidiarité : considéré le président qu'avait centralisé l'union, il était vu comme incapable d'assumer et mettre en pratique un tel principe. (« Toujours Delors ? » 1992)

l'association des pays européens *dans un projet politique basé sur une philosophie fédérale* (*Ouest France* 1993). Si on prend compte de la modalité d'expression de Delors, le fédéralisme européen devrait être de type centraliste, à savoir : la Commission, considérée *le moteur de la communauté et l'ingénieur de la construction européenne...* soit *l'amorce d'un gouvernement européen* ; le président soit élu, pour son premier mandat, par les parlements nationaux et le Parlement européen, et pour le deuxième mandat par vote universel (*Libération* 1987) ; la Commission devient l'exécutif de l'Europe unie, étant responsable devant le Parlement européen et d'un Senat représentant les douze États membres (*L'Express* 1989) ; la Commission soit dirigée par le président du Conseil européen, qui devait devenir le président de l'Europe, élu pour trois ans (ou mieux pour une période plus grande) tant par le Parlement que par le Conseil Européen, et ayant comme vice-président (en admettant aussi l'existence de deux vice-présidents) un représentant d'un des États membres (*Témoin* 1993). Delors a soulevé aussi le problème du Parlement européen, qui devra être muni d'un vrai pouvoir législatif, mais aussi de la création d'un Sénat qui représentait les différentes collectivités de citoyens et qui devrait être consulté pour tout problème à portée régionale. Delors soutenait aussi la nécessité de la création d'une *structure fédérale qui définirait les compétences exclusives de la Communauté, les compétences partagées et les compétences réservées aux nations. En outre, on pourrait avoir une Cour constitutionnelle qui jugerait des éventuels débordements…*, tout cela afin de dépasser le déficit démocratique de l'union. (*Ibidem*)

Delors soutenait le fédéralisme européen dans la mesure qu'il considérait qu'il était besoin d'un *leader européen* reconnu dans le dialogue politique international et qui devait coordonner *une fédération européenne d'États nations*, uniquement s'il était évident *qui et quoi fait*, s'il aurait existé *un citoyen informé et actif* (Drake 2002, 40-2, 181). Delors ne voulait pas que l'Europe soit limitée à *un grand espace économique sans solidarité ni volonté politique. Ce n'est pas mon Europe*, affirmait Delors, soutenant la nécessité de la création tant d'une Europe sociale que politique (Meyret 1994, 134). Ainsi, il était nécessaire *une union des pays européens, qui partagent un destin commun, finalement même une Europe fédérale* (« Interview radiophonique… » 1985). Delors considérait comme « fédéralistes » *non pas ceux qui défendent une doctrine institutionnelle, mais ceux qui sont partisans d'une Europe fédérale… d'une Europe politiquement unie et fondée sur un système fédéral avec un gouvernement et les pouvoirs distribués à l'échelon communautaire, national et local* (Delors 1994, 239). Delors, même si personnaliste, il s'est dédis toujours de la doctrine fédérale en ce qui concerne la construction européenne, mais il a développé les concepts de subsidiarité et *méthodes fédérale* (Drake 2002, 180), des concepts clarifiés spécialement à l'occasion de débat de la structure européenne imposée par le Traité de Maastricht. Delors a soutenue (sans pouvoir l'imposer) exactement la formule qui visait, dans son opinion, une tendance fédéraliste, celle de l'arbre à plusieurs branches, *la conception évolutive vers le fédéralisme*, vers une plus grande indépendance, dans l'esprit protestant, refusant le centralisme excessif des institutions européennes (Delors 1994, 291 ; « La nation contre… » 1993), et non celle rigide de les trois piliers (*du temple grec*). Le concept de trois piliers était pour Delors un obstacle dans l'exercice d'une volonté politique européenne, pendant que l'idée de l'arbre permettait l'esquisse de la personnalité politique de l'Europe et une réponse à l'adresse des défis politiques provoqués par l'élargissement (Delors 1996f, 53). D'autre coté, Delors regrettait la disparition du mot *fédéral* et de *l'idée d'une perspective fédérale* du texte de Traité à cause de l'intervention de la Grande Bretagne. (Idem 1994, 273)

A l'opinion de Delors la méthode intergouvernementale de la construction européenne ne pouvait pas être maintenue à longue durée, cela pouvant être un facteur de recul pour le processus de l'intégration (Delors 1996d, 25 ; Idem 1992b, 248). La solution offerte par Delors était la construction européenne à deux niveaux : l'un communautaire, s'occupant des

problèmes économiques et monétaire, et un autre issu des *traditions intergouvernementales*, mais sans aucune lien avec les caractéristiques fédérales, même si une union politique ne peut pas se réaliser uniquement sur un fondement économique (Idem 1996d, 25-6). Delors a hésité entre considérer la méthode fédérale, grâce à sa *transparence et clarté*, comme une méthode viable pour la continuation du processus de construction européenne (Idem 1992b, 247-8) ou comme une fausse solution : un système européen fédéral ne serait pas suffisamment dynamique pour l'élargissement européenne parce que l'Union européenne n'avait pas encore *de personnalité juridique et il n'y a pas de passerelle prévue avec la Communauté existante, d'où la schizophrénie organisée en matière de relations extérieures* (Idem 1996d, 30).

Dans le même temps Delors, même si européaniste, dans une première étape il n'était pas d'accord avec l'idée d'une constitution européenne, la considérant comme une source de la diminution massive de la souveraineté nationale des États membres. L'auteur fait la différence d'entre les conséquences de l'adoption d'un traité, ce qui ne produit que l'union, par les biais des objectifs communs qu'il les prévoie, des *certains États souverains*, pendant que la constitution attenterait juste à la souveraineté de ceux-ci, raison pour lequel Delors ne lui accorde pas aucune chance d'être adopté, même pour le futur assez éloigné. (Idem 1994, 279) Même s'il se reconnaissait comme adepte de la théorie personnaliste (*Ibidem*, 18, 311-2), dont les partisans soutenaient la disparition graduelle de l'État nation du plan politique et l'accroit de l'importance de acteurs régionaux ou internationaux, pour Delors les *nations*[29] sont immortelles et il ne faisait pas des références au moins au changement des coordonnées classiques de l'État-nation ou (Delors 1994, 285). Toutefois, Delors soutenait comme nécessaire la pratique de la subsidiarité dans l'Union, ce qui est possible à réaliser, même à son avis, uniquement par l'adoption d'une Constitution qui délimite les compétences de toute institution (Idem 1996f, 52).

L'unité des nations européennes

A partir de la perspective des États-nationaux, l'unification européenne est considérée par Delors une *chance exceptionnelle*, spécialement dans le contexte de l'exclusion nationale qui se dérive du processus de la modernisation et de la globalisation économique. Parce que le développement exclusivement par les moyens nationaux était devenu impossible, une Europe unie était considérée la seule chance de créer la prospérité des États-nationaux, mais le processus d'unification représentait le réel défi pour les États membres de la communauté. (Delors and Clisthène 1992, 151) L'unité européenne est, dans l'opinion de Delors, l'une *des ambitions collectives les plus nobles*, originaire dans le débat intellectuel sur le maintien de la paix, de la démocratie et de la liberté. Toutefois, l'Europe ne devait pas être comprise comme *une panacée* et elle ne pouvait pas être réalisée par un miracle, mais par un travail acharné pour réaliser une *entité politique et économique* à la mesure des idéaux européens, et dans laquelle les États-nationaux deviennent plus forts. (*Ibidem*, 152) La solution proposée par Delors est celle de *l'exercice en commun des souverainetés*, les États nationaux[30] arrivant ainsi à un rôle plus important *par l'Europe, comme Europe, un group de nations de rang moyenne s'affirmant ainsi comme un pouvoir de premier rang*. (*Ibidem*, 153) La mauvaise connaissance des institutions européennes au niveau des citoyens, les différentes affinités de l'opinion publique des pays membres et la faiblesse numérique des militants européanistes, détermine que l'unité politique européenne reste encore, dans l'opinion de Delors, *un monument obscur* ou *une aventure sophistiquée*, connue uniquement par les spécialistes ou par certains groups d'intérêts. Ce qu'il faudrait premièrement être réalisé serait une opinion publique éduquée dans l'esprit de l'unité, capable *d'une réaction* devant un tel objectif, ce

[29] Un concept qui dans l'opinion de Delors représente l'élément essentiel de l'identité personnelle et de l'appartenance collective.

[30] Delors donne toujours l'exemple de la France.

qu'il est impossible à transformer en réalité si les acteurs politiques qui possèdent le pouvoir ne sont pas impliqués dans la réalisation *d'une Europe forte, unie et influente*, sans des militants de l'idée européenne dans les écoles, universités ou dans l'environnement des affaires, sans un mouvement d'opinion dans se sens. (*Ibidem*, 159) Tout citoyen européen *doit ajouter au sentiment national une autre patrie, l'Europe* (*Ibidem*, 160), mais Delors reconnaissait que, même s'il pouvait bien expliquer son image sur l'Europe aux intellectuels, il a échoué dans son mission d'expliquer l'Europe pour toutes les catégories de population. Afin de réaliser cet objectif une seule personne était insuffisante, même si cette personne était la plus charismatique, mais il était encore besoin de la contribution des gouvernements et des hommes politiques nationaux. (Delors 1996a, 109)

Delors a élaboré quatre scénarios possibles pour la réalisation de l'Europe politique, mais il considérait efficient uniquement un d'eux :

- Une Europe élargie *à la carte*, appuyée sur la collaboration plus étroite des certains États autour du Marché unique, avec la préservation et le renforcement de quatre libertés (Idem 1996f, 58). Toutefois, Delors ne soutenait pas ce modèle parce qu'il ne respectait pas les desiderata des pères fondateurs et contredisait *l'union politique des nations, sans la nostalgie de l'ancien ordre…* [à savoir] *d'un grand espace économique, où la décision politique restait au niveau national, au nom du fameux principe de la souveraineté* (Delors and Clisthène 1992, 300).
- Une Europe élargie, ayant une base commune réduite au minimum, utilisée par les États membres selon leurs nécessités, mais payant pour les services utilisés. Ce modèle impliquait le risque que les pays qui ne voulaient pas adhérer à une telle union suivent leurs politiques macroéconomiques, ce qui aurait pu déterminer l'effondrement du Marché commun.
- Une Europe élargie, où certains États pouvaient aller plus loin que les autres dans le processus de l'intégration (une Europe à géométrie variable). (Delors 1996f, 59)[31]
- La double Europe, à savoir une Europe élargie qui respecte les nécessités spécifiques de chaque État membre, et une autre Europe, *une fédération d'États-nations qui désiraient l'intégration la considérant la seule possibilité de préserver une certaine autonomie et le mode de vie et d'exercer une certain influence dans le monde*. Delors considérait ce dernier modèle l'un qui provoquait la peur de différents acteurs politiques et qui était évité dans les débats publics, mais qu'il préférait à tous les autres. (*Ibidem*, 59-60 ; Delors and Clisthène 1992, 241)

L'Europe politique était, selon Delors, une nécessité très évidente[32], elle était *inévitable* (« La communauté européenne… » 1991, 15), son absence déterminant des déséquilibres dans le fonctionnement du système et perturbant le fonctionnement de celui-ci. Delors envisageait une Europe *vraiment politique*, à savoir une union qui eût fixé des objectifs concernant tant la politique extérieure que la défense, et des politiques de développement économique et sociale également, mais sans oublier la cohérence nécessaire entre la politique extérieure et les actions économiques sur lesquelles elle s'appuyait. Même si ce modèle était difficile à l'appliquer à tous les trente (futurs) États membres, il pouvait se réaliser entre les États qui étaient capables d'assumer ce modèle, mais d'une manière qui ne périclitait pas l'existence de la Communauté.[33] L'Europe politique ne devait pas être conçue *comme une forteresse*, mais *forte et généreuse* (Delors 1996a, 108), solidaire avec les autres. Même si Delors n'avait pas de confiance dans la possibilité de réaliser une *politique extérieure*

[31] Même si au début Delors avait considéré comme viable ce modèle stellaire de la construction européenne, finalement il ne le soutiendra pas. (« La communauté européenne… » 1991, 25, 27)
[32] Le problème de la réalisation devait être soulevé le plus tard en 1996. (Delors 1994, 301)
[33] Dominique Wolton voit dans cette stratégie la réalisation concomitante de deux types d'Europe. (Delors 1994, 242, 300; Idem 1996f, 59).

commune, considérée d'être un concept ambitieux, qui mérité d'être considéré mais qui pour l'instant (1994) était encore sans substance (Idem 1994, 272), il considérait que le processus de la construction européenne avait atteint des frontières inimaginables pour les signataires français des Traités de Rome, tel que l'interdépendance du système mondial. Ainsi, les problèmes spécifiques d'un États ne pouvaient pas se résoudre que par les biais de certaines variables interdépendants (les rates d'échange, les taux d'intérêts, le commerce international), même si l'union douanière européenne ne pouvait pas encore devenir un centre économique d'importance internationale. (Delors and Clisthène 1992, 4-5) *Le géant économique est encore un nain politique* (Delors 1994, 265), et l'Europe politique qui suivait d'être édifiée ne devait être semblable à rien de ce qui existait déjà, l'invention de l'Europe politique étant la mission à réaliser par les intellectuels (Idem 1996b, 107). Delors regrettait qu'il n'a eu pas du temps pour créer un for européen d'hommes de science et culture qui analysent le problème politique européen, à distance de technocrates impliqués directement dans le processus de l'intégration (« La communauté européenne… » 1991, 15).

