

# ANALELE UNIVERSITĂȚII DIN ORADEA



## RELAȚII INTERNAȚIONALE ȘI STUDII EUROPENE

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## **I. The International System and the Regional Development in EU**

**Ioan HORGA** ⇔ *The Unaccomplished Decentralisation or Formal Decentralisation in the EUMS from Central and Eastern Europe*

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## THE UNACCOMPLISHED DECENTRALISATION OR FORMAL DECENTRALISATION IN THE EUMS FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

*Ioan HORGA*\*

**Abstract:** *During the accession process and after they became members of the European Union, the Central and Eastern states went through a process of decentralization that emphasized the local and the regional level. Although the process was not complete, after the financial crisis erupted, these states began to develop a centrifugal behaviour are started a recentralization process that decreased the competences of local and regional authorities.*

**Keywords:** *EUMS, Central and Eastern Europe, decentralization, local and regional level*

The enlargement process from 2004 and 2007 was possible due to the adoption of the membership criteria by the member states. It is well known the fact that besides the three criteria that were adopted in Copenhagen in 1993 (the political, economic one and the *acquis comunitaire*), in 1995 in Madrid the strengthened administrative capacity criterion was added. The regular evaluation and monitoring of progress analysis for the countries from Central Eastern Europe highlights the developments that took place at the level of administration and public management system (Iancu, 2010: 126-127).

Pollitt and Bouckaert highlight five different reform models on the administration and the management of public systems, from a very narrow and limited model to a very stretched and broad span of reform. Choosing one of these models has tremendous practical implications for the content of a reform programme, for the choice of the reform projects, but also for the sequence and the timing of the reform portfolio. It also requires different tactical choices to be made. One of the issues that can be arisen here is how many degrees of freedom there are in reforming the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009: 94-104).

The first proposed model has a span of reform which is limited to single organizations within the public sector. In this sense, the “*public management is a merger of the normative orientation of traditional public administration and the instrumental orientation of general management.*” (James and Kenneth, 1983) In practice, this means that private-sector management techniques are imported into the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009: 97).

The second model has a broader span of reform which looks beyond single organisations to clusters of public sector organisations. There is the question of relationships, (e.g. hierarchies of organisations) in order to have good delivery service and policy implementation. This requires a vision on the architecture and the mapping of the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009: 97).

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The third model includes the interface of the public sector, but also the civil society. This interface needs to be reformed too, which in some cases requires civil society to be (re)built. This requires the recognition of civil society as a partner in reform. Therefore, platforms for exchange, transparent discussions and contradictory debates are necessary to reform the public sector in a sustainable, legitimate, and transparent way (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2009: 97).

The fourth model goes beyond the infrastructural level and includes the supra-structure that is also involved in the reform process. This reform's scope includes the realm of ideas and ideologies, culture and values within a society. Reforming the public sector includes not just its infrastructure (organisations and their interactions within the public sector and its civil society) but also its supra-structure. Although this does not mean that identities of communities or nations need to change, it does imply that practices are based on the belief of systems with norms and values, cultures and ideas (Bouckaert, 2007: 29-64).

The fifth model goes beyond the fourth one and includes all elements of the system. This requires a reform strategy which includes the major steering mechanisms in society, depending on the state structure itself. Market mechanisms are obvious within the private sector. Budget mechanisms are clear within the public sector. In a mixed economy, you also may have consensual allocation of resources amongst non-profit organisations. Public sector reform affects the proportions and regulates the allocation mechanisms of all these public, private and not-profit sectors. It also affects the allocation mechanisms within the public sector using hierarchies (budgetary top-down distribution with e.g. envelopes), markets (market type mechanisms such as vouchers or competitive tendering) or networks (consensual distribution) (Bouckaert, 2007: 98).

Looking to see which of the five aforementioned models had been implemented in the public administration reform and management from Central and Eastern Europe states, we started our analysis from Bouckaert's finding that the public administration and public management system in this region present themselves with chosen mixed models of "public-sector reform, and these choices have changed over time " (Bouckaert, 2007: 98).

Since the available space is limited within this paper, we will try only to look at the evolution of public administration through *local autonomy and decentralization*<sup>1</sup>. These manifestations will be highlighted throughout the two following chapters. Firstly, we will emphasize **the regionalisation and decentralisation** within Central and Eastern European countries regarding their accession moment from 2004 and 2007. Secondly, we will discuss about the process of **the unaccomplished decentralisation or formal decentralisation**. Among the identified manifestations we will mention only 3 that will be followed throughout the paper: the existing elected regional and local public authorities and their collectivities; the legal recognition of rights and obligations of regional and local administrative authorities that are necessary in order to manage the interests of the represented collectivities; the existing transfer of powers, responsibilities and resources from central to local and regional administrative authorities (Iancu, 2010: 127).

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<sup>1</sup> The other principles - subsidiarity, openness and transparency, partnership and cooperation, non-discrimination, proportionality, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, rule of law will be retained only for those elements that relate to the topic that we have proposed.

## 1. Regionalisation<sup>2</sup> and Decentralisation<sup>3</sup>

Regional policy design is the result of a process of multi-level decision-making between supra-national, national and sub-national actors. The implementation of this policy in Central and Eastern Europe varies greatly<sup>4</sup>. Some countries, like Poland and the Czech Republic, decentralized power creating strong and independent regional governments. Others, like Romania, Hungary or Bulgaria, only delegated administrative responsibilities to regional offices, failing to devolve power and create regional governments. The cause of this variation lies in the actors' diffuse role in decision-making on regional policy (Unita, 2010: 66). To understand the meaning of regionalisation within the new Member States, we should take into account the a number of economic and structural factors, explicitly, changes in productive systems, accelerated market integration on sector bases, as well as the increasing competition between different economic areas after the abolition of most barriers regarding the circulation of goods and capitals (Tatur, 2004: 15).

The principle of local autonomy and decentralization, generally sketched with direct reference to regional policy, multilevel governance and efficient allocation of structural funds<sup>5</sup>, is considered to be an appropriate presence regarding the reforms from EU Member States and candidate countries<sup>6</sup>.

The beginning of leaving aside the centralized administration model, inherited from the communist period, was done differently from country to country in Central and Eastern Europe (Kruglasov, 2013: 8-34), as aforementioned. The tendency toward maintaining some degree of centralism or even toward certain recentralization can be observed in the region throughout a period of 25 years of transition. If we analyze each country, we can notice that decentralization addressed by national governments in Central and Eastern Europe, at least at the level of discourse, after the events from 1989-1990 (Kruglasov, 2013: 14-15), the introducing of *local autonomy and decentralization* was done after signing the Association Agreements with the EU and amid financial assistance

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<sup>2</sup> Regionalisation est le processus par lequel s'opère la construction d'un nouvel espace d'action publique ayant pour objet de promouvoir un territoire, infra-national mais supra-local, par la mobilisation de son tissu économique et par le développement de son potentiel (infrastructures), voire par la mobilisation des ressorts identitaires et des solidarités locales ou régionales (Gérard Marcou, « L'adaptation des structures territoriales face à la politique régionale communautaire ». *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, 2002, vol. 32, n° 3, p. 139)

<sup>3</sup> The decentralisation recouvre le transfert de compétences de l'État à des collectivités territoriales (personnes morales à vocation générale) ou à des établissements publics (personnes morales à vocation spécifique) de niveau inférieur. Elle vise à donner à ces entités des compétences, des ressources propres distinctes de celles de l'État. Elle peut s'accompagner de l'élection des autorités qui exercent ces compétences. Il faut la distinguer de la déconcentration qui opère le transfert de compétences au sein même de l'appareil de l'État (Emmanuelle Boullineau, Marius Suci, "Décentralisation et régionalisation en Bulgarie et en Roumanie. Les ambiguïtés de l'eupéanisation", in *L'espace géographique*, 2008, vol. 37, p. 353

<sup>4</sup> The topic was of great interests for many authors. We mention one of the most recent works: Francesco Palermo & Sara Parolari (2013) *Regional Dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe New Approaches to Decentralization*, Brill Online, Leiden

<sup>5</sup> Better involvement of national, regional and local actors (2001, Working Group 3b, White Paper on European Governance). See also John Loughlin, Frank Hendriks, Anders Lidstrom, *The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

<sup>6</sup> The European Parliament resolution on Agenda 2000 and Council Regulation no. 1659/98 on decentralized cooperation, as last amended by Council Regulation no. 625/2004/189, as amended and supplemented.

from the EU. This topic of the Europeanization impact on the introduction of local autonomy and decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe (Kimball, 1999) is seen by scholars as top-down (Keating and Hughes, 2003) action which translates to some as an external pressure (Bouckaert, 2009: 96) or for other as part of the imposed conditionalities (Keating and Hughes, 2003: 69-88).

Out of the large number of countries in the 2004 accession wave, with a strong assistance from PHARE, Hungary was the first to create the NUTS regions in 1994. Still a candidate, Romania adopted the necessary legislation only in 1998. Hughes underlines that as Hungary never had regions and never considered it needed them, regionalization was a great challenge. The same was perceived by Romanian politicians. It was felt that the pressure to adopt the *acquis comunitaire* implied regionalization following the NUTS classification (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, 2004: 75). This implicit pressure was mainly felt through the comments of the Country Regular Reports. These reports can moreover be considered guiding documents to what results are expected from the regionalization process. The repeated criticism of the administration's insufficient capacity in implementing regional policy can be understood as insufficient decentralization or weak regional administrative capacity. For instance, in its 1998 report, the European Commission emphasized the national progress in the public administration reforms from the Czech Republic and listed among the successful actions the creation of regions and among failures, the lack of authorities' interest to sign the European Charter of Local Self-Government<sup>7</sup>. A year later, however, the Czech Republic ratified the *Charte*<sup>8</sup>. In 2000, the European institution focuses its attention on the decentralization process and the slow pace of its development<sup>9</sup>. The years of 2001 and 2002 brought significant improvements in the field (by creating and clarify the powers of regional authorities<sup>10</sup>). In 2003 the Commission mentioned that the process of decentralization to local and regional levels was almost completely<sup>11</sup>.

After a difficult start, compared to the Czech Republic's case, the Commission highlighted and suggested in its report from 2000 that the Slovak law requires a local government<sup>12</sup>. In 2001 constitutional revision, administrative reorganization and reformulation of a package of laws on decentralization of public administration and transfer of powers from the state to the regions bring positive signals to the European

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<sup>7</sup> European Commission (1998) *1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Czech Republik's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 8

<sup>8</sup> European Commission (1999) *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Czech Republik's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 12

<sup>9</sup> European Commission (2000) *2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Czech Republik's Progress Towards Accession*", Brussels, p. 19.

<sup>10</sup> European Commission (2001) *2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Czech Republik's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 18; European Commission (2002) *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Czech Republik's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 21

<sup>11</sup> European Commission (2003) *2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Czech Republik's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 11

<sup>12</sup> European Commission (2000) *2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Slovak Republik's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 16

Commission<sup>13</sup>. In 2003, the Commission considered the implementation of the administrative reforms and the strengthening of local autonomy as signs of change<sup>14</sup>.

The 1998 report emphasizes that Hungary needed to implement the objective and the principle of partnership and to reinforce the administrative and institutional capacity<sup>15</sup>. Although it received substantial assistance through PHARE program in paving the way to regional policy implementation, the seven established regions had limited success. In 2001, the European Commission highlighted that fact that the transfer of local responsibilities should be sustained by a proportional allocation of resources<sup>16</sup>. The reports from 2002 and 2003 emphasized the positive evolution of decentralization to as more transparent and efficient way<sup>17</sup>. Especially after 1994, Hungary moved from centralisation to cautious and limited decentralization after transition, mostly due to the weak and half-hearted pressure from the European Commission. Most of this pressure had effects before the accession in 2004 (Pogatsa, 2013: 147-174).

In the case of Bulgaria in the Commission's 2004 report, there is specified the need to clarify the powers/competences and budgets of central and local administrations<sup>18</sup>. Similar comments were subsequently offered also by the Country Reports from 2005 and 2006 respectively.<sup>19</sup>

In the case of Poland, the European Commission considered in 1999 the regionalism as a success<sup>20</sup>. Poland is considered to be the only country among new Member States where there is clear correlation between the NUTS II and the meso-level of government (Yoder, 2003: 263-286). Apparently the reformed framework of regional policy from Poland seemed to reflect largely the idea of decentralisation, subsidiarity and partnerships. In fact by means of the regional contracts sub-national self government through the marshals (democratically-elected voivodships' representative bodies) have been enabled to participate in the process of decision-making in all issues concerning regional development (Glowacki, 2002: 105-137).

Indeed, emphasis on the development of this sort of contractual relationships in regional policy making can also be reasonably related to the Polish government's commitment to prepare for the EU accession (Glowacki, 2002: 105-137). The new planning framework for regional administration and its development was embraced with

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<sup>13</sup> European Commission (2001) *2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Slovak Republik's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, pp. 16, 24

<sup>14</sup> European Commission (2003) *2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Slovak Republik's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 11

<sup>15</sup> European Commission (1998) *1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 32

<sup>16</sup> European Commission (2001) *2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 16

<sup>17</sup> European Commission (2002) *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 21; European Commission (2003) *2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Hungary's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 12

<sup>18</sup> European Commission (2004) *2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 16

<sup>19</sup> European Commission (2005) *2005 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, pp 7-8 ; European Commission (2006) "2006 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession", Brussels, p. 6

<sup>20</sup> European Commission (2000) *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 8 November 2000

satisfaction by the European Commission<sup>21</sup>, thus with the accession of Poland to the EU the system of regional contracts merged directly into the broader framework of EU cohesion policy (Szczerki, 2013: 175-199), to which now almost three-fourths of the Polish is related. The year of 2002 brings a strengthening of local self-government in Poland in terms of political and financial decentralization<sup>22</sup>, but in 2003 the Commission reminds the Polish authorities that local reforms and their consolidation is a priority<sup>23</sup>. The Polish specialists in European integration and practitioners have frequently advocated that the Polish public administration still appears poorly developed (Ferry, 2004) and that the post-accession capacity to absorb the structural funds was, on average, relatively low (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, 2004: 26). But comparing the situation from Poland with the other states from the region, the Polish developed was a positive one, fact that was evidenced especially during 2007-2013.

According to the 1998 report, the public administration from Slovenia appeared to be centralized, rather passive in taking the necessary reforms<sup>24</sup>. In 1999, the situation was almost unchanged, although the Commission announced the existence of local authorities but it does not make any comment about them<sup>25</sup>.

Regarding Romania, the Commission Report from 2003, taking into consideration the decentralized process, that there is a considerable lack of transparency in the financial transfer to the local county level, believes there is a threat to the very existence of local autonomy<sup>26</sup>. The same document highlighted the current legal framework that was unclear, Romania lacking a strategy for managing the process of decentralization in a transparent and stable way<sup>27</sup>.

In 2004, the Commission reiterated Romania's still unsolved problem of responsibilities' transfer to the local level showing that they were not followed by doubling adequate financial transfers. However, the Commission considers that "*the Romanian authorities have made considerable effort to develop a strategy to manage the process of decentralization in a transparent and stable manner*"<sup>28</sup>. Decentralization and the need to clarify the allocation of responsibilities and the financial resources to the various levels of government remain points of interest and in 2005 the Commission emphasized that "*the transfer of powers to local authorities is far from completion*" and local financial autonomy "*is still limited*"<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> European Commission (2000) 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, p. 67.

<sup>22</sup> European Commission (2002) 2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, pp. 22-23

<sup>23</sup> European Commission (2003) 2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, 2003, p. 14

<sup>24</sup> European Commission (1998) 1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Slovenia's Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, p. 8

<sup>25</sup> European Commission (1999) 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Slovenia's Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, p. 59

<sup>26</sup> European Commission (2003) 2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession", Brussels, p. 17

<sup>27</sup> *Idem*

<sup>28</sup> European Commission (2004) 2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, p. 18

<sup>29</sup> European Commission (2005) 2005 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession, Brussels, pp. 8, 25

In 2006, the Report of the European institution limited itself to mention exclusively the state that regulatory efforts that had been made towards the decentralization without doing the usual references to consolidation (Iancu, 2010: 144). "*Progress has been made in the area of public administration reform. [...] Local Public Finance Law completes the legal framework of decentralization. Continue efforts to ensure the transfer of powers from the central level to the local one. Time schedules are developed and there are identified procedures that are necessary for the decentralization and resource management responsibilities, including financial ones*"<sup>30</sup>.

Analysing these examples we can notice that the impulse for procedural regionalization and decentralization reached all countries from Central and Eastern Europe, at least in procedural terms. Firstly, there were created intermediate levels between central government and administrative structures. But even here there are many issues to be arisen given the fact that the map of the regions is not correlated with the upper structures of the sub-national levels of government. Except for Poland, regarding the others countries there is no correlation between the two territorial division, Bulgaria had 6 NUTS II regions and 28 regions at the upper level of the sub-national government; the Czech Republic had 8 NUTS II regions and 14 regions at the upper level of the sub-national government; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were regarded as single NUTS II regions, but they have respectively 15, 33 (26 districts plus 7 cities with districts right) and 10 regions at the upper level of the sub-national government; Hungary had recognised 7 NUTS II regions, but it had 41 regions at the upper levels of the sub-national government (19 counties plus 22 cities with county status plus Budapest); Romania had 8 NUTS II regions and 42 (41+ Bucharest) regions at the upper level of the sub-national government; Slovenia was regarded as single NUTS II region (an attempt to constitute two regions of NUTS II status had failed, the two areas being too small to match the NUTS criteria), and 58 regions at the upper level of the sub-national government; Slovakia has 4 NUTS II regions and 8 regions at the upper level of the sub-national government. Secondly, in all these countries there were given legislative packets in order to pave the way towards decentralization, stressing here reforms in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Speaking from the perspective of *functional regionalization and decentralization*, the European Commission reports show that until the accession moment, no state revealed a normal functioning of the regional structures. However, there are notable differences. For instance, if Poland at the time of accession and in the next two years until the entry into financial cycle from 2007 to 2013, we can say that reached an optimal level of functional regionalization and decentralization, in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the two countries registered "undeveloped regionalization and different decentralization" (Boullineau and Suciun, 2008: 357). We cannot say that the two countries have reached a functional regionalization as stated Boullineau & Suciun, but we agree that it is a result of a technocratic reflection that is necessary in order to facilitate the managements of the European funds (Boullineau and Suciun, 2008: 357). Comparing the Central Eastern states, Slovakia, the Baltic states, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic were situated higher than the two aforementioned countries, the latter being the closest to the optimal decentralization of the country.

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<sup>30</sup> European Commission (2006) *2006 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, p. 39

## 2. The unaccomplished decentralisation or formal decentralisation

Going through the previous chapter, we can say that the process of Europeanization of the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, seen through the regionalization and decentralization process, was a linear and solid trend. But, there were many elements which suggested that this process if not stopped, more regressed.

It has been observed that despite their intentions, the EU policies have not yet led to significant decentralization or the empowerment of regional actors in countries with highly centralised political systems (Marek and Baun, 2002: 914).

It is accurate to say that the current territorial map of the majority of Central and Eastern European countries is the result of a compromise not easily reached after intensive and passionate political debates involving conflicting interests and a variety of pressures, the European Commission being just one of them (Kerlin, 2001:14-18). The new territorial organisation came into effect bringing about an unprecedented modernization of the Central and Eastern European countries in terms of institutional and administrative systems. Some states succeeded in accomplishing successful regionalization projects. It can be argued that political, historical and cultural conceptions of Poland's regional framework have had at least as much to do with the shaping of the regional map of Poland as the pursuit of goal and principles set by the Commission with its conditionality criteria. Other states also developed their tasks, but after 2004, or achieved "the limited level of decentralization froze" (the case of Hungary) (Pogatsa, 2013: 147-174). Other states reached rather a shy development stage. For instance, in Romania the establishment of these eight regions assumes also the development of new institutions. In terms of effectiveness, their functions are being questioned taking into consideration the loose connections with the local level, fact that affects local authorities and central ones' ability to represent the needs and the interests of their citizens (Horga, 2011: 281-302). According to Boulineau & Suciuc "*the regionalization is a formal process created for regions without power or territory*" (Boulineau and Suciuc, 2008: 357). "They were created as cooperation forms with the sub-national territorial administrative forms: county in Romania (*judet*) (Dragoman, 2011: 648-649) sau in Bulgaria (*oblast*). They are led by Regional Development Council which does not have a legal personality (Kruglasov, 2013 : 20) and that is responsible for the distribution of European funds between the counties, after they were distributed at the central level (Boulineau and Suciuc, 2008: 357). We should add that neither the current Romanian administrative structure, composed of 42 counties, which is seen as a sufficient form suitable for the European the regional policy framework or for managing the structural funds after joining, is not functional, being too diffused (Suciuc, 2013: 103-146). Additionally we can legitimately raise the question of the inability to influence the national strategies regarding the regions as it was demonstrated during 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 (Horga and Costea, 2014).

The most recent report regarding Romania in what concerns the local and regional democracy dates from March 2011. The study report highlights the positive dynamics in Romania's development, but still draws attention towards the reforms that are needed due to the fact that there are no consultation mechanisms for the local authorities in subjects of their concern like financial and social aspects (Răducanu, 2013: 48).

In 2013 in Romania there could be noticed a pro-regionalization movement, as well as for decentralisation and preparation for the transformation of eight statistical regions into regional authorities that have their own rights. These new regions would to benefit from a large-scale transfer of competences from the central state, from the counties (*judet*) and from the municipalities. The exact details surrounding these new competences

are not yet officially determined, but they will require revisions of the framework agreement on decentralisation and of the law on public administration. These regions are meant to enjoy a great deal of financial autonomy. The financing plan for local and regional authorities and the tax code should be modified accordingly, in a way that will also help the development of local self-government. The existence of these new regional entities may also trigger the restructuring of services and changes in the number of civil servants. It is also worth noting that the presidents of these new regions are proposed to be elected by direct vote<sup>31</sup>. Unfortunately this process is greatly underdeveloped, apart from a few progress realized by the agglomeration of some decentralized institutions (health, finance, construction inspection, inspection of the forest), in the 8 centres of NUTS II nothing was achieved. There is rather the perception that these agglomerations are nothing more than some recentralization masked result of the financial crisis. But looking from another perspective, in the case of Romania, and other countries from the region, the after-crisis effects can constitute the engine for the creation of functional regions, because the major plans to reduce costs and improve public administration efficiency may, however, affect the traditional (judetele) organisation of local and regional authorities in Romania in the favour of regions.

To bring forward an argument in support to this assumption we can refer to the task of setting territorial boundaries for the new sub-national governmental institutions. As previously observed, one of the prime requirements of the *acquis* is the establishment of regional units with dimensions matching the NUTS II classification and capacities to manage EU funds. At least four divergent positions supported by different cultural and political beliefs struggled to obtain a legal acknowledgment of their own standpoint on the country's internal boundaries. The result of the compromise was a solution in compliance with the NUTS II classification characterised in the case of Poland by a marked mismatch between the administrative boundaries and the country's socio-economic regional profile, a solution which is much more likely to complicate rather than facilitating the reduction of internal disparities<sup>32</sup>. Also in Poland the *powiat* has become largely dependent on the regional level, which is responsible for making the final decisions on the allocation of EU structural funds (Bertrana, Hubert, 2013: 73-89).

In case of Romania the boundaries of these regions have been established. The 8 units NUTS II which were created in Romania have in few cases (except the South-West and partially the North-East regions) a functional socio-economic regional profile (Horga, 2011: 287-288). The two examples of Poland and Romania, are, in our opinion, the two large regionalism models from Central and Eastern Europe. In the Case of Poland we can discuss about a system of regional decentralisation (Marcou, 2001: 22), whereas in the case of Romania we can notice a model of regionalised unitarism (Sherpereel, 2007: 41).

The new regional authorities were given a wide range of competences and responsibilities for conducting regional development policies. When drawing up the reform the central governments have secured certain strategic dispositions allowing them to preserve a significant degree of control over regions. If the regional institutions have theoretically responsibilities in the field of programming regional economic development,

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<sup>31</sup> The Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), *Decentralisation at crossroads. Territorial reforms in Europe in times of crisis*, October 2013, accessed on 18 November 2014, [http://www.ccre.org/img/uploads/piecesjointe/filename/CCRE\\_broch\\_EN\\_complete\\_low.pdf](http://www.ccre.org/img/uploads/piecesjointe/filename/CCRE_broch_EN_complete_low.pdf)

<sup>32</sup> For a broader discussion on this issue see Jan Rokita, *Continuity and Change in Polish Policy after Regional Reform in 1998*, Paper presented at the Conference "Regionalisation of Polish Politics" SSEES, 15-16 April 2002.

their activities are subordinated to the control of a government-appointed entity. For instance, the *Wojewoda* which represents the central government in Poland or *Prefectul* in the case of Romania are designed to safeguard state's interests not only by controlling the legality of the decisions that are taken by the elected regional authorities, but also by making certain that they are in line with the priorities defined at the national level. Moreover, what is even more important to note, being the representatives of the state treasury they also perform a financial control at the sub national level.

The decentralisation of competences has not been followed with an adequate degree of financial decentralisation. The regions still remain to a large extent financially dependent on the central government, and this fact poses severe restrictions to regional authorities when elaborating their own strategies of local development, hence it contradicts their statutory functions. As a result the Ministries of Finance with the power to provide specific grants and subsidies to sub-national authorities exercise a significant control over their functions in all Central Eastern European countries. The dominant position of the centre over the regions in terms of finance undermines the validity of the regional contract as a symbol of a new, regionalised approach to regional policy-making.

Another example is that the central government still clearly possess the upper hand in fields like the regional development which has increasingly become a major element of European domestic policy. The latter should not be surprising, since the sub-national authorities are playing a leading role in the regional programming within the EU Cohesion policy framework. It has been until now the exception rather than the rule. As it has been previously noted, these implications are strictly connected with the vagueness and the ambiguities of the EU Commission's recommendations, which contribute to the paradoxical outcome of the territorial reforms from Central and Eastern European countries. Therefore, we can observe an apparent empowerment of regions which hides a *de facto* re-centralisation of power with the government controlling the purse strings (Dabrowski, 2007).

For the European Commission its regional policy has been an important driving force regarding the process of territorial decentralisation in Central and Eastern European countries. However, this influence has generated different outcomes. There is little question about the fact that the imposition of the Cohesion policy framework has pushed the regional authorities to adjust their practices in what regards the management of regional development policy. It is out of doubt that the position of sub-national authorities within the national institutional structure, if weighted against that existing during the communist system, has been largely reinforced. However, the ambiguity of the Commission's own regionalist agenda regarding the territorial and administrative reforms along with its reluctance to allow the regions to formulate and manage regional operational programmes, have given the central government the opportunity to impose solutions suiting its own interest and have made the re-centralisation of power much easier.

Therefore, we can say the EU regional policy model that was developed in order to manage the Structural Funds has provided incentives for the mobilisation of local and regional interests in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the strength and impact of empowerment depends on whether local or regional interest groups existed as organised political actors rooted in the regional communities or identities, and whether they formed broader pro-regional advocacy coalitions with other political actors and participated in government (Brusis, 2010: 70-89).

Concluding, the regionalization and decentralization process from Central Eastern states has led towards three major evolutions. Firstly, the new sub-national governments have been granted with increasing competences for regional development in the majority of

the states. Secondly, within all countries we can notice a centralisation of procedures; the lack of coordination between different levels, as a consequence of an unclear division of competences does represent a serious problem. Finally, there are severe constraints that block the efficient implementation of the EU's co-financed programmes which, as widely known, require the complementary participation of authorities from all administrative levels.

If during the 2000-2006 financial cycle, these developments have affected more than the relationship between Central and Eastern European countries and Brussels due to the low volume of funds to which they had access, during 2006-2013 financial cycle, in which the states of the region had access to over 70% of cohesion funding, contradictory developments in decentralization and local and regional autonomy determine a relationship between these states and Brussels that paradoxically will be translated through making regional policy without regions.

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## THE PROCESS OF CHANGING THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM – A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE INSTITUTIONS

*Răzvan COTOVELEA\**

**Abstract.** *Institutions are now the focus of political actors. They will try to modify the institutions depending on factors characterizing a certain historical period. For this reason, various branches of theoretical science tried to explain and evaluate the operation and interaction of institutions. Today, there are many differences between the new institutionalists, both theoretically and in terms of methodology. There are however two things on which everyone agrees: institutions shape policy. Rules and standard operating procedures of the institutions put their mark on the political, in that they structure behavior. Institutions influence these consequences, because they give shape identity, power and strategies of actors. Institutions are shaped by history. History matters because it is a dependency path: what happens first (even if somewhat accidental) determines what will happen later. Individuals can choose their institutions, but they can choose in circumstances created by institutions and their choices influence the rules by which their successors will choose in the future.*

**Keywords:** *Institutions, European Union, Institutional project, Institutional design, theories*

There are two theoretical approaches in which the main actors of the analysis are the institutions and not individuals: old institutionalism and new institutionalism (Nee, 2001: 1-17). The two theoretical approaches prove that “institutions matter” and they can significantly influence the outcome of decision making regarding a state (eg. Romania) or within a group or a voluntary organization of states (eg. EU). Institutions are thus central actors of concern to decision makers. They will try to transform the institutions based on specific historic factors. For this reason, various branches of human science attempted to explain and evaluate the functioning and interactions institutions.

Game theory<sup>1</sup> and econometrics are two of the methods used by academics to determine the effects of institutions. The presentation of these methods is of utmost importance because of the ability they can provide, namely, the ability to describe institutions in a different perspective political science dose. At the same time, using these two methods, one has the opportunity to quantify the effects reform and the functioning of institutions have. From a theoretical perspective, the new institutionalism implies helping organize the analysis of the evolution of ideas within institutions. Under the new institutionalism, historical institutionalism is one that offers a better interpretation of the

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv3c12.html#Ch. 12, Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality>

role institutions have within a system. Historical institutionalism argues that the integration process involves a restructuring of state responsibilities and actions on many levels; this is based on the idea that what matters is not whether or not the nation state wins, but rather if the negotiation environment won is sufficiently important and beneficial to determine a process of state restructuring.

Regarding methods of measuring of the institutional reforms effects, game theory and econometrics helps explain certain behaviors of institutions. Thus, we can imagine a cooperative game type - the creation of CECO; and a non-cooperative game type - The EU joining of a Central-Eastern European State. The game is general in nature and is applicable to any candidate. A more in depth analysis of these games can lead us to a new way of interpreting the actions of European institutions, private or public actors in general. From an econometric point of view the impact of institutional reform on the legislative process was analyzed by Thomas König (König, 2008: 145-166). The econometrics analysis concludes that legislative proposals which require a majority to be approved, require considerable shorter time span than those requiring unanimity, Parliament participation in decision-making increase the time required for approving proposals; measures regarding internal market, agriculture, competition and trade proposals require less time than measures in other areas, and regulations and decisions require less time than Directives. European institution reform does not adversely affect decision making. The qualified majority requirements in almost all areas, demonstrates that the EU is trying to improve its decision-making, while, by increasing the powers of Parliament (although reducing speed and efficiency of decision making) Europe came closer to its citizens and become more transparent. The European Union is able to cope with a broad agenda, taking into account its latest expansion which included 13 new states.

EU institutional reform is based on two types of factors: classical factors and enlargement factors. Amongst classical factors we remember the binomial regionalization-globalization, “eurosclerosis”, the EU population aging factors and the efficiency of economic and social institutions. Each of these factors contributed to the need for institutional reform of the European Union. But the most was the enlargement process which required a fundamental European Institution reform. Thus, national leaders were forced to negotiate more European Treaties: the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe<sup>2</sup> and the Treaty of Lisbon; all this in order to address the problem of noncompliance with EU institutions with the requirements of an increasing number of EU Member States<sup>3</sup>. These treaties aimed for a better definition and division of powers within the Union, an increase in transparency and efficiency of Community decision-making and the simplification of Union legal instruments.

The study of institutions was a constant concern for political science, lately political scientists try to solve institutional problems, in the name of new institutionalism (Nee, 2001: 12), with special vigor and creativity. Theorists of international and supranational organizations have shown both the practical and symbolic roles as well as the balance of power of the analyzed entities. Historical institutionalism followers revealed a connection between government and politics and focus on the timing and sequences of institutional development. Today there are many differences between the new

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<sup>2</sup> Despre eșecul ratificării Tratatului privind Instituirea unei Constituții pentru Europa vezi: <http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/118/art3-tuca.html>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.zf.ro/opinii/vasile-puscas-victoria-esecului-3080218>

institutionalists, both the theoretical and methodological point of view. However, there are two things on which all world agrees:

- *Institutions shape politics*. Rules and standard procedures of institutions, leave their mark on the political medium, namely because they structure political behavior. Institutions influence because they give shape to identity, power and strategy.

- *Institutions are shaped by history*. History matters because of its dependency trail: what happens first (even if somewhat accidentally) influences what will happen later. Individuals can choose their institutions, but cannot chose the circumstances created by them and their choices influence the rules by which their successors will have to choose by.

Another neglected stage in works regarding institutions is the fact that the performance of institutions are shaped by the social context in which they operate. One person can chose to define or chase an interest in different ways, the same thing applies to institutions, these choices are influenced by the context in which they are taken.

Institutions are mechanisms that serve to achieve certain goals, not just an agreement. We want governments to do something, not just to take decisions. We want government to educate our children, to pay our pensions, to ensure public order, to create jobs, to keep prices under control, encourage family values etc. The idea of institutional performance is based on a well-defined scheme: social demands -> political interaction -> government -> policy choosing -> implementation. Government institutions receive input from the social environment and produce outputs to respond to this environment. A very powerful democratic institution must be flexible and efficient at the same time: sensitive to citizens demands and effective in using resources to satisfy demands (Putnam and Leonardi, 1993: 15-22). The effect of government action, even if it is well thought out and effectively implemented, may be different than the one planned or imagined by its initiators. However, the institutional performance is important because, ultimately, the quality of governance directly affects people lives, scholarships are granted to students, the streets are paved, children are educated or if government fails, these things never happen.

Understanding the dynamics of institutional performance is for a long time of concern to comparative social science. The literature provides three ways of explaining performance (Putnam and Leonardi, 1993: 15-22):

a. The first one focuses on the institutional project. This guidance is a branch of political analysis, risen primarily from the process of constitution conception which is specific of the nineteenth-century. Considerations on representative government of John Stuart Mill, reflects a confidence of this school of thought in the procedural structured mechanism. Most of Mill's famous treaty deals with constitutional techniques, and with the discovery of those institutional forms that allow a greater efficiency of a representative government<sup>4</sup>. This guideline has continued to dominate the performance analysis of a democracy even in the first half of the twentieth century. The collapse of democratic experiments that took place after the first world war and before the 2nd (Italy and Germany), and the immobility of the Third and Fourth French Republic, alongside the greater and greater attention towards social and economic based politics, all this led to a more moderate view on institutional manipulation. A well thought out project does not automatically guarantee performance. However, nowadays, the interest for institutional performance determinants has revived amongst new institutionalism followers as well as between those who wield the ability to put reforms into practice. Those who write constitutions, managerial consultants and advisors attach great importance to project

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.utilitarianism.com/ol/one.html>

development as part of improving institutional performance. Arturo Israel, specialised in Third World development, finds it easier to build a street than an organization to take care of that street<sup>5</sup>.

b. A second school of thought which deals with the performance of democratic institutions focuses on socio-economic factors. Sociologists, since Aristotle showed that the success of a democracy depends on social and economic prosperity. Contemporary theorists such as Robert A. Dahl or Seymour Martin Lipset also emphasize on different aspects of modernization (wealth, education, etc.) in their debates on the conditions underlying the stable and efficient democratic governance. An effective democracy is closely linked both in time and in space to modern socio-economic development. Arturo Israel argues that institutional performance improvement is an integral part of modernization (Putnam and Leonardi, 1993: 15-22), as well as Putnam, in his famous *How does democracy work*, which we mentioned above, observed a striking difference in levels of socio-economic development amongst regions of Italy, this gives us a concrete indication about the complexity of the links that exist between modernity and institutional performance (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993, 45-50).

c. The third way of explaining performance, focuses on socio-cultural factors to explain democratic institutions performance. In *The Republic*, Plato says that the type of government varies depending on the citizens (Plato, 2005: 251 - 254). More recently, social scientists began to explain variations in national political systems by the differences in the political culture. Almond's and Verba's study "Civic Culture" seeks to explain the differences between democratic governments in the United States, Britain, Italy, Mexico and Germany examining attitudes and political orientations gathered under the name of civic culture (Abraham and Sidney, 1989: 3-40). In the American democracy, Tocqueville highlights the link between a company's moral and political practices<sup>6</sup>. To understand how an institution functions, how different institutions operate in different ways, the researcher must use different techniques. The rigorous field observation and case study used by anthropologists and journalists can and should be borrowed by the aforementioned researcher. These techniques require for the one who uses them to soak in every detail about an institution, to experience its habits and practices, booms and falls. Statistical analysis is as important, because it permits the comparison of several particular cases at once. Also, to unravel the mystery of institutional performance, the past and the various regions that are part of the state should be investigated because we live in a world of constant movement, the forces change, government regimes change regional groupings are created and disappear. Everything is interconnected and every action creates interdependencies. Globalization is the main feature of this century and trends of regionalization is a consequence of it.

European Economic Community (EEC) occurred in the late 1950s as a response to the problems Europe was facing after the Second World War. The six founding European Governments understood that it is easier to find common solutions to common problems. At the same time, the prospect of European economic cooperation increased internal capacity of European states to rebuild their devastated economies and reduce the possibility of a new outbreak of war. Currently, EEC (now EU) is comprised of 28 member states and the enlargement process will not stop here, other countries like Turkey, Macedonia and Ukraine are expected to join in the next decade. In order to become

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.springerlink.com/content/v18822781n5x7432/fulltext.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1571/is\\_33\\_16/ai\\_65091771/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_33_16/ai_65091771/)

Member States, candidates of the latest enlargement (and those who will apply for membership from now on) had to meet three basic criteria set out by the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1993 (Abraham and Sidney, 1989: 35; Brie, Chirodea and Ţoca, 2013).

For a complete picture of conceptual approaches, I will present another three main ones, very present in international relations, which I classified in rationalist theories, specifically realism, and non-rationalist theories, specifically: constructivism and the English school of thought.

*Political realism* is a new paradigm that appears after the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, and it's based on the belief that international politics must be defined as a struggle for power (Moise, 2008: 56). Most emblematic representative of classical realism is Hans Morgenthau who in his famous work entitled *Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace*, defines the concept of power and highlights the six principles underlying this school of thought. This doctrine is based on the balance of power between states and it generated the development of militarism and the proliferation of arms in the world. In a bipolar world like that of the Cold War, this theory focused on meeting national interests, ignoring ideological or moral values. The solution proposed by realists was that of achieving a balance of powers so that it provides a bipolar hegemony (Moise, 2008: 57).

The realist and neo-realist theory provides a pessimistic perspective on international relations. Realists agree that a peaceful world is desirable, but they find it very difficult to realize because we live in a world characterized by competition for power and war. Creating a peaceful world remains an ideal difficult to implement. As EH Carr emphasizes "realism is inclined to focus on strength and irresistible forces and the inevitability of existing trends and insists that maximum wisdom consists in accepting and adapting to these forces and trends.

The pessimistic perspective on international relations of realism derives from three fundamental beliefs. First, realists consider states to be main actors of the international system. They specifically focus on great powers, because they are "the states that dominate and shape international policy, and also cause the most terrible wars." Second, realists consider that great powers are influenced by the external environment and not their internal features. In other words, the structure of the international system determines the behavior of states. Realists refuse to make a distinction between "good" states and "bad" states, on the grounds that all states act according to the same principle, regardless of their culture, internal political system or state leader. It is difficult to distinguish between states, the only difference that we can easily observe is between their capabilities. Thus, the only differences are between the relative power of states. Third, realists believe that states are constantly making power calculations, always being engaged in a quest for power. The competition for power is a zero sum game (a win of a state is a loss to another) and therefore it is intense and cruel.

Classical realism assumes that states have a need for infinite power, and therefore permanently seek opportunities to take the offensive and dominate other countries. All states have an "animus dominandi" so there is no reason to believe that some are less aggressive, of somehow better than others. The anarchy of the international system, makes states feel insecure, and this causes concern for the balance of power. The main driving force in the international system is the race to power, pushing states to fight for supremacy. External actions of the state are determined, amongst others, by the interactions that occur internally between state actors and non-state actors, thus being

able to talk about the internal potency of the state, while the manner in which the state acts internationally is characterized by its power to act on an international level.

In the rationalistic theories, classical realism has Morgenthau as its principal representative, he developed two theories of the state: a minor systemic approach (the state is denied any capacity for action), a major international non-systemic approach in which the state is endowed with considerable international action (Hobson, 2000: 45). In both theories, the state has a strong internal capacity for action. Morgenthau's conclusion brings the two theories together and specifies that state power always needs high internal potency while the international potency can fluctuate with time. In this approach, international institutions have a marginal role in the cooperation between states, their main role being that of a mediator of a permanent competition between them, in an attempt to maintain universal peace. Neorealism, however, assumes that states in the international system seek to ensure survival. Their first aim is security. The structure of the international system determine states to pay attention to the balance of power. Anarchy leads states to compete for power, which is in the same time the best means to survive. The primary concern of States is to maintain its position in the system. In the anarchic international system, states are stimulated to gain power at the expense of rivals, and "it's a fully logical strategy to act on this stimulus when the right moment arises."

Neorealism argues that, although the state has high internal potency, it does not have the capacity for international action which can influence the international order without any constraints. States are "passive carriers" of international political structure. Waltz, for example, considers that the state has high internal potency but is unable to decide internationally, being thus, forced to comply with the anarchy (Waltz, 1983: 159 - 160). Gilpin complements state theory by adding two elements: variable internal potency and socio-economic barriers. In this respect, Gilpin argues that states can have internal power on many social levels. Thus, a high internal potency permits the state to compete in a game with anarchic conditions, therefore, becoming stronger, while low potency undermine the state's ability to develop their own power base leading, in time, to great power loss (Gilpin, 1983: 96-105). Now international organisations intervene and take the security issue, offering states the possibility and opportunity to cooperate in various fields without fear of becoming vulnerable.

Another paradigm which prevails on the theoretical field and which influenced international relations is liberalism and neoliberalism. Liberalism proclaims the freedom of the individual as the central issue of human society and emphasizes the role of the state to support and strengthen private property seen as a condition for unlimited human growth (Moise, 2008: 169). Liberalism has its roots in the nineteenth century. One form of classical liberalism was known as idealism. The liberal paradigm argues that peace is of great importance to maintain economic prosperity and therefore increasing the role of democratic institutions is fundamental. Expanding democratic regimes to a global scale allows for peacekeeping. In the 80s liberalism moved to a new phase called neoliberalism. This school of thought recognizes the anarchic nature of the international system as a result of the lack of world order and likely lead system, but does not exclude the existence of different degrees of interdependence, where cooperation is possible (Moise, 2008: 171).

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, show in the paper *Power and Interdependence* that international cooperation is due to a complex interdependency. This interdependence allows the development of cooperation which, while maintaining certain levels of power relations between states, the solution eliminates the war as it becomes unproductive. Theories of realistic influence, focusing on military security of states in an anarchic and

competitive environment could only partially explain international relations (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 187). Processes such as numerical or qualitative growth of trade between democratic economies, European unification or tensioned US-Soviet relations in the 70s found possible explanations in neoliberal theories. Most influential theory of the neoliberal is considered, as we have seen in the introduction to this chapter, the *institutionalism*. Frequently it is mainly attached to implications generated by the interaction between states. In academic terms this stream of thought occurs most often as the best shaped position in the dispute with the followers of neorealism in the current liberal representatives of classical liberalism as Adam Smith and David Ricardo; the state power has a strong domestic and international action while the new liberalism, having as chief representative on Hobson gives the State the power to moderate internal action, provided that this power shall be strengthened by the existence of a supranational government which would aim primarily at promoting universal free trade and the establishment of universal peace. In other words, Hobson prescribes the achievement of collective security by creating a league or confederation of states with the broadest possible participation. The liberal conception, international organizations are considered in some areas even more important than nation states being created to help and support the process of interstate cooperation, thereby improving the effects of international anarchy. Neoliberal research program involves not only the international institutions' existence but the influence itself on states. Axelrod and Keohane identify three important dimensions for research cooperation: reciprocity of interests, expectations of others' behavior and the number of participants (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 89-90).

The first of these dimensions, the convergence of interests, is relatively simple, the two authors content to assert that, in the light of past experience, it appears that the military intrinsic interests are more numerous than in other areas; theoretically this cannot be considered a rule (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 91). With regard to the nature of the behavior of others' expectations, the authors concluded that there is a clear distinction between my two types of interactions than the previous one that refers to earning structures (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 91).

The last dimension, the number of actors, is translated by the ability to identify and punish defectors and motivate other participants in the action. Thus, the sanction caused problems tend to be more severe than the military security and the political and economic costs due large costs for defectors punishment, where a successful disturbance may dramatically change the expectations (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993: 96).

It should be noted also that Axelrod and Keohane observe the distinct nature of institutions according to the nature of the problem which is addressed to, making them fit in with the current common realistic typology: hard and soft institutions.

We conclude that the institutions, conditioned by the limits of their own categories, influence the states' behavior, being in the same time a necessary ingredient for any global architecture that aims to the lasting peace establishment.

Rationalist theory of the state called *English School Rationalism* is a term created in the 70s to describe a group of authors mostly British or British-inspired, for which international society is the main object of analysis. Among the founders of this approach we find names like Hedley Bull, Martin Wight, John Vincent and Adam Watson, whose main publications have appeared in the period between mid-60s and late 80s (Linklater, 2008: 101). The term rationalism, attributed the English school has at least two specific meanings in International Relations. On the one hand, it may refer to a group of theories that emphasize the rationality of the actor, following by epistemological and methodological

means the positivism in - neorealist and neoliberal perspective representing such theories. The second meaning for rationalism is given by Martin Wight for the *grotian* (Guzzini, 2000: 95-96) intellectual tradition, linking Machiavelli's realism and Kant's revolutionism. In this regard the English School is rationalistic (Wight, 1979: 238).

English School's fundamental thesis is that sovereign states form a society, although an anarchic one, they will not have to undergo a major higher power (Linklater, 2008: 101). The English School sees the state having the power to act and international high primary sequence used to promote long-term which in turn leads to the development and reproduction of an international society of states. The fact that these countries are able to create a society of equal sovereign entities followers of this theory is one of the most fascinating dimensions of international relations. Starting from the idea that states act in an anarchic environment, the followers of English rationalism find that there is a surprising level of order and low levels of violence between states. That does not mean that the English School's doctrine ignores the violence phenomenon among states; on the contrary, it highlights violence as an endemic feature of anarchist society that is largely controlled by international law and international morality (Bull, 1998: 75). Under this approach, the international institutions are legal or constitutional and their role is to serve the interests of the Member States.

Martin Wright uses a major definition from sociology, stating that institutions are "*a model of sustainable behavior, complex, integrated, organized through social control exerted and by whose means are being satisfied basic needs or desires.*" (Wight, 1979: 238) The role of these institutions is to monitor agreements concluded by participants, thus increasing confidence and cooperation between them, thus crucial in defining international society. For M. Wight their existence is a necessary condition to identify the company among states, saying "*where there are institutions, there is a society*" (Wight, 1979: 238). In this sense we can say that states comply institution building and then the primary condition for the existence of a society is fulfilled. In short, members believe that the English School of international political system is more civilized and more orderly than suggested realists and neorealists. In this sense Bull made the following compromise: talking about a society that is a large area of agreement possible due to the specific characteristics of the international world, he accepted the position as regards the idealistic standards in international affairs (Guzzini, 2000: 97). It is recognized that English rationalist current followers are attracted to elements of realism and idealism, but they gravitate towards a middle ground between these extremes, never fully reconciled with the harsh lines of the two viewpoints. The Rationalist political system does not expect to reach the levels of international cooperation at a high degree of security, likewise the standard stable society. For them, international politics is more than realists argue, but much less than cosmopolitans would prefer (Linklater, 2008: 102-103). Therefore we can say that the members of the English School believe that there is some degree of progress in international policy regarding the role of the state and international organizations but less for the individual. The role of the latter, according to the English school theory, is very low and statocentric; does not recognize other members of society than States, the international society being a society of societies.

In conclusion, we can say that the institutions that are mentioned by the followers of this approach are those in which states exist rational actors who negotiate an agreement according to their own interests and is respected not only in order to see their goals achieved, but also because of the required social normative system. Otherwise, the existence of the society itself is endangered. The arrangements appear to be the most

suitable type of institution for this third-party orientation, while respecting the imperative of rationality and sovereignty of the actors and also the stability and the continuity of the social interest (Todorean and Apahideanu, 2006: 108-110).

Hedley Bull, another representative of the English School, states a complete dimension of the "international society" term. This "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and values, form a society in the sense that they are considered to be related among themselves through a common set of rules and constitutes the functioning of the joint (...) so that to respect each other's claims to independence, to honor the agreements they have established and to be subject of certain limitations, in the exercise of force against each other (...) cooperate in the functioning of institutions such as forms of international procedures, machinery and general organization international diplomacy (...)" (Bull, 1998). The author identifies the fundamental aims to build a society which states and aims a preservation system where the society of states is a fundamental one. Another relates to maintaining independence and the institutions that they establish are made to achieve these goals.

Martin Wight states that institutions should be "a sustainable behavioral model, complex, organized, through which social control is exercised and by whose means are fulfilled desires or basic social needs (Fairchild, 1991: 141). Their role is particularly important in defining international society. Their existence is a necessary condition for author identification society of states, clearly stating that where there are institutions, there is a society. Or else being said, if Members build support and respect the institutions and their operation, they will form a society.

From the perspective of the English School that cannot accept other members in a society than States recognizing that the last components of its divisions, the international society is a society of societies. In the first place matters the survival of the system, in the second, the survival of the states.

In the center of this school of thought is the problematic theory of international order in which Bull explains "a business model that supports elementary or primary goals of the society of states or other international society."

Neorealism and neoliberalism critical paradigm that is constructivism, which is a relatively new theory in international relations from an article published in the journal *International Organization* Alexander Wendt in spring 1992: *Anarchy is What States Make of It* (Wendt, 1992).

Constructivists criticize the emphasis that liberals and neoliberals create on the material factor. From the point of view of the international system constructivists analyze from a social perspective, since the material factor considered by liberals and neo-liberals has no relevance without taking into account social processes. Constructivism is part of the Rawls reflectivist theories group saying that once you get a reflective equilibrium, the principles of political justice can be presented as the result of a specific construction procedure.

This way rational agent selects public right principles regulating the basic structure of society (Rawls, 1999: 100). Constructivism also criticises the neorealist theory, dominant in international relations, arguing that anarchy and self-help institutions are not caused by the structure of international relations, but the political system and states, because institutions, seen in the form of summaries of identities and interests, are a dependent variable on the practice and interactions between international relations

subjects – member states - independent variable<sup>7</sup>. Thus anarchy and self-help are not immutable but depend on how actors perceive themselves and others, the latter depending on how they interact themselves. Anarchy and self-help may exist or not depending on these factors.

According to other authors, constructivism is an attempt to create a bridge between rationalist theories - realism, neorealism, liberalism, neoliberalism and the reflectivist theories -normative theory, critical theory, feminism and postmodernism.

As part of the non-rationalist theories, social-constructivist theories argue that the structures of an international organization are interdependent. As a result, most social relations are relatively stable, but the continuing need to produce structures determines the potential for change. Social-constructivist approach puts the main emphasis on the norms role in human behaviour, on the role of each individual ideas. In terms of institutions and international order, social constructivists use the term "international society" instead of "international system" because in their view, society relies on the existence of common rules and institutions, while a system can exist without these and is able to operate based only on a number of specific mechanic laws (Reus-Smit, 1999: 222). Social Constructivism is based on several concepts namely: the concept of identity, the rhetorical action and the logic of justice. Representatives of this approach consider that identity helps in better understanding of the national interests and policies. Yet, the idea of European identity is particularly controversial. Thus, the citizens of European Union member states can identify with their national state and at the same time develop an European identity, thanks to the sense of belonging that comes with the European construction or the European continent in general. In terms of rhetorical action, actors of the European stage reunited in order to focus on collective interests. The role of rhetoric was significantly noticed in the process of enlargement of the Union within Central and Eastern Europe countries. Eastward expansion of the EU has been one of the major challenges for traditional theories of European integration. The rhetoric of the Member States was mainly based on emphasizing the need that certain liberal norms and values should be respected by the candidate states as a criterion for adherence (political criterion of the Copenhagen criteria (Reus-Smit, 1999: 35).

First of all, it should be noted that the constructivist theory is not used as a theory itself but rather as an analytical framework that complements and further clarifies the existing theoretical approaches. This specification is necessary to avoid the assumption that the constructivist school aims to provide an exclusive and comprehensive analysis of the various social and political phenomena. Secondly, constructivism is an approach that has traditionally been part of the theories of international relations and, more recently, theories of European integration.

The basic hypothesis of the constructivist school says that states cannot exist independently, without the international environment and its systems of gregarious meanings and that the numerous international rules are not only governing the behaviour of the actors, but also constitutes their identity, defining what states and organizations are, as members of an international community (Alder, 2002: 95-98). Since international space is governed by the rules and laws, these should have a constituent impact on the behavior of actors, on the assessment of their possibilities of action, their justifications, and the way they think about themselves as international entities. Interaction, along with sets of collective meanings, assigned different roles to the international actors and these roles

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<sup>7</sup> [www.wikipedia.org/constructivism](http://www.wikipedia.org/constructivism)

tend to emphasize and shape the identities they adopt further (Wendt, 1992: 397-411). Rights and other international standards are the result of an interaction, but tend to be limited to existing perceptions and common meanings of the international phenomena they already contained. Thus, one can say that the rules work in a spiral, this process representing both a reflection of existing common understandings and also a step towards reshaping relations between actors and their identity.

Asserting constructivism proclaimed a return to a form of sociological theorization, more historical and practice-oriented in International Relations. If rationalists have reduced the social to strategic interaction, by doing this they denied the historical factor and claimed uprooted, universal forms of rationality, and reduced the political art of practice to the calculation of utility maximization policy, the social constructivists have reimagined the social as an association field, reintroduced history as part of the empirical research and stressed the variability of political practice (Burchill, 2008: 230).

In many ways, constructivism approach features the English School. Constructivists have adopted the idea that states form more than a system that forms a society and pushed this idea to new levels of sophistication theoretical and conceptual. Their interest in international history is an important point of convergence with English School, as they put emphasis on cultural differences between different member companies. Finally, their focus initially on interpretative methods of analysis Hedley Bull recalls his preference for a more classic, characterized above all by an explicit justification on the exercise of judgment, rather than neopositivists standards of verification and proof (Bull, 1977: 28-35).

Aria growing problems in various EU countries, within the government, such as specific public sector growth and hence the need for new skills, required a specialized understanding of the new political phenomena, social and institutional dynamics. Thus, with the accession to the European Union countries such as Sweden, Ireland, Spain and Greece has increased the concerns of researchers, especially those in universities to study public policy.

70s and 80s were the ones who helped create a well-defined identity for this new science policy, for which three are the defining features:

- Multidisciplinary: apply methods and knowledge from different fields, such as the study of political institutions, economics, organization theory, law, administration, statistics, etc .;

- Oriented problem solving: it is purely academic (and often sterile), but is oriented to real world problems, seeking solutions for them;

- Explicitly normative: the science assumes explicitly that can not be absolutely objective analysis as long as it calls for government action values along with techniques, with the purpose of means. After Lasswell, science policy direction is to "improve the knowledge necessary to improve the practice of democracy (Rabin, Hildreth. and Miller, 2007: 509)"

- Policy analysis is another approach to the process of making policies. There are two major types where it can be done:

- As policy analysis: a research activity aimed mainly study and theoretical understanding of the process of making policy;

- As for policy analysis: a practical activity aimed at solving a concrete problem.

The actual place of an analyst is somewhere on a continuum between the two extremes. Public Policy Analysis aims to support the formulation and implementation, for example by researching the situation by examining and comparing alternatives or by

proposing new alternatives. In this sense, political analysts must possess two main types of skills: scientific facilities. The scientific aims: structuring capabilities, information collection and analysis. Facilitating skills are important for supporting the management of a public policy regarding application development and its evaluation (Miroiu, 2001: 19). With these skills concerned with the study of public policy researchers must find the answer to a question timeless, whose parts are in constant change: the role of the state in public policy?

This question has pursued the European construction over the last 60 years, governing the development of the Lisbon Treaty itself. The issue at stake in this latter case is obvious: what role should the EU play in the citizens' lives for the 28 constituent states? Moreover, there should be mentioned public policies developed and applied at supra-national and even regional level as a tool in influencing the lives of ordinary citizens and, if so, to what degree?

The process of alignment with the provisions of policies such as those concerning the internal market, customs union, cohesion policy, Common Security and Defense Policy or other policies developed and implemented at European level; in other words, Romania's accession to the European Union meant joining a European public policy of a supranational character. Specifically, represents a system of European governance, characterized by a specific decision-making through a distinct interaction between different actors, and also an interconnection between democracy and capitalism; a system of European public policies that influences each of our lives in a more or less "tangible" sense.