Fédérale ou non, Delors n'imaginait pas l'Europe comme une entité isolée, mais comme un important acteur politique international. Ainsi, même si l'idée d'une action politique commune était de plus en plus importante en Europe, Delors considérait encore persistante l'absence de cohésion devant les États-Unis et le Japon, la seule méthode de mobiliser les volontés politiques comportant la création d'une force capable à se manifester dans une cause liée de la coopération internationale. Les nations européennes auraient pu devenir une telle force, dans l'opinion de Delors, si elles eurent eu une collaboration plus étroite pour les domaines les plus importants. Ainsi, ni l'Allemagne ni la France n'auraient pu faire cela d'une manière isolée, mais tous les pays de la Communauté européenne, avec 45% des votes dans le FMI, auraient pu déterminer certains effets économiques et financiers, pouvant considérer de plus le concept de conditionnalité. (Delors and Clisthène 1992, 15) Dans la même mesure que l'Europe s'impliquait dans les interdépendances économiques, L'Europe devrait s'impliquer également dans celles culturelles et politiques, inséparables de les premières. (*Ibidem*, 16) Pour Delors l'Europe était *une association unique par la densité et la quantité des échanges commerciaux, un oasis d'ordre monétaire et d'équilibre financier et une réserve considérable de croissance intérieure*, ayant une grande richesse géographique, historique et culturelle, homogène dans son grande diversité, mais que les défis extérieures la trouve toujours divisée. Delors est mécontent que les États européens, même si partagent les mêmes principes de la démocratie et le modèle européen commun[34], elles ne partagent pas la même vision sur l'équilibre mondial (*Ibidem*, 17), ayant des ambitions différentes et étant caractérisés par les conflits stratégiques et les rivalités économiques et non par une volonté commune[35], une conscience de l'interdépendance et du destin commun (*Ibidem*, 21) dans le contexte de nouvelles réalités internationale et de la globalisation (*Ibidem*, 41-2)[36].

L'unité (politique) européenne, une tache complexe

Le succès international de l'Europe se passe souvent, dans l'opinion de Delors, uniquement à l'abri de l'Amérique, les ambitions et les efforts particulières des certains États

[34] Modèle qui, selon Delors, s'il était soumis à l'application commune par les États membres, pouvait déterminer le renforcement ce ceux-ci. (Delors and Clisthène 1992, 18)

[35] Pour donner un exemple, Delors rappelles l'attitude de la Communauté européenne devant les événements qui se passaient dans l'Union Soviétique pendant la période Gorbatchev. (*Ibidem*, 19)

[36] Dans une telle situation, la solution de la fédéralisation semble implicite, spécialement parce que la conscientisation de l'impossibilité de résoudre les problèmes intérieures détermine l'apparition et la soutenance assez large de certaines associations politiques extrémistes. Quand l'État, comme garant de l'autorité, n'a plus du pouvoir, les groups qui se fondaient sur cette institution entrent dans la crise et cherchent à découvrir l'acteur politique capable à résoudre cette absence de l'autorité de l'État comme un premier pas avant d'essayer de substituer eux-mêmes l'absence de l'autorité de l'État. (*Ibidem*, 64-65)

étant suivis de résultats peu importantes, parce que le group d'États européens membres de la communauté n'étaient pas capables *de se définir un destin commun* (*Ibidem*, 20). Delors se rende bien compte qu'une conscience commune européenne ne pouvait pas être réalisée dans les trente ans d'existence de la Communauté, et qu'un projet européen ne pouvait pas se substituer aux projets nationaux, réalisés par des efforts considérables et à longue durée, si les États membres n'arrivaient pas à la conclusion qu'un nouvel ordre était nécessaire pour le continent européen. Même si à la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale tous les acteurs politiques importants se sont prononcés pour une union politique du continent européen, on a réussi uniquement la réalisation d'un « gradualisme économique », le problème de l'union politique restant ouvert même après un demi-siècle d'existence communautaire, les institutions crées afin d'assurer l'union politique en échouant ou n'arrivant pas à réaliser le but proposé. (*Ibidem*, 22)[37] Ce fondement économique a constitué, dans l'opinion de Delors, tant une base pour le mouvement européen général, pour tout pas dans la direction de l'intégration économique, qu'une obligation pour les citoyens européens *de faire possible l'expression politique de l'Europe*. Delors considérait cela comme un défi, une responsabilité, mais aussi une chance immense des **tous** les citoyens et les hommes politiques européens. *Souhaiter et construire : cela est le choix qui doit être faite. Souhaiter, c'est l'abandon de soi devant la joie de « l'Europe des mots », c'est construire, à savoir suivre, réagir à toute initiative, répondre à tout événement qui peut affaiblir, diviser ou minimiser la position de l'Europe dans le monde*. (*Ibidem*, 23) Ce qui détermine le retard de la réalisation de l'Europe politique est la crise de confiance et d'identité du continent, provoquée par l'absence d'un projet culturel, d'un *corpus spirituel* qui constitue le fondement de la construction politique et facilite cette étape.[38] La création de l'Europe était considérée nécessaire, dans l'opinion de Delors, dans le contexte dans lequel les États-nation n'ont plus un rôle international économique ou politique important, pour obtenir *la capacité de prendre indépendamment les décisions* et aussi pour acquérir un certain degré de liberté nécessaire pour *une France plus sûre* (*Ibidem*, 33)[39].

Toutefois, après le Maastricht le processus de la construction européenne est passé dans la vie politique nationale, mais non en totalité, étant encore nécessaire que l'opinion publique et les responsables politiques la considèrent comme un des *éléments intrinsèques* du débat sur le futur national. Cette situation du renforcement de la nécessité de l'implication de l'opinion publique dans le processus de l'intégration européenne est intervenue après la chute des régimes communistes, quand la construction européenne était, dans l'opinion de Delors, moins urgente que pendant la guerre froide, quand l'unité européenne ne devait pas être considérée une contrepoids du modèle soviétique[40], quand, dans un certain sens, disparait une partie de la raison de laquelle est démarré le processus d'intégration et s'est ouvert une nouvelle perspective, imprévisible, pour laquelle il n'étaient pas prévues des méthodes de gestion (Delors 1994, 225-7, 301), fait qui a déterminé l'existence des doutes sur le futur de l'Europe (Idem 1996c, 7-8). Même si l'unification s'est réalisée comme résultat de la guerre froide, elle ne devait pas s'achever à la fin de celle-ci, mais par contre, se créer une personnalité politique permettant la défense de ses propres intérêts légitimes (Idem 1996e, 40,

[37] J. Delors a contribué à l'initiation et l'application de l'Acte Unique Européen, qui établissait une série de politiques communes pour les pays membres de la Communauté européenne. (*Ibidem*, 25-9)

[38] Aucune disposition de nature éducationnelle ou culturelle ne constituait pas le fondement des Traités de Rome ou de l'Acte unique européen. (*Ibidem*, p. 37; « La communauté européenne… » 1991, 14)

[39] Toutefois, Delors a essayé d'éliminer le soupçon de protectionnisme que pouvait être attribué à ceux qui souhaitaient la réalisation d'une Europe unie, le marché unique étant accessible à tous ceux qui se trouvaient au-delà de la Communauté, dans les mêmes conditions dans lesquelles était accessible à ses membres. (Delors and Clisthène 1992, 38)

[40] J. Delors considérait, en 1991, que la future confédération européenne devait reprendre les contacts avec le *nouvel ensemble soviétique*, si celui-ci ne se désintégrait pas. (« La communauté européenne… » 1991, 32)

44) et qui ne pouvait pas être réalisée que par l'élargissement et l'approfondissement communautaire. Parce que les deux directions ont soulevé des débats assez accrues, s'imposait la réalisation d'une dialectique entre ceux-ci, pas difficile à réaliser si les oppositions sur *l'idée communautaire* et *le degré d'intégration* ne s'entrelaçaient pas avec l'élargissement (« La communauté européenne… » 1991, 15). Les préoccupations de Delors pour l'unification européenne n'ont fini pas avec sa sortie de Bruxelles, celui-ci étant encore intéressé tant de trouver une méthode, que du problème *de l'identité, de la personnalité politique de l'Europe*, à laquelle le continent n'était pas encore arrivé (Delors 1996c, 7). *L'Europe devrait se vouloir européenne* (Idem 1992f, 300). C'est la raison pour laquelle Delors considérait nécessaire, quand le temps était arrivé, la révision du Traité de Maastricht, de point de vue de la politique extérieure commune, de la sécurité intérieure, de la complexité du triangle *Conseil – Parlement – Commission*, de l'approche de citoyens et du concept générale communautaire (la création de la simplicité[41]). Si à l'installation de Delors à la présidence de la Commission il considérait que les européens ont besoin d'*un plus de confiance en eux-mêmes* afin de dépasser les problèmes de l'unité (Idem 1992c, 36), peu du temps après il considérait que l'Europe n'avait plus des doutes et même elle a pris l'initiative[42].

Le problème européen est devenu un de plus en plus politisé et *la théorie de l'engrenage* n'a pas eu des effets après 1992 juste du même motif. Toutefois, dans l'opinion de Delors la solution était juste l'application de la théorie de petits pas (même si insuffisante) au niveau politique européen aussi, en instituant un gouvernement économique européen et une étroite coopération pour les politiques macroéconomiques (Idem 1996c, 15). Dans le contexte du déficit démocratique de l'Union européenne et dans celui de la mondialisation, la solution de Delors était la *ré-politisation*, à savoir l'assurance d'un plus de transparence dans la vie publique, d'un plus grand contrôle démocratique, l'élaboration d'un projet politique réel, ce qui signifiait le dépassement des limites des solutions offertes par la solution de l'engrenage. Cette ré-politisation devait être réalisée par *une approche fédérale* et non par le *fédéralisme* (Idem 1996c, 17-21), les adeptes du fédéralisme étant, selon Delors, la source de différentes polémiques sur *un certain concept d'État-nation* et non d'offrir des solutions valables. (Idem 1992d, 164) La ré-politisation, dont la réalisation incombait aux États-nation, signifiait pour Delors la création d'une *fédération d'États-nation*, parce qu'uniquement une telle solution aurait permis la renaissance de la démocratie. C'était une renaissance possible uniquement au niveau national, les pays souverains étant les entités qui devraient consentir le transfert de souveraineté nécessaire et la création d'une vraie entité politique commune (Idem 1996c, 20-1). Toutefois, Delors reconnaissait dans ce syntagme une possible *solution choquante* parce qu'ils étaient les fédéralistes qui militaient contre l'État-nation et il n'était pas un fédéraliste.

Pour cela il était encore besoin du temps et d'obtenir l'accord des citoyens des États membres (*Ibidem*, 20), ce qui paraît assez difficile pour Delors, parce que l'opinion publique européenne traité le domaine politique *comme un hamburger* (la politique de type *fast-food*), réfléchissant aux effets immédiats mais qu'elle les oublie tout de suite (« La communauté européenne… » 1991, 15).

A la place de conclusions…

Les différentes conceptions sur le processus de la construction européenne, élaborées par les hommes politiques à la mesure de l'avance dans le processus intégrationniste et qui ont

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[41] La simplicité semble d'être un desideratum très présent chez Delors, celui-ci soutenant qu'*il faut être les inventeurs de la simplicité*. (Delors 1996d, 24; Idem 1996f, 51) Delors considérait accomplie l'existence de la simplicité dans le cas du principe de la reconnaissance réciproque, qui a permis la renonciation à certaines réglementations très détaillées, et pour l'adoption du vote à majorité qualifiée. (Idem 1992d, 168)

[42] Il se référait à l'AUE. (Idem 1992a, 280)

contribué à la réalisation de l'unification européenne jusque à ces jours, ont eu certains points communs essentiels. Ainsi, tant W. Churchill, R. Schuman que Ch. de Gaulle ont eu la vision d'une Europe unie dont le fondement se trouve la réconciliation franco-allemande et à laquelle participe la Grande Bretagne aussi, mais, en dépit de toute bonne intention, la Grande Bretagne a refusé d'être part de CECA, de Gaulle[43] n'a pas été complètement d'accord avec le plan de Schuman et la Grande Bretagne est devenue membre de la Communauté européenne uniquement plus tard, après beaucoup de dissensions et quelques essais non réussi. C'est le paradoxe du processus de la construction européenne que les acteurs politiques qui ont soutenu la réalisation d'une Europe fédérale (les *Etats-Unis d'Europe* de Churchill est un syntagme bien connu) ou au moins confédérale (c'est le cas de Général de Gaulle) ont souvent agi d'une manière contraire, empêchant le processus intégratif, pendant que des acteurs qui niaient le fédéralisme comme solution pour la réalisation de l'unité européenne, ont contribué, par leurs actions, à la matérialisation de ce processus, tel comme il est le cas de Jacques Delors. En dépit des actions des uns et grâce aux efforts des autres acteurs politiques qui ont contribué à un certain moment à l'unification européenne, on peut parler aujourd'hui au moins d'une grande décentralisation aux niveaux des États européens, une décentralisation qui, comprise comme un processus de désintégration (relativement) symétrique des États-nation et de l'agrégation au niveau communautaire[44], peut être considérée comme un des fondements du processus fédératif.