The acceptance of this latter assumption can lead to excessive bureaucratization at the EU level, but changes to the Lisbon Treaty are intended to prevent such an evolution. It is increasingly obvious that decisions taken at EU level influence our everyday life and that the challenges facing our continent today are complex and varied. The enlargement of the European Union involves growth and development strategies to Members in order to adapt to the requirements and appropriate policies to legitimize and institutionalize the Community strategy. The reception and the valuation of the policies enforce generally applicable principles at Community level; the degree of compliance is thus directly proportional to the benefits of regional, national or local actors involved in the process. The Lisbon Treaty is the European continent's answer to these challenges and to a world characterized by increasing competition and profound changes at demographic level.

Analyzed to its whole formation, the process of these European policies is a multilevel process that involves not only the interaction between Community institutions and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, but also involves certain stages of this process directly related to development and deepening the community, private interest groups or individual transnational networks. Thus, since 1957, lobbying techniques of these private organizations have experienced a radical change, moving from a fusion based lobbying to one transverse structured around a value chain, where the lobbying EU institutions have become partners of European institutions.

The Lisbon Treaty (2007, art. 11) clearly establishes the place and role of these organizations in formulating European policies: institutions provide to citizens and representative associations, by appropriate means, the opportunity to make their views known publicly, in all areas of action; European institutions maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society, to ensure consistency and transparency of the Union.

Regarding the first level of the process of European policy formulation, namely that referring to the relationship between EU institutions and Member States, the powers

of the European institutions are those established by the founding Treaties; the purpose and objectives of the Union Communities, namely any extension of powers, requires a revision of the Treaties. Consequently, in some areas these competencies have a more extensive influence while in others a lesser one; they belong only in some Communities (customs union, monetary policy for Member States whose currency is the euro, the common commercial policy, etc.), in others - only Member States. Although harmonization of the laws of the Member States limit, to some extent, national action area (health, culture, tourism, education, youth, etc.), in others are to be shared (internal market, social policy - aspects, economic, social and territorial consumer protection, transport, energy, etc.). However, the powers of the Community must respect both the principle of proportionality and that of subsidiarity.

For example, in the context of the June 2009 elections for the European Parliament and the assignment of the European Commission, the Swedish EU Presidency's priorities were influenced by economic and financial crisis. Thus, the implementation of "Revival Plan of the European economy" (approved in November 2008<sup>8</sup>) required the use of the Member States' right to make amendments to legislative action targeting investment purposes in areas of immediate growth or urgent potential (energy efficiency, environmental services, infrastructure, financing for SMEs), exploitation of innovative funding opportunities, accelerate the implementation of programs for 2007-2013 or maintaining public investment. Another objective of the Presidency of the Council of Europe was to provide a social dimension of European policies based on public sound finances and creating more jobs. The effects of this program are intended to be beneficial both in economic growth and competitiveness and social sphere<sup>9</sup>. Therefore, in future, all EU policies will have to consider a better employment of labor, ensuring adequate social protection and to combat social exclusion.

In this sense we will try below to systematize the main European public policy changes by the Treaty of Lisbon:

➤ Climate change is one of the most serious threats we facing today: they influence both the environment and the social and economic life. Conducting international actions to combat climate change, together with a sustainable development represent the cornerstone of EU environmental policy. Although sustainable development and environmental protection are contained in the current treaties, the Lisbon Treaty sets out clear definitions and strengthens the EU action in these areas;

➤ Energy supply is essential in a modern society: in the last two years, many Europeans were affected by price increases in this sector. The Lisbon Treaty helps Europe to ensure the energy supply and to promote sustainable and competitive use of resources. The Treaty comprises a special chapter on energy which defines the key competencies and the overall objectives of the energy policy: the functioning of energy markets, security of supply, energy efficiency and the reducing of energy consumption, the development of new and renewable forms of energy and the interconnection of energy networks. For the first time, has been introduced a principle of solidarity whereby a Member State facing difficulties in energy supply will be able to count on the support of the other Member States;

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<sup>8</sup> *A European plan to relaunch the economy: Investing in people, the environment and innovation*, <http://www.etuc.org/a/5592>

<sup>9</sup> *Prioritățile președinției suedeze a UE*, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress\\_page/004-58192-195-07-29-901-20090714IPR58191-14-07-2009-2009-true/default\\_ro.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/004-58192-195-07-29-901-20090714IPR58191-14-07-2009-2009-true/default_ro.htm)

➤ The Lisbon Treaty aims to facilitate the prevention of natural and anthropic disasters, and the protection against them on the EU territory. A new legal framework will enable support actions undertaken by Member States in this field to promote operational cooperation. Since the first signs of climate change started to show, floods and fires, the cooperation between Member States is now more necessary than ever;

➤ The welfare of European citizens is a central aspect of the Lisbon Treaty therefore health policies will be further enhanced. The Treaty provides a series of measures aimed at directly protecting public health, including addressing the issue of smoking and alcohol abuse. To strengthen the protection of patients, the EU will be able to set standards for products and medical devices. Finally, the Treaty will help Member States to monitor signs indicating the existence of serious cross-border threats. If such threats materialize, the Treaty will enable EU countries to mobilize all resources in a coherent and effective manner;

➤ Lisbon Treaty recognizes the role that public services play in developing social and regional cohesion - transport, education, health care are fundamental to all of us. Lisbon Treaty included in Annex a special protocol setting out the main ways that can improve the efficiency of services of general interest;

➤ The Lisbon Treaty strengthens also economic, social and territorial cohesion within the European Union; for the first time was included in the objectives of the EU the territorial cohesion. The Lisbon Treaty assigns an important role to the regions and the principle of subsidiarity, which sustains that the EU acts only when the results can be more easily achieved at Community level than at the national level and to be applied from now on including the local and regional level;

➤ Lisbon Treaty places at the center of research the policy creation of a European Research Area<sup>10</sup> to allow the free movement of researchers, scientific knowledge and technology. In a time when there are new global players interested in developing space projects, the Treaty creates a new legal basis for a coherent space policy: a clear indication that Europe cannot afford to overlook the economic and strategic benefits of a space policy;

➤ In order to achieve everyone's prosperity, commercial transactions must be conducted fairly and freely. Treaty of Lisbon will extend the scope of commercial policy to include direct foreign investment. The tools of intellectual property such as trademarks, industrial designs, patents, copyrights, is one of the engines that leads to innovation, growth and competitiveness. The Treaty of Lisbon will facilitate the uniformity of protection at European level;

➤ The Euro area, consisting of the countries that have adopted the euro, will work better. The Commission will be able to send warnings "direct" to Member States' whose not very rigorous financial discipline risks are jeopardizing the proper functioning of the euro area;

➤ The Lisbon Treaty clearly states that everyone has the right to protection of personal data. This is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

➤ The Lisbon Treaty creates a new legal basis entirely devoted to tourism, designed to strengthen the EU's status as a main tourist destination of the world;

To conclude, the degree of deepening European construction integration as well as the challenges that an economic crisis brings to European societies are clearly elements

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<sup>10</sup> CARTE VERDE, *Spațiul European de Cercetare: perspective noi*, [http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/pdf/era\\_gp\\_final\\_ro.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/pdf/era_gp_final_ro.pdf)

that determine a redefinition and the need of a continuous adaptation of the way the European Institutions interact with various state and sub-state actors in the formulation of European public policy response to the new EU targets.

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# REGIONS ROLE IN INCREASING EUROPEAN'S UNION COMPETITIVENESS

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**Abstract.** *Nowdays, competitiveness has, more than ever, an economic meaning, based on its major influence on public and private institutions behavior, new jobs, long-term policies and investments. In a global economy, market attractiveness makes the difference between evolution and economic stagnation and aware of this stakes, the European Union tries constantly to improve its general competitiveness. The main goal of this paper is to determinate the general competitiveness index of the entire European Union, how can it be improved by increasing the economic and political role of EU regions and if european policies encourage this bottom-up development of the competitiveness.*

**Keywords:** *regional competitiveness, important factors of an economy competitiveness, competitiveness index*

## 1. Introduction

European's Union enlargement to 28 states, after the successive waves of accession that took place in 2004 and 2007 and the recent uptake of Croatia among member countries, concluded, at least temporarily, the extension progress (or horizontal integration) of the „European family”.

In the attempt of maintaining and enhancing the role of a global player in the context of the economic crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, the European Union is facing new challenges, summarized in the objectives of „Europe 2020” Strategy. The conversion of the European Union in a global competitiveness pole (objective which continues the Lisbon Strategy) requires a number of measures and firm action, both from Brussels and member states, directly interested in creating a stable and sustainable economic environment that encourages direct investments, economic growth and new jobs.

Increasing competitiveness of European regions, as a basis growth of competitiveness index for the entire union, must become a clear priority assumed, on one hand, by public institutions that create public policy, and, on the other hand, by private sector firms, all these in the context in which emerging countries (such as China or India) or developed economies (such as the United States) implement a set of policies that support fair competition and emphasize competitiveness.

## 2. Defining competitiveness. factors determining the competitiveness of an economy.

Increasing global interconnection of economies and globalization have fundamentally altered the perception of traditional markets barriers and national states perceptions upon economic policies. According to Professor Michael Porter, a member of

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Harvard Business School, "at present, we are dealing with a historic opportunity for business and government to work together to restore and develop the competitiveness".<sup>1</sup>

The concept of competitiveness has evolved from the eighteenth century until today, from the assertion of the theory of specialized production and labor division by Adam Smith (Smith, 2001: passim), to the neoclassical economists interested in investing in human capital and infrastructure, and more recently, to theories generated by developing and sustaining other mechanisms such as education, technological progress, macroeconomic stability, good governance, diversification of business activity of private companies and market efficiency.

In light of recent years research, we can hold two definitions of competitiveness, one provided by international academia and other provided by the local one, but both synthesizing, *grosso modo*, roughly, the same features. According to Klaus Schwab, coordinator of the Global Competitiveness Report 2012 - 2013 (*The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013*), published in Geneva, competitiveness can be defined as the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. (Schwab, 2012: 5) However, competitiveness is the ability to produce goods and services that meet the requirements of domestic and international markets, while maintaining a high level of overall sustainable development or, more generally, the ability of companies, industries, regions, nations and supranational geographical areas to generate, exposed in international competition, income levels and relatively high employment. (Jula, Jula, Ailenei, Gârboveanu, 2005: 675)

Regional competitiveness is associated with the level of performance wherewith regions compete at both endogenous (national level) and exogenous level (European or international level), for developing climates which will increase their attractiveness to investors, companies or organizations. The competitiveness of a region is closely related to the competitiveness of firms and organizations operating in the territory, economic entities are those that define the usefulness of public policies undertaken in order to create an environment that promotes fair competition.

In this regard, regional competitiveness:

- a) involves a static component (maintaining a high level of income) and a dynamic one (the attractiveness of the business environment for investors);
- b) requires sustained growth of the real income: a competitive economy is an economy that supports growth;
- c) involves the creation of quality jobs which are able to bring a significant contribution in raising living standards (generating more income than expenses);
- d) requires the creation of extended markets beyond regional and national borders for private companies, in the context of a healthy competitive environment;

Creating a competitive economic environment can also be a mean of reducing the development gap between regions, the more so as mitigating regional disparities is an important section of the policies proposed by Brussels. Regional development strategies must take into account the principles, objectives and the possibilities to support the development of these strategies, the burden which comes on national governments. To promote investment and entrepreneurship and boost competitiveness, everywhere governments need to reform the business climate (Ciot, 2010: passim), in accordance with European directives on competition and competitiveness.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.hbs.edu/competitiveness/>, accessed on the 14<sup>th</sup> of July 2013, 6:30 PM.

Regional competitiveness is the result of the cooperation between local stakeholders, regional and national ones, the policies undertaken by this three levels of decision should be complementary, not overlapping or even canceling each other.

Regarding the supranational factors, one of the ways in which the European Commission supports and promotes the development of competitiveness is through the implementation of policy in competition field, which is one of the most important factor for the proper functioning of markets through efficient allocation of resources, increasing productivity and innovation. Therefore, as a first major aspect, competition policy supports the competitiveness of EU, which becomes more and more important for the economic and financial stability. (European Commission, 2011: 5)

According to Klaus Schwab, the competitiveness of an economy / region can be established by analysing the 12 competitiveness factors (pillars) (Schwab, 2012: 6 – 20; See Brie, Chirodea and Țoca, 2013; Brie, Polgar and Chirodea, 2012), strongly interconnected and which, for being improved, require coordinated and decisive action from political actors.

**Institutions** (both public and private) – represent the institutional framework, determined by the administrative and legal framework in which individuals, companies and governments interact, strongly influencing competitiveness and economic growth. Through their performance, through the policies they create and implement, public institutions affect investment decisions of private companies and organization of production. Moreover, governmental attitudes about markets, commercial freedoms and effectiveness of the measures taken by them are extremely important: excessive bureaucracy, over regulation, corruption and lack of transparency slow economic growth.

The economic crisis has shown the importance of a healthy private environment based on the principles of fair competition and ethic. Private institutions are also extremely important in the economy, an economy is healthy when all the companies operating within it do it correctly.

**Infrastructure** - extensive and efficient is vital to ensure effective functioning of the economy and is also an important factor in determining the location of economic activities and the types of activities or sectors that can develop in a certain geographical area.

Well-developed infrastructure reduces the distance between regions, integrates and connects regional and national markets with low cost, with markets in other regions and countries.

Infrastructure domain includes both transport infrastructure (road, rail, sea and air), energy infrastructure being crucial for the efficient work of production units.

**Macroeconomic environment** – the stability of the macroeconomic environment is important for the business sector and for the general degree of competitiveness of a region. Macroeconomic stability does not necessarily improve the competitiveness of a region but macroeconomic instability influences it negative.

**Health and primary education** – a healthy workforce is vital for the competitiveness of a country and an economy. However, basic education of the population, qualitative and quantitative, increases the efficiency of each worker. Workers with a low formal education can only execute basic actions and do not bring any contribution to innovation and advanced technical processes, aspects that enhance the competitiveness of an economy. Education can prevent goods manufacturers to implement advanced processes and create greater value goods. The low level of education may lead to relocation of companies or production processes in other regions where labor is more skilled.

**Higher education and training** - critical to the economies which rely on simple processes and want to exceed this production phase. Globalization lead countries to create poles of well-educated workforce so that it can adapt easily to changes in the labor market and can execute complex production processes.

**Goods market efficiency** - countries benefiting from an efficient goods market are well positioned to create appropriate products and services, in appropriate proportions, depending on supply and demand. Fair and healthy competition, both domestic and external, is important in the context of market efficiency and productivity, ensuring that the most efficient firms, which produce the required goods in the market are those to evolve.

In this case, competitiveness is affected by taxes. Restrictive and discriminatory policies towards foreign investors are always counterproductive protectionist measures.

**Labor market efficiency** – workforce must be allocated more efficiently in the economy to provide high productivity, in terms of efficiency and flexibility of the labor market. The labor market should have the flexibility to move workers from one economic activity to another as quickly as possible, with minimal costs and to allow labor migration without major social problems.

**Financial market development** - an efficient financial sector allocates the resources of a nation as well as possible, both foreign-owned companies and those with domestic capital, with the purpose of obtaining the best results. Investments made by the business sector are critical for productivity, low productivity affecting the competitiveness of the economy.

**Technological readiness** - in today's economy, technology is essential for companies to thrive and grow. This pillar measures the agility with which the competitiveness of an economy adopts existing technologies to increase industrial productivity and its ability to adopt modern communications technologies in daily activities and production, in order to increase efficiency and encourage innovation for competitiveness.

**Market size** – it affects productivity because large markets allow firms to exploit scale economies. Traditionally, the available markets for the business sector were constrained by national borders. Open markets are positively associated with economic growth, especially for countries with small domestic markets. The dimension of the European Union's market illustrates its importance in increasing competitiveness in the context in which the countries that joined the European community constantly improved their economic competitiveness.

**Business sophistication** - leads to a higher efficiency in the production of goods and services. Business specialization includes two elements which are interconnected: the quality of the business environment of a country and the quality of operations and individual strategies of each company. These factors are important for countries with high levels of development, when, to expand, the primary sources of base productivity were consumed.

**Innovation** - the most important pillar of competitiveness is based on technological innovation. Although less developed countries can improve their competitiveness and productivity by grabbing new technologies from other countries, countries with advanced economies are forced to improve their services.

Evolution requires an environment ready to support competitiveness and innovation, both in the public and private sectors. Improving innovation involves, in short, investment in research and development carried out, particularly, by the private sector.

The translation of these principles, the analysis of their presence and their degree of development at regional level is one way of quantifying the degree of competitiveness, because as well as globally, in regional context, regional or local institutions can make an imprint on competitiveness and development, existing infrastructure determines the types

of activities that can take place in a certain type of economy and the quality of basic education and higher education are vital to the regions which create products in free market conditions.

However, there are no regions where a competitiveness assessment is entirely favorable, competitiveness indices entirely stable and not subject to possible adverse developments.

The competitiveness of a region is relative and the factors which determinate it may change at any time, or may occur in other regions. Thus, we can say that the competitiveness of an economy is relative, subject to fluctuations. In the medium and long term investments made by the private, public policies and quality of education are segments that can cause "leakage" of competitiveness of a region to another region. However, labor migration to more attractive markets strongly influences production processes that can take place in a region and is the fastest way to improve the competitiveness of an economy. An educated and prepared workforce influences investor's decisions in creating new jobs and innovative technological processes.

Inter-regional competition compels regions to evaluate available resources and opportunities. Increasing competition between regions leads them to get specialized in different economic areas; increased regional competitiveness is characterized by the ability to absorb innovation with inherent implications in region's economy / social environment and the ability to generate innovation in terms of efficiency.

For those economies where reducing disparities is as important as economic modernization, research-oriented policy and innovation may seem, on short and medium term, less urgent and pressing than the assimilation of technology and foreign investments, as more accessible factors for increasing competitiveness and ensuring high rates of development. Obviously, such an approach would be a totally wrong policy, developing a highly competitive on long term requires a series of measures aimed at the same time on research, innovation and investment incentives.

### **3. The economic competitiveness of EU countries**


Competitiveness is a relative aspect, influenced by the development in time and space of the twelve pillars mentioned before, pillars which, to get improved, require a complex analysis of the macro and micro-economic environment and actions taken by stakeholders in the context of supporting evolution, development and revenue growth. Thus, comparison of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is one of the main indicators used to assess a country's economy, the level of GDP representing the total value of goods and services produced in a given period of time. Moreover, the GDP is influenced by the degree of public institutions development, the private sector, the investment rate, the employment of labor, the quality of goods and services, market size, etc.

Among EU member states, the national levels of GDP are quite high. Luxembourg records the highest gross domestic product / capita, but an important aspect of this ranking is given by the fact that a large number of foreign residents are employed in the economy and thus contribute to its GDP, but are not included in the stable population.

Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden exceed by 30% the average GDP of the 28 Member States; countries such as Denmark, Germany, Belgium and Finland have GDP values higher by 15-25% than the European average. The lowest rates of GDP in the

EU are made by Romania and Bulgaria, countries that record lower values than Turkey<sup>2</sup>, an EU candidate country.

Even that the GDP is not the only landing to be taken into account to determine the competitiveness of an economy, GDP values are highly correlated with the index of competitiveness, Table 1 highlighting the reduced viability of worldwide economies that record low GDPs.



**Fig.1** - The global competitiveness of EU economies

**Source:** World Economic Forum. The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013

At present, the most solid analysis about global competitiveness of economies is given by the World Economic Forum in Geneva, through the Global Competitiveness Report for 2012-2013. The report sets valid indicator for the economy of each country by applying complex algorithms based on offering different percentage values of the various components of the twelve pillars of competitiveness.

As an example, Pillar 1 - Institutions, give 25% of the total competitiveness index value. In turn, the institutional sector is divided into two main branches, public institutions (75%) and private ones (25%). In this sense, the coefficient provided by public institutions segment consists of property rights (20%), ethics and corruption (20%), undue influence (20%), government efficiency (20%) and security (20%). Regarding the coefficient for private institutions, the private sector consists of ethics (50%) and responsibility (50%).

The report ranks the economies of 144 countries according to competitiveness index value. Using the data provided by the Geneva Forum and restricting the final results in the European Union, we can rank the countries according to competitiveness of economies, both at global and European level. Finland, Sweden, Holland, Germany and the UK are among the most competitive economies in the world, while the lowest rankings are signed by Romania (78), Croatia (81) and Greece (96).

<sup>2</sup>[http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics\\_explained/index.php/GDP\\_per\\_capita\\_consumption\\_per\\_capita\\_and\\_price\\_level\\_indices#Relative\\_volumes\\_of\\_GDP\\_per\\_capita](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/GDP_per_capita_consumption_per_capita_and_price_level_indices#Relative_volumes_of_GDP_per_capita), accessed on the 27<sup>th</sup> of June 2013, 10:10 PM.

The competitiveness index of the economies of all 28 EU countries have not fluctuated with large values, aside from Slovakia, Romania, Croatia and Greece.

Thus, we can say that the twelve pillars affect different economies competitiveness: the best way for Greece or Croatia to improve their competitiveness is not the same as the way to be applied in France and Germany, as countries are at different stages of development. Countries with weak competitiveness indexes compete on primary labor and natural resources. Advanced economies compete on more efficient production processes and improving the quality of products, while countries with the best indicators (Finland, Sweden, Netherlands etc.) compete on innovation principles.

Seen as a whole, made up of the economies of all 28 countries that form the European Union, EU recorded a competitiveness index of 4.71, which indicates a lower value than in case of other global actors such as the United States (5.47) and China (4.83 ), but higher than India (4.32) and Russia (4.20).

#### **4. Growing the role of the regions – the key of improving EU competitiveness**

The construction of the European Union has made national interests to be exceeded in many areas by the supra-national ones, and the context of the principle of action and reaction, subnational interests, defined as regional, get themselves increasingly important. (Maniu, 2009: 24)

Increasing the role of the regions, both economically and politically, can be a first step towards increasing the competitiveness across the European Union. Solving problems at central level is often slow, occurs later or takes a long time of analysis; central governments answering hardly to the modernization needs.

Removing all economic barriers by creating the single European market will enforce competition between regions, which will create the context for increasing competitiveness, for using the specific skills that differentiate the regions and give them a competitive advantage not only at national or European level, but also on global level.

By eliminating a series of intermediate decision factors, transparency and better human interconnectivity, regions can respond in a short time and at low costs to the challenges of a permanent changing global economy. The importance of the regions and their significant role in long-term development of the EU are outlined by Brussels policies aimed "to fulfill EU's major achievements, including the single market and the euro, reducing the economic, social and territorial major disparities between Europe's regions."<sup>3</sup> The EU allocated in 2007-2013 about 347 billion euros to regions, funds that were intended to improve transport infrastructure (road, sea, air and energy), to stimulate SMEs, to implement environmental projects and to encourage investments.

In the 2014 – 2020 financial framework, decisive for meeting "Europe 2020" Strategy, EU countries must rethink the use of structural funds and to direct them towards improving the competitiveness of regions and increasing their potential and their long-term development. EU countries should use the structural funds to promote competitiveness, convergence and cooperation by establishing clear priorities and consistent investment for each and economy region. In order to transform the European Union into a world-class competitiveness pole, regional spending should be directed towards research and innovation, SME support, education and training quality. Funds must leverage private investment as a determinant of economic competitiveness.

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<sup>3</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/what/index\\_ro.cfm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/index_ro.cfm), accessed on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2013, 11:30 AM

European Union's interest in regional development and in increasing the role of the regions is found in the strategies that promote regional policy, whose stated goals involves creating geographical and economic space to allow inter-regional cooperation and competitiveness. EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and EU Strategy for the Danube region have succeeded, in some measure, to create new ways of cooperation in the Union. Member States and all stakeholders in the region manage to work properly without relying on additional funding from the Community budget, special laws or new institutions, in order to solve regional problems.

The objectives proposed by both strategies meet the needs of the regions which they address to, encompassing goals of competitiveness through research, education and technology, qualifications and labor market inclusion and institutional capacity development.

These common strategies answer to the needs of creating a unique administrative framework which can cover all regions and provide an active role for member countries. Thus was created a competitive environment with an area smaller than the entire European Union that led to the development of the regions competitiveness and to the development of their economies; regional economies managed to improve their own situation in cooperation with other regions, through natural flight of power labor and production technology. In light of growing the regions role, through strategies such as those mentioned above, the development process must not only move toward economic competitiveness, but also toward society competitiveness, which means research and development programs, innovation, education and reducing disparities between regions and Member States of the European Union.

Along with the development of "Europe 2020" Strategy, the European Union has created a new growth strategy in order to encourage national and regional policies aimed at increasing innovation and creating new jobs. The strategy, which as we pointed before, aims to transform the Union into a world-class competitiveness pole, includes seven dimensions designed to improve Member States economies and their competitiveness, as a set of general recommendations provided for the national governments.

In the next financial framework, efforts to reform and streamline the implementation of public policies, investments and long and medium term strategies will need to focus on creating a union in innovation for improving framework conditions and to access funding research so that new ideas would easy be transformed in products and services, economic growth and jobs, in education improvements and easy access for youth to the labor market. The competitiveness index of an economy is closely linked to the quality of the processes that occur in a specific geographical area and the use rate of natural resources. Detaching economic growth from resource use, encouraging the transition to a low carbon economy, an increased use of renewable energy and energy efficiency are areas that need to be improved, both at regional and national levels.

In more than half of European regions and especially in the regions of Central and Southeastern Europe, competitiveness indexes record low values regarding SMEs activity which, by their nature, cannot carry out specialized production and far-reaching economic processes. The role of SMEs must be boosted through regional policies which must support the creation of clusters and also the creation of economic partnerships and technologies exchange between small, medium and large companies.

Clusters have become the main goal of many EU policy initiatives, mobilizing clusters economic and innovative potential in order to reduce regional imbalances and increase competitiveness represents one of Brussels main action. Through the conditions

and facilities which clusters offer, a region's private sector becomes more productive and competitive, than if every business would work in isolation.

Specialization in products, technology, ease of procuring resources (material, financial, labor, know-how), diffusion of technologies between cluster members and the cluster support activities policy are only some of the benefits reported by the firms which operate in clusters. (Antonescu, 2011: 118). In "2020 Europe" perspective, industrial policy should be aimed at improving the business environment, especially for SMEs and at supporting the development of a strong and sustainable industrial base that can compete both at inter-regional, national and global level.

The importance of increasing the role of regions in European Union's economic development and growth was synthesized in 2008 by Danuta Hübner, the European Commissioner responsible for regional policy, which stated that: *"discovering the economic geography of the Europe marked a radical change for both EU policies as well as national and regional policies. Identifying those regions which are most in need, defining priorities, involving of local institutions and imposing common standards for the management, control and evaluation have led not only to tangible results, but also created a unique multi-level governance."*<sup>4</sup>

European Union's high interest in regional development has materialized over last financial frameworks by increasing the amounts allocated for regional and cohesion policy. For 2007-2013 period, amounts reached 347 billion euros (35.7% of the total EU budget) or just over 49 billion euros per year. According to the budget draft for 2014 – 2020 period, the Commission intends to increase the amounts allocated to regional and cohesion policy instruments to 376 billion.<sup>5</sup>

According to Professor Vasile Puscas, if the European Union wants to become a museum of the great achievements of the twentieth century, it should not rush the pace of structural reforms. To keep close with other global actors, the EU must speed up reforms which, regarding the increasing amounts allocated for regional policy and the statements of the policy makers from Brussels, are aiming at European Union's growth and development through regions.

## 5. Conclusions

Boosting region's competitiveness in terms of fair competition and good governance is one way that must be followed for diminishing the effects of the crisis, for growth and sustainable development of regional and national economies.

Transforming the EU into a global competitiveness pole can not be imagined without the gradual improvement in competitiveness for every member state, aspect which can only be achieved by combining policies to support sustainable and long-term growth at local, regional, national and european level.

In the context of the economic disparities between EU regions, disparities which arise from the GDP analysis, the less competitive countries should focus their efforts towards the development of the twelve pillars of competitiveness. Cohesion funds may be the easiest way to create more competitive economies, obviously, assuming that national governments can ensure long-term strategies in this regard.

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<sup>4</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag26/mag26\\_ro.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag26/mag26_ro.pdf), accessed on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2013, 9:30 PM

<sup>5</sup> [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/budget/bu0001\\_ro.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/budget/bu0001_ro.htm), accessed on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of August 2013, 11:00 PM

Thus, regional competitiveness must be a goal not only for national governments but also for all decentralized government structures and regional public entities.

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## OBSTACLES OF THE CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION CURRENTLY EXISTING BETWEEN ROMANIA AND BULGARIA

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**Abstract.** *Cross-border cooperation is not working very well between Romania and Bulgaria. This is not only the general opinion given by international observers, but it is also recognized by national and local politicians, businessmen, teachers and people from different cities of the border. Anyone with experience journey through the lands of the Romanian-Bulgarian border, knows how difficult it is to cross the border, not to mention doing business across the border. So why this? Why is there almost no cooperation, or at least appears to be no cross-border interaction? I will try further to explain the obstacles of cross currently existing between Romania and Bulgaria, and how these might be overcome.*

**Keywords:** *Cross-Border Cooperation, obstacle, objectives, funds, territorial cooperation, borders, development.*

Cross-Border Cooperation Programme Romania-Bulgaria, 2007-2013 (Fondul European de Dezvoltare Regională, 2007) is the first program that addressed to the border area between Romania and Bulgaria as EU internal border after their accession to the European Union on 1 January 2007. It is the first program developed based on the principles and requirements of the Structural Funds as border area became eligible to receive financial assistance from the European Regional Development Fund under the European Territorial Cooperation Objective. It is also the first program that treats border region as a whole, without distinction belonging to one of the two neighbors (Evaluare ex-ante, 2007).

The program aims to encourage and strengthen cooperation in the border area of the two neighboring countries, Romania and Bulgaria, through joint activities leading to the interconnection of territories and of course to promote social and economic development consistent, correlated and that sustainable border region.

The program supports the development of eligible border areas, both in Romania and in Bulgaria. Seeks to create a "bridge " between the two countries in order to assist border regions, in order to solve similar problems of developing collaborative and promoting common solutions. In this way, the border, instead of separate regions on both sides of the Danube, it will unite them (Acces la fonduri).

The program promotes sustainable integrated cooperation in the border area, focusing on the strategic dimension of European cross-border spatial development involving and that benefits local communities. This will be achieved by joining communities in the program area and their involvement in economic activities, social and environmental.

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Overall objective of the CBC program is to bring people, businesses and communities in the border area Romanian - Bulgarian to develop joint cooperation area through sharing the benefits of human, natural and environmental and resources (Programul de Cooperare Transfrontalieră România-Bulgaria).

While Romania and Bulgaria have good relations between them (Report, 2009), achieved by their engagement in this CBC program, collaboration between the two neighboring countries is quite weak. It said that Romania look to Bulgaria as a country where its citizens should be allowed to go on holiday in Greece. Of course, this is a stereotype, but there is truth in it. Cross-border cooperation in the same area can fluctuate greatly over time. For example, the cities of Ruse and Giurgiu. Both cities have once belonged to the medieval Bulgarian state. In fact, it could be very possible that were once city, only separated by the Danube River. However, power has shifted and Giurgiu became part of Romania. Interactions were gradually reduced between the two cities, although in the communist regime a lot of people have crossed the Danube to go to do some shopping in town opposite border. After the fall of the Berlin Wall fell interactions amount to almost nothing, just a little more rise again in recent years. And there are many examples like this throughout the world proving that borders are always in motion, such as cooperation across borders. As noted, cross-border cooperation is at a low level now between Bulgaria-Romania. There are several obstacles, from the cultural and economic barriers to infrastructure or administrative/legal barriers. From the various means and observations made during my research can be identified several major obstacles (Challenges):

1. *Lack of awareness and regional identity;*
2. *Similar economic structure on both sides of the border;*
3. *EU funding does not get where it is most needed;*
4. *Lack of adequate infrastructure to overcome geographic barriers;*
5. *Lack of access to Schengen;*
6. *Lack of experience on both sides of the program in attracting and managing the Structural Funds;*
7. *Insufficient knowledge about the specifics of the program management team during the implementation of projects contracted;*
8. *Delays in the contracting of selected projects;*
9. *Law partner states and mutual lack of it, at a sufficient level.*

Of course, there are many factors involved, but the obstacles mentioned above seem to be the most important. Before presenting some ideas on how these barriers can be overcome, every obstacle will be analyzed separately.

### **1. *Lack of awareness and regional identity***

Regional identity is very important for CBC to succeed, when there is a common identity, the governments can create a common policies with a common vision. It is much easier to work together if identities are divided. Meanwhile, the cultural barrier is more difficult to understand, because it is not as concrete as, for example, lack of roads or bridges. It is a problem that exists in people's minds and, therefore, it is most difficult to assess and, if necessary, to change it. (Annual Implementation Report, 2009). In the context of cross-border regional cooperation, culture takes on other meanings than that is usually associated with, by those who are working in the field of culture, primarily by artists and those in administration and policy makers. Artistic excellence, supporting artists and artistic manifestations seen as a good aesthetic, spiritual high or critical eyes

give a more comprehensive place on the role of culture and arts in size and opportunity for sustainable regional development. Reading the objectives of the financing cross-border cooperation programs, and cultural profile lists projects contracted until January 2011, (ArtActMagazine, 2013), transpires the idea that cultural speech develops along the lines of dialogue between identities, between communities, between people with though approaching "other" that are separated by an artificial boundary, but historically significant, develop a deeper understanding of the specific cultural significance of the area, and collaborate virtually on a specific topic. Essential in this case is not so artistic excellence, caught in the classical canons of European or national charts or speeches critics and curators validations, but intercultural competence and professional development and reporting of certain values and artistic practices recognized by the partners and their beneficiaries as being the site of the region, and in that sense, cultural material. An important dimension of geographical proximity and cultural heritage recovery is encouraging tourism (Mirza, 2011). For neighboring former communist countries that still share many cultural traits and administrative infrastructure before 1989, such as Romania and its immediate neighbors, cross-border cooperation that emphasizes treating the target region as a whole with an inner dynamic, is the chance of an exchange professional experience, knowledge and redefining the communities of today's history of cultural relations often closely intertwined over time. Translated through the specific objectives of the Structural Funds, such cooperation shall be considered a tool for sustainable European regional development.

## ***2. Similar economic structure on both sides of the border***

Cities on both sides of the river were too similar structure to have good cross-border exchanges between them. In addition to being underdeveloped, the economic structure is about the same. Prices of products on both sides of the border are more or less the same, so that cross-border shopping does not really have a "raison d'être" (a good reason to exist). This was well expressed by a 84 year old Bulgarian citizen by a question he put it after visiting the other side of the river: "What is there for me?'s exactly the same as here" (Papot). This does not stimulate cross-border interaction, especially because there is a big problem with the existence of adequate infrastructure for border crossing. There are no social and economic complementarity. The economic crisis has made things even more complex. At the beginning of the EU accession process, a lot of companies saw opportunities in the markets of their coasts. In particular Bulgarian companies in the food and construction took advantage of their chances on the Romanian market as it is about three or four times more than Bulgaria. And more importantly, there is a significant demand for the products of Bulgaria in these sectors in Romania. So big companies started to invest in cross-border activities. But then came the economic crisis, the Romanian currency dropped significantly and their activities could not be profitable. Most of the Bulgarian companies have frozen or closed their efforts and activities and this is a situation that persists until today. Due to the economic crisis, some of the beneficiaries were not able to provide co-financing or cash flow necessary. One of the proposed solutions was to access bank loans. However, in the same context of the financial and economic crisis, the beneficiaries had difficulty getting loans from banks, because many banks require more collateral from them in order to approve the loan. 5 beneficiaries requested to withdraw projects during 2011 (Annual Implementation Report, 2011)

Although the economic situation has since improved recently, companies are not very keen to invest abroad because they are aware of the high risks which it would assume. In other

sectors, there is almost no interaction, because the economic structure is about the same and it is difficult for a foreign company to compete with the indigenous, mainly because to cross the border, a lot of fees must be paid.

### ***3. EU funding does not get where it is most needed***

In 2007, shortly after the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria, was inaugurated Cross-Border Territorial Cooperation Programme between the two countries. This program is part of the EU cohesion policy. EU Cohesion Policy seeks to achieve balanced and sustainable development of the Community and is a fairly egalitarian notion. The idea of balanced development is actually a spatial manifestation of a social problem. (Davoudi, 2010)

One of its main objectives is to implement various cross-border projects. Even before 2007, in 1998-2006 the EU has granted 8 million euro per year for Romania and Bulgaria to finance projects with transboundary impacts. It is not yet clear what projects exactly were using this money. Overall objective of the cooperation area, made in the official program is "to bring together the people, communities and economies of the Romania-Bulgaria to participate in the joint development of a cooperative area, using its human resources, natural and environmental benefits in a sustainable way" (European Regional Development Fund, 2013).

This strategic objective is divided into five specific objectives, each of one being part of a priority axis. The total funding of the program is 262 million euro, of which 217.8 million euro from the ERDF, 42.6 million euro from the national public funding and private funds 1.5. Various monitoring agencies were established at program and project level to control the efficiency and allocation. Despite these agencies, the allocation of funds face some difficulties. Public Policy Institute published a report in July 2011 which stated that in Romania, only 3.4% of the money from EU funds are spent effectively (Institutul pentru Politici Publice). In the case of Romania and the countries which recently joined the European area, one of the biggest challenges facing both public administration and business area, is the capacity to absorb EU structural funds allocated for the programming period 2007 - 2013, the latter contributing to economic and social convergence with EU structures and desire (Bărbulescu, Ion, Toderaș, 2013: 106-148). Some of the main reasons that causes the low absorption rate financial resources are generated, in particular by the lack of a coherent long-term vision of the authorities, insufficient resources for co-financing projects, low administrative capacity at central and local level, lack of institutional coordination failures PPP and insufficient skilled human resources. (Georgescu, 2009: 58) Although it has been more than six years of accession, Romania still faces a great challenge in the absorption of EU structural funds. The absorption rate is still low, both in relation to allocations and overall national income, and, given the ongoing economic context and borrowing, the national authorities have pledged to take measures to increase the absorption taking into consideration including closer involvement of commercial banks.(Report, 2011:155)

Romania's inability to use EU funds is endemic, although this may be explained by various factors. The fact that it fails to attract European funds since the early post-accession, at least the same as the national contribution to the Community budget, recording net charges like EU state member, is not only paradoxical situation, but also with dramatic effects discrepancies regarding the recovery of development and real convergence with the EU states. We tend to believe that the debate on structural funds absorption by Romania is the least confusing, the main reason is related to the lack of transparency of the central government, especially at the management of operational

programs and also denying the vulnerabilities in this regard, which prevents identification of potential problems. Instead of analytic image is presented an incomplete picture of absorption, emphasizing only the positive aspects that ultimately make possible scientific approach difficult.

To note is that during the implementation of a project, absorption may be influenced by the vulnerabilities stemming from both macroeconomic internal and external of Romania. (Zaman, Georgescu, 2009:15)

While it is unclear how much money intended for the cross-border cooperation is necessary to achieve the objective, surely we can say that at least 50% of the allocated funds do not reach where needed. This is related to the lack of transparency and gives rise to suspicions of corruption. However, the excitement and cooperation expectations were very high at the beginning of negotiations on the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union and a wealth of Bulgarian companies have tried to enter to the Romanian market and also to make use of funds EU. This enthusiasm and expectations have changed recently away, when people realized how hard it was to meet all EU standards. Especially for small businesses, it is very difficult to satisfy certain criteria, because they have to invest a lot. EU provides some funds for these companies, but the money often does not reach to them.

Summarizing all the above, we conclude the issues that determine the low absorption of European funds in Romania, namely (Gherghinescu, 2009):

- undue delays in preparing operational programs by managing authorities from different ministries and low speed of response to comments made by the European Commission; These delays were caused mainly by the persistent mentality of the pre-accession period, when the strategic planning was performed in most cases by the European Commission and not by the national Government;
- delays in providing a solid institutional building networks of intermediary bodies and regional units in whose powers shall manage the Structural Funds at regional and local level;
  - Low culture in project management for both public and private bodies;
  - Weak involvement of public authorities in developing the capacity of potential beneficiaries of projects;
  - Reluctance of beneficiaries generated by the low level of pre-funding the operational programs and the high level of private financing;
  - Delays in finalizing the lists of eligible expenses and payment and reimbursement procedures;
  - Misunderstandings between existing and newly established bodies involved in the management of structural funds and a lack of training and qualification for staff in certain intermediate bodies.

#### ***4. Lack of adequate infrastructure to overcome geographic barriers***

Perhaps the most amazing thing about the Romanian-Bulgarian border is that it was linked by a bridge over the Danube, just once. The fact that there was a single bridge, was not because there were no money available, but geopolitical reasons. The only existing bridge until this year, was between Ruse and Giurgiu. To cross this bridge must be paid fees. A person traveling by car have to pay 6 euro each time. A truck has to pay about 37 euros. This is a heavy burden and a major barrier to people who want to cross the border. It is remarkable that during communism, people could travel for free and not have to pay fees for crossing the border. These fees were introduced after the fall of the Berlin

Wall. Official fees are for road improvement and maintenance services of the bridge, but anyone who has used the bridge knows that this is not true. The road is per generally in very poor condition. Taxes are used as an addition to the local budget. Both countries want to build more bridges also increase their connection to Europe, but they could not agree where to build another. A classic case of isomorphism. Romanians wanted to build the second bridge more inward, preferably near Constana. The reason for this was that people who need to use the bridge (eg. to travel to Greece and Turkey) have to spend more time in Romania and thus would spend money there. But Bulgarians wanted the bridge to the west, because it is close to Sofia. Because this argument was not built a bridge in decades. But for many people living in border areas would be very useful the bridge, for Bulgarians for example, would be useful to make the trip to Bucharest for international flights because Bucharest is much closer than Sofia for many. But due to lack of bridges and existing taxes border, most of them prefer not to travel there, but to Sofia, instead. In 2010 they finally started to build a second bridge between the Romanian town of Calafat and Bulgarian city Vidin. This project too encountered difficulties and obstacles, being stopped a while, right in the middle, but the bridge was finally completed and opened last year, being open railway and road traffic. But of course, not enough only two bridges, because it takes at least ten. Ideally, all twinned towns along the Danube frontier would be connected by a bridge. (Challenges, 2011) But how bridges are used only when there is traffic, it is questionable whether there is indeed a demand for more. However, this example shows that it is necessary to distinguish between policies intentional self-promotion rhetoric and actual real cooperation.

### ***5. Lack of access to Schengen***

There were different data set that Romania and Bulgaria could enter Schengen, but each time they were postponed. It looks like a combination of "open borders" and "Romania and Bulgaria" is not very popular in the European Union. România was the most disappointed by this situation, given the fact that our country has invested heavily to improve border control. Romania's external borders, especially the border with Serbia, are covered with the most advanced technological tools. Existing cameras scan license plates of cars entering the country, trucks must pass through mobile scanning devices and biometric scanning devices are used to check passports. In the unlikely event that a car or a person crosses the border illegally, a squadron quads and APVs equipped with infrared night vision are ready to intercept. Continuous control of cameras and GPS tracking also makes it more difficult for border guards to be bribed. Compared to a few years earlier, when the border was a gray area with occasional checks by guards and a place of "contraband" cigarettes, the current situation could be presented as an example of good practice in the EU. Both countries are technically ready to join Schengen. But a lot of EU member states oppose this idea, headed by France. France fears about the romany people issue that would generate an open border with Romania, which would lead to great difficulties. Bulgarians and Romanians are surprised that these issues are not dealt with by experts, but by politicians.

### ***6. Lack of experience on both sides of the program in attracting and managing the Structural Funds***

Given that both Romania and Bulgaria are the last two European Union member states, with no experience in the management of structural funds, has been difficult to establish the regulatory framework (establishing evaluation procedures, contracting

irregularities, management financial, technical assistance, archiving, workflow, risk management, etc.), depending on strict requirements of the Audit Authority for the program. However, in 2009, 2 years after the launch of the program, Managing Authority and the Joint Technical Secretariat developed the Project Implementation Manual for projects selected under the first call for proposals, needed to implement the program.

**7. *Insufficient knowledge about the specifics of the program management team during the implementation of projects contracted.***

Of all progress reports and requests for reimbursement received, concluded that the level of knowledge about the specific features of the program's implementation by the team members, was in many cases very low and they were not sufficiently understood by the beneficiaries rules of the program is often confused with the rules PHARE CBC Romania-Bulgaria.

**8. *Delays in the contracting of selected projects***

The time required for contracting projects selected proved to be longer than originally anticipated in the contract procedures. The average time needed to contract the selected projects, including time allocated for beneficiaries to provide all documents / information required for contracting purposes necessary to comply with all procedures and legal provisions, is described as follows:

- 17 months after the approval until to signing up tthe selected projects, under the first call;
- 9 months of the approval until to signing up the selected projects, under the second call;
- 8 months after the approval until to signing up the selected projects, under the second call for proposals, interim deadline March;
- 7 months after the approval until to signing up tthe selected projects, under the second call for proposals, interim deadline of April.

The delays in contracting projects selected for the second call, had implications for program implementation, causing low reimbursement level of the expenses required.

**9. *Law partner states and mutual lack of it, at a sufficient level.***

Beneficiaries from Romania had problems during the execution of public procurement as a result of many changes to the public romanian procurement legislation .Also, law partner state, in terms of program implementation, was not always fully known and understood by partners, (at program and project level), from the other side of the border, sometimes creating confusion. In fact, this situation is specific also to other examples of cross-border cooperation (Cârmaciu, Csuros, Domocoş, Horga, Miheş, Pătrăuș, 2009: 213; Brie, 2010; Brie and Horga, 2009), in our case beeing some nuances.

These would be the main obstacles faced by program Romania-Bulgaria Cross-Border Cooperation in the period 2007-2013.

**Conclusions**

After above, I listed the problems that arose during the period of CBC Programme implementation between Romania and neighboring Bulgaria, the next question is, of course, what can be done?

First of all, there is an urgent need for national commitment. Local stakeholders makes great efforts in CBC, but are hampered by the lack of support from national

governments. This is linked to the problems of corruption. To do something really effective, policymakers should strive to support local businesses as much as possible. More public-private initiatives would be more than welcome.

Secondly, infrastructure problems must be solved. Infrastructure is one of the basics of cross-border cooperation, in case people want to work together, they must be able to cross the border. A good example is the completion of the second bridge, given to use last year and after that it should come at least five bridges and / or crossings of the major cities along the border.

After creating the appropriate infrastructure, more specific issues could be addressed and found solutions to them. Of course, much of the success of this program depends on the developments within the European Union. Gaining access to Schengen could lead to a major step forward in the CBC. With Schengen, the corrupt border guards and unjust taxes issues could be eradicated. Access to Schengen would give both countries the legal framework to ensure free border. In addition, it might be a good idea to establish an independent monitoring agencies that keep track of funds. If it were a more effective monitoring, the funds would not disappear into a black hole like now and chances for them to get where most needed would increase significantly.

Nevertheless, regional identities can be promoted. Although there are some efforts in this regard at present, they are not very effective because there is a lack of bases. It is understood that regional identities are already present in the region, but to be successfully "run", or sold, other activities should take priority right now. If there is a good example of successful cross-border cooperation, this is the Center Bulgarian-Romanian Interuniversity Europe (in short: BRIE). This center is located in Ruse close to the bridge crossing the Danube. The scheme was introduced in 1993, prior to pre-adhesion strategies. It is a collaboration between the University of Rousse, on the Bulgarian side and Giurgiu, from the Rumanian side. It offers several undergraduate and graduate programs for students who live in the borderlands.

MBA courses are offered in both English and German and are held in common. The Centre also prepares specialists across South East Europe in various areas related to European integration.

Currently underway is a program with German funding for training of magistrates. In addition to degree programs, the center also prepares joint proposals to improve cross-border cooperation. Many of them were accepted, including one called symbolic "Bridge", an abbreviation of the Bulgarian-Romanian Initiative for Democracy as a "post-call" of Europe. This program, funded by the EU PHARE program is focused on training border police not only on how to work effectively together, but also how to work in a Schengen. These types of collaborations shows the cross-border cooperation potential in the region. It is a pity that this potential remains untapped pool of mostly. One way to increase cross-border cooperation and to create successful partnerships, such as Brie, would be to do more with the various programs of the Black Sea. A more pro-active attitude could attract more money in the border regions of Romania and Bulgaria.

Interested parties also should not focus too much on the European Union. EU is important, that it's perfectly sure, but it is not the sole originator or fund-border program provider. In 1992, the U.S. provided funding through the United States Agency for International Development, in order to establish an association of municipalities in Bulgaria. This association, called the Union of Bulgarian Black Sea Local Authorities (UBBSLA), promotes local autonomy and seeks the active participation of citizens in the Black Sea region. In addition to networking in the region, the Association provides

services for capacity building, training for public officials, especially local government. The organization has five different committees, each dealing with problems of municipalities. There is a committee of law and regulation, one for financial regulations, one for spatial planning, a committee dealing with tourism and sustainable development, and the last which focuses on energy development. While each committee is important, most achievements have been made in the field of energy development. Energy, so to speak, is a hot issue in the Black Sea region countries are committed to work together. Generally, UBBSLA has a lot of projects, which many of them, currently receive funding from European Union. Perhaps one of the most relevant political projects was the creating of Black Sea Euroregion, an initiative from 2006.

Brie and UBBSLA are excellent examples of how the CBC can operate in Romania and Bulgaria. BRIE demonstrates that barriers to work together over the Danube can be overcome. There are still some management frustrations, particularly with regard to how long it sometimes takes to complete a new project, but at least there is visible progress. UBBSLA is geared more towards the interior, but proves as the Black Sea municipalities can jointly undertake various projects, whether this means the formation or creation of new businesses. If more organizations would follow their example, driven by national leaders (instead of top-down decisions) and support of (EU) funds, the Romanian-Bulgarian border could develop into a border area fully operational. A place where terms like meeting, connection and contact, would replace the associations of frustration and corruption, that too many people currently do with this particular border.

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## **II. The History and Theory of International Relations**

**István POLGÁR** ⇔ *The Romanian-Soviet Relations in the Interwar Period*

**Anca OLTEAN** ⇔ *Ongoing Theory-Driven Evaluation of the Publications from Romania and Hungary Concerning the History of the Jews from Romania and Hungary during the Years 1945-1953 and a Few Policy Recommendations*

**Georges CONTOGEOORGIS** ⇔ *Prolégomènes à une théorie cosmodynamique. L'approche cosmodynamique de l'histoire et l'hellénisme*



## THE ROMANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

*István POLGÁR\**

**Abstract.** *In the international political environment preceding the 1<sup>st</sup> World War the diplomatic and economic relations between the Tsarist Empire and the Kingdom of Romania can be characterized positive, especially because of the fruitful cooperation and contribution of Romania to the Russian military actions in Bulgaria.*

*Although, from another point of view it is important to mention and can not be denied the tensions which appeared in this relationships mostly on account of Romanian national revival feeling of belonging between the inhabitants of Bessarabia. This phenomen is visible at political level to, but becomes more vocal through the local, provincial romanian mass media.*

*The aim of the study is to present an inventory of the relations between the two neighboring countries. In the actual international and geostrategic context, we believe that this type of historical/inventory studies are necessary and usefull in the managment process of bilateral relations.*

**Keywords:** *diplomacy, Romania, Moldova, relations, minority*

The Romanian-Russian relations were marked throughout the existence of the Soviet Union by the so-called problem of Bessarabia”, a territorial dispute caused by expansionary policies cultivated over time by both the Tsarist Empire and its successor, the Soviet Empire.

Diplomatic, cultural or economic relations maintained during the interwar period between the Kingdom of Romania and the USSR are characterized by fragility and uncertainty, the discord apple having the face of the same Bessarabian problem, namely actions to destabilize the province now reintegrated into the old homeland boundaries, orchestrated by the Soviet part through communists agents, sometimes Russophones but more often than not of Romanian origins.

### ***The relations between Romania and Russia as allied military powers within the entente***

The Kingdom of Romania began its epic military operations alongside the Entente forces on the night of 14 to 15 August 1916 with the operations started in Transylvania aiming to free the Romanian population living on Transylvanian Carpathian land (Cupșa, 1967: 49).

The first attacks and incursions into enemy territory depth were successful. The Austro-Hungarian troops present in the province were forced to retreat inward until the middle of September when, after relocating four additional divisions here, they began a sweeping counter-offensive.

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The Romanian advance was impeded, although the Russian allies provided three divisions as support, but these soldiers were deprived of motivation, poorly trained and poorly supplied and equipped.

On the southern border of Romania, under General August von Mackensen, the Central Powers forces opened a new front by unleashing on September 1 the surprise attack on the Turtucaia garrison.

A multinational army consisting of German, Bulgarian and Turkish soldiers was aiming at the opening a combat theater designed to occupy the land of the Romanian Dobrogea, with the mouths of the Danube and the port of Constanta. Outnumbered and technically inferior, but also due to serious tactical command mistakes, the Romanian garrison surrendered on September 6, 1916 (Scurtu, 2011: 150).

Its role was to delay a possible attack of the enemy, its troops on a mission to withdraw, resisting on successive alignments. The complex was composed of 15 centers of resistance, numbered from west to east, spaced 1-3 km apart and built as earth redoubts with trenches, barbed wire networks and underground shelters for troops, according to their contemporary military rules.

This first major defeat suffered by Romania and was later labeled as ‘the disaster from Turtucaia’ not only because of magnitude of their losses, but also because it opened a path for the Bulgarian-German troops into Dobrogea, which they will occupy, but more seriously, because of what was happening seven entire Romanian divisions were displaced in great haste from Transylvania to be able to block the enemy’s advance on the southern front (Olteanu, 1988: 926).

Relocating the troops stopped the Romanian offensive in the province, action that could not be resumed even after other six divisions were back on this front, moreover, this loophole has allowed the Austro-Hungarian and German troops to take initiative and then to push back the Romanian troops beyond the peaks of the Carpathians and the final occupation of Wallachia (Bărbulescu, Cloșcă, 1982: 56).

In connection with the political significance of this unfortunate event, Constantin Argetoianu will record in his memoirs: “Turtucaia means a great date in our country’s political development. (...) With Turtucaia started our hatred against parties. Turtucaia put in full light the nakedness of the people to whom the homeland had entrusted their fate , almost without control. With Turtucaia arose a new mentality and it is safe to say that with the disaster from Turtucaia, our public opinion was awakened” (Constantiniu, 1997: 280).

Not even the long planned counter actions to curb the Bulgarian-German offensive did bring the expected results. After September 15 the War Council decides to suspend military actions in Transylvania, and General Averescu sets up the so-called “Flămânda Offensive” which sought to cross the Danube and to hit enemy forces in flank and rear Cobadin points and Kurtbunar.

Although on October 1 the two Romanian divisions managed to create a bridgehead at Flămânda, and although the Russian divisions started their offensive the same day, the short-lived success was shattered by the storm that followed and brought destruction to the pontoon bridge (Stoian, 1975: 55).

Now both Constanta and Bucharest were in danger, which is why the defensive line was reinforced with Russian troops hastily brought here by General Andrei Medardovici Zaioncikovski. Until September 21 the two opposite sides were involved in fierce fighting, marked by successive attacks and counterattacks.

Starting 23 November, the Bulgarian-German armed forces were supplemented with elite troops who crossed the Danube at Svishtov. Thus the southern front was

approaching dangerously the country capital, a reality that made General Constantin Prezan plan starting a counterattack that was to use the entire military reserve army and an important contribution of Russian troops. Unfortunately the Russian defies the plan and refuses to cooperate (Țăcu, 2004: 17).

Across the front, the German-Austro-Hungarian troops, under General Erich von Falkenhayn, attack on November 10 the Romanian positions in Vulcan Path and the front will be pushed foothills; on November 26 the theater of battle is pushed again all the way to the Romanian Plain.

The Romanian attack started on December 1 in order to prevent the junction of the two great corps of the enemy but it was late and desperate. The Royal Court and central government authorities were forced to leave Bucharest for Iasi. The capital will be occupied on December 6, 1916, a number of 150,000 Romanian soldiers will go to imprisonment, while around 300,000 will not ever see their families again (Argetoianu, Neagoe, 1996: 47).

Following this disaster, the Russian side is forced to send massive reinforcements to the Romanian front in order to avoid a German invasion in southern Russia. After several small-scale battles, the German army was stopped from advancing in mid-January 1917. The Romanian troops will continue to fight further, although most of its territory is under foreign occupation.

There have been a number of criticisms at the time to address the errors committed in 1916 by politicians and military factors responsible, opinions resumed today, when it is considered that Romania entered the First World War in a very unfavorable moment.

It also considers that if she had entered the war on the Entente side since 1914 or at the latest in 1915 there could have been avoided the occupation of Serbia, or that at the beginning of 1916 the Romanians could have supported the "Brusilov Offensive".

There is also the view that in fact the main cause of delay of Romania's entry into the war was the quasi-general distrust of political and military leaders in the Russian loyalty towards Romania, history not once proving otherwise.