La présidence Delors de la Commission européenne a mis en place des nombreux actes normatifs qui aujourd'hui sont considérés d'une valeur incontestable pour l'évolution de l'unité européenne, et parmi lesquels l'Acte unique européen, l'Union économique et monétaire[45] et le Traité de Maastricht sont les plus souvent mentionnés comme points de repère pour l'évolution de l'organisation économique, sociale ou politique de l'Union et que les États membres ont eu besoin de beaucoup du temps pour les assumer et digérer (« The return of Jacques Delors… » 2004), même si des autres changements ont bien intervenus. Beaucoup des objectifs de Delors se sont bien réalisés, même si parfois en vacarme et supportant plusieurs oppositions. Des autres objectifs ont bien changé ou sont encore à travailler et à mettre en pratique. Toutefois, c'est le mérite de Delors, le visionnaire pragmatique d'une période grise et tumultueuse également, d'établir les pas à suivre, ou mieux dire, d'avoir le courage de dire qu'il était besoin de certains pas à suivre d'une manière consensuelle. Et aussi le mérite de ceux qui ont accordé leur confiance à un leader assez atypique et têtu.

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[43] De Gaulle a eu une vision très ample sur le problème de l'Europe unie, E. Jouve ayant besoin de presque six cents pages pour nous redonner les passages des discours de de Gaulle concernant ce sujet, mais, même si certaines références peuvent donner l'impression que de Gaulle ne s'est jamais opposé à l'idée de l'unification européenne, pendant la période qu'il s'est trouvé à la présidence de la France l'intégration européenne a stagné, les causes étant dans leur majorité due aux politiques françaises concernant le processus de l'intégration.

[44] L'Union européenne comprend aujourd'hui trois fédérations (Belgique, Allemagne et l'Autriche) et deux États ayant un haut niveau d'autonomie (l'Espagne et l'Italie). (Croisat and Quermone 1999, 9). Ces auteurs affirment aussi que la France fait partie de ce deuxième group, mais nous considérons qu'en dépit du processus de décentralisation administratif de la France, ce pays est encore assez loin d'achever ce processus.

[45] Considérée comme « un élément essentiel du fédéralisme », le but beaucoup rêvé, mais encore inachevé, de l'Union. (Dinan 1996)

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L'EUROPE POLITIQUE: QUEL AVENIR ?

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1. Toute réflexion sur l'avenir de l'Europe politique exige la prise en compte de trois facteurs, constitutifs de son sort: son statut actuel et sa dynamique interne, qui nourrissent son existence; le discours qu'elle projette concernant son avenir idéal; l'environnement international dans lequel elle se situe.

Une première remarque est que l'Europe géographique et culturelle diffère de l'Europe politique, cette dernière étant plus restreinte. Est-il légitime de mettre de côté l'Europe géographico-culturelle, qui renvoie à l'identité globale, pour constituer une Europe politique qui ne représente qu'une certaine idée de l'Europe ? Faut-il admettre que l'Union européenne forme la base institutionnelle d'une Europe politique qui a vocation d'intégrer le Vieux Continent tout entier ? Quelle est, en dernière analyse, la relation entre identité européenne et Europe politique ? Et comment va-t-elle évoluer ?

Une deuxième remarque concerne plus particulièrement la relation entre identité et politique dans le cadre de l'Union européenne. Nous savons bien que selon la doctrine de la modernité, la responsabilité de l'identité nationale est laissée à l'État. L'État souverain étant déclaré détenteur unique du système politique et, au-delà, de la gestion des affaires de la société, il est aussi censé définir authentiquement le contenu et la finalité de la conscience collective, en l'occurrence nationale. L'Europe politique est assurément transformée, de sujet de relations internationales (de type ONU, OTAN, etc.) en un système politique réunissant des États indépendants. Dans ce nouveau cadre, il convient de savoir qui est le responsable politique auquel appartient la gestion de l'identité et, en dernière analyse, des intérêts européens: les États membres ou les instances européennes du système ?

Le préalable à ces deux remarques est relatif à la problématique concernant la puissance mobilisatrice et, au-delà, le poids politique de l'identité collective européenne. Y a-t-il une identité européenne qui soit capable de soutenir le projet politique de l'Europe ? Dans l'hypothèse où cette identité existerait, il convient de savoir quels en seraient les fondements et essentiellement le poids par rapport à d'autres facteurs tels que le facteur géopolitique ou celui de la pluralité identitaire européenne. Et dans ce cas, l'identité européenne est-elle capable d'agir en termes d'identité globale, de sorte à intégrer ou du moins à héberger les identités disparates du Continent, voire à éveiller les Européens ? Et en l'occurrence, dans quelles frontières ?

En fait, la question des frontières politiques de l'Europe est d'un ordre différent, et la réponse dépendra de la capacité de l'Europe politique à articuler les identités et les intérêts particuliers sous l'angle d'un projet global. Ainsi revient-on au projet de système politique européen qui conviendrait le mieux à cette Europe plurielle.

2. La question de savoir si le système politique de l'Union est en mesure de soutenir ce projet nous ramène à l'examen de sa nature. En effet, on ne se rend pas compte que l'Europe politique forme une *union d'États*, c'est-à-dire que les États membres incarnent le système politique européen. Ce système ne doit pas être confondu avec le système fédéral ou confédéral. Il n'est pas non plus inédit, comme on le croit parfois: le système politique européen rappelle, d'une manière homothétique, les *sympolitéia* grecques dont le modèle le

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plus achevé est celui de la période hellénistique, juste avant la conquête romaine. Ce terme, composé de deux mots, «*syn*» et «*politéia*», définit le fait de la synthèse, de la réunion d'États indépendants.

La référence au précédent du *cosmosystème hellénique* n'a pas l'intention de déplacer la discussion dans l'histoire. Elle vise à souligner son importance pour relever les circonstances dans lesquelles on voit naître le phénomène, les formes qu'il revêt ainsi que les conditions qui le font évoluer ou disparaître.

On présume alors qu'à la différence de la fédération, la *sympolitie* apparaît quand le *cosmosystème anthropocentrique*[1] est déjà consolidé sous sa première phase statocentrique, c'est-à-dire en États indépendants. La *sympolitie* répond en l'occurrence au besoin d'une reconsidération des relations des forces au sein du cosmosystème global et non pas à un projet de société politique fondateur. Au contraire, les États nations indépendants ou fédéraux sont nés dans le courant du XIX^e^ siècle et de la première moitié du XX^e^, pour servir la cause de la société globale politiquement constituée d'un cosmosystème anthropocentrique naissant[2]. On peut supposer que si le projet de l'Europe politique était apparu au cours du XIX^e^ siècle, son système aurait été fédéral.

J'entends par là que depuis, la priorité politique des identités collectives a changé. Au niveau national, il ne s'agit pas de supprimer le différent ou, du moins, d'assimiler «l'autre», mais de l'intégrer, voire de valoriser son statut sous l'angle de la liberté. Ainsi, l'identité nationale étant acquise, le projet politique européen doit en tenir compte. Cela signifie que, plus que l'État-nation, l'Europe politique est appelée à reconnaître formellement l'autonomie politique de «l'autre» politique pour exister.

En somme, au stade où nous en sommes en Europe, ni l'identité européenne ni le système politique de l'Union européenne ne peuvent s'inspirer du précédent de l'État-nation, voire de la fédération, et donc se passer de la pluralité identitaire et du statut statocentrique de l'Europe. Et il en ira ainsi à l'avenir.

3. D'autre part, la géopolitique a conditionné dès le début la naissance de l'Europe politique. En effet, la Communauté européenne est apparue au moment où les rapports de forces au sein du cosmosystème planétaire changeaient de façon dramatique. Le centre de la puissance mondiale se déplaçait vers l'Europe de l'Est et vers l'Amérique, mettant les États européens jadis hégémoniques dans une situation d'infériorité. En même temps, cette situation était chargée des totalitarismes qui avaient précédé et des ruines de la guerre, ainsi que du choc provoqué par la division socio-économique du monde.

Les initiatives européennes répondent essentiellement à ces préoccupations. Aussi longtemps que les puissances européennes ont été assurées de la direction du monde, la question de l'Europe politique ne s'est pas posée. Le fait que la Grande-Bretagne adopte une attitude *sui generis* vis-à-vis de l'Europe politique s'explique précisément par sa place particulière dans l'axe anglo-saxon qui dirige le monde.

La dimension géopolitique s'avère donc le facteur par excellence pour que les patriotismes nationaux cherchent à découvrir l'identité européenne pour s'y réfugier. La géopolitique restera aussi fondamentale pour leur équilibre dans l'avenir. L'importance du facteur géopolitique tel qu'il se présente sur le continent européen explique le phénomène, que

[1] L'ensemble des sociétés qui forment une entité autarcique et ont comme dénominateur commun la liberté. Du cosmosystème anthropocentrique font partie le monde grec et celui de l'époque moderne. Voir à ce sujet Georges Contogeorgis, *Le cosmosystème hellénique*, Athènes, 2006, t.1. pp. 17 ss.

[2] En ce sens l'État-nation constitue la société fondamentale du cosmosystème anthropocentrique de grande échelle. En termes d'analogie, l'État-nation correspond à la cité-État, qui fut la société fondamentale du cosmosystème anthropocentrique de petite échelle, à savoir hellénique.

nulle part dans le monde les identités périphériques (par exemple celles des Arabes) n'ont réussi à prendre le pas sur les identités nationales.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la création de l'Europe économique et ensuite de l'Europe politique fut le résultat de compromis entre les Européens qui se rencontraient autour de l'axe franco-allemand et les Anglo-Saxons. Un compromis qui consistait à ménager les intérêts des premiers sans contester le leadership des seconds. Le recours à l'identité européenne fut nécessaire pour légitimer une option politique, sans que cela laisse entendre qu'elle fut forgée par les pères fondateurs ou par l'Union. Les Européens se reconnaissaient comme tels bien avant.

Souvent dans l'histoire, surtout au moment de la menace ottomane sur Constantinople, la solidarité européenne –c'est-à-dire la dimension politique de l'identité européenne– fut évoquée pour instaurer une synergie politique contre l'ennemi extérieur. Pourtant, c'est avec le projet de l'Europe communautaire que l'identité européenne a acquis une vraie dimension politique.

4. Entre-temps, on dut dépasser les tentations d'une définition à la carte de l'identité européenne selon les priorités de ceux qui avaient le pouvoir dans l'évolution. Pour cela, on essaya de transcrire l'incarnation de l'identité nationale par l'État-nation dans les instances européennes. Selon cette opinion, appartenaient à l'Europe les sociétés qui faisaient partie des institutions européennes. En tout cas, elles étaient de vrais Européens. Les sociétés socialistes ne partageaient pas les valeurs de la civilisation européenne.

Parmi les hommes politiques, Charles de Gaulle fut le premier à ré-identifier le projet de l'Europe politique avec sa géographie: il a parlé de l'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural.

En découvrant à «l'autre» Europe l'allié contre l'axe anglo-saxon, De Gaulle avait réalisé un grand pas. Il avait légitimé la pluralité de l'identité européenne. Une pluralité qui tiendrait compte à la fois des voies historiques différentes des peuples de l'Europe et de leur fonds commun: le fonds du cosmosystème anthropocentrique hellénique, l'acquis de l'*imperium* romain et la religion chrétienne attachée à ce fonds commun.

Du même coup, il soulevait la question d'un projet européen qui viserait au dépassement des deux camps idéologiques et à la revendication d'une Europe politique et libre à la hauteur de son passé historique. De Gaulle avait sans doute le souci d'un retour en force des anciennes puissances continentales dans le monde, mais la dynamique de son projet allait plus loin.

L'effondrement du camp socialiste a révélé que les valeurs anthropocentriques européennes (la liberté, le pluralisme politique et identitaire, la quête de la prospérité collective et individuelle, etc.) constituaient un «argument» solide, capable d'alimenter la dynamique de l'Union. Leur avantage est qu'elles profitent à ses membres tout en laissant l'espace libre au développement de différences identitaires fortes.