Again, some US military experts believe that the Romanian military staff made a mistake when they chose to invade Transylvania as the operational priority without securing their rear front, i.e. the southern front, where they abut the enemy troops of Bulgaria. Then, they are accused that after the failure of the Transylvanian campaign they did not how to mobilize and concentrate firepower in the hot spots but, instead, they dispersed major combat forces on very broad and inconsistent lines of defense (Messinger, 2001: 667).

### **Domestic and international political contexts that favoured the reintegration of Bessarabia into the national Romanian space**

The year 1917 brought major changes in the equation of armed clashes on the Eastern Front. Moldova, the only remaining Romanian state territory left, remained unoccupied because the triangle defense strategy adopted by the Fourth Army, tactics that resulted in minor losses after the withdrawal of December 1916. This line of defense remained steadfast in the effort to safeguard firstly of the provisional crisis capital, Iasi, against the repeated German attacks.

Political events that have disrupted Tsarist Russia in February 1917 commenced the collapse of the multinational empire ruled from Petersburg, notably through the liberalization of the option for the non-Slavic nationalities towards autonomy within the borders of the colossus.

After the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II, the Provisional Government sought to improve the strategic situation of Russia through a series of complex military operations on the Eastern Front, the so-called “Kerensky Offensive”, named after the War Minister of the moment, the socialist Alexander Kerensky (Gilbert, 2001: 234).

The nature of the violent street events unfolded throughout the spring in Russia set the tone to an unhealthy development of a revolutionary spirit among the masses of soldiers. In this context, the officers had lost much authority to the soldiers, who did not want to fight and thought only to the social transformations that would come with the end of the war.

Later historians called this phenomenon the “trench Bolshevism” because an important role in undermining the capacity to fight of the Russian army had the Bolshevik agitators and anarchists. At the same time many pacifist militants, together with the leader of the Bolsheviks, Lenin, returned to the country in the spring of 1917, crossing Central Europe with the permission of the German army, who wanted to take advantage of the internal unrest in Russia (Lupsor, 2014: 87).

The Russian offensive proved to be a military and social disaster. The soldiers deserted en masse throughout the frontline to join the revolution, and their collaboration with the enemy became commonplace.

The Romanian Army was included in operations on the eastern front, attacking in May 1917 together with Russian troops the German positions at Mărășești. The advancing of the Russo-Romanian forces had to stop soon because the failure of military action subordinated to the “Kerensky Offensive”, so that General Makensen’s forces counterattacked, but were defeated on Mărășești, Marasti, Oituz line (Buzatu, 1987: 147).

The desperate attempt to restore order in the country, through a coup, initiated by the Russian army generals and government leaders of the Right was also doomed to failure. Kerensky loses the trust of his senior officers after General Kornilov, the coup leader, is arrested, but also lose the confidence he enjoyed among the moderate left after he decides to dissolve the revolutionary committees of soldiers.

Profiteers from the increasing internal crisis were the Bolsheviks led by Lenin, who soon managed to take power without much opposition from the government or the military. The coup in October 1917 when the Bolshevik party came to the helm of Russia, thanks to the agreement between the Germans and the Communists, led to a ceasefire and then to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, by means of which Lenin granted the Germans the Baltic countries, Belarus and Ukraine (Wheeler Benneth, 1937: 7).

Moreover, they promised to bring peace and the end to internal crises. Thus, on October 26, 1917 was adopted the “Decree on Peace”, written by Lenin, in which he demanded the immediate conclusion of peace. The Central Powers answer the call of the Bolsheviks and support the signing of a truce for the Eastern Front (Constantinescu-Iasi, 1967: 292).

In December 1917, just weeks after the Bolshevik revolution, negotiations to sign a separate peace treaty with Germany and its allies begin, but they were greatly extended due to misunderstandings, because originally the Russians were not willing to give up territories and they did not accept any reparations, so that eventually the Germans denounced the truce and resumed hostilities, advancing into the Russian territory in five days more than they had done in three years (Cavendish, 2008: 3). Eventually, the Russians were forced to sign a peace treaty in March 1918. The document signed at Brest-Litovsk set that Russia lost a quarter of the territories, one third of the population and a significant percentage of the initial rural industrial capacity (Constantiniu, 1991: 7).

Left without military support of his great ally, Russia, and with no immediate prospect of the other powers of the Entente, Romania was forced to seek and accept an armistice with the Central Powers on 9 December 1917, a document that would materialize until the following spring in a peace treaty (*România în Primul Război Mondial*, 1979: 330).

During December the Russian soldiers on the territory of Romania organized themselves into small soviets, then devised a plan for a coup that covered the arrest of King Ferdinand and members of the Romanian Government, which must have been completed with the proclamation of the Moldovan Soviet Republic between the Carpathians and Prut (Smarandache, 2006: 69). Once these revolutionary projects failed, the Russian troops were forced to return home, but during their withdrawal through Bessarabia a number of soldiers committed the robberies, rapes and murders on civilians and the murder of leaders of the provincial Romanian national movement (Cornea, 2003: 95).

On such backdrop, a unionist ray of light came from the new government in Chişinău<sup>1</sup>. In the impossibility of ensuring civil peace in the province and failing to ensure food security of the population, the Council of State called on December 22, 1917, in Iaşi

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<sup>1</sup> The need to create a Bessarabian parliament was perceived by Bessarabia with the collapse of the tsarist empire and the emergence of the first democratic party politics. Making the idea of self-determination involved also the establishment of a legislative body. In March 1917, the newspaper "Moldovan word" in Chisinau published the press release of the Moldovan National Party, calls upon the population of the region to demand national autonomy. On April 9, 1917 the same newspaper said that it is necessary that the "provincial Diet" according to old habits and needs now to prepare all laws related to the internal life of Bessarabia.

The main claims set out in the Programme of National Moldovan Party in April 1917 were: autonomy for Bessarabia in administrative, economic, and cultural areas; choosing the supreme power in the territory- the Council of State; introduction of indigenous people native language as an official language of administration and justice, as the language of instruction in schools and religious services in the churches; land reform with little or no earth ground; full freedom for minorities. This program of the Moldovan National Party has found a wide echo among the population.

Along with the Moldavian National Party have worked in this direction the Basarabians Association, formed in Petrograd in March 1917 and the Moldovan Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, appeared later. Odessa Moldovan Military Committee also called for the autonomy of Bessarabia. This idea was supported by cooperative congresses, peasants, priests, teachers and students from Bessarabia. With even more strongly pronounced in defending the interests of the Moldovan population of the region and the struggle for national self-determination spoke the Moldovan military congress, which took place in Chisinau between 20 and 27 October 1917. The Moldovan military congress adopted a decision on the establishment of the Country's Council as a legislative body supreme power in the land and established that its composition to between 120 delegates, 70% of MPs will be Moldovan, and the remaining 30% are members of other nationalities representatives held.

The organizing committee elected by the Moldovan military congress called the State Council for November 21 1917. The first plenary session opened in the palace of the State Council that had the Bessarabian flag. The created government was acknowledged by various parties and organizations, out of which many soviets of deputies of workers and peasants. For instance, on December 6, 1917 the Chişinău Soviet congratulated the workers and peasants from Moldova on the occasion of creating the Moldovan Republic and promised support for the State Council. The mission of this government was rather difficult, because just like the whole Russia, Bessarabia was facing terrible troubles and anarchy. Cf. Mihai Rotaru, Gheorghe Cernea, *Activitatea legislativă a Sfatului Ţării și autodeterminarea Basarabiei*, în *Literatură și Artă*, din 20 martie 2014

for Romanian government military assistance. The Romanian troops under General Broșteanu and the French troops under General Berthelot, crossed the Prut River on 10 January 1918, and in a few days restored order and peace in the province of Bessarabia (Colesniuc, 2007: 59).

Then, on January 24 1918, the the Council of State will declare independence of the province, which will be called the Moldavian Democratic Republic; this act will designate the complete break with the former Tsarist Empire and will also highlight the new Romanian identity of the state between Prut and Dniester Rivers (Stepaniuc, 2005: 143).

In the months that followed, however, integrity and, ultimately, the viability of the new state entity was threatened by repeated Bolshevik attacks coming from across the Dniester, but especially the territorial claims of the new Ukrainian state, proclaimed independent, manifested imperatively for some important areas in Bessarabia (Țurcanu, 2007: 114).

In such a context, the Council of State openly expressed desire for the union with Romania, in the form of union motions voted at county level, approach successfully approved during the plenary meeting of 27 March 1918, where they voted *for* unity 86 MPs, 36 *against*, other three abstained (Mitrașcă, 2002: 433).

However the situation in Romania was not one of the most favorable at that moment. On May 7, 1918 she is required to sign in Buftea a peace treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Under the conditions imposed by the victorious powers, Romania was forced to return the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, the neighbouring country that on this occasion took another strip of territory south of the Rasova-Agigea line.

Moreover, Romania engaged to cede control to Austria-Hungary of the Carpathian paths and to Germany she was going to lease for a period of 90 years the right to exploit oil fields across the country.

In return, the two victorious powers engaged, even if outside the treaty, to not oppose to accepting the act of union of Bessarabia with Romania, on the grounds that, although defeated, Romania emerged from the war with a larger territory.

The problem of Bessarabia, far from being definitely settled by the Act of March 27, 1918, marked the decisive relations between Romania and the Soviet Union during the interwar period.

### **Attempts to resume interstate Romanian-Soviet relations in the interwar period**

We saw that on 27 March 1918 the Council of State of Bessarabia proclaimed the union with Romania with a majority of votes, then that on October 14, 1918 representatives of the population of the province of Bukovina voted their union with the mother country, and as of 1 December 1918 the wholeness of all Romanian-inhabited regions was to be completed by the union of Transylvania with Romania, act ratified by the Great Popular Assembly of Alba Iulia (Ardeleanu, Pascu, Popesc-Puțuri, 1989 : 386).

In other words, 1918 has profoundly changed the history of the territorial and geopolitical state of Romania. The union acts issued by plebiscite meetings in Chisinau, Chernivtsi and Alba Iulia were ratified by the Parliament in Bucharest and then internationally recognized by the great powers of that time, who put their signatures on the complex Peace Treaties of Versailles (Vaida-Voevod, Vaida-Voevod, 2003: 106).

In other words, the Treaty of Versailles confirmed as true and in force all proclamations of union under the right to self-determination set in the “Declaration of the 14 points” of US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson. Soviet Russia did not attend the

Paris Peace Conference and never recognized the new world order established by the complex treaties signed in the French capital between 1919-1920 (Iordache, Ionescu, 2001: 236).

Moreover, on November 1, 1920 the Soviet government said it did not recognize the Treaty of Paris, signed by the major powers on 28 October the same year, the international legal document ratifying the unification of Bessarabia with Romania. The territorial issues between Romania and Soviet Russia created by the act of 27 March 1918 would mark the Romanian-Soviet relations both in the coming decades of the twentieth century and the beginning of the XXI century (Cretzianu, 1998: 202).

Over the next two years following the consummation of the Soviet Union unilateral act of breaking any kind of relations with Romania, the constant concern of all Romanian governments that succeeded to power was to resume relations, at least the diplomatic ones between the two states.

The beginnings of Romanian-Soviet diplomatic contacts were consumed in the fall of 1921 in Warsaw, on the backdrop of regulating the Polish-Soviet relations after the recently ended armed conflict between the two countries and the application of the provisions of the Treaty of Riga, signed by the belligerents a year prior (Iachimovschi, Wieruszewska, 2004: 209).

Although informal, the discussions between the Soviets' representative, Karkhan, and the Romanian Filality advanced the hypothesis of recognizing the union of Bessarabia with Romania in exchange for \$ 65 million in gold and of Romania's neutrality when employing any military conflict in the region by the Soviet Union (Bruhis, 1992: 162). After some probing, diplomatic envoys of Romania and the Soviet Union agreed to address the issues raised at the resumption of inter-state relations at the Genoa Conference, which was to begin in April 1922.

At the conference, the head of the Romanian delegation, Prime Minister Ion Bratianu proposed regulation of relations with the Soviet delegation Soviet Russia, advancing in this regard, a number of principles to underpin future relations between the two countries. The discussion was one conducive and was to solve the problems of Central and Eastern Europe, both political and economic agenda included debates and specific issues concerning the position of the capitalist states against the new Bolshevik state, successor of the former tsarist empire.

However, the head of the Soviet delegation, Georgi V. Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, rejected Brătianu's proposal, saying that Russia does not recognize the current territorial status quo and more, the present pertaining of Bessarabia to Romania (Scurtu, 2003: 291). In the same year, however, at the Conference of Lausanne from December 1922, the Soviet Minister Chicherin reviewed the proposals and ruled favorably on agreeing a Romanian-Soviet non-aggression pact based on the recognition, in one form or another, of the union of Bessarabia with Romania provided that the Romanian state would quit claiming her national treasury and the crown jewels, achieving in this way - in the opinion of the Soviets - a complete liquidation of mutual debt; this approach unfortunately remained unfinished (Păunescu, Isărescu, Ștefan, 2000: 67).

The first meeting dedicated especially to the Romanian-Soviet normalization was held in Vienna from 27 March to 2 April 1924, the level of representation being the ambassadors level. The delegations were led by Constantin Langa-Rășcanu respectively Nikolai Nikolaevici Krestinsky.

The Russian side tried to impose on the agenda addressing the problem of Bessarabia, request rejected by the Romanian who objected that the government is not

empowered to discuss territorial issues, instead proposing their own agenda in the resumption of diplomatic relations, starting from negotiations held in Genoa in May 1922, by I.I.C. Brătianu, I.G. Duca and Chicherin, continuing the talks in Paris in the summer of 1923 held between Gherman Pântea and Cristian Racovski (Constantin, 2010: 26), and then Soviet declaration of compliance from Tiraspol in 1923, to regulate the Dniester incidents<sup>2</sup>.

None of the delegates changed positions expressed prior, did not steer away from the guidelines set by their respective governments, the only novelty in the meeting was the proposal made by the Soviets on the need for a referendum among the population of Bessarabia, in the spirit of self-determination of peoples, otherwise the Soviet Union would not have to consider how the act of 27 March 1918 - the union of Bessarabia with Romania, in support of this idea citing similar view of Soviet Ukraine. In these circumstances the Romanian-Soviet talks failed miserably (Țurcanu, 2012: 112).

More interesting were the informal discussions held in during the receptions that concluded the meeting, where Krestinsky suggested to Gherman Pantea that there could be a recognition of the union of Bessarabia with Romania perhaps if Romania would be willing to give Hotin, Ismail and Belgorod to the Soviet Union, mainly the mouths of the Danube to the Black Sea, strategic and economic positions as precious for Romania, as well.

In reply, Pantea, with the consent of Prime Minister Brătianu, proposed the exchange for the Romanian national treasure, which was anyway sequestered in Moscow, accompanied with the union recognition, an offer to which the Soviet diplomat replied that the only remaining Romanian treasure traces were the protecting boxes because the values such boxes contained had been long are widely used to protect and strengthen the Soviet military. On this occasion Krestinsky also said that although the USSR considers the problem of Bessarabia a *casus belli*, she will not attack Romania, but will wait for a good time when the province can be claimed (Oprițescu, 1990: 525).

The Romanian authorities have made numerous efforts in the next decade and a half, using every opportunity created or regional political conjuncture to obtain recognition for the union act. On August 27, 1928 the Briand-Kellogg Pact was signed and on February 9, 1929, the Moscow Protocol, in which Soviet Russia was a party and which were based on the fundamental principle of the League of Nations concerning the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means only. This was somehow a recognition of the territorial integrity of the State Parties and an assurance of the security of their borders as existing at the time, although no penalties were set in the event of a breach of the principle (Scurtu, 2003: 444-461).

<sup>2</sup> In applying the freedom to self determination principle, on December 17, 1917 the Dniester Romanians hold a national congress to validate similar decisions taken in prior meetings in Tiraspol and Grigoriopol. Then on January 9, 1918, Ion Precul, a Romanian from Dniester and deputy in Rada Ucrainei speaks and claims equal rights for his compatriots. In this regard it was expected to have a national congress of Romanians from Ukraine in June 1918, but it could only be convened in December, during which the Transnistrian Romanians called for a own national state. On 3 August 1923 the Soviet government proclaims once again on the status of nationalities and the free use of mother tongue, proclamation followed on 3 September by the meeting in Balta of the Romanian delation from Ukraine in order to set out an autonomous republic. On 12 October 1924 enter in force the Moldovan Socialist Autonomous Republic, within RSS Ukraine, with the capital in Balta, and from 1928 in Tiraspol. In April 1925, the Pan-Moldovan congress at Kotovsk fixed the boundaries of the new republic, on May 10, Ukraine recognizes its constitution, and in 1933 introduces the use of the Latin alphabet. Cf. Georgii Ignat'evich Kostaki, Ion Gugeac, *Fenomenul constituționalismului în evoluția Republicii Moldova spre statul de drept*, Institutul de Filozofie, Sociologie și Drept al Academiei de Științe a Moldovei, 2003, p. 244-266

In the years 1931 and 1932 were held in Riga other meetings between the Romanian and Soviet parties with a view to agreeing on a mutual non-aggression pact, negotiations that were also doomed to failure because of the so called standing territorial dispute regarding Bessarabia, raised by Soviet representatives (Nanu, Dobrinescu, Pătroiu, 1993: 13).

A certain normalization wave of Romanian-Soviet negotiations, at least in terms of bilateral meetings relieve tensions, began to be felt with the coming of Titulescu at the head of the Romanian diplomacy. The illustrious diplomat realized that any discussion with the Soviets on contentious positions is detrimental to Romania (Titulescu, 1967: 437).

In this sense, Titulescu took advantage of the context provided by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in early 1933, when, with Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, worked together to define what the aggressor is. With this document, signed later in London on July 3, 1933, the Soviet Union indirectly recognized both the territorial integrity and Romania's eastern border, which does not mean, however, that Moscow gave up the Bessarabian issue (Matei, 1971: 229).

The most important gain for the country credited to Titulescu was the consent of the Minister Litvinov on resumption of bilateral diplomatic relations. After nearly 16 years of interruption, on June 9, 1934, at the headquarters of the League of Nations in Geneva, there is an exchange of diplomatic letters between Titulescu and Maxim Litvinov, followed by a joint meeting on whose agenda appeared a number of issues of common interest such as lifting the prohibition on Soviet goods imported or in transit, the recognition of ownership for the citizens on out territory, the resumption of passenger and goods transport across the Dniester, direct relationship between the news agencies Rador and TAAS, free movement on our territory for the two publications of "Izvestia" and "Journal de Moscou" enhancing cultural, scientific and artistic exchanges, the repatriation of the mortal remains of Prince Dimitrie Cantemir and the restitution of a part of the Romanian treasure, in June 1935 (Cimpoeșu, 2012: 5-6).

On 15 September 1934 the Soviet Union became a full member of the League of Nations, an organization which was based on the fundamental principle of its work conflict resolution between states only by peaceful means. In his new capacity, the USSR undertook to respect the territorial integrity and independence of all Members of the League of Nations, implicitly of Romania.

Accordingly, in September 1935 confidential negotiations were initiated between Titulescu and Maxim Litvinov to negotiate the bilateral pact. Talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister were extended for a year, often discontinued because of the reservations expressed by the Soviet part towards the conclusion of such a pact with Romania (Buzatu, Acatrinei, Acatrinei, 2008: 71).

The negotiations resulted only in signing a protocol on July 21, 1936, which established the basic principles of the future pact of mutual assistance. In two of the four articles of the Protocol Romania's eastern border is recognized, limited by the Dniester, but not directly, only implicitly. Negotiations between the two countries would remain at this stage, as Maxim Litvinov had exceeded its mandate given by the Soviet government and Titulescu had lost his foreign affairs portfolio after the government reshuffle of August 29, 1936 (Ragsdale, 2004: 61).

During 1938 and 1939 Romania tried to reach an understanding with the USSR and to conclude either a pact for mutual assistance or a non-aggression pact. Nothing cleared out because the Soviet government was aware of the predicament in which

Romania was and wanted to take advantage of it to solve the Bessarabia problem which had been delayed for more than 20 years then (Steiner, 2011: 277).

USSR soon recalled her ambassador from Bucharest in early 1938 and did not send a replacement until June 1940. Then the Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov was replaced with Vyacheslav Molotov, in May 1939, the adept father of offensive diplomacy of the Soviet government in its relations with other states (Pons, 2013: 414).

We conclude that Romania, neighboring first with the Tsarist Empire and later with the Bolshevik Empire was not in one of the luckiest positions, few and apart are the moments when our country enjoyed the proximity of the giant Russian state.

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## ONGOING THEORY- DRIVEN EVALUATION OF THE PUBLICATIONS FROM ROMANIA AND HUNGARY CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS FROM ROMANIA AND HUNGARY DURING THE YEARS 1945-1953 AND A FEW POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

*Anca OLTEAN\**

**Abstract.** *The study presents a foray into the historical writing concerning the history of the Jews from Romania and Hungary during the years 1945- 1953. Attempting to draw a picture of the historical writings of this field, the analysis reveals a framework of living conditions of the Jews from Romania and Hungary in early postwar years. The research constitutes itself in an ongoing theory- driven evaluation of the publications existent in this field, the author formulating also a few policy recommendations.*

**Keywords:** *evaluation, theory, publications, Jews, Romania, Hungary, recommendations*

In the opinion of the analyst Huey – Tsyh Chen theory helps to the understanding of the functioning of our world and has a very important role in the evaluation process (Chen, 1990: 17). This fundamental role of the theory has been initially denied, but later reconsidered. The evaluation process can be based on specific methods, but later the focus was put on the movement towards theory – driven evaluations. (Chen, 1990: 28)

Then, the author Huey – Tsyh Chen makes the portrait of “the rationale, logic and strategies of the theory – driven perspective” (Chen, 1990: 37). Sometimes, the theoretical knowledge is implicit or unsystematic, shows Huey – Tsyh Chen, but it surely provides a general guidance framework. In the opinion of the author, theory is supposed to guide social actions. (Chen, 1990: 40)

Our research intends to be a case – study, an application of theory – driven evaluation. Focusing on a broader description of the publications’ framework from Romania, Hungary and abroad concerning the history of Jews from Romania and Hungary, during the years 1945- 1953, I tried to identify the main problems with which was confronting the Jewish Community in a near close epoch, the communist years. I emphasize the necessity of a better treatment for this community, the necessity to share the same rights as the Hungarian or Romanian majorities. I especially point out a few policy recommendations based on this survey such as the necessity of a pluralist education which to integrate the history of Jewish minority in the history of Romania and Hungary, the necessity to have a curricula that focuses on local history in an areal such as Transylvania where the presence of minorities is very significant. And last but not least, I

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want to point out the necessity of non-discriminatory policies in what concerns the human rights of Jewish minority such as the right to education in their native language, the right to exert their own religion, the right to association. These are a few policy recommendations that need to be fought for and further implemented.

The present paper has as purpose the critical evaluation of scientific publications that researched the history of Jews from Romania and Hungary during the years 1945-1953. Thus I have made an inventory of the historical writings from this field that demonstrates that, during these years, the Jews can be regarded as a distinctive ethnical group and one can talk of the existence of a history of Jews in this area, during the years 1945-1953. During the first years after the war, the situation tended to come back to normal and the life of the Jews tended to revive. There were Jews that became victims of the communist regime, being imprisoned in communist prisons or to the chanel Dunăre – Marea Neagră. The number of communist Jews was not so high as it was mentioned later, especially as a percentage from the total of population. As I mentioned above, it was not hard to understand why some Jews chose communism that saved them from death, a lot of them perceived the things that way.

It should not be ignored the fact that in that epoch it existed a current of great importance, Zionism, that militated for the emigration of the Jews in Israel. A great extent of the Jews emigrated during these years, legally or illegally, in Palestine (from 1948 Israel).

The present paper tried to explain the relation of the Jews with the communism and the relation of the Jew with the communism. I hope that the following pages will convince you that the Jews are an distinct ethnical group, having ancient important traditions, that they did not bring the communism, but adjusted or cooperated with it, hoping that thus they will contribute to the creation of an egalitarian, ideal, society or they will succeed to go in “the country of Israel”.

The specialized papers concerning the history of Romanian and Hungarian Jews between 1945-1953, approach problems such as the demographical situation of Jewish population after the war and the Holocaust, and also under the condition of emigration of a part of the Jews from these areas to Israel, the USA and Western Europe. Some works present the economic situation of the Romanian and Hungarian Jews at the end of the war and the relationship of Jewry and communism, looking for explanations for massive adherence of Jews to communism. Some Jewish political leaders such as Ana Pauker or Rakosi are analyzed as individual entities. The problem of Zionism is much more debated as being connected to Romania's case, because the number of emigrants to Israel was bigger from Romania than from Hungary. From the most important studies concerning the history of the Jews from Romania and Hungary in the period 1945-1953 we focus on the following:

In the study *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, the authors Peter Meyer; Bernard Weinryb; Eugene Duschinsky; Nicolas Sylvain approached the problem of restitution of Jewish property in Hungary and Romania. (Meyer et al., 1953: 185) In Hungary, the Jews who returned from concentration camps found their houses occupied by the beneficiaries of the Nazi regime, their property destroyed, their stores robbed. (Meyer et al., 1953: 185) In spite of the precarious situation, most Jews of Hungary were not Zionists and they decided to remain in Hungary, especially because, immediately after the war, the communist government promised to maintain private property. Most land did not return to Jewish owners, only the properties smaller than 100 acres. The communist slogan was that the land belongs to the one who works it and it was considered that the Jews never involved in working the land. Meyer et al., 1953: 186). The authors underline that the

Jews in Hungary encountered difficulties also with the restitution of apartments in towns which were given before to Hungarian Nazi party members and whom the new regime tried to convince to cooperate. In Romania, the Jews received back their civil rights. The racial laws were abolished. But as in Hungary, the Jews encountered difficulties in receiving back their properties. Also a decree from December 1944 maintained the restoration of Jewish property to its owners, in locations where there were functioning schools, shops, factories, the Jews could return only if they had lived before in those locations. (Meyer et al., 1953: 186) Also, the Jews could practice any job, in reality, in the first years after the war, they accepted bad paid jobs or they were working on the black market in Bucharest on Lipsyani street. (Meyer et al., 1953: 186) The authors underline that, without any help of the state, the Jewish community was assisted after the war by the Joint Distribution Committee.

As in the study mentioned above, in his work, *Anti-semitism without Jews. Communist Eastern Europe* (Lendvai, 1971), Paul Lendvai makes a description of the situation of Jews in the communist space. (Lendvai, 1971: 309) For Hungary, the author explains that Rakosi was the communist leader most interested in destroying the Zionist organizations of Jews in communist space. The author explains that the Jews were also victims in this period. In 1951, when Rakosi government tried to eliminate the capitalists and the middle class and deported them, it was estimated that the Jews represent one third from the tens of thousands of deportees. In Romania, the Jews were supporters of the communist regime. In 1921, at its founding, the Romanian communist party was dominated by Jews, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians. The most representative Jew in power was Ana Pauker, but she was released from power in 1952 as a consequence of Romanization of Romanian communism. (Lendvai, 1971: 335).

In his study “A zsidókérdés a mai Magyar társadalomban” (The Jewish problem in Hungarian society of the present days) (Kovács, 1984: 3-14), Kovács András shows that in the publications of the years 1945-1948, the so called Jewish problem and the persecution of Jews were a frequent topic. (Kovács, 1984: 3-14) But from 1948 on nobody talked about Jews. Like other authors, Kovács András tries to find other explanations for the adhesion of Hungarian Jews to communism. Parallel with the abolition of private property, most of the Jews lost their means of living. The Hungarian Jewry chose assimilation and found a place in the political bodies of governance or in state administration. For the Jews, the presence of the Red Army in Hungary was a reason for happiness, not for fear (Kovács, 1984: 7). They were considered as foreigners as the author explains. And they did not understand the danger in which Hungary was. (Kovács, 1984: 7) The massive presence of Jews in leading positions of Hungary of Jewry can be explained, as the author considers, by the fact that they were skilled people, specialized and had a good reputation.

In his article “Szociológiai Kísérlet a Magyar zsidóság 1945 és 1956 közötti helyzetének elemzésére” (Sociological experiment with regard to the analysis of the situation of Hungarian Jewry in the years 1945-1946), in *Zsidóság az 1945 utáni Magyarországon*, (Karádi, 1984). Viktor Karady furnishes statistical data with regard to Hungarian Jewry. The study contains also new approaches, as the author shows that the historiography of subjects related to Jewry was always influenced by an official censorship. The data which Karádi furnishes are provisional, they refer to the territory of Hungary in the time of the monarchy or the interwar period. The data after the Second World War are not complete because, after the deportation, not all the Jews returned, some emigrated to Western Europe or America, so it is not known how many of them

were still alive. In 1949, in Hungary the Zionist movement was banned and all the Zionist leaders were arrested.

In his work, *Second exodus/ The full story of Jewish Illegal Immigration to Palestine, 1945- 1948* (Hadari, 1991), Ze'ev Venia Hadari shows that in Germany a big number of foreigners existed at the end of the war and their way back home was a problem: "Only in Germany, was more of ten million of non- Jews at that date, a big part of them were war prisoners, together with prisoner of work and concentration camps". (Hadari, 1991: 9) The author shows that the Jews from Romania and Hungary emigrated because of the new economic processes imposed of communism and discrimination to which they were subjected.

In his work, *Hungarian Jewry during the Holocaust and after liberation*, Tamás Stark (Stark, 1994: 243- 247) shows that the National Committee of Liberation of Deported Persons furnished data of 74 657 people which returned until September 1945. (Stark, 1994: 245) He offers data about Jewish population before the German occupation of Hungary which was approximatively 800 000 individuals on the territory of Hungary from the time of the war, the number of Hungarian Jews at liberation was 224 000 in Hungary from the time of the war, and during 1945- 1946 the number of Hungarian Jews was 365 000. (Stark, 1994: 248)

Bernard Wasserstein in his study *Vanishing Diaspora. The Jews in Europe since 1945*, is one of the numerous authors who offer data about the Jewry from Hungary and Romania after 1945. (Wasserstein, 1996: 1-158) He shows that the Jewish population from Hungary in 1946 was 145 000 in Romania and in Romania in the same time was 420 000. (Wasserstein, 1996: VIII). He talks about the last victims of Stalin in the period 1945- 1953, his last years, whose politics reverberated in all communist countries. In this period in Hungary the teaching of Jewish language is suppressed in 1949, in Romania 122 Jewish schools were taken over by the state in 1948.

Harry Kuller wrote the article *Presă evreiască bucureșteană 1857- 1994/ The Jewish press from Bucharest 1857- 1994*. (Kuller, 1996: 188) The paper has an innovative character, it includes data concerning Jewish press in the period 1945- 1953. After August 23 1944, the Jewish press of Romania reflected the situation of the Jews during the war: the condition of Jews in Transnistria, the robberies and assassinations committed by the Iron Guards and the supporters of Hitler and anti- Jewish legislation. Zionism was largely debated in the press.

Harry Kuller in the work *Opt studii despre istoria evreilor din România/ Eight studies on the history of the Jews in Romania* (Kuller, 1997: 5-45) dedicates one study to the process of emigration of the Romanian Jews. He furnishes data about the Jews in Romania. In 1947 there were still 428 312 Jews living in Romania, and from 1945 there have been emigrating about 400 000 Jews to Israel and Western Europe. (Kuller, 1997: 19) Among the reasons of emigration, the author talks about the fact that the new system inaugurated in Romania after 1945, the communism, was different from the lifestyle of most Jews: "The perspective of a "collective" and bureaucratic – centralized commanded work did not seem to be on the "taste" of a population which practiced since a long time the spirit of competition, competitiveness, the respect of propriety, etc. The ideal of the reconstruction of an own state was not on the last place, but the voice of siren of the communism tried to pursue, without massive effect, that only in a Marxist – Leninist order the Jewish problem would be fully solved". (Kuller, 1996: 47)

Raphael Patai considers in the work *The Jews of Hungary. History. Culture, psychology*, (Patai, 1996: 596- 659) like other authors who approached the topic of

Hungarian Jewry, that while the Jews considered the coming of Red Army a salvation, the Hungarians considered it a defeat. It was very difficult for Jews and Christians to cooperate, considering the fact that before the war and in the period of Holocaust, anti-Semitism was encouraged. Stalin did not impose the immediate implementation of communism in Hungary. Anti-Semitism continued to exist, the Jews were considered as different also in the communist era, in spite of the effort they made to assimilate.

Tamás Stark offers in his study “a Magyar zsidóság veszedelme a vészorszakban (The losses of Hungarian Jewry during the Holocaust)” offers also statistical data with regard to the human losses suffered by the Jews in the period of Holocaust. The data are provided with approximation, but especially useful. (Stark, 1997: 521- 531)

The author Stephen J. Roth, in his study “Indemnification of Hungarian victims of Nazism: An Overview” (Roth, 1997: 733- 757) writes about the actions which were adopted in Hungary in the period 1945- 1948 with the goal of compensation for the Hungarian Jewry who suffered material and human losses during the Holocaust. These measures did not confer compensations for persons, but also restored the Jews in their material rights. (Roth, 1997: 741) After a decree in 1945 the Jews were acknowledge their propriety rights, at least in the field of agriculture and horticulture. (Roth, 1997) But the author underlines that the mobile goods, equipments, the stocks of Jewish factories were never given back and cash deposits lost value as a consequence of inflation. (Roth, 1997: 742) The author shows that the Jews were compensated in other ways, not as individuals, but as community through the formation of National Jewish Fund for Rehabilitation which was founded on November 15, 1946 and was offering assistance to the Jewish victims or to institution which were working in their service, this fund being the beneficiary of the property of the disappeared Jews from Hungary. The Treaty of Peace of Paris was promising compensation to the victims of religious and racial persecutions and, in the same time, the properties of the victims had to be transferred to the representative of their communities. (Roth, 1997: 742-743)

Andrei Corbea in his study *Antisemitismul – o permanență a istoriei est-europene?* (Antisemitism – a permanence of Eastern – European History) (Corbea, 1997: 210 – 213) asserted that the study of the history of Jews did not took into consideration the particularities of Eastern Europe, the internal factors which generated anti-Semitic excesses in this part of the continent. Andrei Corbea explains the latent anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe as being a consequence of a historical continuity: “Besides of what was known in the Occident – and to a sufficient extent- about the anti-Semitic component in the politics of communist regimes, since Stalinist purges from the period 1948- 1953 until the “anti-Zionism” encountered after 1967 in the countries from the Warsaw Pact (with the notable exception of Romania), an interesting and troubling idea appeared first of all in the historian’s debate: may it be possible that, in spite of all dramatical ruptures which characterized the events that happened in the history of the countries from Eastern Europe, a line of continuity exists which maintains, at least in the field of social, collective representations, a latent tension between “national” element (respectively native) and the “foreign”, incorporated in this geographical area by Jews and Jewry?”. (Corbea, 1997: 211)

In his research, “Dr. W. Filderman și problema Palestinei” (Dr. W. Filderman and the problem of Palestine”), Șlomo Leibovici Laiș bring into discussion two personalities of the Romanian Judaism: A.L. Zissu and W. Filderman. (Laiș, 1998: 282- 294) About A.L. Zissu, the president of Jewish Party and of the Zionist organization it was told that he was Zionist while about W. Filderman, leading the Union of Romanian Jewry and the Federation of Jewish Communities, it was said that he was not a Zionist and that he

militates for the rights of Jews in Romania. The author shows through documents that Filderman, an important leader of the Jews in Romania, whom the communists abandoned after the war, was a Zionist, too.

Gheorghe Onișoru, in his study, “Evreii și problemele României “democrat – populare”, 1944- 1948” (Onișoru, 1998: 295- 309) explains that although there had been a number of Jewish communists in Romania, it was wrong to assert that Jews brought communism to Romania. He shows that in the North- West of Transylvania in the year 1944, the Hungarian government oppressed the Jews and Romanians. He asserts an idea acknowledged by other authors, namely, that the Jewish Democratic Committee, dominated by the communists, was against the immigration to Israel, thus, opposing to Zionist movement. (Onișoru, 1998: 306).

Carol Bines elaborates in *Din istoria imigrărilor în Israel/ From the history of immigration to Israel 1882- 1995*. The author talks about “alia”, the movement of emigration of Jews to Palestine, the later Israel. (Bines, 1998) The author asserts that he years 1948 – 1951 were the years of mass emigration when Jews from Romania increased the number of Jewish population in Palestine with 18%.

Vera Ranki, in the study *The politics of inclusion and exclusion. Jews and nationalism in Hungary* shows that 600 000 of Jews, more than two thirds of the number of Hungarian Jews died in the Holocaust. (Ranki, 1999: 189- 220) The Jews were confronted with two problems after the war: (1) – unlike the Hungarians they saw in the coming of Red Army in 1945, an act of liberation, their suffering ending in the same time with the German defeat. (2) – A high number of Jews adhered to the communist party, understanding that the new system brought the abolition of social inequalities, of oppression but also of anti- Semitism, being accused that they brought the communism in Hungary.

Theodor Wexler, in the study “Procesele sioniștilor” (The Zionists Trials) describes the situation existent in the years 1952-1953 when Romanian communists decided to solve once and for all the “problem of Zionists”. Until 1959 around 250 of Zionists had been arrested and investigated on.

Tamás Stark, in the work *The Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust and after the second world war, 1939- 1945: A statistical review*, (Stark, 2000: 1- 174) shows that a comparison between Gulag and Holocaust can not be made especially not in term of numbers. He refers in this paper both to the situation of Hungarian Jewry during the Holocaust, but also after the war. He writes about the emigration of Jews after the war, furnishing, illustrative tabels for this aspect. The number of Jews found outside their home countries was higher in Germany than in Austria and France. Another table furnishes the total number of emigrants to Palestina in the years 1945- 1948. For the years 1946- 1948 the total number of immigrants was 61 023. (Stark, 2000: 158) Another table furnishes data about the number of immigrants to Palestina, both from Hungary and from Romania in the years 1919 – 1961. In the period 1946- 1955, 17 000 persons from Hungary and 124 500 of Romania arrived in Israel. (Stark, 2000: 160).

In his work, *Magyarság, zsidóság (Hungarians, Jews)*, Ferenc Fejto tells that in Hungary, after the war, the condition of Jews was not perceived in a negative manner anymore, unlike the one of bourgeoisie. The Jews returned from deportation were the most interested in abandonment of fascism and democratization. For them communism represented the chance of a new life. The Jews were more cultivated than Hungarian proletarians who were ready to get new positions and, thus, had an advantage. (Fejto, 2000: 284) The author describes the Hungarian leader of Jewish origin, the prime

secretary of the communist party, Rákosi Mátyás, as formed in Russia in Bolshevik spirit. He took over the pattern of Stalin. On the other side we see the figure of Nagy Imre, a Menshevik, of democrat orientation which played an important role in the agrarian reform of 1945.

Also Péter Kende writes about the condition of Hungarian Jewry in the work “Zsidó Magyarország (1867- 1997)”/ *The Jewish Hungary (1867-1997)*. The author underlines that, because of what happened in the years 1941- 1945, a lot of Jews left Hungary, but a good part also remained in the country. Some consider that the Jews that remained in Hungary took revenge on Hungarians. (Kende, 2001) Their affinity towards Hungarian culture was high. It could be a mistake to assert that the Jews brought the communism in Hungary, asserts the author, because both the Jews and the non - Jews militated for the implementation of the new system.

Robert Levy focuses his attention on the case of the Jews that became members of the communist structures, namely Ana Pauker in his study *Gloria și decadența Anei Pauker/ The glory and decadence of Ana Pauker*. (Levy, 2002). The case of Ana Pauker was ignored in the Jewish historiography, explains the author, being considered a case similar to the one of other non genuine Jews who separated from community because of their communist affinities. The author focuses on the role played by Ana Pauker during the years 1947- 1952 when she functioned as minister of external affairs, pointing out the moment of her elimination in 1952, weakened by the illness she had, cancer.

Harry Kuller, in the work *Evreii în România anilor 1944- 1949 (The Jews of Romania during 1944- 1949)* (Kuller, 2002) shows the fact that not only the Jews were attracted by communism. Others joined the Communist Party ranks looking for protection and only a small number were communist party activists who separated from their religion and traditions and who came in the Jewish streets only for propaganda purposes in order to increase the number of Jewish members on Communist Party. The author militates for an integral approach of the history of Jews in Romania that includes material, mental, economic and political aspects, and also for a unitary and/or parallel history: “But as I shown, the shaping of a history of a social – ethnical group, in our case of the Jews of Romania in the years 1944-1949, can not be limited only at revelation of “parallel” aspects or/and particular, as the above mentioned ones, but it requires their reference to the entire local historical phenomenology in that time and in connection with larger zonal and temporal areas. Because the resultant of the interactions between the Jewish – Romanian group and the local majority or other minorities, so as the reciprocal impact in all sectors of social – economical, political and cultural life are both problems of Romanian history. So, what is to be demonstrated (Logical and ontological) in an experiment of special history – so as the present one – is that the Jews of Romania had all the characteristics of an ethnic group and after August 23, 1944: the outcome from the years of persecution – 1940- 1944 – did not cause, as a consequence of that time, a dissolving assimilation under ethnical perspective as some leaders of “the left” including Jews, predicted. (Kuller, 2002: 16) The author reveals his point of view that the research of the history of Jews from Romania was a complex issue.

The collection of interviews *Memoria salvată. Evreii din Banat, ieri și azi (The saved memory. The Jews of Banat, yesterday and today)* coordinated by Smaranda Vultur is formed from a series of testimonies of the Jews from about their past and present. The interviews focused on the years of Stalinism in Romania, the Jews of Banat representing a small community today: “The Jews of Banat represent a community which do not surpass today, unfortunately, 400 – 500 persons, which live today in special in Timisoara, Lugoj

and Resita. A population, almost exclusively urban living in rural areas, with a few exceptions, especially in Northern Transylvania). The family history leads often to connection with Central Europe, but also with the Transylvanian one or, rarely with the one from Muntenia, Moldova, or Bucovina. Because of this the history of the place which interested us overpasses with the national and European history. The history of the two world wars, the one of expansions of left and right totalitarianism in twentieth century, of anti-Semitism, of the creation of the state of Israel, of Zionism interpheres with personal and community history". (Vultur, 2002: 9-465).

In the work of Victor Karadi, *The Jews of Europe in the modern era. A socio-historical outline*, it is revealed from a larger sociological perspective the situation of European Jewry after 1945. (Karadi, 2004: 1-452) In the opinion of the author, the Jewry had a particular place in communism. Unlike other authors which approached the problem of restitution of Jewish propriety, the author concludes that this was not sufficiently given back to the Jews, in reality a lot of non-Jews remained the owners of Jewish goods. (Karadi, 2004: 393). The author's opinion it was that it existed a collaboration between the nationalists of communist countries and communist Jews, considers the author. After the war, the communists minimized Holocaust and Jewish sufferings. (Karadi, 2004: 395)

Liviu Rotman in the work *Evreii din România în perioada comunistă 1944- 1965 (The Jews of Romania in the communist period 1944- 1965)* furnishes demographical data with regard to the Jewish community before and after the Holocaust. (Rotman, 2004). He describes the activity of Jewish Democratic Committee. He emphasises two events of great importance for the history of Jews from the communist zone: "Slansky trial" after which the general secretary of the communist party of Czechoslovakia, Rudolf Slanski is arrested together with thirteen people among whom three were not Jews under the accusation of Zionism, and the "blue gown affairs" from Soviet Union, when a lot of medics from USSR were accused for death of some Soviet leaders.

Andrei Oișteanu is one of those authors who underline the existent prejudices about Jews in Romanian collective mentality in the work *Imaginea evreului în cultura română (The image of the Jew in Romanian culture)*. (Oișteanu, 2004) The author underlines the stereotypes which existed in Romania with regards to Jews. He mentions in popular and classical Romanian literature negative aspects with regard to Jews which were criticized for their appearance, alterity and their traditions. The conclusion which follows is that proverbial Romanian tolerance can be put under a question mark.

Aleksandr Soljenitin offers an image of ensemble on the condition of Jews from the Soviet Union, a country who influenced the history of Romania after the second world war in the work *Două secole împreună. Evreii și rușii în epoca sovietică (1917-1972) (Two centuries together. The Jews and the Russians in communist epoch)*. (Soljenitin, 2004). The most important years are the years of Stalin because what happened in Moscow could not remain without consequences in Eastern Europe. The politics of the USSR towards the Jews reverberated in all the communist block. The last years of Stalin were marked by a campaign against the cosmopolitan Jews, the elimination of the Jews from Russian public sphere and the end of the Jewish Antifascist Committee.

Lya Benjamin, (Benjamin, 2004) such as other authors, approaches the problem of demographic data with regard to the Jews of Romania in the work *Populația evreiască din România în cifre și date (până în 1948) (Jewish population in figures and datas (until 1948)*. She furnishes tables concerning the situation of Jewry from Romania until 1942, but there are also a few numbers about the period that followed. In the years 1948-1988 around 95% of the total number of Jews have left off the country. (Benjamin, 2004: 147).

The emigration happened during the waves so that in 1948 – 1953 one third emigrated, and during 1948 – 1964 another third did as like. After 1965 the last wave of Jews emigrated. For comparison, we can say that if in Romania in 1947 they were still living 428 312 Jews, after the census of January 7, 1992, there were still living in Romania 9000 of Jews. (Benjamin, 2004).

Harry Kuller, in the article *Evreii în anii tranziției spre comunism (1944- 1948) / The Jews in the years of transition to communism* reveals us that after the Second World War, in Romania, the Jews oscillated between integration and immigration. The author makes the portrait of the postwar years: “The years 1945- 1949 were thus years of expectations and confrontations – between bodies and organizations, between their leaders, followed by larger or smaller groups. It was an open field, opened for positions and oppositions, for diverse solutions and usual adversities. A state of democracy, some would say, in a paradox manner, the general social – political trend of the country was not leading towards democracy. At the horizon a socialism of Soviet nature was noticeable, there were Jews who desired it, others who tried to avoid it, making compromise in order to survive, until emigration; at last a lot of them decided to remain in the place where they were born no matter what conditions they had. None of the above mentioned category did not “bring” socialism to Romania. But they did not prevent its coming, because it would have been impossible”. (Kuller, 2004: 155)

Victor Newman, in the study *Evreii în anii regimului comunist/ The Jews in the years of communist regime*, makes an account of the Jewish population of Romania that was about 428 312 persons from which 150 000 were active. (Newmann, 2004: 174- 180) As other authors who understood the Jews, he describe the condition of Jews under communism which he analyses as community: “The re- evaluation of the condition of Jews under communism means to know the social and intellectual stratification, but also the motivations which stayed at the base of ideational options. The political and cultural Zionism from everywhere (with a good and longstanding activity in modern Romania) had an out of ordinary impact on the local Jews. Propaganda and Zionist organizations were forbidden – a lot of leaders being imprisoned” (Newmann, 2004: 176). The author shows that the Jews continued to militate to emigrate in Israel during the communist years and rejected communist egalitarianism.

Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid and Mihail E. Ionescu (ed) in their collective work *Raport final/ Final report*, are some from the very few authors who approached the Jewish problem reflected in Romanian historiography before 1989. (Friling, Ioanid & Ionescu, 2005) The purpose is to approach the degree of guilt of Romania towards its Jews in the period of the Holocaust, but there is also a chapter in which it is shown that, in the postwar – period in Romania, the Holocaust was distorted, negated and minimized. From the attitude towards the Holocaust, it can be noticed also the attitude of the Romanian state towards its Jews in the communist period.

Carol Iancu in the work *Miturile fondatoare ale Antisemitismului. Din Antichitate până în zilele noastre/ The founding myths of antisemitism* makes a portrait of the situation of the Jews from Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR. (Iancu, 2005) Among the Hungarian Jewish communists, the author gives the example of Rákosi. For the Jews from Romania the author considers that most of them were not communists, but emigrated to Israel.

Radu Ioanid deals with an important problem in the study *Răscumpărarea evreilor: Istoria acordurilor secrete dintre România și Israel/ The ransom of the Jews: the history of the agreements between Romania and Israel*. (Ioanid, 2005) The author focuses

on the movement of emigration of the Jews to the holy land, Israel from 1948, a movement that had its beginnings at the end of XIX th century until the end of the presidency of Ceausescu. The position of Romania towards the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel was in conformity with the position of USSR which, from 1946, was in favor of emigration in Palestine. The author signalized the important role played by the chief rabbi of Romania, Moses Rosen in emigration and continuity of Jewish community. He draws the attention on a shameful event which happened in communist Romania and this was the sale of the Romanian Jews to the state of Israel, an objective achieved with the consent of communist authorities.

Balász Ablonczy in the work *La fin d'une monde? Les élites hongroises face à l'installation du régime communiste* (Ablonczy, 2006: 57-71) shows that the bourgeoisie to which the interwar elites belonged to was often of Jewish origin. This bourgeoisie was purged and a lot of people considered the communists more evil than Hitler. (Ablonczy, 2006: 63) The elites of the interwar period were deported, no matter of their ethnical origin.

Arpad von Klimó, in the article *Detruire la source symbolique du pouvoir: la stalinisation de la culture historique des elites hongroises*, (Klimó, 2006: 73-84) shows from a cultural perspective the situation of Hungarian elites in Stalin's epoch. The Hungarian constitution, says the author, consented the dependency of Hungary to Soviet Union and the liberty of Hungary was understood after the Soviet model. In the Stalinist epoch the historical culture of Hungarian elites was inspired after the Soviet model and it offered legitimacy to the regime imposed by Rakosi, being based on Stalinist cultural model that was based on the opposition between good and bad. (Klimó, 2006: 93)

Viktor Karady was one of the prominent authors that approached the subject of the relations of Jews in communism in the study "Les Juifs, la modernité et la tentation communiste. Esquisse d'une problématique d'histoire sociale". (Karady, 2006: 85- 105) The author tries to explain why the Jews voted for communism after the war. Karady explains these secret adhesion through the character of modernity, to the attraction of Jews for the situation of separating from the past, for separating the inherited Judaism. The laicity, the scientific atheism of communism, the collectivism were other elements of attraction for Jews. (Karady, 2006: 104-105). In other words, the communism offered to the Jews the chance of a new life.

Catherine Horel in the work "1989 en Europe Centrale, une restauration des élites juives" (Horel, 2006: 335- 351) underlines the condition of Jewish elites during the communist years. She mentions the trend of Jewish elites to assimilate, to get closer to the dominant political trend, communism. (Horel, 2006: 336) In their try to adjust to communist system values, the Jews renegated pretty often their identity. The author shows that the communist nomenclature was to a great extent formed of Jews, in the 1950 the main political leaders were Jews: Mátyás Rákósi, Ernő Gerő, Mihály Farkas, József Révai, Zoltán Vas and Gábor Péter. (Horel, 2006) In the same time a lot of Jews were part of the political police.

Dan Danieli in the study "Interviews with survivors of the Hungarian Forced Labor Service: An Evaluation" (Danieli, 2006: 63-75) took some interviews with survivors of the Hungarian concentration camps. He underlines the need to re- create the history of the units of the concentration camps. The information does not have a unity in its character because of the sufferings of the interviewees which generates inconsequences.

The next paper is situated with objectivity on the line of the studies which put the responsibility for Holocaust not only on German shoulders, but also to the Allied Axis Powers. Gábor Kádár and Zoltán Vági (Kádár& Vági, 2006: 63-75) in their research "The

economic annihilation of the Hungarian Jews, 1944- 1945” underlines that not only the German fascists maintained in Hungary anti- Jewish legislation but also a lot of Hungarians who were dreaming of Jewish property”. (Kádár& Vági, 2006: 77) On May 1944 in Hungary the Minister of Justice enacted a law which was pursuing the annihilation of the presence of Jews from economic life. For their fortunes, the Jews were provided the existence in ghettos, the author naming this policy “self financing genocide”. (Kádár& Vági, 2006: 78) On the other hand, the deportation of Hungarian Jews lasted 8-9 months and, in consequence, it was impossible for the Hungarian state to take over all the Jewish fortune. A part of goods was left in the care of local administration and, in consequence, the officials of the villages, local police and gendarmeries robbed some Jewish goods. The Jewry, received back only a small part of these goods after the war. After the war the restitution did not happened immediately because of the tensions that appeared between the new and old owners. ((Kádár& Vági, 2006: 86).

In the work of Daniel A. Lowy “Christian help provided to Jews of Northern Transylvania during World War II: As revealed by the Jewish weekly *Egység* (May 1946 – August 1947)”, it is shown that the salvation of Jews by diplomats did not take place in this area, but the leaders of the churches played an important role in salvation of Jews. (Lowy, 2006:113- 135). For the same time there are mentioned salvations of Jews with the participation of International Committee of the Red Cross. The newspaper where these problems are reflected, *Egység*, is a newspaper published from May 1946 until March 1949. The newspaper became, after 1948, communist. In time, the political reasons determined about which saviours could be written and about which not. (Lowy, 2006: 128)

In the study of Jean Ancel, “The She’erit ha – Pletah: Holocaust survivors in Northern Transylvania” it is mentioned that at the end of 1944, a lot of survivors of concentration camps also from the neighbouring countries arrived in Transylvania. (Ancel, 2006:155-165) After the liberation of the city of Cluj the Democratic Association of Jews was founded and similar associations have been constituted also in other liberated cities. The association helped the survivors of Holocaust materially and has as purpose the restauration of Jewish property. The Jewish communities organized themselves in Transylvania with 56 being in existence at the end of 1945. With the help of Zionist organizations, the association helped to the return of a large number of Jews to Transylvania. (Ancel, 2006: 157) As a conclusion, the author shows that although a lot of Jews reintegrated in Romania, they could not escape too easily from the nightmare of Holocaust who terrorized their lives.

Alice Freifeld in the work “Identity on the move: Hungarian Jewry between Budapest and DP Camps, 1945- 1948” explains that, on the way to camps of dislocated Jews after the Second World War, Budapest was a station and most Jews of these camps were Hungarian Jews. Hungary had around of 80 000 of Jews at the end of the war. (Freifeld, 2006:177) The soviet soldiers played an important role in the salvation of Hungarian Jews which were not deported yet. So the Jews regarded the Red Army as a liberating force while Hungarian ethnics considered that the coming of Soviet in 1945 was a defeat and a calamity. (Freifeld, 2006: 179). After the war, the Hungarian identity was based on the blind imitation of Moscow, while the Hungarian Jews had separated themselves from their lives and their bourgeois ideals. (Freifeld, 2006: 197)

Maria Ghitta, in the article “Problema evreiască” în *România ieri și azi. Câteva considerații / The Jewish problem in Romania yesterday and today. A few considerations*” describes shortly a few characteristics of communist historiography: “The school books, the historiography, mass media were the image of a history of Romanians according to which they

never attacked other nations, being forced, in numerous occasions, to defend themselves of waves of foreign invaders. The Romanian people (entire and abstract) was (then) and had always been tolerant, hospitable, but firm in defending “the needs and nation”, according to the famous expression of Romanian national poet Mihai Eminescu”. The historical writing was hardened after 1989 because of some topics that came up in the last years that “the Jews brought the communism”, “the innocence of the Iron guard”, “rehabilitation of Antonescu”, “negation/ minimization of the Holocaust”. (Ghita, 2006: 185).

These considerations made us believe that the living conditions and the life of Jews from Romania and Hungary during the years 1945-1953 were far from good. Anti-semitism continued to exist in post- Holocaust world, their human rights were restrained, their property too less returned. For the post 1989 years it is necessary a more tolerant policy of Romania and Hungary towards minorities in general and Jews in particular, a pluralist education with respects for tolerance and diversity, a society where human rights and minorities’ rights are protected.

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# PROLÉGOMÈNES À UNE THÉORIE COSMOSYSTÉMIQUE. L'APPROCHE COSMOSYSTÉMIQUE DE L'HISTOIRE ET L'HELLÉNISME<sup>1</sup>

*Georges CONTOGEOORGIS\**

**Abstract.** *This comparative vision of anthropocentric character at global scale and the demonstration with regard to the rise of anthropocentrism of Hellenic cosmosystem do not mean a return to the small scale of Cosmos. The edification at the grand Cosmos scale is not a given fact, but a capital positive evolution in the sense of progress.*

*But the deepening of the cosmosysteme nature of social phenomenon will allow to modernity to conquer the necessary self- knowledge concerning his antropocentric stage, it will make possible to meet the history on new bases, it will conduce to a new periodization of continuous evolution of human being and, in consequence, it will facilitate the ellaboration of a project for the future which will reconcile the notion of progress with the notion of anthropocentric development.*

**Keywords:** *modernity, cosmosystem, periodisation, Marx, freedom, despotic cosmosystem, anthropocentric cosmosystem, labour*

## ***1. La base cosmothéorique de la modernité***

Le problème que soulève l'approche du devenir historique de l'être humain réside essentiellement dans l'absence d'un «argument» qui prendrait en considération les paramètres fondamentaux qui le constituent et lui confèrent sa cohésion en tant qu'universalité. La modernité, admirative devant les réalisations liées à l'édification de l'anthropocentrisme à grande échelle cosmosystémique, mais peu préparée à affronter le monde avec suffisamment de maturité gnoséologique et méthodologique, a choisi de promouvoir son paradigme en «mesure» et «modèle» de la vie humaine. Ainsi n'a-t-elle pas hésité à conclure que l'évolution, en tant que développement anthropocentrique, s'arrêtait à son propre acquis, exempté de ce fait de toute expérimentation comparative avec le passé.

Avec cette constante pour axe directeur, l'approche du devenir social suit forcément les éclaircissements fragmentaires ou partiels des domaines de la science qui prétendent l'étudier (la sociologie, la politique, l'économie, le droit, etc.), étudier ses réalisations événementielles ou, enfin, d'autres de ses dimensions selon une dominante thématique (la religion par exemple, ou le «capitalisme», la «lutte sociale», etc.), géopolitique (la Méditerranée, l'Asie, etc.) ou spatio-temporelle (le Moyen Âge, etc.).

Ce qui distingue toutes ces «optiques» de l'histoire, c'est l'absence de démarche réellement globale – même si presque toutes les écoles de pensée prétendent en posséder une – et, partant, l'absence de synthèse du devenir social sous l'angle de sa cause, c'est-à-

<sup>1</sup> In *Le cosmosystème hellénique*. t. A` *La période statocentrique*, Éd. Sideris, Athènes, 2006, pp. 25-65.

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dire de sa nature véritable. Et les difficultés sont encore accrues par l'obstination de la modernité à exclure la diachronie de la démarche comparative de la science sociale.

C'est ainsi que, pour elle, le temps est le temps global de l'histoire et non le temps du phénomène universel. Cela est confirmé par le choix d'une *périodisation* qui suit linéairement l'horizon historique, avec la «force» pour résultante. L'approche du devenir social en termes de «force» est assurément révélatrice du caractère primaire de l'optique et, par voie de conséquence, du caractère lacunaire de cette démarche qui juge l'évolution anthropocentrique sous l'angle de l'histoire. Le rattachement de la «force» au fait ethnique traduit également le choix fait par la modernité de projeter son acquis sur le passé comme argument interprétatif de l'évolution. Et finalement, même les écoles de pensée qui ont tenté de constituer le discours de l'histoire sur le critère du «mode de production», comme par exemple le marxisme et sa version post-marxiste ou libérale, n'ont su échapper à cette incongruité.

Ces écoles sont essentiellement axiologiques; elles se distinguent d'une vision linéaire de l'histoire qui aboutit à une justification globale de la modernité. C'est ainsi que le vécu historique d'une simple région géographique – le continent européen en l'occurrence – est-il élevé au rang de véhicule de l'évolution en général et, au-delà, de périodisation de l'humanité. Dans ce cadre, le progrès suit également une évolution linéaire et marque l'univers entier.

Le cas du schéma marxiste est hautement caractéristique. Karl Marx est le premier des modernes à avoir élaboré une cosmothéorie achevée du devenir social. Sa proposition part de l'hypothèse que le phénomène social reflète le «mode de production» qui domine à une époque donnée de l'histoire. La succession des différents «modes de production» détermine donc les stades successifs de l'évolution, qui correspondent à leur tour à autant de degrés du progrès.

Dans ce cadre, Marx distingue la société esclavagiste, la société féodale, la société capitaliste et la société socialiste. Dans son schéma, la société esclavagiste (et le «mode de production» qui y est attaché) est jugée antérieure et inférieure à la société féodale (et au «mode de production» qui l'accompagne), de même que la société capitaliste par rapport à la société socialiste.

Ce n'est pas ici le lieu de montrer en détail la fragilité de cet édifice marxiste et de ses effets collatéraux. Il suffit, à titre d'exemple, de signaler que dans son système de pensée, les sociétés de la cité grecque sont inférieures, en tant que stade esclavagiste, aux sociétés féodales du Moyen Âge européen; que la «société du travail» représente un stade supérieur à celui de la «société du loisir» ou, *a fortiori*, de la «société partenariale»; enfin, que «le travail marchandise» reflète un système de travail inférieur, car antérieur, au travail du servage du despotisme. Mais quant à comprendre comment un «mode de production» pré-féodal et, par conséquent, une forme antérieure d'organisation sociale telle celle de la cité-État ont pu créer une littérature scientifique et une pensée qu'il tient lui-même pour insurpassables, alors que la féodalité a produit une atmosphère intellectuellement asphyxiante, ce sont là des questions qui ne semblent pas arrêter Marx<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> De même, la cité est identifiée à l'économie monétaire, tandis que le domaine féodal ignore formellement la monnaie et les activités inhérentes à celle-ci. D'autre part, le cas de Byzance, d'un côté, est assimilé à l'histoire de l'économie monétaire, c'est-à-dire à un système qui se situe aux antipodes de la féodalité, et de l'autre, est classé comme Moyen Âge, à savoir comme féodalité. Il est clair que le cas de Byzance soulève d'autres questions très importantes, telles celle de la religion et de ses différences avec celle du Moyen Âge occidental. Pour une première approche, voir G. Contogeorgis, «La modernité, la tradition et le projet de progrès», dans

Pourtant, le principal problème du schéma marxiste est qu'il pêche logiquement. La société «esclavagiste» et la société féodale se distinguent quant au «mode de production». Toutefois, ledit mode de production «esclavagiste» – et plus précisément celui du «travail marchandise» – est non pas antérieur mais manifestement postérieur au «mode de production» féodal ou despotique. En tant que «mode de production», il s'inscrit dans le cosmosystème anthropocentrique à petite échelle et non dans le cosmosystème despotique comme le servage. De même, entre la société socialiste et la société capitaliste n'intervient pas un «mode de production» différent mais une organisation différente du même «mode de production». Leur différence est donc, sur ce point, morphologique et non pas typologique, indépendamment du fait que le cours de leur évolution se situe aux antipodes de celui que Marx avait imaginé. Le projet socialiste apparaît historiquement là où la transition du despotisme à l'anthropocentrisme s'avère sans issue, et précède donc, c'est-à-dire prépare en quelque sorte la transition capitaliste.

L'impasse de la vision cosmothéorique de Marx ressort également de sa certitude que l'abolition des classes conduirait à l'abolition de l'État et donc de la politique. Cette hypothèse surprend le grand penseur en flagrant délit d'ignorance, non seulement quant à la nature du phénomène politique en soi mais aussi quant au paradigme anthropocentrique majeur de la cité-État, dont a résulté l'abolition de l'État en tant que schéma institutionnel qui possédait la politique, sans abolition des classes. Il est évident que l'abolition de la politique ne va pas de pair avec l'abolition de l'État mais avec l'abolition de la société en tant qu'entité politéienne.

Les visions post-marxistes, libérales ou non, de l'histoire simplifient davantage encore la problématique. Elles distinguent en gros entre *sociétés traditionnelles* – dans lesquelles s'inscrivent les sociétés d'Afrique qu'a rencontrées la colonisation, les despotismes asiatiques historiques mais aussi les sociétés grecques des cités – et *sociétés industrielles*, c'est-à-dire les sociétés de l'époque moderne.

Dans la foulée, et en un sens pour lever cette problématique, est apparue dernièrement une nouvelle philosophie de l'histoire, fondée sur la «civilisation», qui pourtant est assimilée à la religion. La religion «décide» des perspectives de développement économique d'un pays, de sa capacité démocratique, etc. En même temps, ladite chrétienté occidentale (catholique et protestante) s'interpose comme «mesure» pour juger du fonds «progressiste» des autres religions ou même du dogme chrétien. En tout cas, et indépendamment des préférences géopolitiques de cette école, il est manifeste que le signifiant est transformé en signifié et même en cause efficiente du comportement humain<sup>3</sup>.

## **2. La notion de cosmosystème. La liberté, enjeu de la typologie cosmossystémique, et les paramètres qui en constituent les fondements**

Les remarques qui précèdent concernant la base cosmothéorique de la modernité donnent en tout cas une idée de l'impasse à laquelle elle mène. Du même coup, elles suggèrent la nécessité d'un paradigme cosmothéorique alternatif qui se concentrerait simultanément sur la diachronie et la synchronie de la vie sociale.

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Laokrati Vassi (dir.), *Tradition et modernisation en Grèce au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Athènes 2006. [Nos ouvrages cités dans ces notes sont en grec]

<sup>3</sup> Sur cet argument, son caractère non scientifique et ses prolongements dans l'interprétation de la conception du monde et de l'évolution, voir notre réponse au fondateur de la théorie, Samuel Huntington, reproduite dans plusieurs pays (France, Portugal, Espagne, Italie, etc.): G. Contogeorgis, *Le clergé. La mutation despotique de l'Église helladique*, Terzo Group, Athènes 2000 (et plus spécialement le chapitre intitulé «Civilisation 'religieuse' ou cosmossystémique?», p. 265-348).

Cependant, toute tentative en ce sens exige au préalable que l'on précise la «mesure» sur la base de laquelle sera définie la nature fondamentale de l'homme, de la société ou d'un ensemble de formations sociales. À notre avis, cette «mesure», quand on se réfère aux sociétés humaines, ne peut être que la liberté. La liberté ou la non-liberté font la différence entre les hommes ou les sociétés.

Mais la liberté ne fait pas l'unanimité quant à sa nature ni, par conséquent, à son contenu et à ses dimensions. Néanmoins, nul ne saurait nier qu'elle suggère l'étendue de l'*autonomie* des êtres humains et des entités sociales. Par conséquent, elle s'oppose à l'*hétéronomie*, qui constitue la mesure de la dépendance sociale de l'homme. Cette dépendance peut être volontaire (résultat d'un «contrat», c'est-à-dire d'une concession) ou involontaire, totale ou partielle, et engager par conséquent l'ensemble ou simplement certains aspects de la vie humaine.

Bien que la modernité ait une position clairement différente, c'est un fait que la question de la concession volontaire ou non de l'autonomie concerne exclusivement la base légitimante de la relation sociale ou du système. Elle n'est pas liée à la liberté en soi qui, pour ce qui est de son existence, constitue une grandeur pragmatologique, c'est-à-dire mesurable.

L'autonomie (ou l'hétéronomie) partielle ou totale, quant à elle, détermine le type de système et ses aspects morphologiques plus achevés. Cela signifie que, de même que la relation volontaire d'hétéronomie ne constitue pas une liberté, de même l'individu social partiellement libre n'est pas globalement libre, puisque que le développement réel de sa liberté est en retrait par rapport à la liberté globale.

En ce sens, la substantiation des membres d'une société, avec pour signe la liberté individuelle, est la «mesure» pour classer cette société dans la catégorie de la liberté. Les sociétés constituées d'hommes libres *au moins* individuellement, nous les appelons *anthropocentriques*, tandis que celles dont les membres ne se substantialisent pas en prenant pour mesure la liberté, nous les appelons *sociétés de sujets* ou *sociétés despotiques*.

Prenant donc pour critère la liberté, nous sommes invités à classer le fait social dans son ensemble, le fait historique et le fait vécu. Les sociétés «anthropocentriques» composent une première globalité, les «sociétés de sujets» ou sociétés «despotiques» en constituent une autre. Chacune dispose d'une série de déterminants et de fondements communs qui la substantialisent, lui confèrent sa cohésion et dictent son évolution. À la globalité anthropocentrique correspond un type concret d'économie, de propriété, de structure et de relation sociales, de communication, de politique et d'idéologie, qui façonne ses paramètres. De même pour la globalité despotique. Nous définissons chacune de ces globalités comme un cosmosystème.

La genèse, l'existence et l'évolution de chacune de ces globalités, de chaque cosmosystème, n'est pas le résultat d'une conception ou d'une élaboration mentale ni d'une parthénogenèse. Elles dépendent de la nature et du développement de ses paramètres, qui se situent de ce fait au départ de son évolution.

Ces paramètres, et notamment leur influence sur la formation typologique du cosmosystème (anthropocentrique ou despotique) et par forme, dépendent finalement de l'échelle. C'est l'échelle qui définit le cadre du calibre social et par conséquent la base communicationnelle des paramètres du cosmosystème. Pour faire comprendre l'importance de l'échelle, notamment en ce qui concerne la transition anthropocentrique, l'exemple du paramètre économique est caractéristique: la société anthropocentrique à petite échelle, et donc le cosmosystème anthropocentrique homologue, présuppose une économie adaptée et à l'espèce du cosmosystème (en l'occurrence l'économie

«chrématistique») et à son échelle. Mais l'économie de type anthropocentrique de la petite échelle cosmosystémique ne suffit pas à fonctionner comme paramètre capable de mobiliser sur la grande échelle cosmosystémique le devenir anthropocentrique.

Cette constatation montre clairement aussi que la démarche comparative doit confronter tant l'espèce (de type despotique ou anthropocentrique) du paramètre que l'échelle du cosmosystème. Par conséquent, pour rester sur le même exemple, l'économie de type anthropocentrique de la grande échelle cosmosystémique, comparée à son homologue sur la petite échelle, doit être évaluée non pas quantitativement comme une grandeur absolue, mais au regard de son poids spécifique dans le développement anthropocentrique de la société correspondante.

Il est à préciser également que la notion de cosmosystème ne coïncide pas obligatoirement avec l'œcuméné planétaire. Le cosmosystème ne désigne pas le système de l'ensemble de la Terre mais, comme nous l'avons vu, un ensemble concret, sur le plan cohésif et fonctionnel, d'entités sociales. Il se peut donc qu'il existe sur Terre un seul cosmosystème – une espèce de société – ou que les deux coexistent, le cosmosystème anthropocentrique et le cosmosystème despotique – chacun à un niveau différent d'évolution, sur l'ensemble de la Terre ou par région géographique. Le problème de la coexistence sur Terre des deux formes cosmosystémiques a en fait été posé par l'apparition du cosmosystème hellénique ou cosmosystème anthropocentrique à petite échelle. Mais il continué à se poser même après la montée du cosmosystème anthropocentrique à grande échelle, jusqu'à une époque récente.

Cela donne à comprendre que la notion de cosmosystème n'a rien à voir avec l'idée de «système mondial» (le «*world system*», par exemple) parfois utilisée de nos jours (voir Immanuel Wallerstein), ou avec d'autres symboles connexes (par exemple celui de la «mondialisation», du «village mondial», etc.) par lesquels on entreprend de rendre un aspect spécifique (par exemple l'économie) du cosmosystème anthropocentrique moderne<sup>4</sup>. Ceux qui étudient la modernité ne prétendent d'ailleurs pas proposer une cosmothéorie globale, capable d'interpréter le devenir planétaire actuel (quant à sa nature, ses fondements, ses paramètres, etc.), ni, *a fortiori*, l'intégrer à une vision cosmohistorique de la vie humaine.

On peut s'attendre à ce que la (re-)constitution cosmosystémique du devenir social se différencie des versions dominantes concernant la conception et la périodisation de l'histoire. Le temps cosmosystémique n'est pas linéaire, ce n'est pas le temps de l'histoire en général, il ne dépend pas de la «force», du «pouvoir» ou d'autres applications sectorielles de la politique ou de l'économie, etc. Le temps de l'histoire en général ne peut intéresser en soi le fait social ni, *a fortiori*, les relations de domination. Gengis Khan, Attila ou Charlemagne s'inscrivent dans un champ cosmosystémique différent de celui de Périclès, d'Alexandre le Grand ou de Constantin Paléologue. En d'autres termes, le temps de l'histoire est le temps de l'*anthropos* cosmosystémique. En cela, la périodisation de

<sup>4</sup> Il est à noter également que la science moderne introduit surtout des appellations de phénomènes qui n'ont aucun rapport avec leur nature. Des notions telles que modernité, tradition, mondialisation, modernisation, etc., sont en réalité dépourvues de contenu. En outre, leur lien avec le progrès n'est pas défini, ni, par extension, puisqu'il est question de sociétés humaines, avec la liberté. Un sens leur est conféré par référence au modèle de la modernité, et notamment de ladite société «occidentale», et elles sont évaluées en conséquence. Aux antipodes, un approche strictement scientifique s'occuperait de la constitution de catégories conceptuelles et gnoséologiques plus larges, pour qu'elles deviennent la base de mise à l'épreuve des différents phénomènes, dont celui de l'époque moderne.

l'histoire doit comprendre comme composantes, d'une part, la succession des cosmosystèmes, et d'autre part, leurs mutations internes.

### **3. Le cosmosystème despotique. Despotisme privé et étatique**

Le cosmosystème despotique se constitue, comme nous l'avons déjà signalé, sur la base des «sociétés de sujets». Dans le «type idéal» de société despotique, la relation sociale se construit en termes de propriété, ce qui signifie que, au-delà du despote, il n'y a pas de place pour l'exercice de la liberté.

Cependant, ce type absolu se diversifie en relation tant avec l'évolution interne du cosmosystème que par son croisement avec les paramètres du cosmosystème anthropocentrique.

Le cosmosystème despotique se manifeste sous deux expressions typologiques principales: le despotisme «privé» et le despotisme «étatique».

On entend par despotisme «privé» la formation sociale uniforme sur le plan de la propriété, et pour cela indifférenciée, dont les membres appartiennent au despote. On en a un exemple caractéristique avec le féodalisme du Moyen Âge européen occidental.

Le despotisme «étatique» est constitué de plusieurs fiefs privés sous l'égide générale de la propriété d'un despote central. Le despotisme «étatique» est donc pluraliste, il dispose d'une infrastructure «administrative» centrale et crée, par nature, les conditions de l'émergence d'enclaves anthropocentriques, capables d'assurer l'échange nécessaire entre les despotismes «privés» et de garantir la fonction «opérationnelle» du despotisme central. Ces enclaves sont une partie organique du despotisme mais ne caractérisent pas le système. L'exemple typique de despotisme «étatique» est ledit despotisme «asiatique».

La différence entre despotisme «privé» et despotisme «étatique» est capitale tant du point de vue de la typologie interne du cosmosystème en question que pour la civilisation qu'ils représentent. Le despotisme «privé» est par nature asphyxiant intellectuellement, alors que le despotisme «étatique» a fait surgir les premières grandes civilisations pré-anthropocentriques de l'histoire.

La dernière remarque sur le cosmosystème despotique est relative à sa rencontre avec le cosmosystème anthropocentrique. Cette rencontre a pour trait caractéristique l'infiltration des paramètres anthropocentriques (par exemple l'introduction de l'économie «chrématistique») et la consolidation des enclaves, qui ont pour base un développement relatif de la liberté. Cependant, il convient de distinguer entre les despotismes «étatiques» typiques, qui absorbent la dynamique de l'infiltration anthropocentrique, et ceux qui subissent en conséquence un sapement progressif de leurs fondations et acquièrent ainsi un caractère transitoire configuré sur le plan cosmosystémique. Au premier cas appartiennent la plus grande partie des anciennes sociétés despotiques (de type «étatique») qui ont coexisté avec le cosmosystème anthropocentrique hellénique, avec au premier rang les despotismes de l'arrière-pays afro-asiatique. Dans le second cas se classent principalement les sociétés despotiques européennes après leur réinscription dans la zone vitale du cosmosystème hellénique, c'est-à-dire à partir du début de la Renaissance jusqu'à leur métamorphose finale, au tournant des XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> De même, le monde hellénique des temps créto-mycéniens.

#### **4. Le cosmosystème anthropocentrique: hellénique, à petite échelle; ethnocentrique, à grande échelle**

Le cosmosystème anthropocentrique désigne, comme nous l'avons vu, les sociétés qui ont pour signe la liberté au moins individuelle. Il apparaît avec un certain retard chronologique par rapport au cosmosystème despotique, mais dispose d'une unité organique et d'une cohérence plus actives pour ce qui est de son parcours évolutif.

Sa genèse peut être considérée comme le résultat d'une accumulation unique de conditions dans le périmètre de la Méditerranée centrale et orientale, avec pour épice de la péninsule hellénique et ses archipels. Les éléments décisifs qui permirent ce résultat furent, d'une part, le haut développement du despotisme «étatique» sur les côtes afro-asiatiques de la Méditerranée et, d'autre part, la reproduction à la petite échelle sociale de la cité de cet acquis despotique, qui devait cependant acquérir une dynamique autonome sous le signe, finalement, de la transition anthropocentrique.

Nous distinguons deux manifestations essentielles du cosmosystème anthropocentrique en général: le cosmosystème anthropocentrique *hellénique* et le cosmosystème anthropocentrique *ethnocentrique*. La manifestation hellénique du cosmosystème anthropocentrique se construit à la petite échelle (avec pour fondement politique la cité-État), alors que le cosmosystème ethnocentrique s'articule sur la grande échelle (avec pour fondement politique correspondant l'État-nation). Le cosmosystème anthropocentrique ethnocentrique n'est pas nouveau: c'est une mutation typologique sur la grande échelle du cosmosystème anthropocentrique hellénique, pour ce qui est tant de sa genèse que de sa physionomie particulière. L'un, l'hellénique, coexistera sur Terre avec le cosmosystème despotique, contestant l'unicité qu'il détenait jusqu'alors. L'autre, l'ethnocentrique, marque la victoire finale de l'anthropocentrisme sur le cosmosystème despotique dans l'ensemble de la planète. Le cosmosystème anthropocentrique hellénique, pour sa part, représente un parcours évolutif achevé qui couvre l'ensemble du développement anthropocentrique supposé de l'individu; l'ethnocentrique est à peine sorti de sa phase de transition et vit le stade de sa construction anthropocentrique primaire.

Pour ce qui concerne plus particulièrement le cosmosystème anthropocentrique à petite échelle, son identité hellénique n'inscrit pas de prénotation ethnocentrique. Elle suggère simplement sa constitution à partir des sociétés helléniques, qui ont aussi constamment été, jusqu'à sa fin, sa matrice anthropocentrique.

Cette remarque signifie, d'une part, que l'hellénisme ne peut être défini de manière ethnocentrique selon le modèle moderne, c'est-à-dire comme «Grèce», mais comme cosmosystème; d'autre part, qu'au cosmosystème hellénique participe peu à peu, au sens où elles y ont été incorporées, une multitude d'autres ethnies qui ont été plus ou moins hellénisées. La qualité d'hellénisé peut suggérer son inscription dans le cercle culturel étroit (du «mode» de vie, de la langue, etc.) ou simplement sa participation à l'acquis anthropocentrique (de la vie, des institutions, de la connaissance, etc.), comme dans le cas des Arabes.

Le cosmosystème hellénique couvre une période qui va de l'époque créto-mycénienne – et, sur une orbite anthropocentrique complète, du VII<sup>e</sup> siècle avant notre ère – jusqu'aux abords du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Cette constatation résonne curieusement dans le monde moderne, qui a pris l'habitude de lier la fin dudit «monde antique» à la chute de la Rome occidentale. Byzance, parce que postérieure, est rattachée comme Moyen Âge à la périodisation européenne occidentale, de même que les époques postérieures au dispositif

de la transition occidentale du cosmosystème despotique au cosmosystème anthropocentrique<sup>6</sup>.

La typologie évolutive interne du cosmosystème hellénique présente un intérêt unique, de même que ses connexions avec l'espace despotique environnant, qui a fonctionné largement comme sa «périphérie» vitale.

Nous distinguons deux grandes phases typologiques: *statocentrique* et *œcuménique* ou *cosmopolitienne*. La phase statocentrique comprend le processus d'achèvement anthropocentrique à l'intérieur de la formation politéienne primitive de la cité-État. Le suivi de cette évolution, tant à travers le développement des paramètres du cosmosystème (l'économie «chrématistique», la quintessence sociale, la communication, etc.) qu'à travers les fermentations idéologiques et leurs correspondants pragmatologiques, se cristallise de manière éloquent dans le projet de *liberté*. Les dimensions individuelle, sociale, politique de la liberté se développent dans un ordre successif et en s'accumulant, obéissant à la logique de l'achèvement anthropocentrique du cosmosystème, initialement à l'intérieur de l'État.

Ce processus, pour ce qui est plus particulièrement de la liberté sociale, est lié à la transition de la *société du travail* (des citoyens) à la *société du loisir* (des citoyens), puis à la constitution, parallèlement à la société des citoyens, de la *société du travail* («*marchandise*»). En ce sens, l'antagonisme socio-politique change fondamentalement de contenu. Il devient: a) dualiste, en opposant la *société des citoyens* (la société du loisir) à la *société du travail* («*marchandise*» ou non politien<sup>7</sup>); b) intra-social, en opposant la société des citoyens aux citoyens possesseurs du capital; c) inter-économique, au sens anthropocentrique primaire, en mettant face à face les possesseurs du capital et les possesseurs du travail (marchandise).

Pour ce qui est de la liberté politique, sa réalisation s'inscrit dans l'idée de la transition des systèmes de pouvoir – initialement la représentation primaire ou inférée, puis la pleine représentation – vers les systèmes de démocratie selon lesquels la politique est détachée – de même que le système politique – de l'État et est absorbée par le corps social lui-même. La démocratie se situe, en ce sens, aux antipodes des systèmes de pouvoir, tout comme l'autonomie par rapport à l'hétéronomie. La démocratie est définie comme le système socio-politique qui achève cumulativement la liberté dans toutes ses dimensions.

Il est intéressant de considérer les trois niveaux auxquels est conçue la politique. Dans le despotisme et à l'époque de la proto-constitution anthropocentrique, la politique est comprise comme équivalant à la *force*. La force constitue le système, et cela en termes de propriété. Dans l'anthropocentrisme primaire, la politique est définie comme une tautologie du *pouvoir*, au sens où elle se mue en un système qui consacre le dispositif du rapport de forces, mais l'intègre à un environnement normatif minimal où les membres du corps social jouissent de la liberté individuelle et d'un certain nombre de droits qui délimitent le cadre de leur présence sociale et politique. La phase de l'achèvement anthropocentrique envisage la politique comme le terrain de la *liberté* globale et, en cela, comme tremplin de la suppression de la *force* et du *pouvoir* à tous les niveaux de la vie socio-économique et politique.

<sup>6</sup> Cette périodisation passe également sous silence le fait que le cosmosystème despotique a été la constante historique du reste (asiatique, etc.) du monde jusqu'au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle.

<sup>7</sup> Nous entendons par ce terme le travail dépendant ou salarié que fournit le citoyen dans le cadre du processus économique.

Cette dynamique de l'achèvement anthropocentrique au sein de l'État ne se combine pas, au-delà de celui-ci, avec un processus analogue au niveau de l'ensemble du cosmosystème. Dans le despotisme, mais aussi pendant toute la période statocentrique du cosmosystème anthropocentrique, la politique au-delà de l'État est conçue comme pure force. Mais malgré cela, après la consolidation de l'anthropocentrisme à l'intérieur de l'État, les acteurs de la dynamique politique vont changer. Alors qu'auparavant, l'État souverain se présentait comme l'acteur quasi exclusif de la dynamique politique au-delà de l'État tout comme à l'intérieur de l'État, dans le nouvel environnement, les paramètres du cosmosystème s'émancipent et s'autonomisent. Non seulement ils ne voient plus dans l'État le foyer naturel de leur développement et de leur protection, mais ils l'envisagent comme un obstacle majeur à leur évolution et, au-delà, comme un «partenaire» concurrentiel dans la dynamique de l'environnement cosmosystémique.

Il était inévitable que ce développement cosmosystémique des paramètres anthropocentriques aboutisse à saper les fondements de la souveraineté étatique tout d'abord, puis, au fil du temps, du statocentrisme lui-même, préparant du même coup le terrain pour son dépassement.

La transition à l'œcuméné post-statocentrique va se constituer en deux phases: l'une avec l'intervention macédonienne dans les affaires grecques; l'autre, avec la conquête romaine de «l'Occident» et l'unification œcuménique du périmètre méditerranéen du système des cités. Dans les deux cas, la transition à l'œcuméné sera combinée à l'incorporation organique à celle-ci de la périphérie despotique voisine: l'asiatique par Alexandre, l'europpéenne par les Romains<sup>8</sup>.

L'œcuméné, en tant que phase du cosmosystème anthropocentrique, marque un point de rupture de caractère typologique. La fin du statocentrisme ne signifie pas la fin des cités ni, *a fortiori*, des politéias (les systèmes socio-politiques) surgies lors de l'achèvement anthropocentrique à l'intérieur de l'État.

La transition à l'œcuméné s'inscrit comme le point de départ d'une nouvelle phase signifiante du développement anthropocentrique, au-delà de la formation politéienne primaire de la cité, dans le cosmosystème. Le rapport de forces qui distinguait l'approche de la politique entre les cités ou les autres acteurs du cosmosystème cède maintenant la place à un environnement réglementaire de type essentiellement de pouvoir, qui ressemble cependant amplement au type des sympolitéias.

Dans le même temps, la relation asymétrique entre la dynamique politique – produite par le «bloc hégémonique» et les paramètres autonomisés par rapport à la cité (l'économie, la politique, la communication, etc.) du cosmosystème – et le processus politique – qui est resté hermétiquement focalisé sur le régime politique de la cité – sera remplacée par la constitution de la *cosmopolis*.

La cosmopolis – la cité-État de l'œcuméné – compose l'environnement de la *cosmopolitéia*, qui finalement se cristallise dans la *métropole* (la cité capitale), qui fonctionne comme système politique central, et des politéias du système des cités du territoire. Dans ce nouveau cadre, le citoyen de chaque cité devient en même temps

<sup>8</sup> La relation qui s'instaure entre le cosmosystème hellénique ou anthropocentrique à petite échelle et le cosmosystème despotique qui l'entoure présente un très grand intérêt. Cette coexistence, pendant toute la durée de vie du cosmosystème hellénique, introduira des relations qui influenceront tant les références internes de l'anthropocentrisme que la logique du despotisme. L'examen de ces relations aux différentes phases du cosmosystème hellénique donne la possibilité de discerner le processus même de transition vers la souveraineté planétaire univoque du cosmosystème anthropocentrique à l'époque moderne.

citoyen de la cosmopolis, *cosmopolite*. Mais la cité conserve jusqu'au bout sa compétence principale – comme une sorte d'État dans l'État –, annonçant d'ailleurs le principe de subsidiarité.

La période œcuménique du cosmosystème hellénique connaîtra des mutations internes significatives, avec des prolongements anthropocentriques qui iront au-delà de son espace vital historique immédiat.

En tant que système cosmopolitien, elle passera par plusieurs phases jusqu'à s'équilibrer finalement au cours de la période byzantine. Byzance, en tant que cosmopolis, est en fait la version la plus achevée de la cosmopolitéia pour ce qui est du fonds anthropocentrique de la Métropole, mais aussi l'articulation en général de cette dernière avec le système des cités. Cependant, la dynamique centrifuge du système des cités ne s'éteindra jamais. À preuve, l'incapacité de la Métropole – de «l'État» central – à reconstituer la cosmopolis byzantine après sa dissolution en 1204, dissolution qui doit être imputée essentiellement à sa nature interne.

Une deuxième mutation aux conséquences fondamentales pour la cité, et avec des prolongements cosmohistoriques, concerne la question du *travail*. L'œcuméné imposera le passage de la *société du loisir*, que véhiculait l'idéologie démocratique, à la *société partenariale*. L'individu est réintégré au système de production pour participer à la redistribution du produit économique. Mais cette réintégration aura lieu non pas par le régime du travail dépendant mais en termes de co-partenariat. Entre les possesseurs de la force de travail ou entre ceux-ci et les possesseurs du capital se constitue une relation de co-partenariat qui exclut la dépendance, c'est-à-dire l'expropriation de la liberté, dans un environnement où l'individu passe un contrat avec les sous-systèmes sociaux.

Ce système, une sorte de «politéia» dans le secteur de la production, conduira à long terme, notamment à l'époque byzantine, et en liaison avec la transformation de la cité indépendante en cité autonome, à l'abolition du travail servile ou «marchandise». De cette façon, toutefois, la liberté sociale se détachera de la liberté politique – dont elle était inférée au cours de la période statocentrique de la démocratie – et cheminera de manière autonome. Dans le même temps, la décomposition du système du travail «marchandise» au profit du travail co-partenarial fut un événement majeur, avec des prolongements cosmohistoriques<sup>9</sup>.

Enfin, il est intéressant de remarquer qu'en fait, les cités vont conserver non seulement la totalité de leurs compétences dans des conditions d'autonomie, mais aussi les systèmes politéiens tels qu'ils avaient été achevés au cours de leur dernière phase statocentrique. La représentation partielle ou complète, l'oligarchie, la démocratie sont des constantes de l'œcuméné, y compris à l'époque byzantine et sous la domination ottomane. La question n'est pas ici celle de la certitude historique de cette opinion, mais l'obstination de la modernité à périodiser la cosmohistoire hellénique sur le modèle de la conjoncture européenne occidentale et à s'auto-définir comme supérieure, dans l'ensemble, au passé<sup>10</sup>. Cette attitude l'oblige à prétendre que la démocratie n'a été l'affaire que de deux siècles et, en tout cas, à négliger l'essentiel, à savoir que son espace

<sup>9</sup> Nous envoyons en introduction à nos études: «Travail et liberté. Prolégomènes à une théorie cosmosystémique du travail», dans Koutra (dir.), *Travail et métier*, Athènes 1998, 2002, p. 66-90, et *Citoyen et cité. Notion et typologie de la «politéienneté»*, Athènes 2003, p. 159 et suiv., 197 et suiv.

<sup>10</sup> Pour le cadre pragmatologique et les conditions intellectuelles qui ont conduit la modernité à se transformer, de simple phase anthropocentrique, et même extrêmement primaire, en une idéologie (dogmatique) et, au-delà, en science, voir G. Contogeorgis, «La modernité, la tradition et le projet de progrès», *op. cit.*

historique, l'Europe occidentale, a constamment été la «périphérie» du cosmosystème hellénique. Le fait que cette «périphérie» devait plus tard dominer le monde n'annule pas sa place historique antérieure.

Le cosmosystème hellénique, sans toutefois le fonds anthropocentrique du pouvoir central<sup>11</sup>, poursuivra son parcours historique après la prise de Constantinople en 1453, jusqu'aux abords du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle. La domination ottomane traduit le compromis historique qu'il fut obligé de passer avec le despotisme asiatique. Mais le conquérant ottoman, non content de ne pas porter atteinte à ses fondements, le servit pour des raisons qui lui étaient propres, avec cohérence.

### **5. Unité et synthèse du cosmosystème anthropocentrique à la petite et à la grande échelle**

Une question d'un autre ordre concerne la relation du cosmosystème hellénique ou anthropocentrique à petite échelle avec son homologue moderne, à grande échelle. Comme nous l'avons déjà souligné, leur relation est organique et projective.

Cette relation est née, concrètement, à partir du moment où Byzance a réorienté son intérêt stratégique de l'Afrique et de l'Asie vers l'Europe. Cette réorientation eut pour conséquence l'intégration des Slaves à sa «périphérie» vitale et la réincorporation de la péninsule italienne essentiellement à sa zone cosmopolitienne. En Italie, Byzance «implantera» des cités sur le modèle d'Alexandre en Asie, visant à y saper la féodalité et à développer le fonds anthropocentrique de ses sociétés. Par l'incorporation anthropocentrique de la péninsule italienne, Byzance ambitionnait en fait d'intégrer l'Europe transalpine à son espace vital économique.

Ainsi la Renaissance italienne est-elle une affaire intérieure de la cosmopolis byzantine, tandis que le transvasement des paramètres du cosmosystème anthropocentrique à petite échelle en Europe occidentale mobilisera la dynamique du passage de celle-ci du cosmosystème despotique au cosmosystème anthropocentrique ; passage qui toutefois sera réalisé non pas par le remplacement de la féodalité par les cités-États, comme en Italie, mais par sa mutation progressive, qui sera l'effet de l'implantation de la cité au sein du domaine féodal. La *cité* ou le *koinon* sera intégré organiquement au fief et transformé en *communauté*, c'est-à-dire en appendice du fief, tout comme les autres institutions et autres fonctions de la petite échelle anthropocentrique<sup>12</sup>.

Malgré cela, la transition anthropocentrique de l'Europe occidentale et l'édification de la grande échelle cosmosystémique continueront à s'appuyer, jusqu'au début du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, sur les données pragmatologiques du cosmosystème hellénique. L'adoption de la littérature grecque par le monde européen moderne ne s'explique que si l'on considère la place décisive occupée par le cosmosystème hellénique de l'œcuméné byzantine et post-byzantine dans sa transition anthropocentrique.

<sup>11</sup> Cette réalité ne se produit pas pour la première fois dans le cosmosystème hellénique. La dégénérescence despotique du pouvoir central se rencontre aussi aux temps hellénistiques tardifs et pendant la plus grande partie de la période romaine.

<sup>12</sup> Voir à titre d'introduction nos études: «Les cités/*koina* sous la domination ottomane», *Ta Istorika* 153/2002, p. 6-4; «Le cosmosystème hellénique dans l'œcuméné tardive. Les cités/*koina* de la domination ottomane», dans J. Alonso Aldama (dir.), Olga Omatos. *Taboula Gratulatoria*, Vitoria-Gasteiz, 2006; «Byzance comme paramètre du cosmosystème hellénique et l'Europe occidentale», dans M. Morfakidis (dir.), *Constantinopla: 550 anos desde su Caída*, Grenade (2003) 2006.

Le terrain social sera définitivement nettoyé des restes de la féodalité à la fin du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle et dans les premières décennies du XX<sup>e</sup>, et ce nettoyage entraînera avec lui les institutions du cosmosystème hellénique, qui s'étaient entre-temps intégrées au domaine féodal et en avaient été une part constitutive. Dans le même temps toutefois, dans l'espace vital hellénique, l'échec de la palingénésie hellénique ou cosmopolitienne, la constitution d'un État mort-né d'orientation ethnocentrique, appendice de l'hégémonie européenne semi-despotique, et l'avènement du mouvement nationaliste dans les Balkans conduiront à la décomposition progressive du cosmosystème hellénique ou anthropocentrique. Ce processus, qui s'achèvera finalement un siècle après la Guerre d'Indépendance grecque, en 1821, coïncidera avec la dissolution définitive du système des cités-États dans la péninsule italienne et du phénomène communal en Europe.

Dans ce cadre, il était inévitable que l'anthropocentrisme à grande échelle cosmosystémique reparte à zéro, puisque ni les conditions pragmatologiques (économiques, sociales, communicationnelles, etc.), ni les conditions culturelles ou idéologiques (le développement de la liberté, par exemple) n'étaient réunies pour retenir ou absorber l'acquis anthropocentrique du monde hellénique. Les relations de propriété, la place du capital et du travail dans le processus de production, l'idéal de la société du travail, la structure même de la politique, tout cela suggère une époque primaire de la construction anthropocentrique, avec pour projet la liberté individuelle et son soutien par un corps de droits socio-politiques. Une époque qui ne concerne finalement que le noyau de l'avant-garde – le «centre» – puisque le reste de la planète, la «périphérie», hésitait à cette même époque entre la décomposition despotique et la proto-construction anthropocentrique.

Cette supériorité du «centre» anthropocentrique moderne sur l'anthropocentrisme hellénique pour ce qui est de l'échelle cosmosystémique, et sur sa propre «périphérie» pour ce qui est de son acquis anthropocentrique, lui insufflera une nouvelle confiance en lui qui se cristallisera sous forme de rupture avec le passé. Ainsi cultivera-t-il le sentiment de sa supériorité anthropocentrique et de l'impossibilité de sa rencontre comparative avec le précédent historique.

Sans aucun doute, cette arrogance de la modernité doit être aussi attribuée à son manque de maturité gnoseologique. Manque de maturité qui va de pair avec l'incapacité à concevoir l'enjeu global de l'achèvement anthropocentrique (ses paramètres mais aussi le projet même de la liberté) et à construire les catégories gnoseologiques et méthodologiques adéquates à l'aune desquelles serait évalué le phénomène social<sup>13</sup>. Manque de maturité qui se focalise sur l'absence de perception globale, cosmosystémique, du fait historique.

Aux antipodes, l'approche cosmosystémique affirme que la rencontre du paradigme hellénique et du paradigme anthropocentrique ethnocentrique en termes d'analogie comparative est non seulement possible, mais est la condition *sine qua non* de la compréhension globale de la vie humaine. Si l'on prend précisément pour ligne directrice cette opinion, on peut aboutir à la conclusion sûre que l'époque anthropocentrique de la modernité correspond par analogie à la période primaire de la cité du VII<sup>e</sup> et du VI<sup>e</sup> siècle avant notre ère. En ce sens, la supériorité de la phase homologue de la grande échelle par rapport à la petite échelle hellénique ne permet pas de déduire l'argument que la première est globalement supérieure au devenir évolutif global de la seconde. À tout le moins, la modernité est statocentrique et non œcuménique, structurée

<sup>13</sup> Pour plus de détails, voir G. Contogeorgis, «La modernité, la tradition et le projet de progrès», *op. cit.*

sur le pouvoir et la propriété et non démocratique, et elle vit donc le système que dicte la liberté individuelle univoque dans le cadre de l'État. Par conséquent, il manque la phase d'achèvement anthropocentrique à l'intérieur de l'État, de même que toute prénation de développement anthropocentrique au niveau post-statocentrique de l'œcuméné.

Cette appréciation comparative du caractère primaire de la période anthropocentrique sur la grande échelle et la démonstration de l'achèvement anthropocentrique du cosmosystème hellénique ne visent pas à un retour à la petite échelle cosmosystémique. L'édification de la grande échelle cosmosystémique est non seulement donnée mais représente une évolution positive capitale dans le sens du progrès.

Mais dans le même temps, l'approfondissement de la nature cosmosystémique du phénomène social permettra à la modernité d'acquérir l'auto-connaissance nécessaire à propos de son stade anthropocentrique, rendra possible sa rencontre avec l'histoire sur de nouvelles bases, mènera à une nouvelle périodisation du devenir évolutif de l'être humain et, par voie de conséquence, facilitera l'élaboration d'un projet pour l'avenir qui réconciliera la notion de progrès avec le développement anthropocentrique.

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### **III. International Relations: the Cultural-Educative Perspective**

**Licia BAGINI** ⇔ *BELLA CIAO: de chant national à chant international*

**Laurențiu PETRILA** ⇔ *The Challenges Europe Faces at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Multiculturalism as an End to the European Identity?*

**Nicolae TODERAȘ, Ana-Maria STĂVARU** ⇔ *The Use of Impact Evaluation and Evidences at the Internal Level: the Higher Education Reform in the Republic of Moldova*



## **BELLA CIAO: DE CHANT NATIONAL À CHANT INTERNATIONAL**

**Licia BAGINI\***

**Abstract.** *In this article, I tried to explain the manner in which the song Bella Ciao had passed from the national dimension to an international dimension because of the fact that patriotism which characterized it, differs from nationalism. If it is true that this song is a part of cultural Italian patrimony, constituting one of the the undeniable identity traits, the fact that it was adopted or reprised in foreign countries is not unjustified with the condition of not betraying his original meaning: the encouragement to resist to all forms of political and social oppression, from the right to live in liberty and dignity, a universal aspiration.*

**Keywords:** *Bella Ciao, text, ballade, song of protest, melody, Italy, national, international.*

*Bella Ciao*, chant populaire très connu en Italie, a eu un succès important à l'étranger. *Bella Ciao* continue à être interprété en différents styles et versions qui comportent, parfois, des paroles qui s'éloignent du « texte officiel »<sup>1</sup>.

*Bella Ciao* est généralement défini comme « chant des partisans italiens » qui s'inspire d'une chanson populaire des repiqueuses de riz de la Plaine du Pô, utilisé comme hymne par les mouvements de gauche. Est-ce la bonne définition ? Comment expliquer le succès de *Bella Ciao* au niveau national et international ? Après une brève histoire de cette chanson, nous explorerons quelques pistes de réflexion pour essayer de répondre à cette question.

### **1. Quelles sont les origines du texte et de la mélodie de *Bella Ciao*<sup>2</sup> ?**

Les premières recherches sur les origines de *Bella Ciao* remontent, en Italie, au début des années 1950 et se sont poursuivies jusqu'à nos jours. Elles ont été caractérisées par de nombreuses querelles et ont vu les contributions de grands ethnomusicologues et historiens comme Roberto Leydi, Gianni Bosio, Bruno Pianta et Cesare Bermani. Il apparaît indispensable de rappeler brièvement les origines du texte et de la mélodie de ce chant pour pouvoir s'interroger sur son succès. Je ferai appel surtout à Bermani auquel on doit le dernier article publié sur ce sujet en 2003 où il fait le point sur les différentes recherches et les dernières découvertes<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Il serait, peut-être, plus exact de parler de « versions officielles » au pluriel, puisque dans les chants populaires, qui privilégient la transmission orale, la transcription écrite comporte souvent des variantes.

Une consultation rapide de *Youtube* offre un large éventail d'interprétations bien différentes de *Bella Ciao*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. les annexes n°1, n°2 et n°3.

<sup>3</sup> Cesare BERMANI, « *Guerra guerra ai palazzi e allechiese ...* ». *Saggisul canto sociale*, Rome :Odradek, 2003. Cf., en particulier, La« vera » storia di « *Bella Ciao* », 223-263, où Bermani, après une étude très riche et documentée, constate qu'il reste encore des points à

La majorité des Italiens ignore que *Bella Ciao* est le fruit d'élaborations de chants populaires, répandus surtout dans le Nord de l'Italie avant la période de la Résistance. Les paroles et la mélodie apparaissent réunies seulement tardivement dans de mêmes compositions, car elles faisaient partie de catégories de ballades différentes. Aujourd'hui les ethnomusicologues concordent sur le fait que ce chant est d'auteur anonyme, malgré les différentes revendications de sa composition.

### *Le texte*

Dans le texte de six strophes un résistant italien, voyant son pays occupé par l'envahisseur – l'Allemagne – se dit prêt à combattre avec les partisans et à sacrifier sa vie pour la libération de sa patrie. Le deuxième vers de chaque strophe est constitué par le refrain qui donne le titre à la chanson: un dernier au revoir à sa bien-aimée avant de la quitter. Le message fort de ce chant est résumé dans les deux dernières strophes: la fleur sur la tombe du partisan doit rappeler aux générations futures que la liberté a été obtenue à travers le sacrifice de nombreuses personnes.

Comment est-on arrivé à ce texte ? En résumant la complexe question relative aux origines du contenu, il faut souligner la confluence de deux grandes familles de ballades dont les thématiques sont, d'une part, « la fleur sur la tombe » et, d'autre part, « le testament ».

La thématique « de la fleur sur la tombe » était déjà présente dans de nombreuses ballades populaires du Nord de l'Italie au XIXe siècle<sup>4</sup>(Leydi et Pianta, 1973, 1184) où souvent le premier vers rappelle celui de *Bella Ciao*. Leydi précise que la première attestation écrite d'une ballade sur ce sujet – *La Bella Malgarita* –, découverte par Pianta, date même de 1632<sup>5</sup>. Cette chanson apparaît par la suite dans de nombreuses publications. Cette thématique se décline selon des variantes régionales qui ont en commun le fait qu'une jeune fille demande qu'on lui prépare une tombe sur laquelle il faudra poser des fleurs. Ces fleurs rappelleront aux gens qu'elle est morte d'amour : 1. parce que son bien-aimé a été condamné à mort (version connue seulement dans le Piémont) ; 2. parce qu'elle a été trahie par son fiancé (version répandue dans toutes les régions et notamment dans la Vénétie<sup>6</sup>). Remarquons qu'à l'inverse du texte de *Bella Ciao*, d'une part, le protagoniste de ces ballades est toujours une femme et que, d'autre part, la cause de la mort est d'ordre sentimental. La fleur a la fonction d'alimenter le souvenir d'un amour qui n'a pas pu se prolonger à cause d'obstacles externes. De plus, cette fleur, associée à l'image de la jeunesse de la fille qui veut se donner la mort, contribue à susciter la compassion de l'auditeur.

A cet ensemble de ballades s'apparente la famille des « ballades du testament » qui s'est développée particulièrement lors de la Première Guerre Mondiale dans les régions de la Vénétie et du Trentin. Prenons l'exemple du chant « Le testament du capitaine ». Dans celui-ci, un capitaine demande qu'à sa mort des parties de son corps

élucider. Ce livre contient également une riche bibliographie relative aux études concernant la chanson de protestation en Italie.

<sup>4</sup> En 1953, Alberto Cirese est le premier à signaler que le texte de *Bella Ciao* dériverait de la chanson appelée *Fior di Tomba* publiée par Costantino Nigra dans *Canti Popolari del Piemonte* en 1888. Cf. Roberto LEYDI et Bruno PIANTA, « La canzone popolare – I. La possibile storia di una canzone », in *Storia d'Italia*, vol. 5, t. 2, Turin : Einaudi, 1973, 1184.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Roberto LEYDI et Bruno PIANTA, *op.cit.*, 1189 : « Nuova Canzonetta della Bella Malgarita/Novamente data in luce ad istanza di chi le compra », in Milan, Giorgio ROLLA, *con licenza de' superiori*, 1632, Biblioteca Trivulziana Milano.

<sup>6</sup> Dans cette deuxième version, la jeune fille fait semblant d'être morte. Elle demande à sa mère de lui faire préparer un cercueil pour provoquer le remords et les larmes de son bien-aimé.

soient laissées à la patrie, à son bataillon et à sa mère. Le dernier morceau devra être enterré sur les montagnes où il sera recouvert de roses. Soulignons les similitudes avec *Bella Ciao* : l'histoire d'un soldat qui perd sa vie en combattant dans les montagnes.

Ces deux thématiques – la fleur sur la tombe et le testament – renvoient implicitement à la coutume chrétienne de mettre des fleurs sur les tombes qui n'est pas étrangère, dans un certain sens, à des rituels beaucoup plus anciens. La fleur, pour que reste sur la tombe une fleur vivante, doit être arrosée et changée, si bien qu'elle symbolise le prolongement de la vie du mort, ne serait-ce que dans le souvenir de la personne qui l'a déposée et même, au-delà, elle évoquera la vie chez les gens qui la verront. Comme l'explique Leydi (cf. Leydi et Pianta, 1973, 1192-93), c'est comme si les morts pouvaient continuer à vivre sous une autre forme – végétale en l'occurrence – en accédant à une sorte de résurrection ou réincarnation. Cette image est fréquente dans différentes mythologies suivant lesquelles les héros ou les héroïnes renaissent sous d'autres formes. Cette représentation a été reprise en littérature. Or dans les ballades, transmises oralement au cours des siècles dans le milieu populaire, il y a eu une élaboration culturelle<sup>7</sup> : la résurrection/métamorphose du héros ne se réalise plus de manière explicite, comme dans la mythologie ou dans les fables, mais de manière indirecte. La fleur devient le médium qui permet à la jeune fille ou au soldat d'atteindre « l'immortalité » grâce au souvenir qu'elle suscitera dans les générations à venir.

Dans le texte de *Bella Ciao* tous ces éléments sont bien présents, même s'ils ne sont pas consciemment perçus à son écoute. Ceci témoigne d'un processus typique des modalités de la production populaire qui intègre et réinterprète certains contenus en les adaptant à l'évolution des situations et des temps. Dans ce sens, dans *Bella Ciao*, la figure du partisan, tout en évoquant l'image du « héros immortel », acquiert une nouvelle dimension. En répondant aux circonstances historiques de 1944-1945, le partisan devient le héros de la guerre de libération, symbole de la lutte contre l'opresseur.

Il nous semble maintenant indispensable d'aborder la question du fameux refrain *Oh Bella Ciao* qui renvoie à d'autres chants qui font partie de la famille des « Chants de protestation » et, plus particulièrement, aux chants des *Mondine*, les femmes travaillant dans les rizières d'Italie du Nord, bien montrées dans le film *Riz Amer* de De Sanctis (1949). Très récemment a été retrouvé un texte de 1906 (non enregistré) dont la structure est très proche de celle de *Bella Ciao* : une repiqueuse de riz se plaint des dures conditions de son travail<sup>8</sup> en répétant au deuxième vers de chaque strophe « *O bella ciao* ». Des chants, au contenu semblable, se diffuseront à partir des années 1920 dans les rizières du Nord.

D'autres ethnomusicologues font remarquer que le refrain dériverait d'un autre groupe de chants : diverses variations de la ballade de *La bevandasonnifera* (La potion soporifique), répandue dans le Trentin, sur laquelle nous allons revenir.

### *La mélodie*

Pour la musique, il serait incorrect de parler d'une production strictement « nationale » car plusieurs éléments remontent à des périodes où l'Italie, comme

<sup>7</sup> Tout ceci renvoie aux systèmes populaires de représentation des rapports avec la mort dans le contexte d'une interprétation magique de la vie qui remonte très loin dans notre civilisation.

<sup>8</sup> En effet, durant ce travail qui avait lieu en juin et juillet, les *mondine* passaient la journée courbées, les pieds dans l'eau, tourmentées par les moustiques, sous le regard et les brimades des surveillants. Il s'agissait d'un travail temporaire, lié à un phénomène d'immigration saisonnière, qui concernait en grande majorité les femmes, très appréciées pour leur dextérité et rapidité.

État-Nation n'existait pas encore<sup>9</sup>, et de plus, certains chercheurs y ont retrouvé l'influence de mélodies étrangères. Donc, même de ce point de vue, *BellaCiao* se révèle comme le fruit d'une succession de transformations.

Aujourd'hui, les ethnomusicologues sont sûrs que cette mélodie existait déjà dans le patrimoine des chants populaires en Italie avant 1943, mais ils ne sont pas d'accord sur les dates. La plupart des familles de ballades dont nous avons parlé, ne présentaient pas initialement la même mélodie que *Bella Ciao*. C'est seulement au cours des décennies suivantes qu'il y a eu une fusion avec d'autres familles de ballades aux textes différents, mais comportant notre mélodie<sup>10</sup>.

Étant donné la complexité de la reconstruction des sources musicales et le fait que certains points ne sont pas encore résolus, je me limiterai à rappeler les théories les plus importantes :

1. Dans le Nord de l'Italie, une ballade française du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle serait entrée dans la tradition folklorique piémontaise (*La daré d'cola montagna*) du Royaume de Savoie<sup>11</sup>.
2. En 1964, Leydi a retrouvé une mélodie presque identique à *Bella Ciao* dans la chanson populaire *E picchia, picchia alla porticella*, qui, toutefois, ne contenait pas le fameux refrain.
3. En 1965, l'ethnomusicologue Coggiola a trouvé et enregistré une version de la ballade de « *labevandasoporifera* » dans la région de Trente (au Nord-Est de l'Italie) qui présentait le fameux refrain accompagné d'un battement de mains.
4. Toujours en 1965, Bermanni a trouvé enfin une version de « La fleur sur la tombe », chantée sur la mélodie de *Bella Ciao* dès les années 1920. Dans cette version nous retrouvons réunis la musique, le refrain et la thématique de la fleur sur la tombe présents dans *Bella Ciao*.
5. Certains supposent l'existence de chants de protestation contre la guerre, répandus surtout après la défaite italienne de Caporetto en 1917, où il y aurait eu une fusion avec la famille des chants « Fleur sur la tombe, variante 2 ». Cette supposition ne peut pas s'appuyer sur des enregistrements ou des transcriptions, car il n'en a pas été recensé à ce jour.

Je signale également quelques théories moins accréditées. Selon les différents chercheurs, il est possible de remonter à des :

1. Origines espagnoles : un motif similaire aurait été chanté par les Franquistes durant la Guerre d'Espagne.
2. Origines françaises : en 1974, Rinaldo Salvadori, ex-gendarme et compositeur, raconte que sa bien-aimée Marie Freçhais, ex *mondina* et résistante française, disait que ce chant était chanté par les maquisards du Sud de la France et aurait pénétré dans le Piémont. Salvadori, qui affirmait être l'auteur de *Bella Ciao*, pensait que les partisans français avaient repris sa chanson *La Risaia* écrite en 1934 pour sa bien-aimée<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> L'unité du Pays remonte à 1861 avec la création du Royaume d'Italie, mais au niveau territorial elle sera achevée après la première guerre mondiale.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. l'annexe n°3.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Gianni BORGNA, *StoriadellaCanzone Italiana*, Rome-Bari :Laterza, 1985.

<sup>12</sup> Rinaldo Salvadori affirmait avoir changé les paroles de sa chanson *La Risaia* avec celles de *Bella Ciao* après le 25 juillet 1943, au moment de la chute de Mussolini et de la progressive organisation d'une véritable résistance armée.

3. Origines slaves: en 1995 on a cueilli le témoignage d'Italiens qui avaient entendu chanter cette mélodie par des filles d'origine ukrainienne servant dans les cantines des camps militaires allemands en 1944<sup>13</sup>.
4. Origines yiddish : en 2006, l'ingénieur Giovanniardi, lors d'un séjour touristique à Paris, achète par hasard le CD *Klezmer-Yiddish swing music* dont les premières notes du morceau *Koilen* (exécuté par Mishka Ziganoff en 1919) rappellent étrangement le début de *Bella Ciao*<sup>14</sup>. La majorité des chercheurs italiens excluent néanmoins cette origine.

En tout cas, à présent, la majorité des ethnomusicologues affirment que cette mélodie, réélaborée, était entrée dans les *Chants de protestation*<sup>15</sup> de tradition orale des *mondine*. Dans les années 1930, dans la région de Vercelli (Piémont), les repiqueuses de riz devaient chanter quelque chose de très proche de la version de Giovanna Daffini ou de Vasco Scansani qui, eux-aussi, dans les années 1960, ont revendiqué la création de *Bella ciao*<sup>16</sup>.

Comment est donc née la *Bella Ciao* de la Résistance?