5. Cet avantage de l'Europe politique contient aussi en germe sa faiblesse. On a déjà remarqué que la *sympolitie* laisse aux États l'essentiel de la gestion de l'identité globale. À savoir que les États membres sont à la fois responsables de la gestion de l'intérêt particulier/national et de l'intérêt global/européen. Ce qui fait que l'espace public européen est souvent occulté derrière les espaces publics nationaux. Si, donc, il y a un conflit entre les deux, l'État membre optera plutôt pour l'intérêt national. Dans tous les cas, l'intérêt européen est vu sous l'angle de l'intérêt national.

Pourtant, la *sympolitie*, à l'encontre de l'État unitaire ou fédéral, n'introduit pas de limites nuisibles à la pluralité nationale et ne constitue pas de ce point de vue une source de conflit. L'exemple belge ou celui des fédérations socialistes est en cela didactique. C'est

d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle l'Europe des régions n'a pas avancé au niveau des instances de l'Union.

De plus, le paradigme hellénique prouve que ce n'est pas le système sympolitéien qui ne parvient pas à équilibrer les intérêts particuliers (nationaux, ethniques, régionaux, etc.) avec l'intérêt général/européen. Cette difficulté est le résultat de son caractère inachevé plutôt qu'inhérent à son type idéal.

En effet, on a déjà noté que l'Union européenne forme un *système politique sans État*. Les caractéristiques qui révèlent sa nature inachevée sont essentiellement liées à l'absence de politique extérieure et de défense, propre à l'Union[3]. L'Europe politique garantit à ses membres la stabilité politique, la prospérité, les libertés et beaucoup d'autres avantages. Mais les États membres sont invités à se débrouiller seuls dans l'arène internationale[4].

Prenons l'exemple des pays de l'Europe Centrale. Tout de suite après l'effondrement du camp socialiste, ils ont opté pour l'Union européenne. Pourtant, ils ont, en même temps, cherché aux États-Unis leur refuge pour leur sécurité extérieure. Or, il est largement connu que par l'intermédiaire de ces pays, les États-Unis sont devenus des partenaires des décisions de l'Union.

6. Cela montre que l'avenir de l'Europe politique dépend prioritairement de sa relation vis-à-vis des États-Unis. Le choix entre une relation de dépendance complémentaire ou une relation de partenariat avec les États-Unis part largement de l'approfondissement du système européen et plus concrètement de sa transformation en *État sympolitéien*. Sans cette évolution, l'Europe politique ne parviendra pas à offrir à ses membres la sécurité nécessaire ni à gérer ses ambitions mondiales.

Cette transformation de l'Europe politique sans le consentement des États-Unis est-elle faisable ? Sinon, dans quelles conditions ce consentement serait-il donné ? Je considère que cette optique n'est pas réaliste tant que l'environnement international et, en l'occurrence, la position dominante des États-Unis dans le monde ne changent pas.

En effet, l'alliance entre les pays européens et les États-Unis a été établie sur un concept qui articulait l'idée de l'Occident et l'idée du système libéral. Pourtant, tout comme dans le cas de l'idée européenne, à l'époque, le concept d'Occident a été perçu d'une manière restrictive. Il refusait d'admettre que l'Europe de l'Est participe au même destin gréco-romain et, au-delà, anthropocentrique; et que le système socialiste était né dans des pays d'Europe occidentale. En même temps, on assiste à une tentative de définir une réalité d'ordre cosmosystémique –le cosmosystème anthropocentrique en général– sous l'angle de la géographie occurrentielle –l'Occident– dans le but de servir des objectifs de puissance.

Dans le cadre cosmosystémique d'ensemble, l'Occident constitue une subdivision interne du monde issu du précédent gréco-romain, à savoir du cosmosystème anthropocentrique à petite échelle fondé sur la cité. On oublie que le concept même d'Occident est né à Constantinople afin de distinguer les deux côtés du cosmosystème hellénique qui, par la suite, ont servi pour la description des deux parties de l'Empire romain. L'Occident n'est donc que l'une des deux parties du Continent, celle qui, après être passée au cosmosystème despotique (au féodalisme) a constitué l'espace vital de l'hellénisme, au même titre que l'Europe de l'Est, et trouvé ainsi la voie de la Renaissance.

Le retour en force au concept d'Occident après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale a servi, en dernière analyse, la consolidation et la légitimation de l'hégémonie anglo-saxonne sur l'Europe de l'Ouest et dans le monde. Ce déséquilibre au sein du camp dit occidental est à

[3] On se réfère en l'occurrence à sa dimension non étatique, car sa nature inachevée fait aussi référence à son système politique.

[4] Ce défaut de l'Europe politique se remarque aussi dans l'absence de solidarité vis-à-vis de l'extérieur au sein de l'Union.

l'origine des difficultés que rencontre le processus de constitution politique de l'Europe. Le dilemme approfondissement ou non, élargissement ou non, de l'Europe politique est conditionné par la difficulté du Vieux Continent à réunir ses forces et contrebalancer la puissance des États-Unis.

Cela étant, on peut aisément comprendre pourquoi l'élargissement récent de l'Union européenne vers l'Est a renforcé le poids du facteur anglo-saxon et, au-delà, les obstacles que doit surmonter le courant de l'approfondissement. Les États-Unis se sont en fait installés au centre de l'Europe, et via leur rôle de protecteur à l'égard de l'ennemi d'en face, comme facteur institutionnel du système politique de l'Union.

On présume alors que si l'Europe politique n'entend pas se transformer en partie intégrante d'une confédération de fait des États-Unis, il faudra rétablir les équilibres au sein du dit Occident, par l'affirmation de sa volonté politique. Rétablissement qui serait l'effet soit d'un réaménagement des rapports de forces entre eux, soit de l'intervention de facteurs externes, par exemple du monde russe ou chinois.

7. En ce sens, il est temps de se demander si l'Europe et essentiellement les pays qui se posent en bastions de l'approfondissement disposent d'une volonté d'indépendance affirmée. Une telle volonté exige à son tour la mise en avant d'une politique qui consisterait à soutenir une stratégie européenne propre dans le monde. Or, il n'y en a pas. Il semble que l'Europe politique se sente plus ou moins à l'aise de profiter de l'hégémonie américaine, c'est-à-dire sans s'exposer aux sacrifices ni au risque de voir la classe politique se heurter à une réaction de l'opinion déjà sensible à une politique impériale.

L'Europe, semble-t-il, n'a plus de volonté de puissance. Les États-Unis, en étant le gendarme du monde, garantissent aux Européens le contrôle des matières premières, la sécurité et le commerce international, un système de communication incomparable, en somme un rapport de forces favorable à leur action. Cela explique en fait l'hypothèse qui a été avancée plus haut, à savoir que le ralentissement de l'approfondissement de l'Europe politique se situe dans le cadre d'un compromis qui arrange les partenaires occidentaux. Un compromis qui résume les deux projets pour l'Europe et s'exprime par le choix d'un chemin qui consiste à faire évoluer le système européen à petits pas.

La question de la Turquie est devenue, en l'occurrence, un enjeu majeur car la décision concernant l'entrée ou non de ce pays dans l'Union conditionnera définitivement l'avenir de l'Europe politique. Pour plusieurs raisons, aussi longtemps que la Turquie n'intégrera pas l'Union européenne, l'évolution de l'Europe politique dépendra de la capacité des États-Unis à assurer le leadership du monde. L'entrée de la Turquie pèsera irréversiblement en faveur d'une Europe politique conditionnée par l'idée de marché, à savoir «américaine». L'axe franco-allemand ne sera plus en vue, l'homogénéité identitaire européenne non plus. Le fonctionnement du système politique de l'Union dépendra essentiellement de ce pays, autant que la mise en place de politiques telles que la défense et la politique étrangère. Enfin, les équilibres économiques s'inverseront au fur et à mesure que l'Europe entière devra financer le développement de la Turquie.

Pour certains, la solution serait la création de deux Europes: l'une politique, l'autre plutôt économique. Cette idée, pourtant, oublie qu'elle présuppose la dissolution et la reconstitution de l'Union européenne, car le système politique exige l'unanimité.

Les fardeaux géopolitiques de l'Union et ses hétérogénéités internes, qui empêchent son évolution en *État sympolitéien*, montrent d'autre part pourquoi la question du monde russe ne peut pas se poser. En effet, l'alternative d'une intégration de ce monde dans l'Union européenne s'oppose à la stratégie du camp anglo-saxon tout autant qu'aux équilibres qui se sont installés en son sein.

Pourtant, à la différence de la Turquie, l'entrée des pays russes dans l'Union renforcerait sa volonté d'indépendance vis-à-vis du monde anglo-saxon, en échange d'un risque imminent de voir l'épicentre de la puissance européenne se transférer vers l'Est. C'est cette perspective, qui soulèverait la question d'une reconsidération de la division historique du Vieux Continent, qui empêche toute discussion sur les avantages économiques et géopolitiques de la transformation de l'espace russe en zone vitale interne, à savoir exclusive, de l'Europe politique.

8. Un autre aspect de la problématique sur l'avenir de l'Europe politique a affaire avec l'évolution anthropocentrique du cosmosystème moderne.

Jusqu'ici, nous avons envisagé les paramètres qui jouent sur l'avenir de l'Europe sous l'angle de la relation existant entre le social et le politique. Or, on ne se rend pas compte que le système politique moderne, malgré ce que l'on dit, est de nature *proto-anthropocentrique* et, en ce sens, *pré-représentative*. Dans ce cadre, le destin de l'Europe appartient largement à la responsabilité de la classe politique et, au-delà, dirigeante.

Que se passerait-il alors dans l'hypothèse où, indépendamment des changements de la carte géopolitique, le système politique évoluerait avec l'installation de la société des citoyens en son sein ? Malgré ce que l'on croit, cette hypothèse n'est plus du tout utopique.

On assiste déjà à une contestation croissante du système politique national et européen qui, pour l'instant, est d'ordre moral. On accuse son déficit représentatif/démocratique sans se rendre compte qu'on demande à la classe politique de se comporter selon les normes d'un autre système, qui n'est pas la réalité. En effet, selon le système en place, l'État est destiné à servir la nation, l'intérêt général, mais certainement pas la société tout court.

Dans l'hypothèse où les systèmes nationaux et européen évolueraient en système représentatif, les répercussions sur l'environnement géopolitique, interne et externe, seront importantes. Le leadership des États-Unis se posera en termes fondamentalement différents, tout autant que la perspective institutionnelle de l'Europe politique. En même temps, au fur et à mesure que les sociétés de citoyens assureront la qualité de mandant, l'agora politique imposera sa suprématie à l'agora économique.

9. Au point où nous sommes arrivés, force est de se demander quel pourrait être le choix politique pour l'Europe.

On peut supposer qu'aussi longtemps que l'Europe politique conservera son attractivité en matière de prospérité et de liberté, en d'autres termes par son modèle de vie, elle sera recherchée par les autres et elle continuera à intéresser ses membres. Il ne faut pas sous-estimer non plus le rôle de l'Europe politique sur la scène internationale. Elle constitue en effet un facteur de stabilité et de sécurité pour ses peuples ainsi qu'un élément de régulation et d'équilibre au niveau planétaire.

On pourrait même dire que ce rôle se conjugue à ce qui peut être la perspective d'une transformation représentative du système interne. Car, en fait, si les choses internes et externes n'évoluent pas ensemble, on risque de se retrouver accroché au sillage des autres.

Entre les deux, je suis convaincu que, du moins à moyen terme, l'Europe politique va continuer à vivre dans l'ombre des États-Unis et, par conséquent, à s'accommoder d'un *système politique sympolitéien inachevé*, c'est-à-dire *sans État*.

Dans les circonstances actuelles, le fait que l'Europe politique existe est déjà un événement de première importance. D'autant plus que la modernité oublie souvent que la longue histoire n'a pas encore valorisé son propre exemple et ne représente pas un paradigme de profondeur historique.

VI. EVENTS

The international symposium* TEXTUS TESTIS *Valore documentario e dimensioni letterarie del testo storico. Documentary value and literary dimensions of the historic text, Padua, 17th of November 2009.

A delegation of the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations of the University of Oradea, participated on Tuesday, the 17th of November, at the University of Padua, at the symposium titled "Documentary Value and Literary Dimensions of the Historic Text".

The organizing of scientific manifestation that gathers historians and novelists it is not something unusual. We are thinking about Sextil Puscariu's researchers upon the Romanian language, at the good collaboration between linguists and historians in the inter-war period, something tried by the *"Dacoromania"* Magazine, and widely, tried by the collaboration between the Romanist Department from the University of Padua, founded by Ramiro Ortiz between the Two World Wars, and the Romanian specialists. The symposium tried to recreate the bond from the Inter-War period. Also, it was tried the larging of the historic document notion, the call to literary resources, obviously after a critic investigation of the sources.

The Romanian part was represented by Prof. Univ. PhD. Barbu Stefanescu, vice – rector at International Relations, Prof. Univ. Phd. Antonio Faur, director at Department of History, lect. Univ. PhD. Mircea Brie, head of Department of International Relations and lect. Univ. PhD. Florin Sfrengeu. The symposium was organized at the initiative of the professors Lorenzo Renzi and Dan Cepraga, from the Romanist Department of the Padua University, and of Prof. Univ. PhD. Sorin Sipos, from the Faculty of History – Geography and International Relations of the Oradea University. At the opening of works there were, from the University of Padua, Prof. Michele Cortelazzo, the President of the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy and Furio Brugnolo, Director of Romanist Department.

The symposium was an exceptional scientific accomplishment, first of all due to the sustained communications, due to the discussions at a high academic level and the best organization. In agreement it was decided that the works will be published in a volume that appears under the protection of the two universities in the first part of 2010. It was also decided that in May 2010, the symposium should take place in Oradea when it will be launched the volume containing the works from the Padua conference.

Oradea
2nd December 2009

Prof.univ.Phd. Sorin ŞIPOŞ

International conference
”Identities, Citizenship and Democracy: 20 years after”
(Charleroi, Belgium, 22-24 October 2009)

This year, in many European countries took place manifestations that celebrate 20 years from the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe. An event of this kind was organized in Belgium, at Charleroi, by GARENP (The Group of Research and Action on the European Neighborhood Policy) near the European Commission and the Poland's Embassy near the European Commission. The event reunited over 150 researchers and academic teachers from all the European countries. A special place, threw the number of attendants, was given to the exponents of the academic environment from Central and Eastern Europe.

The organizers, appreciating the scientific results of the Oradea's academics, invited the Euro-regional Studies Institute, European Excellency Center "Jean Monnet" (GARENP member) to be co-organizer of the conference. Together with the University of Oradea – threw the Jean Monnet European Module "Mass-Media and Intercultural Dialogue in Europe Without Borders" – co-organizers of the conference were too the International Institute of Administrative Sciences in Brussels, the University of Debrecen (Hungary), the "Jagellona" University of Cracow (Poland), the University "Matej Bel" of Banska Bistryska (Slovakia) and the "Charles" University of Prague (Czech Republic).

The discussions were around the following main themes: *Democracy in all its states: challenges and perspectives in the EU and its neighborhood* (with the workshops: Democracy and identity in EU; Democratic transitions and identities); *Communication, Media and the European construction* (with the workshops: Communication and cooperation, Communication, Media and European Institutions); *European identities and citizenship* (with the workshops: Identities and Citizenship, Universities and Cultures).

It was given to the University of Oradea the responsibility of managing one of the three sections of the conference, entitled "Communication, Media and the European construction". Threw this, it is proved that the organizers appreciate the results of the Oradea academics in studying the impact that mass-media had in the democratization of Eastern and Central Europe and then in the process accession to the European Union. It is also confirmed that here exists an expertise recognized by the European Commission, threw the Jean Monnet European Module "Mass-Media and Intercultural Dialogue in Europe Without Borders" of the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations.

Luminita SOPRONI, Ph.D.
Academic Coordinator
Jean Monnet European Module
"Mass-Media and Intercultural Dialogue in Europe Without Borders"

VII. HONOURED PERSONALITY

HONORARY SPEECH FOR PROF. PHD. VASILE VESE ON THE OCCASION OF GRANTING THE TITLE OF DOCTOR HONORIS CAUSA ON NOVEMBER 26, 2009

LAUDATIO

To Professor Vasile Vese, on Awarding the University of Oradea **Doctor Honoris Causa** ***Degree***

In the academic environment, we can often find ourselves in the situation of talking about a professor or senior colleague, on the occasion of different manifestations, which are more or less official in character. In such contexts, one is likely to become subjective in the sense of adopting either a critical approach in an argument that expresses "envy" in terms of the professor's achievements, success and prestige, or exaggerate in eulogies and compliments based on the accumulations of a relationship founded on close cooperation, respect and, why not, friendship.

Today we are living an exceptional moment, when the criteria of subjectivity are diluted by the honoring presence of Professor Vasile Vese - and we should therefore assume a distinct role, that of acknowledging this personality's participation, contribution, activity and results in the development of the Romanian school of contemporary history, international relations and European studies.

In more than forty years of academic career, Professor Vasile Vese has influenced the Romanian academic environment, given the outstanding results of his activities, the profound impact upon numerous generations of students and the decisive contribution to the development of the Romanian school of international relations and European studies.

Professor Vese's personality is characterized by a complex level of relating the scientific research and the didactic activity, which jointly determined a continuous self-improvement, given the multi and interdisciplinary character of didactic approaches and scientific investigation that characterize the fields of history and humanities.

History lies at the basis of Professor Vesa's formation, a fundamental discipline that is not only formative, but also interrogative, demanding the specialist in this field to constantly re-evaluate historical sources and realities, interpreted in contexts that, given the case of contemporary history and international relations, are permanently changing. In 1962, having graduated from the "Babes-Bolyai" University of Cluj Napoca, Faculty of History, the historian Vasile Vese begins his academic career as assistant professor, being distinguished by the interest for and the openness towards the interpretation, in an international context, of the fundamental moments that stood at the basis of achieving the Romanian national unity.

The science of history, correlated with the specific methodologies of international relations analysis, allowed Professor Vese to explore the international echoes of the Romanian external politics, whether we refer to the international context at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Union of 1918, the participation of Romania to the League of Nations, or the reconfiguration of the external politics at the end of World War Two. These topics stood at the basis of the analysis and information that Professor Vese has approached and developed in university courses and scientific debates during his career. In this respect, our argument does not insist on the relevance of novel information, but rather on the hypotheses

and interrogations that encourage new analytical perspectives and a continuous search for historical truth.

Professor Vese's academic activity materializes in a series of fundamental and specialized courses that, in time, formed the basis for the formation of numerous generations of undergraduate, master or doctoral students. In this respect we should emphaisze the continuity of Universal Contemorary History course, that professor Vese has taught, as full professor, at Cluj Napoca University, ever since 1975. The contents of the discipline, the methodology of teaching and the selected bibliography have contributed, through the effort of Professot Vese, to the diversification of investigation and analysis approaches, through the perspective of identifying sources of archive research and the correlation of data obtained to the international knowledge level.

We should highlight the fact that, even before 1989, when the conditions of scientific research of the Romanian academics, concerning the contemporary international environment, were constrained by ideological determinations, Professor Vese managed to grasp the invariables and the vulnerabilities of the bipolar system from a long history perspective that should inevitably confirm, sooner or later, the transcendence of the system towards a new dimension of international relations.

From the historical, and especially from the international relations perspective, the 1989 moment has represented an opportunity for both Romanian society and the Romanian higher education system. Professor Vese was among the few specialists that demonstrated an ability to correlate the experience of the past with the opportunities of the moment and the expectations concerning the future of the Romanians. This idea is supported and demonstrated by the open, flexible and especially critical approach to contemporary history, which can be observed in the contents of courses and discourses held by Professor Vesa during the last twenty years. The advantages professor Vesa has benefited from are the didactic and the research experience at an international level, which provided him with the opportunity to surpass the ideological limitation of historical knowledge, to have access to an open level of debate, where history and international relations confirm the fact that the objectivity of specialists remains a reference point for society. Despite the limitations imposed by the communist regime, the personality of Professor Vesa has been internationally acknowledged, an element that opened possibilities for the distinguished professor to take part to different international exchanges, as either visiting professor, or lecturer at scientific sessions. This situation presented Professor Vesa with the opportunity to have access to sources of information and to the open presentation of the main themes, specific to relationships in the bipolar international environment. The chief accumulation, which could be later identified in university courses and papers, is the level of knowledge and the critical approach to the international system, which opened, after 1989, possibilities for the development of new investigation directions concerning contemporary international relations.

From the perspective of contemporary universal history, as subject consecrated since the formation period of the Romanian academic system, we should emphasize the fact that Professor Vese was among the pioneers who managed to detach himself from the historical positivism approach and adopt analytical investigations that are specific to international relations as a separate subject among humanities. After 1989, the opening, the context and the favorable working environment allowed Professor Vese to explore and thoroughly study some dimensions of international relations, yet unexplored at that moment.

We can observe that, besides the adjustment to normality of historical discourse concerning the role played by Romania in the context of international relations, Professor Vese's activity raises issues and encourages debates on European themes, related to the common space and Romania's belonging to Europe. We can mention in this respect the contribution of Professor Vese to one of the first works aiming at the rediscovery of Europe

by Romanians. The volume entitled *European Convergences*, published in 1993 under the coordination of Professor Vese, represents one of the reference points to which Romanian intellectuals relate when approaching European studies and the opportunity of this subject field, before the Romanian political elites managed to gain a coherent vision upon the European integration. Ever since 1993, following this trend towards openness, Professor Vese delivers lectures of *European integration history* and gathers around him young specialists in European studies and international relations, recognized as belonging to the school of international relations in Cluj.

In the last two decades, Professor Vese has developed and promoted special courses related to the *Contemporary international system* and *International relations sociology*, delivered in several national and international universities.

Between 1990 and 2004, as head of the Contemporary History and International Relationships department ,Professor Vese brought a special contribution to the promotion and the development of study programs for undergraduate, master and doctoral students, in the field of international relations and European studies. In this respect, Professor Vese can be considered among the first Romanian academics to coordinate doctoral programs in the field of international relations. Nowadays, the specialists formed by Professor Vese activate nationally and internationally in universities, or within governmental or international organizations.

An important dimension of Professor Vese's contribution to the knowledge of history and international relations can be identified in his publicistic and research activity, which reunites numerous volumes, articles and studies, considered reference points for those interested in contemporary history and international relations. With regards to the historical dimension we can observe that the works published by Professor Vese approach Romania's role in the history of Europe, either from the perspective of bilateral relations, or from the perspective of Romaina's participation to the international system. We can mention here, *Romania and France at the beginning of the 20th century (1900.1916)* 1975; *Contemporary Universal History* (1918-1929), 1978; Vasile Vese (co-author), *The Encyclopedia of Romanian Historiography*, 1978; *Fundamental Problems of Modern and Contemporary World History*. Textbook for the 12th grade, 1988; *1918 for Romanians. Unification Documents*, 7th volume, 1997; *The Great Unification of 1918 in the European Context*, 2003.

In terms of international relations and European studies, Professor Vese has published, either as author or co-author, several volumes, studies and articles, which represent fundamental works for the understanding of the international environment at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. We mention here only *The Lesson of Yalta*, 1988; *The History of European Integration*, 1997; *International Relations Paradigms*, 2001; *The Treaty of Nice. Translation and Commentaries*, 2002; *Tolerance and Intolerance in Historical Perspective,* 2003.

Another dimension of Professor Vese's contribution to the development of the international relation field is represented by his activity within the National Council for Academic Assessment and Accreditation (1994-2005), prosition that allowed him to support, by means of critical recommendations, the development of the international relations and European studies specialization at the University of Oradea.

The most difficult part of this presentation, limited by the available time, is that of drawing some conclusions related to the influence of Proffesor Vese's academic and scientific activity, since there remain, inevitably, some aspects equally important to the ones mentioned above, upon which we should have insisted more thoroughly.

In the context of the ideas presented above, we believe that the proposal of the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, to confer the Doctor Honoris Causa title to one of the most distinguished Romanian professors comes to strengthen our belief that a

veritable school of international relations and European studies becomes more and more clearly configured in Romania, and it cannot be conceived without taking into account the major influence of Professor Vese in this field.

Following the decision of Oradea University Sennate, Professor Vese becomes part of the gallery of academics in Oradea and we are greatly honored to confer him the Doctor Honoris Causa title of our University. We would like to assure Professor Vese of our consideration, admiration and gratitude, which we hope are reciprocal. It is the consideration and admiration that distinguished people deserve.

Oradea, 26th of November 2009 Prof.PhD Ioan Horga

WELCOME SPEECH OF PROF. PhD. VASILE VESE UTTERED AT AWARDING THE TITLE OF DOCTOR HONORIS CAUSA IN AULA MAGNA OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ORADEA

Dear Professor Cornel Antal, rector of the University of Oradea, dear Professor Ioan Horga, dean of the Faculty of History – Geography and International Relations, dear members of the University Senate, distinguished ladies and gentlemen

I cannot hide the emotions I felt when I learned about the honoring intent of the University of Oradea Senate to award me the *Doctor Honoris Causa* title. Beside the honor of such a distinguished award, it is an honor to receive it from an institution more and more present, more and more representative in the life and the structure of the superior education in Romania, an institution that I respect not solely because of my close personal ties due to my origins, but also because of my recognition of its contribution to the development of the higher education in Oradea, the University that I served with devotion for over five decades. This happy event of my life is coincident with the celebration of 90 years of higher learning in Oradea, a fact that confers even deeper dimensions to this moment.

That is why I feel an intimate need to express the deepest and distinguished gratitude towards the University of Oradea, towards its academic environment, towards its leading board, towards the whole staff of the Faculty of History – Geography and International Relations for an honor that I haven't expected, nor did I think about. Trying to establish a relationship, I can only find an explanation in the perception that many generations of students may have had about me during the time I served for their professional development, as well as for their ascent, with all my devotion and my knowledge. Many of them are now members of the professional staff of History and International Relations departments.