Nous devons supposer que les paroles et la mélodie de ce chant apparaissent réunies seulement tardivement. C'est seulement grâce à des enregistrements datant de la fin des années 1950 - milieu des années 1960, que les chercheurs ont retrouvé des versions proches du chant connu aujourd'hui, aussi bien au niveau du contenu que de la musique.

La fusion de chants de différentes familles constitue donc le substrat de la création de la *Bella Ciao* de la Résistance, vraisemblablement née dans la région de Reggio Emilia et Modène en 1944.

## 2. Comment expliquer le succès au niveau national et international de *Bella Ciao* ?

Certainement le rythme entraînant ainsi que le texte simple et le refrain facile à mémoriser ont contribué au succès de ce chant.

Mais ce n'est pas tout. Si, comme nous l'avons montré, *Bella Ciao* n'est pas une authentique création de la Résistance, pourquoi est-il considéré comme le chant de la Résistance italienne aussi bien en Italie qu'à l'étranger ? Et, comme tel, emblème de liberté, chant de protestation ?

### Le succès en Italie

En réalité, *Bella Ciao* a été chanté seulement par certaines formations de partisans communistes dans quelques régions, bien délimitées, du Nord de l'Italie (Apennins de Reggio Emilia), du Latium (Reatino) et des Abruzzes (Maiella<sup>17</sup>). On pourrait presque

<sup>13</sup> Cette chanson commençait par les paroles « *Bièlabièla* » (blanche, blanche) et était accompagnée du battement de mains.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. l'article de Jenner MELETTI, *Da ballata yiddish a innopartigiano o illungoviaggio di Bella ciao*, in la *Repubblica*, 12/04/2008.

<sup>15</sup> A ce propos, il n'est pas inutile de rappeler, comme le souligne Bermani, que le chant de protestation constitue « un phénomène de frontière entre, d'une part, les cultures officielles (dominantes ou d'opposition) et, d'autre part, les cultures populaires ». Aussi, ces chants peuvent reprendre des textes et des musiques provenant des cultures dominantes ; d'autres fois, ils sont des productions populaires. Les chants de protestation sont l'expression des cultures d'opposition. (cf. BERMANI, 2003, 1-2).

<sup>16</sup> S'ils ne sont pas les auteurs de ce chant, il faut leur accorder le mérite d'avoir mis par écrit les paroles et la mélodie répandues dans le milieu des *mondine*.

<sup>17</sup> La version chantée par les Résistants de cette région comportait des variantes relatives aux paroles par rapport au texte le plus connu.

parler de « chant régional », car le vrai chant des partisans italiens était « *Fischia il vento, infuria la bufera* », dont la musique est celle du chant soviétique *Katouscia*<sup>18</sup> (1938), le texte étant écrit par des partisans<sup>19</sup> de la région d'Imperia (Ligurie). D'autres chants partisans italiens ont repris des chants politiques déjà existants, des chants du Risorgimento et de la première guerre mondiale, des parodies des chants fascistes ou de chansonnettes à la mode, en les adaptant à la nouvelle situation politique. Rares sont les vraies créations même si dans l'Après-guerre on assistera à une prolifération d'enregistrements donnant lieu à des « Recueils officiels de Chants de la Résistance ».

Au début des années 1950, dans plusieurs régions italiennes, *Bella Ciao* est chantée uniquement, par des chorales socialistes et communistes, lors de rassemblements et de fêtes d'ex-partisans. A partir des années 1960, elle va progressivement l'emporter sur *Fischia il Vento*. Pourquoi ?

Tout d'abord, au lendemain de la Libération, *Bella Ciao* est proposée dans toutes les fêtes communistes (Fête de l'Unità) tout comme d'autres chansons italiennes ou danses populaires (diverses mazurkas, polkas, valse). Il s'agissait de présenter une alternative nationale aux différents rythmes américains – très aimés surtout par les jeunes –, perçus comme un élément de corruption des meilleures traditions italiennes<sup>20</sup>.

Deuxièmement, son texte n'est pas connoté politiquement comme celui de *Fischia il Vento* où l'on invite à se battre pour « conquérir le rouge printemps/ où se lève le soleil du futur ». Les paroles de *Bella Ciao*, « politiquement correctes », correspondaient mieux à la situation politique de l'époque où, à partir de 1962, se forme un gouvernement de Centre-Gauche<sup>21</sup> qui prônait la coopération entre les différentes forces politiques. Dans un esprit de concorde, on insiste alors sur l'idée que la nouvelle république italienne et sa constitution avaient été créées à partir des valeurs de la Résistance à laquelle avaient participé des partisans de différentes obédiences politiques, unis dans la lutte antifasciste. Il avait donc fallu fédérer les différents courants autour d'un même idéal qui se basait également sur le principe d'une guerre patriotique. Dans ce sens, la référence à « l'envahisseur » de la première strophe de *Bella Ciao*, était particulièrement appréciée, puisqu'elle évoquait également toutes les guerres d'Indépendance de la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle, où les Italiens s'étaient battus, comme durant la Résistance, pour libérer leur pays de l'occupation étrangère. *Bella Ciao* semble ainsi incarner deux moments emblématiques de la construction d'une identité nationale – le *Risorgimento* et la Résistance – où les Italiens se seraient retrouvés unis dans la lutte autour de mêmes idéaux. Cette interprétation apparaît aujourd'hui assez discutable car nous savons que la population n'a pas participé en masse activement à ces mouvements. Ainsi, *Bella Ciao* correspondait mieux à l'image idéalisée que les nouvelles générations avaient de la

<sup>18</sup> Musique de Michail Isakovskij et MatveiIsakovicBlanter.

<sup>19</sup> Paroles de Sibilla et Cascione. Cf. Annexe n° 4.

<sup>20</sup> Dans le film *Riz Amer*, nous pouvons voir que les *mondine*, pendant leur temps libre, dansent le *boogiewoogie*, qui est même proposé à la fête du village à côté de motifs populaires italiens. Très célèbre est la séquence du *boogiewoogie* dansé par les deux interprètes principaux Silvana Mangano et Vittorio Gassman. Ces nouveaux rythmes, aux yeux de la jeunesse de l'époque, comportaient une image de nouveauté, de liberté et de sensualité étrangères aux danses des générations précédentes. Dans l'Italie de la Reconstruction, ces rythmes apportés par les libérateurs Américains, incarnent la modernité et correspondent à une volonté de changement, une envie d'oublier, dans un certain sens, les dures années de la guerre.

<sup>21</sup> Le Gouvernement, formé par la D.C, le PRI, le PSDI, s'ouvre donc aux socialistes qui s'éloignent des communistes, restés à l'opposition.

Résistance : un seul peuple uni qui se bat pour un même idéal, la liberté. De même, les jeunes appréciaient ce texte pour sa simplicité et son absence d'effets rhétoriques. Le battement de mains accompagnant souvent le refrain facilitait la participation<sup>22</sup>.

Il faut aussi rappeler que les années 1960 représentent un moment important de *revival* des chansons populaires et, *Bella Ciao*, tout en étant reconnue comme une chanson de gauche, participe de ce phénomène. Pour ces raisons, *Bella Ciao*, commence alors à toucher un public plus large, profitant également des nombreux enregistrements de chanteurs italiens populaires au cours des années 1970<sup>23</sup>.

Juin 1964 représente un moment essentiel dans ce processus de diffusion. Au *Festival dei Due Mondi* de Spoleto (Ombrie) est proposé un spectacle intitulé *Bella Ciao* qui s'ouvre avec la version *mondina* et se conclut avec la version de la Résistance. En effet, à ce moment-là, les ethnomusicologues reçoivent le témoignage d'une ex-*mondina*-chanteuse-compositrice - Giovanna Daffini<sup>24</sup> - qui se rappelle avoir entendu la version *Bella Ciao* des *mondine* en 1932-33 dans les rizières de Vercelli. Elle soutenait également l'avoir mise par écrit, mais elle sera démentie par Vasco Scansani qui affirmait l'avoir lui-même fait en 1951. Ce dernier, ex-partisan et repiqueur de riz, affirmait qu'il connaissait déjà la version de la Résistance. Dans ce cas, la *Bella Ciao* des partisans serait devenue le modèle de la version des *mondine* ! Les querelles concernant les auteurs supposés de ce chant se poursuivront pendant des années. En tout cas, au milieu des années 1960, la gauche italienne voit dans la version des *mondine* une forme de protestation paysanne présente sous le fascisme qui pénétrera dans la Résistance. *Bella Ciao* devenait ainsi implicitement porteuse des aspirations de la lutte des classes.

Quoiqu'il en soit, la majorité des Italiens n'étaient et ne sont vraiment pas au courant de tout ce débat autour de *Bella Ciao*. Ils l'ont apprise et chantée de plus en plus depuis les années 1960, si bien que cette chanson est entrée, à plein titre, dans le patrimoine des chants populaires nationaux.

### ***Le succès international***

Ce chant commence à se faire connaître à l'étranger pendant les années 1950, période à laquelle remontent ses premières traductions en allemand, anglais et polonais. Au début, il touche un public restreint, essentiellement lié aux milieux politiques de gauche. Ses premières exécutions ont lieu au Festival de la Jeunesse de Nice en 1947, à Budapest en 1949, à Berlin en 1951. Sa mélodie simple, son refrain aux paroles souvent déjà connues à l'étranger, le battement de mains au caractère entraînant, tout cela facilite, comme je l'ai déjà souligné, son succès, et les « camarades » en traduisent souvent les paroles. De plus, c'est précisément à cette époque qu'Yves Montand, célèbre acteur et chanteur français, d'origine italienne, d'une

<sup>22</sup> Quant au battement des mains accompagnant le refrain, Leydi et Pianta pensent qu'il vient d'une version des « ballades soporifiques » diffusée dans les régions du nord-est de l'Italie avant la seconde guerre mondiale. La ballade la plus connue - « *La me nona, l'è vecchierella/ la me fa ciau, le me dis ciau, la me fa ciau, le me dis ciau/ La me manda la funtanela ..* » - était chantée surtout par les enfants. Le battement des mains correspondait à une sorte de jeu qui, tout en facilitant la mémorisation de la chanson, favorisait la coordination des mouvements des mains.

<sup>23</sup> Cf., par exemple, les enregistrements de Claudio Villa en 1975 ou de Gigliola Cinquetti (version des *mondine*) en 1971.

<sup>24</sup> Pour comprendre la complexité et l'ambiguïté des données de ce débat rappelons, entre autres, les témoignages de Mme Daffini qui, enregistrée par Leydi et Bosio, en 1962, disait avoir appris ce motif en 1932-33 dans les rizières de Vercelli (Piémont) grâce à des *mondine* émiliennes». Toutefois, Mme Daffini affirmait à Bermani en 1964 l'avoir entendu en 1940.

famille antifasciste et lui-même politiquement engagé auprès du Parti Communiste, sort un disque de chansons populaires italiennes, parmi lesquelles figure *Bella Ciao*<sup>25</sup>.

Vers le milieu des années 1960, *Bella Ciao* représente bien un exemple du processus que Hobsbawm appelle « l'invention d'une tradition » (Hobsbawm et Ranger, 1987, 3-4, 8) où nous retrouvons des « traditions » effectivement inventées et l'évolution de traditions déjà existantes, mais sélectionnées. Le recours à des matériaux anciens pour construire des traditions inventées d'un genre nouveau est destiné à des fins nouvelles<sup>26</sup>. Ainsi cette chanson se répand même à l'étranger et progressivement, tout comme en Italie, elle est chantée par un public sans lien direct avec la gauche, qui la perçoit plutôt comme un chant populaire italien. Désormais l'assimilation entre chant emblématique de la Résistance, chant de protestation de paysans (voire également chant à connotation féministe dans sa version des *mondine*), chant populaire national, est accomplie.

### ***Son succès actuel***

Aujourd'hui *Bella Ciao* continue d'être chantée ou jouée aussi bien en Italie qu'à l'étranger. On ne compte plus le nombre de langues dans lesquelles ce chant a été traduit sur tous les continents. Il est repris souvent par les partis de gauche, davantage par les socialistes que par les communistes, ces derniers préférant *l'Internationale*. En France, par exemple, *Bella Ciao* est souvent utilisé comme hymne dans les meetings du Parti Socialiste, comme on a pu le constater lors des rassemblements de la campagne électorale présidentielle de François Hollande de 2012<sup>27</sup>. Étant ressentie comme une chanson de lutte, elle est également utilisée par des mouvements de protestation qui la proposent soit en gardant le texte de la version des partisans, soit en élaborant de nouveaux textes qui correspondent aux revendications en question, en gardant toutefois, le plus souvent, le fameux refrain italien.

Nous assistons donc à une sorte de réappropriation de la part de mouvements qui en font l'expression de la résistance populaire des plus faibles face à l'oppression des plus forts, en lui attribuant une dimension internationale. C'est ainsi qu'on la retrouve dans les manifestations altermondialistes rassemblant un public varié, organisées dans des pays différents. On a pu, par exemple, entendre chanter *Bella Ciao* en juin 2013 à Istanbul, lors des manifestations sur la place Taksim<sup>28</sup>. En Italie, il en est de même. *Bella Ciao* est évidemment chantée lors des manifestations commémoratives de la Libération du 25 Avril, mais elle l'est également le 1<sup>er</sup> Mai où elle symbolise la lutte de classes en devenant la marque de revendications avancées par les forces de gauche. En Italie, durant certaines manifestations publiques, il est presque impossible de dissocier *Bella Ciao* des mouvements de gauche, pourtant elle est plutôt considérée par les Italiens comme un chant anti-fasciste<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> Yves Montand, *Souvenir italiano*, Philip, 432 735 (EP, 1963). Remarquons que la dernière strophe n'apparaît pas dans cette version chantée.

<sup>26</sup> Eric J. HOBBSAWM et Terence RANGER, *L'invenzionedellatradizione*, Turin : Einaudi, 1987.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. [http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/derniers-meetings-avant-la-primaire-ps\\_1037995.html](http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/derniers-meetings-avant-la-primaire-ps_1037995.html), page consultée le 19/01/2014. Au moment de la victoire de François Hollande aux élections présidentielles, dans quelques villes de France on entend chanter *Bella Ciao*. Cf. in <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/topnews/20120506.AFP5343/presidentielle-victoire-de-francois-hollande-en-direct.html>, page consultée le 20/01/2014.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZfu\\_qagC7c](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZfu_qagC7c), page consultée le 15/01/2014.

<sup>29</sup> En juin 2013, par exemple, les Italiens participant aux funérailles de Franca Rame, actrice auteur de pièces théâtrales, féministe et antifasciste engagée dans des batailles civiles - épouse du Prix Nobel de littérature Dario Fo- ont chanté *Bella Ciao*.

Nous devons également remarquer que *Bella Ciao* a été et se trouve de plus en plus revisitée sous d'autres styles et rythmes comportant différents instruments. Il suffit d'un petit détour sur le site de You Tube pour découvrir, par exemple, des versions ska-punk<sup>30</sup>, jazz-grunge<sup>31</sup> ou électro<sup>32</sup>, ou bien encore des interprétations intégrant des éléments typiques d'autres musiques populaires étrangères<sup>33</sup> à côté, bien sûr, d'interprétations « classiques ».

En même temps, à côté d'une récupération de la part de différents mouvements de protestation, cette chanson semble se vider de son histoire et être reconnue seulement pour son « italianité ». On la retrouve ainsi dans des recueils de chansons populaires italiennes dans les collections de « musiques du monde », interprétée par des groupes folkloriques. Cette seule connotation d'italianité, et une sorte de « banalisation » qui gomme son contenu, explique que *Bella Ciao* puisse devenir sans problème le nom d'un restaurant, d'un hôtel ou d'un magasin quelconque. Pire encore: sa mélodie très connue, dont on oublie même le côté italien, peut être reprise durant des matchs de football, comme, par exemple, par des supporters de l'OM<sup>34</sup>.

Ce processus de « spoliation » a atteint le comble en 2007, quand elle a été utilisée dans des spots publicitaires diffusés au Mexique pour la nouvelle boisson Aquarius, un *drink* proposé par Coca Cola Company. La reprise ska-punk de *Bella Ciao*, a contribué dans une large mesure au succès du spot si bien que les adolescents l'avaient élu « spot le plus beau de l'année »<sup>35</sup>. *Bella Ciao* est ici réduite à un jingle et, malheureusement, sa notoriété semble se retourner contre elle. Dans une logique commerciale, l'aspiration à la liberté (du partisan contre l'envahisseur), est véhiculée sournoisement avec une lecture fautive et réductrice : *Bella Ciao* suggérerait alors une aspiration, une sensation de liberté dans le choix et la consommation de cette boisson ? Cela a scandalisé beaucoup d'Italiens, si bien qu'au Mexique, le collectif d'enseignants de langue et culture italiennes AlterIta a lancé même une pétition en ligne demandant l'interdiction de diffusion de ce spot, pétition qui a été signée par plusieurs intellectuels d'Italie.

Le succès peut ainsi comporter des risques.

Dans cet article, nous avons essayé d'expliquer de quelle manière *Bella Ciao* est passée d'une dimension nationale à une dimension internationale et cela grâce au fait que le patriotisme qui la caractérise est tout autre chose que du nationalisme. S'il est vrai que ce chant fait partie du patrimoine culturel italien en constituant un trait identitaire indéniable, le fait qu'il soit adopté et repris à l'étranger n'est pas injustifié, à condition de ne pas trahir son message d'origine : l'encouragement à se battre contre toute forme d'oppression politique et sociale, pour le droit à une vie dans la liberté et la dignité, aspiration universelle.

<sup>30</sup>Cf., par exemple, la version espagnole des Boikot, in <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PdNLSiKWhFE&feature=related>, page consultée le 20/01/2014.

<sup>31</sup>Cf., par exemple, la version des 21 Love Hôtel, in <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M17NZQ4GJKg>, page consultée le 20/01/2014.

<sup>32</sup>Cf., par exemple, la version des Spaceheads, in <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IV0vzG6eGV8>, page consultée le 20/01/2014.

<sup>33</sup> Nous apercevons, par exemple, des influences musicales irlandaises dans la version des Modena City Ramblers (cf. [www.youtube.com/watch?v=55yCQOioTyY](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=55yCQOioTyY), page consultée le 20/01/2014) ou des influences de musique populaire balkanique dans la version de Goran Bregovic (cf. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OyMA84-mowI>, page consultée le 20/01/2014).

<sup>34</sup>Cf. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GFzginvD7vY>, page consultée le 29/01/2014.

<sup>35</sup>Cf. Gaia TORZINI, *Pubblicità delladiscordia, Il Sole d'Italia*, n° 63, 16-30 avril 2008, in <http://www.ilsoleitalia.com/Notizie/306307/messico-coca-cola-absolut.html>, page consultée le 18/01/2014.

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## Annexe n° 1

*Bella Ciao* Version Résistance

Una mattinami son svegliato  
 O bella ciao, bella ciao, bella  
 ciaociaociao  
 Una mattinami son svegliato  
 E hotrovatol'invasore

O partigiano porta mi via  
 O bella ciao, bella ciao, bella  
 ciaociaociao  
 O partigiano porta mi via  
 Ché mi sento di morir

E se iomuoi da partigiano  
 O bella ciao, bella ciao, bella  
 ciaociaociao  
 E se iomuoi da partigiano  
 Tu mi devisepellir

E seppellirelassù in montagna  
 O bella ciao, bella ciao, bella  
 ciaociaociao  
 E seppellirelassù in montagna  
 Sottol'ombra di un bel fior

E le genti che passeranno  
 O bella ciao, bella ciao, bella  
 ciaociaociao  
 E le genti che passeranno  
 Mi diranno: chebelfior

È questoilfiore del partigiano  
 O bella ciao, o bella ciao, o bella  
 ciaociaociao  
 È questoilfiore del partigiano  
 Morto per la libertà.

Un matin, je me suis levé  
 Ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Un matin, je me suis levé  
 Et j'ai trouvé l'envahisseur

Oh partisan emmène-moi  
 ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Oh partisan emmène-moi  
 Car je me sens prêt à mourir

Et si je meurs en partisan  
 Ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Et si je meurs en partisan  
 Tu dois m'enterrer

Tu m'enterreras là-haut dans la montagne  
 Ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Tu m'enterreras là-haut dans la montagne  
 Sous l'ombre d'une belle fleur

Et les gens qui passeront  
 Ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Et les gens qui passeront  
 Me diront « Quelle belle fleur »

Et c'est la fleur du partisan  
 Ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao, ô bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Et c'est la fleur du partisan  
 Mort pour la liberté

**Annexe n° 2*****Bella Ciao version Mondine***

Allamattinaappenaalzata  
 O bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao, ciao,ciao  
 Allamattinaappenaalzata  
 In risaia mi toccaandar

E fragliinsetti e le zanzare  
 O bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 E fragliinsetti e le zanzare  
 Un durlavoro mi toccafar

Il capo in piedi col suobastone  
 O bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Il capo in piedi col suobastone  
 E noi curve a lavorar

O mammamia o che tormento  
 O bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 O mammamia o che tormento  
 Io t'invocoognidoman

Ma verrà un giorno che tutte quante  
 O bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao ciao ciao  
 Ma verrà un giorno che tutte quante  
 Lavoreremo in libertà.

Le matin, à peine levée  
 Ô bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao,  
 ciao,ciao  
 Le matin, à peine levée  
 A la rizière je dois aller

Et entre les insectes et les moustiques  
 Ô bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Et entre les insectes et les moustiques  
 Un dur labeur je dois faire

Et le chef debout avec son bâton  
 Ô bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Et le chef debout avec son bâton  
 Et nous courbées à travailler

Ô Bonne mère quel tourment  
 Ô bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Ô Bonne mère quel tourment  
 Je t'invoque chaque jour

Mais un jour viendra où nous toutes unies  
 Ô bella ciao bella ciao bella ciao  
 ciao ciao  
 Mais un jour viendra où nous toutes unies  
 travaillerons en liberté

## Annexe n° 3

U - na mat - ti - na mi son sve - glia - ta

5 o bel - la ciao bel - la ciao bel - la ciao ciao

9 ciao u - na mat - ti - na mi son sve - glia - ta

13 e ho tro - va - to l'in - va - - sor.

The musical score is written on four staves in a 2/4 time signature with a key signature of one flat (B-flat). The lyrics are in French and describe the song 'Bella Ciao'. The first staff contains the lyrics 'U - na mat - ti - na mi son sve - glia - ta'. The second staff, starting at measure 5, contains 'o bel - la ciao bel - la ciao bel - la ciao ciao'. The third staff, starting at measure 9, contains 'ciao u - na mat - ti - na mi son sve - glia - ta'. The fourth staff, starting at measure 13, contains 'e ho tro - va - to l'in - va - - sor.' The score ends with a double bar line.

**Annexe n° 4***Fischia il vento, infuria la bufera*

Fischia il vento, infuria la bufera,  
 scarperotteppurbisognaandar,  
 a conquistare la rossa primavera  
 dovesorge il sol dell'avvenir.

Ogni contrada è patriadelribelle,  
 ogni donna a lui dona un sospir,  
 nellanotteloguidano le stelle  
 forte il cuore e il braccionelcolpir.

Se ci coglie la crudele morte,  
 dura vendetta verrà dal partigian;  
 ormaisicura è già la dura sorte  
 delfascista vile traditor.

Cessailvento, calma è la bufera,  
 torna a casa il fiero partigian,  
 sventolando la rossasuabandiera;  
 vittoriosi e alfinliberisiam.

Le vent siffle, la tourmente fait rage  
 Les chaussures sont cassées, pourtant il faut  
 partir,  
 Conquérir le rouge printemps  
 Où se lève le soleil du futur.

Chaque quartier est la patrie du rebelle,  
 Chaque femme lui offre un soupir,  
 Les étoiles le guident dans la nuit  
 Fort est son cœur et son bras pour frapper.

Si la mort cruelle nous prend,  
 Le partisan sera durement vengé ;  
 désormais sûr est le dur destin  
 du Fasciste, lâche traître.

Le vent cesse, la tourmente calmit  
 Le fier partisan rentre à la maison,  
 En agitant son drapeau rouge ;  
 Victorieux et enfin libres, nous sommes.



immigrants, who are more and more numerous in Europe, will probably lead to two completely different cultural societies within the same society, aspect very difficult to be managed, in my point of view. Even more than that, the sociologist Bauman considers that today, all over the world, we are witnessing an archipelago of the Diasporas (Bauman, 2014), thing that can lead to great inequalities in development, but also to an identity fragmentation and disintegration in the long run. Neagu Djuvara, a specialist in the history philosophy, who lived in the European area as well as in the Islamic one, makes some clear and pessimistic in the same time statements, underlining the imminent situation based on which Europe will become non-European on its own territory.

The most sensible implications of the globalization are in the cultural-religious area. The traditional societies have already disintegrated and now it is time for the traditional values. In this context, the religious fundamentalism is a reaction to the collapse of traditions and ethical pluralism. The reality of internationalisation was never more visible as now. Today, we live in a world where we always get in contact with people who think, speak and live differently, and this has caused and will continue to cause cultural conflicts in the first place (Gidens, 2011:57-58). Nowadays, all European values that formed the European identity along the centuries are contested by immigrants in their practices. Almost two years ago, there were vivid debates in France on the prohibition of Islamic veil in the public areas, and these propositions were in direct ratio with the constitutional rights in France. The violent clashes and decided protests of the Islamic communities have shown once again their resistance to the cultural assimilation of the West.<sup>3 4</sup> Against the negative population growth rate of the Europeans, the immigrant population increase is higher and higher, especially because the immigrants have exceeded the population growth rate in the European Union, says Eurostat<sup>5</sup>. The demographic figures are the acutest indicators of social prediction in Europe because we have to admit that history was always carried on by the demographic element. For example, 10 years ago, the official figures indicated that in Bruxelles, over 55% of the new born are immigrants – rate that is increasing for that matter, and half of the East born women doing research do not have children and other alarming figures clearly showing that, in the long run, the Europeans will be a minority in Europe (Laquer, 2007). Another relevant figure and even more up-to-date in this aspect shows us that in Great Britain 70% of the population growth is due to the immigrants, as a research recently presented in the British press shows.<sup>6</sup>

Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy, the most important European leaders today have admitted that multiculturalism has failed. We relied on the fact that the immigrants will return to their countries, but they are becoming more and more vivid and active, Merkel said, highlighting that a supplementary effort is needed in order to integrate them.<sup>7</sup> The statements made by the European leaders are extremely important and very lucid regarding Europe's future, especially because they are the representatives of the countries

<sup>3</sup> [http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/ciocniri-violente-franta-cauza-valului-islamic-1\\_51ea5f08c7b855ff565834f8/index.html](http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/ciocniri-violente-franta-cauza-valului-islamic-1_51ea5f08c7b855ff565834f8/index.html), accessed in December 2014.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.rfi.ro/articol-stiri-social-43245-valul-islamic-interzis-universitatile-franceze>, accessed in November 2014.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.frontpress.ro/2011/07/viitor-negru-pentru-europa-numarul-imigrantilor-depaseste-sporul-natural-demografic-inregistrat-in-uniunea-europeana.html>, accessed on December 2014.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2009853/UK-population-growing-fastest-rate-50-years.html#ixzz1QqDOFvrZ>, accessed on November 2014.

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.frontpress.ro/2014/11/angela-merkel-diversitatea-culturala-a-esuat-in-germania.html>, accessed on December 2014.

with the highest number of immigrants. Does their assimilation, proposed by Merkel, become thus a part of the European project or a formal statement in face of weakness?

In this research, we attempt a reflection on the situation in the Europe of today because this is imperative now more than ever. During the fall of this year, I was at Bruxelles, at a Conference and, having enough time over the week to feel in detail the atmosphere of a Europe's capital, I could sense also the Belgians' reservations towards everything connected to migration and the project of the Union. I deliberately talked to almost each person who seemed to be a Belgian native and I heard the same discourse in the majority of the situations: Belgium is not the same country any longer, we all moved back in the country areas or to the outskirts of the cities; today, the important population is represented by the immigrants. But, beyond any other reasons or subjective positions, I cannot forget the disappointment of those people who did not feel at home in their own country any more. In this confused and tensed context that Europe is going through beside the economic crises, I think we should seriously meditate on the implications of migration and multiculturalism on the European identity.

### **European identity – just a memory?**

Originally, the integration concept was to make an ensemble, to reunite elements considered parts of the same unit with a fortifying aim of cultural unity. Namely Europe was formed out of cultural and religious reasons in the first place. These details have to be taken into account, especially because, up to a moment, Europe was often *taken for* Catholicism (Marga, 1998:27). Europe seems to have an identity crisis today. The feeling of belonging to a value and principles system is lower and lower. In spite of the fact that, at the beginning of European formation, Adenauer, Schuman and Gasperi have relied on the spiritual dimension and the role of religion in the formation of European Union, today, in the globalization era and in the context of a multicultural society, things have become much more sensitive. Schuman asserted that *the democratic ideal on which the future of Europe depended owes its origins exclusively to Christianity*<sup>8</sup> and that *democracy will be Christian or will cease to exist* (Schuman, 1964:50-80), but today we are witnesses to the relativisation of these principles or, even more, to the extinction of this system.

It is well known that values form identity, but to what extend the present values and their tendencies can shape the new European identity in the migration era and global multiculturalism still remains a subject to be debated. The formation of the European identity is seen as a process of a multicultural identity formation, but one that preserves the respect for each European nation particularity. Due to the spread of the migration phenomenon, it has been concluded that *the relation to the minorities cannot be seen antagonistically any longer, but dialogically. European identity develops this dialogical pattern: two or more kinds of logic are confronted in a complex way (complementarily and antagonistically), so that the unity of European culture can be born not only out of the Christian-Judaic-Greek-Roman unity, but also out of the antagonism of these elements* (Tartler, 2006:23-24; See Brie, Polgar and Chirodea, 2012).

*The Europenity is attested both by history and by the transnational character of the great cultural deeds* (Verner, 2006:7). *The epic poems, the chivalry, l'amour courtois, feudal liberties, crusades, the birth of the cities, the Gothic revolution, the Renaissance, the Reform and its Counter-Reformation, the expansion beyond its boundaries, the birth of national states, the profane and religious Baroque, the musical polyphony, the Lights, the Romanticism, the Faustian universe of the technology or the appearance of nationalities...*

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<sup>8</sup> *Religion in Europe. Contemporary perspectives*, Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1994, p. 7.

*In spite of a rather different history, the slaves in Russia, the Balkans and others participate as well to this Europenity. Yes, all these cultural deeds are common to the Europeans and only to them, marking the netting of a civilization destroyed today* (Verner, 2006:7). In the context of a cultural unity and a cultural-spiritual heritage specific to Europe, the multiculturalism, seen as the intersection of different cultures, has become a challenge for Europe in relation to the migration of the nations with a different culture than the Christian one, considered the cradle of Europe spirit. The socio-anthropologists have defined the phenomenon happening at the same time with the intersection with many cultures as acculturation, a phenomenon through which the purity of a certain identity can be put to the test. The acculturation is *the ensemble of the modifications arisen in the originary cultural patterns, when groups of individuals with different cultures get into contact permanently. The definition highlights the fact that every culture constitutes a system, whose different elements are re-elaborated with the help of these contacts. It underlines the fact that, disregarding the situation (invasion, colonisation, migration), between the two cultures there are borrowings taking place, exchanges and reinterpretations and no culture can impose itself totally on the other, despite their unequal input* (Boudon, 2009:12). Identity is intrinsically linked to the cultural values and deeds specific to a community. Knowing and maintaining them ensures the perpetuation of identity beyond the inevitable changes in history. Culture is the binder conferring identity durability. The fact that Europe is in the situation of pondering about its identity is due also to the abdication of its cultural aspects in time. *The chaotic state is not only the result of a course of happenings, hostile threats and historic catastrophes. It is a consequence of spiritual confusion, of absolute nihilism or, in other words, of forgetting our tradition* (Verner, 2006:8). In this context, a certain question comes naturally: whether in Bruxelles there is, at this moment, an authentic *spiritual-cultural* agenda regarding the politics of European Union in the long run. Because, in the absence of such politics, we can easily forecast that, in the long run, not only the European values will not have a real space to display, but we will only talk about them as cultural tendencies of the past, and this would be devastating for society and mentality.

### **Europe today. From European identity to extra-European or international identities**

To continue our research, in this section of the study we attempt to understand whether Europe still can confer *unity* within a pressing non-European or even non-Christian cultural diversity. When I refer to Christianity in the European context, I do not refer exclusively to elements related to a religious practice, I refer only to the social values that are specific to the European culture that was understood in relation to the Christian values until not long ago. If, in the beginning, Europe was formed almost by itself, acknowledging simultaneously cultural similarities and differences, today things seem to appear totally changed. In the era of globalization and of a society more and more multicultural, we witness a European project often overwhelmed.

Today we cannot ask ourselves what moment in the formation of Europe we are because, today, the European formation endures an underway adaptation. Cultural crises are almost insignificant compared to economic problems. They say more and more frequently about shaping the new Europe, but this is already outdated, in my opinion. The European Commissary Hahn for the Regional Politics of European Union has even initiated a platform calling for citizens to get involved directly in the shaping of the new Europe because it seems to be commonly agreed that the citizens feel the rhythm of life

more realistically within the European public area.<sup>9</sup> We witness today certain off-handedness on the part of the European structures and politics in their depth.

Even though, at first, things seem to be under control and even if every immigrant is totally compliant at the beginning to the new country he arrived to, with time the situation loosens and the immigrants become those who progressively control the circumstance.

For example, the Islamic community, through the rights they have gained, but also by their imposing presence in the European society display a decided refusal in face of adaptation in the residence society. And, without being pejorative, I have to underline the fact that today, in Europe, the Islamic communities want to make their own rules, undermining thus the state where they look for a better life. Even Sharia Police was established in Germany. Sharia Police is an Islamic grouping, terming themselves as *peace officers*, monitoring the bars areas especially and promoting a lifestyle: no alcohol, no drugs, no pornography, no gambling, music or concerts,<sup>10</sup> and the Muslims who do not accept these rules are held liable violently by Sharia Police. The reaction of the German authorities came immediately: no one has the right to commit such abuse on the good name of German Police”, stated the Federal Minister of Home Affairs Thomas de Maizière. Law is made only by the state, not by the Sharia Police. We will not tolerate illegal parallel justice, said, in his turn, the Justice Minister, Heiko Maas.<sup>11</sup> If they do not find the most adequate measures for this kind of attitudes, we will soon witness the dysfunctionality of the states. In other words, we could even say that, in Europe, the immigrants and minorities of any kind are the ones who seem to represent the majority.

Tolerance, a vital European value for inter-ethnic cohabitation, has become to be a matter of life in exchange for freedom of speech, but is it not too unbalanced? Is the legitimate question arising here about the boundaries or limits of values? Does tolerance have a well-defined area or is it directly linked to the freedom of speech?<sup>12</sup> Namely, I tolerate you only if your freedom of speech does not affront my spiritual affinities. But here things are more delicate; if, in the old Judaic law, there was identical price,<sup>13</sup> in the new Muslim order in Europe, the pamphlet is worth life itself, because in the Islamic view, tolerance is almost unknown. Therefore, the freedom of speech and other European values have to be in conformity with the habits and traditions of the new-comers, not the other way round. But, for that matter, we have to expect delicate conflicts of any kind in Europe.

The issue is that not only immigrants cause problems in Europe today, but even its members, and we do not refer here to states that adhered during the last waves, but to states as UK<sup>14</sup> – Scotland (separation referendum, but here we refer to the tendencies towards an emphasised individuality in EU), but also the great issues in Greece in the last years. It is not the aim of this research to show a certain positioning whether EU took the

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.europedirect-adrcentru.ro/index.php/stiri-uniunea-europeana/329-cetatenii-europeni-pot-sa-se-implice-la-modelarea-viitoarei-agende-urbane-a-ue>, accessed on November 2014.

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.paginaeuropeana.ro/musulmanii-au-infintat-politia-sharia-si-terorizeaza-populatia-dintr-un-oras-german/> accessed on December 2014.

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.dw.de/guvernul-de-la-berlin-nu-tolereaz%C4%83-poli%C5%A3ia-sharia/a-17905755>, accessed on December 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Andrei Pleșu Toleranța și Intolerabilul, <http://www.vestul.ro/uploads/file/aplesutoleranta.pdf>, accessed in November 2014.

<sup>13</sup> *Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot*, - Exodus 21:24, KJV.

<sup>14</sup> Even if here we refer strictly to Scotland, we have to take into account that The Great Britain strikes a false note lately in the European Union, often threatening to withdraw or refusing to participate financially any longer to the activity of EU.

best measures regarding Greece, but, lately, the discourses of the Greek politicians is more and more anti-Europe. And, thus, implicitly, we see the growth of the Eurosceptics. And the reality speaking mostly in favour of this research are the results in the European Parliament Elections. Far right has won in France, Denmark, but also in Great Britain. The success these anti-migration and Eurosceptic systems says a great deal in the context of the crises in the European Union.<sup>15</sup> It has to be underlined that it is in the countries with the highest standard of living where the Euroscepticism is at its highest level.

Europe has become – willy, nilly – dependant on the immigrants, and the practices of the immigrants form the future identity in Europe, ending the old European identity and we can speak about these things disregarding the possible accession of Turkey, which represents an increase with approximately 10% of Muslims.



**The Breakdown of Nations Map**

**Source:** the project of maps The United States of Europe, in Freddy Heineken's view, inspired by Leopold Kohr's theses.<sup>16</sup>

I have to mention one more aspect here and that is the fact that we will have two great societies living in parallel, in which the immigrants will form their own habitat, while on the European side we will have a ghettoisation through value-identity resurgence. For that matter, I attach a map showing Europe's disintegration in the long run.

### **The relevance of the European project in the context of an identity dilution**

Europe was constituted out of many reasons, but especially out of spiritual and cultural reasons, namely the European ethos does not take into account the demographic delimitations, but has in view only identity cultural elements and mutual finding of social values and practices, and this is important to keep in mind in the context of this research because only this way we will be able to understand Europe's crises.

Against the challenges that Europe is confronting with today, Baconski underlines that the question arising is linked to the source from which the 20th Europe will absorb the

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.wall-street.ro/articol/International/166496/alegeri-europarlamentare-extremistii-castiga-in-franta-si-marea-britanie.html>, accessed on December 2014.

<sup>16</sup> <https://mappingworld.wordpress.com/2012/06/26/eurotopia-amb-cervesa/>, accessed on December 2014.

values shaping its unitary spirit. The answer is in the very acceptance of the heritage that Europe has and underlay its identity formation, beyond any controversies and denials linked to this heritage. *If the Europeans claim a distinct identity, if they still take pride in being socially different and are ambitious enough to rely on the new geopolitical arrangements, then they will be bound to remember where they come from and reintegrate in their fundamental canon the Christian idea. Christianity goes beyond the European boundaries – both as transmission and as lifestyle. There is Christianity beyond Europe. But can there be a Europe outside Christianity* (Baconski, 2007:15)?

Huntington talks about the existence of a certain traits that are common to the European area, traits that would be defining for the European identity. Two of these common traits are: *the classical heritage – representing what influenced and formed the cultural basis of the Occident, what it took from anterior civilizations, the Greek philosophy and rationalism, the Roman right, the Latin language and Christianity; Catholicism and Protestantism – are seen as the most important characteristic, historically speaking, of the Western civilization because most of the first millennium, what we call Western civilization today was then called Western Christianity* (Huntington, 2012: 92-95). In the context where European identity means an identity marked by Christian values, multiculturalism, by the consequence of acculturation, becomes a real challenge for Europe. Can multiculturalism become the end of the Europe as it was *ontologically* called? If multiculturalism is an inevitable reality or already an indisputable reality, how can the European identity be redefined so that it would not (self-) dissolve? Can Islam, for example, be integrated into Christian Europe or will the European identity get another form, a syncretic one probably, losing the very essence that constituted it? But, in this case, can we still talk about a European identity?

The professor Marga, as a result of the analyses on the European identity, notes that the religious aspect comes into question as fundamental dimension in the formation and heritage of Europe. *No matter how far were taken the efforts to separate the profane mentality, which has formed in the European culture, from the religious antecedents, no matter how much we wanted to give autonomy to the philosophical and scientific approaches in relation to the religious atmosphere, in the end, we could not leave out of the discussion the Judeo-Christian tradition of Europe* (Marga, 2011:78). *The presence of religion as heritage of Europe cannot be contested also for the fact that the effects of religion on human actions cannot be doubted and they cannot be ignored* (Marga: 79).

The influence of religion, especially that of Christianity, can be noticed regarding values, of the set of common values generally accepted within the European area. *It may be said that overall, the Medieval, Catholic and Orthodox Europeans, and later the Protestants, have been very close to one other, through the acknowledgement and the dispersion of the same Judeo-Christian values, the fundamentals of a Weltanschauung, which have lasted until our day and have impregnated our secular society* (Ribémont, 1995: 16). The traces of Christianity are found in the sublayer of many aspects of life and in many activity domains or in many modern sciences. *Even the birth of the moral conscience, understood as a normative conscience and having as a support the inner need, cannot be explained without the Old Testament and the Epistle to the Romans of Apostle Paul* (Kittsteiner, 1997: 12-19). *...We may say that modern ethics was obviously inspired by the sources of the Bible* (Marga: 82), concluding then that *liberties, institutions, law, natural sciences, social sciences, and moral conscience – as Europe produced them and then spread them around the world, are connected to religion. They are connected to the religion that Europe took from Jerusalem and developed as its own religion: Christianity* (Marga: 82).

In the same train of thought, Europe was described using the concept *Europa christiana* - with its evangelism..., a successful attempt thanks to the singular capacity of universalisation and, therefore, of unification of humanity, that the Gospels and the traditions around them had. Europe is an example of Christian inculturation, with political consequences that claim their own social structure (Romero Pose, 2006: 20-15).

But now, Europe seems to be in a middle of identity crisis with multiple causes and effects. We have to deal with a more and more secularised society, and the belonging feeling to a system of values and principles is lower and lower. In spite of the fact that at the beginning of the European formation Adenauer, Schuman or Gasperi have relied on the spiritual dimension and the role of religion in the forming of the European civilisation. Schuman asserted that *the democratic ideal on which the future of Europe depended owes its origins exclusively to Christianity*.<sup>17</sup> And more than that, Schuman considered once that *democracy will be either Christian or it will cease to exist*.<sup>18</sup> In the context of globalisation, multiculturalism and social fragmentation, it is imperative this very analysis to establish whether Europe's identity given by values not only become relative or fragmented, but we witness to its very extinction or end. The I think that Europeanising and integration process should have a more intense if not even faster rhythm regarding the culture in relation to the globalisation and migration phenomenon.

For that matter, European Union tends not to become, but to stay less and less, in conformity with the values and principles that once made it the most redoubtable interstate project. Europe will not be able to offer the necessary unity to the immigrants because they manifest a visible refusal for real integration in the present society. Europe tends thus to become a mainland where the priority will be freedom of circulation and commercial benefits of free exchange. There will be no mentions about the relevance of a project with secular roots, but there will be made more and more references to the economic competitiveness and to being an important actor on the international stage even on the – high enough - cost of being foreigners in our own country. And this just because of the *simple* fact that history was always brought forward by demography (Brie, Horga and Șipoș, 2011).

### **Conclusions or What is there to be done?**

A possible portrait of the European Union can be outlined only from sociological perspectives or out of fairly clear demographic predictions, but despite all these data, we still cannot have a perspective with which correct policies could be formed in accordance with human rights, but also taking into account the European spirit.

The future of European Union seems to be polarising around the foreigners, since they represent the largest population in Occident at this time. Turkey's accession in the Union will matter enormously because it would bring almost 80 million active Muslims to the detriment of hundreds of millions of non-active Christians. Another thing that would matter will be the possible accession of the Balkan countries that, at this time, represent a strange attachment to Russia's politics.

Is Europe still Christian or was Bernanos right that we could witness a slow tearing of Europe, leading directly to a fragmentation (see the map above). The distribution of cultures in the world reflect the distribution of power. Through history, the civilisation power expansion has usually taken place around the same time with its culture blooming and almost always implied the usage of this power for spreading its values, practices and institutions in other

<sup>17</sup> *Religion in Europe. Contemporary perspectives*, Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1994, p. 7.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Schuman, *Pour L'Europe*, Paris, Nagel, 2nd Ed., 1964, pp. 50-80.

societies. A universal civilisation means a universal power. The Western power, in the guise of European colonialism of the 19th century and American hegemony of the 20th century, has extended the Western culture in the largest part of contemporary world. The European colonialism has ended, but the American hegemony is in its twilight. What could be next is the erosion of the Western culture as native habits, languages, beliefs and institutions with historical roots reiterate. The growth of non-Western societies power due to modernisation determines the rebirth of non-Western cultures in the whole world (Huntington, 2012: 125). The West remains thus the most powerful civilisation in the first decades of the 21th century.

Afterwards, we will probably have a substantial progress in the scientific research and development, in the technological, civil and military innovation. Yet, the control of the other power sources is dispersed more and more among the core states and the dominant countries of other civilisations. The authority of the West over these sources was at its highest level in the '20s and, since then, has irregularly but considerably decreased. In the '20s, a hundred years after this climax, the West will probably control approximately 24% of the world territory (compared to 49%), 10% of the global population (compared to 48%) and maybe 15-20% of the socially mobilised population, almost 30% of the global economic product (compared to 70%), maybe 25% of the industrial production (compared to 84%) and less than 10% of the global military staff (compared to 45%). [...] The era of the Western domination will come to an end. Meanwhile, the downfall of the West and the rise of other power centres favour the global processes of nativization and rebirth of non-Western cultures (Huntington, 2012: 125).

Modernity, through globalisation, but also through a more and more multicultural social feeling brings incalculable positive aspects to our world and, we have to admit openly this, also brings a cultural dilution and value relativisation. European Union has, thus, a supplementary mandate in these confused times, to remain strong and to understand that the desecularisation and the moral deficit are not part of its identity, but an effect of postmodernism. The challenge to maintain a value-united Europe is not an easy mission, but Europe has to demonstrate that identity multiculturalism has to be a good point, not a social vulnerability. The given situation implies almost imperatively a value repositioning in the context of migration, of more and more diverse challenges, but especially of globalisation. It is very important to have real value systems, social-cultural guide marks and European leaders for a real cohesion of the European project.

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## The Use of Impact Evaluation and Evidences at the Internal Level: the Higher Education Reform in the Republic of Moldova

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**Abstract.** *After a series of at least five attempts to change the national higher education legal framework, a new legislative framework convergent in a greater extent with the principles of the Bologna Process entered into force in november 2014. Thus, on the one hand, when Moldova joined the Bologna process, changes made in the legislative and regulatory frameworks were developed rather mimetically and through fragmented transposition of procedures and principles governing the Bologna Process. On the other hand, the adjustments made were not substantiated through studies, analysis and comprehensive evaluations of the system.*

*Are the recent changes in higher education in the Republic of Moldova accomplished on the basis of arguments related to deepening participation in the Bologna Process? Only in the last two years, changes in the legal framework of higher education refer to studies, analyses and policy proposals (see the strengthening of the autonomy of higher education institutions, the change of the funding mechanism etc.). However, the use of evidences in policy grounding is still at an early stage. Therefore, we try to explain and analyse, based on semi-structured interviews with decision-factors, the use of evidences and impact evaluations in policy making which draw the current structural reform in higher education in the Republic of Moldova.*

**Keywords:** *impact assessment, policy reports, evidence-based policies, higher education.*

### **Evaluation and systematic review in the policy-making process**

The higher education system in the Republic of Moldova does not have a long history. Factually speaking, the system has evolved over 80 years' time and its institutionalization mainly took place during the soviet regime, thus generating a predictable path dependence. The lack of a long tradition has influenced the systems' governance in general, and higher education institutions in particular. Because of this fact, after the dissolution of the USSR there was an inability to generate a domestic culture for

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governing the system based on the logic of academic freedom, institutional autonomy and grounding public policies and tactics on solid and convincing evidence. The existence of such an administrative culture could have offered a governance oriented towards efficacy, efficiency, adequacy and institutional diversity. However, during the transition period, the old elements, of soviet origin, coexisted, and some of them continue to coexist with the new elements, which prevents a systemic reform, thus leading to the establishment of a path dependence. In essence, the old path dependence has functioned for more than two decades in parallel to the elements which have been transferred from other higher education systems in the region, like the one in Romania (Toderăș, 2012). However, beginning with the end of the 1990's this coexistence takes place under an obvious exogenous pressure (such as the Bologna Process and the pressure coming from external donors, including the EU) which conditions governmental authorities to undertake actions for incrementally changing the system through the means of different stimulants (for example, changing the structure of the higher education system, introducing ECTS, applying internal procedures for quality assurance, the recognition and validation of alternative types of training etc.). In spite of all these changes, the measure in which the reform actions which have been implemented were based on the systemic use of the public policy cycle mechanism in general and of evaluations and analyses based on evidences in particular is still questionable.


More than once, classical public policy analysis models have described evaluation as a step in the policy making process – the last step. Based on this perspective it was proposed that the analysis of public policies should be undertaken by breaking their entire life cycle in several major steps: agenda setting, defining the problem, formulating alternatives, deciding on the alternative for solving the problem, implementation and evaluation (Lasswell, 1956; Lindblom, 1959; Simon, 1976; Hogwood and Gun, 1984; Miroiu, 2002). Apart from the criticisms which have been brought to this conceptualization, which point out the rarity of the logical and temporal succession of these steps in practice and their low explanatory power in relation to the complex social reality, placing evaluation as the final step of this process, even if it is a circular one, limited to some extent the *area of research regarding evaluation* to understanding and studying it as a marginal element in the production of public solutions with an impact on social issues. Thus, in this conceptual framework, evaluation has been perceived as being useful for measuring the results which are produced by a policy or programme at the end of the implementation process.

On the other hand, the issue of *measuring the impact of public interventions* has become today an important interest and sometimes a conditionality on the agenda of donors and political decidents, a fact which is also indicated by the rising presence of expressions such as *policy impact*, *program impact*, *measuring impact* etc. at the level of the political discourse, but also at the technical-administrative level in relation to the spending of public funds. The increasing frequency of using these terms is only one of the indicators which shows us that there is a need for a more comprehensive reconceptualization. In this context, using evaluation in an integrated manner and the evidences which result from the evaluation process in order to develop policies and programmes becomes a necessary condition for developing a coherent system in order to make public spending more efficient.

Pawson (2002, 2006) underlines the fact that the timing of undertaking evaluation activities is an aspect which can lead to a better use of the evaluation results. Thus, an evaluation which takes place only at the end of the implementation process fails to provide

significant feedback into the policy process due to the fact that evidences are necessary *before* designing any policy or programme. As we can see below, there is a need to develop evaluation approaches which allow for a systematic review of the entire policy making process, and starting the evaluation and evidence collection process after the implementation of an intervention and continuing this process while starting to design a new intervention should supply the latter a significant part of the elements needed for it to succeed.

On the other hand, to what extent can we know if public organizations will be capable to manage and use evaluation processes in order to produce evidences which can aid them in increasing their efficiency and strengthening their accountability? This problem can be addressed in terms of credibility and solidity regarding the chosen action model. The identification of a pertinent model of action and change for supporting such an intervention inside a public organization can in many cases prove to be a difficult task from the point of view of designing activities. This undertaking has to take into account the organizations' and staffs' particularities, the way in which the members of the organizations work and interact, their expectations in relation to the measure in which they will be capable to use the shared instruments and competencies which they have gained. Thus, the integration of evaluation in the regular routine of an organization includes: a) conceptualization, designing and supporting evaluation practices; b) connecting evaluation with the organizations' mission and objectives; c) connecting evaluation with other analysis activities and decision making mechanisms within the organization; d) developing knowledge and competencies for evaluation; e) integrating the practice of evaluation into the system, structure and culture of the organization; f) facilitating the use of evaluation results; g) supporting the organizations' members so that they think in an evaluative manner (Russ-Eft and Preskill 2009).



**Fig. 1.** Systematic review based on evaluation and gathering evidences.

Adapted from Pawson (2002, 2006)

With regard to the facilitation of the organizational learning processes, Leeuw, Rist, and Sonnichsen (2000: 193-194) identify two predominant generic action models. Both of them focus on the information necessities of key actors. The first one consists in using the public policy cycle as an element of reference and analysing the way in which learning processes can take place at every step of the policy cycle. From this perspective, for each step we have to identify what informational needs the members of the organization have. Afterwards, we project the way in which the results of evaluation activities will satisfy these needs, so that the organization can learn how it should behave

from one step to the other. The second action model has at its core the decision making at the governmental level and satisfying the informational needs which appear during the repeated processes of interaction between governmental actors and the actors which are responsible for analysing and communicating the data from the level of implementing agencies. Evaluation should produce useful data for them both in a position of filters, as well as in the position of users of information connected to governmental decisions. Performing these repeated interaction steps produces learning at the organizational level, which is assumed to make future interactions easier.

When referring to the application of the concept of public policy process and of the concept of evaluation within the Republic of Moldova, we can observe that the language and habits of the governmental authorities do not point out a long experience in this area. The occurrence of these elements in the context which has been described takes place due to the activity in the Republic of Moldova of international organizations and external donors such as the Soros Foundation, the Department for International Development – United Kingdom, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, which have financed activities in this area at the end of the 1990's. Later on governmental authorities started to appeal to the idea of evaluating public interventions after the mid 2000's, in a period when the reformation of the central public administration was taking place, which targeted, among other aspects, the institutionalization of the public policy process. The areas of using (even in a clumsy manner) the practices regarding evaluation has maintained itself mostly in the case of interventions that are financed through the technical assistance of the European Union offered to the Republic of Moldova. Presently the understanding of the evaluation concept is limited to specific areas which have a frequent contact with external financing sources. In the other general areas the understanding is a vague one, being associated with the project implementation process, but set apart from its fundamental functions of improving, learning or accountability.


Taking these aspects into consideration we aim to analyse the way in which the main systemic changes specific to the higher education system have been undertaken from the perspective of using public policy analysis methods in order to adequately ground public interventions. This longitudinal analysis is conducted by studying the following phases of change: (a) de-structuring → (b) stabilization → (c) restructuring → (d) coordination (Bîrzea and Fartușnic, 2003: 77). In the figure above we schematically present the flow of the reformation process of higher education in the Republic of Moldova during the last two decades. Each step is characterized through a sequence of critical adaptation conjectures, which lead to marginal changes, which allows the use of evaluations, impact analyses based on evidences to become a constant practice. In essence, every step is characterized by a set of distinct aspects, which are briefly presented in the following sections.

According to the model presented in the Figure 2, the main connexion between the four phases can be understood in two ways. The first one takes into account a consecutive trajectory throughout all the four phases, and the second a fractured trajectory from phase 1 towards phase 4, or from phase 1 towards phase 2 and finally toward phase 4. In both of these ways the particularities of phase 1 are essential, because the motivations which underlie the correction changes will persist throughout all the other phases and will contribute to the decision regarding the model of trajectory which is going to be taken. A relevant example can be the case of Georgia, which applied the second model for undertaking the trajectory of change (Dobbins and Khachatryan, 2014). Thus, in order for

this trajectory to be effective and efficient, the processes of change need to use the most relevant and solid evidences.

In order to investigate the measure and way in which evidences and evaluations (impact evaluations or other types) are used in the process of elaborating policies and programmes for the reformation of the higher education system in the Republic of Moldova we have chosen to interview several decision-makers.<sup>1</sup> Thus, during the interviews we approached issues regarding:

- The financial allocation for supporting data collection and evaluation activities in order to elaborate evidence-based policies and programmes;
- Developing a system for collecting, storing and processing evidences regarding the national higher education system;
- Integrating practices regarding evaluation and using evidences into the culture of organizations;
- The resistance to change of leaders and human resources within public organizations, in cases when visible effects on the existing organizational culture are involved;
- The sensitivity of public organizations which are involved in the reformation of higher education in the Republic of Moldova to the pressures of the organizational environment;



**Fig. 2.** The process of reformation of the higher education system in the Republic of Moldova during the 1991 – 2014 period (adaptation started from Bîrzea and Fartuşnic 2003: 77).

- Training specialized human resources in the field of public policies and using evidences;
- Using an approach such as *the learning organization*;
- Reporting and communicating results.

Furthermore, in order to identify relevant examples we have also focused on identifying and consulting reports published by public organizations in the field of higher education which present or use evidences gathered at the system level or results from evaluations.

<sup>1</sup> In addition to data obtained from interviews conducted in the fall of 2014 for the purpose of writing the current article we also used data collected during doctoral research conducted by Nicholas Toderaş in the 2008-2012 period.

### **Phase 1: De-structuring the old arrangements**

The first phase, that of de-structuring, represented the framework for acknowledging the necessity for change in higher education, in the context of the general changes in society. In spite of the fact that the process began in March 1987, this overlapped with the national liberation movement and with the desire to create the new state of the Republic of Moldova. In the beginning, the de-structuration process gained a nuance of identifying the most adequate options for modernizing the higher education system, and later on measures of de-ideologising and axiological restoration were taken.