Bearing all this determinations in our minds, please allow me to emphasize the need for pleading in favor of the teaching vocation, in particular, and in favor of education, in general, as the main tools for progress of communities and nations. As a convinced supporter of the strong relationship between History and International Relations, during my career, I got closer and closer to the international phenomenon research. After lecturing Paul Kennedy's work *"The Rise and Fall of Great Powers"*, published in 1988, I kept in mind his ascertainment regarding the decreasing economical trend of the United States of America between the Fifties and the Eighties. He stated that if during the '50s of the Twentieth century, USA held 35% of the world economy, at the end of the '80s, the balance fell to 20%. Picturing this reality, the author concluded that this power will maintain its pre-eminence in

International Relations because of its huge amounts of capital invested in research and education.

The value and efficiency of education and learning depends on the two-term relationship student – professor in which the former represents the "dough" that the last has to shape. Seven months ago, in front of an academic meeting gathered on the occasion of my seventieth birthday celebration, forced to an introspective and retrospective meditation, I stated that I served, as a professor, the University unsparingly and with self-devotion. All these years, teaching wasn't for me a just an occupation, but a profession, often identified as a mission. This reality was illustrated through spoken and unspoken appreciations of my students, facts that today are embodied in this distinguished award that the University of Oradea honors me with. There is one thing that I can assure you of: if today I was to choose a profession once again, teaching would be, undoubtedly the one.

For my professional development, I owe a lot to my teachers that had educated me and had directed my options towards school and learning. I ask for your consent to take the liberty of evoking generations of professors from whom not only I received knowledge, but also behavioral manners in academic and society relationships.

During the fifties I benefitted in Beius (where I followed gymnasium and high school) of a generation of outstanding teachers, many of them returned from the battle field, recruited as elementary classes teachers that succeeded in those troublous times to become teachers. They gave strong proofs of self-devotion, self-abandonment and huge generosity for their pupils, most of them coming from rural areas. Their abnegation remained deeply embedded in my memory and in my feelings. Having to live with poor material means, their only reward, that was acknowledged openly, was represented by their pupils' performances. The cases in which they helped, even materially, their best, but often poorest of their pupils to pursue academic studies, are not few.

In 1957, after a series of events, I was admitted, together with the well known and appreciated archaeologist, at the same time professor of the University of Oradea, Sever Dumitrascu, at the Faculty of History and Philosophy of "Babes" University of Cluj. At the time, the faculty was among the elites of research and teaching in Romania and the professional staff was an honor for the Romanian historiography. In "Samuil Vulcan" high school, the University of Cluj was somehow worshipped and considered as a kind of scientific and cultural Mecca for the Romanians from Transylvania, as well as for all Romanians.

I have to recall here, in front of you, the names of outstanding professors and historians that I met as a student and as a young teacher. I start with Constantin Daicoviciu, specialized in classical studies and archaeology, rector between 1956 and 1968, the creator of an archaeology school of outmost importance in Romania. I will mention David Prodan who thoroughly investigated the national and social processes of the Romanian population of Transylvania during the XVIIIth Century; Stefan Pascu, who realized the first monographic work on the Unification of Transylvania and Romania, being constantly preoccupied of medieval studies and the emancipation movement of the Romanians in Transylvania; Virgil Vatasianu, a highly appreciated researcher in medieval art and
the creator of the first school of Art History in our country. I would then mention Mihai Macrea, specialist in the history of Roman Dacia, Francisc Pall – in universal history, Mihail Dan – in the history and language of Slavonian people; Camil Muresan, outstanding personality specialized in modern universal history. I cannot end this list without evoking a personality that shaped us (even though he was only assistant professor at the time) and became a model for generations of students, Hadrian Daicoviciu, the one that left us too early and the one that left a part of himself not only at the University of Cluj, but also at the Faculty of History and Geography in Oradea.

Between the two World Wars, the University of Cluj, at that time named "King Ferdinand the First" developed the so known "university extension", consisting of series of conferences intended to disseminate scientific and cultural knowledge in under-privileged areas, one of the targets being the areas of Apuseni mountains. At the end of the '60s and during the '70s of the last century, the University of Cluj featured this extension through establishing independent universities in cities with vocation and possibilities for developing an efficient higher education. Therefore it was the University that contributed to the progress of historic, geographic and foreign languages higher learning in cities like Oradea and Sibiu. Why Oradea? Because in museums, archives and other cultural institutions, well appreciated graduates of the University of Cluj developed relevant research work in history and geography fields, proving real aptitudes in fostering a high quality superior education. As a consequence, in Oradea, the faculty of history and geography began to function, coming in prominence through high performance.

This constellation of professors taught generations of students during the '60s and the '70s training and educating them in the spirit of reading, in the spirit of attending libraries and bookshops, in the spirit of attending cultural institutions. The measure of behavior norms and assessment was solely the value and performance, a criterion that lasted in the University until the end of the '70s, when the development of the higher education in Romania entered a total immobilism. No matter of the performances, no matter of needs, promotion in a higher professional university degree was blocked and the open appointments as university professor were abolished. At the University of Cluj, in 1989, there were 53 university professors left from an initial figure of 100. The ninth decade of the last century was the most critical period due to the intrusion of the Communist Party in the activity of the higher education in Romania, comparable to the first part of the obsessive decade of the '50s.

Between 1960 and 1980, the ideological pressure was somehow amputated and diminished in many higher education institutions through a spirit of solidarity of the professional staff, with a real positive influence on the students, so that, within possible limits, the Communist ideology was left at the gates of the University. The consequence was the competitiveness of Romanian graduates, if they managed to leave the country, as compared with foreign universities graduates.

After 1989, the liberty acquired through so many sacrifices, reverberated upon students and professors, as well. First of all, I would mention a positive outcome: the University managed to bring back the valuable students that graduated after 1980, promoting them in teaching positions. On the other hand, the access to higher education became unlimited, a fact that lead to the development of mass superior education in Romania, due to the exponential increase in the number of students, as showed by the discrepancy between the number of students in our country as compared to other developed states.

The superior education expanding, as well as the increase in the number of students, has developed on an impoverished scientific support, consequence, as I stated above, of the educational strategy of the '80s. This proved to be very detrimental on the professor – student relationship. The teaching staff, and I am speaking of the very appreciated professors, overstressed in the new university environment, were lacking, objectively, the necessary time space to relate with the students. The new means of communication partially make up to the direct contact that a teacher needs to develop with his student, but they can't substitute it. This is a reality felt by many students, but not often expressed, out of various reasons. We consider that, given the actual facts, the teaching staff must and has to find a solution to this problem, which, experienced by the French superior education in the '60s of the last century drove to profound social convulsions, one of the claims raised by French students being a new approach of the professor – student – pupil paradigm.

The contemporary Romanian education has to face yet another real and important challenge: relationship with politics. Evidently, this relationship exists and has to exist, the progress of education being possible only in the context of national education policies. But the intrusion of politics in the field of education, that has to remain faithful to the principle of value in recruiting and promoting professors, can sometimes prove to be prejudicial.

As an observer, not involved in politics, I seized the temptation of those elected in the Romanian Parliament, of those selected in power structures to obtain teaching degrees, most often professor titles, a fact that harms the position and the quality of the university professors. Unfortunately, this temptation tends to become the rule and not the exception.

Nowadays the higher education in Romania is facing a lot of problems and phenomena, but I stressed only the above mentioned two aspects that regard the role and the position of the professor in contemporary society.

I am ending now, inviting you all, teaching staff and scholars, to restoring the solidarity spirit in order to recompose what University should represent at present: community and communion between professor and student.

Still, I need to express again my warm and sincere thanks for the honor you are awarding me and to assure the University of Oradea of my deepest feelings of solidarity and support for the difficult, yet human and absolutely necessary mission assumed.

Since New Year and the great celebration of the birth of our Lord is close, allow me to wish you all, professors and students, the whole staff of the University of Oradea success in your noble mission of teaching and training!

Oradea, 26th of November 2009 Prof.Ph D Vasile VESE

VIII. BOOK REVIEWS

Svetlana Suveică, Ion Eremia, Sergiu Matveev, Sorin Şipoş (coord), ***Istoriografie şi Politică în Estul şi Vestul Spațiului Românesc /Historiography and politics in the East and West of Romanian space***, Editura Cartdidact, Chişinău/Oradea, 2009, ISBN 978-973-759-793-9, 235 p.

The book "*Istoriografie şi politică în Estul şi Vestul spațiului românesc*" (Historiography and politics in the East and West of Romanian space) brings into the spotlight important issues for Romanian and Bessarabian history, such as the Jews from Russia and Bessarabia in the view of Russian historiography, the problem of the formation of Moldavian people in the view of postbelic Sovietic studies, politics and historiography in the Republic of Moldavia, Silviu Dragomir and his work concerning the Romanity from the North of Balkans, Rural Romanian history and its relation with politics, the identity and memory as seen in post 1991 Moldavia reflected in historical speech, the Gagauz as seen by historiography, historical-archaeological considerations concerning the VIII and IX centuries in North West of Romania, the valachian ways of the crusades at the end of XV century, the conspiracy of Maximilian I of Habsburg and Stephen III the Great against the kings of Hungary and Poland at the end of XV century, myth and reality in Moldavian-Russian relations in the year 1654, ethnical identity in Transylvania at the end of XIX century and at the beginning of XX century, French diplomatic documents with reference to the status of Northern Transylvania (1945-1947), translating for propaganda purposes and the nation building and the Soviet cultural policies in Moldavian Republic (1944-1989).

The authors Ion Gumenâi, Sergiu Matveev, Svetlana Suveică, Sorin Şipoş, Barbu Ştefănescu, Andrei Cuşco, Igor Şarov, Anatol Petrencu, Florin Sfrengeu, Alexandru Simon, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Alexandru Simon, Ion Eremia, Mircea Brie, Antonio Faur, Cătălina Iliescu Gheorghiu, Octavian Țîcu show us images from Bessarabian and Romanian history along the history, bringing thus together the history of these two territories united by historical ties.

An important study is the one of Ion Gumenâi which reveals aspects from Russian historiography concerning the Jews from Russia and Bessarabia, underlining the opinions of Jewish friends but also of the enemies of the Jews. The supporters of the Jews militated for the improvement of the condition of Jews in Russia and Bessarabia as they were living in separate zone of residence and showed Jewish merits in the development of Russian Empire. The enemies of the Jews were considering that the Jews were acting against the Russian society and feared that they would come out from their zone of residence and will conquer Russian society. They were complaining also about poor performances of the Jews in agriculture.

Svetlana Suveică shows us the condition of historian in the years 1960 and 1970 and the situation of the historical writing. The historiography was a tool of political power which assured its legitimacy. The freedom of expression and free thinking of historians were impossible in those times, the historian pursuing party and state ideologies.

Sorin Sipoş underlines the scientific activity of Silviu Dragomir after his release from prison at the Institute of History and Archeology from Cluj-Napoca. His research on the historz of Romanians from North – West of Balkan Peninsula underlined the role of this population during the Middle Age, his results being also confirmed by other authors.

Barbu Ştefănescu underlines the image of rural history of Romania as reflected in the writings of historians. Dimitrie Cantemir, Şcoala Ardeleană, Nicolae Bălcescu, Alexandru Papiu Ilarion, Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu and Nicolae Densuşianu, the Critical School of Nicolae Iorga and A. D. Xenopol, David Prodan are only a few authors who wrote about Romanian village and rural world.

Ioan-Aurel Pop and Alexandru Simon writes about the conspiracy organized by German King Maximilian of Hapsburg and the Moldavian Prince Stephen the Great against

two kings of Jagiello family from Hungary and Poland with the purpose to eliminate them. They underline the importance of Moldavian prince in the fight for defending Christian civilization.

Mircea Brie studies the ethnical identity of the population of Transylvania at the end of XIX century and at the beginning of XX century. In his opinion as personal declarations considering the individual ethnical identity are rarely encountered, language, religion and the name of person are important tools for finding a person's ethnical identity.

The other papers focus also on the history of Romania and Bessarabia. The volume is an interesting lecture showing the historical, cultural and political aspects of the two territories which form together the Romanian space.

Anca Oltean olteananca@hotmail.com

Michel Nazet, *La Russie et ses marges: nouvel empire?*, Ellipses Edition Marketing S.A., 2007, ISBN 2-7298-2-7298-3235-3, 190 p.

The book "*La Russie et ses marges: nouvel empire?"* written by Michel Nazet approaches subjects as the collapse of Soviet Union (1989-1991), the development of new Russia between 1992-2007, Russia in the quest of a democracy "à la russe", Russian capitalism, restructuration and reorganization of the space of ex-Russian Empire, Russia as a tactical player, etc.

The present book includes notions of the history of Russia starting with the idea of Moscow as the third Rome, emphasizing Russian nationalism developed in the first half of XIX-th century, continuing with Russian orthodoxy as a home which sustains Russian nationalism and emphasizing the negative image of Stalin in contemporary Russia. The book mentions the creation of the Community of Independent States at Minsk at December 8 1991 which replaced the former Soviet Union. It also refers to the communist party as a leading force in Russia and to the developments achieved during the presidency of Boris Eltsin and Vladimir Putin.

Boris Eltsin was elected as president of Russia at May 29 1990. He was the main actor of the dissolution of Soviet Union. During the last years of Eltsin government the value of Russian devise decreased, the activity decreased with 5% of GDP because of the financial crisis, the wages decreased also with 30%. The author emphasized that Eltsin renounced to the politics of "choc therapy" searching for a "new way" which to maintain budgetary discipline and the fight against corruption.

During the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the years 2000 – 2004 the author stresses that the economical situation was improved. Another aspect is the fact that after the terrorist attack from September 11 2001, Russia got involved in the antiterrorist campaign. This common fight against terrorism determined the fact that Russia started to develop stronger diplomatic relations with the Old Europe also involved in the antiterrorist campaign.

During the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia was divided in 7 great districts which are mentioned by the author: Center (Moscow), North-West (Sankt Petersburg), South (Rostov-sur-le-Don), Volga (Nijni-Novgorod), Ural (Ekaterinburg), Siberia (Novossibirsk), Extreme Orient (Khabarovsk).

Michel Nazet underlines the situation of the main areas of economy during the years of Vladimir Putin's leadership, such as: the situation of state capitalism, the situation of military –industrial sector, investment funds, public services, private sector, privatization, agrarian reform, Banks, foreign investments, joint-ventures, the difficulties encountered in the economic field. He identifies obstacles encountered in the development of the country such as

the financing of economy which is not sufficient, the bad condition of infrastructure and telecommunications, the problems identified in sustainable development.

The authors identify the condition of the present day Russian economy, after 15 years of difficult transition. Russia is capitalist economy in which the state plays an important role, the state has the control in the field of hydrocarbures, the people who have the power are close relations of leading political persons and the Russian state is facing the problem of massive corruption at all levels of the society.

The book is worth reading for offering us the image of a page of Russian contemporary history and because it provides the main features of development of Russian society and economy during the presidency of Boris Eltsin and Vladimir Putin.

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Eurolimes (Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies), Europe and the Neighborhood, Volume No. 7, Spring 2009, Oradea University Press, ISSN: 1841-9259, 207 pp**.**

The 2009 spring issue of the Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies is dedicated to one of the most challenging issues related to the reconfiguration of transnational and regional relations after the EU enlargement in 2007. Neighbourhood represents both a variable concept and a variable reality. Ten years ago, from an EU perspective, the European neighbourhood was considered to be represented by the southern and eastern candidate states. After the enlargements in 2004 and 2007, the Eastern frontier of EU has changed and a new neighbourhood emerged. Therefore, new approaches and policies were established in order to manage the relations with the neighbourhood. Within this context, there are noticeable signals that the mutual influence between EU and the neighbourhood does not take place necessarily around the border or in the proximity of the frontier. The dynamics of exchanges, trade, travel and communication involves a relationship that affects both sides, in a complex scale of interdependences. Many times the echoes are better identified not on the border, but in the states capitals and major cities.

Eurolimes comes with a multi-perspective approach about the opportunities and challenges of a European Neighbourhood. The studies gathered in this volume are organised in three main sections: The European Union and the Neighbourhood, Connecting European Neighbours, Neighbourhood and Crossborder Experience. A particular study, signed by Carlos E. Pacheco Amaral represents a *Focus* section which brings into our attention the essence, meaning and value of the idea of Europe.

The first section addresses the issue of Neighbourhood from the European Union viewpoint. The first observation, common to all the authors that cover this issue, is that the EU needs indeed a clear and coherent European Neighbourhood Policy, with proper political and financial support. The first argument is developed by Dacian Duna in an analysis regarding the security approach of Northern and Southern dimensions of the EU. Before the exploration of political, economical and cultural potential of the neighbourhood, EU must ensure that any projects and investments are to be made in a secure and predictable environment. Another article submitted by Irina Pop investigates the assessment of the ENP in South Caucasus, in a context where it becomes clear that an important issue in the EU-Caucasian states will be the energy security, in a context where Russia has a major interest in exerting its influence. From a similar perspective, Sinem Kocamaz makes her argumentation on the role of Transcaucasian states, mainly Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The cross-border cooperation as a strategic dimension

of ENP at the eastern frontier of the EU is analysed by Nicolae Dandiş and is focused on specific programmes, financial instruments and CBC projects.

The second section brings into attention the trans-national dimensions of cultural contributions. In the context of neighbourhood mutual influence, there are several issues that the authors considered that should be analysed. Gilles Rouet proposes a debate on the perceptions of Europe from a citizens' perspective. His main argument states that the cultural heritage of Europe is an accumulation of national cultures and cultural influences. Consequently, the national visions of Europe had an influence upon the conceptualization of the neighbourhood which has been a predominant cultural orientation.

One of the most striking cultural differences in Europe consists in the interaction between Christianity and Islam. The representation of identity is analysed by Marius Lazăr in a paper that emphasise different aspects of cultural manifestation of Islamist groups in Europe. Muslim populations settled in European countries have brought not only cultural practices but also various oppositions, rivalries and conflicts.

A fresh perspective over the neighbourhood relations is offered by Thierry Côme who identifies forms of interaction and exchange that can contribute decisively in the emergence of a new perception of Europe and the European identity. His article on the Erasmus program and other forms of mobility for students, acknowledge that the frontier does not represent a limit, but a line to be crossed for a better understanding and contributes decisively in the formation of a new identity.

The third section is focused on the cross-border experiences and neighbourhood relations from a perspective that considers the frontier as an area of exchange and influence. Fahrettin Sumer suggests in his article that Turkey represents a particular case of a special partnership in the relation with the EU, and presents the pros and cons of Turkey's accession into the EU, stressing that the scenarios of membership or non-membership will be consequential not only for Turkey's future but also for that of the EU.

Professor Istvan Suli-Zakar examines the role of the Euroregions and Eurometropolises in the etheralization of the borders in the Eastern periphery of the EU. His perspective is based on mutual sharing and comparative advantages that can be found on both sides of any border and the need to introduce institutions and rules that can widen the prospects of regional and trans-border development. A similar analytical framework is used by Zoltan Gal in his study on the Danube region from a viewpoint that underlines the future prospect of transnational cooperation as a playground of the European integration. In both articles we can track arguments of a revisited functionalism.

A distinct perspective of neighbourhood is offered by Vasile Nazare who explores the security and military dimension of the neighbourhood, with a case study on the role of Romanian naval forces in crisis management in the Black Sea area. The main conclusion is that the security environment is required as an argument to ensure confidence among all the actors interested in the development of different forms of regional cooperation.

The overall content of this issue of *Eurolimes* underlines, that there are so many interdependencies between Europe and its neighbourhood and we believe that the arguments developed in the articles demonstrate how important the neighbourhood is for the Europe. A particular model as the EU, must develop and implement particular models of relationship with the neighbourhood. We appreciate that the subject must be further developed because the challenges and opportunities are still under investigation by EU, governments and social and economic actors in the European space.

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Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, ***Relaţiile Internaţionale de la echilibru până la sfârşitul Concertului European (sec XVII - începutul secolului XX) / International Relations from the balance at the end of the European Concert (XVII century - beginning of XX century),*** University of Oradea Publishing House, 2009, 389 p., ISBN 978-973-759-925-4

The first course for the study of history of international relations in the XVII-XX occurred in the University of Oradea Publishing House, the work of International Relations at equilibrium at the end of the European Concert (XVII century - beginning of XX century) is already in its second edition, the first being in 2006. Lengthy research paper sums up two specialists in International Relations and European Studies, Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga, teachers of the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations from the University of Oradea. At first, Mircea Brie, a Ph.D. in history, and owner of the International Relations of the XVII – XIX centuries lecture of the above mentioned faculty and Head of Department of International Relations. European Studies. The second, Ioan Horga, is Dean of Faculty, Director of Institute for Euroregional Stusies, Jean Monnet, Professor and Member of the Commission of Social Sciences, Political and Communication.

Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were centuries of ever more powerful assertion of national spirit. With the affirmation of nation, European wars have seen other connotations. Diplomacy, including the secret, has won for itself the role of the new geopolitical context. In time, state the authors of the paper, the existing system of international relations between the European powers is based on a series of marriage, complemented by economic or geostrategic interests. These systems were designed alliance policy implementation pursued individually.

The scene of international relations aimed at the three centuries was marked by rivalry between the Habsburgs and Bourbon, supplemented or more precisely balanced the interests of the main games maritime powers, England. The book is a balanced overview of developments and various aspects regarding the importance and "play" the diplomat in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Here it was underlined the role of diplomatic missions that have increased since the second half of the seventeenth century. Starting from the war for 30 years, which represented the birth of a new Europe, it increased the prevalence and role of French and British diplomacy in the international system.

A special place was given to the *Congress of Vienna and the European Concert*, 1814-1830. This chapter has marked the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of a new European order. The authors of this paper aim to broaden the scope of interests and outside Europe, with a chapter on America's role in the international system of the period of 1783-1895. A particular importance was given to the impact of the revolutions of 1830 -1848 and the question of East and Mediterranean. The paper concludes with a description of bankruptcy of the European Concert 1848-1871, emphasizing on Italian and German unification process, and the German dominance in Europe and Bismarck diplomacy (1871-1890). The book is a reference to this field and is a necessary reference work for students of International Relations. European Studies. Written in a accessible form to the general public, the book does not lose the character of university academics, both in content and the quality of synthesis and analysis of giving evidence.

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"***Security Sector Reform. The Political Usage of Conflicts. European Security and Defence Policy***", in: *Western Balkans Security Observer*, No. 11, October-November 2008, Belgrad. ISSN 1452-6115.

La grande actualité de la problématique relevée par le titre de la revue qui apparaît à Belgrade, peut susciter d'un coup l'attention des chercheurs intéressés par le sujet de la politique extérieure et de sécurité commune de l'Union européenne, et spécialement à ceux qui, fortement compétents dans le sujet, savent bien l'importance de la reforme de ce secteur de politiques communes européennes. La deuxième partie du titre, concernant l'utilisation politique des conflits, n'est pas du tout moins intéressante, même il n'est pas très facile de soupçonner les conflits en question. Un court regard sur le sommaire de la revue nous donnera toutefois la réponse.

Comme dans les autres numéros, la revue belgradoise est très clairement partagée en sections distinctes, chacune agissant sur un sujet concret et bien déterminé. Ainsi, le présent numéro de *Western Balkans Security Observer* (*WBSO*) contient trois sections d'articles, chacune reflétant une des trois parties du titre, et une section de révisions.

La première section comprend l'article de Jelena Radoman sur le concept de la réforme dans le secteur de la sécurité, et celui de Barry Ryan, sur la réforme du politique en Serbie. L'article de J. Radoman s'appui sur un sujet assez récente dans les recherches académiques, un concept qui a ses fondements dans les changements politiques de la fin des années '80 et le processus de démocratisation et d'accès aux différents structures supranationales parcouru par les anciens États communistes. La portée du concept est de plus en plus claire si on considère l'importance de la reforme dans le secteur du sécurité pour les nouvelles démocraties européennes devant leur entrée dans les structure de l'OTAN, par exemple. J. Radoman met également en évidence les trois directions d'étude du concept de la réforme dans le secteur de la sécurité, à savoir les relations d'entre l'espace civile et celui militaire, les études du développement et de la sécurité. L'autre article de cette section réalise une histoire de la réforme d'espace politique en Serbie à partir de la monarchie constitutionnelle jusqu'à la période de transition qui a suivi l'époque de la guerre. Même si l'auteur a effectué une très bonne exposition générale, l'étude n'est toutefois suffisamment profonde, spécialement pour la période d'après la guerre, sur laquelle les études claires et profondes sont encore peu nombreuses.