The first tactics which were used for changing the systems' governance consisted in undermining the statist dependency. These tactics were based on the desire to demopolize the system and progressively reduce administrative interferences, but these processes were not sustained by adequate studies and functional analyses. On the one hand, at that moment the administration did not use methods for analysing public policies, and on the other hand the civil society did not show itself interested in supporting the processes of change by offering alternative solutions based on solid evidences. As a consequence, the changes were based on statistical data provided by the authorities. The statistical activities focused mainly on collecting and interpreting data regarding the systems' inputs and outputs, based on a system of indicators, calculated according to the international methodologies and concepts from that time. In spite of this fact, the mentioned activities did not target subjects regarding the quality of the education process (for example, monitoring the professional course of graduates according to their qualification, the reasons behind drop-out, the relevance and efficiency of equity tactics which were applied in order to ensure access to higher education). This approach for collecting and processing statistical data has been kept to the present day.

Due to the lack of fundamental landmarks for democratically creating higher education, a state of intractability was reached regarding the systems' change. This unfavourable conjecture was also completed by the succession of several economic crises, as well as by the turbulent political changes which were specific to the period of ante and posts dissolution of the USSR. As a consequence, the context was not favourable to systemic change immediately after the dissolution of the USSR, in spite of the fact that there was a significant social pressure regarding increased access to higher education programmes. This is why political decisions-makers opted for a two phase approach: first there was a desire to repair the system – by using mechanism of de-ideologisation of the system and practices specific to systemic and institutional management – and, after that, gradually accomplishing a structural change. The idea of a systemic change was abandoned in the first year after independence was declared. In consequence, the dismantling of old institutional rapports was limited to the de-ideologisation of the system and to the creation and consolidation of new axiological fundamentals. The process of replacing the old rapports of the systems' governance with new ones, specific to the market economy and to the pluralist and reflexive framework of public policy making was postponed indefinitely. As we will notice in the case of the other phases, in certain critical conjectures, perspectives and visions for systemic change reappear more consistently and with increased impact.

An interesting aspect regarding this first phase refers to the fact that the changes which were implemented entailed the reversal to a previous state, based on institutional memory. In contrast with the Baltic countries, in the higher education system of the Republic of Moldova the restauration of old arrangements specific to higher education interwar governance could not be done just so the model. This was caused by the fact that

during the interwar period higher education was only vaguely institutionalized in the actual geographical space of the Republic of Moldova. This is why, on a background of arrangements specific to the soviet model of higher education, a fractured transfer of elements from the Romanian higher education system took place. This transfer was not undertaken in an organized and coherent manner, based on ex-ante, impact evaluation or on certain and credible evidences, but rather on the consideration of contesting the institutional arrangements of soviet origin. What is more, during this phase we can notice the initiation of the process of gradually letting go of the logic that “*the state is the main, unique and direct beneficiary of the higher education system*” in favour of governance practices centred on the market.

### **Phase 2: The systems’ stabilization**

The second phase, that of stabilization, represented the consensus of the actors in order to initiate marginal changes within the system, which implied the reconfiguration, from a technical perspective, of the relations regarding the systems’ structure and functions, while also maintaining relations specific to the soviet higher education model (for example the financing mechanism, the admission procedures etc.). Thus, the specific characteristic of this phase is represented by the elaboration and application of a new internal legislation regarding education (1995), which also targeted higher education. Another characteristic refers to the initiation of the phenomenon of increasing demand for higher education. For example, in comparison with the year 1993, in the year 2000 the contingent of students registered in state and private universities represented approximately 73% (according to the National Statistics Bureau). As a result an uncontrolled massification of higher education programmes took place, which lead to situations in which certain study programmes were offered in parallel by several faculties within the same university. Furthermore, according to the data which was gathered through the interviews which we conducted, due to an obvious legislative void and to the partial retraction of the central authorities from the systems’ governance, but also in order to increase profits, some higher education institutions founded leech structures, which from a juridical point of view functioned as distinct higher education institutions with the statute of organizations for profit or non-profit organizations. From a functional point of view, these institutions double the study programmes which were offered by state institutions and used spaces for studying, the teacher staff, as well as logistical resources entailed by the educational process. As an effect of their existence, the conception of needing a diploma engrained into the collective mind (quantitative approach) as opposed to the need of gaining professional and transversal competencies (qualitative approach).

During this phase tactics for modernizing the system were predominant, without basing them on studies or functional analyses of the system from the perspective of public policy approaches. In spite of this fact, in 1993 – 1994 the Education Ministry coordinated the process of redacting the *Conception for developing education in the Republic of Moldova*. The document was approved by the Government of the Republic of Moldova in July 1994 and adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova in December 1994. Furthermore, the Parliament created a coordinating Council for undertaking the education reform. The Council’s mission was to present the project for the New Education Law in a reasonable time (several months).

The role of the Conception for developing education in the Republic of Moldova was to create the architecture of the space-time and axiological coordinates, the learning stages, the functioning of the entire education system and the administrative relations in

the conditions of a market economy. Thus, the Conception was created as a synthetic document for grounding the policy in the field of education, of legislative acts and other normative acts regarding education, including superior education. The main specific objective of this document was reached on the 21<sup>st</sup> of July 1995, when the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted the Education Law. During its 19 years of application the law was modified 47 times. Some of the modifications were major, such as those from May 2005 regarding the generation of convergence with the approaches of the Bologna Process, modifications which were mandatory in order to materialize the adherence of the Republic of Moldova to the Bologna Process.

In essence, the Conception projected an initiation of the process of dismantling the old relation through which the research sector would not be separated from higher education. This desire was not transposed into the subsequent legislation, and the old arrangement strengthened during the transition period (Popa, 2011). The extremely ambiguous references regarding the mission of higher education point out the fact that in 1994 no one was aware of the model of system governance which needed to be adopted. Thus, due to the procedures of mimetic and coercive isomorphism, the latter being caused by the economic and social shocks to which the new state was subjected, the grounding of the new system governance arrangements took place based on the model of statocentric governance, which was specific to the soviet higher education system, with several elements inspired from the collegial governance model, as well as from the market-centred governance model. As a consequence, a considerable part of the old rapports continued to function and produce effects even in the context of the legislative framework adopted in 1995. This aspect demonstrates the fact that there was no desire to dismantle the path dependency specific to soviet higher education. This is why, through the means of this critical adaptation conjecture, the old relations were adapted and consolidated in the new social, economic and political context. This option was based on the fact that the old relations, identified through symbolic, relational systems, the code of routines and artefacts, still offered the certainty of maintaining increasing returns. In a similar manner, the lack of a synoptic thinking exercise and of strategic action caused the institutional choice of changing the model of governance to be applied through incremental successive tactics. Furthermore, interventions were mainly based on mimetic practices and hybrid transposition of notions. In this case evidences referred mainly to the practices of states in the region, without having a contingent of national experts who could assess the adequacy of referential practices, estimate the potential impact of transpositions, as well as to adapt and monitor the transposition of notions, practices, methods and instruments which were transferred. For example, we can invoke the case of the creation of the national system for the evaluation and accreditation of higher education institutions, which after a long period of institutionalization (1996-2001), had a devolutive trajectory after the year 2000. This explains why during this period actions which are characteristic to systemic change could not take place, actions which would lead to the establishment of new options for relations and which would entail the adoption of a new model of system governance.

In spite of the fact that certain stipulations within the Conception can be perceived as progressive, the authors of the document hesitated to project a coherent and sustainable trajectory for the internal higher education and to specifically explain aspects which are inherent to the systems' functioning, such as the financing mechanism, quality assurance, accountability etc. The lack of vision, the void in knowledge and the apprehensive attitude towards the new approaches for managing institutions and system governance (which are enounced with no effect in the Conceptions' text), constituted later of a significant

impediment in the process of conceiving, applying and adapting the legislative and normative framework and in the public policy making process.

### **Phase 3: Restructuring the system**

Restructuring the higher education system in the Republic of Moldova represented the phase in which the previous routine was replaced with a set of relations which would offer an increased efficiency. Thus, using adequate and solid evidences started to become an essential element for initiating different interventions within the system. In spite of this fact, we cannot talk about a clear perception at the public system level with regard to the necessity of using evaluation and evidences as a base for the measures which were taken. A possible explanation for this observation consist in the fact that, on the one hand there was a lack of an internal administrative culture based on actual concepts of policy-making, and on the other hand a lack of a solid school of thinking in the epistemic area, which could spread ideas and practices regarding the way in which public policies should be elaborated. We can notice however that certain non-governmental organizations attempted to fill this gap at the societal level, but not to a sufficient extent (Toderăș and Stăvaru, 2013).

On the other hand, during the interviews, decision makers suggested that there is a need to develop the administrative capacity for improving policies and programmes, including the improvement of data collection and conducting evaluations which would later serve as a basis for making decisions.

With regard to the activity of external donors, we can notice the project from which the Government of the Republic of Moldova benefited in the 2008 – 2010 period from the Department for International Development, United Kingdom – “Support for implementing the National Development Strategy”. The project aimed, among other aspects, to develop a methodological guide for the ex-ante evaluation of public policies (Toderăș and Stăvaru, 2013). An outcome of the project consisted in the gradual increase of the frequency of contexts where references are made to the need of using public policy impact analyses. In time, the experience which has been gained by implementing this project has also been extended towards other public sectors, including the higher education system. Thus, both the staff from the Ministry of Education, as well as different national experts began to focus more and more on collecting, analysing and interpreting evidences in order to provide a basis for public policy proposals. However, according to the results obtained from the interviews, we cannot talk about the formation or stimulating the formation of the systems’ own expertise regarding evaluation, the knowledge and competencies of civil servants still being low in this area, being an activity for which external expertise is generally used. During this step no major structural changes were made in the case of the higher education system – which would be defining for a restructuration phase. We can rather notice a succession of marginal changes for modernizing the system. During 2005 – 2009 there were at least four attempts to adopt a new legislative framework in the educational field which sought, more or less, to make structural changes in higher education, such as the hyper centralization of the system and moderately changing the structure of education.

With regard to the hyper centralization of the system, it referred to the desire of bringing more clarity and coherence to the system and to counteract the effects stemming from its uncontrolled expansion and massification. Thus, this process took place by reimposing the logic that “*the state is the principal, unique and direct beneficiary of the higher education system*”. In consequence, the number of private higher education institutions diminished considerably and this tendency could gradually be noticed in the

case of the student contingent. This phenomenon materialized by strengthening some relations specific to the soviet period (using the method of state order to conceive maximum levels of registration, financing of institutions, redefining balances of power etc.). Some of the tactics were based rather of ideological rather than technical premises, including the changes of relationships within the hierarchy of the central authorities. The explanation can be found in the fact that evidences were not seen as being useful for the process of grounding tactics, but on the contrary, they were perceived as elements which stood in the way of achieving the political desires and objectives from that time. As a member state of the Bologna Process, in order to optimize higher education, the central authorities of the Republic of Moldova was expected to systematically use evidences as a basis for public interventions. The text of normative acts, as well as governmental speeches on this theme from the respective period seem to rather indicate a strategy of minimally using evidences (for example statistical data), without effectively using them for justifying the measures which were taken.

The moderate change of the structure of education is a consequence of adhering to the Bologna Process (May 2005). What is more, starting from the moment when the adhesion procedures were launched (2003), we can notice a more and more obvious pressure towards structural or systemic change in order to actively participate in EHEA. Like all the other states in the region, the process of institutionalizing EHEA involved, through mechanisms of stimulation or pressure, the implementation of reforms which would ensure the convergence of policies, tactics and practices specific to higher education (Heinze and Knill, 2008; Dobbins and Knill 2009; Voegtle, Knill and Dobbins 2010; Dobbins, Knill, and Vögtle 2011). Thus, groups of expertise, both from within the country, as well as from outside the Republic of Moldova undertook processes of collecting and interpreting different categories of relevant evidences in order to redact public policy proposals from that period. For example, on the internal plan we can notice the activities of the Soros Foundation from the Republic of Moldova, the Public Policy Institute from the Republic of Moldova, the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives and the Analytic Centre Expert-Grup. On the external plan, examples towards this end are represented by the Council of Europe and CEPES UNESCO. In spite of the fact that the stipulations of the Bologna process were transposed in a fractured manner into the legislative and normative internal framework (Toderaș, 2007; Ciurea et. al., 2012), the impact of the activities conducted by the communities of experts presented earlier could be noticed in the way in which decision makers and civil servant within the Ministry of Education changed their view on using evidences, thus beginning to use studies and analyses which were offered by these communities of experts.

The increasing pressure coming from external donors, who gradually increase their financial assistance allocations for the Republic of Moldova in order to undertake structural changes within the higher education system, especially for secondary education, has generated a transformative trial-error type process. Even though for this period the moment of adhering to the Bologna Process is essential, there was a lack of a structural desire based on connecting vision, objectives, actions, results and effects during time (Ciurea et al, 2012). In other works, there was no conceptual vision regarding the mission and finality of internal higher education in the context of participating in EHEA. The existence of a conceptual vision would have led to the elaboration and adoption of an education pact, which would make political factors and decision-makers to respect an integrated course of policies, strategies and actions for changing the arrangements for the governance of higher education in the context of actively participating in EHEA.

#### **Phase 4: Adequate coordination of the system**

Reaching a stage in which the higher education system would coordinate itself in an adequate manner entails the creation or identification of the context which is characterised by a political and social consensus, as well as by solid administrative and political support in order to undertake ample system changes (Bîrzea and Fartușnic, 2003). Using evidences is crucial because it offers clues as to the directions of intervention, the degree of expectation and availability of different categories of beneficiaries and stakeholders, as well as to tendencies which can be observed over time. For the Republic of Moldova this phase implies the dismantling of arrangements which have been maintained through path dependence and creating new arrangements specific to participative-reflexive governance. In spite of the fact that the systemic reform has yet to be fully started, in the last three years a series of actions meant to prepare the systemic change has taken place, such as:

- Re-establishing the main democratic axiological fundaments;
- Seeking political consensus in order to initiate systemic change;
- The elaboration of the new programming, strategic and conceptual framework which presents a new strategy for the systems' governance;
- Studying models and elements specific to higher education systems in the region and from the Western-European space regarding quality assurance, financing, system organization, management of higher education institutions etc.;
- Increases in external assistance by diversifying financial resources, as well as increases in the pressure to initiate systemic reform.

All these actions are based on the collection, systematization and interpretation of evidences, as well as on previsioning impact. From the interviews which were conducted we observed the fact that if during the previous phases governmental authorities were apprehensive to the different types of analyses which were conducted by third party actors, during this phase authorities are much more receptive towards these types of analyses. On the one hand, in order to adequately ground interventions, authorities have begun to cooperate with actors who are willing and able to offer analyses based on credible evidences. On the other hand, governmental authorities have made investments for the creation of a group of experts who will systematically work in order to provide real time evidences regarding the systems' evolution. For example, changing the financing mechanism for higher education in 2012 was based on procedures which are relatively similar to the policy-making process. In this context, the different types of evidences which were used had the role of justifying the opportunity of introducing the new financing mechanism.

Starting from 2012 there was increased focus of making institutional arrangements more adequate and efficient so that they would lead more rapidly towards convergence with the governance in other states in the region. Some of the measures which were adopted are based on the transfer from the higher education system in Romania, which represents a landmark in the modelling or recent institutional arrangements (for example, the institutionalization of the national quality assurance system – after the ARACIS model, the implementation of the system foresight exercise – based on the model promoted by UEFISCDI, applying the per capita financing model – based on the model developed by CNFIS, which has been applied in Romania since 1999).

An important milestone for this phase is represented by the elaboration of a new legislative framework (the Code of Education) which, after several failed attempts during the last decade, was adopted by the Parliament in July 2014 and promulgated by the

President of the Republic of Moldova on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 2014. From the interviews which have been conducted we noticed the fact that the process of adopting the new legislative framework and the current institutional changes are encouraged rather by external factors and actors, especially by those with a high transformation power (such of donor financial organisms or the European Union), which recommend a systemic change. This type of change implies a major difference of the new system governance arrangements in comparison to the old arrangements. At the same time, this view leads to the conceptualization and institutionalization of new arrangements, which are convergent with the ones which are characteristic to the higher education systems in states from Western Europe, who participate to the development of EHEA. This is why it is very important that these processes be charted and evaluated with based on methods and techniques for evaluating public policies, for estimating and measuring their impact by using evidences which are periodically gathered. In the coming period it is to be expected that the diversification of research and analysis of the particularities of the change of governance in the higher education system in the Republic of Moldova will have the effect of connecting the Republic of Moldova to international research and analyses in the field. A priority is also represented by the process of spreading the use of monitoring and evaluation processes in order to support the institutionalization of the national quality assurance system, in order to systematically supply evidences during the process of changing the financing mechanism for higher education, as well as in order to facilitate a natural process of creating a network of independent speciality agencies within the system. In this context, from the analysis which has been conducted and based on the opinions which were expressed in the interviews, we can notice a consolidation of the administrative capacity of the Ministry of Education, which is enabled by the adoption and application of the new legislative framework in the educational field.

### **Conclusions**

During the first two phases the changes which were made were not based on studies, analyses, evaluations or on the collection of relevant evidences. However, we can notice that beginning with the third phase the groups which are involved in the processes of reform either contract or use analyses and studies regarding the processes and tactics which are subject to change so that the actions which are undertaken will be properly grounded. In the case of the fourth phase we can notice, in a context of accelerating reform, the fact that evidences are increasingly used in order to support the actions for institutional change. Thus, we can notice that the path towards a higher education system which needs to be convergent with the principles of the Bologna Process entailed different approaches, starting from apprehensiveness towards using evidences, mimetic transposition, and trial and error, to initiating the more adequate use of evidences as a basis for policies. Thus, in order to prepare the structural changes and to adequately inform the actors within the system, there is a need in the immediate future for the Government of the Republic of Moldova to focus on supporting the trajectory of institutional structural and/ or systemic change by elaborating a Green Paper or White Paper for the 2025 horizon.

In order to ensure a predictable and clear trajectory for systemic change there is a need to support the dissemination at the public sector level in general, and at the higher education level in particular, of the practices regarding the evaluation of public interventions, on the background of developing an administrative culture based on understanding and applying the public policy process. In order to support this

development, we can also point out the need to train, through long or short term study programmes, human resources who are specialized in public policies and evaluation, which in time should fuel the need for internal expertise. Last but not least, in order to develop and improve a participative framework for the elaboration of public policies and programmes in the field of higher education, there is a constant need to ensure the organizational transparency of all the actors which interact in the system.

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## **IV. Geopolitics and International Security**

**Constantin Vasile ȚOCA, Bogdan POCOLA** ⇔ *Leadership Scenarios in Ukraine. The Impact of EU and Russian Politics*

**Anda-Ioana CURTA** ⇔ *Changing the Security Paradigm. Health Security for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*

**Natalia Putina** ⇔ *The New Challenges of Georgian Political System in the Framework of the Last Elections (2012 Parliamentary, and 2013 Presidentially)*

**Daniela BLAGA** ⇔ *The Placement of the Missile Defense Shield in Europe. Interests, Ambitions and Real Beneficiaries: Romania, between the United States and Russia*



## LEADERSHIP SCENARIOS IN UKRAINE. THE IMPACT OF EU AND RUSSIAN POLITICS

*Constantin Vasile ȚOCA<sup>\*</sup>, Bogdan POCOLA<sup>\*\*</sup>*

**Abstract.** *The political crisis and subsequent civil conflict within Ukraine has raised a number of important questions in Europe. The idea that security is a problem dealt with in and around the EU has had to be rethought. Also the growing power of Russia and the leadership characteristics that stem from that power has created opportunity for significant geopolitical changes at the EU's external borders. The paper addresses the issue of political leadership from a multidimensional perspective in an effort to understand what each side really wants. With a conflict that has not stopped growing we find ourselves determined to understand the power struggle in and around Ukraine.*

**Keywords:** *leadership, political crisis, European Union, Russia, Ukraine, civil conflict, military intervention.*

**Abstract:** *The political crisis and subsequent civil conflict within Ukraine has raised a number of important questions in Europe. The idea that security is a problem dealt with in and around the EU has had to be rethought. Also the growing power of Russia and the leadership characteristics that stem from that power has created opportunity for significant geopolitical changes at the EU's external borders. The paper addresses the issue of political leadership from a multidimensional perspective in an effort to understand what each side really wants. With a conflict that has not stopped growing we find ourselves determined to understand the power struggle in and around Ukraine.*

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The Eastern European states have been the center of clashes between new Russian leadership and EU leadership even more so after 1990. The crumbling of the USSR and the reemergence of Eastern Europe as real actors in European politics have provided ample opportunities for each side of the former blocks to test and reinforce their leadership styles.

It is of great importance to structure these influences and contextualize them as many things have changed in European politics in the last 20 or so years. As such, we have chosen to frame the arguments based on what is described as the new direction in Russian politics that emerged around the turn of the century. Since then, the strong leadership style imposed by Vladimir Putin and politicians close to him has reconstructed, in part, the position that Russians have held in international politics. In this matter, the case of Eastern European

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states that have been close to the USSR and maintained robust connections to Russia today, prove to be definitive case studies for understanding leadership.

We will use the case studies referenced here as examples meant to showcase the relationship between Russia and the EU and to deconstruct the puzzle that is leadership in this particular area. The case study will revolve around concrete examples that highlight various aspects: military issues, economic issues, political issues and will serve contextualize, in part, current events – the crisis in Ukraine and its possible outcomes.

### EU – Ukraine - Russia relations at the start of the new milenium

There is much to be said about the EU – Ukraine relations in the new milenium as much of the active components of this interaction ultimately lead to the situation with Russia today. The dynamic of outside borders has to be one of the more interesting aspects in today's international politics. The concept of borders, especially in the case of the European Union's pexternal borders, and all the changes that have targeted this concept come to mind; the literature on this topic has become quite extensive in the last years (Horga, 2011: 5-13; Horga, Landuyt, 2013: 5-22; Horga, Brie, 2009: 15-31; Chirodea, 2012: 135-139; Șoproni, Horga, 2009: 5-6; Brie, Chirodea, Toca, 2013: 7-16)

The instruments used by the EU and its neighbourhood policy driven approach have been under criticism from scholars as results have been difficult to quantify. This has to do with the effects of the europenization process and the limitations that this model presents; it is important to note that this process is based on the idea of a misfit between ideas, values and institutional processes of the target country and the EU, a scenario that is constructed to foster change (Börzel, Risse, 2000:2). There was also the belief that the relationship within the partnership between the EU and Ukraine has had a strong impact on the process as the ENP Action Plans worked in a asymmetrical, top-down logic (Franke, Gawrich, Melnykovska, Schweickert, 2010: 150).

Based on a set of criteria aimed at quantifying the europenization process scholars have argued that there needs to be a willingness to cooperate, an asymmetrical interdependence between the EU and the target state and an adaptation cost associated with the process itself (Franke, Gawrich, Melnykovska, Schweickert, 2010: 155). Out of all the countries part of the ENP there was strong evidence in favor of Ukraine's western approach.

Variable:	Willingness	Asymmetrical dependence	Adaptation costs
<b>ENP countries</b>			
Armenia	Xx	Xx	Xx
Azerbaijan	x	x	x
Belarus	x	Xx	x
Georgia	X	Xx	Xx
Moldova	X	X	Xx
Ukraine	X	X	X

**Fig 1:** Level of interest for the Europeanization process among ENP countries  
(X – most likely, Xx – intermediate, x – least likely)

**Source:** Franke, Gawrich, Melnykovska, Schweickert, 2010: 156

Going on this tendency, the EU pressure on Ukraine became stronger over the years and ultimately having a strong impact on the situation as it stands today. There have been official comments on this matter even before the situation in Ukraine escalated; State Duma speaker Sergey Naryshkin argued that “certain EU officials [are] quite harshly meddling with Ukraine’s internal affairs and [are] applying unprecedented pressure regarding the signing of the association agreement”<sup>1</sup>, referring, of course, to the signing of the association agreement from November 2013. It is confirmation of the effects of europenization on Ukraine, the importance of this process to the EU, but also the resistance shown by Russia towards this development.

The focus for the European Union in Ukraine was on consolidating the democratic tendencies that appeared as a result of the 2004 “Orange Revolution”, with great emphasis on reducing corruption and supporting the rule of law. These objectives were clearly defined in the Action Plan’s priorities<sup>2</sup>:

- Further strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law;
- Ensuring the democratic conduct of presidential (2004) and parliamentary (2006) elections in Ukraine in accordance with OSCE standards;
- Ensuring respect for the freedom of the media and freedom of expression;
- Develop possibilities for enhancing EU – Ukraine consultations on crisis management.
- Enhanced cooperation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation;
- Enhanced cooperation in our common neighbourhood and regional security, in particular working towards a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict in Moldova, including addressing border issues;
- Accession to the WTO;
- Gradual removal of restrictions and non-tariff barriers that impede bilateral trade and implementation of the necessary regulatory reforms;
- Improving the investment climate, through non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable business conditions, simplified administrative procedures and by the fight against corruption;
- Tax reform, improved Tax Administration and sound management of Public Finances;
- Establishing a constructive dialogue on visa facilitation between the EU and Ukraine, with a view to preparing for future negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement, taking account of the need for progress on the ongoing negotiations for an EC-Ukraine readmission agreement.
- Gradual approximation of Ukrainian legislation, norms and standards with those of the European Union; further reinforcing administrative and judicial capacity;
- Encourage dialogue on employment issues and best endeavours to ensure that treatment of migrant workers does not discriminate on grounds of nationality.

This event in Ukraine’s recent history (the 2004 elections) marked the start of inconsistent foreign policy as the country tried to consolidate an EU and NATO direction while still maintaining strong ties with Russia. Internal politics in Ukraine showed support

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<sup>1</sup> In an article published on Russia Today entitled “Russia denounces EU over harsh pressure on Ukraine”, available at: <http://rt.com/politics/russia-ukraine-europe-pressure-440/>

<sup>2</sup> See: EU – Ukraine Action Plan 2005, available at: <http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/eu-ukraine-action-plan-0>

for this new direction, but was ultimately held back by issues such as corruption and constant political change, as was the Yulia Tymoshenko government (from January to September 2005), followed by Yuriy Yekhanurov – showing a more restrained approach to Western politics (M. R. Freire, 2009: 238).

Changes in internal affairs will persist throughout this period with another significant change occurring in 2006 when Viktor Yanukovich became the new Prime Minister. His victory is significant in that his strong ties with Russian politics was very much known, a fact strengthened by Vladimir Putin's quick reaction following his investiture (M. R. Freire, 2009: 238). At this point the situation was clearly becoming a tightrope act for Ukraine's internal and external policy as they continued to try and please both the EU and Russia. It is clear at this point that Ukraine's Western interests will have to be linked to how they wanted their relations with Russia. For Russian politics this period of instability was carefully speculated on as they were reluctant to release Ukraine from their sphere of influence (M. R. Freire, 2009: 244) and has been consistent with these views up until now.

As for the relations between EU and Russia, the basic level has to do with the institutional framework and the way this affects communication between the two. The partnership that has developed between the two is dependent on a large number of mechanisms such as: joint structures (permanent council, working groups), bilateral agreements (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, EU – Russia Common spaces<sup>3</sup> and other instruments, specific to each party: strategies, neighbourhood and partnership instruments (Gomart, Kuchin, 2008:2). It is a sign of respect by both parties for the importance of a functional partnership between the two, all the while being a source of information for analyzing approaches in leadership and perspective. It is also important to note that Russia is the only country with which the EU organises two summits each year<sup>4</sup>. At first glance, the plethora of instruments created to ensure a functional dialogue could give the impression of a very open and constructive approach, but, as is usually the case, could prove to be more representative of the weaknesses of EU – Russia dialogue and an attempt to remediate this issue.

Another important fact about the EU – Russia partnership has to do with policy making. EU policy on the matter, more so in the early stages of the partnership, were aimed at trying to “Westernise” Russia in terms of political and economical leadership. As stated by a policy paper by Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, EU members found it easy to agree on a common approach to Moscow back in the 1990s. They coalesced around a strategy of democratising and Westernising a weak and indebted Russia. That strategy is now in tatters. Soaring oil and gas prices have made Russia more powerful, less cooperative and above all less interested in joining the West (Leonard, Popescu, 2007:1). This is also strengthened by how the Russian state views itself: “Being the largest geopolitical entities on the European continent, Russia and the EU are interdependent in many spheres, linked by their common civilization roots, culture, history, and future. The agenda of our interaction is multidimensional and covers various sectors. We are willing to enhance it – on the basis, of course of equality and mutual benefit”<sup>5</sup>. One could argue that these interdependencies provided an extra barrier for the EU in implementing their regional objectives in Eastern Europe. The fact that the Russian Federation had started to

<sup>3</sup> For more information, as this will come up later, see: [http://www.eas.europa.eu/russia/common\\_spaces/](http://www.eas.europa.eu/russia/common_spaces/).

<sup>4</sup> See <http://russianmission.eu/en/russia-eu-summits>.

<sup>5</sup> Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, extract from an article published in the Diplomatic Yearbook 2010, available at: <http://russianmission.eu/en/russia-eu-summits>.

rebuild some of its importance in the international relations scene meant that all efforts to shape Russia under the Western guise had become obsolete.

There is also the matter of consistency among the EU member states. As it is the case (and these aspects will be addressed later on), new Russian leadership has a strong foothold on a centralized model of power, while the heterogeneous nature of the EU construction creates a potential 27 different voices while on the other side there is only one. Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu have identified and classified these facts in 5 groups of distinct policy approaches (Leonard, Popescu, 2007: 2):

- **Trojan Horses** (Cyprus and Greece) who often defend Russian interests in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions;
- **Strategic Partners** (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) who enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with Russia which occasionally undermines common EU policies;
- **Friendly Pragmatists** (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) who maintain a close relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests above political goals;
- **Frosty Pragmatists** (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to speak out against Russian behaviour on human rights or other issues;
- **New Cold Warriors** (Lithuania and Poland) who have an overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with Russia.

As far as Russia is concerned, its efforts, before signing the “four spaces” accord with the EU, were concentrated in consolidating the former CIS space. As Michael Emerson states, through the steps leading to signing this accord in 2005, Europe entered a new episode in the post- Communist transition politics of virtually all of the European states of the former Soviet Union, except Russia. They all now have, or are being drawn towards, a second attempt at true democratisation and withdrawal from Russia’s sphere of political domination. Russia tried in the last few years to make re-consolidation of the CIS space its foreign policy priority. Its clumsy methods were a big failure, even to the point of being counterproductive. Political Russia is not normatively attractive to its neighbours, and will not become so again until it is seen to embrace true democracy (Emerson, 2005:3). In some respects, this new accord was put in place as a copy of the EU neighbourhood agreements that were not feasible due to Russia’s lack of interest in this matter. At the time the lack of EU availability to act in any way was criticized by the elite, not only on the issue with Russia<sup>6</sup>.

### **European and Russian leadership in the case of Ukraine**

Things took a very different turn in international politics after 11 September 2001. As the whole international community shifted its priorities, so did Russia. Newly elected president (elections were held in 2000), Vladimir Putin took a pro-Western course.

The appeasing and indulgent Russian attitude towards the West was possibly related to the great value Putin attached to improving the economy. In the long run Putin desired to strengthen Russia’s international position, not excluding military means to achieve this. However, Putin realized quite well, in contrast to many Soviet leaders, that

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<sup>6</sup> See Paul Thibaud, Qui sont et où sont les bons européens, original article appeared in Le Monde, 12 mai 2005, available at: <http://multitudes.samizdat.net/Qui-sont-et-ou-sont-les-bons> .

influence on a global level was more than ever based on economic leverage. Taking this into account, his rapprochement towards the West, and especially towards Europe, did not seem strange. Closer cooperation with the EU could serve more than one objective of Russian policy. First, economic cooperation with Europe would most likely bring about growth of the Russian economy. An increase in economic weight subsequently would result in strengthening of Russia's international position. Second, closer ties with the EU could possibly also weaken the relationship between Europe and the USA, even more so if Russia would be supporting, or participating in, the further development of an independent European security policy with its own military power, which almost certainly would be in contrast with American interests (de Haas, 2010:156). This also explains the reluctance shown by Moscow in terms of the missile defence system proposed by the Americans in Europe, the topic of many discussions among the two powers.

The strategic shift in Russia's perspectives came during Putin's second term as president: from a mainly cooperative stance to an assertive stance to the West. Considering his fierce reaction, Putin considered the regime changes of Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) and their subsequent interest in joining Western organizations as unacceptable. A continuing line in Russian external policy has always been that Russia has a legitimate influence in the former Soviet area, in which other actors, such as the West, would not be tolerated. Furthermore, swapping over of former Soviet republics to the West could result in a domino effect, which was considered to be a threat for Russia's national security. In Putin's second term, due to the high prices for oil and gas, the revenues of energy resources had strengthened Russia's economy to such an extent that Moscow could advance in an international security policy further away and thus less dependent on its (economic) ties with the West (de Haas, 2010:157). It is around this time that questions related to Europe's energy supplies started to be more and more relevant to this discussion. In an article published by Christophe-Alexandre Paillard in 2010 entitled „Russia and Europe's Mutual Energy Dependence”, he argues that in light of gas resources depletion in the European Union, falling production explains why supply from European fields will only meet around two thirds of continental European gas demand by 2015, and less than a quarter of demand by 2025 (Paillard, 2010). Experts estimate that the year 2008 was the peak for European gas production, given the decrease production in the North Sea after that (Paillard, 2010).

When addressing the idea of political leadership in Europe, at the european borders (Dogot, Perchoc, Tokes, 2011: 5-7), firstly we must address the dimension of the EU interests and the that of the individual countries that form the EU. As stated above, the interests of member states in the case of Russia, for example, differes: there is a particular mixture of individual gain and common history that makes or breaks the view towards Russia. Countries that have had negative experiences with Russia in the past show reluctance in embracing an open and firendly policy direction, countries making up former Soviet satellite states in the past are a prime example in this case. The rift between the member states can also be traced to other, more pragmatic aspects such as the topic of energy mentioned above<sup>7</sup>.

As far as the EU is concerned, its pacifist and normative approach is streghtened by a number of guide rules when it comes to expressing its leadership. As pointed out by Ilyas Nabiyeu, the EU leadership is conducted through a mechanism of norms spreading:

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<sup>7</sup> See Ilya Pitalev, Russia's Gazprom ready to negotiate lower prices for European clients, available at: <http://en.ria.ru/business/20101129/161544829.html>

Firstly, spreading norms can be thought as a *contagion*, in other words norm diffusion happens unintentionally or EU leads by ‘virtuous example’ and other actor just imitates it. Secondly, it is *informational* as this is the result of the strategic communications, such as new policy initiatives and declaratory communications. Third, the mechanism is *procedural* to the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party, inter-regional co-operation agreement, membership of an international organization or enlargement of the EU itself, and as an example we can mention the inter-regional dialogue with the Southern African Development Community or the membership of the EU in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Fourth is the *transference* that happens when the EU exchanges goods trade or technical assistance with the third party. The existing conditionality, including economic sanctions and financial rewards can be shown as an example for aforesaid type of mechanism. This conditionality is strengthened by the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organizations, in other words through Commission’s monitoring missions (Nabiyev, 2013:25).

The final mechanism indicated is, *cultural filter* that affects the impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms. As an example for cultural filter the diffusion of democratic norms in China and human rights diffusion in Turkey can be noted. The presented mechanism helps the Union, to define what passes for normal in world politics (Nabiyev, 2013:25).

The influence of European political and economic culture was understood by the new Russian leadership and even partially embraced. The first EU-Russian summit in May 2000 Putin also insisted that “Russia was, is and will be a European country by its location, its culture, and its attitude toward economic integration” and one of other example for Europeanization in Russian foreign policy, Putin’s 26 January 2001 speech where he indicated, “European direction is traditionally the most important for us”. The Europeanization is a major key feature of Putin’s foreign policy which differentiates his leadership from past ones (Nabiyev, 2013:34-35).

### **The effects of regional leadership on Ukraine**

The crisis in Ukraine escalated quickly in the last couple of months leading to violent clashes between protesters and authorities. It has claimed lives and continues to stir up a lot of issues regarding the past 20 or so years since the country has not been under Soviet influence. It is one of the more interesting cases in which two conflicting views towards leadership styles also intersect with conflicting spheres of influence. As stated up until this point, Russia’s views on ex-Soviet states does create conflict in certain parts of Europe. On the other hand, the expanding nature of European normative and cultural influence has not been delimited, if any, it has only increased in the last 15 years with the biggest waves of new member states up until now (a total of 13 new members in the last 10 years). Here is where the conflict stands.

As space is fairly limited, the scope of this analysis will encompass only events that provide relevant information in the case of EU or Russian leadership and their respective clashes. The events, as they unfolded, did not always offer information on this subject and as such will be addressed in a limited fashion.

It is important to go to the root of these events and, in this case, it is the EU Eastern Partnership launched in 2009 to express the interests and expectations of the EU in relation to its Eastern border. As a part of this sphere, Ukraine was presented with a choice. As stated by James Sherr in a report filed in July 2013, Ukraine is an organic part

of an ethno-cultural, Greco-Roman and Christian civilization alongside Europe (and the EU for that matter), despite its Soviet past, its self-aggrandizing political class and its decidedly uncivic state (Sherr, 2013:2). At the same time, the EU is also a source of wealth and development, a view very much embraced by a part of Ukraine's political and social elite. To almost everyone, the EU is also a geopolitical project offering, for good or ill, an escape from the country's historical dependency upon Russia. In this conversation, far less attention is paid to the way the EU actually perceives itself: as an increasingly multi-cultural entity defined by values, standards and the harmonization of institutions. The technocratic biases of EU elites and the dry nature of the integration process do not assist clarity in this regard. Nor do real divisions within the EU-28 about Ukraine's significance and potential (Sherr, 2013:2).

Deemed „one of the most ambitious and complex agreements the European Union has ever negotiated with a third country”<sup>8</sup> back in 2012 by Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood, as it not only regulates trade ties and a strong partnership, but it is also a path towards EU membership. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) was the key agreement that indicates this evolution.

In contrast to its ambitious but insubstantial predecessors, the Eurasian Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (ECU) has acquired institutional coherence and momentum. Since its launch in October 2007, it has steadily become a rules-based customs regime, with legal and executive mechanisms of enforcement and a ‘proven commitment to implementation’, given impetus by the entry into force of the Single Economic Space in January 2012. The ECU's incorporation of WTO provisions (as of November 2011) underscores its seriousness and also undermines the claim that it simply seeks to restore the trade patterns and linkages of the USSR (Sherr, 2013:4). It has become clear, from Russia's standpoint, that Ukraine must decide one or the other. In an article by Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, there is clear mention of understanding the full intent of the EU Partnership agreement:

„The authors of the Eastern Partnership initially assured us that this project has no confrontational component and is aimed at helping the countries on the eastern flange of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the so-called “focus states”, to solve the tasks of development and modernisation without casting doubt on their traditional historical ties with other neighbours, including Russia. We were even told that it would be desirable to implement trilateral projects with the participation of the European Union, Russia and the “focus state”. To be honest, these ideas were not particularised.”<sup>9</sup>

Following the initial agreements between the EU and Ukraine, The Association Agreement became the focus of both EU and Russia's interest in Ukraine. Taking into consideration the fact that this agreement does not refer to any membership status, it was perceived as thus by both parties. In December 2012 the European Council made signature of the Association Agreement contingent upon Ukraine fulfilling three conditions: complying with international standards of electoral practice, ending selective justice and ‘implementing the reforms defined in the jointly agreed Association Agenda’(Sherr, 2013:5). The Vilnius summit in November was to decide Ukraine's direction: towards the EU or Russia. As noted by the press: „Ukraine has abruptly ended its plans to sign a historic pact with the European Union. The decision handed victory to President Vladimir

<sup>8</sup> See: “Speech at the meeting of the EU – Ukraine Parliamentary cooperation committee”, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-12-448\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-448_en.htm)

<sup>9</sup> Sergey Lavrov, Russia-EU: Time to Decide, published in the Kommersant newspaper of 13 February 2014, available at: <http://russianmission.eu/en/news/russia-eu-time-decide>

Putin in the increasingly vicious tug of war between Russia and the west for Ukraine's future, and looked like turning a special EU summit next week focused on Ukraine into a debacle. President Viktor Yanukovich ordered the suspension of preparations for the pact between Kiev and Brussels after talks between the Russian and Ukrainian prime ministers – and after Yanukovich's party in parliament rejected six bills aimed at meeting the EU's terms" (Traynor, Grytsenko, 2013). It was perceived as a huge blow by EU leaders that proceeded to accuse Russia of putting pressure on Ukraine, backed up by the Ukrainian president's own claims<sup>10</sup>. It was the beginning of large protests in the country in support of EU alignment. These protests were specifically aimed at President Viktor Yanukovich and his backing party.

The next confrontation between the EU and Russia was to revolve around the EU – Russia summit, in 28 January 2014. Following the acceptance of the Ukrainian government resignation by President Viktor Yanukovich<sup>11</sup>, the issues with Ukraine were the dominant topics of the summit. At this moment in time protests against Viktor Yanukovich were past the 2 month mark, with no end in sight:

„Russian President Vladimir Putin assured Ukrainians that Russia would honour a loan deal whatever government emerges in Kiev. Putin also warned the EU not to become involved in brokering an agreement between the opposition and Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovich. The Ukrainian prime minister, Mykola Azarov, today resigned in an effort to appease protestors who have come out almost daily onto the streets for over two months. The opposition, however, continues to call for Yanukovich's resignation and new elections. "The more intermediaries there are, the more problems there are," Putin said. The presidents of the European Council and European Commission had said that the EU's foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, was heading to Kiev to talk with political leaders". (Gardner, 2014)

Up until this point the EU had been accused of a lack of implication in the situation, with criticism being addressed (even informally<sup>12</sup>) by other parties: the US and protesters. At this point we see more commitment to solving the crisis in Ukraine and to ensure a more active leadership role.

Through the voice of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moscow deemed the actions of the EU as a form of social engineering and stubbornness to understand the situation fully:

„Such "social engineering" always produces rather sad results. It is sufficient to look at the consequences of external interference in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. The latest example is related to the situation in South Sudan, the state, which was created mainly thanks to stubbornness of several influential international players. There is no reason to believe that the "export of revolutions" in Europe may turn into something positive"<sup>13</sup>.

The joint action of the EU institutions and a more uniform voice of the member states yielded a positive result after more than 3 months of protests, that since 18 February 2014 became much more violent. A deal to ensure transition of power between Viktor

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<sup>10</sup> See: "Ukraine aligns with Moscow as EU summit fails",

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/29/ukraine-yanukovich-moscow-eu-summit>

<sup>11</sup> See: „Ukraine's PM Azarov and government resign", <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25932352>

<sup>12</sup> See: "US diplomat Victoria Nuland phonecall leaked", <http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/feb/07/eu-us-diplomat-victoria-nuland-phonecall-leaked-video>

<sup>13</sup> Sergey Lavrov, Russia-EU: Time to Decide, published in the Kommersant newspaper of 13 February 2014, available at: <http://russianmission.eu/en/news/russia-eu-time-decide>

Yanukovych and the leaders of opposition was finally signed in 21st February. The Russian Foreign Minister condemned the subsequent attempts by German, Polish and French representatives to further mislead public opinion in any way<sup>14</sup>.

What appeared as a conclusive stop to the crisis in Ukraine ended up being a simple stalemate. The pact signed by Yanukovych did not have a significant impact on the situation in the streets, as protest did not stop there. To make matters worse, the very next day, on the 22nd of February Yanukovych disappears and during the following days an arrest warrant is issued on his name and the Parliament votes for elections to take place on the 25th of May 2014.

The moment afterwards is crucial in understanding active leadership in the region as the events that followed the month of February have shaped the situation in Ukraine in a way that has not changed significantly up until the moment we are writing this paper. After the disappearance of Viktor Yanukovych tensions grew stronger in pro-Russian regions within Ukraine, most notably the Eastern part of the country and the Crimean peninsula. On the 1st of March, the Russian Parliament approved an intervention of the army in Ukraine, which sparked a lot of concern in the international community, with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urging for „an immediate restoration of calm and direct dialogue”<sup>15</sup>. The support from Russian authorities rallied pro-Russian Crimeans to push for a secession referendum that, on the 16th of March, ended with a 97% vote for the move. The annexation of Crimea was finalized on 18th of March when Vladimir Putin signed a bill integrating the province within the Russian border despite heavy protest from the West.

There were a number of factors that contributed to Russia's successful operations in Eastern Ukraine. Crimea as a region offers all the necessary infrastructure to make it easy to defend once captured, so the strategic military thinking was sound in this case. The fact that as a region of Ukraine it was very distinct and clearly defined by its geographical characteristics also made it easy to annex (Franke, Westerlund, 2014:44). The second factor was proximity that addressed the problems of supply lines. There was also a different kind of proximity, a cultural one between the population in Crimea and Russia, with many locals being pro-Russians and very susceptible to propaganda. The third factor was Ukraine itself and the state it was in. In terms of operational specifics, the situation was not new for Russian forces, with similar events unfolding in Georgia in 2008. The lack of leadership, funds and focus of the Ukrainian army was a deciding factor in securing the annexation of Crimea (Franke, Westerlund, 2014:45).

Following this rather dramatic escalation of events, the international community urged Russia to stop the aggression in Eastern Ukraine. The fact that this didn't happen is not surprising. Another effect of Russia's actions in the region was that other parts of Ukraine started to rally against the power in Kiev. On the 11th of May, separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence from Ukraine after organising referendums that were eventually not recognised. Russia did not intervene in force after the results of these referendums in the same way they did in Crimea.

While events escalated in Eastern Ukraine after the elections in 25 May, we have yet to see direct interference from the EU or Russia in the events that followed after the elections. Some authors called it appropriate to name this new state of affairs a „new

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<sup>14</sup> See: [http://www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/newsline/3FBCB6D49BDB512A44257C87004F74FD](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/3FBCB6D49BDB512A44257C87004F74FD)

<sup>15</sup> See: “Russian parliament approves troop deployment in Ukraine”, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26400035>

Cold War” and argued that relations between Russia and the West have reached an all time low (Legold, 2014).

While the conflict in Ukraine has not had a definitive outcome by the time we are writing this article, the sanctions imposed to Russia after events in March and May have turned this issue in a diplomatic and political war between Russia and the West. Ukraine, sadly, has been out of focus for the better part of half a year already. The only outstanding effort to include Ukraine in peace negotiation talks have come as a result of a joint diplomatic operation of Germany and France in February 2015 – a last effort to stop fighting in Eastern Ukraine. Results have been inconclusive at this point.

A solution based on dialogue appears to be the only viable option for addressing the conflict. Ukraine and Russia as members of the same cultural group could use cultural diplomacy and constructive dialogue to resolve some of the points raised by this conflict as well as to find a way for reconciliation (Stoica, Pantea, 2014: 219-230).

With the conflict still not over we must look towards find a solution to end the bloodshed. There is no doubt that all parties involved have a high stake in this issue. In terms of political leadership, the EU and Russia have both had a crucial role to play in presenting and selling a political direction to the citizens and politicians of Ukraine.

The interest of the two outside parties in this affair was made clear by official views cited by their respective press agencies. While the EU press were condemning the actions of the Ukrainian government<sup>16</sup>, Russian press were urging the opposition to not push protesters<sup>17</sup>. It is not in any way surprising that the stakes are very high as it is a fight for influence in the largest country in Europe, a great economic and geostrategic point.

There were significant differences in leadership style between the EU and Russia in this case. While the actions of the former were constructed on a series of agreements and a multiannual plan, the actions of the latter were more spontaneous and with greater short term impact. One explanation for these differences could have to do with the nature of said leadership, being that one actor is a state and the other actor is a conglomerate of states acting as one actor.

Without having a clear idea on what the end result of these actions will be, there are a number of aspects that are clear even at this time:

- The decision that Ukraine makes in the near future will have an impact in the country's political direction in the medium and long run;
- The two directions offered to Ukraine are in no means a complete solution on their own, as was pointed out by the Russian Foreign Minister there is no „or-or” solution in this case;

Russia has deemed fit to flex its military muscle within the boundaries of modern Europe. The success of this action will undoubtedly encourage a new strategic thinking for the West and Russia both. We can already see how this situation has affected economic and security stability in the region, with countries such as Poland pushing strongly for sanctions and the US missile defence system.

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<sup>16</sup> See: “EU leaders condemn Ukraine for violence”, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8b699574-9950-11e3-b3a2-00144feab7de.html#slide0>

<sup>17</sup> See: “Russia condemns Ukraine protests as attempted coup”, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/02/19/351374/russia-condemns-ukraine-protests/>

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## CHANGING THE SECURITY PARADIGM. HEALTH SECURITY FOR THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY

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**Abstract.** *Until the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, health had never been an issue on the international politica agenda, nor was it considered a threat to international security. Moreover, the successes achieved during the 1960s provided a false sense of safety to what regards the infectious diseases, as it was thought that the biggest challenges to health were to be the non communicable diseases. And they are. The global overall mortality rate is dominated by cardiovascular diseases and cancer. But the HIV/Aids pandemics, the anthrax attacks of 2001, the rapid global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, the E. coli O104 (STEC O104:H4) outbreak in Germany, and the recent Ebola epidemic have all demonstrated the considerable human, political, and economic costs that result from outbreaks of infectious disease. This paper examines the processes that led to the securitization of public health.*

**Keywords:** *human security, health security, infectious diseases, securitization*

### 1. Introduction

Security is almost a basic human need, as seen in Maslow's pyramid, the need for safety, stays right above the physiological needs, as breathing, food and water, shelter (Maslow, 1943:376).

Not so very long ago, attempts to connect public health and national security would have been considered an interesting approach by experts in both areas. The discipline of public health focuses on "what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy" (Institute of Medicine, 1988:8). Although public health events have long been an issue in of health diplomacy, public health studies have had a strong domestic focus (Fidler, 2001:9). The International Relations theory, on the other hand, aims to construct models that will assist in preventing the premature loss of human life and productivity as a result of war (Price Smith, 2001:164). As Thomas Hobbes claimed, the central function of the state is to guarantee the physical safety of its citizens from both internal and external forms of predation (Hobbes, 1968:87).

During most of the twentieth century, International Relations defined a state-centric concept of "security" by equaling the term with state defense, safety, protection and territorial integrity. Influenced by two World Wars and the Cold War that followed, with the world being threatened by a potential global nuclear war, security meant "state security" and "military security" solely. At that time, it was considered legal for states to put an end to all factors that could endanger the state, even if this meant using power and violence. Therefore, security was seen as being equivalent to the non-existence of violent

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conflict. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s, the neorealist focus on safeguarding the "core values" of a state from military threats emanating from outside its borders became no longer adequate as a means of understanding what (or who) is to be secured, from what threats, and by what means (Krause and Williams, 1996:230).

Over thirty years ago Richard Ullman had pointed to the need to redefine national threats beyond their exclusively military focus as “*an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state*” (Ullman, 1983:117).

## **2. Changing paradigm. Human security**

The security paradigm needed to be shifted. In the old paradigm the world was purely black and white, an asset was either secure or not. Nowadays, we are in a gray zone, with threats arising every single day. Another classic assumption regarding security tends to become obsolete: there is the possibility to discover all vulnerabilities and eliminate them. The present developments on the international arena show that there are too many vulnerabilities to find them all, much less to eliminate them all, the only coherent approach to contain them being prioritization (according to possibilities) of the ones that can be discovered and fixed, and management of those who haven't be eliminated yet.

After the end of Cold War security suffered a simultaneous horizontal and vertical broadening giving birth to a new concept: human security<sup>1</sup>. Horizontal broadening, started by the Copenhagen School, refers to incorporating non-military aspects of security, into the security discourse, “because it is in this practice that the issue become[s] a security issue—not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan *et al.*, 1998:24), while vertical broadening of security refers to incorporation of other non-state referent objects, such as individuals, local communities, groups of people by common ethnic, religious or ideological characteristics, global community, etc.

The concept of human security was first articulated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1994<sup>2</sup>, defining it as: “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression” and as “protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP, 1994:22). Human security changed the referent object of security “from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security”, and, tried, to advocate “security through sustainable human development” (UNDP 1994:24). Keeping in mind that securitization is “the move that takes politics beyond the usual rules of the game” and a process that involves political actors declaring that specific issues

<sup>1</sup> Although as Fen Hampson has noted, “since the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the nineteenth century, the notion that people should be protected from violent threats and, when they are harmed or injured, that the international community has an obligation to assist them, has gained widespread acceptance” (Hampson *et al.*, 2002:17)

<sup>2</sup> „*We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly*” (World Summit, 2005)

warrant exceptional attention, efforts or even sacrifices (Balzacq, 2005:173), the human security concept, as stressed in the UNDP 1994 Report recognizes seven categories of threats to human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.

Of course, there were many scholars standing against such broadening of the concept, arguing that the new boundaries of security can appear so vague as to sometimes make the more pertinent question what is not a security issue, instead of what is a security issue (McInnes, 2012:116). Daniel Deudney harshly states: “if everything that causes a reduction in human well-being is labeled a security threat, the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym of <bad>” (Deudney, 1999:192). Roland Paris indicates that “because the proponents of human security are typically reluctant to prioritize the jumble of goals and principles that make up the concept” there is no coherent way forward in terms of analytically organized scholarship or pragmatic policy prescriptions to improve human security (Paris, 2001:92). Stephen Walt (1991) argues that defining the field of security so broadly “would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems” (Walt, 1991:212).

From the “freedom from fear” perspective, state as an organization that has the legal monopoly over the legitimate means of violence and it is tied up with the duty to eliminate the threat of force and violence from everyday human interactions, human security focuses on the primary responsibility of political institutions to maintain the social order that is a prerequisite for the security and well-being of individuals and communities (Buzan *et al.*, 1998:141)<sup>3</sup>. According to this approach, human security is *unavoidably and inextricably* about the state and more specifically about the relationship between citizens, and between citizens and the state (Wood, 1996:43). But, In order for “freedom from fear” to be achieved, individuals have to be empowered to take control of their environment and to become stakeholders in political, economic and social processes that affect them and this can be achieved only if they surpass being passive subjects in the human security discourse (Krause, 2007:19).

### **3. Changing paradigm. Health security**

Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity (WHO Constitution), a fundamental right of every human being, a value that any state should provide for its citizens, as it is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security. Approximately 14.7 million people die each year from known and preventable infectious diseases (WHO, 2003:6). Acute respiratory infections, AIDS, diarrheal diseases, tuberculosis and malaria were the five leading causes of mortality from infectious disease between 2002 and 2006. “*In a globalized world where people and goods move rapidly via air travel, much of the world's manufacturing process is spread across countries, food is imported from one country to another, and the health security of each nation is dependent on the health security of other members of the international community.*”(The Department of Health and Human Services, 2009:15).

Indeed, the process of globalization is often linked to the diffusion of pathogens in the modern era, as trade is directly associated with the inter-continental diffusion of pathogens and with their vectors of transmission (Price Smith, 2009:5). Global microbial

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<sup>3</sup> As Buzan argues “this [the political] sector is probably the primary locus at which (seemingly) individual-level security appears on the security agenda”. (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 141).

proliferation and emergence is also facilitated by tourism and migration, by increasing population densities, by environmental degradation, by international (and intra-state) conflict (Price-Smith, 2002:22), and by inequities in the international distribution of resources between developed and developing countries (Poku, 2002:538).

The development of the public health-national security linkage in the 1990s flows from four important causes (Fidler, 2003:791): the devastating scale of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the developing world, the recognition of the global problem of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases and the renewed concerns about the proliferation of biological weapons by states and their use by terrorists.

As stated above, ingenuity, knowledge and management capacities can't counteract the vulnerability of man facing the invasion of microbial agents. Infectious diseases will exist as long as mankind exists. Despite unprecedented progress in disease control, communicable diseases remain a major killer. To put these numbers in perspective, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that since 1945 three diseases alone – AIDS, TB, and malaria have claimed 150 million lives, many times the approximately 23 million deaths casualties from wars (Peterson, 2002:47).

It is estimated that 2.1 billion airline passengers travelled in 2006 (Factsheet IATA 2007). This means that diseases now have the potential to spread geographically much faster than at any time in history. An outbreak or epidemic in one part of the world is only a few hours away from becoming an imminent threat elsewhere.

Several factors contribute to the emergence and re-emergence of pathogens. Ecological changes, including those due to agricultural or economic development, are among the most frequently identified factors in emergence. They precipitate the occurrence of outbreaks of previously unrecognized diseases with high case-fatality rates, by placing people in contact with a natural reservoir or host for an infection unfamiliar but usually already present (often a zoonotic or arthropod-borne infection), either by increasing proximity or by changing conditions so as to favor an increased population of the microbe or its natural host (Morse, 1991:391). The emergence of Lyme disease in the United States and Europe was probably due largely to reforestation (Barbour and Kish, 1993: 1612), which increased the population of deer and the deer tick, the vector of Lyme disease. The movement of people into these areas placed a larger population in close proximity to the vector.

One other human cause of insecurity is inadequate investment in public health, which resulted from a false sense of security in the absence of infectious diseases outbreaks, a fact that leads to the ignorance of effective prevention programs. The widespread use of insecticides in large-scale, systematic control programs, in the 1960s diminished the populations of vectors and, therefore many important vector-borne diseases showed decreasing prevalence in Africa. Within the next 20 years, many of these illnesses, like dengue hemorrhagic fever and malaria emerged in new areas or re-emerged in areas previously affected. Urbanization and increased international trade and travel have augmented the lack of surveillance, contributing to rapid spread of dengue viruses and causing an unprecedented pandemic in 1998, with 1.2 million cases reported to WHO from 56 countries. Since then, dengue epidemics have continued, affecting millions of people from Latin America to South-East Asia. Globally, the average annual number of cases reported to WHO has nearly doubled in each of the last four decades (WHO Report 2007:18).

Armed conflict is another factor for consideration, when we speak about frightening epidemics. It results in destruction or weakening of health systems, diminishing their capacity to detect, prevent and respond to infectious disease outbreaks,

also dramatically reducing the concerned population's access to health care. In Angola, one of the most notable consequences of the 27-year civil war (1975–2002) was the spread of an outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever in 2004–2005, which affected more than 200 people, 90% of whom died (Bausch *et al.*, 2003:1535). The transmission of Marburg hemorrhagic fever, an infectious disease related to Ebola, was amplified by the overcrowded and understaffed poor health facilities with sub-standard infection control procedures. The forced migration as a result of war, conflict or natural leads to the displacement of large numbers of people often obliged to live in crowded, unhygienic and impoverished conditions, which favor the transmission of the antimicrobial agent. This was the cause of the cholera epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the aftermath of the crisis in Rwanda of 1994. In July of that year, between 500000 and 800000 people crossed the border and settled in the outskirts of the Congolese city of Goma. During the first month after their arrival almost 50000 refugees died, showing an extremely high mortality rate<sup>4</sup> due to an explosive outbreak of combined cholera and dysentery (Goma Epidemiological Group, 1995:341-343).

Unexpected policy changes in public health systems can have lethal and costly repercussions. In August 2003, in northern Nigeria, there were unsubstantiated claims that the oral polio vaccine (OPV) was unsafe and could sterilize young children. The governments ordered the ceasing of polio immunization in two northern states and the polio immunization coverage lowered substantially in a number of others regions. The result was a large outbreak of poliomyelitis across northern Nigeria and the reinfection of previously polio-free areas in the south of the country. Nigeria was also the starting point for the spread of the microbe to other polio-free countries. At the beginning of 2003, only seven countries in the world remained infected: Afghanistan, Egypt, India, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia. By the end of 2006, 19 polio-free countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East had experienced outbreaks traceable genetically to the Nigerian virus. The effort to eradicate polio has made great strides since the launch of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 1988. Then, 350000 children were paralyzed annually in 125 countries. The number has decreased dramatically during the next 25 years by more than 99%, with just around 200 cases per year. It was hoped that complete eradication of wild-type poliovirus would be achieved by the end of 2003 (Minor, 2004:474). The remaining 1% seems to be the hardest goal to achieve, given the Islamic resistance to the vaccination. Moreover, the killing of the healthcare personnel, working in polio vaccination campaigns in Pakistan was thought to be linked to Osama Bin Laden capturing in 2011, when, allegedly, the CIA used a fake hepatitis vaccination program to help locate the Al Qaeda leader (Scientific American, 16 April, 2013).

Another category of threats to public health security concerns the continuing and increasing evolution of resistance to antibiotics, a major factor in the emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases (Heymann, 2004:98). Antibiotic drug resistance is an increasing threat to global health security, potentially compromising gains made in public health worldwide. In an article published by BBC News, the chief medical officer of England suggests that the danger posed by growing resistance to antibiotics should be ranked along with terrorism on a list of threats to the nation. Professor Dame Sally Davies described it as a "ticking time bomb", warning that routine operations could become deadly in just 20 years if the ability to fight infection gets lost. She then stated: "If we don't take action, then we may all be back in an almost 19th Century environment where

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<sup>4</sup> 25-30 cases per 10000 per day

infections kill us as a result of routine operations. We won't be able to do a lot of our cancer treatments or organ transplants." (BBC News, 2013). Resistance occurs when bacterial infections previously considered routine to treat survive exposure to antibiotics (Laxminarayan, 2013:1057).

The emergence and spread of drug resistance results from several ecological and evolutionary interacting factors, that occur either naturally or human-made. Bacteria can develop resistance to antimicrobial medication through various mechanisms – spontaneous mutation and the exchange of genes between strains and species of bacteria. Since penicillin became widely available in 1942, and other antibiotics soon followed, the killing and growth-inhibitory effects of antibiotics have applied selective pressure that has reduced the number of susceptible strains, leading to the development of more resistant varieties of bacteria (Levy, 1997:131). The selection and spread of these strains are facilitated by a sum of different practices that include includes poor use and abuse of antibiotics (excessive and irrational use for treatment or prevention), availability of substandard products (particularly in less developed countries where antibiotics are easier to obtain without prescription and their quality can be questionable), increased global travel, medical tourism and trade, declines in research and development for new medicines, poor application of infection control measures and use of antibiotics in the agricultural industry, particularly in the food industry (Heymann, 2006:673). Antibiotics were initially developed for the treatment of infectious diseases in people, but eventually the same drugs also began to be used for the treatment of animals and plants. When same microbes circulate among their human, animal and agricultural hosts, they provide opportunities for swapping or exchanging resistant genes and thus assisting the evolution and spread of resistance. The discoverer of penicillin, Alexander Fleming, first warned of the potential importance of the development of resistance (Fleming, 1945). Soon the evidence became alarming as early as in 1946, when a hospital in the United Kingdom reported that 14% of all *Staphylococcus aureus* infections were resistant to penicillin. By 1950, this proportion had increased to 59% and in the 1990s, penicillin-resistant *S. aureus* had attained levels greater than 80% both in hospitals and in the community (World Health Report 2007:23). Parasites often follow the same pattern. By 1976, malaria caused by chloroquine-resistant *Plasmodium falciparum* was highly prevalent in South-East Asia and 10 years later it was found worldwide. The development of parasitic and bacterial resistance to drugs commonly used to treat malaria and tuberculosis is a grave threat to public health. The same is true for viruses, as shown by the emerging resistance to anti-HIV drugs. Organisms that are resistant to multiple anti-infective drugs are also an occurrence nowadays. The results of resistance are very serious in terms of increased mortality, with a doubling of mortality being observed in some resistant infections as well as a need for an increase in the length of treatment with the more expensive anti-infective drugs or drug combinations. The immediate health consequences are increased sickness and death rates, prolonged illness and a greater risk of complications. In economic terms this leads to loss of productivity and increased costs for diagnosis and treatment, which poor health services have difficulty in affording (Howard, 2003:8). Complicating the matter, fewer new antibiotics are reaching the market with no new class of broad-spectrum antibiotic likely to appear soon (Levy, 1998:612). In the absence of effective health promotion measures, this creates a classic example of the “tragedy of the commons” where an individual’s choice to use an antibiotic can affect the possibility of treating bacterial infections in other people. This cannot be solved alone by a costly race to keep

one step ahead of resistance. A multi-faceted international effort is required to avert a “global-scale failure” (Nugent, 2010:2).

#### 4. Conclusion

This paper focuses on health security only from the “non-military” point of view. The most direct threat posed by a disease to the global community arises from a biological weapons attack. But it is important to keep in mind that failure to prevent a biological weapons attack results in the same outcome – infection of the population – and requires more or less the the same solutions. Therefore, preparation for widespread disease should be a key focus of national security.

Traditionally, national security has been narrowly defined as the preservation of the state from physical threats. Still, emerging diseases and their pandemic potential pose perhaps an even greater national security threat, particularly in this era of globalization when disease can spread more rapidly than in previous eras. Thirty four percent of all deaths worldwide are now attributable to infectious disease, while war only accounts for 0.64 percent of those deaths. Moreover, the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918 killed approximately 500000 Americans, more than all wars fought in the 20th century (Evans, 2010:100).

There are many ways diseases can threaten national security. First, they cause increased rates of morbidity and mortality – people sicken and die, putting huge strains on health systems and the nation’s workforce, leading to political instability and economic embalmencement. AIDS has led to numerous problems in many African countries. When marginalized or poor people cannot afford treatment and the government cannot or will not provide it, faith in the political system crumbles; class and ethnic conflict emerges and without a sufficient working class, GDP decreases and each problem becomes a source of more problems. On the other hand, a high burden disease poses indirect threats to national security that include “the health of the armed forces and, most significantly, to the social, economic, and political stability of certain key regions” (Peterson, 2002:46) that can emerge in crisis situations.

Despite all debates that surround the issue of health security being part of the higher politics agenda, the developments on the international stage prove that this is an issue that cannot be ignored any more. On January 10, 2000, US Vice-President Al Gore, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, and US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke convened a at an unprecedented meeting to address a public health concern, a special session of the UN Security Council to deal with the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which was subsequently recognized by much of the international community as a novel and growing threat to both national and international security. In his address to the Security Council, Gore argued as follows: “For the nations of sub-Saharan Africa, AIDS is not just a humanitarian crisis. It is a security crisis – because it threatens not just individual citizens, but the very institutions that define and defend the character of a society. This disease weakens work forces and saps economic strength. AIDS strikes at teachers and denies education to their students. It strikes at the military, and subverts the forces of order and peacekeeping. AIDS is one of the most devastating threats ever to confront the world community. The United Nations was created to stop wars. Now we must wage and win a great and peaceful war of our time – the war against AIDS”<sup>5</sup> (Price-Smith, 2002:125). On

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<sup>5</sup> Office of the Vice-President, remarks prepared for delivery by Vice-President Gore at UN Security Council Session on AIDS in Africa, January 10, 2000  
[http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/health/000110\\_gore\\_hiv-aids.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/health/000110_gore_hiv-aids.html).

July 200, Resolution 1308 of the UN Security Council regarding the spread of HIV/AIDS wrote a history page in the evolution of health security. That was the first time a health issue climbed so high on the international political agenda. On 16th of September 2014, the UN Security Council convened once more for a public health global concern. It issued Resolution 2177 of 2014 on Peace and security in Africa, that explicitly states: „Determining that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security...” (UN, 2014).

Disease can reverse development gains in a state, by hitting its human capital and simultaneously increasing the demands of the its nation. If the state is not capable to provide basic needs and services, it becomes weakened and pre-existing societal tensions accelerate or exacerbate and may contribute to increased criminal activity, to intrastate violence, and to the collapse of effective governance. That is why health should be a security concern for all states.

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## THE NEW CHALLENGES OF GEORGIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LAST ELECTIONS (2012 PARLIAMENTARY AND 2013 PRESIDENTIALLY)

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**Abstract.** *This article seeks to examine the particularities of Georgian political system and the constitutional reforms that relates to distributions of powers in state. Also, performs an analysis of the activities of political actors and their contribution to state-building and democracy in Georgia: the role of political parties and the party system peculiarities; the role of presidential institution and the contribution of Georgian Presidents to creation and consolidation of new Georgia. The challenges of a new form of constitutional government are examined, focusing on the increasing role played by Georgia's Dream Coalition and how this new political forces and the oppositions parties responded with new policy agendas.*

*The article goes to explore the last electoral processes in Georgia, the 2012 parliamentary elections, and 2013 presidential by placing them initially in an historical political context. Having chartered the emergence of political transformation in Georgia in the last years, the article focuses in detail on the events surrounding the new government.*

**Keywords:** *Georgia, democratization, political process, electoral campaign*

### Introduction

One of the most beautiful and prosperous Soviet Republic - Georgia was divested by a series of internal wars (Zucher, 2007: 133). Twenty years ago Georgia won its independence in a bloody civil war. Since then it has endured two decades of instability and turmoil. Thousands of people have fled their homeland. Most preserves the memory of those events up today (20 Years Post-soviet, 15 July 2011).

Therefore, the first main challenge for independent Georgia was to safeguard its territorial integrity. Following civil wars in two regions of the country make the Georgian government to lose control over two territorial entities: from 1992, in the former Autonomous District of Ossetia; and in 1993 in the former Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. Since then both regions have been ruled by separatist regimes and the question of Georgia's territorial integrity remains unresolved. Another territorial problem was related to Adjara region. Nonetheless, although the central government regained full control over the Adjara Autonomous Republic in 2004, a constitutional arrangement providing for the territorial distribution of power has not yet been introduced and institutions for local government are underdeveloped (*Research and Dialogue with Political Parties*, 2006: 5). That feature of Georgian political process,

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certainly determine the policy vector and leaves a large footprint in memory and political perceptions of the Georgian population. Today Georgia is a democratic oriented state profoundly facing west. Since 2004 Georgia has started the structural reforms of democratization of the political system. After 2012 they exchanged political forces in government, criticizing many of the reforms undertaken by the Saakashvili' Government.

### **1. The evolution of Georgian political system**

During the soviet collapse, from October 1989 to May 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a well-known nationalist leader and the first President of new Georgian state, led a parliamentary system. From 1992 to 1995, Eduard Shevarnadze was directly elected as chair of parliament and simultaneously occupied the position of "head of state". He hadn't veto power and was accountable to the parliament. The Constitution of independent Georgia was adopted on 24 August 1995. Choice was made in favor of the presidential system. The decision to create a powerful political executive in 1995 was influenced by a dysfunctional 26-party legislature, a vacuum of authority, and the return of the old Soviet "nomennklatura".

Presidentialism in Georgian conditions was developed into personalized rule in which the head of state was also the executive and had no right to dissolve Parliament. Since 1995 the Georgian Constitution was amended several times. Therefore, the constitutional amendments of 2004 changed to a semi-presidential system with shared executive power. In this way, was created a cabinet of ministers and the post of Prime Minister. The president was head of the state, but no longer chief executive. Simultaneously, President had the right to dissolve the legislature. Those constitutional arrangements led to a greater concentration of authority in the hands of the President at the expense of a balance of powers (*Research and Dialogue with Political Parties*, 2006: 5)The real balance of power under President Saakashvili was breached. Some authors characterize he's government period as a "super-presidential system"

After the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the Georgian government declared the launch of a "new wave" of democratic reforms to better balance branches of government, strengthen judicial independence and private property, and increase media freedom. The cornerstone of this effort was to be a constitutional reform that would devolve power away from Georgia's traditionally strong presidency. After sixteen months of development, deliberation, and discussion, Georgia's parliament approved a set of far-reaching constitutional amendments on October 15, 2010. These will go into effect in 2013, after Georgia's 2012 round of parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections (Welt, 2010). Georgia initiated these constitutional amendments in 2009. A constitutional commission was created which was composed of six opposition parties, the ruling party, NGO representatives and academics. They drafted the new stipulations of constitution, which was adapted in October 2010 (Turashvili, 2012).Opposition parties that refused to take part in the Constitutional Commission denounced the reforms and called on the government to postpone making changes to the constitution until after the 2012 parliamentary elections. While the Venice Commission was generally supportive of the amendments, its conclusion coincides with an alternative view within Georgian civil society that constitutional reforms have not gone far enough toward establishing parliamentary rule (Welt, 2010).

The main idea of the constitution was to move from the presidential system of government to the rather mixed system, where the executive power is in the hands of the

government, which is elected and accountable to the parliament. So, accordingly, the new amendments will diminish the powers of the president and increase those of the prime minister, who becomes the head of the government, with the executive authority over domestic and foreign policy (Turashvili, 2012). While president retains veto power, a parliamentary majority will be sufficient to override the veto, rather than the 60 percent currently required. Instead, the president will serve as “the guarantor of national independence and unity of the country,” according to the constitution. In practice, the president will serve as the kingmaker between a parliamentary majority and the government, in the event that a rift arises between them. Specifically, while the new constitution greatly reduces the president’s power to dissolve parliament, it grants him the discretion to do so after a parliamentary vote of no-confidence against the government. The president will be able to veto the no-confidence vote and dissolve parliament if a second vote of no-confidence fails to gain the support of 60 percent of deputies (Welt, 2010).

The president remains Georgia’s commander-in-chief and will be able to declare martial law or a state of emergency (though parliament retains the right to reject such declarations). Innovatively for Georgia, the prime minister will need to countersign nearly all the president’s legal acts – including appointments of military officers and the declaration of a state of emergency. The right to declare war remains the president’s own. Outside of war, foreign policy is to be shared by the president and government. While the latter “exercises” foreign policy, the president “represents” Georgia in foreign relations and negotiates international treaties.

The prime minister, together with the cabinet, will be elected by a simple parliamentary majority, while the president remains head of the state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces but without the right to initiate laws, to introduce the state budget or hold an official post in a political party. Parliamentary powers, however, have not been increased. There are a few new functions, one of them was the approval of the cabinet, but other parliamentary oversight mechanisms, such as scrutiny of state expenditures, holding individual ministers accountable and the setting up of temporary investigative commissions, wasn’t strengthened, so the parliament has limited power. For instance, the parliament cannot amend the budget without government consent (Khalamadze V., Jibgashvili. Z., 2010). The Venice Commission, which is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional and other legislative matters, noted that the role of the parliament in budget matters is too limited. So even after 2013, much power and influence will still remain in the executive branch (Venice Commission, 2013).

The Venice Commission expressed guarded approval of the redistribution to the government of some powers hitherto vested in the president, but implied that these changes did not go far enough. It noted that “the president plays a political role, which is not coherent with the role of impartial guarantor of the constitutional order of the state and its continuity. In addition, the president “still retains important powers” with regard to international relations, the armed forces, and during a parliament move to vote no confidence in the government (Caucasus Report, 2014). In essence, some opinions said that the constitution is a shift from super-presidentialism to super prime ministership (International Crisis Group, 2010; Khalamadze V., Jibgashvili. Z., 2010).

<i>Parliament name (generic / translated)</i>	SakartvelosParlamenti / Parliament
<i>Structure of Parliament</i>	Unicameral
<i>Voting System</i>	mixed
<i>Mode of designation</i>	directly elected 150, -77 seats by the Proportional Representation system (closed party list system), one nationwide constituency for PR system; -73 single-member constituencies for the majority system
	Parties exceeding a 5-per cent threshold are entitled to win seats under the PR system. - 73 seats by the Majority system (first past the post): If no candidate secures 30 per cent of the valid vote, run-off elections will be held between the two leading candidates.

### 1.1. Party system in Georgia

Political parties are indispensable for making democracy work and deliver. Finding the proper conditions for better internal functioning and effective legal regulation of political parties is of key importance anywhere. The recent history of political parties in Georgia begins with the first free elections, which were held under Soviet rule in 1990. At the moment, the most important political parties with the highest profile are: United National Movement; New Rights; Industry will Save Georgia (Industrialists); Conservative Party of Georgia; Leiborist (Labour) Party; Union of Georgian Traditionalists; Republican Party of Georgia; Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia (Political Party Finance Report, 2011).

#### Parties in Georgia: ideologies, social groups represented, why and when established<sup>2</sup>

<b>Leiborist (Labour) Party</b>	Left-wing, centrist; middle class; established to represent broad strata of population in 1995
<b>United National Movement</b>	No specific ideology; claims to represent the whole population; says it was created because the country was developing in the wrong way; 2002.
<b>Republican Party of Georgia</b>	Right-wing, centrist; neo-conservative; represents all social strata; established to struggle for independence in 1978
<b>Union of Georgian Traditionalists</b>	Right-wing, centrist, conservative; middle class; created as a part of the national independence movement to participate in elections and build independent Georgia; 1990.
<b>New Rights</b>	Right-wing, conservative, middle class; business groups, intelligentsia, entrepreneurs; created to fill a gap in the political spectrum in 2001.
<b>Industry will Save Georgia.</b>	Right-wing, middle class; established to support local industries by means of reducing tax burden, improving investment climate, representing business interests; 1999
<b>Conservative Party of Georgia</b>	Conservative, right-wing; various social strata who should be supported by the state; says it was established because the country should be arranged differently; 2005

<sup>2</sup>International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2006), *Research and Dialogue with Political Parties* (2006), Georgia - Country Report. Center for Social Studies., [http://www.idea.int/parties/upload/Georgia\\_report.pdf](http://www.idea.int/parties/upload/Georgia_report.pdf), accessed 28.11.2013

Political parties are governed by the constitution of 1995 and the Law on Political Associations of Citizens (1997). Both provide a high level of negative freedoms and impose only limited restrictions on the functioning and formation of political parties. The law prohibits the creation of regionally-based parties; since the country's territorial integrity is one of the most pressing issues to have emerged following independence. On the other side the legal framework in the party's regulation is very permissive related to conditions of creation and registration (Foresti, Welton, Jijelava, 2010).

Under the Organic Law of Georgia on Political Unions of Citizens, state funding is one of the components of a party's assets. Funds are allocated in the Georgian state budget annually to provide financial support to the activities of political parties: 1) direct transfer of funds to parties and 2) the transfer of funds to a legal entity of public law – The Centre for Electoral Systems Development, Reform and Training<sup>3</sup>. The Fund's goal is to promote the development of the governmental sector and the establishment of a healthy and competitive system. According to "Political Party Finance Report" realized by Transparency International – Georgia a total of 14 political parties received funding from the state budget in 2007-2009 (Political Party Finance Report, 2011). The Law on Political Associations of Citizens prohibits regional or ethnically based parties. This way can have positive aspects that ethnically based parties can deepen conflict in multinational states as Georgia. On the other hand, such legal provision doesn't stimulate ethnic minorities' representation. Analysis of the ethnic profile of the legislature of Georgia shows an unfavorable situation. So since 1995, when 16 non-Georgians were elected to a 235-seat parliament, there has been a decline in representation. In 1999, it was 14, and in 2004 it was 8. In 2008, six made it to a smaller parliament of 150 members (Foresti, Welton, Jijelava, 2010).

Likewise, non-Georgians are rarely among the top candidates on closed party lists and usually gain their seats in single-member districts. Open lists, which allow electors to choose who to vote for, would be better for Georgia's minorities, but even then, larger numbers in parliament do not guarantee better representation. Many non-Georgian parliamentarians are products of local patron-client network and have little influence in the legislature. Quotas or ethnic parties may not resolve the issue. Georgia's minorities are too small to reach the electoral barrier (Foresti, Welton, Jijelava, 2010).

Permissive rules for the registration of a political party in Georgia, also generates fragmentation of the party system. Thus, in Georgia are currently about 200 registered political parties. The large number of existing political parties does not affect very much the number of electoral candidates involved in parliamentary elections, that only less than a quarter of the existing parties are electoral or political actively. Over the years there has been a decrease in the number of registered party in parliamentary election campaigns. For example, in the 1999 parliamentary elections was 50 political parties-candidates; in the 2002 local elections - 41 parties-candidates; in the 2003 parliamentary elections - 22 parties-candidates; and in the 2004 parliamentary elections - 20 parties- candidates<sup>4</sup>.

## **2. The Presidents of Independent Georgia**

Georgia has had three presidents since it eventually regained its independence in December 1991 when the Soviet Union unceremoniously disintegrated. Most Georgians these days find it difficult to talk highly of any of them.

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<sup>3</sup>*Organic Law of Georgia on Political Unions of Georgia*, art.26-28,

[http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL\(2009\)060-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2009)060-e), 05.01.2014

<sup>4</sup>[www.cec.gov.ge](http://www.cec.gov.ge), accessed 28.12.2014

The first of them was **Zviad Gamsakhurdia**. During Soviet period, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was a prominent human rights campaigner in the 1960s and 1970s. He became identified with the Democratic Movement in Russia (Jones, 2012: 54). In independent Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia embodied the spirit of euphoric nationalism that swept away Soviet power. Oftentimes, his short period in office is seen as a period of chaos, criminality and confusion. After some, Gamsakhurdia was neither well suited nor well prepared for the job, yet Georgians elected him willingly and convincingly for what he represented (All for Georgians to Lose, 2013). “The post-Soviet environment under Gamsakhurdia – a lumpen classlessness with confusion and rage directed against the authorities, the intelligentsia, the West, and national minorities – has moderated, but not disappeared” (Jones, 2012: 6). Moreover, during his short career as a politician Gamsakhurdia capitalized both on his merit as a dissident, and he arguably mixed politics with his convictions about the “missions” of the Georgian nation (Zurcher, 2007: 128). Political context forced him to abandon the position of President. A few years later, on December 31, 1993 he died under murky circumstances. Most observers outside Georgia accept the view that it was suicide (Zurcher, 2007: 29).

The second President, **Edward Shevardnadze**, as called “the old fox of the Caucasus” is considered probably one of the politicians that did most to end the cold war. He is generally characterized as a pragmatic politician who understood well Georgians. On the other hand, he was credited to have brought stability and for having pulled Georgia back from the brink. On the other side, he is also identified with a period of stagnation and of laissez-faire politics of the worst kind (All for Georgians to Lose, 2013). When Eduard Shevardnadze initially took over from Georgia’s first President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, he was also seen by many locals and the majority of the international community as a liberator and reformer. Initially, he lived up to that image, successfully marginalizing many of the criminal and paramilitary elements that had first brought him to power and building strong relations with the West. However, his inability to fight corruption gradually undermined his administration and left it unable to provide the most rudimentary of social services or social protections. By 2003 it had become apparent that Shevardnadze’s government was extremely weak. His party performed catastrophically in the 2002 local elections and a number of high-profile figures, including Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze, who had once been members of his Government, became strong opponents. Other opposition groups, such as the Labour Party, the New Rights, and the Revival Party also gained ground (Foresti, Welton, Jijelava, 2010). In the end he was swept away from power in a wave of public discontent that same wave swept Mikheil Saakashvili into power after the bravado of the “Rose Revolution (All for Georgians to Lose, 2013).

The ex-President, **Mikheil Saakashvili**, the country’s third President since independence, was first brought to power as the result of post-election protests in 2003 against then President Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime and the resulting change of power, known as the Rose Revolution (Foresti, Welton, Jijelava, 2010). He had immense popularity to start with – even if the 95% vote that he claims to have polled in the 2004 election was inflated and exaggerated, and the first sign of bigger problems to come. M. Saakashvili was a reformer to start with, but having decided early on that reform was too difficult and too risky, he swapped to being a builder (All for Georgians to Lose, 2013).

The known author of several books on Caucasian history and politics, Stephen Jones, in one of his publications characterized the first three Georgia’s presidents in this way: “under Gamsakhurdia, democracy’s failing derived from a simplistic belief in sovereign

statehood and majority rule; under Shevardnadze, democracy was eaten away by corrupt and unaccountable networks; under Saakashvili, swift and haughty have policies have alienated large segment of the citizenry, including national minorities and the emerging “middle class” he wants on his side”. In his opinion all three leaders failed to achieve a balance between the needs of de-standing – reducing the state’s role in the economy, creating greater institutional transparency, and strengthening national security (Jones, 2012).

October 27, 2013 marked Georgia’s sixth presidential election since independence and the winner, the fourth President **Giorgi Margvelashvili**, assumed a narrowed set of powers. Constitutional reforms shifting Georgia from a presidential to a parliamentary system was taken effect with the inauguration of the actual head of state. The significance of that election thus lies at least as much in the environment and processes surrounding it as in its outcome (National Democratic Institute, 2013).

### **3. Georgia’s legal framework related to elections**

There are five key documents regulating presidential elections in Georgia:

1. *Constitution of Georgia*
2. *Election Code of Georgia*
3. *Law on Political Unions of Citizens*
4. *Central Election Commission Regulations*
5. *Criminal Code of Georgia*

#### **3.1 Parliamentary Elections**

The electoral system adopted in Georgia uses the “parallel” form of mixed member proportional (MMP). The 150-member parliament is elected for a four-year term under a mixed electoral system: 73 members are elected in single-mandate constituencies under a majoritarian system and 77 on closed party lists in one nationwide constituency under a proportional system. A majoritarian candidate must obtain at least 30 per cent of valid votes cast in the constituency to be elected. If no candidate reaches this threshold, a run-off is held within 14 days between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes. The mandates of the members of the Parliament shall be distributed only among those political associations and electoral blocks, which obtained at least seven per cent of the votes of the electors, participated in the elections held under the proportional system<sup>5</sup>.

Elections are held regularly but there has been no change in the ruling authorities through elections since independence. Elections in Georgia are characterized by persistent electoral fraud spurred the ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003, when the results of the parliamentary elections were partly annulled and President Eduard Shevardnadze resigned his post. The leader of the Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili, was elected as President in 2004 and his party, the United National Movement, won an overwhelming majority after the elections to Parliament were repeated in 2004.

The most of international reports on election described the last 2012 parliamentary elections as the first peaceful change of government since Georgia’s independence in 1991. Thus, the **Georgia’s Dream Bloc (GD)**, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, won 85 mandates and the **United National Movement (UNM)**, led by President Mikheil Saakashvili, won 65 mandates. Thus UNM went into opposition and sent levers in the hands of a new government political force – Georgian Dream Bloc. The period since those elections has seen tense co-habitation between the current governing coalition and the

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<sup>5</sup>*The Constitution of Georgia*, adopted on 24 August 1995, art.50, p.2

opposition. Arrests, trials and interrogations of some United National Movement members following the 2012 elections negatively impacted the environment around the by-elections (OSCE/ODIHR, 27 April, 2013). While the United National Movement characterized such actions as political persecution, the Georgian Dream justified it as accommodation of public demand to “restore justice” for alleged crimes by UNM officials in previous government (OSCE/ODIHR, 27 April, 2013: 3). Actual parliament majority owned by The Georgian Dream coalition comprised the following parties:

- Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia
- Conservative Party of Georgia
- Industry will save Georgia
- Republican Party of Georgia
- Our Georgia - Free Democrats
- National Forum<sup>6</sup>

### 3.2. Presidential Elections

The President of Georgia shall be elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot for a term of five years. The same person may be elected the President only for two consecutive terms. Any person may be elected the President of Georgia if he/she is a native-born citizen of Georgia, having the right to vote, has attained the age of 35, has lived in Georgia for at least fifteen years and lives in Georgia by the day on which the election is scheduled. Regular elections for Presidency shall be held in October of the calendar year when the presidential authority expires. The President of Georgia shall fix the date of the elections not later than within 60 days before the elections<sup>7</sup>.

The right to nominate a candidate to the office of the President shall be vested with a political association of citizens or a stirring group. The nomination shall be confirmed by the signatures of not less than 50,000 electors. A candidate shall be deemed to be elected if he/she has obtained more than half of the votes of participants. (If no candidate has received the required number of votes in the first round, a second round of elections shall be held in two weeks after an official announcement of the first round results. Two candidates having the best results in the first round shall be put to the vote in the second round. The candidate who received more votes shall be deemed to be elected. The President of Georgia shall not have the right to hold any other position except for a party position, engage in entrepreneurial activity, and receive salary or another permanent remuneration for any other activity<sup>8</sup>.

## 4. The 2013 Presidential Elections

The 2013 presidential elections are considered a turning point for Georgia in all kinds of ways, and set a completely unprecedented and unique pattern of doing politics in the Caucasus region. Whilst Georgia has now turned the page in its modern political history a new set of leadership, quite unknown to the Georgian public are set to take the front line. Georgia still faces many serious problems, political, institutional and most of all economic. Yet the new leadership has a unique opportunity to build a new future for the Caucasus republic (Caucasian Elections Watch, October 27, 2013). Although the country was moving toward a semi-parliamentary system, the newly-elected President retains

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<sup>6</sup>[www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2119.htm](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2119.htm), accessed 24.12.2013

<sup>7</sup>*The Constitution of Georgia*, adopted on 24 August 1995

<sup>8</sup>*The Constitution of Georgia*, adopted on 24 August 1995

significant internal and external powers and political leverages. Therefore, the prospect of an opposition candidate retaining the role of President may have a significant impact on Georgia's political landscape (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2013: 3).

Georgian citizens abroad, on October 27 has possibility to vote in the presidential election in 38 other countries. While Greece has have the most out-of-country voting sites, with seven locations, Georgians may also cast their ballot at multiple polling stations in the United States (3), Azerbaijan (3), Turkey (3), Ukraine (3) and Spain (2). There are approximately 1.5 million Georgian citizens living abroad, although citizens residing or travelling to countries without polling stations was not be eligible to vote. Georgians residing in Russia was not having the opportunity to vote due to the absence of diplomatic representation in the country (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2013: 10).

On September 23, 2013, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Georgia finished the candidate registration process, registering 23 candidates. Overall, the CEC received 54 applications from parties and initiative groups; 31 were rejected on various legal grounds. This included the former Foreign Minister of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili, whose appeal was rejected by the Tbilisi Court of Appeals (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2013: 4).

Thus, in the 2013 Presidential elections 23 people are officially running to take over from Mikheil Saakashvili. Ten candidates have been appointed by political parties, 13 by initiative groups. There were three women running for President of the 23 registered candidates. It's Nino Burjanadze, leader of "Democratic Movement – United Georgia Party", as well as Nino Chanishvili and Nesta Kirtadze who were nominated by initiative groups. Nino Burjanadze was one of the favorites of electoral race and she's political experience in the lidding functions has assured for her the third place in the electoral score<sup>9</sup>.

#### List of candidates in 2013 Presidential Elections<sup>10</sup>

1. Giorgi Margvelashvili	Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia, former Minister of Education and Science and the candidate of the party in office
2. Davit Bakradze	United National Movement, ENM, former President of the Parliament (2008-2012);
3. Nino Burjanadze,	leader of the Democratic Movement-United Georgia
4. Shalva Natelashvili,	leader of the Labour Party;
5. Giorgi Targamadze	leader of the Christian-Democratic Movement;
6. Akaki Asatiani,	former President of the Supreme Council under the government of Zviad Gamsakhourdia (1991-1992) and leader of the Traditionalist Union;
7. Sergo Javakhidze,	leader of the Party for a Just Georgia;
8. Zurab Kharatishvili,	European Democrats of Georgia, chair of the Central Electoral Committee;
9. Koba Davitashvili	People's Party
10. Teimuraz Mzhavia	Christian Democratic People's Party;
11. Nestan Kirtadze	leader of the International Movement for Peace, Democracy and Development Georgia-Abkhazia-Ossetia appointed by an initiative group;
12. Mikheil Saluashvili,	appointed by an initiative group;
13. Giorgi Liluashvili,	appointed by an initiative group;

<sup>9</sup> www.cec.gov.ge, accessed 24.12.2013

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem.*

14. LevanChachua,	appointed by an initiative group;
15. AvtandilMargiani,	appointed by an initiative group;
16. NugzarAvaliani,	appointed by an initiative group;
17. GeorgiChikhladze,	appointed by an initiative group;
18. TeimurazBobokhidze,	appointed by an initiative group;
19. Nino Chanishvili,	appointed by an initiative group
20. KartlosGharibashvili	appointed by an initiative group
21. – TamazBibiluri,	appointed by an initiative group
22. MamukaChokhonelidze	appointed by an initiative group
23. – MamukaMelikishvili	appointed by an initiative group

The delegation accredited as observers in elections noted with satisfaction the consensus between the main political stakeholders concerning the recent amendments to the election legislation and the “Law on Political Unions of Citizens”, adopted by Parliament in July and August 2013. It is now essential to implement the amended legislation in an efficient manner, namely banning the misuse of administrative resources, ensuring the accuracy of voters’ lists, the transparency and control of sources of funding and expenditures by political parties and candidates (PACE, 2013).

The 2013 Presidential Elections overall electoral turnout was 47 %, the lowest of any election in Georgia since independence. Although past instances of electoral fraud may have increased electoral turnout significantly particularly the 2000 presidential elections. The most recent elections have been increasingly free and fair in opinion of the international observers. The result of votes indicates lower than usual electoral participation in both the 2012 and the 2013 elections. Also telling is the decline in turnout in the last two elections among the ethnic minority concentrated districts in southern Georgia. These districts have historically supported the party of power during electoral cycles (and, after being caught with high votes for United National Movement in 2012, have begun to switch loyalties) but despite such partisan shifting, electoral turnout among these groups is lower than the turnout for the country as a whole. This downward trend is one to watch; since it offers a significant change in how we might predict electoral behavior in Georgia (George, 2013).

Regarding other features of elections in Georgia can be distinguished complaints about electoral violations. That has traditionally been rife in Georgia’s ethnic minority regions. It is thus particularly important for voters in these regions to have access to election materials in their native languages so they can make informed choices. The CEC has indicated that it will publish the voters’ lists and ballots in minority languages as well as Georgian in nine of the 73 districts. The CEC is conducting trainings and providing materials to election administrators in minority languages. It is also conducting voter education and outreach activities in cooperation with civil society organizations representing ethnic minorities (National Democratic Institute, 2013). The delegation of observers was informed of cases of intolerance toward minorities. In this regard, it finds any political exploitation of sensitive ethnic and religious issues for electoral purposes unacceptable, all the more so in a multi-ethnic society such as Georgia [PACE, 25.09.2013]. Well-designed elections are vital to the integration of minorities and women. The electoral system in Georgia serves non-Georgians and women poorly (common in Western democracies too). There are provisions in the UEC for ballot paper in native language, but Georgian political leaders rarely make the effort. These are some serious gaps and overcoming them will greatly contribute to the democratization of the Georgian state.

Turnout in the election was lower than in the Parliamentary elections in 2012 but enough to ensure that a re-run is not necessary. The candidate, from Georgian's Dream, Giorgi Margvelashvili wins the election in the first round with the 62.12%<sup>11</sup>. G. Margvelashvili utilized a risky mobilization strategy. He declared that in case of incapacity to win the election from the first round he will retire from election campaign. In this way he managed to mobilize his own sympathizers to actively participation in first round of scrutiny, in time that the other candidates not succeeded to convince the electorate to come to vote and to give them their vote and express their confidence. The success of Georgian's Dream candidate was assured by the changes and transformations on political landscape in Georgia. The failure of United National Movement in 2012 parliamentary elections was started the decline of political influence of Saakashvili as a politician in Georgia and that denote a desire of Georgian people to new challenges and opportunities for his country. Ex-prime Minister, Bedzina Ivanishvili, the architect and the same time the heavy artillery of new party Georgia's Dream and of the Georgia's Dream Bloc, constituted by six political parties (mentioned earlier) was a leader match for his opponent M. Saakashvili. None of parties (Georgia's Dream Bloc) has enough political force to have created a real opposition to United National Movement. Their share of the Georgian political arena as an independent political party is minor.

Therefore, this election was a contrast between the party politics and the personality of candidates. Bedzina Ivanishvili led the GD coalition to government at 2012 parliamentary elections. He became the most popular leaders of Georgia's landscape at that moment. Even before triggering the Presidential election campaign, B. Ivanishvili declared his retirement from political live after the formation of new government. Coming from the business, Będzina make a choice in favor of this area. In this context it was said that he has performed his role as messiah of Georgian policy, having the purpose of legal removing from power the UNM and its leader M. Saakashvili. In order to ensure success to GD coalition candidate, G. Margvelashvili, was utilized the strategies of "images transfer". A lot of opinion considers that Ivanishvili will remain in Georgia's political landscape as a "shadow cardinal". Moreover ex-Prime Minister declared on this subject that "My activities will be absolutely transparent. And I will have a certain amount of influence, of course. At the same time, I do not look at this influence as something blameworthy. Quite the opposite, I will try to enhance this influence. How else can one be an active member of civil society?" (Ivanishvili, 2013).

### Conclusions

The recent elections in Georgia, which resulted shrieking came to power Saakashvili 's opposition undoubtedly awakens us some questions . First, it is interesting the position of the new government in foreign relations. Georgia is a post-Soviet state that has borders with Russia and political relations between these states are difficult to estimate. UNM and Saakashvili President showed deep western favorites. New invested Prime Minister 31-year-old Irakli Garibashvili was confirmed by the Parliament on November 20 as Georgia's new Prime Minister with 93 votes to 19. In this way the new government in Georgia was established. Both new President, as well as Prime Minister revealed the continuation of the Georgian political course in democratization and Europeanization. So Garibashvili declared on this subject that the foreign policy of Georgiawill expressed the choice of Georgian people, but he see the Georgia future is only in the EU and NATO aspiration.

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<sup>11</sup>*Ibidem.*

Another question relates to the changes in the Constitution of Georgia and the effectiveness of these reforms. Like other new states of post-Soviet space (Ukraine, Moldova), Georgia is still under processing and searching of effective and appropriate governance model. History of Georgian political system has already experienced at least three forms of government, each of them in political conditions in Georgia have demonstrated generosity classic disadvantages. The immaturity of the political class in Georgia and its inability to respect the democratic rules in political activity determine until today the inability of conciliation between government and opposition. In practical terms, each new president of Georgia operates under a new constitutional arrangement. This new constitutional changes provide important prerogatives sharing between the President, Prime Minister and Parliament. Option in favor of a semi-parliamentary regime is clear. Was wished a de-concentration of Presidential power, but as the new political power will be able to put into practice is a question of time.

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# THE PLACEMENT OF THE MISSILE DEFENSE SHIELD IN EUROPE. INTERESTS, AMBITIONS AND REAL BENEFICIARIES: ROMANIA, BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

*Daniela BLAGA\**

**Motto:** *If interests and ambitions conflict, the absence of crises is more worrisome than their presence. (Waltz, 1988: 615-628)*

**Abstract.** *When interests and ambitions are conflicting, the absence of the crisis is more alarming than its presence. The Cold War brought about more relaxed relations between the United States and Russia, but Washington and Moscow remain in opposing positions. Freedom is directly proportional to the order and the anarchy of international society. Romania had the “freedom” to choose the alignment, but in terms of geopolitics the problem deepens once the location of the missile shield had been decided for Romania: if Romania did express a free choice, then has Romania made the best choice?*

**Keywords:** *Alliance Theory; geopolitics; nuclear weapons; missile shield.*

When interests and ambitions are conflicting, the absence of the crisis is more alarming than its presence. The Cold War brought about more relaxed relations between the United States and Russia, but Washington and Moscow remain in opposing positions. Balance of terror turned into balance of threat, states are now “free” to choose between alignment and balancing. Freedom is directly proportional to the order and the anarchy of international society. Romania had the “freedom” to choose the alignment, but in terms of geopolitics the problem deepens once the location of the missile shield had been decided for Romania: if Romania did express a free choice, then has Romania made the best choice?

## **Alliance Theory and Geopolitics**

The experience of WWII, the bipolarity and the increasing capacity of conventional weapons make the Third World War to be more difficult to start than any previous war, the presence of nuclear weapons dramatically emphasizing this aspect. Nuclear weapons distort conventional causes of war. Wars may be fought against nuclear weapons, but the higher the stakes and the more a country will be close to winning the war, the more certain retaliation and risks of self-destruction are. (Waltz, 1988: 625)

In a conventional world, if two countries go into a state of war, both are committed to the idea of winning the war, and if they lose, the results of failure will be tolerated. August 1945 - Hiroshima and Nagasaki - was a new twist in international

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relations. The fear turned into terror war, mankind has known new generation of weapons, of apocalyptic dimensions.

In 1985, Stephen Walt raised the question “When do states enter into alliances and what exactly determines their choice for one ally or another?” (Walt, 1985: 3-43) More precisely, the states tend to balance against greater powers through an alliance against them, or even better, they tend to bandwagon, by choosing an alliance with the most powerful or with the most threatening of these states? The neo-realist school sees the states mainly preoccupied with their own security. Stephen Walt asks “Security against what?” In essence, he states that the states look for security against danger rather than against power. Power in itself is neutral; it has consequences that can be either favourable or destructive. Not all powers are threatening and this is exactly what makes the distinction between power and danger. The coalitions that defeated Germany in World Wars I and II “were vastly superior in total resources, but united by their common recognition that German expansionism posed the greater danger” (Walt, 1985: 3-43).

The level of threat, according to Stephen Walt, is given by 4 factors:

- General capabilities,
- Proximity,
- Offensive (vs. Defensive) capability *and*
- Perceived intentions.

The state that poses the greatest threat is not necessarily the most powerful state in the system. Balance of threat theory is superior to balance of power theory because we get greater explanatory power with no loss of parsimony. Balance of threat theory explains why a more powerful coalition would form in response to a threatening coalition (because the new coalition is balancing threat, not merely power) and why alliances form, not response to shifts in the global balance of power, but in response to regional threats. Balance of threat also explains alliance choices when potential allies are roughly equal in power.

Neighboring states are perceived as more threatening (dangerous) than the remote ones. States with great offensive capabilities (translated into the ability to threaten the sovereignty of other countries) are a bigger threat than states with defensive-oriented capabilities. States with aggressive intentions represent a greater threat than those who only seek to retain their *status quo*. If the tendency to balance is normal, then an augmentation of any of these factors - power, proximity, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions - should encourage other countries to ally against the threatening power.

*“It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.”*

– National Missile Defense  
Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-38)

When the U.S. President Barack Obama announced that the United States give up missile shield in Europe he caused general amazement.<sup>1</sup> The anti missile shield<sup>2</sup>, one of

<sup>1</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6720153.stm>, last accessed on 06.10.2014

<sup>2</sup> <http://dexonline.ro/definitie/antirachetă>, last accessed on 07.10.2014

the major American defense projects of the Republican administration of George W. Bush would have been placed in the Czech Republic and Poland.

Subsequently, the Democratic administration said they would develop another missile defense system, and President Traian Basescu announced that the U.S. President Barack Obama invited Romania to participate in the development of missile defense, saying that the president is talking about setting its components in our country.<sup>3</sup>

CSAT<sup>4</sup> accepted the invitation, but gave no further details about this program. U.S. already have a military base in Romania, the Kogalniceanu Airport in Constanta.

After the former missile defense system, covering the Czech Republic and Poland, has been canceled, Romania is now invited to participate in a new version. What it entails:

From the technical point of view, it means only another missile system, somewhat larger than the classical anti-aircraft missiles.

It works on the same principle: when the radar detects the target missile interceptor is launched and guided to destroy the target. This time not by explosion but by physical impact.



To a usual surface-air missile, there are other differences. The SM-3 anti-ballistic missile is more expensive (about \$ 10 million for a single projectile) has a radius of action of 500 miles and top speed of about 10,000 km / hour, i.e. nine times the speed of sound.<sup>5</sup>

In tactical terms, the nowadays missile systems are not designed as a counterweight to the threat of nuclear war. They can destroy much of the threat, but even 10% of the intercontinental missiles of Russia and the U.S. can turn off the light permanently if able to reach their targets.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.zf.ro/zf-24/americanii-fac-scut-antiracheta-in-romania-5474961/>, last accessed on 07.10.2014

<sup>4</sup> The Supreme Council of National Defence (Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Țării; acronym: CSAT), last accessed on 01.11.2014

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/sm-3/>, last accessed on 01.11.2014

However, the interception systems can effectively counter small and medium threats - impenetrable to negotiations - the size of Iran and North Korea.<sup>6</sup>

The continental U.S. is still somehow geographical safe from these threats. For many of the other areas of interest exposed there is naval protection (basically, the SM-3 missile was originally designed for the naval AEGIS system<sup>7</sup>). But the Eastern European is exactly the limit of range of Iranian ballistic missiles.<sup>8</sup>

From the political point of view, proximity to Russia raises a sensitive issue.

In 7 February 2011, Agerpress writes: "the missile defense system, designed by the U.S. to be deployed in Europe, is directed against the Russian missiles and it might undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent forces, said Deputy Defence Minister, General Anatoly Antonov, Monday in a press conference in Moscow, quoted by Interfax."<sup>9</sup>

In this sense, Russia has again warned by the voice of the Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov that they will correlate the enforcement of the new START nuclear disarmament treaty to further American plans to place a missile shield in Europe.<sup>10</sup>

In this case, Moscow would react, taking also military-technical measures, suggested the representative of Russian diplomacy, emphasizing the interdependence between offensive and defensive weapons is legally binding under the new START.<sup>11</sup>

He said that this interdependence is mentioned in the preamble of the document and that it is a key element for Moscow, pointing out that this is the very reason why the conclusion of the treaty was possible. Moreover, Russia does not see an 'urgent need' to make public data on the number of its strategic offensive arms.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to what Ryabkov said, the Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov stated that the data regarding the strategic arsenal to be transmitted between Russia and the U.S., according to the new START Treaty, are confidential and may be disclosed only with the prior consent of the parties.

As the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry specified, the parties are required to make such a data exchange within 45 days after entry into force of the new START, but stressed that it is not to declassify any information. Much of this data is already provided to the American partners, in accordance with existing agreements, said Sergei Ryabkov.

Given that a number of problems remain in suspense, Russia believes it is premature to negotiate with the United States to reduce tactical nuclear weapons - said the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister.

Earlier, the U.S. President Barack Obama stated that his administration hopes to begin negotiations with Russia on this issue no later than one year after the entry into

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<sup>6</sup> [http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/space/sm3\\_2b/](http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-space/space/sm3_2b/), last accessed on 01.11.2014

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/aegis-ballistic-missile-defence-bmd-us/>, last accessed on 06.10.2014

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.riscograma.ro/1843/la-ce-foloseste-scutul-anti-racheta-3-abordari/>, last accessed on 01.11.2014

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.agerpres.ro/media/index.php/international/item/50409-Moscova-a-decis-Scutul-antiracheta-al-SUA-este-indreptat-impotriva-rachetelor-Rusiei.html> last accessed on 06.10.2014

<sup>10</sup> [http://en.rian.ru/trend/missile\\_shield\\_europe/](http://en.rian.ru/trend/missile_shield_europe/), last accessed on 06.10.2014

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-says-arms-control-talks-held-up-by-us-missile-shield-plan/>, last accessed on 06.10.2014

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Contentnavigation/Library/Libraryoverview/tabid/1299/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/3409/Russian-antimissile-shield-position-unchanged.aspx>, last accessed on 06.10.2014

force of the new START. “We are evading these discussions” said in reply<sup>13</sup> the Russian diplomat, indicating that the problem mentioned can not be examined separately from the missile shield, the imbalance in terms of conventional weapons, the placement of weapons in space etc.

The new Russian-American treaty START for nuclear disarmament, signed on 8 April 2010 in Prague, came into effect on Saturday, 5 February, with the exchange of instruments of ratification between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. State Department Chief Hillary Clinton”, as announced by AGERPRES<sup>14</sup>.

Along with Russia, they spoke about Iran. Placing a shield would target missile defense against an attack from Iran. Iran is a sufficiently intelligent nation to be able to understand that it is not the time to use WMDs” argues Fareed Zakharia<sup>15</sup>.

Important for Iran is not even owning nuclear weapons and missiles to carry them to the target. It matters only the technological capacity to be able to build them quickly. That would maintain internally an aura of power of the Islamic regime.

Just as important for NATO is the ability to convey the message that the alliance is invulnerable to any attack.

### **Recap: What does America do? What does Russia believe?**

When the Bush administration agreed with the Czech Republic and Poland about the location of elements of the missile shield - a radar in the former country and interceptor missiles in the latter - Russia felt directly threatened, arguing that the location - in its immediate vicinity - destroys their global strategic balance. Moscow said that the radar would spy on her moves and the interceptor missiles could have nuclear warheads.

Moreover, Russia has considered the United States intent to humiliate her by placing the shield within one of her former area of influence (in the former Warsaw Pact countries) and the move might restart a new arms race of the Cold War type. Despite all the assurances that the shield would protect against Iranian missiles - an argument that has not satisfied Russia who considered more relevant for the location of these systems to be in Turkey, not in Poland or the Czech Republic - Russians decided to move to threats and announced that will deploy missiles in Kaliningrad, in their enclave in the heart of Europe.

At one time, Moscow threatened to bomb the U.S. military bases on the territory of the two countries, where the shield elements would be placed. Russia’s bellicose rhetoric is intended to make Europeans nervous, the Pentagon said, convinced that the threats will not be carried out. Such threats did not have the expected result, and Bush administration continued their established plan.

Under these circumstances, the Russians changed tactics and proposed the U.S. at the G8 summit in Germany, in 2007, to work together, and offered an alternative: instead of locating the shield in the Czech Republic and Poland to use an interception station (a radar), a Russian one for that matter, located in Azerbaijan. Americans demanded access to Russian facilities, and talks stalled. Discussion about missile defense must be considered in the context of Russian-American disarmament treaties, START and Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty - Anti-Balistic Missile Treaty).

<sup>13</sup> <http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2013-08-12/mounting-tensions-between-us-and-russia>, last accessed on 06.10.2014

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.agerpres.ro/media/index.php/international/item/50409-Moscova-a-decis-Scutul-antiracheta-al-SUA-este-indreptat-impotriva-rachetelor-Rusiei.html>, last accessed on 02.11.2014

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/05/22/they-may-not-want-the-bomb.html>, last accessed on 02.11.2014

In 2002, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the treaty, dating back to 1972, wishing to be able to build the missile shield, an idea to which the Russians vehemently opposed. Americans argued that they wished to protect themselves from possible attacks by terrorist states. A day after the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Russians withdrew from START II treaty, agreement that expired at the end of 2009.

### **Missile Shield in Romania, following a reset of American-Russian relations**

The change in the Washington's administration revealed first conciliatory signs from Russia. Obama announced in a campaign that America would rethink the missile shield, and when he took office, Russia announced that she will no longer place missiles in Kaliningrad. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said he was "moderately optimistic" on relaunching US-Russia relations and the first meeting of the two presidents Medvedev and Obama was eagerly awaited.

It was held in April 2009 in London, before the G20 summit. They discussed about starting negotiations on a new arms control treaty that would replace START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which was to expire at the end of the year. Visiting Moscow in June 2009, Barack Obama spoke about a reset of relations between the two countries.

Moreover, he stressed that the future belongs to those who gather armies and launching missiles and Russia proposed joint efforts to halt nuclear proliferation. Discussions, negotiations on START agreement became prime objective and the desire to make and reheat symbolic relations between the U.S. and Russia. However, negotiations have proved more complicated than expected the two sides, and Moscow considers this reset relations more American rhetoric.

Their condition for the START treaty was quitting negotiations relating to the missile shield project, so defiant on the part of Bush administration, after all, with respect to Moscow's concerns. The September announcement of the Obama administration's waiver of the missile shield project initially pleasantly surprised Kremlin, who saw in this the first sign of resetting their relations. Even if there are issues concerning the new configuration of the shield to be discussed, none of them worries Moscow to the extent that the old project used to.

However, this attitude might change if Russia will have the impression that the U.S. can get the first attack capabilities against Russia. Obama has been harshly criticized by his opponents from home and European countries accused of succumbing to pressure from Russia. Some were disappointed, of course, the Czech Republic and Poland, who felt abandoned and have argued that America now has other areas of interest, definitely not in Central and Eastern Europe.

The tour within this area of the U.S. vice-President Joe Biden aimed at quieting these countries and to reaffirm their status as partners of the U.S. Moscow, however, appears to be relatively quiet, fact that explains their reaction to placing ground-based interceptors planned to happen in Romania in 2015. Talks on START agreement intensified in late 2009, the two presidents wishing to sign their names on the new treaty before the end of the year, which was not possible.

In January 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev said that the agreement is 95% completed, the negotiations were to be resumed shortly. In July 2010, Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama established the goal of bringing down the number of nuclear warheads in the period 1500-1675 for each of the two former Cold War enemies,

and the number of vectors able to carry between 500 and 1,100.<sup>16</sup> As it is easily understandable, in its much broader context, the negotiations were held on several levels and each party had something to gain and each party had to make concessions. The location of the missile shield in Romania is a concession made by Russia after Lavrov's reaction. A concession that confirms to Romania the status and the geostrategic relevance in the area. The Russians must have statements of opposition to this idea, but in reality, even analysts in Moscow said that the decision was made by mutual agreement between Russia and the U.S.<sup>17</sup>

Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, said that the U.S. have not promise to inform Russia on missile shield development actions and transmits to the two administrations - which had ensured that the shield elements in Romania are not directed against Moscow – that it reflects the Freudian theory: you must have thoughts on a possible target in Russia, otherwise why would all not but assure that they were not launch an attack. Reconfirmation of the strategic partner status of U.S., protection against possible missile threats and bargaining power with Russia are the main advantages of locating the missile shield in Romania.

It is proof that we are in the game, especially in regional play, which is important in the context in which Romania has strong competitors in the region, and aspiration to play a prominent role.

### **Bush's shield vs. Obama's shield**

The project initially aimed at defense against long-range missiles while - along with threats reconsidered - new project aims to defend against medium-range missiles.

Bush's shield did not fully cover the territory of Romania, south and east remaining vulnerable. The new shield covers the entire territory. The old one provided the location of a radar system in the Czech Republic and 10 interceptor long range missile in Poland until 2013. The new system based on mobile elements would involve locating until 2015, in the Czech Republic and Poland, of SM-3 missiles, designed to destroy the short and medium range ballistic missiles.

Under the new plan, the U.S. ships would be stationed aboard SM-3 interceptors in the Mediterranean in 2011 and mobile SM-3 interceptors on land, in Central Europe, and in Romania implicitly, 2015.<sup>18</sup>

The projects for the U.S. missile shield have four phases. In the first phase, scheduled for 2011, will be unfolding missile defense systems currently existing and proven capacity, including maritime Aegis Weapon System, the SM-3 Block IA interceptors and sensors, and transportable radar surveillance system AN / TPY -2, to address regional ballistic missile threats as to the Europe and U.S. troops on the continent.

The second phase provides for the year 2015, after appropriate testing to occur unfolding of an improved SM-3 Block 1B interceptors, both in configuration land and sea, of sensor performance, the aim being to extend the apparatus against possible attacks with short or medium range missiles action.

In the third stage, for the year 2018 after the closure of research, development and testing, will be conducting advanced interceptor SM-3 Block 2A, a variant currently under

<sup>16</sup> <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/03/white-house-kremlin-claim-start-ii-treaty-imminent/>, last accessed on 02.11.2014

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start2>, last accessed on 06.10.2014

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-opinii-6880698-scutul-antiracheta-cum-trecut-rusia-amenintarea-amplasarea-rachete-kaliningrad-cererea-explicatii-exhaustive.htm>, last accessed on 06.10.2014

development. This move will allow the threats to short-range missiles, medium and intermediate missiles.