La deuxième section d'articles, concernant l'utilisation politique du conflit, rassemble les articles de Jelena Radoman sur la relation d'entre la deuxième guerre tchétchène et la stratégie politique promue par V. Putin ; l'article de Věra Stojarová et Miroslav Mareš sur le rôle de la République Srpska dans le processus d'intégration européenne de la Croatie, et l'article de Tatjana Petrović concernant les divergences d'entre les politiques de sécurité de l'Union européenne et de la Russie, avec un étude de cas sur Kosovo, Bessarabie et Georgie. En ce qui concerne l'article de Jelana Radoman, celui-ci commence avec une très précise mise à point du cadre politique régional caucasien (la deuxième guerre tchétchène) et le début d'un nouvelle situation politique dans la fédération russe (l'arrivée au pouvoir de V. Putin et le début d'une nouvelle étape dans l'histoire politique de la Russie). Le mérite de l'auteur est celui d'avoir mettre en évidence la capacité de mobilisation de V. Putin dans un certain contexte géopolitique, mobilisation dont les effets ont été bénéfiques pour le recommencement du système politique et également de l'État russe. Assez importante sont, pour J. Radoman, les bénéfices que le président Putin a su bien en profiter : la fortification des pouvoirs présidentiels et la création d'un besoin pour un dirigeant puissant, charismatique et même dominateur. Le deuxième article de cette partie, celui de Věra Stojarová et Miroslav Mareš sur le rôle (plus ou moins important) de la République Srpska dans le processus d'intégration euro-atlantique et européenne de la Croatie, un rôle interprété par les biais de

différents conflits où la République Srpska a été impliquée à partir des années 1990, quand la dite république a obtenu son indépendance. L'auteur réalise une très ample description de la scène politique du petit pays et souligne tant les influences des situations conflictuelles que des hommes et de partis politiques radicales et nationalistes. Le dernier article de cette section, celui de T. Petrović, s'appui aussi sur un sujet sensible et longtemps discuté dans le monde politique et de l'analyse politique contemporaine. Comme l'auteur elle-même affirme, l'article essaie à réaliser une parallèle entre la manière de traiter les conflits de l'Union européenne et celle de la Russie, à partir de trois conflits importants, ceux du Kosovo, Transnistrie et Georgie (en ce qui concerne la dernière, sans le conflits déclanché le 08 août 2008). Le point de départ de l'article le constitue la possible influence de la déclaration d'indépendance de Kosovo sur les régions de conflits « gelés » de l'ancienne Union Soviétique. Le sujet est devenu très commun pendant les débats (européennes et russes) sur l'indépendance du Kosovo et également après la Déclaration d'indépendance de cette province. Comme conclusion, T. Petrović affirme que la Déclaration d'indépendance de la province Kosovo a eu plusieurs effets, parmi les plus importants étant le surcroît de divergences politiques d'entre l'Union européenne et la fédération russe, l'impossibilité d'établir un accord à long temps entre les deux parties mentionnées, chacun de deux acteurs internationaux envisageant l'application de son plan politique. L'auteur met en évidence les réactions de leaders politiques de Bessarabie et de Georgie, les deux inquiétés sur la nouvelle situation géopolitique et ne reconnaissant pas le nouveau statut du Kosovo. Pour la fin de l'article, l'auteur reprend l'idée du début, concernant la déstabilisation de la relation UE-Russie à cause de la politique extérieure de l'UE.

La dernière section d'article contient uniquement l'article de Dragana Đurašinović-Radojević relatif au contrôle parlementaire sur la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense, et spécialement sur les instruments et les méthodes utilisées par le Parlement européen dans ses démarches. D. Đurašinović-Radojević evidencie très bien le rôle militaire de plus en plus important de l'Union européenne, tant dans le conflit de l'ancienne Yougoslavie qu'en Afrique ou en Asie, mais considère le rôle du Parlement européen encore peu important dans le processus décisionnel concernant le Politique Extérieure et de Sécurité Commune (PESC), le Conseil et les parlements nationaux des États membres étant encore plus importants que l'institution européenne mentionnée. De point de vue de l'auteur, la possibilité d'adopter des résolutions, recommandations, rapports ou décisions sur les missions PESC, doublée par le contrôle budgétaire et les interpellations que le PE peut les adresser à la Commission européenne ou au Conseil ou par les groups de travail sur les problèmes de politique extérieures et défense (groups que le PE peut bien les organiser) ne sont pas suffisantes. Ce qui est important pour Đurašinović-Radojević est la pré-approbation du PE pour toute mission PESC déclanchée par l'Union européenne, devenant ainsi une partie active dans le processus décisionnel.

Même une très courte regarde sur le contenu du numéro 11 de la revue *Western Balkans Security Observer* peut être suffisant pour nous faire une impression sur la qualité et l'actualité des sujets abordés. Toutefois, il ne faut pas rester au surface des choses, parce que les auteurs de cette revue viennent avec leur propre vue sur les événements européens et internationaux sorte souvent de tout chablon et nous offre une autre point de vue, parfois de l'intérieur de certains faits moins connus.

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The Great Experiment: The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, and the Quest for a Global Nation *by Strobe Talbott – 496 Pages*

Strobe Talbott *(born April 25, 1946) is an American foreign policy analyst associated with Yale University and the Brookings Institution, a former journalist associated with Time magazine and diplomat who served as the Deputy Secretary of State from 1994 to 2001. In 1972 Strobe Talbott, along with his friends Robert Reich (a fellow Rhodes Scholar) and 2nd Lt. David E. Kendall, rallied to his friends Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton to help them in their Texas campaign to elect George McGovern president of the United States. Through the 1980s he was Time magazine's principal correspondent on Soviet-American relations, and wrote several books on disarmament, and his work for the magazine was cited in the three Overseas Press Club Awards won by Time in the 1980s. Following Bill Clinton's election to national office, Talbott was invited into government where he served at first managing the consequences of the Soviet breakup as Ambassador-at-large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on the New Independent States. After leaving government, he was for a period Director of the Yale Center fort he Study of Globalization. He is currently the president of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.*

Strobe Talbott, provides us an excellent overview of human political history enriched by personal experiences and comments, all organized to show how humanity is slowly but surely creating larger political units to the point where now the next step is a creation of a global nation, a politically unified community that encompasses the whole Earth. Talbott gave us his general viewpoint in his 1992 article in TIME when he said, "I'll bet that within the next hundred years . . . nationhood as we know it will be obsolete; all states will recognize a single, global authority" (pp. 126-27) He now adds,"I have qualified my forecast somewhat, but not in essence" (p. 127). The book's vast historical sweep, apparent in the subtitle, is also evident in the three parts into which the 405-page survey is divided: "The Imperial Millennia" (roughly up to 1914), "The American Centuries" (roughly up to the end of the Cold War in 1990), and "The Unipolar Decades" (from 1991 to the present). There are also another 71 pages of notes in this carefully documented work.

World federalists will especially enjoy reading chapter 10 titled "The Master Builder," which covers the end of World War II, the beginning of the U.N., and the all-too-brief flourishing of the world federalist movement. Most readers will be surprised to learn that Harry Truman, from the time he graduated from high school in 1901, carried a scrap of paper in his wallet on which were written 12 lines of Alfred Lord Tennyson's poem "Locksley Hall," including the lines "Till the war-drum throbbed no longer, and the battle-flags were furl'd, In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World." Talbott notes that "Truman recopied this text by hand as many as forty times during his life" (p.184) and that in a 1951 conversation with author John Hersey Truman said, "Notice that part about universal law. . . . We're going to have that someday. I guess that's what I've really been working for ever since I first put that poetry in my pocket" (p. 210).

The negative reactions of world federalists to the U.N. plus their arguments for a radical change are described in detail. The book also contains several statements that suggest that world federalist ideas are having some influence in unexpected places. For example, Talbott notes that in the first edition of his 1948 classic POLITICS AMONG NATIONS prominent realist political theorist Hans Morgenthau noted that "the argument of the advocates of the world state is unanswerable. There can be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with the confines of the political world and a radical transformation of the existing international society of sovereign nations into a supranational community of individuals" (p. 198). In 1992 Ronald Reagan said that he could foresee "a

standing UN force--an army of conscience--that is fully equipped and prepared to carve out human sanctuaries through force if necessary" (p. 258). In his 2006 farewell address at the Truman Library and Museum in Independence, Missouri, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, "The United States has given the world an example of a democracy in which everyone, including the most powerful, is subject to legal restraint. It's a current moment of world supremacy gives it a priceless opportunity to entrench the same principles at the global level" (p. 391).

Talbott provides interesting inside accounts of crucial events and international meetings during the years of the Clinton administration as well as an insightful analysis of the actions and views of individuals in the current Bush administration, he concludes with a trenchant critique of the worldview and policies of George W. Bush, whose presidency he calls a "consequential aberration" in the history of American foreign policy. Then, looking beyond the morass in Iraq and the battle for the White House. His last chapter, "The Crucial Years," focuses on the upcoming U.S. Presidential election and the policies Talbott believes the United States should adopt as well as the issues that must be addressed. "The next administration should . . . waste no time in demonstrating that respect for international law is once again part of the bedrock of U.S. foreign policy" (p. 393). There should be greater support for the United Nations, but beyond that "the UN needs to be incorporated into an increasingly variegated network of structures and arrangements--some functional in focus, others geographic; some intergovernmental, others based on systematic collaboration with the private sector, civil society, and NGOs" (p. 394). The United States should "encourage regional organizations to develop their own capacities as well as habits of cooperation with one another and with the UN itself" (p. 395). Also "ensuring a peaceful twenty-first century will depend in large measure on narrowing the divide between those who feel like winners and those who feel like losers in the process of globalization" (p. 395).

With regard to the most urgent problems to be tackled Talbott points to "two clear and present dangers. One is a new wave of nuclear-weapons proliferation; the other is a tipping point in the process of climate change. These mega-threats can be held at bay in the crucial years immediately ahead only through multilateralism on a scale far beyond anything the world has achieved to date" (p. 395). Talbott concludes with this comment: "By solving these two problems that are truly urgent, we can increase the chances that eventually . . . the world will be able to ameliorate or even solve other problems that are merely very important. Whether future generations make the most of such a world, and whether they think of it as a global nation or just as a well-governed international community, is up to them. Whether they have the choice is up to us" (p. 401). It seems to this reviewer that Talbott strays from his own basic insights when he suggests that the nuclear proliferation problem might be resolved by multilateralism on a grand scale in the absence of a prior revolutionary change to the global nation system (that is, to a world federation) which would substantially restrict national sovereignty.

In my opinion "The Great Experiment" provides a richer, deeper account of the idea of global governance in American foreign policy, it's a rare combination of historical narrative with personal insight, wisdom, and analytic. It should be a call to action for leaders at the highest level.

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The two numbers RJEA focuses mainly on economic crisis phenomenon. The articles present the views of the authors on the challenges in terms of financial crisis, seeking to answer questions relating to the listing for New Member States to join the euro-zone in the next future. Thus in the study entitled *"The Monetary Union: the decade ahead. The case of non-Member States"*, Daniel Daianu, Laurian Lungu say that *"The current financial crisis some Maastricht criteria it would be more difficult to fulfill in the short and medium term"* (RJEA, vol. 9 / 1: 5), and that would make it hard for the *Non-Member States* to join the Euro-zone.

Are given there analyzes implications of the current global economic crisis for the decision-making mechanism and the interactions among the major players. The analysis explore the possibility that the changes implied and required by the economic crisis may led either to better global governance or even a step closes to the possible, virtual and global government.

Overall theme is treated extensively in governance magazine pages in studies on the E-Government, Security and Liberty in the EU: a role for the national Parliament (Juliet Lodge), are presented *"how in the EU the institutionalization of the norms, practices and procedures of accountability and transparency reflects political and legal values and commitments to sustaining them in ways that are visible, open, just, legitimate and not arbitrary"* (RJEA, vol. 9 / 2: 5).

The same subject is treated in the study of governance *"Beyond Connectivity. Future Challenges for e-inclusion policies"* (Radu Gheorghiu, Manuela Unguru). The authors noted that the information society stays at the core of the Lisbon Strategy, despite the dot-com crisis and the still hidden macroeconomic impact of the Information and Communication Technology (ITC). The extreme dynamics of technology sometimes breathtaking whit its promises, poser new challenges for e-inclusion (RJEA, vol. 9 / 2: 20-33). Delia M. Costan, in *"The politics of evaluation in the co-financed projects: The Case of the Scottish Executive and the evaluation of the Structural Funds"*, explores the experience of the Scottish Structural Funds evaluation in the context of the various theories and hypothesis expressed in the evaluation literature. Study play a practical example of the good governance (RJEA, vol. 9/2: 33-45).

From the same list of discussion around the answers to the challenges of governance of European, courts have selected two articles for this book review. First, Anton Comanescu in his article *"To talk or not to talk? Reflections on Central Bank Communication in time of crisis'* (RJEA, Vol.9 / 1, 41-52) noted that central banks around the world seek to enhanced their credibility by effectively communicating their policy goals to the financial markets and the public at large.

The transparency has its challenges, particularly in times of financial turmoil when markets central banks can misinterpret messages. Bogdan Petrica in *"La Differentiation - solution miracle pour l'avenir de l'Union européenne"*, noted that the differences has always accompanied the process of integration and it become more obvious whit the succession of enlargements. Beginning whit the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice the differentiation is legally enshrined, but it is the work of the Lisbon Treaty.

The dimension of migration is present in RJEA studies by Adrian Pop, "Migration Effects of Romania's Accessions to the EU: The Case of Moldova" (RJEA, Vol.9 / 1, 73-95) and by Anca Voicu, "Immigration and Integration Policies in the UK" (RJEA , vol 9 / 2: 71-86). The two studies show both the general aspects of migration and issues involving the specific subjects covered.

These studies, along with the book review of the book entitled *The implication of the EU Membership on immigration trends and immigrant integration policies for the Bulgarian labor market* published at Sofia in 2008, gives an another face to the two magazines numbers that I have read.

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