The fourth phase, foreseen for 2020, states that after the closure of research, development and testing, to make the deployment of interceptor advanced SM-3 Block 2B. This move will improve the ability to counter attacks and intermediate range missiles, but also a potential threat to the U.S. with an intercontinental missile attack.

The SM-3 has been successfully tested 8 times since 2007. (Mediafax<sup>19</sup>) Barack Obama congratulates Romania, December 1: “We appreciate the key role played by Romania in developing the new Strategic Concept”.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, Romania has officially joined the big-league dance.

### **Instead of conclusions**

It is rather impossible to draw stern conclusions nowadays, in view of the ever changing dynamics of the international politics. It has to be admitted that there is order in the anarchy of the international system and that we do live in a global village. Whose voice is heard better and whose voice tries to speak the loudest, or who cries wolf first, it all depends on the moment and on the geometry of the space. In the end, we all have to give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar.

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<sup>19</sup> <http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/mae-in-scutul-antiracheta-romania-va-gazdui-exclusiv-terestru-rachete-de-interceptare-5490237>, last accessed on 06.10.2014

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/11/152046.htm>, last accessed on 06.10.2014

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## **V. Events**



## **“MIGRATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OF MINORITIES” - THE INTERNATIONAL JEAN MONNET CONFERENCE**

Between the 6th – 9th of November 2014 the Department of International Relations and European Studies within the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences, University of Oradea organized an international conference entitled “*Migration and European Integration of Minorities*”.

The scientific event represented one of the main activities of the Jean Monnet project, entitled “*Migration and European Integration of Minorities at the Eastern Border of the European Union*” coordinated by Lector univ.dr. Polgár István, member of the Department of International Relations and European Studies.


The opening ceremony was held at the Library of the University of Oradea in the 7th of November 2014, Friday starting from 10am.



The plenary session of the conference was organised also at the Library of the University of Oradea. During the plenary session the audience of the conference had the possibility to attend the presentations of Prof.univ dr. Süli Zakar István, from the University of Debrecen, Prof.univ.dr. Anatoliy Kruglashov, from the University Yuriy Fedkovych from Cernivtsi, Prof.univ.dr Vasile Cucerescu from Chişinău (president of ECSA Rep. Moldova) and Prof.univ.dr Ioan Horga, the dean the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences

After the plenary session the conference schedule was divided in three workshops.

Workshop number 1, entitled *Minority and Majority in the Eastern European Area* was organised in the campus II of the University of Oradea, Y building, Albert Barker room. The main topic of the presentations were related to the relations between minority and majority in Central and Eastern Europe.



Workshop number 2 entitled *The Phenomenon of Migration in Europe. Migration and integration of immigrants in the EU* was organised in the Council room of the University of Oradea. Presentations and discussion were focused on the phenomenon of migration and on the process of integration of the immigrants.

Workshop number 3 entitled, *Managing Interethnic Relations and Community Security* was organised in the campus II of the University of Oradea, V building, Barbu Ștefănescu room of the University of Oradea. Was organised in the campus II of the University of Oradea, in the V building, room Barbu Ștefănescu. The main topic of the workshop was related to the management of inter-ethnic relations.

In the 8th of November 2014, Saturday a workshop for young researchers, local and foreign Ph.D students was organised at the University of Oradea. The presentations of the MA and Ph.D students were related to the process of migration and the problems in the integration of the minorities.

The conference ended with an organised visit to churches of various confessions from Oradea.

## **VI. Honoured Personality**



# LAUDATIO

## ***Honouring Professor Maria Manuela de Bastos Tavares Ribeiro, PhD on the Occasion of Awarding the Title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Oradea***

The appreciation, which the University of Oradea has enjoyed recently is a result of the well-deserved effort that our academic community has constantly applied for affirmation on multiple fronts in the national and international academic medium.

Today, our university is highly honored to be able to express its gratitude and appreciation towards an important personality of the University of Coimbra, Portugal. We are certainly referring to the distinguished Professor Maria Manuela de Bastos Tavares Ribeiro, PhD, to whom we dedicate this scientific event by awarding her the title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Oradea.



Awarding the highest distinction of the Senate of the University of Oradea represents an explicit acknowledgement of our laureate's professional and academic value and international scientific prestige, which have come as a result of a career dedicated to teaching activities, research and advanced studies in the field of contemporary history and European studies.

\* \* \*

In this context, in the name of our entire academic community, please allow me to detail some biographical references of Madam Professor's career.

Madam Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro graduated from the Faculty of Letters and Arts at the University of Coimbra in 1974 and was granted the title of Doctor in History in 1988. Madam Professor received the *Solemn Doctoral* in 14 November 1993, at the University of Coimbra, where she was named Full Professor in Contemporary History at the Faculty of Letters and Arts, University of Coimbra, since 2006.

As for her official charges, she has been:

- Scientific Coordinator of Centro de Estudos Interdisciplinares do Século XX da Universidade de Coimbra - CEIS20, Coimbra, Portugal (2007-2011).
- Coordinator of the research group *Europeísmo, Atlanticidade e Mundialização* – CEIS20 – since 1998
- Director of the Master *Estudos sobre a Europa. Europa – as visões do “outro”* – Faculty of Letters and Arts, University of Coimbra, since 2002
- Director of the PhD Studies in *European Studies* - Faculty of Letters and Arts, University of Coimbra, 2010-2012
- Director of the PhD Studies in *Contemporary Studies*, CEIS20, 2011-2014
- National Coordinator and Member of the Scientific Commission of the Master in European Studies entitled *The Process of Building Europe*, coordinated by Professor Ariane Landuyt of the University of Siena with 16 University partners:

Salamanca, Coimbra, Strasbourg III (Robert Schuman), Krakow (Jagiellonski), Athens (Pantheon), Hannover, Oradea, Montpellier 1, Bologna-Forlì, Azores, Concepción (Chile), Institut Marie Haps (Brussels), Maribor, Siegen and CRIE, Europe Direct de Forlì, CVCE (Luxembourg).

Madam Professor is a member of several scientific committees: on the editorial board of several journals, such as *Revista de História das Ideias, População e Sociedade – CEPESE, Estudos do Século XX, Ler História, Eurolimes, Estudos Europeos, Revista de História da Sociedade e da Cultura, Revista Portuguesa de História, Gazeta, Societat Catalana de Comunicació, Institut d'Estudis Catalans, Debater a Europa, The Romanian Journal of International Relations and European Studies, ARRISE, Pôle Sud - Revue de Science Politique.*

She is an associated member of numerous institutions: Academy of Sciences of Lisbon, Portuguese Academy of History in Lisbon, International Academy of Portuguese Culture, Iberian Studies Center, European Community Studies Association and Contemporary History Network, International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions – ICHRPI.

Chief editor of *Estudos do Seculo XX* journal – CEIS20, 2004-2014.

Director of the collection *Estudos sobre a Europa* (2002-2014, 10 volumes, Coimbra, CEIS20/Almedina).

Director of the collection *História Contemporânea* (2009-2014, 8 volumes, Coimbra CEIS20/Imprensa da Universidade).

Chairman of the Scientific Commission of the Department of History European Studies, Archeology and Arts (2007-2009).

Coordinator of the Scientific Projects - *Portugal e a Integração Europeia and Intelectuais e a Ideia de Europa* – CEIS20.

Member of the Scientific Projects - *Les idées d'Europe* – Network in European Studies – SENT – Erasmus Thematic Network Project, 2007-2010; *Initiative and Constraint in the Mapping of Evolving European Borders*, coordinated by prof. Ioan Horga at the University of Oradea – 2011-2013, as a European network comprised of 17 partners from 14 countries.

Scientific Coordinator of numerous (more than 100) Seminars, Intensive Programs, Congresses.

Visiting Professor of several universities, namely Siena, Salamanca, Montpellier 1, Strasbourg, Krakow, Budapest, Oradea, Athens, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Porto Alegre, Brasília, Paris VIII, Azores.

Supervisor and member of juries of Master and PhD programmes from Portugal and other foreign universities (Hannover, Hamburgo, Göttingen, Roma, Siena, Oradea, Paris, Salamanca, Valladolid, Granada, Porto Alegre, Granada, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo).

Main interests of scientific research: history of ideas, cultural history, history of the idea of Europe, history of the process of building Europe.

She has published several articles and books on the History of European Integration in Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, French, Greek, Russian and English (Assembleia da República, Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Almedina, Quarteto, Routledge, Il Mulino, L'Harmattan, Sedes (Paris), Ashgate Publishing Ltd., USP, PUCRGS).

Since 1988, she has been a Lecturer in several universities from countries such as the USA, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Great Britain, Poland, Romania and Russia.

Since 1980, she has attended conferences dedicated, among others, to the following themes: *Nationalism, Patriotism and Europeanism; A paz difícil: os movimentos pacifistas na I.ª*

*metade do século XX; Paz e Pacifismos no período entre Guerras, Modernidade e Tradição. Economia, Sociedade e Inovação no Mundo Contemporâneo, Europe/Occident – Répresentations et discours; Renovação da reflexão sobre a Europa – séculos XX-XXI; Internacionalização e politização do campo intelectual na Europa – século XX; Political and cultural problems of the Euroatlantic security system; Portugal y las Comunidades Europeas.*

In the field of History and European Studies, Madam Professor teaches: *União Europeia, História da Europa Contemporânea, História da Unificação Europeia.*

At PhD and Master levels, she teaches, among others, the following seminars: *Génese e Evolução da Ideia de Europa, Identidades e Tensões no Espaço Europeu, O Ocidente e os “Outros”, Territórios, Poderes e Instituições 3, Federalismo e Regionalismo, Temas de História Contemporânea de Portugal, Políticas e Ideologias, Instituições e Redes de Poder 3.*

**Madam Tavares Ribeiro has published numerous books, collective volumes and articles, out of which we mention the following:**

- *Portugal e a Revolução de 1848*, Coleção Minerva – História, dir. por Luís Reis Torgal, Coimbra, Livraria Minerva, 1990, 572 p. (dissertação de doutoramento apresentada em 1988).
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- “Régions, régionsculturelles, fédération”, in *Autonomie régionale et relations internationales*, coord. Carlos E. Pacheco Amaral, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2011, pp. 313-316.
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- “Salazar e la sua idea d’Europa: anticomunista e antidemocrática”, in Giuliana Laschi (coord.), *Memoria d’Europa. Riflessioni su dittature, autoritarismo, bonapartismo e svolte democratiche*, Franco Angeli, Milano 2012, pp. 37-52 e “Discours d’António de Oliveira Salazar”, pp. 216-229.
- “As imagens do Parlamento em Portugal (1870-1926): literatura, iconografia e política”, in *Das Urnas ao Hemiciclo. Eleições e Parlamento em Portugal (1878-1926) e Espanha (1875-1923)*, coord. de Pedro Tavares de Almeida and J. Moreno Luzón, Lisboa, Assembleia da República, 2012, pp. 165-192 (with Paulo Silveira e Sousa).
- “L’ouverture de l’espace de l’Europe pour les intellectuels portugais au début du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle: l’Europe en crise et l’idéalisaton du futur”, in *Construire l’espace politique européen. Historiographies, politiques et territoires*, coord. By Ariane Landuyt e Denis Rolland, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2013, pp. 91-98.
- “Ideas of Europe - Portugal and Spain”, coord. By Ariane Landuyt, Firenze, Il Mulino, 2013 (in press), “Europe/Occident – représentations et discours”, coord. Of Ariane Landuyt, Firenze, Il Mulino, 2013 (in press).
- “Le processus d’européanisation et les transformations sociaux – le cas portugais”, coord. By Ariane Landuyt, Firenze, Il Mulino, 2013 (in press).

With a special inclination to knowledge and with an openness to collaboration, Madam Professor Maria Manuela de Bastos Tavares Ribeiro is a person who easily cultivates intellectual friendships. Madam Professor has collaborated with our university, and especially with the Department of International Relations and European Studies, for 14 years. In 2002 a collaboration agreement was signed between the University of Coimbra and the University of Oradea, as one of the first European partnerships obtained by our university. Starting from that moment, Madam Professor has constantly been on our side in different European projects, on the occasion of which she has promoted and supported our university. Among all projects, we mention the following:

- Honorary member of the *Eurolimes* review
- Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Group, *Initiative and Constraint in the Mapping of Evolving European Borders*, a project developed by a network of 17 partners from 14 different countries, with the University of Oradea as a coordinator
- Jean Monnet Module, “*Cultural Diplomacy at the East and West Borders of the European Union – an Essential Element in the Process of European Integration*”, also initiated by the University of Oradea

We consider that these personal accomplishments and the fact that Madam Professor is one of the promoters of European Studies, as well as a constant supporter of the integration of the University of Oradea in European networks of institutions of higher education, whose activities regard the issues of EU accession and European integration, fully justify the awarding of the honorary title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Oradea.

Oradea, May 23rd, 2014  
 Prof.univ.dr. Ioan Horga

## **VII. Book Reviews**



# FRAMING THE EUROPEAN STUDIES IN THE ACADEMIC CURRICULA

*Cristina MATIUȚA*\*


*Teaching and Learning the European Union. Traditional and Innovative Methods*, edited by Stefania Baroncelli, Roberto Farneti, Ioan Horga, Sophie Vanhoonacker, Springer, 2014, ISBN 978-94-007-7042-3

The growing importance of the European Union in both national and international politics has led to an increased interest of researchers to study its institutions, their functioning mechanisms and the governance beyond the unitary state. The European Studies have become a part of the university curricula, being taught at Bachelor, Master and doctoral level programmes in various fields as Law, Economics, Political Science, International Relations, History, Sociology, Cultural Studies and others.

The book *Teaching and Learning the European Union. Traditional and Innovative Methods*, edited by Stefania Baroncelli, Roberto Farneti, Ioan Horga and Sophie Vanhoonacker examines the changes of the European educational system and the challenges facing it, looks into curricula where the EU is taught and analysis the needs in the field of the European Studies, the methodologies used and the innovative teaching methods. The volume is part of an ambitious project, *Network of European Studies (SENT)*, whose main goal was to achieve a comprehensive picture of the evolution of the European Studies over the last decades in different disciplines and countries. Coordinated by Prof. Federiga Bindi from the University of Rome "Tor Vergata" and generously supported by the European Commission, the results of the SENT network have materialized in a series of volumes among which this one.

The book is structured in three parts, that explore different aspects of teaching and learning in the field of European Studies, based on contributors own' experiences and academic research. The first part- *European Studies: Contexts and Challenges*- comprises five chapters, dealing with diverse issues as civic education or multilingual teaching and paying special attention to the issue of professional education.

Thus, the opening chapter, *Shaping the New Professional for the New Professions* (by Wim H. Gijssels, Amber Dailey-Hebert and Alexandra C. Niculescu), looks at the European Studies from the perspective of professional education. The key problems are examined here: how to assure adequate professional learning to prepare graduates for new professions, how to help them to internalize the importance of values and ethics in professional behavior, how to build strong connections between theory and professional practice. The examples provided by established professions such as business and medicine



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in preparing students for professional practice and guiding learners on how to deal with continuous change in practice can be useful for new professions like EU specialists.

The second chapter, by David Bearfield, director of the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), presents the European Union's Human Resources Selection System. A new competition model, differentiated and adapted, in terms of content and difficulty level, to the type of selection and profile, was put into practice, offering better service to both candidates and Institutional stakeholders.

In the next chapter, Gretchen J. Van Dyke focuses on education for EU citizenship and civic engagement through active learning. She reviews the EU strategies and programming to support active citizenship, finding similarities to those undertaken in American context to reengage citizens and encourage a greater sense of political efficacy through civic education. The statistical trends of disengagement and its negative effects for the health of democracy are comparable either in the European and American realm, so the educators at various levels, especially those in such disciplines as European Studies and Political Science, have the duty to structure classroom learning to support the goal of active citizenship and lifelong civic engagement. The active learning techniques (as in-class debates on current questions at the EU policy level, simulations for understanding the policy making process, traveling to EU institutions, inviting EU officials/experts/activists as guest speakers, looking for EU grant opportunities etc.) may be a key for developing civic skills, for fostering the European identity and a greater sense of European citizenship among European students.

The last two chapters of this first section explore two different topics: the role of linguistic diversity in shaping EU public sphere and the social and cultural implications of circulating human capital within the EU. Rita Franceschini and Daniela Veronesi analyze the multilingual policies and practices in higher education, meant to offer a space for communicating as Europeans. Given the establishment of a European higher education and research area, including students' mobility, the changes in job profile and the increasing mobility between jobs, the globalization process and the rampant developments in ICT, the universities are asked to promote the multilingual education. The case study presented here, on the trilingual Free University of Bozen-Bolzano in the northern Italy, is an example of good practice in preparing students for operating in a multilingual and multicultural Europe. In the chapter about the EU study tour and internship programme for Canadian students, Eduard M. Lavallo and Alexandre Berlin enter inside the EU institutions and analyze the opportunity for students to complement their academic courses with an integrated experience in the European organizations, working with the representatives of these organizations, exchanging point of views with practitioners, acquiring thus a better understanding of EU and initiating them into the new EU professions.

The second part of the book, *Mapping Innovations in Teaching and Learning*, comprising three chapters, presents the results of an extensive empirical research conducted through European Studies Network (SENT) and Jean Monnet Programme Network. The survey included more than 2000 EU courses on traditional EU studies disciplines (Economics, History, Legal Studies, Political and Administrative Sciences) and more recent ones (Intercultural Dialogue Studies, International Relations Studies) in 30 different European countries (the 27 EU member states, plus Iceland, Norway and Turkey). Based on this research, the first chapter, by Stefania Baroncelli, Fabio Fonti and Gordana Stevancevic, focuses on the extent to which the innovative pedagogical methods (as teamwork, field-work, special expert sessions, simulations, learning games, project-based learning, role-plays, distance learning, peer tutoring, internships, students'

volunteering, exchange programmes) and the innovative tools (as the use of Internet, educational software, movies, e-learning and social networks) are used in European Studies. The authors explore also the link between the use of new methodologies and demographic and personal background of the lecturers involved, concluding that teaching in European Studies relies mostly on tenured professors, who have lots of experience on the subject, but there is a long way to go especially in the terms of diversification the teaching tools. In the next chapter, Fabio Fonti and GordanaStevancevic goes forward examining which characteristics of European Studies lecturers and classes correlate with teaching innovation, focusing on three teaching methods: internships, distance learning and exchange programmes. They found that Jean Monnet lecturers who teach larger classes seem to be more inclined to implement more innovative teaching methods, but there are still barriers to their implementation, mostly associated with the stability of professors' academic position and the amount of their teaching experience. The last chapter of this section, by StefaniaBaroncelli, deals with linguistic pluralism in European Studies. According to the survey, only one third of EU Study courses included in the sample are taught in English, while two thirds are held in the domestic language of the country in question, despite the EU's commitment to linguistic pluralism. The author argues for a more proactive approach taken by the EU through its programmes as Jean Monnet to promote English and other EU languages in teaching, especially those which are more widespread within the EU.

The last section of the book, *Innovative Teaching and Learning in European Studies*, includes five chapters which present several case studies on the use of innovative teaching methods and tools, exploring both their strengths and weakness. The first one, by Rebecca Jones and Peter Bursens, deals with the use of simulations as a learning tool, presenting the case study of EuroSim, a cross-national simulation of the decision-making processes of the EU, organized by the Trans-Atlantic Consortium for European Union Studies and Simulations on a yearly basis. By conducting pre and post-simulation surveys, the authors test the efficacy of this teaching tool, concluding that simulation develop the critical and analytical thinking skills, enhance knowledge and promote affective learning (involving the emotional sphere in the learning process) along with cognitive learning. In the second chapter, Natalia Timus, using a case study of a master course taught at Maastricht University, examines the distance learning as an alternative method of teaching European Studies, able to incorporate a variety of theoretical frameworks and practical experiences and to make the learning process more accessible. Heidi Maurer and Christine Neuhold explore the problem-based learning (PBL), a teaching approach used in the domain of medical studies, nursing and law and more recently in the field of social sciences. The method is structured around students' activity in terms of formulating the learning objectives and organizing their learning process, the role of the academic staff being not to teach but to facilitate the learning process and to support students in their knowledge construction. Using a case-study from the Maastricht University, a pioneer in applying PBL, the authors consider this approach as a very intensive instruction model, asking for well-equipped administrative support and assignments regularly reviewed. Another approach, blended learning, examined by Alexandra Mihai in the next chapter, involves the idea of various teaching methods and learning styles, combining the e-learning tool of E-modules with face-to-face training sessions and webinars. This mix of methods implies a departure from traditional learning and needs a clear organisation for ensuring that the various educational activities are pursued coherently. Blended learning could be a suitable approach for the European Studies, being the multifaceted nature and the multidisciplinary character of this field. The last chapter, by Roberto Farneti, Irene

Bianchi, TanjaMayrgündter and Johannes Niederhauser, deals with social networks as teaching tools, using a pilot project of an electronic forum in a political science class. The advantages of this tool are in building the social relationships, improving learning abilities, developing language and „teaming” skills and enhancing communication between students and educators. Social networks represent a way to develop new patterns of literacy in our daily democratic exchange, to reduce the gap between people and institutions, reasons for which became a very important tool in higher education.

As appears from this brief description of its content, the book represents undoubtedly a valuable contribution to improving the teaching methods and tools in the area of European Studies or connected areas facing similar challenges. By exploring various dimensions of teaching and learning processes and the challenges involved and bringing together the educational experiences in the field, the volume broadens our understanding on European Union Studies. It offers a platform for knowledge exchange and a foundation for designing programs for European Studies.

# EUROPEAN UNION BETWEEN MODERNISATION AND STAGNATION


*Anca OLTEAN*

**Review of:** *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, edited by Loredana Radu, Alina Bârgăoanu, and Nicoleta Corbu. București, Comunicare.ro, 2013. ISBN 978-973-711-479-2.

The volume edited by Loredana Radu, Alina Bârgăoanu and Nicoleta Corbu and entitled *The Crisis of the European Union* is divided in four sections: the crisis of the European Union, Perspectives on European identity, Perspectives on European citizenship, Perspectives on European Solidarity. The first section, focused on the economic crisis in the European Union, contains the papers of Gabriela Drăgan on EU economic governance and the paper of Loredana Radu, Mădălina Boțan, and Nicoleta Corbu on “core vs. periphery” of European Union. Gabriela Drăgan in the paper *EU Economic Governance between the Need for Reform and the Inertia of Status quo* points out that intergovernmentalism is at the basis of structure of European Union in times of crisis<sup>1</sup>.

The macroeconomics of the European Union, suggests the authors, imply the monetary policy and fiscal policy. The author raises the question “whether supranational or national policies dominate the policy – making process within the EU economic governance?”<sup>2</sup>, and underlines that in the evolution of EU, different policies were adopted. EU’s macroeconomic policies evolved asymmetrically because fiscal policies, shows Drăgan, are in the hands of national politics while monetary policy is supranational<sup>3</sup>. The second part of the paper focuses on EU economic governance and the monetary policy in EMU, the author starts the story of monetary policy of European Union with Bretton Woods System (1960) that was based on the dollar etalon and on fixed exchange rates. In 1971, the system from Bretton Woods failed and it is replaced after the Hague negotiations with EMS (European Monetary System).

This new system has ECU as etalon and was based on exchange rate mechanism of + - 2,2%, and was maintained until the foundation of EURO – AREA in 1999. The plans of Jacques Delors for European Monetary System lead to the Treaty of Maastricht, entered into force in 1993. Now there are established integration criteria: budget deficit – not higher than 3%, and public debt no higher than 60% of GDP. Concerning the fiscal governance in the EU/ EMU that ensures price stability and economic growth, in the opinion of the author, fiscal regulations operate both at national and supranational levels. The author focuses later on the reform of EU economic governance and starts by



<sup>1</sup> Gabriela Drăgan, “EU Economic Governance between the Need for Reform and the Inertia of Status Quo,” in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: comunicare.ro, 2013), 15.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 17.

describing the current state of EU, that is a state of economic crisis. EU elaborated mechanisms able to solve the existent crisis.

The second paper of Loredana Radu, Mădălina Boțan, and Nicoleta Corbu, entitled *The “Core vs. Periphery” Dichotomy Feeds Euroskepticism*<sup>4</sup>, starts with a brief introduction regarding the current situation in Europe, showing that the end of communism created new premises for countries from Central and Western Europe to integrate into the European Union. After several years of integration, point out the authors, Central and Eastern Europe is still less developed than the Western Europe regions. The solution of multispeed Europe should not be abandoned but approached with more responsibility. In the chapter “core” vs. “periphery”, the authors present the current crisis that started in 2008 and that is reflected in the financial and social struggle of Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain and also in the weakness of the European Monetary System<sup>5</sup>. Great expectations and unclear European goals are the grounds for Euroskepticism. The authors quote Taggard and Szczerbiak that distinguish between hard Euroskepticism that is opposed to European integration and soft Euroskepticism that is based on negative costs of European integration<sup>6</sup>, and approach too the problem of *Media and Euroskepticism*<sup>7</sup>. In the opinion of the three authors media are a generator of Euroskepticism that represents resistance to European integration. In the chapter *Euroskepticism and the Identity Question* the authors underline that the population from Eastern Europe would support EU if they will be rewarded with benefits and establish the methodology of the chosen subject and its research objectives. Pointing out that young people are usually less likely to involve in politics, the authors underline that among the young generation international issues, not the European ones, come first on the priority list. In Romania, there is a public formed by young generation with appetite for European issues which consider themselves both European and Romanians, underline the authors. In the end of their study, the authors conclude that it is an ideal love story between Romania and the European Union<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Loredana Radu et al., “The “Core vs. Periphery” Dichotomy Feeds Euroskepticism,” in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

<sup>5</sup> See the article of Luminița Șoproni and Ioan Horga, „The Economic Frontiers of Europe – Introduction,” in *EuroTimes 8, Europe and Economic Frontiers* (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2009), 5-6, when in times of the last European crisis, the authors are confident in future progress of European continent and progress of European governance: “Nowadays regions have become bridges between local and global models of economic progress, offering new opportunities for development strategies. The globalisation phenomenon turns frontiers more permeable and confirms the “vision” of Thomas Friedman, who argues that “the world is flat.” At least in the economic world, uniformity represents one of the aims of development” (Ibid., 5) (n.n. – uniformity read quality).

<sup>6</sup> See the article of Ioan Horga, „European Union between the Constraint of Borders and Global Competition,” in *European Union between the Constraint of the Borders and Global Competition* ed. Ioan Horga, Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu (Supplement of *EuroTimes*) (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea [Oradea University Press], 2011), 5, that takes into discussion different attitudes towards European Union existent in the context of European crisis: “The disfunctionalities between the EU member states within the crisis have fueled a lot of positions, from euro-skepticism, federalism to intergovernmentalism, but also severe critics addressed to the supranationalists, the constructivists and to the people supporting the integration theories, such as governance and policy networks”.

<sup>7</sup> Radu et al., 50.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 61.

The second section of the volume has the title *Perspectives on European Identity* and contains paper signed by Matej Makarovič, Tea Golob, Oana Ștefăniță, Denisa Oprea and Georgiana Udrea, Alaadin F. Paksoy, Corina Daba-Buzoianu, Gülgün Erdogan Tosun and Huriye Toker. The presented papers refer to the appeal and identification of European Union in time of crisis, the perception of EU by media and citizens, the absence of EU – related topics on the agenda of recent Romanian and Turkish protests. In the paper of Matej Makarovič and Tea Golob, *Identifying with the European Union in Times of Crisis*<sup>9</sup>, it is asserted that the crisis is actual and omnipresent. One of the reasons of the actual EU's crisis is considered the fact that EU is not based on a democratic system or in other words on "people's will"<sup>10</sup>. The authors contest the concept of European collective identity. The concept of "European people" to the European project would be important<sup>11</sup>. Another chapter is *The EU and Transnational Identification*, where European Union appears to be, in opinion of the authors, as an institutional construct. From the European project, several identities emerged<sup>12</sup>, but the concept of identification is preferred by the authors to the concept of identity: "Identifications with the EU should also be considered as resulting from dynamics on transnational and supranational level"<sup>13</sup>. Last but not least, the authors talk about identifications with the EU in times of crisis. So, in their opinion, when economic development is low, identification with EU is missing: "Our analysis also indicates a certain impact of the crisis on European citizenship. The crisis does not only limit the opportunities of the individuals to participate in the transnational social sphere (as people need certain resources to participate there) but also affects the general image of the EU and thus one's willingness to identify with it. The European layers of identifications in a marble cake are thus less intensive and leave space for other layers, which are more bounded into local or national environments. As demonstrated by our empirical analysis, the economic prosperity alone is not a sufficient factor for identifications with the EU to emerge but it is one of the most important conditions. On the other hand, the perceived lack of economic prosperity is a sufficient condition for the lack of European identifications"<sup>14</sup>. Another article for this section belongs to Oana Ștefăniță, Denisa Oprea, and Georgiana Udrea, and has the title *EU from Media to*

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<sup>9</sup> Matej Makarovič and Tea Golob, "Identifying with the European Union in Times of Crisis," in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.

<sup>11</sup> Dana Pantea in the book review *Building the European Identity* (book review of the work of Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, *European Identity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, ISBN 978-0-521-70953) published in *Eurolimes* 10, *The Geopolitics of the European Frontiers*, ed. Dorin I. Dolghi et al. (Oradea: University of Oradea Press, Autumn 2010), 195, talks about the concept of European identity that was the subject of a continuous change since the creation of the European Union structures: "We live in an epoch when globalisation deepens every day; communication brings people together helping to construct new political, economical and social structures. European Union has been expanding since its birth and there are candidate countries waiting for a positive answer to their request to accession. Under these circumstances the question of a European identity arises. But inside the European Union there are many cultures which we should also into consideration when talking about European identity. So who is the European today? Who feels to be European? It is a difficult question to answer because in the old Europe identity was in strong connection with territory, but starting with the European Steel and Coal Community the perspective upon identity has changed".

<sup>12</sup> Makarovič and Golob, 70.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

*Citizens. Building the European Identity*<sup>15</sup>. In a brief introduction, the authors state that, in times of crisis, people are more sensitive to the information provided by media, including in the field of European issues<sup>16</sup>. They define Europe's identity as a never-ending contested phenomenon. The Romanian citizens, when asked about their European identity, do not know what to say: their attachment to the European continent or to European Union. The authors introduce the concepts of "identity" and "collective identity". Identity appears in consequence "a multi-layered construction that defines who I am in relation to who are they". Collective identity represents the identity of certain groups towards an individual can declare his affinity. Referring to relations between different collective identities, the author talk about different level of loyalties stronger than others where national identity has somehow a primacy on other identities<sup>17</sup>. Referring to European identity today, a civic, cultural concept or rather instrumental, the author consider that civic identity is the identity of EU citizens of European Union, while Cultural identity applies to Europe as a whole, a continent of shared civilisations. European instrumental identity is a pragmatic identity, a calculation based on the benefits that attachment to EU could bring<sup>18</sup>. In what concerns the problem of media implications in the Europeanisation process, media can both support or obstruct European integration process. The authors analyse the European integration process reflected in 6626 articles from Romanian press. From the published articles, the European issues represents only 12.9%. According to the authors the European topics were more debated by the readers than other topics. Among the European actors present in the press, we remark Jose-Manuel Barosso, president of European Commission and present Europarlamentarians. There are three categories of actors: national actors, European actors and non-EU European actors. The frames utilised by the press in order to define European issues were: „economic consequences frame”, „responsibility frame”, „conflict frame”, „human interest frame”, „civic European identity frame”, „instrumental European identity frame”, „cultural European identity frame”<sup>19</sup>. In what concerns qualitative analysis of the press, the authors want to show the transition of EU subjects from media to citizens and the forging of a European identity, by taking 20 interviews with Romanian students. According to the interviews, it seems that students are interested in European issues and are concerned with Romania's evolution as a member state, they use Internet as a source of Information for the European issues and only 2 students rely on TV<sup>20</sup>. The majority of students considered that the subject of European identity as media topic is not approached almost at all. The support for Europeanisation and for the European identity is poor among the students. The students seems pessimist to the idea of existence of a European identity of Romanians, but that the concept can be developed in the future considered most of the students. Thus „The majority of the interviewed students (16 out of 20) seem to rather experience a feeling of Europeanness than to really assume a common European identity”<sup>21</sup>. In the opinion of the authors there is no such thing as common European identity. In the part of conclusions, the authors sum up that their paper is based on quantitative and qualitative research. European issues,

<sup>15</sup> Oana Ștefăniță et al., „EU – from Media to Citizens. Building the European Identity,” in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 118.

conclude the authors, seem to have a low visibility, below the European average that can be explained by the fact that mass media miss a crucial aspect that is „to make the citizens aware of the way the European decisions influence their lives and also of the fact that they themselves can influence these decisions”<sup>22</sup>.

Also, in the same section two, it is published the paper of Alaaddin F. Paksoy entitled *Turkey and the Issue of European Identity: An Analysis on the Media Representation of Turkey’s EU Bid within the Borders of Religion and Culture*<sup>23</sup>. Turkey has an interesting position on the globe that was not always on its favour. For more than 50 years, Turkey tries to become a EU member<sup>24</sup>. Negotiations for full membership were started in 2005. The author refers to the Copenhagen criteria that contain no reference to Christianity but still the door to EU was not opened for Turkey. The author quotes Gerard Delanty that says that the door of EU can be opened for Turkey and that „modern Turkey is a combination of the Ottoman heritage and westernization”<sup>25</sup>. The author also focuses, in the chapter *The Studies on Media, Culture and Religion in the Context of Turkey – EU Relations*, on the fact that in Turkey national media is more important than European media, and UK has a strong influence on Turkish media. In Paksoy’s opinion it can be claimed that religious and cultural difference is the reason of Turkey’s rejection from the concert of European powers, and this situation is reflected by European Media. According to Paksoy, in British media Turkey is labelled as a country of „Muslims” according to the dominant religion in Turkey (77.6%). In the part of conclusions Paksoy states that the character of „Muslim” seems to separate Turkey from European culture, and considers that historical disputes and battles that opposed and Turkish and European Civilisation in its times of building the unity of Europe as a continent in medieval and European epoch could not be deleted from European memory and this negative remembrance hardened the Turkey’s accession negotiations<sup>26</sup>.

In the article *“This Is Not about Europe!” The Absence of EU – Related Topics on the Agendas of Recent Romanian and Turkish Protests*, elaborated by Corina Daba-Buzoianu, Gülgün Erdogan Tosun, and Huriye Toker<sup>27</sup>, the authors consider that the European crisis imposed the stringent problem of European identity, putting under question mark the idea of European integration. In 2012 in Romania and in 2013 in Turkey took place protests and demonstrations generating a public sphere where the critical problems of their lives were debated<sup>28</sup>. These street protest, show the authors, had the role of deliberations in the public sphere. After trying to define what means the concept of public debate in the public sphere, considering it as the only one that gives legitimacy to the power, the authors put the problem of identity as they consider it a

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 122.

<sup>23</sup> Alaaddin F. Paksoy, „Turkey and the Issue of European Identity: An Analysis on the Media Representation of Turkey’s EU Bid within the Borders of Religion and Culture,” in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 134.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 147.

<sup>27</sup> Corina Daba-Buzoianu et al., „“This Is Not about Europe!” The Absence of EU – Related Topics on the Agendas of Recent Romanian and Turkish Protests,” in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 155.

precondition for the emergence of a public sphere<sup>29</sup>. In the next chapter of their work authors offer a few general considerations of the protests in Romania and Turkey, and describe Romania a country where street protests often take place, taking often the form of civil disobedience. By opposition, in Turkey, in 2013 over 2.5 million Turks have demonstrated in over 79 Turkish cities<sup>30</sup>. The authors try to establish a research methodology in order to examine the particularities of Romanian and Turkish protests by analysing the most important newspapers in Romania and Turkey. Thus, the protesters enjoyed a large visibility in the press both in Romania and in Turkey, and authors reveal themes in the 2012 Romanian protests and themes in the 2013 Turkish protests. Issues like political corruption, state of economy, Romanians seemed to have a large visibility in the Romanian press. In Turkey predominant were the issues of human rights/freedom of expression, economy and environment<sup>31</sup>. The authors conclude that these protests constituted themselves in voluntary civilian resistance movements and were a success in terms of social solidarity. Both social protests from Romania and Turkey show that the authors abandoned the initial themes of debate and addressed new ones. EU issues were not so addressed as the national ones.

Section three of the volume edited by Loredana Radu, Alina Bârgăoanu, and Nicoleta Corbu has the title *Perspectives on European Citizenship* and begins with the article of Hendrik-Jan Rebel with the title *European Citizenship. Whence and Whither?*<sup>32</sup>. The author start with an introduction to the meaning of European citizenship: “Citizenship will be understood as comprising both individual citizens as well as the so – called ‘corporate citizens’, meaning interest groups from profit and non - profit origin”. Then Rebel allocates a chapter to society at large connected through communication, and starts by using two approaches, one of the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, and the second belonging to the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells. In the end of his study, in the chapter *European Citizenship. Whence and Whither?*, the author asserts that European Union is regarded by EU citizens as a “black box” and they don’t know how the European Union functions<sup>33</sup>. In the article of Józef Niżnik, *European Citizenship and the Cultural*

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 156.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 160.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 164-165.

<sup>32</sup> Hendrik-Jan Rebel, „European Citizenship. Whence and Whither?,” in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

<sup>33</sup> Apart from the skepticism of Hendrik-Jan Rebel, Cristina-Maria Dogot, in the article *How Permeable or Impermeable Could Be the Borders? – Introduction*, in *Eurolimes 13, Permeability and Impermeability of Socio-Economic Frontiers within European Union*, ed. Violaine Delteil et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2012), 5, shows her confidence that European borders are permeable and in the success of European project of the European Union: „The continuous evolution of the European unity process allowed one of the most important results of this unique economic, social and political experience that is now the European Union, a result that consists in the more and more increasing permeability of the national frontiers. Year after year the process of the opening of the national borders represented the basis of an increasing movement of economic goods, capital and, in the end, of different European citizens. Hence, the Europe of the post-communist period, especially the last decade Europe, was a more opened and a more dynamic one, both from the economic and social perspective. The economic and the social side of the European dynamism influence each other, and together they exert a fluctuating influence on national decision-making processes”. Also referring to the permeability of borders between Romania and Hungary, both countries belonging to European Union, Constantin Țoca, in the book review *Cross-border Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe*, in *Eurolimes 14, Enlargement, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities*, ed. Ariane Landuyt et al.

*Policy of the EU*<sup>34</sup> in the first chapter it is shown the unstable attitudes of citizens towards the EU. The recent crises of EU generated Euro-scepticism. In the opinion of Nižnik there is a complexity of citizens' identity the authors considering that "identity is a personal experience which answers the questions "who am I" and "who are we"? ". When talking about "European identity" the author distinguish between "Europeans" and "identity of Europe". Talking about identity, Nižnik considers that "Various studies on European identity point out that a majority of EU citizens perceive themselves above all as member of their own ethnic group, nation, or nation-state"<sup>35</sup>. In the chapter *Towards the Axiological Dimension of Post-national Citizenship?*, the author shows that European citizenship is an identity-building instrument. The author concludes the necessity that the European culture has yet to be put to work in favour of European citizenship, and author quotes the work of Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* that did not distinct a culture such as European culture. Europeans, concludes the author, are more aware of their cultural affinities than their differences. Nižnik tries too to answer to the question why national sentiments cannot be overcome and replaced by unity<sup>36</sup>, but in the last chapter of his paper, he raises the question on how to understand EU's cultural policy. Hence, in the opinion of Nižnik, culture creates the very basis of group identity, and national ingredients can add value to European culture.

Section four of the present book is entitled *Perspectives on European Solidarity*. Alina Bârgăoanu and Flavia Durach present the paper *Nothing Bad Could Come Out from the EU? An Analysis of Euroenthusiasm among Young Romanian Students*<sup>37</sup> while Alina-Daniela Mihalcea, Rodica Maria Săvulescu, and Alexandra Vițelar present the paper *Y So Pessimistic? How Generation Y Sees the European Project*<sup>38</sup> and Loredana Radu and Elena Negrea-Busuioac present the paper *Solidarity as a Shared Value in the European Union*<sup>39</sup>. In the first paper Alina Bârgăoanu și Flavia Durach start their presentation by talking about European crisis that started in Greece and soon spread in Eurozone. The crisis had at least two consequences show the authors. Firstly it represents a test for EU. Secondly it is a crisis that divided the public opinion. The crisis, thirdly, divided European nations into creditor and debtor nations, nationalism and individualism continuing to rise. The authors show that the euro crisis is no an ordinary crisis, and it put in question the

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(Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2012), 192, talks about the Hungarian-Romanian project entitled „Cross-border Agglomeration Debrecen-Oradea” that started in 2007 and that presupposed sociological research in the field of cross-border cooperation between the Romanian city of Oradea and Hungarian city of Debrecen that presupposed even the creation of a Euro metropolis in this zone.

<sup>34</sup> Józef Nižnik, "European Citizenship and the Cultural Policy of the EU," in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 206.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 215.

<sup>37</sup> Alina Bârgăoanu and Flavia Durach, „Nothing Bad Could Come Out from the EU? An Analysis of Euroenthusiasm among Young Romanian Students,” in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

<sup>38</sup> Alina-Daniela Mihalcea et al., „Y So Pessimistic? How Generation Y Sees the European Project,” in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

<sup>39</sup> Loredana Radu and Elena Negrea-Busuioac, „Solidarity as a Shared Value in the European Union,” in *The Crisis of the European Union. Identity, Citizenship, and Solidarity Reassessed*, ed. Loredana Radu et al. (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro), 2013.

very existence of EU, by imposing questions such as why EU exists, which is EU *raison d'être*?<sup>40</sup>. In the chapter *Solidarity – On the Road to Extinction?* authors consider that the crisis brought forward differences and discrepancies that were not revealed before. In the time when solidarity is needed for the purpose to have a monetary union show the authors, the concept of solidarity is shaken by the current crisis. In the opinion of the authors solidarity is impossible to achieve because of the confrontation between liberal vision and socialist one<sup>41</sup>. When values are shaken, show the authors, it comes up the problem of leadership, which belongs today to Germany for demographic and economic reasons, even with the risk of critics for imposing austerity model in all Europe. The authors quote Ulrich Beck that called Germany an “accidental empire”<sup>42</sup>, becoming a very important state on the map of Europe. Then the authors define their research project they had in mind for this paper:” Our research project aims to investigate the existence of Eurosceptic feelings at the level of the public opinion in Romania, in the particular context of the economic crisis”<sup>43</sup>. For achieving their project the authors focus on four research questions: 1. „*What is the level of Euroscepticism among young people in Romania, in the context of the economic crisis?*” 2. “*What is the influence of the economic and financial crisis on the attitudes and perceptions of the young people in what the EU is concerned?*” 3. „*What is the influence of the political and economic situation in Romania on the attitudes and perceptions of the young people towards the EU?*” 4. „*How do young people imagine the future of the EU on the short term and on the long term?*”<sup>44</sup>. The target group is formed from students that live and study in Bucharest. Another objective of the research was “to identify Romanian young students’ attitudes towards the EU, with three main possibilities: radical opposition to the EU and European integration; disappointment with the current design of the EU; and, mild, passive, Euroenthusiasm”<sup>45</sup>. In the part of conclusions, the authors conclude that the crisis evolved from Greece, labelled as “the sick man of Europe” to European Union that became also “the sick man of Europe”. Alina-Daniela Mihalcea, Rodica Maria Săvulescu, and Alexandra Vițelar in the work *Y So Pessimistic? How Generation Y Sees the European Project*, the authors start with a brief introduction saying that the crisis of 2008 put under question mark the entire “European project”<sup>46</sup>. The attitudes towards EU can be optimistic and pessimistic, assert the authors that try to define generation Y attitude when it comes to European project. In the opinion of the authors, young people are the most important capital of the European Union<sup>47</sup>. In this chapter, the authors want to present the European Youth and his attitude as he is presented in the existing literature. There is a sort of similarity encountered at young people (“generation Y”), reflected in attitudes, norms and behaviours given by globalisation and digitalisation. In the chapter, *We Love Europe as Long As It Gives Us What We Need*, the authors consider that this is the attitude of young generation towards Europe. In their opinion the relation of generation Y is a relation of type cost-benefits. In the chapter *We Share a Common European Culture/Identity if It Suits Us*, the authors underline that the cultural and identity-based is of special interest for researchers. European cultural identity can be based on the concept of unity, diversity and unity in

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<sup>40</sup> Bârgăoanu and Durach, 227.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 231.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 248.

<sup>46</sup> Mihalcea et al.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 257.

diversity<sup>48</sup>. In the part of conclusion, the authors consider that the attitude of young generation towards Europe is decisive in what concerns the European project<sup>49</sup>. European Union' peoples, in the same time, must act like *as a nation*. Last but not least, the last section of this book, presents one more paper written by Loredana Radu and Elena Negrea-Busuioc, *Solidarity as a Shared Value in the European Union*<sup>50</sup>. The authors raise the question *What Solidarity Means?* A term that finds its origins in the difference between “mechanical solidarity” and “organic solidarity” that is reflected by the vision of sociologist Emile Durkheim. Then, the authors try to define what is solidarity in the EU<sup>51</sup>, trying to see if there is a clear-cut distinction between Eastern and Southern Regions and the rest of the continent. Hence, authors considering that EU is an artificial construction built as a result of the geopolitics in Europe after the Second World War, it become necessary to create *de facto* solidarity in Europe. The authors brought forward the question of *Values shared by Europeans: people and official's assessment of solidarity in the EU*. Some respondents have to answer to the question which values are more characteristic for Europe. They mention peace, democracy and human rights. In the part of conclusion, the authors think that the last crisis had shown the limits of the European states' solidarity.

The present volume reveals interesting points of views and European issues in the context of European crisis showing the limits of European integration process, but also suggests solutions for the future.

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<sup>48</sup> Mihalcea et al., 268.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 282.

<sup>50</sup> Radu and Negrea-Busuioc.

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# DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*Dana BLAGA*

**Review of:** Mircea Brie, *Diplomacy and International Relations in Europe (17<sup>th</sup> –18<sup>th</sup> centuries)*, Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken, 2014, ISBN: 978-8484-8999-2, 244 p.

Methodology, contents, varied documentation sources, and stylistic / language component are at least four reasons that make this book remarkable. History plays its role in the formation/education of students; this book makes an easy read because of the way it is constructed. The explanations are comprehensive, everything is put in context, the arguments are round. The author's merit is with the idea and the subject of interest for students and researchers in the area of International Relations and/or History and Humanities-related fields, and with his knowledge to use historical and sociological data and theories in order to explain the particular event or concept.

Diplomatic relations between states and the shape of the states themselves did not embody the same existence, the same substance or the same structure. They are the result of historical evolution.


International relations, European diplomacy, the evolution of negotiation practices, the diplomatic, political or economic-military preponderance, the emergence or the balance of power, abuse of power or the control exerted by the *European Concert* are just some of the topics addressed in this work. The way the author approaches all these issues has a focus on diplomacy and the period of time is structured around the idea of the French Revolution, colonial conflicts and the great conflagrations that happened in Europe due to the ambitions of kings and emperors, in a nutshell an old continent with new ideas and old monarchies.

Mircea Brie structures his work in three main parts and one concluding argument:

## **European Diplomacy - Concepts, Structures and Trends in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries**

This first part could always be read as a very generous introduction that places the subject matter in the wider context. Concepts are defined, the backdrop of the century is explained, readers discover what we call nowadays *trivia* about negotiations, diplomatic networks, rulers, ambassadors of the time.

Most 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries rulers paid attention to war actions. They invested a lot of resources in challenging, maintaining and ending armed conflicts. In order to manage avoiding such conflicts and particularly avoiding missing “any detail” of the conflict, European rulers granted an ever increasing importance to diplomacy. At the beginning of the epoch, diplomatic attempts were still modest, as they were based on other practices rather than modern diplomacy. Yet in time, we can notice that negotiations, good relations with partners – whoever they were – became more specialised and diverse. We could undoubtedly say that modern diplomacy was in tight connection with economic



development and bourgeois revolution. When economic interests came to the foreground, politicians began to be more careful with “the others”.(Bély, 2000: 55) More often than not, the State was “compelled” from the inside to revise its attitude towards the European partners. From that moment on, a small step had to be taken for the establishment of modern and specialised diplomacy. We have to admit that the step was smaller or bigger depending on the abilities and interests of each European state. (Brie, 2014: 48)

### **Diplomacy and International Relations the 17<sup>th</sup> Century**

In all European states, the ruler and their council appointed for this mission were in charge with external policy. They had a regular administrative body subordinated to either a minister or a state secretary to put into practice their political will (Balard, Bercé, Molinier, Péronnet, 1984: 33). Besides this structure, each European state had its own manner of organising the “diplomatic” system. Obviously, we cannot yet speak of a clearvoyance in the field at the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Naturally, the diplomatic system had its origins in the need for communication and collaboration, as well as the need to get to know one another. (Béranger, 1991: 57)

The author shed light on negotiation practices used at the time. Brie demonstrates that although the 17<sup>th</sup> century is known as a century of war in the history of Europe, we can say that it was a time of intense negotiations. Since most European states were ruled by dynasties, they were dominated by the ruler in point of diplomatic decisions. Monarchic alliances were often the best diplomatic “practices”. International decisions were made based on the principle that the royal family had the capacity and will to settle the political-diplomatic international position of the state with the support of a low number of ministries and counsellors. Practically, in most cases the ministries and counsellors were engaged in diplomatic actions beyond the understanding or will of the ruler. (Maubert de Gouvest, 1968: 427)

### **The Domination of the English Diplomacy**

In early 18<sup>th</sup> century, an indisputable reality was the restructuring of the European diplomacy. It is true that such “restructuring” was actually a first outline of a coherent structure in the system of relations between European states (Thompson, Padover, 1937 : 112). Ministries and state secretariats meant to supervise the relations with other states were established first in most Western European states. People involved in this activity enriched their experience in time and specialised in different fields of diplomacy. More and more often, the idea of “European balance” could be heard in European embassies. The idea of such a balance became more obvious once new powers came to the foreground in Europe. They also spoke of a need for “balance” to be respected by all states in their relations with both new and old powers, as the latter still expressed hegemonic trends.

England became a more and more pragmatic state. Led by a bourgeoisie aware of its interests, England was the European solution in the 18th century. Interested in continental peace and the balance between the great powers, the English were concerned with conquests on the sea and world markets. (Brie, 2014: 150)

### **Final Considerations**

This part is read as a *sum it up* chapter, as Brie summarizes the 2 centuries in terms of policies, main ideas and directions, explaining who’s who and why. From the Peace of Westphalia all the way to Bismarck, the historical and diplomatic events are related in such a manner that we can speak about a narration and not merely a presentation.

The author uses an impressive variety of sources with precision to work details into a rendition of a long-time gone society that still impregnates into the nowadays international society and diplomacy. There is a wide range of perspectives which is not often found in historical works.

The book is highly recommended to anyone at all interested in the subject. Because of the round approach and presentation of arguments this book could help students at undergraduate and graduate levels as main or supplementary reading as well as any scholar or researcher interested in the history of international relations. Because of the multiple perspectives, this book will be a gratifying read for specialists and non-specialists alike.

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# AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE SOCIETAL APPROACH

*Daniela BLAGA\**

**Review of:** *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach*, Barry BUZAN, Cambridge Polity Press, 2014, ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-5314-3


Barry Buzan is widely recognized as being one of the most prominent figures in international relations nowadays. Buzan emerged from the the contemporary English School and his contribution to the international society tradition ranges from the study of the evolution of the international system (Buzan, 2015) to the study of the contemporary international society (Buzan, 2004) to the study of international society at the regional level (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2014) to the linking of the English School theory of international relations to the study of international security. (Buzan, 2010)

Buzan's *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations* could be used as a teaching text for both the beginners in the study of international relations theory, and the more advanced theorist or practitioner who would need a detailed listing of distinctive key concepts and ideas, broken down and explained to the tee. The book does not introduce new concepts and arguments; it presents specific main trends, identifies places where further work is deemed necessary. As Buzan himself has put it in the introductory part, the aim of the book is to make sense of the existing literature rather than to try to extend it.

As we have stated above, the book addresses more than one audience. The book is divided into three parts so that readers with different degrees of familiarity with the subject would be able to comprehend the subject matter. The first part provides a comprehensive guide to the English School's approach to international society and it provides context. This is particularly useful for the undergraduate and graduate students, or, in general, to those with none or some information about the theory of international relations. More context is offered in the second part and finally, the third part, for those already very familiar with the English School (junior research), will provide new vantage points and pondering questions.

## Concepts and Methods

The three chapters in Part I provide a general overview of the English School's history (Chapter 1), its main ideas, concepts and distinctions (Chapter 2), its methodology and place within the field of International Relations theory (Chapter 3). A special attention is paid to the three fundamental concepts of the English School, i.e. international system,



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international society and world society, together with the distinctions and relations among them. Two main points are evident in these chapters: first, the English School is a well-established approach to the study of international relations, and second, that unlike theories such as realism, liberalism and constructivism (theories that claim an angle of analysis of the subject), the English School provides a way of approaching the subject as a whole.

### **A diachronic approach of the English School of International Relations**

Part II gives a bird's eye view on the work of the English school taking into account its development and structure over the epochs. Buzan demonstrates how the English School's societal approach gives the backdrop for the study of international relations and world history in terms of the social structures of international orders. Not to steer away from scholars like Martin Wight or Hedley Bull, Barry Buzan aligns with the general guidelines of the English School which, although uses history to give foundation to theories, does not see history as a means of prediction or explanation. History is used only to speculate about present and mostly future events. We are provided with explanations regarding the past from the traditional diplomatic approaches.

Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the place of international society in world history. The focus is on the two major English School fronts of ideas: Martin Wight (Wight, 1977) and Adam Watson (Watson, 1992) on the one hand, and Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Bull, and Watson, 1984) on the other hand. The first front provides a comparison between different international societies evolving in in different times and places. With forms other than the Westphalian one. The second front agrees that the European society of states has expanded almost like an empire.

Institutions give a view of the international society as a form of social structure, that is any given international society can be defined in terms of the set of primary institutions that compose it, says Buzan. Moreover, the rise, the evolution and sometimes the obsolescence of primary institutions can be used to frame a historical account of how international societies evolve. This approach can also be applied to differentiate regional international societies both from each other and from the global level. Moreover, a typology of international societies can be established. Buzan argues that such a social structural approach dissolves the necessity for a concept of international system by folding all into types of international societies.

### **The normative side of the English School of International Relations**

In Part III, Buzan explores the normative side of the English School through an in-depth account and analysis of orientations towards order and justice and their evolutionary role played in the contemporary international society. As Buzan notes, English School's normative structure is a key feature distinguishing it from realism and constructivism.

The four chapters in this part address both theoretical and historical perspectives of pluralism and solidarism. Buzan makes an in-depth literature review. Chapter 6 examines the pluralist position (Jackson, 2002), while Chapter 7 interrogates the pluralist position in terms of a "distinctive set of primary institutions" (Bull, 1977). The international society is highly dynamic; this means that old institutions die, new ones arise, and many if not all are transformed by the ever changing international practices.

The discussion the presence of the international law in the larger realm of international relations. Should the international law include natural law as well, or is it redundant to mention it nowadays because of its intricacy? There is great talk about human rights (Vincent, 1986) and humanitarian intervention. (Wheeler, 2000) According to Buzan, the states or the people issue can be regarded two-fold, either as the rights of

states versus the rights of people or as shared (common) norms, rules, practices and institutions within interstate societies.

Institutions have taken over from war and the balance of power. It is now the institution which dictates and regulates the international society. As Buzan notes, different from before, people are connected through mass media and the internet and get emotionally involved in international matters relating to human rights matters. People are equal, they have equal chances and yet, the global economy dictates terms that eventually drive a dent in societies. Nationalism, free market, oligopolies are shared practices and this is precisely how we moved from an international society to a world society.

### **Ongoing Debates and Emergent Agendas**

The final chapter addresses, as it is obvious from the title, the ongoing debates and how the English School's research program tackles them. Traditional debates regarding the distinction between system and society, the ever going expansion of international society, the English School's methods, these are subjects that will continue to attract the attention of English School scholars. Buzan argues that it is high time the English School paid more attention to the link between international society and international security. He even offers three pondering issues: first, what are the security consequences for insiders of being included within the particular set of primary institutions that defines any international society? Second, what are the security consequences for outsiders of being excluded from international society? Third, can international society itself become a referent object of security?

### **To sum it up**

Barry Buzan provides us with another piece of food for thought. The range that this book addresses is extensive, from familiarizing students with the ideas, concepts, methods and debates of the English School all the way to offering pondering ground for scholars of various degrees of involvement in the subject. The English School has a different stand than the American School and Buzan, with his writing talent and clarity of ideas delivers a book that is as enjoyable to read as it is current and well-documented.

Because of the round approach and presentation of arguments this book could help students at undergraduate and graduate levels as main or supplementary reading as well as any scholar or researcher interested in the theory of international relations (with current, emerging agendas) viewed through the lens of the English School.

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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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